ATCCT — Références

Textes chinois traduits

Chu Hsi and Lü Tsu Ch’ien (compilers) Chin-ssu lu, Reflections on things at hand. The Neo-Confucian anthology. Trans. Wing Tsit Chan. New York / London : Columbia University Press, 1967.

Confucius, An. = Analectes. An online pedagogical translation. Trans. R. Eno (2015).

Mencius_LAU = Mencius. Trans. D. C. Lau. (New York: Penguin Classics) (1970 / 2004).

Mencius_ENO = Mencius. An online teaching translation. Trans. R. Eno (2016).

Qu li, I, Summary of the Rules of Propriety, Part 1. In Liji, The Classic of Rites. Trans. J. Legge.
Cité d’après China Text Project.

Xunzi = Xunzi -The complete text. Trans. E. L. Hutton. (Princeton, Oxford: Princeton University Press) (2014).

Chuang Tzu, The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu. Trans. B. Watson (1964)

***

(W) = Wikipedia
(Ck) = China Knowledge

Aristote. Rhétorique. Traduit par J. H. Freese. (Londres: William Heinemann & New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons) 1926.

Bloom, Allan. (1968). Preface to [his] trans. of Plato’s Republic (Basic Books / Harper & Collins)

Casacchia, Giorgio 1989. Les débuts de la tradition linguistique chinoise et l’âge d’or de la linguistique impériale. Dans Auroux, S. [dir.], Histoire des idées linguistiques, T.1 (pp. 431-448). (Liége : Mardaga)

Graham, Arthur C. (1989). Disputers of the Tao. Philosophical Argument in Ancient China (La Salle, Ill.: Open Court)

Khallâf ‘A.(1997). Les fondements du droit musulman. Trad. de l’arabe (1942). (Paris : Al Qalam).

Lau, Dim Cheuk. (1963 / 2004). On Mencius’ Use of the Method of Analogy in Argument. In Mencius. Trans. Lau. (New York: Penguin Classics) pp. 200-229 (Reprint 1970 / 2004).

Leslie, Donald. (1964). Argument by contradiction in pre-buddhist Chinese reasoning. Occasional paper 4. Center of Oriental Studies (Canberra: Australian National University)

Perelman, Chaim & Olbrechts-Tyteca, Lucie. (1958) Traité de l’argumentation – La nouvelle rhétorique. (Bruxelles : Université de Bruxelles).

Plantin, Christian. (2005) “Essai d’argumentation comparée : Sur l’argumentation théologico-juridique en islam”. Dans L’argumentation : Histoire, théories, perspectives, chap. 7 (Paris : PUF)

Plantin, Christian, (2016) Dictionnaire de l’argumentation (Lyon : ENS Éditions).
En ligne : Dictionnaire de l’argumentation – Dictionary of Argumentation, (2022)

Sen, Amartya. (2006). The Argumentative Indian. (Allen Lane / Penguin Books)

Toulmin, Stephen E. (1958). The Uses of argument. (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press)

Textes chinois traduits

Chu Hsi and Lü Tsu Ch’ien (compilers) Chin-ssu lu, Reflections on things at hand. The Neo-Confucian anthology. Trans. Wing Tsit Chan. (New York / London : Columbia University Press) 1967

Confucius, An. = Analectes. An online pedagogical translation. Trans. R. Eno (2015).

Mencius_LAU = Mencius. Trans. D. C. Lau. (New York: Penguin Classics) (1970 / 2004).

Mencius_ENO = Mencius. An online teaching translation. Trans. R. Eno (2016).

Qu li, I, Summary of the Rules of Propriety, Part 1. In Liji, The Classic of Rites. Trans. J. Legge.
Cité d’après China Text Project.

Xunzi = Xunzi -The complete text. Trans. E. L. Hutton. (Princeton, Oxford: Princeton University Press) (2014).

Chuang Tzu, The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu. Trans. B. Watson (1964)

Raisonner sans théorie du raisonnement

Cela conduit à s’interroger sur l’universalité des concepts utilisés dans la théorie de l’argumentation. Le degré d’universalité d’un phénomène argumentatif n’est pas déterminé par des considérations a priori, mais est un fait empirique qui peut être déduit en collectant des données qui 1) proviennent d’une variété de langues et de cultures 2) peuvent être clairement rattachées à un même concept. Par exemple, étant donné que des occurrences du modèle d’argumentation a fortiori peuvent être trouvées dans la culture juive, la culture arabo-musulmane, la culture occidentale et la culture chinoise, on peut en déduire que l’argument fortiori a un degré élevé d’universalité. La question est cruciale en ce qui concerne le syllogisme. Parlant des Moïstes, Graham écrit (1989, p. 168)

Although well aware of the difficulties of relating names to objects in the art of discourse, [the Moist] seems to see the lucid and self-evident relations between names as raising no theoretical problems. Chinese civilization never abstracted the forms in which we observe it reasoning in practice, as in this curiously familiar-sounding syllogism of Wang Ch’ung

Man is a thing: though honored as king or noble, by nature he is no different from other things. No thing does not die, how can man be immortal?[1]

Wang Ch’ung utilise un syllogisme valide, qui combine des propositions vraies pour arriver à une conclusion correcte : « Les humains sont des êtres, aucun être n’est immortel, donc aucun humain n’est immortel. » Dans le langage rébarbatif de la logique traditionnelle, ce raisonnement est décrit comme un syllogisme de la quatrième figure, dit galénique, et sur le mode camenes :

tout H est T aucun T n’est I donc aucun H n’est I.

Wang Ch’ung présente cette conclusion incontestable sous la forme d’une question dite « rhétorique », qui est un défi lancé à tout adversaire (Toulmin, 1958, p. 97) ; cela introduit un mouvement dialectique au sein du raisonnement syllogistique.

Graham attribue aux disciples de Mozi[2] « un sens de la preuve rigoureuse [combiné à] un mépris pour les formes logiques » (1989, p. 169). Une analogie peut être faite avec le langage et la grammaire. Selon les spécialistes, les Chinois anciens n’avaient pas de grammaire[3] et ils parlaient certainement un excellent chinois. De même, ils n’ont pas développé de logique (art du raisonnement), et ils argumentaient très bien. En d’autres termes, il n’est pas nécessaire d’avoir une théorie logique de ce qu’est un argument logiquement bien construit et reposant sur des prémisses vraies pour maîtriser une pratique efficace de l’argumentation.

Admettons que cette conclusion puisse (a fortiori ?) être généralisée aux formes d’argumentation non syllogistiques. Une théorie de l’argumentation n’est pas une condition préalable à une pratique efficace de l’argumentation. On peut développer une idée claire et une pratique critique efficace de l’argumentation sans formalisation, c’est-à-dire sans développer un métalangage logique sur le processus d’argumentation et les opérations critiques corrélatives.

Il s’ensuit que l’enseignement de l’argumentation peut se passer de théorie de l’argumentation. Les théories de l’argumentation de type occidental ne sont pas essentielles à l’articulation cohérente des idées. L’argumentation peut être enseignée en montrant et en discutant des exemples paradigmatiques d’arguments et d’argumentation. Ces exemples peuvent être paraphrasés, niés, contredits, généralisés, leurs présupposés et implications peuvent être explorés sans jamais sortir des usages naturels du discours naturel.

On peut avoir une pratique acérée de la critique des arguments sans formaliser ni l’argument ni l’opération critique.

Il n’en reste pas moins qu’il existe des moyens de pratiquer, voire d’enseigner l’argumentation sans théorie de l’argumentation. En d’autres termes, les théories de l’argumentation ne sont pas indispensables pour clarifier les idées et les exprimer en déductions concluantes.

_______________

[1] Wang Chu’ng = Wang Chong, Lun Heng — Philosophical Essays, ch.24; trad. Forke V,I, 335f. (Note Graham). Wang Chong, 27 – c. 97 AD, « developed a rational, secular, naturalistic and mechanistic view of the world and man, and gave a materialistic explanation of the origin of the universe » (Wikipedia).

[2] Mozi (c. 479 – c. 392 av. J.-C.), auteur éponyme de l’ouvrage Mozi.

[3] « Dans la Chine ancienne, quelques siècles avant l’ère chrétienne, la réflexion linguistique avait déjà commencé à produire d’excellents résultats ; nous trouvons d’importantes réflexions sur la nature du langage, des dictionnaires très élaborés, des systèmes de description phonologique et de dialectologie. Cependant, […] l’analyse des structures grammaticales est pratiquement absente. En dehors d’une énorme production d’études sur des mots isolés ou des groupes de mots, il n’y a presque rien sur la description organique de la langue. » (Casacchia, 1989, p. 431).

Argument of the name

Categorization – Nomination – Definition
Classification – Syllogism

Proper names have their specifc argumentative resources. The following description applies to common names; the best designation here would be “full words”.

By naming concrete or abstract beings, we attach them to a name, the definition of that name, and the category corresponding to this definition.

The category associated with the definition of a name groups beings on the basis of the specific characteristics of their member, and-or their similarities with the other members of the category, and-or their resemblance to an exemplary member of this category.

An Aristotelian classification consists in a combination of more or less general categories and sub-categories, typically under the format of a « Porphyrian tree”.
Jorge Borges famous Chinese classification is fictional..

Syllogistic reasoning (“set theory” reasoning) is the most powerful argument scheme exploiting the cognitive resources of a well-done classification

A, B, C are M; some M are X
=> some X are M
=> M are or A or a B or a C

A syllogism is  evaluated as valid or invalid (“paralogism”) through a specific set of rules (“rules of syllogism”, or, preferably through the Venn diagrams method.

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The classification method that is, naming – defining -systematically categorizing things, is considered by Claude Levi-Strauss as  « the science of the concrete, » [‘la science du concret”] as « the” fundamental science shared by all human beings (1962], ch. 1).

Following Levi-Strauss, we argue that naming – defining – categorizing – classifying a being is the fundamental, universal, most discreet productive and efficient, argumentative operation.
We will call it the argument of the name.  *
Example will be found in the quoted entries, as well as in the pair a pari argument / argument from the opposite term.

(*) not to be confused with the use of the same expression in computing.

***

The argument of the name necessarily functions in  Chinese language, all languages having « full words », that is a lexicon where speakers find the necessary resources to categorize and designate beings, events, circumstances…
So, the argument of the name must be considered as a linguistic-cognitive universal, an expression of « subjectivity in language” in action (Benveniste, (1963), p. 259-250).

Benveniste, 1963 / [1958], De la subjectivité dans le langage. In Problèmes de linguistique générale. Paris, Gallimard. p. 258-266

Argumentation Schemes and Means of Persuasion

Toulmin, Rieke, Janik distinguish nine forms of argumentation, «most frequently to be met with in practical situations” (1984, p. 147-155),

Analogy                                     Dilemma                             Generalization
Classification                           Sign                                        Opposites
Cause                                        Degree[1]                             Authority

[1] In the argument from degree, « The different properties of a given thing are presumed to vary in step with one another » (id., p. 155).

Levi (1992) considers that the essential rhetorical means of persuasion used in Chinese are

Metaphor                                    Analogy
Example                                      Quoting an authority.

Quoting an authority comes with the argument from authority. Metaphor comes with the argument from analogy; Analogy and authority are  common to both lists.

Examples are associated with a number of argumentative operations. They are associated with any law, according to the type / occurrence principle; they are powerful instruments of refutation. Generalizations are based on one or more cases or examples. A paradigmatic example has the value of a general law. Precedents are memorable examples that function as rules. In addition, examples function as crucial cases that, which can disprove a proposed law or generalization (The N are blue – Yes, but that one is red)[2]). As anecdotes, examples can have the most persuasive power in everyday argumentation; when they involve the speaker’s credibility, they are conversationally untouchable, armored against rebuttal: any tentative refutation becomes a personal attack and ruins the conversation.

In what follows, we suggest some  passages from classical Chinese texts as instances of some of these argument schemes.

[2] Dans le langage ordinaire, le contre-exemple correspond à une exception : C’est vrai, mais…

Empirical universals

This leads to the hypothesis of universals in argumentation theory. The degree of universality of an argumentative phenomenon is not determined by a priori considerations, but is an empirical fact that can be inferred by collecting data that 1) come from a variety of languages and cultures 2) can be clearly assigned to the same concept.

For example, since occurrences of the a fortiori argument pattern can be found in Jewish culture, Arab-Muslim culture, Western culture, and Chinese culture (see infra), it can be inferred that a fortiori has a high degree of universality.

Auteurs, Événements, Personnages …

Confucius

Deng Xi

Gaotzi

Gongsun Long

Mencius

Mozi

Lu Buwei

Zhuangzi

Une analyse de deux traductions d’une analogie

Cet exemple est tiré de la discussion de Mencius[2] avec Gaozi (Kao Tzu)[3] telle qu’elle est rapportée dans le texte de Mengzi. La discussion porte sur deux concepts fondamentaux du confucianisme, human nature, righteousness,morality. Gaozi tente de les éclairer par une analogie avec le saule, dont on fait des tasses et des bols. Mencius rejette vivement cette analogie, qu’il estime inadéquate.

Nous nous bornerons à deux traductions, celle de Robert Eno et celle de Dim Cheuk Lau, soit Mencius_Eno et Mencius_Lau (notre présentation et numérotation),

Il s’agit clairement d’un échange de type dialectique entre deux philosophes. Gaozi avance une analogie explicitée par la construction A is like B pour illustrer sa conception de la nature humaine.

Les deux traductions utilisent la même expression, human nature (1a) pour désigner le thème général du débat. Le problème posé par Gaozi concerne l’émergence d’une capacité complexe désignée par les termes suivants (le signe “>” indique que les termes entrent dans la chaîne dont l’ensemble correspond à un même objet de discours),[4]

Mencius n’intervient pas sur le concept en discussion, mais seulement sur l’analogie utilisée par Gaozi. Il développe l’analogie en mettant au premier plan la nature de la transformation subie par le saule pour devenir bol et tasse

Pour désigner le processus affectant le saule, dans les deux traductions, Gaotzi emploie le prédicat abstrait “making C from / out of W”, qui n’a pas d’orientation argumentative définie. Le texte poursuit par une question de Mencius

Toujours dans les deux traductions Mencius adopte en quelque sorte le point de vue du saule. Mencius_Lau utilise le mot mutilate, ayant une orientation argumentative négative. L’expression “mutilating W in order to make C”, met ainsi au premier plan la nature négative de la transformation du saule en bol et en tasse. L’éclairage de l’opération change du tout au tout. Avec hack, Mengzi_Eno ajoute la sensation d’un instrument tranchant, parfaitement cohérent avec l’idée de mutilation “hack W [into] C”.

Et, sur la base de l’analogie proposée par Gaozi lui-même, il transfère l’opération sur les humains (processus marqué par then dans Mencius_Lau)

Nous concluons que les traductions disent clairement ce qu’elles veulent dire, et qu’il s’agit d’une argumentation par analogie, rejetée par l’opposant qui met en défaut cette analogie, en dégageant une faille dans sa structure.

En conséquence, ce cas peut donc être utilisé, sous l’une ou l’autre traduction, à toutes fins utiles lorsqu’il s’agit d’argumentation. La seule réserve porte sur le statut des concepts sur lesquels s’exerce l’analogie (righteouness, dutifulness, humanity, morality), que nous ne sommes pas en capacité de discuter.

[1] La référence à la “traduction d’Untel des Analectes de Confucius” sera parfois abrégée comme suit : “Analectes_Untel” avec le nom du traducteur en indice.

[2] Mengzi (= Mencius), 372 – 289 AÈC. Mencius est le nom romanisé du philosophe chinois Meng Ke ou Mengzi, et le titre de l’ouvrage contenant ses paroles.

[3] Gaozi (= Kao-tzu = Gao Buhai), vers 420-350 AÈC « Gaozi était un contemporain de Mencius. L’essentiel de ce que nous savons de lui provient du livre 6 de Mencius, intitulé Gaozi » (Wikipedia, Gaozi).

[4] Pour une présentation de ces concepts et du concept d’éclairage (utilisé infra) de J.-B. Grize, voir Plantin 2016 ou 2022 Objet de discours ; Schématisatisation.

La question de la traduction

Les pratiques argumentatives dites occidentales sont présentes dans les textes écrits depuis l’aube des civilisations grecque et latine. Les premières théorisations de cette pratique correspondent à la naissance et au développement de la rhétorique et de la logique. L’enseignement du latin et du grec est constitutif de la culture occidentale, les textes originaux sont abondamment traduits et irriguent en permanence la pensée occidentale par une tradition continue de commentaires et de remaniements. À l’intérieur de cette tradition, certaines traductions font date, comme les traductions latines d’Aristote par Guillaume de Moerbeke,

These versions are so faithful to Aristotle’s text that they are authorities on the corrections of the Greek manuscripts, and they enabled Thomas Aquinas to become a supreme interpreter of Aristotle without knowing Greek.
Allan Bloom, « Preface » to his translation of Plato’s Republic, 1968, p. xi.

Quoi qu’il en soit de tels sommets, le lecteur illiteratus intéressé peut facilement obtenir des traductions fiables de nombreux textes classiques chinois. Le prix à payer est que, à proprement parler, ces traductions ne permettent pas d’étudier “l’argumentation dans les textes classiques chinois”, ni “telle argumentation dans les Analectes de Confucius”, mais seulement “telle argumentation dans telle traduction des Analectes de Confucius”[1] c’est-à-dire “tel passage où le traducteur a rendu le passage chinois correspondant par une argumentation”. Parler de “la traduction d’une argumentation”, suppose qu’on est capable d’identifier quelque chose comme une argumentation en chinois. Mais le traducteur confirmé peut parler ainsi, et on ne voit pas quel soupçon universel a priori pourrait peser sur la qualité de la traduction. Pour les grandes œuvres, plusieurs traductions d’un même texte sont disponibles. L’illiteratus peut seulement considérer que ces différentes traductions d’un même passage expriment des lectures différentes de raisonnements différents.

Notre critère de choix des passages est subjectif. Nous nous limiterons aux traductions que nous avons l’impression de comprendre. Si la traduction du passage considéré reste obscure, il faut se résigner à renvoyer ce passage à plus tard ; c’est aussi parfois le cas pour certains textes dans la langue et la culture de l’analyste.

Si plusieurs traductions sont disponibles et équivalentes, on peut penser que ces traductions sont fiables. La question de savoir si elles transmettent quelque chose de la saveur et du parfum authentiques du texte original est réservée aux spécialistes.

Le paragraphe suivant sur l’analogie propose un exemple de telles traductions stables et compréhensibles

Some translations are epochal, such as William of Moerbeke’s Latin translations of Aristotle:

These versions are so faithful to Aristotle’s text that they are authorities on the corrections of the Greek manuscripts, and they enabled Thomas Aquinas to become a supreme interpreter of Aristotle without knowing Greek.

Allan Bloom, « Preface » to his translation of Plato’s Republic, 1968, p. xi.

Without systematically aspiring to such heights, the interested reader can easily obtain reliable translations of many classical Chinese texts.  The price to be paid is that, strictly speaking, this illiterate reader cannot study « argument in Chinese (classical texts) », « such and such an argument in the Analects of Confucius », but only « such and such an argument in such and such a translation in the Analects of Confucius ». If necessary, the reference to « Eno’s translation of the Analects of Confucius” can be abbreviated as: “Analects_Eno” with the translator’s name in subscript.

In the case of major titles, several translations of the same text are available, which makes it possible to to identify their differences and similarities, if necessary. In this case, one should consider that the different translations of the same passage express different readings, different ways of reasoning.

Sometimes, the translation(s) of the passages remain unclear or incompatible. In this case, comments can be left for a better future or for better readers. After all, this is also the case for texts in the analyst’s own language and culture.

The principle of non-contradiction is at the root of reasoning. Everyday argumentation could be defined as a style of conversation in which the principle of coherence applies: If you hold incompatible things in different contexts, you owe the other participants an explanation; if you hold incompatible things in the same context, you make conversation impossible, we have to stop it

Self-coherence of feelings

The following case appeals to the self-coherence of feelings (Leslie 1964):

12.10 Zizhang asked about […] discerning confusion. The Master said […] When one cherishes a person, one wishes him to live; when one hates a person, one wishes him to die – on the one hand cherishing and wishing him life, while on the other hating and wishing him death: that is confusion.
Truly, it is not a matter of riches, Indeed, it is simply about discernment. (Analects_Eno, 12) 

Interpersonal contradiction

Like self-contradiction, interpersonal contradiction demands clarification. Disagreement stimulates intellectual activity.
Confucius says that he prefers disagreement: 

The Master said, Hui is of no help to me. There is nothing in my words that fails to please him. (Analects_Eno, 11, 4)

Nonetheless, it is unpleasant for a teacher to be critically confronted with its own teaching (our presentation:

Zilu appointed Zigao to be the steward of Bi.
The Master said “You are stealing another man’s son!”
Zilu said, “There are people there; there are altars of state there – why must one first read texts and only then be considered learned?”
The Master said, “This is why I detest glib talkers!” (Analects_Eno, 11, 25)

Note Eno: Zilu seems to be invoking lessons Confucius himself taught, much like the ideas in 1.6-7, to confound Confucius himself, which is the basis of Confucius’s response.

Confucius teaches that the basic condition to be called learned can be extended to persons on the way to become a learned person

Analects_Eno, 1.7,
Zixia said: If a person treats worthy people as worthy and so alters his expression, exerts all his effort when serving his parents, exhausts himself when serving his lord, and is trustworthy in keeping his word when in the company of friends, though others may say he is not yet learned, I would call him learned.

In this last passage (1,7), Confucius characterizes a learned person by his correct behavior toward worthy people, his parents, his lord, his friends, and seems to attach only secondary importance to reading texts. In 11, 25 Zilu – a very bold disciple of Confucius –  indirectly reminds him of his former position.

Argumentation practice without argumentation theory

The following remarks are based upon A. C. Graham’s views on the Chinese way of argumentation, as presented in his Disputers of the Tao. Philosophical Argument in Ancient China (1989).  Speaking of the Moists, Graham writes (1989, p.  168).

Graham attributes to Mozi’s disciples[2],

a sense of rigorous proof [combined with] a disregard for logical forms. (1989, p. 169).

Although well aware of the difficulties of relating names to objects in the art of discourse, [the Moist] seems to see the lucid and self-evident relations between names as raising no theoretical problems. Chinese civilization never abstracted the forms in which we observe it reasoning in practice, as in this curiously familiar-sounding syllogism of Wang Ch’ung:

Man is a thing: though honored as king or noble, by nature he is no different from other things. No thing does not die, how can man be immortal? (1989, p.  168).

Wang Ch’ung uses a valid syllogism, that combines true propositions producing a sound conclusion, « Humans are beings, no being is immortal, no human is immortal.” In the unfriendly language of traditional logic, this reasoning is described as a syllogism of the fourth figure, said Galenic, and in the Camenes mode: « all H is B; no B is I; therefore no H is I. »
Wang Ch’ung presents this incontrovertible conclusion as a so-called “rhetorical » question, which is a challenge to any opponent (Toulmin, 1958: 97); this introduces a dialectical movement within syllogistic reasoning.

A little further on, Graham attributes to Mozi’s disciples “a sense of rigorous proof [combined with] a disregard for logical forms. » (1989, p. 169); “Hsün-tzu like the later Mohists has no deductive forms like( the syllogism, but does mark off deductive inference as a separate type of thinking” (id. p. 267)

How is this possible? An analogy can be drawn from language and grammar. According to specialists, the ancient Chinese had no grammar[3]; and they certainly spoke excellent Chinese. By the same token, they did not develop a logic (an art of reasoning), and they argued very well. In other words, it is not necessary to have a clear view of what is a valid and sound argument, in order to master an effective practice of such arguments. Let us admit that this conclusion can (a fortiori?) be generalized to non-syllogistic forms of argumentation: A theory of argumentation is not a prerequisite for an effective practice of argumentation. One can develop a clear idea and an effective critical argumentative practice without formalization, that is, without developing a a logical meta-language about the process of argumentation, and the correlative critical operations.

It follows that the teaching of argumentation can do without argumentation theory. Western-style theories of argumentation are not essential to the coherent articulation of ideas. Argumentation can be taught by showing and discussing paradigmatic examples of argument. Such examples can be paraphrased, denied, contradicted, generalized; their presuppositions and implications can be explored without ever leaving the level of natural discourse.

[1] Wang Chu’ng = Wang Chong, Lun Heng — Philosophical Essays, ch.24; trad. Forke V,I, 335f.  (Note Graham). Wang Chong, 27 – c. 97 AD, « developed a rational, secular, naturalistic and mechanistic view of the world and man, and gave a materialistic explanation of the origin of the universe » (Wikipedia).

[2] Mozi (c. 479 – c.392 B.C.), eponymous author of the work Mozi.

[3] « In ancient China, a few centuries before the Christian era, linguistic reflection had already begun to produce excellent results: we find important reflections on the nature of language, very elaborate dictionaries, systems of phonological description and dialectology. However, […] the analysis of grammatical structures is practically absent. Apart from an enormous production of studies on individual words or groups of words, there is almost nothing on the organic description of language » (Casacchia, 1989: 431).

Grah. p. 267:

“Hsün-tzu like the later Mohists has no deductive forms like the syllogism, but does mark off deductive inference as a separate type of thinking”

[1] Mozi (c. 479 – c.392 B.C.), eponymous author of the work Mozi.

[2] « In ancient China, a few centuries before the Christian era, linguistic reflection had already begun to produce excellent results: we find important reflections on the nature of language, very elaborate dictionaries, systems of phonological description and dialectology. However, […] the analysis of grammatical structures is practically absent. Apart from an enormous production of studies on individual words or groups of words, there is almost nothing on the organic description of language » (Casacchia, 1989: 431).

 A Paradigm Case of Analogy

Dans la présentation occidentale des schèmes d’argument comprend deux section principales, la première tourne autour du schème proprement dit, la seconde, autour d’un exemple illustrant le schème.

The following passage may be taken as a paradigmatic case of analogy:

The wise man who has charge of governing the empire should know the cause of disorder before he can put it in order. Unless he knows its cause, he cannot regulate it. It is similar to the problem of a physician who is attending a patient. He has to know the cause of the ailment before he can cure it. Unless he knows its cause, he cannot cure it. How is the situation different for him who is to regulate disorder? He too has to know the cause of the disorder before he can regulate it. Unless he knows its cause, he cannot regulate it. The wise man who has charge of governing the empire must, then, investigate the cause of disorder.
Mozi_MEI, Universal Love 4, I.

The passage is presented as one sole paragraph in the original text. The following numbering and disposition are ours:

1. The wise man who has charge of governing the empire should know the cause of disorder before he can put it in order. 2. Unless he knows its cause, he cannot regulate it.

3. It is similar to the problem of a physician who is attending a patient.
4. He has to know the cause of the ailment before he can cure it. 5. 5. Unless he knows its cause, he cannot cure it.

6. How is the situation different for him who is to regulate disorder? 7. He too has to know the cause of the disorder before he can regulate it. 8.Unless he knows its cause, he cannot regulate it.

9. The wise man who has charge of governing the empire must, then, investigate the cause of disorder.

Mozi’s demonstration  takes place in two stages, the first justifying the thesis and the second confirming that no one dares to answer it. No rebuttal is mentioned.

Positive argumentation

— Claim: (1) and (2) state the thesis

(1)        To put the government in order = O

To know the cause of the disorder = C
Proposition (1) expresses a necessary condition (NC):
For O (to put the government in order), C (to know the cause of the disorder) is necessary
Which is noted: O => C (O requires, implies C).

(2) reformulates the thesis:

(1) C is a NC of O = (2) non-C implies non-O.

— Warrant: Elucidation of the argumentation scheme, (3) announces that the thesis will be proved by an argument by analogy. Warrant: « is similar to »; implicit backing: the traditional assimilation of the « human body » to the « social body ».

— Argument
Source domain: Medicine. (4) presents a fact (as) known and admitted by all.
The structure of the argument strictly follows the structure of the thesis by substituting the doctor (who repairs the human body) for the wise man (who seeks how to repair human society).

The modes of sentence construction are identical. The presentation of the analogy as a parallel case pushes the similarity to identity.

Search for a refutation

A test of the validity of the analogy follows in the form of a rhetorical question, (5), interpreted as a challenge to a possible opponent, who is given the floor to show that the analogy is invalid. Question (5) remaining unanswered, this maneuver concludes with an argument from ignorance.

The argumentation repeats (reinforces, confirms) the essential element of the argument, the claim: (6) and (7) repeat word for word (1) and (2). This introduces into the reasoning an element of rhetorical persuasion (epikeirema) into the argumentation.

(8) repeats the thesis by replacing the expression « must know » (1) with « must investigate », the first step on the way to knowledge. To investigate and to know must not be understood in their contemporary sense.  .

Schemes and Paradigm Cases

The same idea of argumentation scheme can be understood in two equivalent ways.

– In intension, as an abstract, logico-semantic form expressing the essence of reasoning. The scheme of the opposites and the a fortiori scheme are examples of such forms.
– In extension, as the potentially very large set of passages assembled on the basis of their argumentative similarity; the set of arguments that can be paraphrased by the same formula; the set of arguments that derive from the same phrasal pattern. A functional knowledge of arguments can be based on paradigmatic examples.