Appeal to MODESTY
Ad Verecundiam [1]
1. The argument ad verecundiam
The argument of modesty is used by someone who bows before the speech and the good reasons offered by a person whom he considers superior to himself. It typically ratifies an act of submission to the ethos.
The ad verecundiam argument is the interactional correlative of an appeal to authority, not an appeal to authority. Note that, in the following key passage, Locke refers to ad verecundiam as arising from a fear of violating “modesty”.
The first [fallacious argument] is to allege the opinion of men, whose parts, learning, eminency, power, or some other cause has gained a name, and settled their reputation in the common esteem with some kind of authority. When men are established in any kind of dignity, it is thought a breach of modesty for others to derogate any way from it, and question the authority of men who are in possession of it. This is apt to be censured as carrying with it too much pride, when a man does not readily yield to the determination of approved authors, which is wont to be received with respect and submission by others: and it is looked upon as insolence for a man to set up and adhere to his own opinion against the current stream of antiquity; or to put it in the balance against that of some learned doctor, or otherwise approved writer. Whoever backs his tenets with such authorities thinks he ought thereby to carry the cause, and is ready to style it impudence in any one who shall stand out against them. This I think may be called argumentum ad verecundiam. (Locke [1690], p. 410).
This argument is considered fallacious:
It argues not another man’s opinion to be right because I, out of respect, or any other consideration but that of conviction, will not contradict him. [1690], p. 411).
Similarly, topic #11 of the Rhetoric argues “from a previous judgment in regard to the same or a similar or contrary matter”. Such a precedent-setting judgment must have been made by an authority, one of “those whose judgment it is not possible to contradict” (Aristotle, Rhet., II, 23, 12; F. 309), that is to say, “it would be disgraceful to contradict him” (ibid.; my italics), be he a father, a god, a teacher or a wise man. Courtesy is argumentatively oriented in favor of the submission to the status quo.
2. Authority or pusillanimity? Ad verecundiam, or misplaced modesty
Locke stages an interaction, in which one partner “allege[s]” an authoritative opinion. The qualities that give authority to an opinion have either a social source (“parts, learning, eminency, power … dignity”) or an intellectual source (“learning, … approved author… learned doctor… approved writer”), see ethos. Such sources do indeed have a legitimizing power, see dialectic. Note that are not mention of religious authorities.
It must be emphasized that Locke is not censoring the expression of, or the reference to authoritative opinions in a first round of speech, but rather the acritical acceptance of such an authority. The problem does not lie in the appeal to authority in the first round, but in the fear of an aggressive third round that prohibits criticism of this authority.
The condemnation ad verecundiam is a protest against the censorship of this second round by an internal impulse of modesty, the feeling of one’s own inadequacy (however legitimate this feeling may be!). This censorship is a preventive reaction to a threat that could come from a third round that claims to silence the objection addressed to the authority. This third round itself does not deal with the substance of the objection made to the second (by an argument ad judicium, see matter. It merely substitutes a negative evaluation of the person who holds it, an ad personam attack that invokes “a breach of modesty, too much pride, insolence, impudence”, i.e., a maneuver , of intimidation, see personal attack; respect. The problem then is not in the authoritative first round, but in the inhibiting foreboding of an aggressive third round. As the label “argument ad verecundiam” indicates, the fallacy is committed by the interlocutor, the overly modest person who does not object for fear of making a scene. This is not primarily a fallacy of authority but of cowardice or spinelessness. Verecundia is the (misplaced sense of) shame that prevents one from saying out loud what one is thinking. It is a betrayal of our duties to truth.
4. Justified modesty
When it comes to authority itself, the problem is twofold. In the first round, participant S1_1 has “alleged” an authoritative opinion, which may be a perfecty reasonable move. Suppose that in a second round, S2 can overcome his ad verecundiam inhibition and express his dissenting opinion quite freely. If, in a third round, S1_2 silences S2_1′s remarks in the name of authority, while at the same time criticizing his opponent for his boldness and pride then S1 is arguing from authority, which is certainly a fallacious move.
Some situations, however,are embarrassing. If S1 quotes Einstein in his (Einstein’s) area of expertise, and S1 has a good background in physics and S2 has none, then a humble lay speaker S2 would be wise to ask for more explanation before voicing his doubts. If not, S1_2 could legitimately give in to an , authoritative exasperation.
3. A fallacy in dialogue
The problem of authority is thus recast as one of authoritarian interaction, i.e., a dialogue in which a claim of authority is expressed in the first speech turn, and exploited in the third turn to silence the objections, considering that the quoted authority gives the caster the power to end the discussion. This use of authority is in a direct contrast to the use of authority in a dialectical game. The problem does not lie so much in the quoting of authority as in the possibility of contradicting authority. Modesty, respect, concern not to cause the other to lose face, rules of politeness, preference for agreement are all intellectual inhibitors. All these constraints define a typically anti-dialectical situation, see Dialectic.
Authority is accepted as a fact, the problem lies in the possibility of questioning that authority . Authority is deceptive only when it claims to escape from dialogue, to silence its opponent, and not to answer his counter-discourse. The conclusion is that what is deceptive or not, is a dialogue move. It is impossible to say whether a statement like “The Master said it!” is fallacious or not; it all depends on the position of the statement in the dialogue. If it is an opening statement, it is not misleading. If it is a closing statement, intended to silence the critic, it is.
[1] Latin “argumentum ad verecundiam” lat. verecundia “modesty, humility”.