MOTIVE – REASON
The individual’s will, intentions, desires, motives, reasons… can be interpreted as causes of actions, considered to be effects or consequences of such an “inner” causation. Conversely, actions are evaluated and interpreted according to their motives and reasons which are seen as their causes. The consistency requirement imposes this causal structure on human motivation, S. Consistency.
1. Argumentation from the existence of reasons for action
Two basic Aristotelian topoi (argument schemes, sg. topos) implement the law of causality in human action by substituting reasons and motives for causes. If the cause exists, then the effect follows. That is, if a party has a motive or a reason to do something, he will do it as soon as the opportunity arises. In the wording of the topos # 20 of the Rhetoric:
To consider inducements and deterrents, and the motives people have for doing or avoiding the action in question. (Rhet., II, 23, 20; RR, p. 373)
The basic topos is:
You wanted it, so you sought it!
he who wants the end wants the means.
This topos is also used in the pathetic argument. Here, it supports an accusation:
You had a motive, you talked about it, the opportunity came along, and you did it!
Or a defense:
L1: — You did it!
L2: — I had no reason to do it, I even had reasons not to do it.
Similarly, in topos #24, cause means “reason to do”:
Another topic is derived from the cause. If the cause exists, the effect exists; if the cause does not exist, the effect does not exist. […] For example, Leodamas […] (id., II, 23, 24; F. p. 319).
2. Arguments about the “real reasons”
The following argument schemes substitute a hidden motivation for a public good reason, just as a true cause can be substituted for a false one, see interpretation:
— Topos # 15 substitutes a hidden, self-serving motive for a noble, publicly claimed reason. It is used to accuse or to refute an opponent.
— Topos # 23 rejects the malicious interpretation given to an action by giving an acceptable, respectable reason for the allegedly guilty motive. It is used to clear somebody from a charge.
— Topos # 19 changes the benevolent interpretation given to an action into a malevolent one.
2.1 Publicly displayed good reasons and real private ugly intentions
According to topos #15 of Aristotle’s Rhetoric:
The things people approve of openly are not those which they approve of secretly: openly, their chief praise is given to justice and nobleness, but in their heart they prefer their own advantage. […] This is the most effective of the forms of argument that contradict common opinion. (Rhet. II, 23, 15; RR, p. 369)
The argument highlights a (possible) private, hidden, bad motive to refute the public, honorable, good reason given as justification for an action:
S1: — In supporting this charity, I am fighting for a noble cause!
S2: — You are fighting mainly for your own publicity.
S1: — We are fighting a war to restore democracy and human rights in Syldavia
S2: — You are fighting a war to get their oil.
In the second dialog, S1 justifies the war, S2 does not oppose the war, he can simply introduce a realpolitik argument, that could be made openly in another situation.
2.2 A laudable motive substituted for a blameworthy one
This argument corresponds to topos # 23, “useful for men who have been really or seemingly slandered”:
To show why the facts are not as supposed; pointing out that there is a reason for the false impression given. (Rhet., II, 23, 23; RR p. 375)
Embodied in the enthymeme:
She embraces him because he’s her son, not because he’s her lover.
Topos # 23 is the opposite of topos # 19; it helps to exculpate by substituting an honorable motive for the offending one:
I hit him to save him from drowning, not to hurt him!
The is reinterpreted action is re-evaluated: “You must congratulate me and not blame me.” See Stasis; Interpretation; Orientation.
2.3 The poisoned chalice
The wording of topos # 19, “some possible motive for an event or state of things is the real one”; is rather puzzling. It fits the enthymemes:
A gift was given in order to cause pain by its withdrawal.
Gods give to many great prosperity, / Not out of good will towards them, but to make / Their ruin more conspicuous. (Rhet., II, 23, 19; XX p. 371)
The topos operates a dramatic negative reinterpretation of an act that was evaluated positively.
He seduced her not out of love but out of hate / greed / to make him suffer by leaving him later
This is the principle of the “dinner game”, “they invited me not as a friend, but to make fun of me”. This technique for narrowing the cognitive and affective discrepancy, particularly effective for destroying a sense of gratitude, see emotion.