Argument of REFLEXIVITY

Consider a proposition of the form: « N 1 — Verb — N2 ». The relation denoted by the verb is reflexive if it connects N1 to itself, that is, if « N1 — Verb — N1″ makes sense.

“Is contemporary with ” is a reflexive relation; A is contemporary with all the people who live at the same time as he, and in particular he is strictly contemporary with himself.

The causal relation is not reflexive; no being is its own cause. Only God is causa sui, his own cause – though it is possible to be a son of one’s own works.

Reflexivity can be exploited in ad hominem argumentation. The principle “charity begins at home” forces the reflexivity of the relationship « to do charity to ». Similarly, love of others can be used to promote a certain love of self:

If you want to help the whole world, you’d do well to start by helping yourself a little!

A counselor’s competence can be challenged by encouraging him to use his talents  reflectively:

You give me advice and you act the old way, start by giving yourself advice!

You fight for women’s liberation, and (= but) at home you never do the dishes.

Doctor, heal yourself!

You claim to teach others how to argue, but you are incapable of arguing yourself!

Or again:

Among the ragged people, there are some who wear long robes,
And boast that they are masters in the art of transmuting metals.
Why don’t these people make a little gold for themselves?
Because their whole art is to sell a little clear water to gullible people.
The Alchemists. Six Chinese Short Stories. [1885] / 1999 [1]

PATHOS 2: FROM PROOF TO FALLACY

The standard theory of fallacies considers emotions to be the main pollutant of rational discourse; to be valid, the argumentative discourse should be an-emotional. Pathos, the essential component of rhetorical argumentation, is therefore the typical target of this criticism. The “passions” are grouped into a family of ad passiones fallacies, and these are to be eliminated.
This is an essential point of articulation and opposition between rhetorical and logical-epistemic argumentation. Emotions, with their ability to subvert the mind and bypass rational reflection, are considered to be the most powerful of rhetorical tools and, for the same reason, they are forbidden within critical argumentation.

1. Ad passiones arguments

The standard theory of fallacies holds that wherever emotion is allowed to flourish in discourse, reason is in danger of being overshadowed:

I add finally, when an Argument is borrowed from any Topic which are suited to engage the Inclinations and Passions of the Hearers on the side of the Speaker, rather than to convince the Judgment, this is Argumentum ad passiones, an Address to the Passions: or, if it be made publicly, ’tis called an Appeal to the People. (Watts, Logick, 1725, quoted in Hamblin 1970, p. 164; capitalized in the text).

In an argumentative situation, emotions, like fallacies, tend to be the emotions of the other, the opponent: “I’m trying to stay cool and rational, why are you so upset?”. This is a common strategy in controversies over both scientific and political issues (Doury 2000). It can be seen as a typical case of the ad fallaciam argument, see evaluation.

The sophisms of passion are not included in the original Aristotelian list, see Fallacy (2). The label “ad + Latin name” has been widely used in modern times to refer to “fallacies of emotion”, and traces of this use can still be found. The herbarium of ad passiones  is well stocked, as Hamblin’s list of ad fallacious arguments show. The labels making a clear and direct reference to the affects have been underlined.

The argumentum ad hominem, the argumentum ad verecundiam, the argumentum ad misericordiam, and the argumenta ad ignorantiam, populum, baculum, passiones, superstitionem, imaginationem, invidiam (envy), crumenam (purse), quietem (repose, conservatism), metum (fear), fidem (faith), socordiam (weak-mindedness), superbiam (pride), odium (hatred), amicitiam (friendship), ludicrum (dramatics), captandum vulgus (playing for the gallery), fulmen [thunderbolt], vertiginem (dizziness)) and a carcere (from prison). We feel like adding: ad nauseam but even this has been suggested before. (Hamblin, 1970, p. 41)

This list contains not only emotional arguments: for example, the appeal to ignorance (ad ignorantiam) is an epistemic, not an emotional argument. Others designate various forms of appeal to subjectivity, but the majority of the labels mentioned refers to personal interests and have a clear emotional content. Note that the concept of emotional language and the analytical method backing the diagnostic of these ad passiones fallacious appeals remain unclear.

The literature on fallacies mentions a dozen fallacies involving emotions, mostly under the label « fallacy in ad + Latin name« . As the generic label « ad passiones fallacies” allows, this list can be expanded to include all emotions.

– fear, designated either directly (ad metum) or metonymically through the instrument of threat, ad baculum, a carcere, ad fulmen, ad crumenam
– respectful fear, ad reverentiam
– affection, love, friendship, ad amicitiam
– joy, happiness, laughter: ad captandum vulgus; ad ludicrum; ad ridiculum
– pride, vanity, ad superbiam
– calmness, laziness, tranquility, ad quietem
– envy, ad invidiam
– popular feeling, ad populum
– indignation, anger, hatred: ad odium; ad personam
– modesty: ad verecundiam
– pity: ad misericordiam.

In this list, the basic emotions are mixed with vices (pride, envy, hatred, laziness) and virtues (pity, modesty, friendship), both of which are valued emotional states.

The list of emotions constituting pathos and the list of emotions stigmatized as fallacies, largely overlap to large extent. The pathemic proofs of rhetoric have become the sophisms ad passiones in the modern standard fallacy theory.

2. Four “emotional fallacies”:
ad hominem, ad baculum, ad populum, ad ignoratiam

All emotions can intervene in ordinary argumentative speech, but not all of these emotions have received the same attention, the focus is on the emotional and subjective character of the following four fallacies (Walton 1992).

— For arguments attacking the opponent, and other manifestations of contempt, see personal attack; dismissal. The ad hominem fallacy involves epistemic subjectivity, not emotion.

— The appeal to popular feelings in populist argumentation corresponds to a complex range of positive or negative emotional movements: the audience is amused, enthusiastic, pleased, ashamed; the speech plays on their pride, vanity, incites hatred, etc., see ad populum; laughter, irony.

— Ad baculum argumentation relies on various forms of threat or intimidation. Fear, possibly respectful, is contrasted with the positive emotion of hope, created by the promise of a reward, see threat.

— The appeal to pity, ad misericordiam, can serve as a basic example of the role of emotion in argumentation. First, the speaker S must substantiate his appeal to pity; justifications are necessary to produce a movement of pity. in the listener L, see emotion.

Rhetoric and argumentation can be contrasted on the basis of their relation to affects. If there is a concept of argumentation defined within rhetoric (inventio), there is also a concept of argumentation defined against rhetoric. Rhetoric is concerned with the production of discourse , while argumentation is concerned with the critical production and reception of discourse. Confronted with proactive, aggressive, rhetorical attitudes, critical argumentation is defensive.

3. Emotion, rationality and action

The field of argumentation is built on the rejection of what rhetoric considers the strongest evidence, ethotic and pathemic evidence. This an-emotional vision of argumentation corresponds to a classical and popular view of the functioning of the human mind, which contrasts reason, understanding, and contemplation with emotion, will and action. The following passage is a synthesis of this account:

Hitherto we have dealt with the proofs of truth, which compel the human understanding when it knows them, and for this  purpose, they are effective in persuading men accustomed to follow reason. But they are incapable of compelling the will to follow them, since, like Medea, according to Ovid, “I see and approve the best; I follow the worst.” This results from the misuse of the passions of the soul, and therefore we must deal with them in so far as they produce persuasion, and this in the popular manner, and not with all the subtlety that is possible when one treats them philosophically. (Mayans and Siscar 1786, p. 144)

The “passions” are assgned two functions: they change the perception of reality, put knowledge in brackets and thus give a decisive impulse to action.
This vision or emotion as a stimulus to action seems to be based on an etymological argument. The word emotion comes from the Latin emovere, e- (ex-) “out of” and movere, “to move”; an emotion is something that « sets people in motion ». In any case, passions are the almighty manipulative instrument of the action-oriented discourse favored by rhetoric, and the main enemy of the truth-oriented discourse favored by logicians.

In the mid-twentieth century, the psychologists Fraisse & Piaget argued that emotion is not an organized response, but a disorder of behavior that leads to “a decrease in the level of performance” (1968, p. 98):

People get angry when they substitute violent words and gestures for efforts to find a solution to the difficulties they experience (resolving a conflict, overcoming an obstacle). […] [Anger] is also a response to the situation (hitting an object or a person who resists you), but the level of this response is lower than it should be, given the standards of a given culture. (Ibid.)

According to this vision, emotion would trigger low-quality behavior, and therefore poor reasoning. In interaction, it would necessarily be manipulative: the candidate cries in an effort to distract the examiner from his shortcomings, magically transforming the exam situation into a more interpersonal, private, relationship.

This leads to a kind of paradox: for rhetoricians, emotions lead to action while psychologists believe that emotions make action worse.

Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca share this vision of emotions as “obstacles” to reason, and thus consider emotions to be incompatible with sound argumentation. However, they retain the motivational quality of emotion in order to explain the relevance of argumentative discourse to action. The solution lies in a dissociation that contrasts emotions with values:

We should point out that the passions as obstacles must not be confused with the passions that provide a support for a positive argument. The latter will generally be designated by a less pejorative term, such as value, for instance. (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca [1958], p. 475 ; my emphasis)

By this clever operation, emotions are disposed of, and these remain pejoratively marked as obstacles to reason, while their dynamic potential is transferred to values. In this way, the effect of argument can be extended beyond the mere production of mental persuasion to become the determinant of action,  (id., p. 45); see persuasion

5. Alexithymia and everyday rationality

If emotions are seen as the ideal manipulative tool, the equation “emotion = fallacy” seems more than justified, so that, extending the example of scientific language to ordinary linguistic practices, a solution can be found in the pure and simple elimination of emotions. But the price of eliminating the emotions from ordinary discourse is high: in everyday circumstances, the use of an-emotional discourse is actually considered to be the symptom of a mental disorder, alexithymia.
The word alexithymia is composed of three lexemes a-lexis-thymos, “lack – of words – for emotion”; alexithymic language is defined as a language from which all expression of feelings and emotions is banished:

Alexithymia: term proposed by Sifneos to describe patients predisposed to psychosomatic disorders and characterized by: 1) the inability to verbally express the affects; 2) the poverty of the imaginative life; (3) the tendency to resort to action; and (4) the tendency to focus on the material and objective aspects of events, situations and relationships. (Cosnier 1994, p. 160)

Such an emotionless discourse is reduced to the expression of operational thinking, mirroring, “a mental mode of functioning organized around the purely factual aspects of everyday life. Operational discourse is characterized by objectivity and ignores any fantasy, emotional expression or subjective evaluation” (id., p. 141).

Similarly, the repression of affect by the neurotic personality can lead to the same result.

From a neurobiological perspective, Damasio has shown that a theory of purely logical reasoning, leaving aside the emotions, cannot account for the way people actually deal with everyday problems:

The ‘high-reason’ view, which is nothing more than the common­ sense view, assumes that when we are at our decision-making best, we are the pride and joy of Plato, Descartes and Kant. Formal logic will, by itself, lead us to the best available solution for any problem. An important aspect of the rationalist view is that to get the best results, emotions must be kept out. Rational processing must be unencumbered by passion. (1994, p. 171)

Pure reasoning on everyday affairs may actually be observed in certain types of patients:

What the experience with patients suggests is that the cool strategy advocated by Kant, and others, has far more to do with the way patients with prefrontal damage make decisions than with how normals usually operate. (Id., p. 172)

The exclusion of subjectivity and emotions risks turning argumentation into an operational alexithymic practice. Insofar argumentation studies are interested in the treatment of everyday problems in common language, they cannot adopt  the discourse of neurotic, alexithymic or brain damaged individuals as a model discourse. The question of how emotions develop in argumentative discourse demands much more than simple a priori censorship, see emotions

[1] The Complete Poems of Tibullus: An En Face Edition. Translated by R. G. Dennis and M. C. J. Putnam. With an introduction by J. H. Gaisser. Berkeley, etc: University of California Press, 2013.

PROOF BY FACT
PERSUASION AGAINST FACT

A statement about a concrete fact is refuted by the observation that it is contradicted by reality: “Pierre (is French, so he) has red hair ” is refuted as soon as you observe that Pierre has brown hair. The affirmation of a general fact “all Syldavians have red hair” is falsified by a simple counterexample, “this Syldavian is brown-haired”.
But the effect of facts on beliefs is much less clear than these examples suggest. The “web of beliefs » and the “web of facts » function as parallel networks. An embarrassing fact can be dealt with by declaring the fact to be marginal or misobserved. It can also be admitted as an imperfection in the web’s meshes.

1. Falsifying a statement of an empirical fact by showing that its opposite is true

A statement of fact can be made as a report of directly observable evidence or as the conclusion of an argument: « You are very flushed, you feel tired, you probably have a fever. » Every argument contains such statements all of which can be contradicted and refuted.
In philosophy, « an atomic fact is the simplest kind of fact, and consists in the possession of a quality by some specific, individual thing » (SEP, Logical Atomism). An elementary proposition reports such an elementary fact.
In natural language we can assume that the elementary proposition ascribes to a being a property that is empirically evident and therefore empirically refutable.

The assertion of a concrete fact is refuted by the observation that it is contradicted by reality: “You say this, but I observe that”. This is an application of the principle of non-contradiction; the rule of opposites states that two terms that are opposites cannot both be true of the same subject.

Statement: Pierre has brown hair
Observation: Pierre has red hair
Application of the Rule of Opposites: “black” and “red” are opposites; they can be simultaneously false, but they cannot be simultaneously true. The statement Pierre has black hair is disproved

The alleged fact and the established fact must belong to the same class of opposites: one does not refute “Mary has a cat” by stating, on the basis of an observation, that “Mary has a rabbit”.

The same procedure works for other forms of opposition:
— Contradictory statements. In the sexual regime of  the19^th century one refutes « Marie is a woman » by observing that Marie is a man. The opposition is refuted by establishing that the contradictory proposition is true.
— Terms in the relationship of possession/deprivation. I am accused of having torn off someone’s ear in anger. I ask him to come to court to show that he does indeed have both ears.

The verified presence of an opposite makes it possible to eliminate all the other concepts of the family of opposites to which it belongs. This argument has immense scope, it constitutes the standard refutation system for false statements concerning  judgments of elementary facts.

The assertion of a generic concrete fact, “all Syldaves have red hair” is refuted by the counter example, by finding a Syldave with black hair. This generic refutation is in principle much easier than refutating a claim about a singular case: any black-haired Syldave will do in the first case, while the singular claim requires concrete knowledge of the being mentioned.

Resistance to refutation by facts — Resistance to factual refutation by facts is first achieved first by maintaining the original factual assertion, « to me he has red hair. »  It is then accepted that there is a blurred area between brown and red.

3. Effect of facts on theories and beliefs

Facts can be deconstructed and reconstructed to fit theories, and conversely, theories can be revised to fit facts.

3.1 Saving the theory

But, at least in the field of the human sciences, the opposite observation that the opposite is actually true, is less conclusive than it appears. The theory asserts, directly or indirectly, that P. However, common sense and linguistic intuition tend to notice rather Q, something that contradicts P. Several options are possible to get out of the dilemma.

— Reject the theory, but this is a costly and painful solution.

— Downplay the inconvenient fact, by contrasting it with the mass of facts that confirm the theory, or that the theory satisfactorily explains or coordinates.

— Put the inconvenient fact on hold until it can be integrated into the theory.

— Allow exceptions, and move from universality to generality. In classical logic, you cannot argue that “all swans are white” and concede that this particular swan is black. The quantifier all indicates that the proposition is universal, and the existence of a black swan conclusively disproves the universality of the proposition; you must then abandon universality for generality, which allows for exceptions, see reasoning by default.

— Reform the intuition, and decide that the theory is brilliant, precisely because it makes us see things “differently”, in a richer and deeper way, and that in fact P is a kind of deep structure of the elementary intuition expressed by Q. In other words, one can resist refutation by choosing to reform the internal hypotheses (the theory) or the external hypotheses (what counts as a fact).

3.2 Belief resists the facts that are held against it

Predictive discourse is in principle subject to the control of facts: someone predicts that a certain event will, or must, take place, but when the time comes, everyone can see that nothing happens. The end of the world is predicted for next Wednesday, but Wednesday comes, the world goes on, and the prophet postpones the fulfillment of his prophecy.

“Facts do not penetrate the world in which our beliefs live”

The “worship” that Mr. Vinteuil devotes to his daughter despite her scandalous behavior inspires the following lesson in Proust.

Facts do not penetrate the world in which our beliefs live; they did not give rise to these beliefs, nor do they destroy them; they can inflict the most constant denials on them without weakening them, and an avalanche of misfortunes or illnesses following one another without interruption in a family will not make it doubt the goodness of its God or the talent of its doctor. But when Mr. Vinteuil thought of his daughter or himself from the point of view of the world, from the point of view of their reputation, when he tried to place himself in the rank they occupied in the general esteem, then he made this judgment of a social nature exactly as the inhabitant of Combray who was most hostile to him would have done, he saw himself with his daughter in the lowest depths. (Marcel Proust, Swann’s Way, 1913[1])

The first sentence of this passage is the most often quoted. It is followed by a but of this passage suggests that things go further than simple suppression, or repression. “The facts” do not change the love that Vinteuil has for his daughter, but he « sees himself with his daughter in the lowest depths. » The facts remain there, under the ‘I know, but still’ rule.

Persuasion can resist the basic facts that are opposed to it.

If the claim put forward corresponds to an experimental result, it is refuted by repeating the experiment, only to find that what actually happens has nothing to do with what was said, or that the experiment, as described, does not work.

But it is not enough that it work irrefutably in order to be accepted, as the case of Ignaz Semmelweis (1818-1865), “the inventor of hand washing” proves.

In the 19th century, women often died of childbed fever. The Central Hospital of Vienna had two maternity wards, and it was found that women died much more in one than in the other, 11.4% for Ward #1 compared to 2.7% for Ward #2, for the year 1846. This difference was explained by the hypothesis of a psychological shock suffered by the women in ward #1; the priests who attended to the women at the time of their death had to cross the entire ward, where the mortality rate was particularly high, whereas in the other ward, they could go directly to the bedside of the dying women, without being noticed. Semmelweis, a pysician at this hospital, tested this hypothesis by asking the priests to stop going through that ward to get to the bedside of the dying; the mortality differential remained the same.

He observed that Ward #1 was used for the training of medical students, who performed dissections in the morning before caring for women in the maternity ward. Ward #2 was used for the training of midwives, who did not participate in the dissection sessions. Semmelweis noticed that his fingers had a strange smell after these dissections; he therefore washed his hands in a solution that we would call disinfectant, and asked each of the students to do the same. Results: in April 1847, in Ward #1, 20% of women died of childbed fever. Beginning in May, after the introduction of hand washing, the mortality rate in the same ward dropped to about 1%

This fact has a persuasive force that one might believe to be irresistible. But fact is one thing and beliefs another. How can we accept that the hands of doctors who bring life can also bring death? Twenty years later, some of Semmelweis’s colleagues still attributed the mortality of women after childbirth to a psychological shock due to their special sensitivity.

Powerless proof: The wolf and the lamb

La Fontaine’s fable The Wolf and the Lamb (Fables, i, X) illustrates is about the persuasive force of facts, and argues that proof is powerless when vital needs are at stake.

The reason of the strongest is always the best:
We will show you right now.

Situation:

A lamb was quenching its thirst
in the course of a pure stream.
A wolf came along, hungry and looking for adventure,
attracted by the hunger in those places.

The interaction begins with a violent reproach, as humans usually do to their future victims:

“Who makes you so bold as to disturb my drink?”
Said the animal full of rage:
“You will be punished for your temerity.”

The offense is presupposed (you are disturbing my drink). The request for an explanation of the motives ([what is it] that makes you so bold?) seems to leave the lamb a possibility of justification, but it is immediately followed by the condemnation (you will be punished for your temerity). This speech is mysterious: why does the wolf speak? He could simply make use of the food he was seeking and which he finally found; he could eat the lamb just as the lamb drinks the water. The lamb responds with an observation of obvious fact :

— Sire, replies the lamb, may Your Majesty
not be angry;
But rather that she consider
That I was quenching my thirst
In the stream,
More than twenty paces below Her,
And that consequently, in no way,
I cannot disturb her drink.

The conclusion is rigorous, since the laws of physics say that the stream never returns to its source. But “conclusive” does not mean “impossible to contradict”. The wolf repeats its first accusation and adds a second one:

“You do disturb it,“ said the cruel beast,
“And I know that you have been speaking ill of me for the past year.”

The lamb rejected this second accusation, then a third, still conclusively:

“How could I have done so if I had not been born?”
“I am still sucking my mother’s breast,” said the lamb.
“If it wasn’t you, then it was your brother.”
“I don’t have one.”

But the final attack is irrefutable, leaving the defense no room to respond:

“So it was someone close to you:
For you hardly spare me,
You, your shepherds, and your dogs.
I’ve been told: I must take my revenge.”

And we conclude that good reasons do not determine the course of history:

Thereupon, deep in the forests
The wolf prevails, and then eats him,
Without further ado.

Truth and Power

The previous examples may seem depressing. Facts also says that truth has enemies and needs interpreters.

[1] Marcel Proust, Du côté de chez Swann, T. 1. Paris, France Loisirs, p. 226.

STRENGTH

The words strength or force are used with three different meanings:

— Argument from or by force, argument from strength, see threat -promise
— Force or strength of circumstances, see weight of circumstances
— Force or strength of an argument, this entry

The graded concept of strength of an argument contrasts with the binary notion of valid or invalid argumentation. An argument is strong (or weak) either by itself or in relation to another argument.
This strength is evaluated according to several criteria.

Strength as validity
In a scientific field, to be strong an argument must first of all be valid. That is, it must be developed according to a method that is accepted in this field.
However, an argument can be valid and not so strong, but really relevant and interesting for the discussion of this or that hypothesis.

In philosophy
From a philosophical point of view, one might consider that some argument schemes are inherently stronger than others. The strength of an argument is thus determined on the basis of ontology. An adept of moral realism will think that an argument based on the nature and definition of things is stronger than a pragmatic argument; a practical mind will think the opposite.
The New Rhetoric defines the strength of the argument according to the quality and universality of the audiences that accept it, see persuade – convince.

Strength as effectiveness
With respect to a goal such as persuasion, the strongest argument will be the most efficient, the argument that most quickly achieves the arguer’s goal, whether it is selling a product or electing a president. A degree of strength can be assigned to an argument based on a study on the target audience, see persuasion.

Subjective attribution of strength
In linguistic, wo arguments that lead to the same conclusion belong to the same argumentative class. Both provide some support for that conclusion; they share the same orientation. Within the same argumentative class, the strength of an argument may be determined by some objective gradation, such as the temperature scale, or it may simply be assigned to the argument by the speaker, who values such an argument over another. This hierarchization is marked by the means of argumentative morphemes (e.g., even) and realizing or de-realizing modifiers.
The resulting arrangements of the arguments on an argumentative scale are governed by the laws of discourse.

THE DIALOGUE
THREE VERSIONS

White horse discourse  — Chinese Text Project

1[A]: Can it be that a white horse is not a horse?
2[B]: It can.

3[A]: How so?
4[B]: « Horse » is how the shape is named; « white » is how the color is named. That which names color does not name shape. Thus I say: « a white horse is not a horse ».

5[A]: Having a white horse cannot be said to be having no horses. Is not that which cannot be said to be having no horses a horse? Having a white horse is having a horse; how can a white one not be a horse?

6[B]: Requesting a horse, a brown or a black horse may arrive; requesting a white horse, a brown or a black horse will not arrive. By making a white horse the same as a horse, what is requested [in these two cases] is the same. If what is requested is the same, then a white horse is no different to a horse; if what is requested is no different, then how is it that in one case brown and black horses are acceptable, and in the other they are not? Acceptable and unacceptable are clearly in opposition to each other. Thus brown and black horses are also one in that one can reply that there is a horse, yet one cannot reply that there is a white horse. It is clear indeed that a white horse is not a horse.

7[A]: If a horse with color is not a horse, then since there are no colorless horses in the world, can it be that there are no horses in the world?

8[B]: A horse necessarily has color; thus there are white horses. If one makes horses have no color, then there are merely horses – how can one pick out a white horse? Thus that which is white is not a horse. A white horse is horse and white, horse and white horse. Thus I say: « a white horse is not a horse ».

9[A]: A horse not yet with white is a horse, and white not yet with a horse is white. Combining horse with white, it is together named a « white horse ». This is to use an uncombined name for a combined thing, and is inadmissible. Thus I say: « a white horse is not a horse » is inadmissible.

10[B]: Taking their being white horses as there being horses, as calling there being white horses there being brown horses – is this admissible?

11[A]: No.

12[B]: Taking their being horses as different to there being brown horses, is to take brown horses as different to horses. Taking brown horses to be different to horses, is to take it that brown horses are not horses. To take brown horses as not horses, and yet take white horses as being horses, is to have the flying in a pond and the inner and outer coffins in different places: a contradictory claim and misuse of statements as there is under heaven!

13[A]: Having white horses cannot be called having no horses, this is what is meant by the separation of white. Not separating it, having white horses cannot be said to be having horses. Thus the reason why it is taken as having horses, is merely that « horses » are taken as « having horses », and « having white horses » is not « having horses ». Thus on your taking it as having horses, one cannot call a horse a horse.

14[B]: White does not fix what is white, this can be put aside. « White horse » speaks of white fixing what is white. That which fixes what is white is not white. « Horse » does not pick or exclude color, thus a brown or black horse can be brought. « White horse » does pick or exclude color; brown and black horses are excluded by color, thus only a white horse can be brought. That which does not exclude is not that which does exclude. Thus I say: « a white horse is not a horse ».

Forke

1— Is it possible that a white horse is no horse
— Yes.

3 How ?
4 A horse denotes a shape, white a colour. Describing a colour one does not describe a shape, therefore I say that a white horse is no horse.

5. There being a white horse, one cannot say that there is no horse. If one cannot say that there is no horse, can the existence of the horse be denied?There being a white horse, one must admit that there is a horse; how can whiteness bring about the non-existence of a horse ?

6. When a horse is required, yellow and black ones can all be brought, but when a white horse is wanted, there is no room for yellow and black ones. Now let a white horse be a horse ! It is but one kind of hose required. Then, one of those required, a white horse would not be different from a horse. Those required do not differ. Would then yellow and black ones meet the requirement or not ? In so far as they would meet the requirement or not, they would evidently exclude each other. Yellow as well as black horses are each one kind ; they correspond to a call for a horse, but not to a call for a white horse. Hence it results that a white horse cannot be a horse.

7. — A horse having colour is considered no horse. But there are no colourless horses on earth ! Are there, therefore, no horses on earth ?

8 A horse having colour is considered no horse. But there are no colourless horses on earth! Are there, therefore, no horses on earth? 8. Horses of course have colour, therefore there are white horses. If horses had no colour there would be merely horses. But how can we single out white horses, for whiteness is no horse? A white horse is a horse and whiteness. Such being the case, I hold that a white horse is no horse’.

ATC
A DIALECTICIAN WANTS TO CROSS THE FRONTIER
ON HIS WHITE HORSE

The dialectician Kung-sun Lung

Kung-sun Lung’s paradoxical claim:

ATC
Irony

Huan T’an (43 BCE. – 28 CE.), Sin-Lun (“New Treatise”) 

Pokora Timoteus, 1975 Sin-Lun (“New Treatise”) and Other Writings by Huan T’an (43 B.C. – 28 A.D.). An Annotated Translation with Index. Ann Arbor Center for Chinese Studies The University of Michigan. P. 124

 [135A] Kung-sun Lung was a dialectician who lived at the time of the Six Kingdoms. He wrote a treatise on “Hard and White” and, to illustrate his theory, said that a white horse is not a horse. To show that a white horse is not a horse, he said that “white » is that by which one names the color and horse that by which one names the form. The color is not the form, and the form is not the color.

[135B] Kung-sun Lung often argued that “a white horse is not a horse”. People could not agree with this. Later, when riding a white horse, he wished to pass through the frontier pass without a warrant or a passport. But the frontier official would not accept his explanations, for it is hard for empty words to defeat reality. (fragment 135B)

Pokora  1975, Sin-Lun (“New Treatise”), p. 124

Pa Kin, Famille. Traduit du chinois par Li Tche-houa et Jacqueline Alezaïs. Paris, Flammarion, 1979.

Le surlendemain […eut lieu la révision des articles pour le n°8. Le cadet y assista comme d’habitude. Á son arrivée, Telle que Sourire lisait à haute voix une proclamation de la police interdisant aux femmes de porter les cheveux courts. Le jeune homme la connaissait déjà; elle était, disait-on, l’œuvre d’un talent en fleur (¹) de l’ancienne dynastie. Le fond, simpliste, et la forme même, peu correcte, suscitaient à chaque phrase la gaieté de tous les auditeurs.
— C’est vraiment se moquer des gens! Que veut-il dire? s’écria Telle que sourire en jetant la feuille à terre.
— On pourrait publier ce chef-d’œuvre dans le prochain numéro sous la rubrique « Histoire de rire”, proposa Réserve de bienveillance.
— Bravo ! applaudit la jeune fille.

Tous approuvèrent. Telle que grâce ajouta qu’il serait bon de joindre une réfutation cinglante.

(¹) Titre officiel des anciennes dynasties, traduit généralement par le terme : bachelier.

Excerpt from Ba Jin, Family (Chia)

Two days later […] the revision of the articles for the next issue of the magazine took place. The youngest attended as usual. When he arrived, Such as smile read aloud a police proclamation forbidding women to wear their hair short. The young man was already familiar with it; it was said to be the work of a blossoming talent (1) of the ancient dynasty. The content, simplistic, and even the form, not very correct, aroused the gaiety of all the listeners at each sentence.
— This is really making fun of people! What does he mean? exclaimed Such as smile, while throwing the sheet on the ground.
— We could publish this masterpiece in the next issue under the heading « Let’s laugh a bit », proposed Reserve of benevolence.
— Bravo! applauded the girl.

All approved. Such as grace added that it would be good to attach a scathing refutation.

(1) Official title of the ancient dynasties, generally translated by the term: bachelor.
Translation adapted from www.DeepL.com/Translator (free version)

1. Le discours renversé

(T1) In by-gone days, Mi Tzŭ-hsia was in favour with the Ruler of Wei. According to the Law of the Wei State, « whoever in secret rides in the Ruler’s coach shall have his feet cut off. » Once Mi Tzŭ-hsia’s mother fell ill. Somebody, hearing about this, sent a message to Mi Tzŭ late at night. Thereupon Mi Tzŭ on the pretence of the Ruler’s order rode in the Ruler’s coach. At the news of this, the Ruler regarded his act as worthy, saying: « How dutiful he is! For his mother’s sake he even forgot that he was committing a crime making him liable to lose his feet. » Another day, when taking a stroll with the Ruler in an orchard, he ate a peach. It being so sweet, he did not finish it, but gave the Ruler the remaining half to eat. So, the Ruler said: « You love me so much indeed, that you would even forget your own saliva taste and let me eat the rest of the peach. » When the colour of Mi Tzŭ faded, the Ruler’s love for him slackened. Once he happened to offend the Ruler, the Ruler said: « This fellow once rode in my coach under pretence of my order and another time gave me a half-eaten peach. » The deeds of Mi Tzŭ had themselves never changed. Yet he was at first regarded as worthy and later found guilty because his master’s love turned into hate.
Han Fei Tse_Liao Ch. XII Difficulties in the Way of Persuasion

(T2)

Le conseiller n’est jamais en sécurité
(contrairement à l’orateur)

(T3) Conseiller, un emploi difficile …
Comment se faire écouter du monarque éclairé?

In remote antiquity, when T`ang <sup>8</sup> was the sanest and I Yin <sup>9</sup> the wisest of the age, though the wisest attempted to persuade the sanest, yet he was not welcomed even after seventy times of persuasion, till he had to handle pans and bowls and become a cook in order thereby to approach him and become familiar with him. In consequence T`ang came to know his worthiness and took him into service. Hence the saying: « Though the wisest man wants to persuade the sanest man, he is not necessarily welcomed upon his first arrival. » Such was the case of I Yin’s persuading T`ang. Again the saying: « Though the wise man wants to persuade the fool, he is not necessarily listened to. »
Han Fei Tse_Liao Chapter III. On the Difficulty in Speaking: A Memorial

Aucun des antiques souverains ne fut plus saint que T’ang le Victorieux, nul vassal ne fut plus avisé que Yi Yin, et pourtant le plus sage des ministres parla soixante-dix fois au plus saint des rois avant de s’en faire écouter. Il fallut qu’il entrât dans les cuisines comme maître queux pour que son roi, l’ayant en familiarité, découvrît ses vertus et lui donnât un emploi. L’histoire de Yi Yin illustre à l’évidence que le plus sage des sujets peut donner des conseils au plus sage des princes sans qu’ils soient retenus.

 ♦

(T4) … et dangereux
Le monarque stupide peut mettre à mort son  conseiller; « tranformé en hachis, il marine dans la saumure ».

En effet, pour juste que soit votre jugement, pour sensés que soient vos arguments, seront-ils pour autant entendus ? Et ne peut-on craindre d’être au mieux calomnié et mis à mort?
Wou Tse hsiu eut la tête tranchée malgré son astuce, l’éloquence de Confucius ne lui évita pas d’être assiégé à K’ouang . […] Était-ce parce que ces personnages manquaient de vertu ? Nullement, mais leurs maîtres n’étaient pas des monarques éclairés.

Le marquis de Yi fut rôti, celui de Kouei salé et séché ; le prince Pi-kan eut le cœur arraché ; Mei Po transformé en hachis, marina dans la saumure ; Kouan Yi-wou fut emprisonné, Tchao Ki dut s’enfuit à Tch’en, Po-li tse mendia sur les chemins

CORRELATIVE TERMS

Correlative terms are also called relative or reciprocal terms, and can be thought of as opposite terms. Mother and child are correlative terms, that is, they are related by immediate inference:

If A is the mother of B, then B is the child of A.

Correlative terms are defined by reference to each other; mother is defined as « woman with children »; child is defined as « son or daughter of a woman ». The following are correlative terms:

cause / effect; double / half; master / slave
action / passion; sell / buy

Generally speaking, two predicates R1 and R2 are in a correlative relation if

A_R1_B <=> B_R2_A
A_Mother_B <=> B_Child_A

« By definition, correlatives are opposites »; they are « ontologically simultaneous » (Hamelin [1905], p. 133). The theme of the correlative is #3 on Aristotle’s list:

Another line of proof is based on correlative ideas (Rhet, II, 23, 3; RR, p. 357).

The topos is illustrated by the enthymemes:

Where it is right to command obedience, it must have been right to obey the command.

If it is no shame for you to sell it, it is no shame for us to buy it (ibid.).

.These conclusions have limits:

If it is legal/tolerated to buy 2 grams of marijuana, then one may sell 2 grams of marijuana.

But what about « possession » and « purchase »?

If it is legal/tolerated to possess 2 grams of marijuana,
then it is legal/tolerated to buy 2g,
then it is legal/tolerated to sell it.

Since the only way for me to get marijuana is to buy it. But the law can distinguish between two kinds of « possession »: possession for personal use is not a crime, but possession for trafficking is.

The following case deals with two pairs of correlatives, knowing/learning and ordering / obeying, articulated by the topos of opposites:

If you want to command, you must first learn to obey (see supra).
The executive, on his way up, had to learn to obey in order to know how to command (quoted in Linguee).

Mencius, “If he had asked me, ‘Who should attack Yan?’”

2B.8 Shen Tong asked Mencius in private confidence, “Do you think Yan ought to be attacked?”

Mencius said, “Yes. Zikuai had no authority to give Yan away, and Zizhi had no authority to receive it from Zikuai. Let’s say there was a gentleman here whom you liked; what if you, without consulting the King, privately granted to him your court rank and salary, and he accepted them without any commission from the King? What difference is there in the case of Yan?”

The armies of Qi attacked Yan, and someone said to Mencius, “Is it true that you urged Qi to attack Yan?”

“Never!” said Mencius. “Shen Tong asked whether Yan ought to be attacked and I said yes, in response to his question. Then they went off and attacked Yan! If he had asked me, ‘Who should attack Yan?’ I would have replied, ‘He who acts as the agent of Tian should attack Yan.’

“Let’s say there were a murderer here, and someone asked, ‘Should this man be executed?’ I would say yes. If he asked, ‘Who should execute him?’ I would reply, ‘The Chief Judge should execute him.’

“As it is, this is simply one Yan attacking another Yan. Why would I ever urge such a thing?”

2B.8 We return here to events surrounding Qi’s invasion of Yan in 314 (see 1B.10-11). Mencius is reported in a different early text to have given his approval of the invasion of Yan by Qi, and here the Mencius seems at pains to explain that this is not so. Note how it is specified that the courtier Shen Tong visited Mencius in an unofficial capacity.

The background events in Yan are that the ruler, Zikuai, abdicated to his minister, Zizhi, prompting Zikuai’s son – the original heir to the throne – to initiate a civil war.

Deux questions

Stase sur l’acte : Question1:  — Y a-t-il eu meurtre? OUI
[— le meurtrier doit être puni = exécuté]

Stase sur l’agent Question2:  — Qui doit prendre en charge l’exécution?

Dictionnaire, Composition et division

L’exemple suivant est emprunté au drame de Sophocle Électre : Clytemnestre tue son mari, Agamemnon. Oreste, leur fils, tue Clytemnestre pour venger son père. Mais avait-il le droit légal et moral de tuer sa mère ?

Il est juste que celle qui a tué son mari meure, et il est juste aussi, assurément que le fils venge son père ; ces deux actions ont donc été accomplies justement ; mais peut-être que, réunies, elles cessent d’être justes. (Rhét., II, 24,1401a35-b5 ; p. 407).

Réunir les deux actions signifie qu’elles n’en font plus qu’une. Oreste soutient que cette composition est licite :

Composition : X est juste et Y est juste => X et Y sont justes
(X) “venger son père” est juste et “ (Y) exécuter la femme qui a tué son mari” est juste

Or si “venger son père” est juste, “tuer sa mère” est un crime. Pour les accusateurs d’Oreste, le fait qu’il soit le fils de Clytemnestre bloque la composition, car il n’est pas possible de composer une action vertueuse et une action criminelle. La stase dramatique se noue autour de l’argument de la composition.

Cette technique de décomposition d’une action douteuse en une suite d’actes louables, ou au moins innocents est argumentativement très productive : voler, ce n’est jamais que prendre le sac qui se trouve là, le déplacer ailleurs et négliger de le remettre à la même place. La division bloque l’évaluation globale.

What Is Shun's Awful Family Doing in the Mencius?

Warp, Weft, and Way

Chinese and Comparative Philosophy 中國哲學與比較哲學

Take 2B/8 as an example. In Qi, Shen Tong asks Mencius whether Yan should be invaded, and he says it should. The text insists that Shen wasn’t acting in an official capacity, but of course it only does that because it’s obvious that Mencius’s answer will be passed on. Indeed, Qi invades Yan and the invasion is a brutal mess. Questioned about this, Mencius insists that he only said that Yan should be invaded, he didn’t say anything about who should do the invading. (Imagine—of course I mean remember—someone in early 2003 saying that Iraq should be invaded, and then after the fact complaining that George Bush hadn’t been the one to do it.)

2B/8 isn’t in the Mencius because of any philosophical point it makes. Even the passages where the Mencius uses the invasion of Yan to present the Mencian fantasy of a true king (whose armies are welcomed with rice and wine wherever they invade) aren’t there just to present that view (1B/11). Mencius’s involvement in the invasion of Yan left him with an image problem, and these passages are attempts to address that problem. Mencius still comes off as a coward and a liar, but I guess that’s better than leaving the criticisms unanswered.

My suggestion is that the stories about Shun’s awful family, or at least 5A/2–3, are there for the same sort of reason. There was a mythology surrounding Shun, and that mythology was not under the control of pious moralists such as the authors of the Mencius. As a consequence, elements creeped into the mythology that would make pious moralists extremely nervous—elements such as Shun’s predilection for putting up with murderers in his family