Archives de l’auteur : Christian Plantin

Abduction

ABDUCTION

Latin abductio, “action of taking”, by an outwardly directed movement (see below, meaning 2).

1. Abduction as Inference from Facts to Hypothesis

The concept of abduction was introduced to modern philosophy by philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce. According to Peirce, there are two kinds of inferences: deductive inference and abductive inference or abduction. Abduction starts from the observation of a fact that is “contrary to what we should expect” (Peirce ([1958], § 202), that is to say, a fact that does not fit into an available explanatory system. Abduction is a process by which one proposes a hypothesis accounting for this new fact.
This hypothesis is not the product of the applying a “discovery algorithm”, but rather the fruit of a creative process. “Abduction is, after all, nothing but guessing” (Peirce [1958], § 219).

Abduction is not an issue in logic, but rather a scientific method (id., Chap. 6). Scientific work consists of proposing, on the basis of facts, plausible hypotheses “suggested” by these facts. Abduction is the first step in this process.
The practice of abduction is not guided by logical rules but rather by general principles, such as the principle of exclusion of so-called metaphysical hypotheses, that is to say, hypotheses that would have no experimental consequences, or the principle according to which every fact has an explanation. An abductive hypothesis is interesting “if it seems to make the world reasonable” (id., §202).

Unlike abduction, which starts with facts and searches for theory, the Peircean deduction starts with a theory in search of facts; that is, it seeks to identify the crucial experimental consequences of a hypothesis.

Rather than being a form of deduction or induction, argumentation should be seen as a form of abduction. For example, when the light is on, “I abduct”, that is, I hypothesize, that someone is in the room; however, this hypothesis still needs to be verified, see probable, plausible, true.

Woods redefines abductions as “responses to ignorance-problems. An agent has an ignorance-problem in relation to an epistemic target that cannot be hit by the cognitive resources presently at his command, or within easy and timely reach of it” (Woods, 2009; Gabbay & Woods, 2005). The study of argument as an abductive process has proved especially fruitful in the fields of medicine, science and law (Walton 2004).

2. Abduction as Reduction of Uncertainty

In its Peircean sense, abduction is a type of inference by which one arrives at a hypothesis that accounts for a given fact. Aristotle defines abduction as a kind of dialectical syllogism (Aristotle, PA, II, 25), in which the major premise is true and the minor merely probable, and, consequently, the conclusion also probable. Without the minor, the conclusion alone is more improbable than the minor. Therefore, the minor strengthens the relative acceptability of the conclusion. This situation recalls the Ciceronian definition of argumentation, see argumentation 1.

For example, if the question is: “can virtue be taught?” we can reason as follows:

A true premise: it is clear that science can be taught.
A doubtful premise: virtue is a science.
Conclusion: virtue can be taught.

Though uncertain, the veracity of the second premise is still less in doubt than the conclusion “virtue can be taught”. Therefore, this second premise may serve as an argument for the conclusion. We find this montage in speeches such as:

Citizenship can be taught.
Citizenship is essentially a set of social knowledge and practices.
Knowledge can be taught and all practical skills can be improved by teaching. Therefore, citizenship can be taught.

Arguments function “for want of better”. Reducing uncertainty modifyies the epistemic status of a belief. This is a logic not of elimination but of reduction of doubt and uncertainty, see default reasoning.

Ab exemplo argument

AB EXEMPLO

Latin exemplum, “example”.

In law, the label ab exemplo refers to an argument that interprets the law based on:

A previous case, see precedent.
A traditional interpretation, “the doctrine generally accepted” (Tarello, quoted in Perelman 1979, p. 59).

The argument ab exemplo is therefore distinct from the argument from example.

A / Ab — Arguments (A Contrario…)

A / Ab – arguments, e.g. « A contrario« arg.

Some argument schemes are designated by Latin labels, see Ab —; Ad —; Ex —. This entry lists the labels using the Latin preposition a / ab.

The same Latin preposition has two forms, a or ab: in general, a is used before a noun beginning with a consonant (a contrario argument), and ab before a noun beginning with a vowel (ab auctoritate argument).

1. The Construction

In Classical Latin, the preposition a / ab means “separation; away from” and governs the ablative case. Grammatically, ab / a introduces only a circumstantial clause of a verb, indicating the origin. This means that the Latin construction “argumentum ab + N” is to be interpreted as elliptical for “argumentum [ducetur, “drawn”] ab [“from”] N”. Latin texts regularly use expressions of this type, Cicero for example, wrote in the Topics:

Cum autem a genere ducetur argumentum (my emphasis) (IX, 39; p. 411);

that is “when, however, an argument is drawn from genus”. Genere is the ablative case of the noun genus; the construction is “argumentum [ducetur] a genere”, “argument [provided by, taken] [from] the genus”. Similarly, the rhetoric Ad Herennius suggests that, in order to amplify the charge, the orator must first look for arguments drawn from authority:

primus locus ab auctoritate sumitur (my emphasis) (Ad Her., II, 48; p. 147).

That is “the first commonplace [primus locus] is taken [sumitur] from [ab] authority [auctoritate]”. Auctoritate is the ablative case of auctoritas, “authority”. Locus literally means “place”, and is used here metaphorically as “inferential commonplace” or “argument scheme”, see. Topos, Topic Common,place.

2. List of the “Ab/a + N” arguments

The set of “ab / a + N” arguments belongs to the original stock of Latin argument labels. Its core is drawn from the Ciceronian typology, passed on to the Middle Ages by Boethius, up to modern times S. Collections (2).

Table
First column: Latin name of the argument
Second column:
• Meaning of the word(s) (based on Gaffiot).
• (When necessary a word-for-word translation)
• Reference for the corresponding entry.

Latin name of the argument	• Latin term(s) and their English equivalent(s) • (Global translation) • Corresponding entry/ies.
ab auctoritate	Lat. auctoritas, “authority” — S. Authority; Modesty
a carcere	Lat. carcer, “jail” — S. Threat; Emotion.
a coherentia	Lat. cohærentia, “coherence, consistency” — S. Consistency.
a comparatione	Lat. comparatio, “comparison; confrontation” S. Comparison; A fortiori; Analogy
a completudine	Lat. completus, “complete” — S. Completeness
a conjugata	Lat. conjugatus “belonging to the same family” S. Related Words
a contrario (sensu) (or: ex contrario)	Lat. contrarius “opposite, contrary” — S. Opposites
a consequentibus	Lat. consequens “close; what logically follows” S. Circumstances; Consequences.
a fortiori a fortiori ratione	Lat. a fortiori ratione, “for a stronger reason”; ratio, “reason”; fortior = fortis + higher degree comparative “stronger” — S. A fortiori
a generali sensu	Lat. generalis, “general”; sensus “meaning, point of view” — S. Generality of the law
a genere	Lat. genus, “genus” — Argument from genus S. Genus; Classification; Definition; a pari
a pari	Lat. par, “equal, same”  — S. a pari
a posteriori	Lat. posterus, “which comes after” —S. A priori; A posteriori
a priori	Lat. prior, “the first of two, superior” — S. A priori; A posteriori
a repugnantibus	Lat. repugnans, from repugnare “contradictory; contrary; incompatible” — S. A repugnantibus; Opposites.
a rubrica	Lat. rubrica, “title of the section (law)” — S. Title
a silentio	Lat. silentium, “silence” — S. Silence.
a simili	Lat. similis, “resembling, similar” — S. Analogy; a pari
ab absurdo [or: ad absurdum]	Lat. absurdus, “absurd” — S. Absurd.
ab adjunctis	Lat. adjuncta, “attached to” — argumenta ex adjunctis ducta, arg. from circumstances — S. Circumstances.
ab antecedentibus	Lat. antecedens, “preceding” — S. Circumstances.
ab consequentibus	Lat. consequens, “following” — S. Circumstances; Consequences.
ab auctoritate (or:  ad auctoritatem)	Lat. auctoritas, “authority” — S. Authority.
ab enumeratione partium	Lat. enumeratio “enumeration”; pars, “part” arg. from enumeration of parts S. Composition — Division; Case-by-case; Definition.
ab exemplo	Lat. exemplum “example” S. Example; Exemplum; Precedent.
ab inutilitate	Lat. inutilitas, “useless, dangerous” — S. Superfluity
ab utili	Lat. utilitas, “useful, beneficial” — S. Pragmatic argument

The a / ab arguments constitute the original stock of arguments whose core is taken from Cicero’s typology, S. Collection (2). From Aristotle to Boethius

Unlike the ad arguments, these labels never refer to emotions or subjective beliefs.

The ad arguments are clearly arguments and not fallacies. In other words, when using the label “ad + N” argument we take the perspective of the proponent, who produces and presents the argument, rather than the opponent impacted by the argument.

A repugnantibus

A REPUGNANTIBUS Argument

The label a repugnantibus is borrowed from Latin frepugnans “contradictory; resistant, contrary, incompatible”.
The term repugnant meaning “disgusting” is also derived from this source, but the argument a repugnantibus is not the “argument of disgust”, see emotions.
The meaning of Latin repugnans in a repugnantibus is closer to “revolting, unacceptable”, the second meaning of the English wordrepugnant.

1. In Cicero’s Topica, the argument a repugnantibus is based on logically “contradictory” things (Cicero, Top, XII, 53; p. 420).
In her translation of Boethius, Stump translates a repugnantibus as “from incompatible [things]” (Boethius Top. p. 64), see contradiction; opposites.

The argument a repugnantibus is based on contradiction, whereas the argument ad incommodum involves consequences that are subjectively unacceptable to the speaker, either from a material or a moral point of view, see pragmatic argument.

2. Bossuet defines the argument a repugnantibus as a contradiction between action and speech: “Your conduct does not correspond to your speech” ([1677], p. 140), which corresponds to the third type of ad hominem. argument.

Indétermination du sens

Ang. Uncertainty of meaning

1. Le sens dans les langages logiques et dans le langage ordinaire

Les langages logiques, formels et scientifiques se distinguent du langage naturel par leur univocité. À chaque chaîne signifiante (terme ou expression), simple ou complexe, correspond une signification (interprétation) et une seule. De telles chaînes ne connaissent ni le vide de sens (le non-sens), ni l’obscurité, ni le flou (le vague), ni l’ambiguité, ni la multiplicité des sens (ambiguïté), ni les variations de sens dans un discours comme dans domaine.

Dans le langage ordinaire, l’interprétabilité des chaînes signifiantes n’est pas garantie. Une chaîne signifiante peut être :

— Vide de sens, ou ininterprétable (non-sens).
Dans le cas le plus général, il est impossible d’attribuer au segment linguistique un sens quelconque. On ne lui trouve pas de paraphrase satisfaisante (acceptable dans ce contexte). Le texte est totalement obscur, il pose un défi interprétatif, il est inexploitable par le récepteur.

— Obscure. Il est difficile de formuler la moindre interprétation.
Un texte énigmatique n’est pas un texte obscur, dans la mesure où l’énigme a une clé, qui peut éventuellement être trouvée au terme d’un cheminement interprétatif.
La coexistence dans un même discours d’orientations incompatibles est une cause majeure d’obscurité pragmatique.

— Floue ou vague. Il est possible d’attacher à la même chaîne signifiante plusieurs interprétations également douteuses et discutables.
On parle de flou et de vague à propos de phénomènes limites qui apparaissent particulièrement à propos de la catégorisation et de la définition.
Le vague du discours peut être également lié aux questions de généralisation et de particularisation.

— Ambiguë. La chaîne signifiante est ambigüe si on peut lui plusieurs interprétations nettement distinctes et incompatibles. L’interprétation hésite entre deux ou plusieurs sens possibles pour le même segment.

— Instable. Le sens d’une même chaîne peut varier ou s’obscurcir, dans un même discours, V. Objet de discours.

Globalement, ces cinq caractéristiques — non-sens, obscurité, flou, ambiguïté, instabilité — opposent le langage scientifique, qui est le prototype du langage transparent, au langage naturel qui comporte nécessairement une part d’opacité.
Si l’on définit l’activité de raisonnement à partir du raisonnement logico-scientifique, alors l’incertitude du sens dans le discours ordinaire fait apparaître le langage naturel comme un mauvais milieu particulièrement peu favorable au développement du raisonnement.

2. Exploitation argumentative de l’incertitude sémantique

Le sens d’un discours est le produit d’une activité rhétorique d’expression et d’une activité herméneutique d’interprétation. Le sentiment d’incertitude du sens, peut avoir sa source dans l’incertitude de l’expression ou dans celle l’interprétation.
Ce sentiment d’indétermination se matérialise par un jugement porté par le récepteur. Comme le jugement de clarté, il peut varier avec les récepteurs.
Dans le cas de discours argumentatifs, le jugement d’incertitude porté sur un discours sert à le réfuter. Le discours cible est invalidé sur le plan logique et rejeté sur le plan interactionnel, V. Destruction du discours. On lui dénie toute pertinence pour l’échange en cours. Comme tous les jugements, le jugement d’incertitude demande donc à être justifié.
Dans certains genres de discours et d’interaction, le sentiment d’incertitude peut être vu, à juste titre, comme une richesse stimulant l’interprétation. Ils exploitent positivement ce que le discours argumentatif rejette comme fallacieux.

L’interprétation d’un discours tient compte du genre et du type d’échange dans lesquels entrent ce discours, et avant tout de son contexte immédiat, l’échange auquel il apporte une contribution. On peut réfuter une accusation d’indétermination en montrant que l’indétermination est levée par la prise en compte d’un ou plusieurs de ces éléments.

Le dialogue collaboratif joue un rôle essentiel dans la levée de l’indétermination ou de la sous-détermination, lorsque le discours n’atteint pas le niveau de pertinence requis par l’échange.

Political Arguments: Two Collections

POLITICAL arguments

1. The parameters of political debate

Political deliberation is a problem-solving activity. The following interrogative framework groups the most common questions that must be answered before deciding whether or not to adopt or reject a measure of general interest

Is this measure legal? Fair? Honorable? Timely? Useful? Necessary? Safe? Possible? Easy? Pleasant? What are the foreseeable consequences? (From Nadeau 1958, p. 62).

This framework operates on different modes.
— In the interrogative-deliberative mode, it guides a practical decision-making process:

If you are considering such an action, consider whether it is just, necessary, feasible, glorious, profitable, and whether it will have positive consequences.

In this case, the set of questions is used as a heuristic. One can take up a responsible political position on a given issue by examining each point and giving a well-reasoned answer to each question.

— In the prescriptive-justificatory mode, it helps to develop a global, positive or negative persuasive argumentative script about an issue:

If you want to support (or to attack) such measure, show that it is (or it is not) just, necessary, etc.

— In the analytical-critical mode, it serves to test the completeness of an argumentation

You argue that this measure is just, necessary, glorious; but you say nothing about its consequences and the practical modalities of its realization.

In practice, this simple, robust and effective rules applies to any practical public or private decision.

2. Arguments/fallacies of parliamentary debate: Bentham’s collection

In The Book of Fallacies [1824], Bentham focuses exclusively on fallacious arguments in parliamentary debates. This collection is strongly oriented towards the refutation of conservative discourse, see collection (II). In the same spirit, Hirschman has analyzed The Rhetoric of Reaction (1991).
In politics, sophists are accused of engaging in obstructive or manipulative maneuvers, producing bad arguments in bad faith, rejecting legitimate discussion, and serving dishonest or unpopular ends.

Bentham distinguishes four main categories of fallacies: fallacies of authority, of danger; of delay, andof confusion.

(i) Fallacies of authority

See Modesty; Threat; Politeness; Personal Attack

— « The wisdom of our ancestors, or Chinese argument; ad verecundiam. » (p.69)

— « Irrevocable law; ad superstitionem« .

— « Fallacy of vows or promissory oaths; ad superstitionem »

The object of this fallacy is the same as in the preceding; but to the absurdity involved in the notion of tying up the hands of generations yet to come is added, in this case, that which consists in the use sought to be made of supernatural power. (p. 104)

— « No-precedent argument; ad verecundiam »

The proposition is of a novel and unprecedented complexion: the present is surely the first time that any such thing was ever heard of in this house. (p. 115)

— « Self-assumed authority; ad ignorantiam; ad verecundiam » (p. 116)

— « Self-trumpeter’s fallacy »

There are certain men in office who (…) arrogate to themselves a degree of probity, which is to exclude all imputations and all inquiry. (p. 120)

— « Laudatory personalities; ad amicitiam »

The object of laudatory personalities is to effect the rejection of a measure on account of the alleged good character of those who oppose it. (p. 123)

(ii) Fallacies of danger, appeals to fear (ad metum) or hatred (ad odium) to supress discussion

See Emotion; Threat.

— “Vituperative personalities; ad odium” (p. 128). Attacking the person: “Imputation of bad design; of bad character; of bad motive; of inconsistency; of suspicious connections; imputation founded on identity of denomination.” (p. 127-128)

— “Hobgoblin argument or: No innovation! ad metum” (p. 145) – Innovation leads to anarchy.

— “Fallacy of mistrust – What’s at the bottom?” (p. 154)

— “Official Malefactor’s Screen (ad metum) – Attack us, you attack Government.” (p. 158)

— “Accusation-Scarer’s Device.” (p. 184)

(iii) Fallacies of Delay

These fallacies play for time, with the intention of “postponing discussion, with a view of eluding it”. Some are based on stupidity and laziness (Lat. socordia):

— “The quietist, or ‘No complaint’ (ad quietem). No one complains, therefore nobody suffers” (p.190); so, no need to change.

— “False consolation (ad quietem)”

Look at the people there, and there: think how much better off you are than they are. (p. 194)

— “Procrastinator’s Argument (ad socordiam)” « Wait a little, this is not the time!” (p. 198)

— “Snail’s Pace Argument (ad socordiam])”:

One thing at a time! Not too fast! Slow and sure! (p. 201)

— “Artful diversion (ad verecundiam)”

Why that? (meaning the measure already proposed) — Why not this? — or this? (p. 209)

(iv) Fallacies of confusion

“[Their] object is to perplex, when discussion can no longer be avoided” (p. 213), see personal attack; ambiguity; ad populum; for ad judicium, see matter

— “Question-begging appellatives (ad judicium)”

The use of “eulogistic terms” and “dyslogistic or vituperative terms”. (p. 214)

— “Impostor terms (ad judicium)”

For instance, persecutors in matters of religion have no such word as persecution in their vocabulary; zeal is the word by which they characterize all their actions. (p. 221)

— “Vague generalities (ad judicium)”,

A fallacy resorted to by those who, in preference to the most particular and determinate terms and expression (…) employ others more general and indeterminate. (p. 230)

— “Allegorical idols (ad imaginationem)”

substituting for men’s official denomination the name of some fictitious entity, to whom (…) the attribute of excellence has been attached. Example: Government, for members of the governing body. (p. 258)

— “Sweeping classifications (ad judicium)”

Ascribing to an individual (…) any properties of another, only because the object in question is ranked in the class with that other. (p. 265)
Example 1: Kings; Crimes of Kings (…) criminals ought to be punished; kings are criminals, and Louis is a king: therefore Louis ought to be punished). (p. 266)

— “Sham distinctions (ad judicium)”

Declare your approbation of the good by its eulogistic name, and thus reserve to yourself the advantage of opposing it without reproach by its dyslogistic name (…) Example 1: Liberty and licen- tiousness of the press. (p. 271)

— “Popular corruption (ad superbiam)”

The source of corruption is in the minds of the people; so rank and extensively seated is that corruption that no political reform can ever have any effect in removing it: This was an argument brought forward against parliamentary reform. (p. 279)

— “Anti-rational fallacies (ad verecundiam)”

When reason is found or supposed to be in opposition to a man’s interest, his study will naturally be to render the faculty itself and whatsoever issues from it an object of hatred and contempt. (p. 295)

— “Paradoxical assertions (ad judicium)”

When of any measure, practice or principle the utility is too far above dispute to be capable of being impeached by rea- soning, a rhetorician (…) in a sort of fit of desperation (…) he has assailed it with some vehement note of reprobation or strain of invective” (p. 314). “Ex- ample: Good method, a bad thing. (p. 316)

— “Non causa pro causa (ad judicium)”

When in a system which has good points in it you have a set of abuses (…) to defend; (…) take the abuse you have to defend (…) and to them ascribe the credit of having given birth to the good effects. (p. 328)

— “Partiality-preacher’s argument (ad judicium)

“From the abuse, argue not against use.” (p. 339) – A discussion

— “The end justifies the means (ad judicium)” – A discussion of the maxim (p. 341).

— “Opposer-general’s justification (ad invidiam)”

it is not right for a man to argue against his own opinion. (…) If a member of the House of Commons, and in opposition, a measure which to him seems a proper one is brought on the carpet on the ministerial side, it is not right that he should declare it to be, in his opinion, pernicious, and use his endeavours to have it thought so, and treated as such by the House. (p. 344), and reciprocally.

— “Rejection instead of amendment (ad judicium)”

This fallacy consists in urging in the character of a bar, or conclusive objection against the proposed measure, some consideration, which, if presented in the character of an amendment, might have more or less claim to notice. (p. 349)

***

Bentham condemns these maneuvers as prima facie fallacies, and discusses them further under the corresponding headings.

He does not express the fallacies under any “logical form”, but presents them in the form of statements which are condensed arguments, sometimes in the form of a slogan. The topoi are getting closer to the discursive clichés.

Politeness

POLITENESS

The linguistic aspects of interpersonal relations are governed by a set of principles that define linguistic politeness:

Politeness refers to all aspects of discourse that 1. are governed by rules, 2. intervene in the interpersonal relationship, and 3. have the function of maintaining a harmonious relationship (at worst: neutralizing potential conflicts, and at best: ensuring that each participant is as open to the other as possible). (Kerbrat-Orecchioni 1992, pp. 159; 163)

Ordinary conversation is governed by the principle of preference for agreement. The interactionist theory of politeness (Brown and Levinson, 1978) defines individuals by their faces and their territories. Polite intervention respects rules of positive politeness and rules of negative politeness, both toward oneself and toward the interlocutor.

In argumentative situations, this preference for agreement is transformed into a preference for disagreement (Bilmes, 1991). Differences are maximized, with consequences for all components of the linguistic politeness system. The case of the ad verecundiam argument is a typical illustration of this transformation, see preference for agreement.

The interactionist theory of politeness (Brown and Levinson, 1978) defines individuals by their faces and their territories. Polite intervention respects rules of positive politeness and rules of negative politeness, both toward oneself and toward the interlocutor.

1. Politeness Oriented Towards the Addressee

Negative politeness recommends the avoidance of face-threatening actions, while positive politeness recommends positive actions in relation with respect to the territories and the face of the interlocutor (Kerbrat-Orecchioni 1992, p. 184).

The argumentative situation reverses these principles. The rules of positive politeness are not applied, while those of negative politeness are reversed. For example, the rule « avoid encroachments on the private territories of the interlocutor » (id., p. 184) corresponds to a principle of non-aggression, « do not violate the territory of the other ». In an argumentative situation, there is necessarily a form of aggression and territorial conflict, with encroachments and counter-encroachments.

Another general rule of politeness recommends that parties « refrain from making disparaging remarks, too sharp criticisms, too radical refutations, too violent reproaches » (ibid.) – towards their interlocutor; whereas in an argumentative situation radical refutation is sought rather than avoided and negative challenging of the opponent is a standard strategy. Positive praise for the interlocutor is rare, and when it occurs, it can be an indirect attack on his current positions, see counter-argumentation.
The prohibition of personal attack is a matter of courtesy aimed at protecting the interlocutor for aspects of his person that are not at stake in the debate.

2. Self-Centered Politeness

The principles of defending one’s territory recommend that one,

protect one’s territory as much as possible (resist overly invasive incursions, do not allow oneself to be dragged through the mud, do not allow one’s image to be unfairly degraded, respond to criticism, attacks, and insults) (ibid., pp. 182-183).

In argumentative situations, participants vigorously apply these protective principles. In non-argumentative situations, the speaker’s territory is to be protected, but not unduly extended and praised; « our societies severely judge complacency and pro domo advocacy » except in « exceptional circumstances » (ibid.). These exceptional circumstances are precisely those of argumentative situations in which the speakers do not hesitate to praise their persons as well as their territories, that is, their points of view and arguments. The principles of moderation and self-esteem are thus put on hold. In non-argumentative interactions, « if one must praise oneself, it should at least be in the muted mode of understatement » (ibid., 184); one can even « slightly damage one’s own territory and practice light self-criticism » (ibid., 154). This principle requires a willingness to compromise and concede, all of which the arguing speaker may or may not do without being rude.

The conclusion is that argumentative situations locally suspend the application of the rules of politeness in relation to the objects and persons involved in the discussion. This can even be seen as a fundamental characteristic, a defining criterion of such situations. The protagonists use a kind of « anti-system of politeness » that reflects the system of politeness. However, to speak of a « system of impoliteness » would imply that all these interventions are perceived as rude, which is not the case, notwithstanding the fact that in such situations the partners can engage in polemics about the « tone » of their interventions.

The redefinition of the politeness system applies strictly to the aspects of the person, the face, and the territories involved in the argumentative conflict. Outside of these areas, the rules of politeness still apply. Thus, it is possible for an arguer to praise his personality and possessions and to attack the status or values of those of his opponent in an argumentative interaction where his behavior will independently be polite or impolite.

Persuasion

PERSUASION

1. Persuasion as the essence of rhetoric

Since Isocrates and Aristotle, argumentative rhetorical speech is commonly defined by its function, which is persuasion:

Rhetoric may be defined as the faculty of observing in any given case the available means of persuasion. (Rhet, I, 2, 1355b26, RR, p. 105).

According to Crassus as portrayed by Cicero, persuasion is the “first duty” of the orator (Cicero, De Or., I, XXXI; p. 40). Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, in their definition of argumentation, focus on how to “induce or increase the mind’s adherence to the theses presented for its assent” ([1958]/1969, p. 4; italics in the original) before elaborating on the notion of “adherence of the mind” by contrasting persuading and convincing speech, see assent; persuading and convincing.

According to these standard definitions, argumentative rhetoric is fundamentally concerned with the discourse structured by the illocutionary (overtly expressed in the discourse) intention to persuade, that is to communicate, explain, legitimize, and make the listeners share the speaker’s point of view and the words that express it. Persuasion, as a state of mind achieved through discourse, results from the realization of these intentions.

The rhetorical tradition binds the discourse of persuasion to the production of a plausible representation in the minds of the audience. This rhetorical representation of reality is considered to be antagonistic to truth by essentialist philosophers such as Plato, see probable.

2. A rhetoric without persuasion: The ars bene dicendi

Chapter 15 of Book II of Quintilian’s Institutes of Oratory is devoted to questioning the definition of rhetoric in relation to persuasion, “The most common definition therefore is that [rhetoric] is the power of persuading” (IO, II, 15, 3), a definition attributed to Isocrates. Quintilian rejects all definitions that associate rhetoric with persuasion:
— As the power to persuade:

But money, likewise, has the power of persuasion, as do interest, and the authority and dignity of a speaker, and even his very look, unaccompanied by language, when either the remembrance of the services of any individual, or a pitiable appearance, or beauty of person, draws forth an opinion. (Id., 6)

— Or as an instrument of persuasion, even with the restriction “power of persuading by speaking”:

Not only the orator, but also others, such as harlots, flatterers, and seducers, persuade or lead to that which they wish, by speaking. (Ibid.)

Finally, Quintilian takes up the definition of rhetoric attributed to the Stoics and Chrysippus, “rhetoricen esse bene dicendi scientiam” (id., p. 841), that is to say, “ rhetoric is the art to speak well and say the Good”:

The definition that [rhetoric] is the science of speaking well […] embraces all the virtues of [rhetoric] at once and includes also the character of the true orator, as he cannot speak well unless he be a good man. (Id., 34)

Its purpose is, “to think and speak rightly” (id., 36).

The rhetoric of persuasive communication and the rhetoric that focuses on the quality of expression have been contrasted as primary vs. secondary rhetoric (Kennedy 1999), or extrinsic vs. intrinsic rhetoric (Kienpointner 2003). We can also speak of an introverted rhetoric, which focuses on the quality of an expression based on intellectual rigor and depth of feeling. Extroverted, communicative rhetoric strives for eloquence, while introverted rhetoric requires an alternative concept of style.

Note that this distinction does not correspond to the distinction advanced in the 1960s, between restricted rhetoric and general rhetoric. Nor does it correspond to the distinction between the rhetoric of arguments and the rhetoric of figures. see rhetoric.

Introverted rhetoric is a rhetoric whose communicative and interactional dimensions, and thus its persuasiveness, are weakened, but which nevertheless remains an argumentative rhetoric. La Bruyère expresses the concept of such a rhetoric, which has renounced eloquence and persuasion, as follows:

We must only try to think and speak justly ourselves, without aiming to bring others over to our Tastes and Sentiments; that would be too great an undertaking. (La Bruyère, [Of the Works of Genius], [1688])[2].

3. From Persuasion to Action

In an essential but often neglected addition to the basic definition of argumentation, the Treatise on Argumentation extends the scope of persuasion through argumentation to action. Indeed, argumentation would produce the “disposition to act”:

The goal of argumentation, as we have said before, is to create or increase the adherence of minds to the theses presented for their assent. An efficacious argument is one which succeeds in increasing this intensity of adherence among those who hear it in such a way as to set in motion the intended action (a positive action or an abstention from action) or at least in creating in the hearers a willingness to act which will appear at the right moment. (Perelman, Olbrechts-Tyteca, [1958], p. 45)

This vision is restated a little later:

Argumentation alone […] allows us to understand our decisions. (Id, p. 37)

The end point of the argumentative process, then, is not persuasion seen as a mere mental state, an “adherence of the mind. The ultimate criterion of complete persuasion is an action accomplished in the sense suggested by the discourse, and emotion plays an essential role where in that enactment. Adherence beyond a certain degree would trigger action. This is a crucial point where argument, emotions, and values are combined to give an answer to the philosophical problem of action.

4. Persuasion, Identification, Self-Conviction?

Burke stressed that persuasion requires identification:

When you are with Athenians, it is easy to praise Athenians, but not when you are with the Lacedaemonians.
Here is perhaps the simplest case of persuasion. You persuade a man only insofar as you can talk his language by speech, gesture, tonality, order, image, attitude, idea, identifying your ways with his. (1950, p. 55).

According to the rhetorical doxa, the prerequisite for a successful persuasive performance is based on agreements between the speaker and the audience, see conditions of discussion. This negotiation of agreements could take place through a preliminary argumentative dialogue, which would run the risk of an infinite regression. The speaker therefore chooses not to explicitly agree with his audience, but to adapt to it. For this reason, he makes a preliminary study of the audience, in order to adapt, or mimic it correctly. This is exactly what what the theory of the ethos of the audience foresees, see ethos, §5: by ethotic suggestion, the speaker presents himself or herself as “one of us, the people. Second, by logical proofs, the speaker gives prominence to the values and judgments accepted by his or her audience (ex concessis). Third, by appealing to a pathemic communion with the audience, empathy is demonstrated.

For the audience to identify with the speaker, the speaker must first identify with the audience. At the end of this process of accommodation, one might ask who exactly is being persuaded by whom? The extroverted rhetoric of persuasion is threatened by the solipsism of identification. It expresses only group introversion. The notion of “community” (Fr. communion)proposed by the Treatise, may characterize the culmination of this process.

Note: This rhetorical concept of identification is completely alien to the concept of identification defined in the framework of polyphony theory.

5. Who Studies Persuasion?

The characteristic difference of rhetorical argumentation cannot be defined in terms of persuasion, for the simple reason that persuasion is an object claimed by many other disciplines, including the science and philosophy of cognition; neuropsychology as well as “neurolinguistic programming.

A year before the Treatise on Argumentation, Vance Packard published The Hidden Persuaders (1957), in which he developed a critique of rational persuasion as socially ineffective. This critique was first developed in the twenties by Walter Lippman (1922) and later by Edward L. Bernays (1928). In the wake of these books, but using very different methods, neuromarketing began to focus on the issue of persuasion. To take a less controversial discipline, the analysis of persuasion also belongs to social psychology. This discipline counts among its fundamental objects the theoretical and experimental study of social influences: persuasion, conviction, suggestion, grip/influence, incitement… the formation and manifestation of attitudes, representations, and correlative transformations in the way individuals or groups behave. The whole movement of the world, the material events, including scientific discoveries and technical innovations, together with the correlative flows of language, produce and correct the representations, thoughts, words and actions of individuals and groups. The great classic studies of the social psychology of persuasion published in the last century barely mention rhetoric or argumentation. For example, neither the word rhetoric nor the words argument or argumentation appear in a collection of texts on the psychology of persuasion, entitled Persuasion (Yzerbit and Corneille 1994). The problem of persuasion can legitimately be raised in relation to discourse, but the study of the process of persuasion, even in term of its linguistic aspects, can under no circumstances be carried out solely within the framework of rhetorical studies (Chabrol and Radu, 2008).

6. Persuasion as a general function of language

Just as rhetorical argumentation cannot be characterized by its persuasive function, it cannot be defined as the study of persuasive language genres, insofar as the persuasive function is not bound to a genre but is coextensive with language use, see schematization.

From the general point of view of language functions, persuasion can be seen as representative of the function of action on the recipient (call function; German Appell Funktion, Bühler [1933], or conative function, Jakobson [1960]). More specifically, Benveniste contrasts history (narrative) with discourse, and considers the intention to influence to be a characteristic of the latter category, discourse:

In contrast, we have in advance situated the level of discourse. Discourse is to be understood in its broadest extension: every utterance supposes a speaker and a listener, and in the first the intention of influencing the other in some way. It is first of all the diversity of the oral discourses of every nature and of every level … but it is also the mass of the writings that reproduce the oral discourses or borrow their turns and ends. (Benveniste [1959], p. 242, my emphasis)

Nietzsche, in his lectures on rhetoric, generalizes rhetorical force to make it “the essence of language”:

There is obviously no unrhetorical “naturalness” of language of which one could appeal; language itself is the result of purely rhetorical arts. The power to discover and to make operative that which works and impresses, with respect to each thing, a power which Aristotle calls rhetoric, is at the same time the essence of language; the latter is based just as little as rhetoric is upon that which is true, upon the essence of things. Language does not desire to instruct, but to convey to others a subjective impulse and its acceptance. (In S. L. Gilman & al. C. 1989, p. 21)

This tendency to extend rhetoric as persuasion to any kind of talk is, moreover, compatible with all classical definitions of rhetoric as a technique capable of developing the natural capacities of individuals.

7. Persuasion and the “Colonization of Minds”

The concept of rhetorical persuasion is based on the key idea that persuasion is intrinsically good, even if men and women have an unfortunate tendency to misuse the best. The orator is placed in the exalted position of being a “good man, who speaks well” striving to universalize his visions and aspirations, an aristocrat of speech, while his audience is placed in the lower, insubstantial position of the undecided, because of their poor reasoning and decision-making abilities, see enthymeme; metaphor. The audience is seen as barely capable of making an independent decision, in need of guidance and easy prey for manipulators.

On the political and religious level, persuasion is the strictly correct term to use for propaganda. Propagandists and converts also present themselves as good people, eager to persuade; would-be and actual dictators and fundamentalists also have their place among the deeply convinced, see dissensus. In the early 1950s, Domenach defined propaganda as the activities systematically organized “to create, change or confirm opinions” ([1950], p. 8), while Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca focus on “the adherence of minds”; and adherence is also the first step to membership.

Nevertheless, a key difference between argumentation and propaganda is the means they use: argumentation uses “discursive techniques” (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca [1958], p. 5), that is an overt, technique, while propaganda combines well with violence, and uses all the available means, both overt and covert, to achieve its goal, using not only discourse, but also images and all spectacular manifestations that require ritual collective action.

To persuade is to convert or, in the words of Margaret Mead, to “colonize minds” (Dascal 2009), to save the audience from some evil and to direct them to some good, of which they were previously neither persuaded nor convinced.

8. Arguing in an Exchange Structure

The theory of rhetorical persuasion is discussed in the context of an interaction without exchange (an addressed monologue, i.e., a one-way interaction), which gives the audience a largely passive role.
Pragma dialectics does not assume an opinion to be conveyed to an audience, but rather from a difference of opinion between two individuals, giving each opinion an equal value and chance to prevail. This theory “takes as its object the resolution of divergences of opinion by means of argumentative discourse” (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1992, 18). Rule 1 opens up the space for debate and controversy:

Freedom – The parties must not obstruct the free expression of points of view or their questioning. (van Eemeren, Grootendorst, Snoeck Henkemans 2002, p. 182-183),

The debate achieves its rational goal if it can effectively eliminate either the doubt or the “inconclusively defended point of view”:

Closing – If a point of view has not been conclusively defended, the advancing party must withdraw it. If a point of view has been conclusively defended, the other party must withdraw the doubts it has expressed with respect to that point of view.” (ibid.)

This leads to a consensus either on the opinion, or on its “withdrawal” (from the current interaction, from the other’s mind, etc.).
Interactional and cooperative approaches to argumentation assume that the point of view that one partner brings to the discussion and presents to the other participants, who argue their own point of view can be profoundly transformed by the encounter. Consensus can be achieved by merging primitive views or by co-constructing a third opinion, with participants behaving like Hegelian evolutionary dialecticians who progress by synthesizing actual positions, rather than like Aristotelian dialecticians, who progress by eliminating the competing position, see rhetoric; dialectic.

9. Externalized persuasion

To persuade, that is, to change the mind of the audience, is to change the language of the audience. The experience of persuasion marks a turning point in the discourse of the persuadee. The new discourse produced by a persuaded audience is characterized by its argumentative co-orientation with the persuader’s discourse. Persuadees ratify the persuader’s interventions; they adopt the speaker’s presuppositions, repeat his or her arguments, adopt his or her personal style, and, in the case of “deep persuasion”, his tone of voice.

In other words persuasion can be externalized and analyzed on the basis of linguistic evidence obtained by comparing the discourses of the persuader and the persuaded.

1 Cited after Quintilien, I. O. = Institution oratoire, Trans. by J. Cousin. Paris: Les Belles Lettres,
2 Jean de La Bruyère, The Characters, or Manners of the Age. London: D. Browne, etc. p. 7. [Des ouvrages de l’esprit. In Les Caractères ou les mœurs de ce siècle, 1688] https://books.google.fr/books?id=6y9QiTEK1JAC&printsec=frontcover&dq=La+Bruyere+Characters&hl=en&sa=X&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=think&f=false (03-19-2017)

Persuade, Convince

To PERSUADE, To CONVINCE

The contrast or progression, from to persuade to to convince, along with the evolution of audiences from particular to universal, is a major focus of the Treatise on Argumentation (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca [1958]), see persuasion

1. To persuade a Particular Audience,
to Convince the Universal Audience

Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca significantly restructure the concept of audience. First, they extend the concept to written communication, “Every speech is addressed to an audience, and it is frequently forgotten that this applies to everything written as well” ([1958] pp. 6-7). The focus placed on this expanded concept of audience explains the fact that the Treatise does not engage in the analysis of delivery (pronunciatio), the basic, oral, face-to-face, dimension of classical rhetoric, S. Rhetoric.

The Treatise goes beyond the actual audience to consider the particular audience and the universal audience. The former is the sole object of classical rhetoric; the latter is a philosophical projection of the essential characters of the former. The notion of audience is then extended to include self-reflection, using the resource of polyphony:

Thus, the nature of the audience to which arguments can be successfully presented will determine to a great extent the direction the arguments will take and the character, the significance that will be attributed to them. What formulation can we make of audiences, which have come to play a normative role, enabling us to judge on the convincing character of an argument? Three kinds of audiences are apparently regarded as enjoying special prerogatives as regards this function, both in current practice and in the view of philosophers. The first such audience consists of the whole of mankind, or at least, of all normal adult person; we shall refer to it as the universal audience. The second consists of the single interlocutor whom a speaker addresses in a dialogue. The third is the subject himself, when he deliberates or gives himself reasons for his actions. (Id., p. 30)

2. A Normative Opposition

While the translators of classical rhetorical texts use the verbs to persuade and to convince interchangeably, Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca distinguish between these two verbs on the basis of the quality of the audience:

We are going to apply the term persuasive to argumentation that only claims validity for a particular audience, and the term convincing to argumentation that presumes to gain the adherence of every rational being. ([1958], p. 28)

This is a stipulative definition, based on a normative perspective. For the New Rhetoric, the norm of argumentation is constituted by the hierarchy of audiences that accept it. This position strongly distinguishes the New Rhetoric from the standard theories of fallacy, for which the norm is given by logical laws, or by a system of rules defining rationality see norms; rules; evaluation.

3. To Persuade, To Convince: The words

3.1 History

The Greek word for rhetorical proof is pistis. Unlike the scientific and logical word proof, pistis belongs to a family of terms that express the idea of “trust in others; what can be relied upon” and “proof” (Bailly, [Pistis]). The family of Greek terms translated as “persuasion” refers to “obeying”, as well as to “persuading, seducing, deceiving” (id., [Peitho]).
The name of the goddess Peitho, the companion of Aphrodite, sometimes Aphrodite herself, goddess of beauty, seduction and persuasion, also belongs to this family. From this perspective, the word pistis is syncretic; it covers what for us is the field of influence, proof, seduction, submission and persuasion. By definition, rhetorical evidence is persuasive.

The Latin verb suadere means “to advise”; the corresponding adjective, suadus, means “to invite, to insinuate, to persuade” (Gaffiot [1934], Suadeo; Suadus). Persuadere is composed of suadere and the aspectual prefix per-, indicating the completion of the process, meaning: “I. Decide to do something […] II. Persuade, convince” (id., Persuadeo).

Convincere is composed of con- (cum-) “completely” + vincere “to conquer”: “totally conquer” (id., Convinco); its primary meaning is “to confound an adversary” (ibid.). Like per- in persuadere, the prefix cum- refers to a completed action. The same meaning is expressed in to convict, coming from the Latin convictus, past participle of convincere meaning “to refute, to convict” (MW , Convict, Etymology):

1: to find or prove to be guilty. The jury convicted them of fraud.
2: to convince of error or sinfulness

Both persuadere and convincere mark the completion of the action.
According to the grammatical normative tradition, to convince is should be used for situations in which beliefs are changed without action, while to persuade should be used for situations in which action is taken; the rule is based on the etymology of the words. In practice, the two terms are synonymous. The traditional rule is reminiscent of on the rule of redundancy in law (the normative grammarian is also a lawyer), according to which there can be no two words with the same meaning, just as there can be no two laws to the same effect. However, two words can have the same meaning until everyday usage differentiates them.

3.2 Lexical Opposition Persuasion vs. Conviction

The verbs to persuade and to convince belong to a lexical-semantic field that includes:

advising
brainwashing
bringing around
catechizing
converting
counseling
inciting

inducing
insinuating
inspiring
instilling
inviting
preaching
prevailing on
prompting

propagandizing
seducing
suggesting
talking somebody into / out of doing sth.
winning somebody over to a point of view.

This lexical base is a rich source of semantic orientations and oppositions the exploitation of which could contribute to a reflection on the diversity of expected effects of discourse.To persuade and to convince are equivalent in many contexts.

A tries to persuade / convince B of something
A makes a persuasive / convincing argument to B
=> then B adopts new persuasions / convictions

However, in other contexts, they are not equivalent:

A letter of persuasion — not *conviction
A thinks that B is persuadable (-ible) — not *convince-able

The pair persuader / persuadee is not matched by a pair *convincer / *convincee. Convictive and convict are, at least etymologically, linked to convince. To persuade is not matched by a pair *convincer / *convincee.

The present participle convincing can be used as an independant adjective, meaning “cogent”; a conviction is “a strong belief”. “Very convincing” seems to be more common than “very persuasive”.

Convincing (not persuasive) can be used to qualify not only argumentative discourse but also other kinds of discourse:

very convincing accounts, reports…
– – novels, tales, narratives…
– – portraits

as well as non-verbal activities:

a very convincing experience
– – scar (stage make-up).

“Ad —” Arguments

Some argument schemes are designated by Latin labels, S. A/Ab —; Ad —; Ex —. This entry lists the labels using the Latin preposition ad. In classical Latin, the preposition ad is constructed with the accusative and introduces a goal complement. The phrase “argument ad hominem” reads “argument addressing the person”.

According to Hamblin, the oldest scheme in this grouping is ad hominem, which appears in the Latin translations of Aristotle; this naming method was popularized by Locke ([1690]) and by Bentham ([1824]), and most of these terms seem to be nineteenth or twentieth century creations (Hamblin 1970, p. 41; p. 161- 162).

1. A list of “ad + N” arguments

Latin name of the Argument

Meaning of the Latin word(s)
• (When necessary a word-for-word translation)
• (English equivalent(s))
• Reference to the corresponding entry/ies

(reductio) ad absurdum (also: ab absurdo):	Lat. absurdus, “false, unpleasant, absurd” — reduction to the absurd — S. Absurd
ad amicitiam	Lat. amicitia, “friendship” — appeal to friendship — S. Emotion
ad antiquitatem	Lat. antiquitas, “antiquity, tradition” — appeal to antiquity, to tradition — S. Authority
ad auditorem (pl. ad auditores)	Lat. auditor, “hearer, audience” — S. Beliefs of the audience.
ad baculum	Lat. baculus, “stick” — S. Threat — Promise
ad captandum vulgus	Lat. captare, “try to seize … by insinuation, by guile”; vulgus “crowd, ordinary people” — playing to the gallery ; playing to the crowd — S. Emotion; Ad populum ; Laughter and Seriousness.
ad consequentiam	Lat. consequentia, “following, consequence” — S. Ad consequentiam; Consequence — Effect
ad crumenam	Lat. crumena, “purse” — argument to the purse — S. Emotion ; Threat — Promise
(reductio) ad falsum	Lat. falsum, “false” — reduction to a falsehood — S. Absurd
ad fidem	Lat. fides, “faith” — S. Faith
ad fulmen	Lat. fulmen, “thunderbolt” — argument from thunderbolt — S. Threat — Promise
ad hominem	Lat. homo, “human being” — S. Ad hominem
ad ignorantiam	Lat. ignorantia, “ignorance” — S. Ignorance
ad imaginationem	Lat. imaginatio, “picture, vision” — appeal to imagination — S. Subjectivity
(reductio) ad impossibile	Lat. impossibile “impossible” — reduction to the impossible — S. Absurd
(deducendo, reductio) ad incommodum:	Lat. incommodum “unfortunate, disadvantageous” — reduction to the uncomfortable — S. Ad incommodum
ad invidiam:	Lat. invidia, “hate, envy” — appeal to envy — S. Emotion
ad iudicium:	Lat. iudicium, “sentence, judgment, opinion” — arg. appealing to the judgment ; to common sense — S. Matter

ad lapidem:	Lat. lapis, “stone; (symbol of stupidity, insensibility)” — S. Dismissal
ad Lazarum	Lat. Lazarus, character of the Bible, paragon of the destitute — arg. ad Lazarum — S. Rich and Poor
ad litteram:	Lat. littera, “letter” — S. Strict Meaning
ad ludicrum:	Lat. ludicrum, “public game (theater, circus…)” — appeal to the gallery — S. Emotion; Ad populum ; Laughter and Seriousness
ad metum	Lat. metus, “fear, apprehension” — appeal to fear — S. Threat — Promise
ad misericordiam:	Lat. misericordia, “compassion, pity” — appeal to pity — S. Emotion
ad modum:	Lat. modus “measure, just measure, moderation” — arg. of gradualism — S. Proportion
ad naturam:	Lat. natura, “nature” — appeal to nature ; naturalistic fallacy — S. Weight of circumstances
ad nauseam:	Lat. nausea, “nausea, seasickness” — proof by assertion — S. Repetition
ad novitatem:	Lat. novitas, “novelty, innovation; unexpected thing” — appeal to novelty — S. Progress

ad numerum:	Lat. numerus, “number, great number” — arg. from number — S. Authority
ad odium:	Lat. odium, “hate” — appeal to hatred, to spite — S. Emotion
ad orationem	Lat. oratio, “language, comments, speech, discourse” — S. Matter
ad passionem (pl. ad passiones)	Lat. passio, “passivity; passion, emotion” ; appeal to passion, to emotion — S. Pathos ; Emotion
ad personam	Lat. persona, “mask; role; person” — abusive ad hominem — S. Personal Attack; Ad hominem
ad populum	Lat. populus “people” — appeal to people, arg. from popularity — S. Ad populum
ad quietem	Lat. quies “rest; political neutrality; calm; peace”, tranquili- ty” — appeal for calm, conservatism — S. Calm
ad rem	Lat. res, “thing, being, reality ; judicial matter, issue” — arg. addressed to the thing, to the point, dealing with the matter at hand — S. Matter
ad reverentiam	Lat. reverentia, “respectful fear; deference” —S. Respect
ad ridiculum	Lat. ridiculus, “funny; ridicule” — appeal to ridicule, appeal to mockery — S. Absurd ; Laughter and seriousness

ad socordiam	Lat. socordia, “stupidity; indolence” — appeal to weak-mindedness — S. Subjectivity
ad superbiam	Lat. superbia, “pride” — appeal to pride; arg. of popular corruption — S. Emotion; Ad populum
ad superstitionem	Lat. superstitio, “superstition”— S. Subjectivity
ad temperantiam	Lat. temperantia, “moderation, restraint” — S. Proportion
ad verecundiam	Lat. verecundia, “respect, modesty, discretion ; fear of shame” — arg. from modesty ; arg. from authority — S. Subjectivity ; Modesty ; Authority
ad vertiginem	Lat. vertigo, “rotation, dizziness” — S. Vertigo

1.Characteristics of the “ad + N” family

2.1 A productive pattern

There are many more “ad +N” arguments than there are “a / ab + N” arguments. Only the “ad +N” construction is still productive; the pattern is popular and mocked (ad bananum argument).

2.2 Origin of the labels

Some of these names have been defined and used by Locke and Bentham, S. Collections (III).

Locke has defined the arguments:

ad hominem	ad judicium
ad ignorantiam	ad verecundiam

Bentham has defined the arguments:

ad amicitiam

ad ignorantiam

ad imaginationem

ad invidiam

ad judicium ad metum ad odium ad quietem

ad socordiam
ad superbiam
ad superstitionem ad verecundiam

2.3 Semantic subsets of “a d + N” arguments

These arguments refer to very different strategies. Nonetheless, some group- ings can be proposed according to their semantic content.

(i) Arguments bound to affects, emotions, often via positive interest (rewards) or negative results (threats):

ad amicitiam

ad captandum vulgus

ad invidiam

ad ludicrum

ad metum (ad carcerem, ad baculum, ad fulmen, ad crumenam)

ad misericordiam

ad novitatem

ad numerum

ad passionem

ad odium

ad quietem

ad personam

ad populum

ad superbiam

ad verecundiam

(ii) Arguments involving a limited, subjective system of beliefs, not universal, questionable:

ad consequentiam

ad fidem

ad hominem