Archives de l’auteur : Christian Plantin

Absurd

ABSURD

Latin absurdus, “absurd”. Arguments ad absurdum, ab absurdo, ex absurdo.
Also, reductio ad absurdum, “reduction to absurdity”, under different forms:
reductio ad impossibile, “reduction to the impossible” —  r. ad falsum, “r. to the false” — r. ad ridiculum, “r. to the ridicule” — r. ad incommodum; “r. to the undesirable”.

1. The scheme

The argumentation from the absurd is a form of indirect evidence based on contradiction. This lcategory of arguments concludes that an assertion or a proposal should be rejected based on the indefensible consequences which would result from its adoption.

The general process of reduction to the absurd corresponds to the following mechanism:

1. A claim, a proposal is put forward, as a working hypothesis or possibility.
2. Consequences are drawn from this proposition, regardless of whether they are causal or logical.
3. One of these consequences is deemed “absurd” based on certain criteria, cf. below
4. The initial proposal or hypothesis is rejected.

Argumentation to the absurd is not an argument from ignorance.
— An argument from ignorance concludes that P is true because not-P has not been proven false.
— An argument to the absurd concludes that P is true because not-P has been proven false, and only one of P and not-P, can be true.
This corresponds to a case-by-case argument in a situation where the number of cases is reduced to two, either P is true or not-P is true; but not-P is false, so P is true, see apagogic argument; contradiction.

2. Varieties of absurdities

There are as many kinds of reduction to absurdity as modes of deduction and reasons to evaluate a consequence as inadmissible. The qualification as absurd may thus apply to:
— Mathematical consequences. One clearly sees the variety and the diversity of what is called the “absurd” in argumentation by contrasting these forms with the demonstration from the absurd, where absurd means “contradictory”, cf. infra.

— Logical or semantic consequences. Consequences derived, from the very meaning of an expression lead to a semantic difficulty, see dialectic; opposites.

— Causal consequences. In the physical domain and natural experience, the effects predicted by the hypothesis are not observed, see. refutation by the opposite. Refutation by an attested fact that differs from the theoretically expected fact, is a type of refutation from the absurd.

— Practical consequences. However, as soon as one turns from the scientifically established causal link to the “causal story” as constructed in a pragmatic argument, however, the speaker intervenes through his or her positive or negative valuation of the consequences. The consequence is then:

— Contrary to the intended goals, the effects of the proposed action are perverse, the measure is counterproductive, contrary to various interests.
— Inadmissible from the point of view of common sense, law, or morality, see apagogic; ad Incommodum.

Pragmatic refutation by negative consequences is opposed to a measure by showing that it will have negative consequences unforeseen by the individual who proposes the measure, and that these drawbacks will prevail over any possible advantage.
The argument is strengthened  if the opponent can show that these  alleged negative consequences are not just collateral effects, but are in fact diametrically opposed to the expected positive effects: the measure proposed to cure the patient will in fact strengthen her disease.

3. Demonstration by Reduction to the Absurd

Proof by the absurd (or by contradiction), is based on the principle of the excluded middle, according to which “A or not-A” is necessarily true. The reasoning is based not on the proposition A that we want to prove, but on its negation, not-A.
The negation, not-A, is provisionally admitted and its consequences are deduced. These consequences lead to statement A, but the conjunction “A and not-A” contravenes the principle of contradiction. thus, not-A is false, and A is necessarily true.
In the language of implication, we are in a situation where “A → non-A’. According to the principle of “one can deduce anything from the false”, this implication is true only if A is false.

It can be shown by reduction to the absurd that “the square root of 2 (the number whose square is 2, noted by the symbol √2) is not a rational number” (proposition A).

(1) Suppose that “the number corresponding to √2 is a rational number” (proposition not-A).
(2) By definition, a rational number can be written as a fraction “p / q”, where p and q are prime numbers (a prime number can only be divided by itself and 1).
From this hypothesis, it can be deduced that both p and q are even; Therefore, they have 2 as a common divisor, which is contradicting the initial hypothesis.
(3) Conclusion: hypothesis (1) is false, and √2 is not a rational number.

The demonstration by the absurd is an indirect method of proof. It does not directly prove that A is true, only that not-A is false. Not all specialists agree with this reasoning, “while the classical mathematicians consider the proof by the absurd to be valid, the intuitionists reject it. They argue that in order to prove A, it is not enough to establish that not-(not-A)” (Vax 1982, Absurd).
We see that the demonstrative character of a demonstration can be discussed.

 

Ab —, Ad —, Ex —: Latin Labels

A / Ab —; Ad —; Ex —
 LATIN LABELS

Latin labels are used to name arguments and fallacies. This practice, although not systematic, is common in modern texts, not exceptional in law, and some traces remain in contemporary usage.

A few of these labels belong to the usual vocabulary of argumentation theory:

argument ad hominem, a fortiori, a contrario, a pari…

The English counterpart of the Latin word is often transparent:

argument e silentio, argument from silence.

Nonetheless, some labels remain opaque when one is not familiar with Latin:

argument ad crumenam, argument to the purse.

The current translation of these Latin labels may be questionable. The label argument ad verecundiam is often translated as “argument from authority”, while the Latin word verecundia means “modesty, humility”. For Locke, who introduced this label, the ad verecundiam argument is not precisely a sophism of authority but of submission to authority, S. Modesty.

This terminology is no longer spontaneously understood. In many cases, this piecemeal Latin appears gibberish and even ridiculous, particularly when well established, or more readily understood English terms can be used to refer to the same argument scheme.

This continued use of Latin labels, however, is due to the power of Latin as the language of law, theology, philosophy and traditional logic. This designation system for argumentation parallels the one which is well established and currently used for the designation of rhetorical figures. Latin has provided a common technical language for everyday reasoning, whilst giving the theoretical discourse some fragrance of Ciceronian authority. This use of Latin is altogether comparable to the contemporary use of English in countries where English is not the native language.

Three main types of Latin phrases can be distinguished.

1. Prepositional labels using the prepositions ab /a — ad — ex

Some arguments or fallacies are designated, in contemporary texts, by prepositional phrases having the following structure:

Latin Preposition + Latin Noun + argument

Sometimes, the Latin word “argumentum” replaces argument.

Latin is an inflected language; in prepositional phrases, the preposition imposes a specific grammatical case on the following noun, marked by a morphological variation at its end.

The three most used prepositions are ab, ex, and ad.

— The preposition ab (or a before consonant) means “from, pulled of, drawn from”:

a contrario argument, argument from the contrary.

—The preposition ad, means “to, towards, for »:

ad personam argument, argument to the person.

— The preposition ex means “from, out of”, indicating the origin:

Argument ex datis: argument drawn from what is admitted by the audience.

Ex labels are less common.

Occasionally, other prepositions can be found:

per: per analogiam argument, argument by analogy;
in: argument in contrarium, argument from the opposites;
pro: argument pro subjecta materia, argument relative to the subject matter. S. Subject matter.

From a semantic point of view, there is a directional contrast, origin vs. purpose, between the prepositions ab and ex on the one hand, and ad on the other hand:

ab, ex + Latin noun + argument = argument based on —, using —
— ad + Latin noun + argument = argument targeting —.

Ab, ad and ex compete in the designation of some arguments, with the same meaning:

ab auctoritate or ad auctoritatem argument;
ab absurdo or ad absurdum or ex absurdo argument.

The argument schemes designated by each of these labels have no common semantic basis. Many ad tags have been introduced in the modern period. Sometimes, they refer to very specific contents, in particular, to appeals to emotion or to a subjective position, whilst the labels ab and ex are never used in this sense.

 

The following entries list the Latin labels according to the preposition head of the noun phrase, give some equivalent of the Latin terms, and refer to the corresponding entry or entries:

Ab — Arguments (A Contrario, etc.)
Ad — Arguments (Ad Ignorantiam, etc.)
Ex — Arguments (Ex Concessis, etc.)

These lists are taken from Bossuet ([1677]), Locke ([1690]), Bentham ([1824]), Hamblin (1970); Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca ([1958]), and from the Internet. They do not claim to be exhaustive.
Modern Latin labels are presented along with ancient ones, as they were used by Cicero, Quintilian and Boethius, and sometimes incorporated unchanged by modern authors. Examples of this original terminology may be found under the entry Typologies (II): Ancient.

2. Other Latin phrases

Less frequently, various Latin phrases are used to refer to classical Aristotelian fallacies:
— Fallacy of omission of relevant qualification or circumstances; undue generalization of a limited claim:

Fallacy a dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter: a reasoning concluding from a qualified statement (limited in scope) to a generalizing statement (absolute).

Lat. dictum “word; maxim; sentence” here: “assertion”; Lat. secundum quid “according to something”; Lat. simpliciter, from simplex, “simple”.

This formula is abbreviated as “secundum quid fallacy”, S. Circumstances.

 

— Fallacies of false cause, that is to say, of poor construction of the causal relation, S. Causation; Cause-Effect: The causal link:

Non causa pro causa: “a non-cause is taken for a cause”. E1 is said to be the cause of E2, although this is not the case.
Cum hoc, ergo propter hoc: “At the same time as, thus because of ”.
From the fact that E1 and E2 are concomitant, one wrongly infers that they are causally linked.
Post hoc, propter hoc ergo: “later, thus because of”: from the fact that E1 always occurs before E2, one wrongly infers that E2 is due to E1.

— Fallacy of vicious circle:

Petitio principii, Lat. petitio, “demand”; principium “principle”: “request to grant (something equivalent to) the claim which is actually disputed”

The language of law uses Latin phrases and expressions to refer to argumentative principles, for example:

eiusdem generi: lat. idem, “the same”; genus, “genus”. Argument from the identity of genus; S. Genus; Juridical arguments.

3. A mocked pattern

In Tristram Shandy, Sterne mentions the arguments ad verecundiam, ex absurdo, ex fortiori, ad crumenam and the argumentum baculinum (ad baculum) and asks to add to this list the argumentum fistulatorium, which he claims to have invented.

— There lies your mistake, my father would reply; — for in Foro Scientiae there is no such thing as MURDER, —’tis only DEATH, brother.
My uncle Toby would never offer to answer this by any other kind of argument, than that of whistling half a dozen bars of Lillibullero.—–You must know it was the usual channel thro’ which his passions got vent, when anything shocked or surprised him; — but especially when any thing, which he deem’d very absurd, was offerd.

As not one of our logical writers, nor any of the commentators upon them, that I remember, have thought proper to give a name to this particular species of argument, — I here take the liberty to do it myself for two reasons. First, That in order to prevent all confusion in disputes, it may stand as much distinguished for ever from every other species of argument — as the Argumentum ad Verecundiam, ex Absurdo, ex Fortiori, or any other argument whatsoever: — And, secondly, That it may be said by my children’s children, when my head is laid to rest, — that their learn’d grandfather’s head has been busied to as much purpose once, as other people’s; — That he had invented a name, — and generously thrown it into the TREASURY of the Ars Logica, for one of the most unanswerable arguments in the whole science. And, if the end of disputation is more to silence than convince, — they may add, if they please, to one of the best arguments too.

I do therefore, by these presents, strictly order and command, That it be known and distinguished by the name and title of the Argumentum Fistulatorium, and no other; — that it rank hereafter with the Argumentum Baculinum and the Argumentum ad Crumenam, and for ever hereafter be treated of in the same chapter.

As for the Argumentum tripodium […] Laurence Sterne The Life and Opinions of Tristram Shandy, Gentleman [1760]1

Lillibullero is a famous Irish march; the fistula is a panpipe (Gaffiot, Fistula). Uncle Toby’s maneuver is an excellent, although rude, strategy to annihilate a discourse, S. Destruction of discourse; Dismissal.

1 In The Complete Work of Laurence Sterne. Delphi Classics, 2013. P. LV

 

A Simili

A SIMILI argument

The following three Latin terms cover the field of analogy: similis, similitudo – analogia (which came to Latin from Greek). Their global meaning covers the field(s) of « analogy, similarity, resemblance, comparison (up to identity), example ».
The corresponding terms, argument a simili – argument ex similitudine – argument per analogiam, may broadly cover cases corresponding to other, more specific, argument schemes.

1. Cicero’s “A Similitudine”: “Argument Based on Resemblance or Analogy”

Under this heading, Cicero cites the similarity of a case to be judged with another case in which the decision is clear (where justice has already been served). It is therefore a kind of precedent (Top. III, 14; Hubbell, p. 393) :

If a man has received by will the usufruct of a house, and the house has collapsed or is in disrepair, the heir (i.e., the remainderman) is not bound to restore or repair it, any more than he would have been bound to replace a slave of whom the usufruct had been bequeathed, if the slave had died.

The following case allows for an interesting variety of analyses, or cross-analyses (« On Similarity, » Top. X 41; Hubbell, p. 413):

If honesty is required of a guardian, a partner, a bailee, and a trustee, it is required of an agent (p. 413). This form of argument, which achieves the desired proof by citing several parallels, is called induction in Greek [epagoge].

This case can be seen as an induction as well as a categorization and/or an application of the generic clause.

With a simili, a similitudine, we remain in the large family of analogy and comparison.

2. Perelman: A Simili

Perelman defines the argument a simili or “by analogy” as follows:

A legal proposition being given, which affirms a legal obligation relative to a subject or a class of subjects, this same obligation exists with regard to any other subject or class of subjects having with the first subject (or class of subjects) sufficient analogy so that the reason which determined the rule with respect to the first subject (or class of subjects) is valid with respect to the second subject (or class of subjects). Thus, the fact of having forbidden a traveler to climb on the steps accompanied by a dog leads us to the rule that it is also necessary to forbid it to a traveler accompanied by an equally inconvenient animal. (1979, p. 56)

Applying the a fortiori rule, travelers may be accompanied by an animal “less inconvenient” than a dog (perhaps a cat?)” but not by an animal more inconvenient (a goat?)
As the extension clause “an equally inconvenient animal” shows, the a simili argument relies on categorization mechanisms. It involves the same kind of reasoning as a pari, and the rule of justice.
The terminology seems somewhat overlapping, see analogy; genus.

 

A Priori, A Posteriori

A PRIORI, A POSTERIORI argument

Latin prior, “above, before, older, better, first”.
Lat. posterior, “coming after, behind, later; second ».

In ordinary language, the modifier a priori is equivalent to “at first sight, before any thorough examination”; the phrase is sometimes used to refer to prejudiced thinking.
A posteriori is currently used to mean “on second thought; after the fact.”

1. A Priori / A Posteriori

The distinction between a priori/a posteriori expresses an epistemological issue. A posteriori knowledge is concrete knowledge, built from sensory data extracted from the world through observation and practice. In contrast, a priori intellectual knowledge is based only on knowledge of language (natural or formal), perhaps coupled with an intuition of essences.
In philosophy, the a priori/a posteriori distinction is related to the opposition necessary / contingent, and the analytic/synthetic.

1.1 A Posteriori

An a posteriori argument takes an element of experience and reconstructs its material causes or origin. Alternatively, it uses by an abductive process, to attach this experience to a general explanation or a law that accounts for the existence of the fact. Arguments from consequences to causes or principles, inductive arguments, and arguments based on a natural sign or a concrete example, are cases of a posteriori argumentation.

When examining the “origin and foundation of inequality among men”, Rousseau emphasizes the difference between a historical, a posteriori, approach to the subject, and his own philosophical, a priori inquiry:

Let us begin therefore by laying aside Facts, for they do not affect the Question. The Researches, in which we may engage on this occasion, are not to be taken for Historical Truths, but merely as hypothetical and conditional Reasonings, fitter to illustrate the Nature of Things, than to show their true Origin, like those systems, which our Naturalists daily make of the Formation of the World.
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, A Discourse upon the Origin and Foundation of Inequality Among Mankind [1755]1.[1]

1.2 A Priori

Unlike a posteriori argumentation, a priori argumentation is carried out without any explicit consideration of what exists. It starts from what is considered to be deep, first, essential, superior in an intellectual, religious or metaphysical order, and develops its consequences in order to account for apparent, second-order, derived and subordinate phenomena.

A priori reasoning can be based on various kinds of foundations.
— Causal a priori reasoning. Causes are considered as primary and conditioning in relation to the  secondary and conditioned effect. A priori reasoning then corresponds to cause-to-effect argumentation (or propter quid reasoning).

— Essentialist a priori reasoning is the product of pure contemplation and intellectual activity. It assumes that the human mind has the capacity to come into contact with (to grasp) the essence; that is to say, the hidden and true reality of things, and to adequately express its concept in substantial definitions. Fundamental concepts are considered as primary in relation to their mundane incarnations. In practice, this type of reasoning begins with the definition of a concept corresponding to an object of study. Deduction then proceeds analytically from one intellectual proof to another, remaining in the realm of the a priori.

A priori argumentation corresponds to various kinds of deductions that start from principles, from linguistic definitions or axioms, in order to identify their consequences.
In a Platonic ontology, the ordered contemplation of essences defines supreme knowledge, and a priori argumentation, based on the essence of things, is the most valued form of argumentation.

2. Propter Quid and Quia Arguments

Latin propter quid, “on account of which”; quia, “that’”.

Thomas Aquinas (ST 1st part, Q. 2, 2; Com. NE, 4, § 51) proposed the distinction propter quid/quia, which  is close to the relation a priori/a posteriori, and covers the same kinds of argumentation respectively.
The quia proof is primary in relation to us, starting from what is better known to us, whereas the propter quid proof is primary in the absolute.

This distinction expresses the difference between
— a cause-to-effect « because » that is a “propter quid” « because »:

The lawn is wet because it is raining
Why is the lawn wet? — Because it is raining

—and an effect-to-cause, that is, a “quia” because: It is raining, because the lawn is wet

*Why is it raining? — Because the lawn is wet
Why do you say it’s raining? — Because  the lawn is wet

In theology, the a priori – propter quid proof corresponds to the ontological argument for the existence of God. According to this argument, God’s existence is inferred from the a priori perfection attributed to him. The ontological proof of God’s existence consists in defining God as an infinitely perfect being, in order to deduce that he necessarily exists. This conclusion being reached, as St. Anselm says “by arguing silently with oneself” (Pros., Preface).

The quia proof of the existence of God corresponds to the argument from the world itself (effect) to a Creator (cause), as in the Voltairean metaphor:

The universe embarrasses me, and I cannot imagine
That such a clock should exist without a clockmaker.
Voltaire, [The Cabals], 1772. [2].

[1] Quoted from John James Rousseau, A Discourse upon the Origin and Foundation of Inequality among Mankind. London: R. and J. Dodsley, 1761. P. 10.
[2] Quoted in Pierre Hadot, The Veil of Isis. Cambridge, MA & London, England: Harvard UP, 2008. P. 127.

A pari “for the same reason”

A PARI argument

Lat. a pari, or a pari ratione, “for the same reason”: par, “equal, same” ratio, “reason”.

There are two types of a pari arguments, depending on whether they deal with individuals or classes of individuals.

1. When the argument concerns individuals, the a pari argument includes an individual x in a cate­gory C. The individual becomes (is identified as) a member of the category; in logical symbols < x ∈ C >, see. categorization.

2. When the argument concerns classes of individuals, the a pari argument reorganizes the cate­gory system (classification, taxonomy). It reduces two formerly distinct categories (class, species) to one, on the basis that they belong to the same supercategory (genus). This entry is about this second definition.

The vocabulary of analogy and the label “argument a comparatione” are sometimes used to refer to the argument a pari, in both its forms, see. taxonomies and categories.

The a pari argument “[applies] to another species of the same genus what can be said about some particular species.” (Perelman, Olbrechts-Tyteca [1958], p. 241).

A pari reasons by equality of the cases if a parricide deserves death, then so does the matricide. (Chenique 1975, p. 358)

The a pari argument transfers a property (a quality, a right, a duty…) (here “— deserves death”) originally attached to a species A (here, “— is a parricide”) to an­other species B (here, “— is a matricide”), arguing that they belong to the same genus (here: “— is a murderer of a parent”). The reasoning is as follows:

The tendency is toward severity
The penalty for matricide is life imprisonment.
Therefore, let’s increase the penalty of matricide!

The penalty for parricide is death.
Parricide and matricide are crimes of the same genus (type, genre, kind…).
The penalty for matricide should be death!

For the general discussion of a pari, two different situations should be distinguished.
— Situations of complete knowledge, where the truth is fully known and can be fully considered; then, syllogistic reasoning applies.
— Situations where the truth is debatable and a concrete decision must be made, i.e., argumentative situations.

1. Syllogistic A Pari

From the point of view of absolute knowledge, an a pari argument is either a truism or a paralogism, depending on whether or not the property under consideration is generic or not, see taxonomies and categories.

If the property is generic, then it is true for all species belonging to the genus, and especially for the two species involved in the a pari argument. The syllogism is as follows:

Having a constant body temperature is a generic property of mammals.
Whales, humans… are mammals
So whales, humans… have a constant body temperature.

The corresponding a pari argument is:

Both humans and whales are mammals (“belong to the same genus”, here mammals)
Humans have a constant body temperature (“what is true of a species”, here humans)
So whales (must) have a constant body temperature (“applies to another spe­cies”, here whales).

If the property is not generic, then, the conclusion is a paralogism:

Labradors and poodles are dogs
Labradors are gun dogs
So, poodles must be gun dogs.

The corresponding a pari argument is:

Both Labradors and Poodles are dogs (“belong to the same genus” here dogs)
Labradors are gun dogs (“what is true of a species”, here Labradors)
So poodles must be gun dogs (“applies to another species”, here gun dogs).

However, poodles are not gun dogs. The property “— is a gun dog” is not a generic property, it belongs to the Labrador as a species, not to the genus “dogs”. Therefore, this characteristic cannot be safely transferred to poodles.

In short, a trait can be transferred from one species to another species belonging to the same genus only if the trait on which it is based is generic. The validity of the argument depends on the quality of the taxonomy on which it is based, and the argument will be considered persuasive only if people agree on the classification, see the cases below.

2. The Apparent Deadlocks A Pari vs. A Contrario and A Pari vs. A Pari

Two paradoxes are attributed to a pari argument. In the same situation:

  • a contrario and a pari cancel each other out.
  • a pari can destroy a pari.

2.1 A Contrario Versus A Pari

(i) A pari extends to the As the treatment given to the Bs, arguing that both belong to a common supercategory:

(1) the As are like the Bs,so they should be treated like the Bs!

(ii) A contrario, the argument from the opposite, justifies the different treatment of the As and Bs, by arguing that they are indeed opposites:

(2) The As and Bs are different, so they are rightly treated as such!

In both cases, the question is whether the difference between the As and Bs should be preserved. A pari answers “no”, a contrario answers “yes”.

2.2 A Pari Against A Pari

An a pari argument extends to B a property of A, or to A a property of B. It can be objected to (i):

(3) If A’s are like the B’s, then the B’s are like As’; the B’s are the ones who should be treated like A’s!

Here, the proponent and the opponent refer to the same data and use the same rule to support opposing claims. They agree on the need to recategorize As and Bs into a single category, but they disagree on which category should prevail.

Hence one can conclude that all this maneuvering is pointless. In the following quote, “analogy” means a pari):

That the argumentum a contrario and analogy as means of interpretation are utterly worthless can be seen from the fact that both lead to opposite results, and that there is no criterion for deciding when the one and when the other should be applied.
(Kelsen 1967, p. 352).

This is the case for an abstract, syllogistic situation, where:
— A contrario is actually logically invalid, see opposites – a contrario.
— A contrario can be systematically opposed to a pari.
— As a “bidirectional” argument scheme, a pari can always be opposed to a pari.

3. Argumentative A Pari and the Situated Condition of Argumentation

Let us schematize a situation in which Gs and Bs are treated differently. A pari can be used to support the claims “All Gs!” or “All Bs!” and a contrario, to rebut both.

Current situation Revendication
S1: — All Gs!
G ≠ B and G and B are treated differently
S2: — All Bs!

— A contrario is the status quo argument, that can be used against both a pari alignments. Those who argue for the status quo do not bear the burden of proof, they can simply reformulate and amplify the current “doxical” discourse, to maximize the opposition between As and Bs, and thus a contrario justify the difference in treatment:

It is no coincidence that As and Bs are called A and B, precisely because they are A and B, and not something else!

— The proponent of either a pari alignments of categories must undermine this discourse, showing that the difference previously considered as essential should now be considered a merely coincidental. The strategies used to minimize the difference depend on the characteristics of the specific situations.

In a more complex move, the person making an a pari argument may try to show that it is possible to construct a supercategory that includes both A and B. This solution implies that the previous definitions of both categories must be modified

The problem with the a priori syllogistic approach is that it does not consider the argumentative situation, whereas in every such situation there are embedded preferences and impossibilities. These contextual conditions systematically exclude one or the other application of a pari. A pari is logically bidirectional and contextually monodirectional, as can be seen in the following cases.

3.1 Military Service: Girls/Boys

Context: a country in which boys, but not girls, perform compulsory military service. Applying a pari to boys, i.e. claiming that they should not do their military service, is tantamount to calling for the dissolution of the army, its professionalization, or the like. That would be the real issue, not the equal treatment of boys and girls.
Thus, the a pari argument can only concern girls. The relevant argumentative question can only be “Should girls also perform military service?”, and a pari supports a positive answer very well.

3.2 Murder: Patricide/Matricide

Context: A social situation in which a “civilizing process” is taking place, with a clear effort to eliminate all forms of violence. In such a situation, an a pari generalization of the death penalty is “out of the question”. The only relevant question can be “Should we reduce the penalty for patricide?”, with a pari being used to justify a positive answer.
If the social climate tends to increase penalties, the situation is the same. In this case, a pari would serve to justify the positive answer to the question “Should we increase the penalty for matricide?”.

3.3 Employment: Temporary/Permanent contract

Context: Some workers have a permanent contracts (PCs), while others have a fixed-term contract (FTCs), the former being considered better than the latter from the worker’s point of view. During a period of prosperity and full employment, the PC is the gold standard, and aligning a pari FTCs with PCs is on the agenda. The question of aligning PCs with FTCs is irrelevant. The difference will be denied by arguments such as:

People with FTCs are exploited, we are all workers, everyone should be able to get a PC!

In less favorable economic conditions however, FTCs become the norm, and equalizing them with PCs is not on the agenda. The difference is denied with arguments like:

People with PCs are privileged, privileges should end, everyone should be put on an FTC!

3.4 Going Out at Night: Girls / Boys

Consider a traditional family of consisting of teenage boys and girls, two species of the same genus. The boys are allowed to go out at night, but the girls are not. Suppose the girls resent this prohibition. They could argue their case in many ways. They could, for example, refer to the positive effects that going out at night would have on their social awareness, s. pragmatic argument; they could also point out that their brothers go out at night, in an elliptical a pari:

G — But the boys do go out at night!

Not surprisingly, the parents argue a contrario:

P — Yes but you are a girl …

To strengthen their case and eliminate the difference, girls could emphasize the similarities that characterize the new catch-all category « like the boys »:

Boys and girls receive the same education; they have access to the same media; they practice judo; they follow the same courses with the same requirements; they share the same responsibilities at home.

And they minimize the gender gap:

Dad, you gave us an excellent education, we are mature énd know how to stay out of trouble.

 

A fortiori, “for a stronger reason”

A FORTIORI argument

Lat. a fortiori ratione, “for a stronger reason”.
Ratio, “reason”; fortis, “strong”, fortior “stronger”.

The argument a fortiori applies in two directions:

(1) “From bigger to smaller” (Lat. a maiori ad minus). This formula allows infer­ences from more to less:

The hook can hold a load of up to 20kg, so it can support 10kg.
If someone is capable of killing someone, then, they are capable of striking someone.

Other expressions to the same effect: “for a stronger reaso;, “all the more reason to/for”: “those who can do hard things can readily do easy ones”, etc.

(2) “From smaller to bigger” (Lat. a minori ad maius). This formula rejects inferences from less to more:

The hook cannot hold a load greater than 20kg, so it certainly cannot support a 30 kg burden.
If one has no right to strike, then one has no right to kill.

Other expression to the same effect: “still / much / even less”, etc.

This scheme can be specified in a discursive domain, for example as a consolation discourse:

The idea that “death should spare young people” is more acceptable (more normal) than “death should spare the elderly”. And you know that many young people have died around you. Therefore, accept death.

This form underlies the statement “others died much younger”, which is said to comfort the living for the death of an elderly relative.

1. A fortiori, a Transcultural Topos

The a fortiori argument scheme is a clear example of a cross-cultural interpretive – argumentative rule.

1.1 Greco-Latin Tradition

In the Greco-Latin tradition all collections of argument schemes throughout the history of Western argumentation mention the a fortiori rule. Aristotle illustrates this rule via the following examples:

If even the gods are not omniscient, then certainly human beings are certainly not. (Rhet, II, 23, 1397b15, RR, p. 359)
A man who strikes his father also strikes his neighbors […] for a man is less likely to strike his father than to strike his neighbors (ibid.).

The second argument can be used in the following situation. Somebody was assaulted. Who is guilty? We know that someone in the victim’s neighborhood committed violence against his own father. The a fortiori argument casts suspicion upon the person who has already committed more severely prohibited forms of violence. The conclusion is that the police should question him.

1.1 Muslim Legal Argumentation

In Muslim legal argumentation, the bi-l-awla argument corresponds exactly to the a fortiori argument. The issue is addressed in the Quran (Surah 17, verse 24), dealing with the respect that a child owes to his parents:

Do not make “pfff!” to them!

The prohibition refers to a minimal impolite retort of a child shrugging off or reluctantly obeying the words of his parents, puffing out a sigh of exaspera­tion. The a fortiori principle extends this prohibition to all disrespectful behavior: “since it is forbidden even to say “pfff!” to one’s parents, it is all the more forbid­den to say harsh words to them, bully or hit them”.
The prohibition takes its support on the lowest point on the scale, the epsilon of disrespect. Commentators have noted that an a fortiori argument can be a form of semantic deduction (Khallâf [1942], p. 216).

1.3 Talmudic Exegesis

The rules of Talmudic exegesis have been established by various authors following Hillel (1st century CE). The entry “Hermeneutics” in the Encyclopædia Judaïca, enumerates the thirteen interpretive rules of Rabbi Ishmael.
The first rule is qal va-homer, “how much more”, which goes from the “minor” (qal) to the “major” (homer) a fortiori. (Jacobs & Derovan 2007, p. 25).

This rule helps to determine what is lawful and what is not, for example it establishes the conditions under which the Easter sacrifice, Pesach, should be offered. The Bible asks that Pesach be offered at Easter. Some actions are forbidden on the Sabbath, so what is one to do when Pesach coincides with the Sabbath? The calculation a fortiori gives the answer: the Olat Tamid sacrifice (“daily burnt-offering” [1]) is offered daily, including on the Shabbat. Pesach is more important than Tamid (proof: if one does not respect Tamid, one does not incur penalties; if one does not respect Pesach, the sanctions are severe). Since not cele­brating Pesach is more serious than not cele­brating Tamid, and Tamid is lawful when Easter falls on the day of Shabbat, it is therefore a fortiori lawful to sacrifice Pesach when Easter falls on Sabbath.
The reasoning can be expressed as a rhetorical syllogism:

Problem: the Pesach sacrifice must be offered on Passover.
Some actions are forbidden on Shabbat
Question: What should we do when Passover coincides with Shabbat?

Data: We know that 1) the Tamid offering must be celebrated on Shabbat, and 2) Not celebrating Pesach is worse than not celebrating the Tamid offering.
Argumentation: Topos of the opposites on (2):
Celebrating Pesach is more important than celebrating Tamid.
This, combined with (1), leads to the conclusion:

Conclusion: Pesach can be celebrated when Easter coincides with Shabbat.

1.4 Chinese Tradition [1]

Confucius, The Analects. Bk 11, §12. Trans. Robert Eno [3]

Ji Lu asked about serving the spirits. The Master said, “While you are yet not able to serve men, how could you be able to serve the spirits?”
“May I ask about death?”
“When you do not yet understand life, how could you understand death?”

Han Fei Tzu, “Precautions within the palace”.  Trans. Burton Watson [4]

Thus, the actor Shih aided Lady Li to bring about the death of Shen-sheng and to set Hsi-ch’i on the throne.1 Now, if someone as close to the ruler as his own consort, and as dear to him as his own son, still cannot be trusted, then obviously no one else is to be trusted either.
1 Lady Li and Hsi-ch’i “forced Shen-sheng to commit suicide in 656 BC”. “Hsi-ch’i (…) succeeded to the throne in 651 BC” (Burton Watson’s note to the text)

A fortiori can therefore be considered a good candidate for universality.

2. Nature of Gradation

The application of the a fortiori rule presupposes both that the related facts fall within a certain category and that they are hierarchically positioned within this category. This gradation may follow very different principles:

— Objective gradation: “He can hardly go from his bed to the window, and you would like to take him shopping downtown?”
— Socio-semantic gradation: “Even grandparents sometimes make big mistakes, so their grandchildren…”
— Gradation based on the authority of the sacred book: “The Pesach sacrifice is more important than the Tamid sacrifice”.

When there is a consensus on the gradation, ratified by the dictionary, the argumen­tative or interpretive deductions is purely semantic, s. definition.

In the “Argumentation within Language” theory (Ducrot 1973) the concept of a graduated category is represented as an argumentative scale; the a fortiori rule is an argumentative operator on such scales.

3. A fortiori in Paragon Scales

Some of these scales are topped by an ultimate individual, the paragon, the most excellent specimen of the category. The absolute degree of category is estab­lished in terms of comparability with the paragon: “sly as a fox”. These paragon scales are effective in rejecting a complaint: “You say that what happens to you is unjust. That’s true. But consider that Christ is the Innocent one par excellence. Now, you are not Christ, and Christ accepted an unjust death. You must therefore accept this injustice.”

An episode of the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939). Paco, a somewhat turbulent villager, turns himself in after the war, at the request of Mosén Millán, a priest. Mosén Millán as­sures him that he will be convicted but his life will be saved. Paco surren­ders, and now he and his companions are to be shot.
— Why do you want to kill me? What did I do? We didn’t kill anyone! Tell them I’ve done nothing wrong. You know very well that I’m innocent, that we’re all innocent.
—Yes, my son. You are all innocent. But what can I do?
— They want to kill me because I fought back at Pardinas; OK, but the other two did nothing wrong.
Pedro clung to the cassock of Mosén Millán, and repeated: “They did nothing, and they are going to kill them. They did nothing.” Moved to tears, Mosén Mil­lán said to him:
— Sometimes, my son, God allows the death of an innocent. He allowed it for his own son, who was more innocent than the three of you.
Upon hearing these words, Paco was paralyzed and speechless. The priest said noth­ing either.
Ramón J. Sender [Requiem for a Spanish Peasant] [1953][4]

[1] After https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/tamid (11-08-2017)

[2] « An infinitely rich and varied textual record attests [that] argumentation, persuasion and contention were key elements in a wide array of activities central to the concerns of state and society in China throughout its history.”
Martin Hofmann, Joachim Kurtz, and Ari Daniel Levine, 2020. Toward a History of Argumentative  Practice in Late Imperial China. In Hofmann, M. Kurz J. Levine A.D. (Eds). Powerful Arguments: Standards of Validity in Late Imperial China. Brill, Leiden.

[3] Confucius, The Analects. An Online Teaching Translation.  R. Eno 2015 (Version 2.21) http://www.indiana.edu/~p374/Analects_of_Confucius_(Eno-2015).pdf

[3] Han Fei Tzu. Basic Writings. Section 17, “Precautions within the Palace”. Translated by Burton Watson. New York, London, Columbia University Press, 1964. P. 84-85.

[4] Ramón J. Sender [1953] = (1981). Requiem por un Campesino Español. Barcelona: ​​Destinolibro, 7th ed. Pp. 100-101.

 

F Oxymore

Oxymore

Wuttke, Walter 1977. Zu Fragen des Zustandekommens potentieller sprachlicher Wirkingen des Oxymoron… Beiträge zur Geschischte des deutschen Sprache und Literature, 98. 83-90

Des emplois récents du mot oxymore lui-même illustrent de façon frappante cette ambivalence pragmatique de la figure. Lors de la constitution de mon corpus, j’ai en effet été frappée de constater que ce terme savant, peu usité dans les manuels de rhétorique eux-mêmes jusqu’à une date récente, s’était suffisamment répandu dans l’usage courant pour apparaître dans des commentaires métalinguistiques à forte orientation argumentative, de sorte qu’on peut parler de jugement d’oxymorisation, comme A. Krieg-Planque (2004) parle de jugement d’euphémisation.

57 Qualifier tel objet de discours d’oxymore devient alors un acte argumentatif décisif, soit pour disqualifier l’objet de discours ou le locuteur qui l’a désigné ainsi, soit au contraire pour les parer de toutes les vertus. C’est ainsi que le syntagme « TVA sociale » se voit dans des échanges récents sur la Toile (mai 2007) qualifier d’oxymore par les détracteurs de l’impôt ainsi désigné afin de montrer la fausseté du caractère social de cet impôt. Une blogueuse voit même dans l’oxymore une tare du discours politique contemporain :

58

(29) C’est ainsi que depuis une dizaine d’années on voit fleurir dans la sphère politico-économique d’aussi brillants oxymores que la « croissance zéro » pour éviter de dire la stagnation, le « développement durable » pour taire toute notion de consommation prudente, la « discrimination positive » ou encore le « libéralisme raisonné » pour faire passer la pilule, quand il ne s’agit pas tout bonnement de nous faire croire à l’impossible avec des expressions comme la « guerre propre » et ses fameuses « frappes chirurgicales ». (Article publié sur Agoravox dans l’édition du 04/12/2006, http:// wwww. agoravox. fr/ article. php3 ? id_article= 16263) [29][29]On peut noter que les exemples cités, hormis « discrimination…

 

59 Dans les débats à l’Assemblée Nationale sur le Traité Constitutionnel Européen, l’expression de « traité constitutionnel » est qualifiée d’oxymore par les défenseurs de ce traité, qui parviendrait selon eux à ménager les prérogatives des États tout en approfondissant la construction de l’unité européenne, alors que, quatre ans auparavant, l’appellation d’ « oxymore » est utilisée pour critiquer le concept de « fédération d’États-Nations » qui masquerait tout bonnement une conception fédéraliste de l’Union européenne :

60

(30) M. Léonetti. Contrairement à ce que certains prétendent en arguant du terme de Constitution, ce nouveau traité ne fait pas de l’Union européenne un super-État. C’est un traité entre États. Pascal Clément a brillamment expliqué comment l’expression de traité constitutionnel faisait coïncider deux concepts a priori contradictoires, mais synthétisés dans la notion de construction européenne. – M. Pascal Clément, président de la commission des lois constitutionnelles, de la législation et de l’administration générale de la République, rapporteur. Un oxymore ! (première séance du 26/01/2005)
(31) M. Jean-Pierre Chevènement. À rien ne sert de se réfugier, Monsieur le ministre des affaires étrangères, dans les oxymores, du type « fédération d’États-nations » ; c’est d’avance concéder à la logique du super Etat fédéral. (deuxième séance du 5/06/2001)

K_Conventions pour K

Conventions

 

Je cherche un symbole capable de …

en attendant:

 signaler, accompagner … par exemple:

(on doit pouvoir cumuler les symboles
NE  an entry of the Dictionnary le nom d’une entrée du Dictionnaire NE

Conduction
a re-worked section of une section retravaillée =

corrigée, reformulée, développée, abrégée, explicitée

 ReF – Add

A pari
the addition of a new section to an existing entry l’addition d’une nouvelle section au texte d’un article existant NSec, Nex, Ncit

Nom propre
a new example un nouvel exemple NEx

Ambigüité
a new quotation une nouvelle citation NCit
a new entry une nouvelle entrée NE
a worked example un exemple analysé WE

 

La méthode des abréviations latines

 

ibid. (de ibidem, au même endroit) Abréviation utilisée pour une référence suivant immédiatement une référence à un même document.

  1. (de idem, le même auteur) Abréviation utilisée pour une référence à un autre ouvrage d’un auteur cité dans la note de référence précédente (de moins en moins utilisé).
  2. cit. (de opere citato, dans l’ouvrage cité) Cette abréviation est généralement utilisée pour les références à des ouvrages publiés. Elle remplace le titre et toute l’information relative à l’édition.

loc. cit. (de loco citato, au lieu cité)1 Cette abréviation est généralement réservée aux références des articles ou des mémoires et thèses non publiés.

K_Représentation – Adéquation

 

Analyse de l’argumentation > Représentation

L’ambition du Dictionnaire est de caractériser un langage de représentation des pratiques argumentatives. Modéliser, c’est construire une représentation d’un certain domaine de données, en s’appuyant sur un langage où les concepts et leurs relations et leurs conditions d’application sont définis le mieux possible. Le langage de représentation détermine un ensemble d’opérations techniques qui permettent de traiter une classe de phénomènes objets. Il n’a pas pour ambition première de représenter l’essence du phénomène argumentation.

Les modèles sont évalués selon leur adéquation aux données, qui a elle-même trois facettes, l’adéquation observationnelle, l’adéquation descriptive et l’adéquation explicative. Ces notions sont proposées par Chomsky (1964) pour évaluer des grammaires concurrentes ; on peut en faire une adaptation modeste au cas du langage de l’argumentation. On parlera d’adéquation descriptive si le langage théorique permet de rendre compte d’un ensemble de données telles qu’elles sont réunies dans un corpus, de façon généralisable (non ad hoc), en respectant les intuitions d’argumentativité d’un locuteur compétent.

Une notion, par exemple un type d’argument comme l’argument par la pente glissante a un pouvoir descriptif si elle peut être mise en correspondance avec un ensemble de productions discursives concrètes ; si elle capte l’air de famille d’une collection de cas intuitivement proches.

Une théorie n’est pas descriptivement adéquate si elle ne respecte pas cette intuition première : par exemple, une théorie de l’argumentation qui ne prend pas en compte la dimension émotionnelle n’est pas descriptivement adéquate.

 

Le niveau de l’adéquation explicative est atteint si le langage théorique jette quelque lumière sur les phénomènes. Dans le cas précédemment évoqué de la pente glissante, on comprend sans problème les discours qui exploitent cette forme ; c’est précisément parce qu’on les comprend qu’on peut dire que la définition proposée du concept est ou n’est pas adéquate. L’adéquation explicative est atteinte si l’intuition seule ne permet pas de comprendre de façon satisfaisante ce qui se passe, et le langage théorique permet de comprendre. Par exemple, le début du corpus “Débat sur l’immigration et la nationalité” m’est resté longtemps totalement incompréhensible, il me semblait que rien ne se passait, jusqu’à ce que, un peu grâce à Bentham et à la forme d’intervention, ou type d’argument “Laissez-nous tranquilles !”, et à la distinction entre ouverture de l’interaction et ouverture de l’argumentation, les choses prennent un peu d’ordre et de sens (voir Plantin 2006). C’est une définition modeste de l’adéquation explicative, relative à une personne. Mais il est essentiel que la théorie soit capable aussi d’éclairer des phénomènes, c’est-à-dire produire du sens là où il n’y en avait pas.