Does catching a crane cause thunderclaps?

In the Empire there are cranes which are eaten in all the commanderies and kingdoms. Only in the Three Capital Districts does no one dare catch them because of the custom that an outbreak of thunder will occur if a crane is caught. Could it be that Heaven originally favored only this bird? [No],the killing of the bird merely coincided with thunder. (Huan T’an  (-43, +28) Hsin Lun (New treatise), fragment 133, p.122)

Huan T’an  (-43, +28) Hsin Lun (New treatise). Translated by Timoteus Pokora. University of Michigan, Center for Chinese studies, 1975. https://library.oapen.org › bitstream.

*

Succession doesn’t imply causation

Causal arguments justify or deny the existence of a causal link between two facts, « B because of A ».
A classic counter-argument to the claim “B, because of A” denies the existence of a causal relationship : « there is no causality between events A and B, but a simple coincidence » — here, « catching a crane » and « thunderclap« .
This fallacy is identified by Aristotle as a fallacy independent of language, sometimes referred to by the Latin label non causa pro causa, that is, “non cause as cause”.

To find a good counselor, one can look for someone with qualities such as experience, a good reputation, and a track record of success in giving advice.
However, these are not the criteria followed by Emperor Hoang-ti, The Yellow Emperor,a legendary emperor who is said to have reigned from 2697 to 2597 bce (W).

According to the “Great Historian » Sima Quian (= Se-ma Ts’ien) (c. 145-86 bce)
The Emperor Hoang-ti raised in dignity Fong-heou, Li-mou, Tch’ang-sien, and Ta hong, and charged them with governing the people. 
Chavannes, Les Mémoires historiques de Se-ma Ts’ien . Tome I, p. 12

Chavannes adds the following note to this passage:

« The names Fong-heou and Li-mou gave rise to a legend that Hoang-fou Mi recounts in his Ti wang che ki.”

According to the legend, Hoang-ti saw in a dream a great wind sweeping away all the dust, then a man holding a huge bow and guarding sheep. He concluded that heaven was thus indicating the names of those he should take as advisors.
Indeed, wind is called fong — and dust is called keou; by removing the key on the left from the latter character, we obtain exactly the name Fong-heou; on the other hand, the enormous bow suggests the idea of strength, li, and the fact of guarding sheep suggests the idea of a shepherd, mou; this gives us the name Li-mou.
Hoang-ti did not rest until he had found two men with these names. »
Chavannes, Mémoires historiques de Se-ma Ts’ien   T1 note 130, p. 133.

Se-ma Ts’ien, Les Mémoires historiques de Se-ma Ts’ien (Shiji). Tome premier, traduit et annoté par Édouard Chavannes. E. Leroux, Paris, 1895.
Mode texte par Pierre Palpant www.chineancienne.fr

4B.26 Mencius said, “When people speak of ‘nature,’ they refer only to our primitive being, and that is moved only by profit. What they dislike about intelligence is that it forces its way. If intelligence acted as Yu did in guiding the rivers, then they would not dislike it. When Yu guided the rivers, he followed their spontaneous courses. If intelligence also followed its spontaneous course, it would be great wisdom indeed. Heaven is high and the stars are distant, but if we seek after their primitive being, we can sit and predict the solstices for a thousand years.”

4B.26 Yu is the legendary sage founder of the Xia Dynasty, who was originally a figure in a flood myth. His method of draining the great flood was to dredge he riverbeds, rather than to dig new channels for their flow.

4B.26 Mencius said, ‘In its arguments about human nature, all the world does is offer reasons. It is for reasons to make for ease of argument. What one dislike in the clever is that their arguments are continued. If the clever could be like Yü guiding the flood waters, then there would be nothing in them to dislike. In guiding the flood waters, Yü did so with the greatest of ease. If the clever could also argue with the greatest of ease, then great indeed would cleverness be. In spite of the heighth of the heavens and the distance of the heavenly bodies, if one seeks the reasons, one can calculate the solstices of a thousand year without stirring from one’s seat.

Mencius_Eno BOOK 6, GAOZI

6B.1 A man from Ren asked Wuluzi, “Which is more important, ritual or food?”
“Ritual is more important,” said Wuluzi.
“Which is more important, sex or ritual?”
“Ritual is more important.”
“What if you would starve to death if you insisted on ritual, but you could get food if you didn’t. Would you still have to abide by ritual? What if by skipping the ritual groom’s visit to receive the bride you could take a wife [1], but otherwise you could not? Would you still insist on the groom’s ritual visit?”

Wuluzi was unable to reply, and the next day he went to Zou to consult with Mencius.

Mencius said, “What’s difficult about this? And inch long wood chip could measure higher than a building if we hold its tip up above and ignore the difference in what is below. When we say that gold is heavier than feathers, we don’t mean a buckle’s worth of gold and a cartload of feathers! If you compare the extremity of need for food with a minor ritual, it’s not just food that can seem more weighty. If you compare the extremity of need for joining of the sexes with a minor ritual, it’s not just sex that can seem more weighty.

“Go back and respond to him like this: ‘What if you could get food you need only by twisting your elder brother’s arm – would you twist it? What if you could get a wife only by climbing over your neighbor’s east wall and dragging his daughter off – would you do it?’”

Note Eno
II. “Balancing”: the art of rule violation
The two passages  [6B1 and 6B2] in this section focus on a notion closely related to timeliness – when are we
licensed to violate rules? Confucian texts grant the junzi who is truly at the level of sage full
violation to do so, but do not want to grant that authority to everyone. After all, li are rules, and if they are not important, what basis is left for a ritualist tradition like Confucianism?

https://chinatxt.sitehost.iu.edu/Thought/Mengzi5.pdf

***

Two dilemma, to test Wuluzi dialectical capacities and / his adherence to li, and determination to follow the rule

A or B?  (or = W)
1) no food or no ritual (in general)
2) no sex or no Ritual = sex at the price of a violation of the ritual of the groom’s visit no food
Food => no ritual

“The ritual groom’s visit to receive the bride” [1] An essential part of the wedding ceremony, that is an important ritual
Suppose that ritual will be sacrified to human needs

2) Mencius distinguishes beetween major and minor forms of ritual, and reformulates the opposition in relation with two major forms of ritual.

• Two violent acts
— twisting your elder brother’s arm
— climbing over your neighbor’s east wall and dragging his daughter off –

Suppose that in this case the consensus would on rejecting the condition

A Fact-Based Refutation

Unkindness
Dêng Hsi Tse (c.546-501 BCE)

1. Heaven is not kind to man, the ruler is not kind to his people, the father to his son, the elder to the younger brother. Why do I say so?

Because Heaven cannot remove disastrous epidemics, nor keep those alive who are cut off in their prime, nor always grant a long life to good people. That is unkindness to the people.
Whenever people break holes through walls, and rob or deceive others, and lead them astray, want is at the root of all these offences, and poverty their main spring. Albeit; yet the ruler takes the law, and punishes the culprits. That is unkindness to the people.
Yao and Shun swayed the Empire, whereas Tan Chu and Shang Chün continued simple citizens. That is unkindness to sons.
The duke of Chou put Kuan and Ts’ai to death, that is unkindness to younger brothers.

From these examples, which may be multiplied, we see that there is no such thing as kindness.

Dêng Hsi Tse  1 — Unkindness — Chinese Texts in English

Deng Xi = Dêng Hsi = Têng Hsi

Preliminary:  What meaning should we give to (un)kindness?

In the current formula, kind is a mere softener in a request to do a small favour for the speaker:
“Would you be so kind as to…”. « That’s not kind!” is a reproach to a child who is behaving badly, or, more generally, to someone who has done something slightly wrong. This meaning is not productive in the context we are considering.
Generosity is one of the first synonyms for kindness. In Descartes’ analysis of passions and virtues, generosity is defined by  self-respect and free will, which regulate the attitude towards oneself and others. We take kindness in this cartesian sense, as a cardinal moral virtue implying consideration and care for oneself and others.
We will take (un)kindness with this general meaning, who possibly reminds Confucius’ dao, as characterized in the Analects, 4.15:

The Master said, “Shen, a single thread runs through my dao.”
Master Zeng said, “Yes.”
The Master went out, and the other disciples asked, “What did he mean?”
Master Zeng said, “The Master’s dao is nothing other than loyalty and reciprocity.”

Seen as a moral imperative, kindness is not refuted by the fact that, volens nolens, everyone can be unkind once in their life. It only shows that virtue is difficult.
If Kindness is seen as the organising moral virtue, the text refers broadly to human moral nature. But is there such a thing? Chinese philosophers argue extensively on this point.

Unkindness in the four basic relationships

Kindness is a relational virtue. In this passage, Deng Hsi considers four cases, four  kinds of relationships (Heaven to people — Ruler to people — Father to son — Brother to younger brother), and considers them one by one.

The classical Confucian set of « five fundamental relationships” groups together the relationships between ruler and subject, father and son, elder brother and younger brother, husband and wife, and friend and friend, that is social relations and and family relations. [1] Deng Hsi’s list adds to this classical set the relationship between Heaven and man; Heaven rules the universe, and therefore human destiny. The “fundamental relationships” are five, but they are of the same nature: they are derived adaptations of the Ruler-Subject relationship. The corresponding society is sex segregated, male-dominated, patriarchal and despotic,

DengHsi’s refutation step by step destroys the idea of is kindness as a cosmological virtue, making all the more radical his critique of kindness as ruling interhuman social and family life.

1. Heaven cannot remove disastrous epidemics, nor keep those alive who are cut off in their prime, nor always grant a long life to good people. That is unkindness to the people.
The refutation is based on prototypical examples of the human condition

2. Ruler — Whenever people break holes through walls, and rob or deceive others, and lead them astray, want is at the root of all these offences, and poverty their main spring.
Punishment may be justified,  but robbery is fully justified by poverty, and punish poverty is a systemic unjustice. Deng Hsi doesn’t base his refutation on the fact that judges can misjudge, or be corrupt. Social unkindness takes precedence over human unkindness.

3. Sons — Yao and Shun swayed the Empire, whereas Tan Chu and Shang Chün continued simple citizens.
According to Chinese mythology and traditional Chinese historiography, Yao and Shun are the last of the legendary emperors.
Yao disinherited his son Tan Chu [Danzhu], and entrusted the empire to Shun.
Shun dishinherited his son Chang Chun [Shangju], and entrusted the empire to Yu the Great, the founder of the Xia dynasty

Yao and Shun are mentioned in the Book of documents.[Shujing]. Arguments based on data from the Shujing are indisputable. As such, Yao and Shun they serve as models for their infallible capacity to make the right decision in all circumstances, both politically and morally.
In this case, their decision not to leave the kingdom to their respective sons and legitimate heirs is justified by the ineptitude of their heirs. But these legitimate heirs are no less prejudiced by the raison d’état.
The fact that the best kings commit “justified unkindness” while remaining model kings makes the argument a fortiori unndisputable.
It is also possible to consider that model kings are role models in politics, but none the less unkind. In that case, the question they had to decide should be considered as paradoxical.

4. Brothers — The Duke of Chou put Kuan and Ts’ai to death
The Duke of Zhou (Chou) is the founder of the Zhou dynasty, regent king of Zhou for his young brother. His brothers Kuan [Guanshu Xian]  and  Ts’ai [Caishu Du] rebelled  against him, and the double fratricide, direct and indirect,  was the conclusion of  “The three Guards rebellion” (c. 1042-1039 BCE).  The whole drama is told by R. Eno here.

On a par with Yao and Shun, who preceded him by a millennium, the Duke of Zhou is a traditional Chinese model, for the role he played in establishing of the Zhou dynasty.
The argument is similar to the previous one.

The four sources capable to be kind are actually severely unkind, hence the  conclusion that, factually, there is nothing like “systemic kindness” under Heaven.

“There is nothing like kindness”

Qualifying the facts

The legal qualification of a fact is the process by which jurists attach the legal name and the corresponding legal category to a  fact that they have to judge.

Along the same lines, Deng Hsi characterises facts facts he considers to be a case of unkindness. These facts can be considered as systemic, they imply the whole organization of the society, and not just one of its isolated component. These systemic facts are:

— Plagues, mortality
— Punishment of the all thieves, even they are poor. 
— The rule of succession to the throne, and choice of one person, necessarily to the prejudice of others. This is the condition for any choice.
— Punishment of the leaders of a rebellion, even if they are the brothers of the sovereign.

All these very different cases are « unkindnesses”. The unkindness does not lie in the specificity of the events considered, but in their systemic aspect, for example in the fact that the father has the possibility of disinheriting their son, and this possibility is unkind.

Composing the arguments : the global claim

Taken together, the four arguments culminate in the claim that “there is no such thing as kindness”. Let’s consider three possible interpretations of this claim.

— Refuting of the universal claim that « [The world] is kind”
Deng Hsi’s argument can be seen as the refutation of an implicit factual assertion, “Heaven and People are kind to each another”. Such a claim is grossly false, as is “Heaven and People are unkind to each another”, i. e. « people and Heaven are wolves to people”.

— Refuting a prejudice: “[The world] is generally kind”
The refuted claim is better considered as a popular belief, “Heaven and People can be /are generally kind”. Such a belief underlies appeals to pity, prayers and sacrifices. However, the full expression of this belief includes a realistic counterpart, « But they don’t have to be”.

— Destruction of the very concept of kindness; “There is nothing like kindness”
The concept of kindness is fallacious. It follows that it cannot be used in a philosophical system, let alone as one of its fundamental concepts.

_______________
[1] Keith N. KNAPP, 2009. Three Fundamental Bonds and Five Constant Virtues Sāngāng Wŭcháng 三 纲 五 常 . In Linsung Chen, Berkshire Encyclopedia of China.
https://chinaconnectu.com/wp-content/pdf/ThreeFundamentalBondsandFiveConstantVirtues.pdf

Only specialists in ancient Chinese can fully understand and analyze the original Chinese reasoning presented in classical Chinese texts. Readers of translations are left with an X as it is translated as a reasoning.
Some translations are not, or not entirely, directly understandable to the lay reader; others are clear and equivalent; still others are clear but not equivalent. Mencius’ discussions with Kao Tzu (= Gaotzi = Kao Tzeu) illustrate these different situations. They are available in at least the following four translations.

Mencius. Trans., Introd. and Notes by D. C. Lau. Penguin Classics.  1970, 2003,

Mencius, An online teaching translation with introduction, notes and glossary  by Robert Eno, Version 1.0 2016. http://www.indiana.edu/~p374/Mencius (Eno-2016).pdf

Œuvres de Meng Tzeu. Les quatre livres, IV. Traduit par Séraphin Couvreur (1835-1919), © 1895. Mise en mode texte par Pierre Palpant, www.chineancienne.fr.

Angus Charles Graham. 1989. Disputers of the Tao. Philosophical argument in ancient China. La Salle, Illinois, Open Court.

On the term “human nature,” see the Glossary

1. Four equivalent translations of the same passage from Mencius

Different translations can cleary express the same argument. These translations are said to be equivalent as far as their reasoning movement is concerned.  There may remain  variations in the conceptual vocabulary used in the different translations.

In the following passage where Mencius counters Gaozi’s arguments from analogy by finding a weakness in the analogy.

Mencius_Lau
VI A 1. Kao Tzu said, ‘Human nature is like the ch’i willow. Dutifulness is like cups and bowls. To make morality out of human nature is like making cups and bowls out of the willow’.
‘Can you,’ said Mencius, ‘make cups and bowls by following the nature of the willow? Or must you mutilate the willow before you can make it into cups and bowls? If you have to mutilate the willow to make it into cups and bowls, must you then also mutilate a man to make him moral? Surely it will be these words of yours men in the world will follow in bringing disaster upon morality’ (fin du §)
Mencius. Trans., Introd. and Notes by D. C. Lau.  ©1970, 2003, Penguin Classics, p.

Mencius_Eno
6A1 Gaozi said, “Human nature is like the willow tree and righteousness is like cups and bowls. Drawing humanity and right from human nature is like making cups and bowls from willow wood.”
Mencius said, “Can you make cups and bowls from willow wood by following its natural grain or is it only after you have hacked the willow wood that you can make a cup or bowl? If you must hack the willow to make cups and bowls from it, must you hack people in order to make them humane and righteous? Your words will surely lead the people of the world to destroy humanity and right.”

Mencius_Couvreur
VI.I.1. p.557 Kao tzeu dit — La nature peut être comparée à l’osier, et la justice (cette disposition qui nous porte à traiter les hommes et les choses comme il convient) peut être comparée à une coupe ou à une autre écuelle d’osier. La nature humaine reçoit les dispositions à la bienfaisance et à la justice, comme l’osier reçoit la forme d’une coupe ou d’une autre écuelle.
Meng tzeu dit — Pouvez-vous faire une coupe ou une autre écuelle avec de l’osier sans contrarier les tendances de sa nature ? Vous ne le pouvez; vous devez couper et maltraiter l’osier. Si vous coupez et maltraitez l’osier pour en faire une écuelle, irez- vous aussi léser et maltraiter la nature humaine pour lui donner des dispositions à la bienfaisance et à la justice ? S’il est une doctrine capable de porter les hommes à rejeter comme nuisibles la bienveillance et la justice, c’est certainement la vôtre.

Mencius_Graham
Kao-tzu said: ‘Our nature is like the willow, the right is like cups and bowls. Making the benevolent and the right out of man’s nature is like making cups and bowls out of the willow.”
‘Are you able’, said Mencius, by  ‘following the willow’s nature to make cups and bowls out of it? Isn’t it rather that to make cups and bowls out of it you have to violate the willow? If you violate the willow to make cups and bowls out of it, do you also violate man to make the benevolent and the right out of him?  I suggest  that if anything can lead the people of the world to think of the benevolent and the right as misfortunes it is this saying of yours’
Grahan, A. C., p. 120.

The nature of the willow is to grow into a flourishing tree and it is violated when we chop and carve the wood into the shape which suits our purposes. Kao-tzu’s analogy does have a direction of growth, and morality is against nature. But then Kao-tzu’s own example tells against him : nature would be not neutral but bad. Neither for Kao-tzu nor for Mencius is this a thinkable — what incentive would there be to moral behaviour? Although it was to become one with Hsun-Tzu in the next century (id.)
Grahan, A. C Disputers of the Tao. p. 120.

The main differences lie not in the reasoning, but in the English conceptual vocabulary used in the various translations, see

2. A difficult case:
Four different translations of another passage from Mencius

In other cases,the translations seems roughly equivalent, but the reasoning movement is nevertheless beyond the grasp of a lay reader.
In the following passage, Mencius counters Gaozi’s definition of the word « nature ». His justification is categorical.
One may find that the inferring license, corresponding to the reasoning move, needs developments based on a sophisticated knowledge of the Chinese language.
Eno’s translation is followed by an understandable explanation of that kind, apparently accessible to the lay reader.

(a) Mencius_Lau (1970, 2003)
6A3. Kao Tzu said “That which is inborn is what is meant by ‘nature’. ”
‘Is that’, said Mencius, the same as ‘ white is what is meant by “white” ?’
‘Yes’
‘Is the whiteness of white feathers the same as the whiteness of white snow and the whiteness of white snow the same as the whiteness of white jade?’
‘Yes’
‘In that case, is the nature of a hound the same as the nature of an ox and the nature of an ox the same as the nature of a man?’ (end of §3)
Mencius. Trans., Introd. and Notes by D. C. Lau.  ©1970, 2003, Penguin Classics

(b) Mencius_Eno (2016)
6A.3. Gaotzi said “The term ‘nature’ simply means ‘inborn’ ”
Mencius said, “Do you mean that ‘nature’ means ‘inborn’ as ‘white’ means ‘white’?
“Precisely” ‘
“As the white of white feathers is the white of snow and the white of snow is the white of white jade?’
“Yes’“Then the nature of a hound would be the same as the nature of an ox and the nature of an ox would be the same as the nature of a man’s?’ (end of §3)

Note Eno 6A.3 :
This passage turns on wordplay. The term for the “nature” of a living thing is xing 性, which was cognate in sound and form with the word sheng 生, which meant “life, alive, inborn.” In Mencius’s time, the graph 生 could stand for either word. While Gaozi clearly wishes to make a substantive claim about how the term xing should be defined, Mencius reduces this to a lexical analogy to the word “white” (bai 白):

生 = 生 :: 白 = 白

Gaozi should have rejected the proposed analogy.

(c) Mencius_Couvreur (1895)
Kao tzeu dit : — La nature n’est autre chose que la vie.
Meng tzeu dit : — La nature doit-elle être appelée vie comme tout objet blanc est appelé blanc ?
— Oui répondit Kao tzeu.
— La blancheur d’une plume blanche, dit Meng tzeu est-elle la même que celle de la neige; et la blancheur de la neige, la même que celle d’une perle blanche?
— Oui répondit Kao tzeu.
— Alors, dit Meng tzeu, la nature du chien est la même que celle du bœuf et la nature du bœuf la même que celle de l’homme. [fin du §]
Œuvres de Meng Tzeu. Trad. et notes par S. Couvreur. Cité d’après www.chineancienne.fr. p. 180

(d) Mencius_Graham
Kao-tzu said : ‘it is life (sheng) that is meant by “nature” (hsing)’
‘Is life meant by “nature” ’, said Mencius, ‘as white is meant by “white” ’ ?
‘It is’
“Is the white of white feathers like the white of white snow, the white of white snow  like the white of  white jade?’
‘It is’
‘Then is the dog’s nature like the ox’s nature, the ox’s nature like man’s nature ?
Graham, A. C Disputers of the Tao. p. 119.

Mencius, bce

2A.6 — Why do I say that all people possess within them a moral sense that cannot bear the suffering of others? Well, imagine now a person who, all of a sudden, sees a small child on the verge of falling down into a well. Any such person would experience a sudden sense of fright and dismay. This feeling would not be something he summoned up in order to establish good relations with the child’s parents. He would not purposefully feel this way in order to win the praise of their friends and neighbors. Nor would he feel this way because the screams of the child would be unpleasant.

“By imagining this situation we can see that one who lacked a sense of dismayed commiseration in such a case simply could not be a person. Moreover, anyone who lacks the sense of shame cannot be a person; anyone who lacks a sense of deference cannot not be a person; anyone who lacks a sense of right and wrong cannot not be a person.

“The sense of commiseration is the seed of humanity, the sense of shame is the seed of righteousness, the sense of deference is the seed of ritual, and the sense of right and wrong is the seed of wisdom. Everyone possesses these four moral senses just as they possess their four limbs. To possess such seeds and yet claim to be unable to call them forth is to rob oneself; and for a person to claim that his ruler is incapable of such moral feelings is to rob his ruler.
(Mencius_ENO 2A6)

This thought experiment is critical in the Mencius, and for it to be understood, emphasis must be placed on the suddenness of the encounter, and the fact that Mencius is making a claim about a true universal: the way all people would react, not about what action they would take.
The idea that certain moral senses are essential to personhood is also explicit in 6A.6, which serves as a companion passage to this one.

Pour décrire l’argumentation développée dans le texte de Mencius (exemple 2.2), nous utiliserons une méthode dérivée de celle qu’utilise Grize for the argumentative operations argumentatives building the objetcs of discours.

An argumentation, {data, claim}

The argument is the description of an fictive situation and its developments. corresponding to the specific thought experiment. Here, this description bears on two partners,the physical situation of the child and a guess concernint the mental states of the person seeing him.
This grossly described situation
Nothing is said about the mental state of the child, for example, if he is afraid of playing with the images reflected in the well, nor about the position of the person in relation with the child.. the claim is on the mental state of the person, we imagine an adult, in the picture: Any such person would experience a sudden sense of fright and dismay.

L’argumentation positive

(i) Situation
La situation envisagée par Mencius décrit schématiquement un fait sans doute rare mais possible :

Imagine now a person who, all of a sudden, sees a small child on the verge of falling down into a well.

Cette situation décrit une scène et rapporte une perception, sans la lier à aucune action. Le destinataire peut se projeter dans cette situation. Mencius en dérive une thèse, en deux étapes.

On peut sans doute imaginer une expérience, portant non pas sur un individu particulier ni sur l’humanité entière, qui prendrait pour base non pas les réactions à une situation réelle, mais à une situation représentée

(ii) Attribution d’un état mental accompagnant  nécessairement la perception de la scène primitive :

Any such person would experience a sudden sense of fright and dismay.

Cette dérivation est fondée sur une intuition, un sentiment d’évidence ou de révélation intérieure, accessible par introspection.

Cette conclusion serait balayée par l’hypothèse cartésienne du Malin Génie.
L’introspection fournit une conclusion en première personne : “I would experience…”.
Mencius ne dit pas  que l’enfant était sauvable, ni que la personne émue “se précipiterait pour sauver l’enfant”. L’interprétation est compatible avec “se sauverait effrayé / par peur d’être pris dans une sale affaire”.

(iii) Opérations argumentatives: Spécification, Re-catégorisation, Généralisation

Cette conclusion d’abord catégorisée comme une “experience”, est ensuite re-catégorisée, ou précisée  comme a moral sense, un sentiment moral :

all people possess within them a moral sense that cannot bear the suffering of others

Sur le plan de la disposition textuelle, l’objet de discours ainsi développé correspond à la suite :

a sudden sense of fright and dismay … [an experience] …a moral sense… dismayed commiseration

Ici, le moteur argumentatif n’est pas l’inférence mais des opérations de spécification et de re-catégorisation. Sur le plan conceptuel, par abstraction croissante on a :

 [an experience] > specified as a sudden sense of fright and dismay
> re-categorized  as a specifc moral sense, dismayed commiseration

Cette dérivation s’accompagne de deux généralisations portant sur l’être visé par  ce sentiment moral, et sur l’autre sur la situation, globalement  d’un risque individuel de souffrance à la souffrance de tous

(iv) Cette conclusion est testée par application du topos des contraires

all people possess within them a moral sense that cannot bear the suffering of others
one who lacked a sense of dismayed commiseration in such a case simply could not be a person.

{Humans] would experience a sudden sense of fright and dismay, soit H would experience F
— par application du topos des contraires : non-H would experience non-F
en d’autres termes, one who lacked a sense of dismayed commiseration in such a case simply could not be a person.

(v) Sur-exploitation
Une troisième étape introduite par “moreover” affirme l’existence de quatre sentiments moraux définissant l’être humain : la généralisation est portée par une analogie :

humanity, righteousness, ritual, right and wrong.
Everyone possesses these four moral senses just as they possess their four limbs

Objections et réfutation

La nature argumentative du texte est  attestée par la mention d’objections possibles (prolepse), de nature utilitariste :

— something he summoned up in order to establish good relations with the child’s parents.
— purposefully feel this way in order to win the praise of their friends and neighbors
— because the screams of the child would be unpleasant.

Ces objections sont rejetées, non pas discutées et réfutées.
Elles sont exploitées par une argumentation implicite ad ignorantiam – cas par cas: on ne peut pas imaginer d’autres ressorts à l’action secourable.

On peut opposer à la conclusion de Mencius la thèse de Xunzi (3e siècle av. JC) selon laquelle “Human nature is bad”

Human nature is bad. Their goodness is a matter of deliberate effort. […] They are born with feelings of hate and dislike with them. Xunzi, Chap 25, Human Nature is bad, p. 248.

Centrality of syllogism in ordinary language

Classical logic considered itself to be the science of correct thinking, and the syllogism is the foundation of propositional logic and, symbolicallyhe, its core. If humans are rational beings, then logic defines humans.
However, the mathematisation of logic and the emergence of observational and experimental sciences have completely transformed this view of logic as the ‘art of thinking’.

Argumentation seeks to define itself in relation to logic, particularly mathematical logic. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca contrast argumentation with logic, and the syllogism disappears from the theory of argumentation.
The classical syllogism employs set theory (see the evaluation method using Venn diagrams). Categorization corresponds to the syllogism with a concrete subject. The legal syllogism is a form of this type of syllogism used in law.

A syllogism with a concrete subject governs the categorization of a being and may be the fundamental operation of ordinary reasoning carried out using only the resources of ordinary language.
Classical texts translated from Chinese contain explicit examples of classical syllogisms (section 2) and syllogisms with concrete subjects (section 3).

A Chinese syllogism

Consider « this curiously familiar-sounding syllogism of Wang Ch’ung (*):

‘Man is a thing: though honored as king or noble, by nature he is no different from other things. No thing does not die, how can man be immortal?‘
(Graham  1989, p.  168; see arguing without argumentation theory)

Wang Ch’ung uses a valid syllogism, that combines true propositions to arrive at a sound conclusion, « Humans are beings, no being is immortal, no human is immortal.” In the unfriendly language of traditional logic, this reasoning is described as a syllogism of the fourth figure, said Galenic, and in the Camenes mode: « all H are B; no B is I; therefore no H is I. »
Wang Ch’ung presents this incontrovertible conclusion as a so-called “rhetorical » question, which is a challenge to any opponent (Toulmin, 1958: 97); this introduces a dialectical movement within syllogistic reasoning.

(*) Wang Ch’ung, c. 27 – c. 97 ce

Mencius_Eno

1B.6 Mencius addressed King Xuan of Qi. “Suppose a subject of Your Majesty entrusted his wife and children to a friend and traveled south to Chu, and when he returned, his friend had left his wife and child to suffer in cold and hunger. What should this man do?”
The King said, “Discard him as a friend.”

“And what if the Master of the Guard could not keep order among his men, what then?”
“Dismiss him.”

“And what if there were disorder within the borders of the state, what then?
The King turned to his other courtiers and changed the subject.

Mencius_Eno

1B.8 King Xuan of Qi asked, “Is it so that Tang banished Jie and that King Wu killed Zhòu?”Mencius replied, “It is so recorded in the histories.”

“Is it permissible, then, for a subject to kill his ruling lord?”
Mencius said, “A man who plunders humanity is called a thief; a man who plunders righteousness is called an outcast. I have heard of the execution of Outcast Zhòu; I have not heard of the execution of a ruling lord Zhòu.”

Un dialogue question / réponses

Une suite de questions du même type, dont la réponse est du même type et fait l’objet d’un consensus et devient évidente.

La dernière de ces questions est toujours du même type, mais par les engagements qu’il a contractés par ses réponses précédentes, doit y apporter une réponse qui met gravement en cause ses intérêts. “c’est vous qui l’avez dit!”

L’interlocuteurs de Mencius, dans les deux cas, est le roi Xuan de Qi. Il est questionneur dans 1B6 et répondant dans 1B8

Magnifique réponse confucéénne de Mencius

Tchouang Tseu (Liou Kia-hway, p. 44)

Si je discute avec toi et que tu l’emportes sur moi, au lieu que je l’emporte sur toi, as-tu nécessairement raison et ai-je nécessairement tort ?
Si je l’emporte sur toi, ai-je nécessairement raison et as-tu nécessairement tort ?

Ou bien l’un de nous deux a raison et l’autre tort ? Ou bien avons nous raisons tous les deux ou tort tous les deux ? Ni toi ni moi ne pouvons le savoir, et un tiers serait tout autant dans l’obscurité. Qui peut en décider sans erreur ?

Si nous interrogeons quelqu’un qui est de ton avis, du fait qu’il est de ton avis, comment peut-il en décider ?
S’il est de mon avis, du fait qu’il est de mon avis, comment peut-il en décider ?
Il en sera de même s’il s’agit de quelqu’un qui est à la fois de ton avis et du mien, ou d’un avis différent de chacun de nous deux. Et alors ni toi ni moi ni un tiers ne peuvent trancher. Faudra-t-il attendre un quatrième?