ATC	A THOUGHT EXPERIMENT: « Imagine a small child on the verge of falling down into a well… »

Mencius, bce

2A.6 — Why do I say that all people possess within them a moral sense that cannot bear the suffering of others? Well, imagine now a person who, all of a sudden, sees a small child on the verge of falling down into a well. Any such person would experience a sudden sense of fright and dismay. This feeling would not be something he summoned up in order to establish good relations with the child’s parents. He would not purposefully feel this way in order to win the praise of their friends and neighbors. Nor would he feel this way because the screams of the child would be unpleasant.

“By imagining this situation we can see that one who lacked a sense of dismayed commiseration in such a case simply could not be a person. Moreover, anyone who lacks the sense of shame cannot be a person; anyone who lacks a sense of deference cannot not be a person; anyone who lacks a sense of right and wrong cannot not be a person.

“The sense of commiseration is the seed of humanity, the sense of shame is the seed of righteousness, the sense of deference is the seed of ritual, and the sense of right and wrong is the seed of wisdom. Everyone possesses these four moral senses just as they possess their four limbs. To possess such seeds and yet claim to be unable to call them forth is to rob oneself; and for a person to claim that his ruler is incapable of such moral feelings is to rob his ruler.
(Mencius_ENO 2A6)

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This thought experiment is critical in the Mencius, and for it to be understood, emphasis must be placed on the suddenness of the encounter, and the fact that Mencius is making a claim about a true universal: the way all people would react, not about what action they would take.
The idea that certain moral senses are essential to personhood is also explicit in 6A.6, which serves as a companion passage to this one.

Pour décrire l’argumentation développée dans le texte de Mencius (exemple 2.2), nous utiliserons une méthode dérivée de celle qu’utilise Grize for the argumentative operations argumentatives building the objetcs of discours.

An argumentation, {data, claim}

The argument is the description of an fictive situation and its developments. corresponding to the specific thought experiment. Here, this description bears on two partners,the physical situation of the child and a guess concernint the mental states of the person seeing him.
This grossly described situation
Nothing is said about the mental state of the child, for example, if he is afraid of playing with the images reflected in the well, nor about the position of the person in relation with the child.. the claim is on the mental state of the person, we imagine an adult, in the picture: Any such person would experience a sudden sense of fright and dismay.

L’argumentation positive

(i) Situation
La situation envisagée par Mencius décrit schématiquement un fait sans doute rare mais possible :

Imagine now a person who, all of a sudden, sees a small child on the verge of falling down into a well.

Cette situation décrit une scène et rapporte une perception, sans la lier à aucune action. Le destinataire peut se projeter dans cette situation. Mencius en dérive une thèse, en deux étapes.

On peut sans doute imaginer une expérience, portant non pas sur un individu particulier ni sur l’humanité entière, qui prendrait pour base non pas les réactions à une situation réelle, mais à une situation représentée

(ii) Attribution d’un état mental accompagnant  nécessairement la perception de la scène primitive :

Any such person would experience a sudden sense of fright and dismay.

Cette dérivation est fondée sur une intuition, un sentiment d’évidence ou de révélation intérieure, accessible par introspection.

Cette conclusion serait balayée par l’hypothèse cartésienne du Malin Génie.
L’introspection fournit une conclusion en première personne : “I would experience…”.
Mencius ne dit pas  que l’enfant était sauvable, ni que la personne émue “se précipiterait pour sauver l’enfant”. L’interprétation est compatible avec “se sauverait effrayé / par peur d’être pris dans une sale affaire”.

(iii) Opérations argumentatives: Spécification, Re-catégorisation, Généralisation

Cette conclusion d’abord catégorisée comme une “experience”, est ensuite re-catégorisée, ou précisée  comme a moral sense, un sentiment moral :

all people possess within them a moral sense that cannot bear the suffering of others

Sur le plan de la disposition textuelle, l’objet de discours ainsi développé correspond à la suite :

a sudden sense of fright and dismay … [an experience] …a moral sense… dismayed commiseration

Ici, le moteur argumentatif n’est pas l’inférence mais des opérations de spécification et de re-catégorisation. Sur le plan conceptuel, par abstraction croissante on a :

 [an experience] > specified as a sudden sense of fright and dismay
> re-categorized  as a specifc moral sense, dismayed commiseration

Cette dérivation s’accompagne de deux généralisations portant sur l’être visé par  ce sentiment moral, et sur l’autre sur la situation, globalement  d’un risque individuel de souffrance à la souffrance de tous

a small child	> généralisation >	others
on the verge of falling down into a well	> généralisation >	sufferings

(iv) Cette conclusion est testée par application du topos des contraires

all people possess within them a moral sense that cannot bear the suffering of others
one who lacked a sense of dismayed commiseration in such a case simply could not be a person.

{Humans] would experience a sudden sense of fright and dismay, soit H would experience F
— par application du topos des contraires : non-H would experience non-F
en d’autres termes, one who lacked a sense of dismayed commiseration in such a case simply could not be a person.

(v) Sur-exploitation
Une troisième étape introduite par “moreover” affirme l’existence de quatre sentiments moraux définissant l’être humain : la généralisation est portée par une analogie :

humanity, righteousness, ritual, right and wrong.
Everyone possesses these four moral senses just as they possess their four limbs

Objections et réfutation

La nature argumentative du texte est  attestée par la mention d’objections possibles (prolepse), de nature utilitariste :

— something he summoned up in order to establish good relations with the child’s parents.
— purposefully feel this way in order to win the praise of their friends and neighbors
— because the screams of the child would be unpleasant.

Ces objections sont rejetées, non pas discutées et réfutées.
Elles sont exploitées par une argumentation implicite ad ignorantiam – cas par cas: on ne peut pas imaginer d’autres ressorts à l’action secourable.

On peut opposer à la conclusion de Mencius la thèse de Xunzi (3e siècle av. JC) selon laquelle “Human nature is bad”

Human nature is bad. Their goodness is a matter of deliberate effort. […] They are born with feelings of hate and dislike with them. Xunzi, Chap 25, Human Nature is bad, p. 248.

 

atc	A syllogism in Chinese

Centrality of syllogism in ordinary language

Classical logic considered itself to be the science of correct thinking, and the syllogism is the foundation of propositional logic and, symbolicallyhe, its core. If humans are rational beings, then logic defines humans.
However, the mathematisation of logic and the emergence of observational and experimental sciences have completely transformed this view of logic as the ‘art of thinking’.

Argumentation seeks to define itself in relation to logic, particularly mathematical logic. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca contrast argumentation with logic, and the syllogism disappears from the theory of argumentation.
The classical syllogism employs set theory (see the evaluation method using Venn diagrams). Categorization corresponds to the syllogism with a concrete subject. The legal syllogism is a form of this type of syllogism used in law.

A syllogism with a concrete subject governs the categorization of a being and may be the fundamental operation of ordinary reasoning carried out using only the resources of ordinary language.
Classical texts translated from Chinese contain explicit examples of classical syllogisms (section 2) and syllogisms with concrete subjects (section 3).

A Chinese syllogism

Consider « this curiously familiar-sounding syllogism of Wang Ch’ung (*):

‘Man is a thing: though honored as king or noble, by nature he is no different from other things. No thing does not die, how can man be immortal?‘
(Graham  1989, p.  168; see arguing without argumentation theory)

Wang Ch’ung uses a valid syllogism, that combines true propositions to arrive at a sound conclusion, « Humans are beings, no being is immortal, no human is immortal.” In the unfriendly language of traditional logic, this reasoning is described as a syllogism of the fourth figure, said Galenic, and in the Camenes mode: « all H are B; no B is I; therefore no H is I. »
Wang Ch’ung presents this incontrovertible conclusion as a so-called “rhetorical » question, which is a challenge to any opponent (Toulmin, 1958: 97); this introduces a dialectical movement within syllogistic reasoning.

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(*) Wang Ch’ung, c. 27 – c. 97 ce

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atc	Mencius in the Mencius: a virtuoso dialectician

Mencius_Eno

1B.6 Mencius addressed King Xuan of Qi. “Suppose a subject of Your Majesty entrusted his wife and children to a friend and traveled south to Chu, and when he returned, his friend had left his wife and child to suffer in cold and hunger. What should this man do?”
The King said, “Discard him as a friend.”

“And what if the Master of the Guard could not keep order among his men, what then?”
“Dismiss him.”

“And what if there were disorder within the borders of the state, what then?
The King turned to his other courtiers and changed the subject.

 

Mencius_Eno

1B.8 King Xuan of Qi asked, “Is it so that Tang banished Jie and that King Wu killed Zhòu?”Mencius replied, “It is so recorded in the histories.”

“Is it permissible, then, for a subject to kill his ruling lord?”
Mencius said, “A man who plunders humanity is called a thief; a man who plunders righteousness is called an outcast. I have heard of the execution of Outcast Zhòu; I have not heard of the execution of a ruling lord Zhòu.”

[CH Piège dialectique]

Un dialogue question / réponses

Une suite de questions du même type, dont la réponse est du même type et fait l’objet d’un consensus et devient évidente.

La dernière de ces questions est toujours du même type, mais par les engagements qu’il a contractés par ses réponses précédentes, doit y apporter une réponse qui met gravement en cause ses intérêts. “c’est vous qui l’avez dit!”

L’interlocuteurs de Mencius, dans les deux cas, est le roi Xuan de Qi. Il est questionneur dans 1B6 et répondant dans 1B8

Magnifique réponse confucéénne de Mencius

Tchouang Tseu (Liou Kia-hway, p. 44)

Si je discute avec toi et que tu l’emportes sur moi, au lieu que je l’emporte sur toi, as-tu nécessairement raison et ai-je nécessairement tort ?
Si je l’emporte sur toi, ai-je nécessairement raison et as-tu nécessairement tort ?

Ou bien l’un de nous deux a raison et l’autre tort ? Ou bien avons nous raisons tous les deux ou tort tous les deux ? Ni toi ni moi ne pouvons le savoir, et un tiers serait tout autant dans l’obscurité. Qui peut en décider sans erreur ?

Si nous interrogeons quelqu’un qui est de ton avis, du fait qu’il est de ton avis, comment peut-il en décider ?
S’il est de mon avis, du fait qu’il est de mon avis, comment peut-il en décider ?
Il en sera de même s’il s’agit de quelqu’un qui est à la fois de ton avis et du mien, ou d’un avis différent de chacun de nous deux. Et alors ni toi ni moi ni un tiers ne peuvent trancher. Faudra-t-il attendre un quatrième?

 

The Discourses CHAPTER 6 SCRUTINIZING HEARSAY (p. 152)

22/6.1 — The statements passed from one person to another cannot but be subjected to careftil scrutiny. When a statement is repeated many times, as it is transmitted from one person to the next, white becomes black and black becomes white. Thus, a dog bears some resemblance to an ape, an ape to a monkey, and a monkey to a man, but the man only distantly resembles the dog. This is how the stupid commit enormous errors.

Objet de discours
Discours rapporté

Non Transitivité de la ressemblance (de la relation « ressemble à”

ATC	COMPOSITION EFFECT

The Annals of Lü Buwei BOOK 25, Chap. 2, DIFFERENT TYPES. (p. 627)

25/2.1 — To know that one does not know is the loftiest form of intelligence. The trouble with those who commit errors is that, though they do not know, they nonetheless think themselves knowledgeable. Now, there are many things that, though they appear to be members of a particular class, are not; there are many people who, though they appear to be intelligent, are not. Thus, there is no end to states perishing and people being slaughtered.
Now, eaten separately, the plant asarum and the lei creeper are lethal; but if eaten together, they will increase longevity. Eaten separately, scorpions or aconite are lethal; but eaten together, they will not kill. In the one instance, they sometimes kill and sometimes extend life; in the other, they sometimes kill and sometimes do not. When the class to which a thing belongs is decidedly uncertain, what can be induced about it? Lacquer and water are both liquids; but if you mix the two liquids together, they solidify, and if you steam the lacquer, it will dry out. Copper and tin are both soft, but combine the two soft substances, and they become hard; and if you heat the combination, it liquefies. In the one instance, you dry out the material by making it damp; in the other, you liquefy the material by heating it. When the class to which a thing belongs is decidedly uncertain, what can be induced about it? A small square belongs to the same class as a large square, just as a small horse belongs to the same class as a large horse. But small understanding is not of the same class as great understanding.

25/2.2 — In Lu there was a Prince Chuo who told people, “I can raise the dead.” Someone asked him how he could do this. He responded, “I am definitely able to cure paralysis. Now, if I double the dosage of the medicine I use to cure paralysis, it should be possible to raise the dead.” There definitely are things that can treat the small but not the large, and there are things that can treat the part but not the whole.

25/2.3 — A judge of fine swords said, “The white metal is what makes a sword hard, and yellow metal is what makes it sharp. If you mix them, you will have both hardness and sharpness—and that is a superior sword.” Someone confuted him, saying, “The white metal is what makes a sword dull, and yellow what makes it soft. If you combine them, you will have neither hardness nor sharpness. Moreover, the blade of a soft sword will twist, while that of a hard one will snap. If a sword both twists and snaps, how can it be considered a sharp weapon?”
The true nature of the sword did not change; yet the one took it to be good, the other bad. They accomplished this with their explanations. Therefore, if one listens to explanations with intelligence, then bizarre explanations will cease. If one does not listen to explanations with intelligence, then one will not be able to separate Yao from Jie [1]. This is what causes problems for loyal ministers and what causes the worthy to be dismissed.

25/2.5 — Gaoyang Ying planned to build a house, but the carpenter said, “The time is not yet right. The lumber is still green, so if I add a layer of clay over it, it will surely warp. If you use green wood in building a house, although it will seem fine for now, later it will fall down.”

“if we rely on what you yourself have said, the house will not fall down. As the wood dries, it will get stronger, and as the clay dries, it will get lighter. If you put what is getting lighter on something that is getting stronger, it will not fall down.”

The carpenter was at a loss for words and so did as he was told. When the house was first finished it was fine, but afterwards it did, in fact, fall down. Gaoyang Ying loved to make trivial investigations but did not understand larger principles.

25/2.6 — The thoroughbreds, Ji, Ao, and Lüer raced westward with their backs to the sun, but by evening the sun was in front of them. There definitely are things the eyes cannot see, the intellect cannot grasp, and techniques cannot deal with. We may not understand the explanation of what makes a thing as it is, yet we know it is that way. The sages founded their institutions on the basis of what they knew to be so and did not exercise their minds over the explanation.

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[1] “one will not be able to separate Yao from Jie”

ATC	References

 Texts translated from Chinese

ZHAN GUO CE (Wade-Giles Chan-kuo Ts’e)
« Strategies / Annals) of the Warring States »
Crump, James Irving 1998. Legends of the Warring States: Persuasions, Romances and Stories from the Chan-kuo Ts’e. University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.

CONFUCIUS = KONG ZI 
Confucius_ENO2015 = Confucius, Analects. An online pedagogical translation. Translated by R. Eno (2015).  Version 2.2.1.

DENG XI c. 545 -501 bce
Teng Xi_FORKE1901

CHU HSI & LÜ TSU CH’IEN
Chu Hsi & Lü Tsü CH’IEN_{Wing Tsit Chan}1967 =
Chu Hsi & Lü Tsu Ch’ien (compilers) Chin-ssu lu, Reflections on things at hand. The Neo-Confucian anthology. Trans. Wing Tsit Chan. New York / London : Columbia University Press, 1967.

HAN FEI TZU

Han Fei Tzu_WATSON1996 =
Han Fei Tzu. Basic writings. Trans. by Burton Watson. New York & London, Columbia University Press.

Han Fei Tzü_LIAO 1939.
The complete work of Han Fei tzü with collected commentaries. Translation, Preface, Methodological introduction by W. K. Liao. Quoted after:
http://www2.iath.virginia.edu/saxon/servlet/SaxonServlet?source=xwomen/texts/hanfei.xml&style=xwomen/xsl/dynaxml.xsl&chunk.id=d2.40&toc.id=d2.40&doc.lang=english

HSÜNTZE = XUNZI

LÜ BUWEI
Lü Buwei_{Knoblock & Riegel} 2000 = The Annals of Lü Buwei. A Complete translation and study by John Knoblock and Jeffrey Riegel. Stanford, California, Stanford University Press. 2000.

MENCIUS = MENG TZE
Mencius_LAU1970 =
Mencius. Translated with an introd. and notes by D. C. Lau. Revised edition 2004, Penguin Classics (1st ed. 1970).

Mencius_ENO2016 =
Mencius. An online teaching translation. Trans. R. Eno, 2016.

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BOOK OF RITES
Book of Rites_Legge 1885 =
Summary of the Rules of Propriety, Part 1. In Qu Li, The Classic of Rites. Trans. J. Legge, 1885
Quoted from China Text Project.

SIMA QIan = SE-MA TS’IEN 
Se-ma Ts’ien_CHAVANNES1895 =
Édouard Chavannes, Mémoires historiques de Se-ma Ts’ien, traduits et annotés par Édouard CHAVANNES (1865-1918). 1e éd. E. Leroux, Paris, 1895.

TENG XI = DENG XI c. 545 -501 bce

TSOU YEN
Tsou Yen_GRAHAM1978,

XUNZI = HSÜNTZE

Xunzi_WATSON2003 =
Xunzi – Basic Writings. Translated by Burton Watson. Columbia University Press. 2003.

Hsüntze_DUBS1928 =
Dubs H. H. The works of Hsüntze. Translated from the Chinese with notes by Homer H. Dubs. London, Arthur Probsthain, 1928.

Xunzi_HUTTON2014 =
Hutton. Xunzi. The complete Text. Translated and with an introduction by Eric L. Hutton. Columbia University Press. 2014.

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ZHUANGTZE = TCHOUANG TSEU = CHUANG TZU

Zhuangzǐ_Eno 2010 =
Zhuangzǐ. The Inner Chapters. Translated by Robert Eno. Version 1.0, 2010 .

Chuang Tzu_Legge1891 =
Chuang Tzu. The Writings of Chuang Tzu. Translated by James Legge. In vol. 39 and 40 … Oxford University Press. 1891.

Tchouang-tseu_{Lou Kia-Hway}1969 = 
Lou Kia-Hway — L’œuvre complète de Tchouang-tseu. Paris, Gallimard, 1969

Chuang Tzu_WATSON1964 =
Chuang Tzu, The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu. Trans. B. Watson (1964)

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About Argumentation in China

Casacchia, Giorgio 1989. Les débuts de la tradition linguistique chinoise et l’âge d’or de la linguistique impériale. Dans Auroux, S. [dir.], Histoire des idées linguistiques, T.1 (pp. 431-448). (Liége : Mardaga).

Crump James Irving 1998. Legends of the Warring States: Persuasions, Romances and Stories from the Chan-kuo Ts’e. University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.

Fung Yu-lan (pinyin Feng Yu-lan)
— 1952/1967, A Short History of Chinese Philosophy. Edited by Derk Bodde. New York, The Free Press.
— 1922 A History of Chinese Philosophy, Vol. 1. Period of the Philosophers. From the beginning to circa 100 BCE. Translated by Derk Bodde. Introd., notes, bibliography and index. Princeton, Princeton University Press

Graham, Arthur C.
— 1989. Disputers of the Tao. Philosophical Argument in Ancient China. La Salle, Ill.: Open Court.
— 1978. Later Mohist Logic, Ethics and Science. The Chinese University Press, Chinese University of London. School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London.

Hofmann M., J. Kurtz & A. D. Levine (2020), Powerful Arguments — Standards of Validity in Late Imperial China. Leiden, Brill.

Hofmann, Kurtz & Levine 2020, p. 1. Toward a History of Argumentative Practice in Late Imperial China,   In Hofmann M., J. Kurtz & A. D. Levine 2020, p.1.

Lau, Dim Cheuk. (1963 / 2004). On Mencius’ Use of the Method of Analogy in Argument. In Mencius. Trans. Lau. (New York: Penguin Classics) pp. 200-229 (Reprint 1970 / 2004).

Leslie, Donald. (1964). Argument by contradiction in pre-buddhist Chinese reasoning. Occasional paper 4. Center of Oriental Studies (Canberra: Australian National University)

Loewe Michael (ed.), 1993. Early Chinese Texts: A Bibliographical Guide. The society for the study of early china and the institute of east asian studies, university of california.

Masson-Oursel, Paul, 1912. Esquisse d’une théorie comparée du sorite . Quoted after the Études de philosophie comparée. “Les classiques des sciences sociales”. Site web: http://classiques.uqac.ca.

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Western Approaches to Argument

Aristote. Rhétorique. Traduit par J. H. Freese. (Londres: William Heinemann & New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons) 1926.

Bloom, Allan. (1968). Preface to [his] trans. of Plato’s Republic (Basic Books / Harper & Collins)

Khallâf ‘A.(1997). Les fondements du droit musulman. Trad. de l’arabe (1942). (Paris : Al Qalam).

Perelman, Chaim & Olbrechts-Tyteca, Lucie. (1958) Traité de l’argumentation – La nouvelle rhétorique. (Bruxelles : Université de Bruxelles).

Plantin, Christian. (2005) “Essai d’argumentation comparée : Sur l’argumentation théologico-juridique en islam”. Dans L’argumentation : Histoire, théories, perspectives, chap. 7 (Paris : PUF)

Plantin, Christian, (2016) Dictionnaire de l’argumentation (Lyon : ENS Éditions).
En ligne : Dictionnaire de l’argumentation – Dictionary of Argumentation, (2022)

Sen, Amartya. (2006). The Argumentative Indian. (Allen Lane / Penguin Books)

Toulmin, Stephen E. (1958). The Uses of argument. (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press)

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ATC	Reasoning without theory of reasoning « Chinese civilization never abstracted the forms in which we observe it reasoning in practice«

Cela conduit à s’interroger sur l’universalité des concepts utilisés dans la théorie de l’argumentation. Le degré d’universalité d’un phénomène argumentatif n’est pas déterminé par des considérations a priori, mais est un fait empirique qui peut être déduit en collectant des données qui 1) proviennent d’une variété de langues et de cultures 2) peuvent être clairement rattachées à un même concept. Par exemple, étant donné que des occurrences du modèle d’argumentation a fortiori peuvent être trouvées dans la culture juive, la culture arabo-musulmane, la culture occidentale et la culture chinoise, on peut en déduire que l’argument fortiori a un degré élevé d’universalité. La question est cruciale en ce qui concerne le syllogisme. Parlant des Moïstes, Graham écrit (1989, p. 168)

Although well aware of the difficulties of relating names to objects in the art of discourse, [the Moist] seems to see the lucid and self-evident relations between names as raising no theoretical problems. Chinese civilization never abstracted the forms in which we observe it reasoning in practice, as in this curiously familiar-sounding syllogism of Wang Ch’ung

Man is a thing: though honored as king or noble, by nature he is no different from other things. No thing does not die, how can man be immortal?[1]

Wang Ch’ung utilise un syllogisme valide, qui combine des propositions vraies pour arriver à une conclusion correcte : « Les humains sont des êtres, aucun être n’est immortel, donc aucun humain n’est immortel. » Dans le langage rébarbatif de la logique traditionnelle, ce raisonnement est décrit comme un syllogisme de la quatrième figure, dit galénique, et sur le mode camenes :

tout H est T aucun T n’est I donc aucun H n’est I.

Wang Ch’ung présente cette conclusion incontestable sous la forme d’une question dite « rhétorique », qui est un défi lancé à tout adversaire (Toulmin, 1958, p. 97) ; cela introduit un mouvement dialectique au sein du raisonnement syllogistique.

Graham attribue aux disciples de Mozi[2] « un sens de la preuve rigoureuse [combiné à] un mépris pour les formes logiques » (1989, p. 169). Une analogie peut être faite avec le langage et la grammaire. Selon les spécialistes, les Chinois anciens n’avaient pas de grammaire[3] et ils parlaient certainement un excellent chinois. De même, ils n’ont pas développé de logique (art du raisonnement), et ils argumentaient très bien. En d’autres termes, il n’est pas nécessaire d’avoir une théorie logique de ce qu’est un argument logiquement bien construit et reposant sur des prémisses vraies pour maîtriser une pratique efficace de l’argumentation.

Admettons que cette conclusion puisse (a fortiori ?) être généralisée aux formes d’argumentation non syllogistiques. Une théorie de l’argumentation n’est pas une condition préalable à une pratique efficace de l’argumentation. On peut développer une idée claire et une pratique critique efficace de l’argumentation sans formalisation, c’est-à-dire sans développer un métalangage logique sur le processus d’argumentation et les opérations critiques corrélatives.

Il s’ensuit que l’enseignement de l’argumentation peut se passer de théorie de l’argumentation. Les théories de l’argumentation de type occidental ne sont pas essentielles à l’articulation cohérente des idées. L’argumentation peut être enseignée en montrant et en discutant des exemples paradigmatiques d’arguments et d’argumentation. Ces exemples peuvent être paraphrasés, niés, contredits, généralisés, leurs présupposés et implications peuvent être explorés sans jamais sortir des usages naturels du discours naturel.

On peut avoir une pratique acérée de la critique des arguments sans formaliser ni l’argument ni l’opération critique.

Il n’en reste pas moins qu’il existe des moyens de pratiquer, voire d’enseigner l’argumentation sans théorie de l’argumentation. En d’autres termes, les théories de l’argumentation ne sont pas indispensables pour clarifier les idées et les exprimer en déductions concluantes.

_______________

[1] Wang Chu’ng = Wang Chong, Lun Heng — Philosophical Essays, ch.24; trad. Forke V,I, 335f. (Note Graham). Wang Chong, 27 – c. 97 AD, « developed a rational, secular, naturalistic and mechanistic view of the world and man, and gave a materialistic explanation of the origin of the universe » (Wikipedia).

[2] Mozi (c. 479 – c. 392 av. J.-C.), auteur éponyme de l’ouvrage Mozi.

[3] « Dans la Chine ancienne, quelques siècles avant l’ère chrétienne, la réflexion linguistique avait déjà commencé à produire d’excellents résultats ; nous trouvons d’importantes réflexions sur la nature du langage, des dictionnaires très élaborés, des systèmes de description phonologique et de dialectologie. Cependant, […] l’analyse des structures grammaticales est pratiquement absente. En dehors d’une énorme production d’études sur des mots isolés ou des groupes de mots, il n’y a presque rien sur la description organique de la langue. » (Casacchia, 1989, p. 431).

ATC	LÉVI-STRAUSS, « THE SCIENCE OF THE CONCRETE »  FOUR UNIVERSAL BASIC ARGUMENTATIVE OPERATIONS

These five basic universal argumentative operations ar

1) Categorization
2) Nomination
3) Definition
3) Classification
4) Syllogism and Set Theory

Proper names have their own specifc argumentative resources. The following description applies to common names; the best designation here would be “full words.”

By naming concrete or abstract beings, we attach them to the corresponding category corresponding to this definition, to the name of this category, and to  definition(s) of that  name and that category.
The category associated with the definition of a name groups beings on the basis of the specific characteristics of their member, and/or their similarities with the other members of the category, and-or their resemblance to an exemplary member of this category.

An Aristotelian classification consists in a combination of more or less general categories (genre) and sub-categories (species), typically under the format of a « Porphyrian tree”.
Jorge Luis Borges famous Chinese classification is fictional..

Syllogistic reasoning (“set theory” reasoning) is the most powerful argument scheme exploiting the cognitive resources of a well-done classification.

All A, all B, all C are M
=> some M are A, some are a B, some are C

A syllogism is  evaluated as valid or invalid (“paralogism”) through a specific set of rules (“rules of syllogism”, or, preferably through the Venn diagram method.

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The classification method that is, naming – defining -systematically categorizing things, is considered by Claude Levi-Strauss as  « the science of the concrete, » [‘la science du concret”] as « the” fundamental science shared by all human beings (1962], ch. 1).

Following Levi-Strauss, we argue that naming – defining – categorizing – classifying a being is the fundamental, universal, most discreet productive and efficient, set of argumentative operations.
Examples can be found in the quoted entries, as well as in the pair a pari argument / argument from the opposite term.

(*) Not to be confused with the use of the same expression in computing.

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The argument of the name necessarily functions in  the Chinese language as in all languages having « full words », that is a lexicon where speakers find the necessary resources to categorize and designate concrete or abstract beings, events, circumstances, etc.
Thus, the argument of the name must be considered as a linguistic-cognitive universal, and an expression of « subjectivity in language” in action (Benveniste, (1963), p. 259-250).

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Benveniste, 1963 / [1958], De la subjectivité dans le langage. In Problèmes de linguistique générale. Paris, Gallimard. p. 258-266

 

 

ATC	Empirical Universals

« Argumentation Schemes » and « Means of Persuasion »

Toulmin, Rieke, Janik distinguish nine forms of argumentation, «most frequently to be met with in practical situations” (1984, p. 147-155),

Analogy                                     Dilemma                             Generalization
Classification                           Sign                                        Opposites
Cause                                        Degree[*]                             Authority

[*] In the argument from degree, « The different properties of a given thing are presumed to vary in step with one another » (id., p. 155).

Levi (1992) considers that the essential rhetorical means of persuasion used in Chinese are

Metaphor (*)                               Analogy
Example                                      Quoting an authority (*)

Quoting an authority comes with the argument from authority. Metaphor comes with the argument from analogy; Analogy and authority are  common to both lists.

Examples are associated with a number of argumentative operations. They are associated with any law, according to the type / occurrence principle; they are powerful instruments of refutation. Generalizations are based on one or more cases or examples. A paradigmatic example has the value of a general law. Precedents are memorable examples that function as rules. In addition, examples function as crucial cases that, which can disprove a proposed law or generalization (The N are blue – Yes, but that one is red. In everyday language, a counterexample corresponds to an exception:That’s true, but…d)  [2]). As anecdotes, examples can have the most persuasive power in everyday argumentation; when they involve the speaker’s credibility, they are conversationally untouchable, armored against rebuttal: any tentative refutation becomes a personal attack and ruins the conversation.

The first list takes a structural approach to arguement, the second a  functional approach. We will consider both.

Empirical universals

My position is that there are universals in argumentation, because arguments develop potentialities of language, and there are linguistic universals. Languages, like Western languages, know the type/occurrence relationship, categorization and predication,  scalarity (a fortiori), comparison (analogy), etc.
See ATC A Fortiori

The degree of universality of an argumentative phenomenon is not determined by a priori considerations, but is an empirical fact that can be inferred by collecting data that 1) that come from a variety of languages and cultures 2) that can be clearly assigned to the same concept.

For example, since occurrences of the a fortiori argument pattern can be found in Jewish culture, Arab-Muslim culture, Western culture, and Chinese culture, it can be inferred that a fortiori has a high degree of universality.

In what follows, we suggest some  passages from classical Chinese texts as instances of some of these argument schemes.

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