ATC	A Paradigm Case of Analogy

Western presentation of argument patterns have two main sections:
— the first focuses on the pattern itself,
— while the second provides an example illustrating the pattern.

The following passage may be taken as a paradigmatic case of analogy:

The wise man who has charge of governing the empire should know the cause of disorder before he can put it in order. Unless he knows its cause, he cannot regulate it. It is similar to the problem of a physician who is attending a patient. He has to know the cause of the ailment before he can cure it. Unless he knows its cause, he cannot cure it. How is the situation different for him who is to regulate disorder? He too has to know the cause of the disorder before he can regulate it. Unless he knows its cause, he cannot regulate it. The wise man who has charge of governing the empire must, then, investigate the cause of disorder.
Mozi_MEI, Universal Love 4, I.

The passage is presented as one sole paragraph in the original text. The following numbering and disposition are ours:

1. The wise man who has charge of governing the empire should know the cause of disorder before he can put it in order. 2. Unless he knows its cause, he cannot regulate it.

3. It is similar to the problem of a physician who is attending a patient.
4. He has to know the cause of the ailment before he can cure it. 5. 5. Unless he knows its cause, he cannot cure it.

6. How is the situation different for him who is to regulate disorder? 7. He too has to know the cause of the disorder before he can regulate it. 8.Unless he knows its cause, he cannot regulate it.

9. The wise man who has charge of governing the empire must, then, investigate the cause of disorder.

Mozi’s demonstration  takes place in two stages, the first justifying the thesis and the second confirming that no one dares to answer it. No rebuttal is mentioned.

Positive argumentation

— Claim: (1) and (2) state the thesis

(1)        To put the government in order = O

To know the cause of the disorder = C
Proposition (1) expresses a necessary condition (NC):
For O (to put the government in order), C (to know the cause of the disorder) is necessary
Which is noted: O => C (O requires, implies C).

(2) reformulates the thesis:

(1) C is a NC of O = (2) non-C implies non-O.

— Warrant: Elucidation of the argumentation scheme, (3) announces that the thesis will be proved by an argument by analogy. Warrant: « is similar to »; implicit backing: the traditional assimilation of the « human body » to the « social body ».

— Argument
Source domain: Medicine. (4) presents a fact (as) known and admitted by all.
The structure of the argument strictly follows the structure of the thesis by substituting the doctor (who repairs the human body) for the wise man (who seeks how to repair human society).

The modes of sentence construction are identical. The presentation of the analogy as a parallel case pushes the similarity to identity.

Search for a refutation

A test of the validity of the analogy follows in the form of a rhetorical question, (5), interpreted as a challenge to a possible opponent, who is given the floor to show that the analogy is invalid. Question (5) remaining unanswered, this maneuver concludes with an argument from ignorance.

The argumentation repeats (reinforces, confirms) the essential element of the argument, the claim: (6) and (7) repeat word for word (1) and (2). This introduces into the reasoning an element of rhetorical persuasion (epikeirema) into the argumentation.

(8) repeats the thesis by replacing the expression « must know » (1) with « must investigate », the first step on the way to knowledge. To investigate and to know must not be understood in their contemporary sense.

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LOGICO-LINGUISTIC SCHEMES AND PARADIGM CASE

The same idea of argumentation scheme can be understood in two equivalent ways.

– In intension, as an abstract, logico-semantic form expressing the essence of reasoning. The scheme of the opposites and the a fortiori scheme are examples of such forms.

– In extension, as the potentially very large set of passages assembled on the basis of their argumentative similarity; the set of arguments that can be paraphrased by the same formula; the set of arguments that derive from the same phrasal pattern. A functional knowledge of arguments can be based on paradigmatic examples.

ATC	Necessity of controversy

Disputation is central to the period of the Hundred Schools of Thought, which flourished during the periods known as the « Spring and Autumn » and the « Warring States, » from the 779 to 221 BC.

The Confucian philosopher Mencius (Mengzi, 372-289 BC), a disciple of Confucius, justifies his practice of disputation as a necessity if one wants to preserve the truth in times of proliferation of systems of thought, which, according to Mengzi, endanger the true,

Gongduzi said, Master, outsiders all say you are fond of disputation. What do you say to that?’

Mencius said, How could it be that I am fond of disputation? I simply have no choice. The world has existed for a long time, now in order, now in chaos. In the time of Yao, the waters ran awry and flooded the central states; eels and dragons dwelt there and the people had no security. […]

But after the deaths of Yao and Shun the Dao of the sages declined and tyrants arose one after another. They leveled homes in order to create their pleasure ponds and the people had no place to rest. They took fields out of cultivation to create their pleasure parks and the people had no way to eat. And then there arose errant teachings and patterns of violent conduct. […]

But no sage king has arisen [after Confucius]. The lords of the states act with abandon and gentlemen in retirement proclaim deviant doctrines. The words of Yang Zhu and Mo Di fill the world such that those who do not preach the doctrines of Yang Zhu preach those of Mozi. The maxim of the Yangists is ‘Each for himself,’ a world of men without rulers; the maxim of the Mohists is ‘universal love,’ a world of men without fathers. To know no father and no ruler – this is to be nothing but a beast! […] If the daos of Yang and Mo don’t cease and the Dao of Confucius is not clear to all, then deviant doctrines will deceive the people and humanity and righteousness will be blocked. To block out humanity and righteousness is to lead the beasts and devour the people, and the people will be led to eat one another.

This is why I am alarmed, and why I defend the Dao of the past sages and confront Yangists and Mohists, driving out depraved speech so that errant doctrines will no longer flourish.
(Mencius_Eno 3B.9)

In this passage, ‘disputation’ is not employed as a means of establishing a common truth, but to eradicate the « bad doctrines » of the opponents. The outcome of the controversy is entirely negative, it bears no fruit.
This position is very different from that of paradox lovers, who appreciate paradoxes purely for the sake of paradoxical language.

 

ATC	NAME and « RECTIFICATION OF NAMES »

Rectification of names

12.1. Duke Jing of Qi asked Confucius about government. Confucius replied,
« Let the ruler be ruler, the ministers ministers, the fathers fathers, the sons sons sons. » Analects_ENO 2015

We consider that « to be ruler, minister… » is to fulfill a social function while « to be father, to be son » is to fulfill a natural function. A father, a son cannot not be father, son. Confucius’ requirements seem empty, because tautological; but they are not.

The social category name is not equivalent to a set of descriptive property; it  is an imperative.

A ruler is a ruler only if he governs according to the model of exemplary Kings, such as King Wen. A bad ruler is not a ruler; he should not be called a ruler. A bad father is not a father; he should not be called a father, even if a biological one.
A woman who does not behave according the rules of exemplary women is not a woman and should not be called woman nor considered as a woman.
By turning bad, they lose their name.

To unduly bear a name is an usurpation. When such  wrong names become current – most of the rulers, fathers, students are actually not fathers, etc, chaos prevails.

It seems that this vision extends to artefacts. A table is defined by  its place and function as defined in the ritual. In the West, we sit and eat at a table. If we dance on a table, the table is no more a table. Same for a gourd:

[1] Quoted after http://archives.charles-de-gaulle.org/pages/espace-pedagogique/le-point-sur/les-textes-a-connaitre/discours-du-30-mai-1968.php (11-08-2017)

An application: Mencius_LAU, 1B.8

1B.8 King Xuan of Qi asked, “Is it so that Tang banished Jie and that King Wu killed Zhòu?”
Mencius replied, “It is so recorded in the histories.”
“Is it permissible, then, for a subject to kill his ruling lord?”
Mencius said, “A man who plunders humanity is called a thief; a man who plunders righteousness is called an outcast. I have heard of the execution of Outcast Zhòu; I have not heard of the execution of a ruling lord Zhòu.”

Eno, Preface, p. 15
Mencius held that kings only enjoyed mandates to rule to the extent that they governed to the benefit of those whom they ruled. He insisted that the population was the most important component of the state, not the king (7B.14), and that rulers who abandoned this charge were, in effect, no longer rulers: of the murder of the tyrannical last king of the Shang he denied that any act of regicide was involved, saying that an outcast had been executed, not a ruler (1B.8)

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Natural categories group beings are named according to a certain organization of their natural characteristics, based on the similarity of the object with the beings recognized as typical of the category.

Social categories are groupings of persons sharing the same type of social role. King, nobleman, were considered as natural categories, now clearly as social categories, as minister, teacher, leader are social functions. There is a dispute about man, woman, father, son… whether they should be considered as social roles or natural categories. In a famous passage of the Analects,

Live up to the name of the social category you belong to!

The  speech made by General de Gaulle on 3ay 30 1968 uses self-argued statements:

As for the legislative elections, they will take place within the period established by the Constitution, unless the whole French people are to be gagged, preventing them from speaking as they are prevented from living, by the same means that prevent students from studying, teachers from teaching and workers from working.
(Charles de Gaulle, Speech on May 30, 1968[1])

In a well-made world, “students study, teachers teach and workers work” if not, the semantic disorder argues the abnormality of beings who don’t act according to their essential principle.

This is an argument based on the name, « let the students study » that is to say « be worthy of their name ». The argument traces the social order over the natural order (Plantin 2021, Name). The name of the category to which the person belongs expresses the norm that governs his behavior.

These self-evident arguments are based on a license to infer according to which the derivational families are semantically consistent. The morphological similarity may obscure deep semantic differences between the root word and the derived word, which meaning may range from the conservation of the root meaning, to opposition between their connotations or argumentative orientations, to the complete independence of meanings in synchrony. By a kind of antanaclasis S. Orientation, the following exchange plays on the opposite argumentative orientations of words belonging to the same lexical family, politic:

S1 — By signing this compromise at a convenient moment, the president made a highly political decision.
S2 — We are just witnessing a new example of the President’s usual politicking

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Criteria for selecting dialogue partners

In classical Western culture, what is considered appropriate is what is said or done in accordance with the vague rules of decorum — that is to say, what is ‘controlled, calm and polite’ (Cambridge Dictionary, ‘decorum’). Decorum implies caution and decency.

In classical Chinese culture, appropriate speech and behaviour are defined by the rules of ritual, which govern all conduct, including drinking alcohol or tea and conversing with a master.
These rules are set out in the Liji (Classic of Rites or Book of Rites), one of the five Chinese classics.
In the first chapter of his writings, ‘Exhortation to Learning‘, the philosopher Xunzi (298–238 BCE) recalls the principles to be observed in interactions between gentlemen willing to discuss « the methods of the Way ». We have introduced numbering and a segmented presentation.

1. 1. Do not answer one who asks about something improper.
   2. Do not ask questions of one who speaks on something improper.
   3. Do not listen to one who tries to persuade you of something improper.
   4. Do not debate with a person of combative demeanor.
   5. Only if people approach you in the proper way should you receive them. If they do not approach you in the proper way, then avoid them.
   6. And so, only if they follow ritual and are reverent should you discuss the methods of the Way with them.
   7. Only if their speech is calm should you discuss the methods of the Way with them.
   8. Only if their countenance is agreeable should you discuss the culmination of the Way with them.
   9. To discuss these things with those unfit to discuss them is called being presumtuous.
   10. Not to discuss these things with those fit to discuss them is called being secretive.
   11. To discuss these things without first observing the person’s manner and countenance is called being blind.
   12. The gentleman is neither presumptuous nor secretive nor blind; he carefully acts according to the other person’s character. The Odes says: The gentlemen are not indolent or haughty /Rewarded by the Son of Heaven shall they be.
       Xunzi_Hutton, 2016, p. 6-7

Xunzi’s recommendations are addressed to the Sage, who is approached by someone he does not know. This aspiring interlocutor with the Sage is evaluated as soon as he approaches him, in the first moments of the discussion.
This evaluation is based on his ability to conform to the ‘rite’. The terms ‘improper’ (1), ‘proper’ (2, 3, 5) and ‘ritual’ (6) refer to the notion of propriety, or ‘what is appropriate’, which conforms to the rules of ritual.
These meticulous rules define appropriate behaviour (4: demeanour) and facial expression (8: countenance). Aggressiveness (4: combative demeanour) is particularly frowned upon; argumentative personalities are undesirable and calmness is valued. This is a Confucian quality.

The Master was warm, yet severe; awesome, yet never harsh; reverent, yet calm.
Analects_Eno, 7.38

In the Confucian tradition, the Sage lives according to ritual, and therefore according to human nature:

Rules of propriety are not a body of ceremonies, but natural principles.
Chu Hsi, Lü Tsu Ch’ien. Reflections on things at hand, p. 128.

He can only be approached by someone who knows how to conform to it. The rite expresses the principles that define human beings and their activities. It provides the criterion for evaluating the degree of excellence of individuals, whether or not they are worthy of pursuing intellectual and spiritual research.

The parrot can speak, and yet is nothing more than a bird; the ape can speak, and yet is nothing more than a beast. Here now is a man who observes no rules of propriety; is not his heart that of a beast? But if (men were as) beasts, and without (the principle of) propriety, father and son might have the same mate. Therefore, when the sages arose, they framed the rules of propriety in order to teach men, and cause them, by their possession of them, to make a distinction between themselves and brutes.
Liji – Chap. 1, Qu Li “Summary of the Rules of Propriety – Part 1” §9

Nous sommes loin de la conception occidentale du rite comme mode d’organisation conventionnelle d’un type d’événements, voire comme symptôme névrotique. Cette vision du monde étant étrangère au monde occidental contemporain, il n’y aurait pas grand sens à rapprocher ces recommandations des règles de politesse (empiriques), ou de règles sur le dialogue argumentatif (normées par la raison), ou des règles conventionnelles explicites qui organisent les cérémonies occidentales.
Les grands systèmes occidentaux ne mentionnent pas de tels critères d’exclusion des discutants, à l’exception peut-être de Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca (1958), qui n’admettent pas n’importe quel interlocuteur

We are far removed from the Western conception of ritual as a conventional way of organizing certain types of recurring situation, or even as a neurotic symptom. As this Confucean worldview of ritual is foreign to us, it would not make much sense to compare these recommendations to our (empirical) rules of politeness, or to rules on argumentative reasonable dialogue.

The major Western systems do not mention such criteria for excluding discussants, with the possible exception of Perelman [2] & Olbrechts-Tyteca (1958), who explicitly do not admit just any interlocutor

There are people with whom any contact may seem superfluous or undesirable; there are people with whom we do not want to talk; there are also people with whom we do not want to discuss, but simply give orders. (1958, p. 20)

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[1] Dans le lexique qui accompagne cette traduction de Mencius, Eno conserve le mot chinois junzi pour désigner le Sage ayant atteint un haut degré de développement moral et utilise le terme gentleman pour désigner le shi, simple aspirant à l’excellence morale (Mencius_Eno, p. 146). Nous assistons ici à la démarche du shi qui désire prendre un junzi pour modèle.

[2] Voir Plantin, Dictionnaire de l’argumentation, 2016 et 2021, art. Règles – Coopération – Rationalité et rationalisation – Normes – etc.

Comme l’autocontradiction, la contradiction interpersonnelle exige une clarification. Le désaccord stimule l’échange et l’activité intellectuelle,

The Master said: I can speak with Hui all day and he will never contradict me, like a dolt. But after he withdraws, when I survey his personal conduct, indeed he is ready to go forth. He’s no dolt! (Id. , 2.9)

Confucius dit implicitement qu’il préfère le désaccord, “Hui ne me contredit jamais, comme un imbécile” — donc les imbéciles ne contredisent jamais leur maître, et c’est cette inférence implicite qui nous intéresse. Mais, en ce qui concerne Hui, cette première conclusion, tirée du comportement verbal de Hui est renversée par une constatation décisive, d’un ordre supérieur, tirée de l’observation de sa conduite. Hui est le disciple préféré de Confucius, et sa mort le plongera dans le désarroi le plus profond (Id. 11.8-11)

 

 

 

 

Zilu fait face au maître

Apprendre dans les livres, Bien se comporter: l’accord

Ad hominem refutation always requires a certain amount of editing of the target’s words or words and actions. For example, it is always unpleasant for a master to be critically confronted with his own teaching. In passages 1.6 and 1.7 of the Confucius Analects, the scholar is characterised by his correct behaviour towards worthy people, his parents, people in general, his masters (those who are ren), and seems to attach only secondary importance to knowledge of the texts.

1.6. The Master said: A young man should be filial within his home and respectful of elders when outside, should be careful and trustworthy, broadly caring of people at large, and should cleave to those who are ren. If he has energy left over, he may study the refinements of culture (wen).

Zixia, a disciple of Confucius, offers a definition of a scholar along the same lines, though perhaps less categorically,

1.7. Zixia said: If a person treats worthy people as worthy and so alters his expression, exerts all his effort when serving his parents, exhausts himself when serving his lord, and is trustworthy in keeping his word when in the company of friends, though others may say he is not yet learned, I would call him learned.
Analects_Eno, 1.6-7

Zilu fait face au maître

In another passage, Zilu, one of Confucius’ disciples, has just hired another of his disciples, Zigao. Confucius seems to reproach him for this:

1, 25 Zilu appointed Zigao to be the steward of Bi. The Master said, “You are stealing  another man’s son!”
Zilu said, “There are people there; there are altars of state there – why must one first read texts and only then be considered learned?”
The Master said, “This is why I detest glib talkers!”
Analects_Eno, 1, 25

The Master seems to take offence at Zilu’s repartee.
Again, R. Eno’s note clarifies the passage by relating it to an earlier passage,

Note Eno : Zilu seems to be invoking lessons Confucius himself taught, much like the ideas in 1.6-7, to confound Confucius himself, which is the basis of Confucius’s answer.
En effet, en 11, 25 Zilu lui rappelle qu’il a dit qu’un comportement parfaitement réglé vis à vis des personnes de référence – parents, Seigneur, amis – suffisait pour que quelqu’un soit reconnu comme « a learned [person] », et traité comme tel, par exemple en recevant un emploi. Zilu se défend ainsi de lui avoir “volé Zigao”, ou défend la décision de Zigao.

This contradiction is just one way of exercising the right of admonition, which is the counterpart of the right and duty of obedience to the ruler and the father.

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[1] Leslie, Donald, 1964. Argument by Contradiction in Pre-Buddhist Chinese Reasoning. Faculty of Asian Studies, ANU., Canberra.

 

ATC	Intentions: A collection of argumentative passages taken from translated Chinese classics

Many years ago, an anonymous student circulated a very interesting question in the argumentation studies community: Is there an alternative to Toulmin’s argumentation scheme?
Some students may of course struggle with the fundamentals of their argumentation course when based on repetitive data, and take Toulmin’s model as a symbol of their discomfort. However, the question also expresses an aspiration for a theoretical “beyond,” which is encapsulated by a response that suggests, without providing further detail, that the Chinese may have practised and developed their own vision of argumentation, unfortunately, without providing further details.

My aim here is to buid a collection of argumentative passages taken from translated Chinese classics.
My wish would be to contribute to the invention of another way for presenting and thinking about our field, one way which would not be based solely on what our great Greek and Latin ancestors has practiced and theorized.

A collection of cases coming from different  languages and cultures is implicitly based on hypothesis the universality of the basic reasoning schemes.

Global Cultures of Argument
We are accustomed to thinking about argumentation and arguing within our comfort zone, even though we know that Western culture cannot be denined as “the” culture of rhetoric and argumentation, but only as “one” of these cultures. Amartya Sen wrote about the Argumentative Indian ((2005), and, with the same right, we should currently work on « the argumentative Muslim » or the « the argumentative Chinese » not to mention the « the argumentative Inuit’ [2].

These are globalized cultures of argument since they all participate to the global movement of world culture. They are nonetheless deeply rooted in their own histories and cultures, developing their own concepts of good reason and good life.

AIM: A collection of argumentative passages
taken from translated Chinese classics

This collection of cases is offered by an illiteratus in Chinese language and culture to other illiterati who, like him, are no less eager to see what Western visions of rhetorical argumentation say and become when used far from their native Western habitat.

The Chinese culture of argument — We immediately encounter the problem of Babel; the West is also a small synchronic and diachronic Babel. Some argumentation specialists who are not specialists in Greek and Latin languages, have ready access to Greek and Latin literature through translated texts. Why shouldn’t we do the same with Chinese texts? But the Western concept of argumentation has been shaped by millennia of Latin and Greek culture, not by millennia of Chinese culture.

We’ll take the risk to do the same for Chinese classical culture, since a capital point is established: Chinese culture is a culture of argument.

An infinitely rich and varied textual record attests that argumentation, persuasion and contention were key elements in a wide array of activities central to the concerns of state and society in China throughout its history. [2]

It is relatively easy to find passages from translated classical Chinese texts that correspond to what the Western tradition considers to be facts and well-known argumentative structures. These include argumentative situations as well as some of the most common argumentative patterns of argument
For instance, we encounter episodes of confrontation of discourses,opening classical argumentative situations, as well as the most common argument patterns.
We will begin by presenting a variety of argumentative situation, that is then argument patterns,

In practice, this collection comes  parallel with the examples and cases, mostly Western, that appear in the Dictionary of Argumentation.
These passages are read and positioned in relation with the concepts proposed in this Dictionary. We systematically indicate the relevant entries with links to them.

This does not mean that this juxtaposition “exhausts” their content, any more than the topos exhausts the content of the enthymeme that translates it into ordinary language. It selects the connecting principles that are at work in this passage.

These suggestions for analysis relate exclusively to translations, considered as structured texts that make sense in the target language.

This is a work in progress: Some entries simply note the relevant passage.

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[1] I have attempted to present theological-legal argumentation in the Muslim world using Khallâf’s great book The Foundations of Muslim Law (1942), a book which can be placed on the same level as Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s Treatise on Argumentation (1958); see Plantin 2005, chap. 7.

[2] Plantin & Tersis 2020. Attack, Defense and Counter-Attack in the Inuit Duel Songs of Ammassalik. In Chr.Plantin (ed.) Argumentation Through Languages and Cultures. Springer. Pp.51-72. DOI:10.1007/978-3-031-19321-7_4

Hofmann, Kurtz & Levine 2020, p.1. Toward a History of Argumentative Practice in Late Imperial China.   In Hofmann M., J. Kurtz & A. D. Levine 2020, Powerful Arguments — Standards of Validity in Late Imperial China. Leiden, Brill.

Art du Discours

L’ADAPTATION À L’AUDITOIRE
selon DENG XI (c. 546 – 501 BCE)

Deng Xi (~-545,-501CK)
♦ “With the stupid, the speech must be based on demonstration” (Deng Xi_FORKE 1901)

The art of speech consists in the following: With the intelligent speech must be based on vast learning, with the learned on dialectic, with dialecticians on equanimity(*) , with the noble on power, with the wealthy on influence, with the poor on profit, with the brave on boldness, with the stupid on demonstration. That is the art of speech. One does not succeed, if one starts before having thought the matter over ; one reaps very little, if one begins the harvest too soon.
One must not say what is not proper, nor do what is not correct to avoid danger. Nor must one take away anything, if not allowed to do so for fear of punishment, nor dispute on things which are not debatable, lest the word escape. The swiftest horse does not bring back a wrong utterance nor overtake a rash word. Therefore he is called an ideal man who never utters bad words nor listens to wicked talk.

(*) Note Forke) With an able adversary, one must never lose one’s temper, always keeping clear-headed.

ATC	HOMONYMY, PARONYMY

Les énoncés suivants sont auto-argumentés par une homonymie, qui leur donne une allure analytique.

”L’homme vraiment bon [jen] parle peu [jen]”

Jean Lévi présente très clairement la situation:

« Jouant sur les mots et voulant faire toucher du doigt à son disciple Se-ma Nieou ses travers, il dira, « L’homme vraiment bon — jen — parle peu — jen —.»  « Bonté » (jen) et “parler avec difficulté, avoir le verbe rare” (jen) sont homonymes, de sorte que l’identité phonique établit une équivalence sémantique entre l’homme accompli et le silence; aux bienfaits procurés par l’exercice de la vertu répond la vertu du silence. » (Lévi 2002 p.96-97) [1]

Analects_Lau 12:3
Ssu-ma Niu asked about benevolence. The Master said, ‘The mark of the benevolent man is that he is loath to speak.’
‘In that case, can a man be said to be benevolent simply because he is loath to speak?’
The Master said, ‘When to act is difficult, is it any wonder that one is loath to speak?^*

Lau ajoute la note explicative “(*) for fear that one may be unable to live up to one’s words.”
L’action est la mesure de la parole.
La caractérisation de “homme bon” comme “parlant peu” est donc d’une part auto-argumentée, et d’autre part, soutenue par un argument « hétéro-argumenté”, c’est-à-dire qui n’a rien du jeu de mot; elle est sémantiquement indépendante de la conclusion “il parle peu”.

Gouverner, donc rectifier