1. Meaning and Unmeaning

Logical, formal and scientific languages differ from natural language by their univocity and stability: each meaningful chain, corresponds one and only one complete meaning.
In such languages, there is no need for interpretation.
Meaning is context-free (not influenced by the context). It remains stable it throughout any speech developped in the domain of reference.
Such chains are neither void of meaning (nonsense), nor obscure, vague, or ambiguous (multiplicity of meanings)

In ordinary language, the interpretability of signifying chains is not guaranteed. A signifying chain of existing words  can be syntactically well formed and nonetheless:

– Meaningless, or uninterpretable (nonsense).

In the most extreme case, it is impossible to attribute any plausible meaning to the linguistic segment, that is, it cannot receive any satisfactory paraphrase acceptable or relevant in this context. It is inoperable by the receiver, interpretation is powerless.
The chain can nevertheless be explained away as a a poem, as a coded language, as a metaphor, as the product of search for meaninglessness

Colorless green ideas sleep furiously (Chomsky)

– Obscure, enigmatic, weakly meaningful.
It is difficult to formulate any interpretation; or it admits of several equally weakly motivated and inconclusive interpretations. S. Interpretation, Hermeneutics, Exegesis.

– Ambiguous.
The discourse admits of two or more clearly distinct and incompatible interpretations, S. Ambiguity.
The coexistence in the same discourse of incompatible orientations is a major cause of pragmatic obscurity.

– Vague.
Vagueness appears about borderline inter-categorical phenomena. Vagueness can also be related to over-generalization making the discourse irrelevant for the specific issue under discussion, S. Vague

– Unstable.
The meaning of the same string can vary or become obscured, in the same discourse, S. Syllogism; Ambiguity.

 

These are the some of the perils of natural expression, when compared with the rigorous requirements of scientific discourse. The plasticity of meaning in ordinary discourse certainly makes natural language a tricky environment for the development of scientific reasoning.
On the other hand, this same plasticity makes that natural language can generate other forms of language, S. Demonstration and argumentation.

Logical languages develop according to its own laws, scientific  language according to  the law of “things themselves ».
Natural discourse develop under the constraints of its own laws, the pressure of reality, and according to the specific needs,  interests, values that makes up the speaker’s subjectivity.
The above mentioned “perils of expression” are first of all  resources for the covert intentions and indirect motives,  ruse and crafts of the speaker.

2. Argumentative exploitation of semantic uncertainty: Fallacies of confusion

The feeling of indeterminacy is materialized by a judgment carried by the audience, or by the speaker herself, considered the first member of her audience.  Like the judgment of clarity, it can vary with the hearer.

In the case of argumentative speeches, the uncertainty judgment made on a speech is an evaluative judgment that serves to refute it as fallacious, S. Rules.

Rule 3. All expressions which are unmeaning or without effect in regard to the subject in debate should be strictly avoided.
Levi Hedge 1838, « Rules for Honorable Controversy”

Commandment 10, Language use rule: Discussants may not use any formulations that are insufficiently clear or confusingly ambiguous, and they may not deliberately misinterpret the other party’s formulations.
van Eemeren, Grootendorst “Ten Commandments for Reasonable Discussants” (2004, p. 190).

The discourse is criticized as

“unmeaning”, that is, “ lacking intelligence, vapid ” and “ having no meaning, senseless” (MW).
“insufficiently clear”
“confusingly ambiguous”.

The interpretive condition, “they may not deliberately misinterpret the other party’s formulations” guarantee the fairness of the criticism

These fallacies belongs to the “fallacy of expression” family. They target the semantic roots of the discourse, S. Discourse destruction.

Under this verdict, the  discourse is dismissed as semantically void, logically unassessable, so irrelevant for the discussion and interactionally rejected. Like all evaluative judgments, these judgments, valid or not, can be disputed and need justification.

The meaning of a discourse is the product of an activity of expression (rhetoric) and an activity of interpretation (hermeneutics). The feeling of uncertainty of the meaning, can thus have its source in the uncertainty/ruse of the expression (proponent side) or of the interpretation (opponent side).

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ATCCT

 

Huan T’an (43 BCE. – 28 CE.), Sin-Lun (“New Treatise”) 

Pokora Timoteus, 1975 Sin-Lun (“New Treatise”) and Other Writings by Huan T’an (43 B.C. – 28 A.D.). An Annotated Translation with Index. Ann Arbor Center for Chinese Studies The University of Michigan. P. 124

 [135A] Kung-sun Lung was a dialectician who lived at the time of the Six Kingdoms. He wrote a treatise on “Hard and White” and, to illustrate his theory, said that a white horse is not a horse. To show that a white horse is not a horse, he said that “white » is that by which one names the color and horse that by which one names the form. The color is not the form, and the form is not the color.

[135B] Kung-sun Lung often argued that “a white horse is not a horse”. People could not agree with this. Later, when riding a white horse, he wished to pass through the frontier pass without a warrant or a passport. But the frontier official would not accept his explanations, for it is hard for empty words to defeat reality. (fragment 135B)

Pokora  1975, Sin-Lun (“New Treatise”), p. 124

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Pa Kin, Famille. Traduit du chinois par Li Tche-houa et Jacqueline Alezaïs. Paris, Flammarion, 1979.

Le surlendemain […eut lieu la révision des articles pour le n°8. Le cadet y assista comme d’habitude. Á son arrivée, Telle que Sourire lisait à haute voix une proclamation de la police interdisant aux femmes de porter les cheveux courts. Le jeune homme la connaissait déjà; elle était, disait-on, l’œuvre d’un talent en fleur (¹) de l’ancienne dynastie. Le fond, simpliste, et la forme même, peu correcte, suscitaient à chaque phrase la gaieté de tous les auditeurs.
— C’est vraiment se moquer des gens! Que veut-il dire? s’écria Telle que sourire en jetant la feuille à terre.
— On pourrait publier ce chef-d’œuvre dans le prochain numéro sous la rubrique « Histoire de rire”, proposa Réserve de bienveillance.
— Bravo ! applaudit la jeune fille.

Tous approuvèrent. Telle que grâce ajouta qu’il serait bon de joindre une réfutation cinglante.

(¹) Titre officiel des anciennes dynasties, traduit généralement par le terme : bachelier.

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Excerpt from Ba Jin, Family (Chia)

Two days later […] the revision of the articles for the next issue of the magazine took place. The youngest attended as usual. When he arrived, Such as smile read aloud a police proclamation forbidding women to wear their hair short. The young man was already familiar with it; it was said to be the work of a blossoming talent (1) of the ancient dynasty. The content, simplistic, and even the form, not very correct, aroused the gaiety of all the listeners at each sentence.
— This is really making fun of people! What does he mean? exclaimed Such as smile, while throwing the sheet on the ground.
— We could publish this masterpiece in the next issue under the heading « Let’s laugh a bit », proposed Reserve of benevolence.
— Bravo! applauded the girl.

All approved. Such as grace added that it would be good to attach a scathing refutation.

(1) Official title of the ancient dynasties, generally translated by the term: bachelor.
Translation adapted from www.DeepL.com/Translator (free version)

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PROBABLE, LIKELY, TRUE

1. Probable: Truth and Manipulation

1.1 Probable as presumptive, credible, believable, plausible

The word probable has the following synonyms:

believable, credible, creditable, likely, plausible, presumptive (MW, Probable)

This synonymy is based on a group of common semantic lines. The following four are adapted from the definitions of MW, as a guide to the semantics of the entire « probable » family.

1. Something (s.) defined in relation to things themselves (ad rem);  « supported by evidence strong enough to establish presumption but not proof” but awaiting confirmation.
2. S. that can be acted upon.
3. S consistent with past experience.
4. S. that has public support.

Let’s tentatively take the claim « X is probable” with the following description. Something is said to be “probable” when it is supported by good reasons, good enough to win public approval and to be acted upon. However, the speaker is aware of possible objections or rebuttals, and is still looking for confirmation and correction, so he should have a Plan B in his pocket. Probably does not refer to a stopping point, but to a stage in an ongoing investigation or action, that builds consensus in a group, related with past experience and future action.
The following commentary tries to capture the linguistic orientations, sometimes incompatible, of the concept of probable as plausible, credible, creditable, verisimilar, truthful… as used in everyday arguments that irreducibly deal with language-made truth.

1.2 Probable as believable

Verisimilar is not mentioned among the synonyms of probable in MW, but probable is the defining synonym of verisimilar as “having the appearance of truth. Verisimilar introduces the key feature of similitude, that is structural analogy. In fact, it can actually be connected to the four previous semantic lines plausible marks the transition from probable to verisimilar.
Similitude occurs when probable is said not of an isolated assertion, but in relation to a worldview see analogical thinking
Verisimilar is related to the visual arts by its second meaning, “depicting realism” (MW). It is said of a literary fiction or a pictorial style.

A witness is said to be credible as a person and as a narrator; she is a storyteller, who describes a situation. In order to be understood and  to be credible this speech must necessarily conform to the linguistic laws of narration: this is the point where the probable and the plausible, the verisimilitude, meet.

From the point of view of its content, a story, an assertion, a representation of a state of affairs… is plausible if it is judged to be in conformity with common sense and reasonable thinking. From the point of view of its structure, a conclusion is plausible if it conforms to the laws of the discursive genre that stereotypes real things or events of the same kind.
The liar must obey such rules of plausibility. The judgment of verisimilitude-truthfulness is refuted under the strategic imperative that « the true is not always truthful”:

The enemy is unlikely to attack through the swamps.
It is unlikely that a mother would kill her children (Medea)
It is likely that one would kill out of jealousy; jealousy is a likely motive.

Pragmatic argumentation through positive or negative consequences is based on plausibility, as in a realistic novel; It can be seen, as the development of a plausible causal fiction. Plausibility is judged not so much by examining the case according to the reality  of the facts, as by its intuitive conformity to certain narrative conventions and stereotypes of action.
The concrete investigation that leads to a justified belief that things went this way may be difficult and inconclusive; the intuition of normality is sufficient to conclude that they probably went the other way.

1.3 The Probable-Believable as an Instrument of Manipulation

The distinction between the probable as presumptive and the probable as verisimilitude corresponds to the rhetorical distinction between two kinds of evidence, rhetorical (« technical ») evidence and non-rhetorical (« nontechnical ») evidence.
Investigating the realities of the case is the business of specialists in other, non-rhetorical, fields. Rhetorical plausibility ignores the so-called “non-technical” evidence, that alone allows reality to inform the discourse.
Rhetorical plausibility is constructed through “proofs” derived from endoxa, that is, widely shared beliefs. This method defines the specialized field of rhetoric, see doxa; commonplace.

On such a basis, one can construct a very plausible account of events, perfectly possible, but having absolutely nothing to do with what really happened. The implication is « it is conceivable, therefore it is ».
The construction of a possible world in which plausible events take place is a matter of fictional coherence. The worlds of conspiracy and manipulation are such worlds. The possible is thus seen as a generator of an « alternative reality » that is more real and convincing, because it is much more exciting than the « real reality », for some. The struggle between these two realities can remain undecided, at least for a while.
This will to live in the fictional world makes it possible to allows to avoid or to refute a scrupulous investigation.

During the « Night of the Long Knives » (June 30, 1934) and the days that followed, the Nazi SS massacred the Nazi SA  branch of the Nazi organisation, led by Röhm, who was himself a victim of the massacre, as well as a number of Catholic or conservative opponents of Hitler’s regime. The leftist opponents had already been eliminated.
Hitler’s explanation for these massacres was the existence of an SA plot against Hitler. It is indeed possible for a clique close to power to plot against the men in power who belong to that same clique; history is full of famous examples, and Piso’s conspiracy against Nero can serve as a precedent. The explanation is quite convincing. But historians have shown that Röhm never plotted against Hitler; the story was a typical manipulative lie.
But can we say that Hitler’s so-called « extraordinary » powers  of persuasion  forced the transition from the possible to the true? The explanatory fiction was accepted not only because it was after all possible, and therefore plausible, but, above all, because it was imposed on the public by the propaganda and violence of the Nazi militias at work during those crucial weeks, the public enthusiasm manifesting the support of some and concealing the terror of others.

2. Truth and the Predicate “— Is True”

The predicates “- is true” and “- is false” apply to a proposition or to the corresponding judgment, i.e., to the logical proposition expressing its content. Truth is “the adequacy between the thing and the intelligence” (Thomas Aquinas, Summa, Part. 1, Quest. 16, Art. 1), which can be interpreted as, “the adequacy between the thing and its representation”.

According to Tarski’s famous definition of truth, “‘the snow is white’ is true if and only if the snow is white” (Tarski [1935]). Note that the proposition “snow is white” comes from Aristotle (Top., 11, 105a), who considers it as a prototypical statement that does not deserve a dialectical discussion because it is clearly true, so it is impossible to problematize, see dialectic; conditions of discussion.
For Tarski, the concept of truth can be strictly defined only in a formal language only:

With respect to [colloquial language] not only does the definition of truth seems impossible, but even the consistent use of this concept in conformity with the laws of logic. [1935], p. 153).

We will admit that ordinary language about human affairs can use some local, practical and satisfactorily defined concept of truth. The statements “- is true” or “- is false” are said of a statement that refers to an event or a state of affairs by a description that constitutes the meaning of the statement; this meaning is a linguistic construct, based on the common understanding that the statement must be relevant to the current discussion and action (Sperber & Wilson, 1995). Ordinary language is not transparent; the true statement depends not only on reality, but also on the linguistic system that generates it, and on the current constraints of s relevance.

Disputability is a characteristic of the statements “this is true, you are right”, “this is false, you are wrong, you are lying”. Truth is then a synthetic positive property attached to argumentation as such. Truth judgments oscillate between the argumentative pole of justification, and the pole of perceptual or intellectual self-evidence.

Argumentation is sometimes criticized for its alleged inability to express and communicate truth. A distinction must be made here between epistemic arguments and practical arguments. In the former case, the argument serves to reduce the uncertainty surrounding a claim. In the latter case, the argument seeks to develop a line of action from true or possible facts, combined with a set of values ​​and preferences.

From the point of view of argumentation in dialogue, truth is a provisional property attributed to a statement that has survived a critical examination, conducted with a method appropriate to the circumstances, within interested and competent groups, on the basis of data whose quality and completeness have been assessed. As a construction, a truth judgment of truth can be adjusted as more and better information becomes available, or as the critical method improves, see default reasoning.

3. The Platonic Dramatization:
Essential Truth vs. Manipulative Social Persuasion

In argumentative rhetoric, the question of the probable-likely appears under two opposing views, either as an arbitrary social representation accepted in place of an absent truth, or as an approach to truth.

In Plato’s Phaedrus, Socrates defines rhetoric as “a way of guiding the soul”:

Socrates: Well, then, isn’t the rhetorical art, taken as a whole, a way of directing the soul by means of speech, not only in the law courts and on other public occasions, but also in private? Isn’t it one and the same art whether its subject is great or small, and no more to be held in esteem — if it is followed correctly — when its questions are serious or when they are trivial? Or what have you heard about all this? (Plato, Phaedrus, 261a; CW p. 537)

This psychagogy (“art of guiding the soul”, probably stripped of its religious function of evoking the souls of the dead, but not of its magical connotations, immediately expresses the control function attributed to rhetorical persuasion, “the need for souls”, that motivates religious proselytism.

Socrates dramatizes the problem of truth by radicalizing the opposition of the plausible-persuasive to the true:

Socrates: […] No one in a law court, you see, cares at all about the truth of such matters. They only care about what is convincing. This is called “the likely”, and that is what a man who intends to speak according to art should concentrate on. (Id., 261a; CW p. 549)

And the proper way to guide souls is postponed until we know the truth about the nature of all things:

Socrates: First, you must know the truth concerning everything you are speaking or writing about; you must learn how to define each thing in itself; and, having defined it, you must know how to divide it into kinds until you reach something indivisible. Second, you must understand the nature of the soul, along the same lines; you must determine which kind of speech is appropriate to each kind of soul, prepare and arrange your speech accordingly, and offer a complex and elaborate speech to a complex soul and a simple speech to a simple one. Then, and only then, will you be able to use speech artfully, to the extent that its nature allows it to be used that way, either in order to teach or in order to persuade. This is the whole point of the argument we have been making. (Id., 277b-c; CW p. 554)

The probable-likely is “like” the true. But in order to say that a representation, a story is plausible, or similar to what is or was true, we must know what is or was true. Socrates’ position is strong, because it is based on the impossibility of saying in any meaningful way “A looks like B”, “Peter looks like Paul” if you do not know either B or Paul.

Having found the truth, one can speak truthfully and live in the truth. The rhetoric adapted to this situation will no longer be a rhetoric of persuasion but a pedagogy of truth. According to Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca,

when Plato dreams, in his Phaedrus, of a rhetoric which would be worthy of the philosopher, what he recommends is a technique capable of convincing the gods themselves (Plato, Phaedrus, 273c)”. ([1958], p. 7).

In the Phaedrus, it is not so much a matter of convincing the gods as it is as it is a matter of distracting the rational man from other fellow ordinary men:

And no one can acquire these abilities without great effort — a sensible man will make a laborious effort not in order to speak and act among human beings, but so as to be able to speak and act in a way that pleases the god as much as possible. (Plato, Phaedrus, 273e; C. W. p. 550)

Note that such a conversion involves following a master, not to say a guru; is it so different from following a good speaker that is, « a good man who speaks well”? In any case, Socrates has thus imposed the pathos of inaccessible truth, implying that rhetorical discourse is constructed on the basis of the plausible, of verisimilitude, that is, on a pseudo-representation that makes it possible to dispense with truth. In essence, the function of persuasion is attached to argumentative rhetoric as a stigma that marks its congenital inability to attain or even  approach the truth, the essence and the gods. The probable bears no relation to the true. To live in the world of persuasion is to live in the world of beliefs and opinions, in the “cave” and not in the light of the truth.

This apparently ineradicable view of rhetorical argumentation is rooted in the anti-democratic and anti-social critique that Socrates addresses to the institutional, political and legal discourses that attempt to deal with the problems of the city.

4. The Aristotelian De-Dramatization:
The Probable is Oriented Towards the True

The Socratic quest for truth unfolds in this atmosphere of tragic radicalism. Aristotle radically de-dramatizes the whole problem by arguing that elaborated probable opinion and truth are not in conflict but are in fact complementary. This is true for at least four reasons. On the one hand, a first set of three reasons:

(1) The true and the approximately true are apprehended by the same faculty; it may also be noted that (2) men have a sufficient natural instinct for what is true, and (3) they usually do arrive at the truth. Hence the man who makes a good guess at truth is likely to make a good guess at probabilities (Aristotle, Rhet., 1355a 14-15; RR, p. 101; our numbering);

Fourth, manipulative rhetoric does not work,

things that are true and things that are just have a natural tendency to prevail over their opposites. (id., 1355a20; p. 101)

A wonderfully optimistic statement. And finally, it is possible to establish an ethical control over speech: “for we must not make people believe what is bad” (id., 1355a30; p. 101).

The plausible is thus defined not as any opinion that wears the mask of truth, but as a positive orientation, a first step toward truth, expressed in the form of an endoxon, that must be dialectically tested, see Dialectic. It follows that « being convinced of sth. » should be defined simply as a provisional state of the individual in his search for truth, a first step toward a truth in progress.

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CLASSIFICATION

Beings are categorized, named and defined on the basis of their common characteristics (what brings them together?), and their specific characteristics (what distinguishes them from beings of other kinds?).
A classification is a set of definitions organized according to their degree of generality, increasing (down-top) or decreasing (top-down).

Categorization and the organization of categories into classifications characterize what Lévi-Strauss calls “the science of the concrete”, a fundamental science shared by all human beings (1962], Ch. 1), and the basis of ordinary argumentation.

From the point of view of argumentation, the system “categorization – definition – classification – syllogism” defines logic as the “art of thinking” in natural language. Until the development of mathematics with its application to the experimental sciences and the emergence of formal logic, the theory of definition and classification served as an introduction to logical reasoning, that is, to scientific reasoning.

1. Fundamental predicates and essentialist definition

Fundamental predicates are also called « fundamental categories ». The theory of categories comes from Aristotle’s Categories and Topics, where he assigns to science the task of giving correct definitions of beings, i.e. definitions that allow them to be grouped into well-made classifications. Reconstructed by Porphyry (c.234 – c.305, in the Isagoge (« Introduction to the Categories of Aristotle »), and transmitted in the Middle Ages mainly by Boethius (c.480-525), this « Aristotelian methodology of definition » (de Pater, 1965) constituted the fundamental intellectual equipment of science until modern times.[1]

Aristotle distinguishes five basic types of predicates (predicables, categories): genus, species, difference, proper, accident. The exact logico-metaphysical status of these terms is disputed, but their function is clear, it is to give a logical-semantic structure to statements such as the following ones

Suzan is a human being
Humans are animals
Humans are rational
The horse whinnies
The (this) horse suffers.

The analysis in terms of categories assigns the following structures to these assertions:

— “Suzan is a human” predicates the species, “man”, of the individual, Suzan.
— “Humans are animals” predicates a genus, “animal” of a species, “human”.
— “Humans are rational” predicates a difference, “rational” of a species, “human”. Human and horse are two species belonging to the same genus animal; unlike the horse and other animals, man is endowed with reason, which is the classical defining difference between man and other animals.
— “Horses whinny”: in its generic interpretation, this statement attaches to the species “horse”, a quality, “— whinnying”. The specific property is a non-essential characteristic of a species; that is (all) horses neigh, and only horses neigh.
The definition of man as a “featherless biped” is extensionally valid; on this basis, a human being can be distinguishedfrom any other being. Essentialist philosophy charges that such property-based definitions say nothing about what is, in essence, a human being.
— “This horse is suffering” attributes an accident to an individual. The accident belongs only to the individual, not to the species or genus. The horse cannot be characterized, at any level, as “a suffering animal”; a particular horse may or may not suffer, depending on the circumstances, but it cannot be a mammal or not.

The famous Aristotelian definition of man, that is human being, is based on these categories

[ Humans_specie ] _definiendum ARE [rational_difference animals_genus] _definiens

The definition of a being by its species, its specific difference and its genus makes it possible to place it correctly in the classification to which it belongs.
An object is known when it has been successfully defined and classified. Then, it is associated with identical individuals (in the same genus), and disassociated from individuals that are closest to them, that is, individuals that belong to the same genus but to different species. This knowledge is not attached to it as a particular individual; this is what is meant by the expression “there is no science of the contingent”.

An incorrect analysis of the nature of predication is at the origin of definitional errors that, lead to incorrect categorization. Suppose that the statements “some clouds are gray” and “all sparrows are gray” are true. This color is an incidental property of clouds, whereas it is a common but not exclusive property of all sparrows: elephants are also grey. The property, “being grey”, although shared by clouds, sparrows and elephants, does not allow them to be placed within the same natural genus. At most, we can say that some clouds are indeed like sparrows in term of their color, S. Intra-Categorical Analogy; Metaphor.

2. Classifications of natural kinds

This “classificatory thinking” gives impressive results in the classification of natural entities. Each entity is classified at its proper level, in a global, comprehensive hierarchy, on the basis of its common and specific properties. At the very top of this great pyramid of classification, are the plant, animal and mineral kingdoms. Such a kingdom contains a number of orders; an order contains families; a family contains several genera; and a genus contains several species that characterize individuals. producing the following pattern of nested succession:

Kingdom => Order => Family => Genus => Species :: {Individuals}

The above series of categories form a seven-level taxonomy. Depending on the complexity of the kingdom under consideration other intermediate levels may need to be introduced, such as Kingdom => Division => Class => Order, etc.

A species is a group of individuals. It is the basic unit of taxonomy. In the animal kingdom, the individuals that make up a species come from the same, or similar, parents, and they can interbreed [2].

The notation « :: » marks the boundary where classification (concepts) touches reality.

As a domain of knowledge, taxonomy requires a well-developed denominative language, that is transparent to the specialist. Latin names are used for this purpose. For example, the fairy ring mushroom (Fr. mousseron), is scientifically known as Marasmius Oreades. This name corresponds to the following taxonomy: Genus: marasmius; Family: marasmiaceae; Order: Agaricales; Species: Oreades.

3. Syllogistic reasoning about natural taxonomies

Scientific classifications obey the laws of set theory.

Definitions are organized in taxonomies according to their generality. The tree structure of the categoriy system allows valid syllogistic reasoning. A taxonomic space defines a syllogistic space. This coupling of classification and syllogism is a fundamental tool of ordinary reasoning; reasoning here means moving in a controlled way from one branch to another in a “Porphyrian tree”.

A well-constructed taxonomy relies on definitions and allows inferences based on the nature of things: “— is a Labrador” implies “— is a dog”, and both also imply “—is a mammal” see Definitions and Argument. Hence the syllogism:

Labradors are dogs, dogs are mammals, SO Labradors are mammals

All L are D	Labradors are dogs	Labrador is a species of genus1, dogs
All D are M	Dogs are mammals	Genus_1 is a subgenus of genus2, mammals
All Ls are M	So, Labradors are mammals	Labrador is a sub (subspecies) of genus2 mammals

From the definition « humans_definiendum are [rational_difference animals_genus]_definiens« 
one can construct the valid syllogism:

all H are A	Humans are animals
all H are R	Humans are rational
SO, some A are R	SO, some animals are rational

Conversely, if the genus C includes the species E1, E2, … En, then we immediately infer the truth of the disjunction:

“to be a C” implies “to be either an E1, or an E2 or … or an En”
“X is a mammal” means “X is either a human, or a rat, … or a whale”.

Other implications are based on the fact that the genus is characterized by a set of properties that are common to all the species included within its scope. If “to be a mammal” is defined as “to be a vertebrate, to be warm-blooded, to have a constant temperature, to have pulmonary respiration, to nurse the youn” then all of these characteristics can be attributed to all mammals, regardless of their differences, that is, regardless of the species they belong to.

3. Common classifications and natural reasoning

According to the psychological and linguistic theories of the prototype, common classifications have three levels:

superordinate category:	“— is a mammal”
basic category:	“ — is a dog”
subordinate category:	« — is a Labrador ».

Beings are identified and names primarily by the name of their “basic” category, which is characterized by its frequency or its perceptual, cognitive or cultural salience. Non-experts first identify an animal as a dog, not as a mammal or a Labrador.

The terms hyponym and hypernym are used in semantics to refer to pairs of terms in a hierarchical relationship. The hyponym relationship is analogous to the genus-species relationship “rose is a hyponym of flower, all roses are flowers”. The hypernym relationship corresponds to the species-genus relationship “flower is hypernym of rose, some flowers are roses”.

Scientific categorization determines the exact position of an individual or of a class of entities in a taxonomy, in which the terms have been given an essentialist definition from which it is possible to argue syllogistically.
Linguistic nomination-categorization assigns to an individual its current name and the definition associated with that name. This operation could be considered to be the basic argumentative technique, fundamental for all types of argumentation. The simple and stable system of scientific-Aristotelian categories is replaced by the infinitely complex system of semantic relations in a given language.
Syllogistic reasoning remains possible on the islands of stability corresponding to semantic agreements, i.e. hyponyms/hypernyms hierarchies.

Since linguistic categories can be destabilized and revised, a pari arguments and arguments from the opposites play a predominant role in ordinary speech, especially in argumentative situations.
Sociolinguistic categories are said to be fuzzy and ill-defined; they are in fact evolving categories, in a process of permanent destabilization and re-stabilization under the pressure of historical evolution of things, language change, and conversational necessities. They are contestable and adjustable; a pari argument and argument from the opposites play a predominant role in ordinary speech, especially in argumentative situations.

4. A non-Aristotelian “classification”

The following passage by Jorge Luis Borges calls itself as a « classification », (h). It reveals the requirements of the Aristotelian classification through common characteristics and specific differences; the value of a theory of definition; and above all the renunciation of free association and subjectivity.

These ambiguities, redundancies, and deficiencies recall those attributed by Dr. Franz Kuhn to a certain Chinese Encyclopaedia called the Heavenly Emporium (*) of Benevolent Knowledge. In its remote pages it is written that animals are divided into: (a) belonging to the Emperor, (b) embalmed, (c) tame, (d) suckling pigs, (e) sirens, (f) fabulous, (g) stray dogs, (h) included in the present classification, (i) frenzied, (j) innumerable, (k) drawn with a very fine camel-hair brush, (l) et cetera, (m) which have just broken a water jug, (n) which from afar off look like flies.
(*) Warehouse
Jorge Luis Borges, ‘The Analytical Language of John Wilkins’ [3].

Needless to say, this account has little to do with the reality of the classification methods actually used in ancient or contemporary China.

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[1] In this book, the word category is used only in the sense defined in the entry Categorization – nomination, and not with the Aristotelian sense of « predicate, predicable or fundamental category ».

[2] From Jacques Brosse, Lexicon, in Atlas des arbustes, arbrisseaux et lianes, de France et d’Europe occidentale, Paris, Bordas, 1983 [Atlas of shrubs, bushes and lianas of France and Western Europe].

[3] Jorge Luis Borges. El idioma analÍtico de John Wilkins. In La Nación. 8 February 1942.
Translated and republished by Eliot Weinberger as “John Wilkins’ Analytical Language,” p. 229–232 in Jorge Luis Borges.The Total Library: Nonfiction, 1922–1986, Penguin, London, 1999.

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Appeal to the LETTER

Latin ad orationem, oratio, “speech, discourse. » Ad litteram, lat. littera, “letter; writing.”
Both terms can refer to written or spoken speech.

1. In law and regulations

The law is interpreted to the letter when its interpretation is limited to the text’s literal meaning, see strict meaning.
This mode of interpretation is opposed to interpretations that appeal to the spirit of the law for example, by referring to the intention of the legislator.

2. In everyday argument

In everyday conversation, the term to the letter (ad litteram) refers to a second turn of speech based on what the other party has explicitly said (« verbally »), word for word, disregarding what the first speaker actually meant.
This occurs with indirect speech acts, such as requests, softened as questions:

S1: – Could you pass me the salt?
S2: – Yes.

However, S2 does not pass the salt shaker to S1. S2 answers the letter, without considering that S1 asked him to pass the salt (to do something), not to comment on his ability to do so.

In an argumentative situation, the term ad litteram refers to a response that strictly adheres to the opponent’s literal words, without attempting to understand or answer the opponent’s intended meaning:

The police pfficer: — Just tell me So-and-so did it, and I will let you go
The suspect: — « So-and-so did it »

By repeating the police’ words, the suspect says–exactly, but ironically–what the police wanted him to say in order to be released.  He answered the letter, but he probably won’t be released.
The type of reply addresses the word and phrase litteral meaning rather than the speaker’s intended meaning, i.e. the spirit or intent of the police, given the conversational context.
The suspect fulfills his turn of speech, and gives the floor back to the accuser, who must rephrase what he wants to say.

Ad rem and ad litteram arguments. An argument on the merits (ad rem, to the matter) deals with the fundamentals of the case. Such arguments  are based on a methodical and exclusive exercise of reason (ad judicium).  An argument to the letter avoids the issue by dealing only with its formal expression.

This strategy can be used as a disorienting move, that serves a destructive purpose. It bypasses the significant content of the intervention by focusing on the fom of the speech. It can even turn the letter of the speech against the speaker’s intention.

This maneuver contrasts with a charitable consideration of the intent of the discourse and does not seek to take advantage of a poor formulation. In other words, it does not consider the conversational context.

3. A Complex Case

— SITUATION: A dispute about the legal and ethical management of science funding

1) Research in domain B is subject to legal provision S, which prohibits research that could lead to extremely dangerous results of type U.

2) A research group submits a research project in domain B to institution I. The research objectives are defined in the research proposal that accompanies the funding application. Funding is granted.

3) This research produces a result, X

— CLAIM: Result X is a type U result. R conducted U-type research, and I actually funded U-type research. Both knowingly violated the law.

ISSUE:
Does this research violate the statute prohibiting research likely to lead to U-Type results?

— ANSWER NO: Appeal to the letter (strict meaning) of the research project.

NO. U-type research emerged unexpectedly. The terms of reference did not include any research likely to produce U-Type results. Such unexpected occurrences are common in scientific research.

— ANSWER YES: Intentional interpretation, see motives and good reasons.

IT DOES. U-Type results did not “emerge”,they were intentionally produced.

(1) According to our panel of top scientists, a competent researcher could have foreseen that  U-Type results would follow from the objectives defined in the specifications.

(2) The terms of reference don’t explicitly refer to U as a goal of the research in order to avoid the obvious legal and political consequences.

(3) However, the research proposal describes work that conforms to the generally accepted definition of U, and meets the criteria for U-Type research, according to distinguished members of the relevant scientific community.

Conclusion: They had a hidden agenda. They intentionaly conducted U-Type research, regardless of whether they used that term. [2]

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[1] This example is derived from Glenn Kessler “The repeated claim that Fauci lied to Congress about ‘gain-of-function’ research.” The Washington Post, Oct. 29, 2021. https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/10/29/repe’sated-claim-that-fauci-lied-congress-about-gain-of-function-research/
This case is linked to the ongoing controversy over the origin of the SARS-CoV-2.

By J. Anthony Blair

About ten years ago, obviously inspired by the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, and motivated by the evident need, I sat down at my computer and typed out “Windsor Encyclopedia of Argument and Argumentation; Terms, Concepts, Theories, Important historical and contemporary figures”. Before too long, I compiled a list of close to 200 headings for entries. It struck me immediately that writing up those entries called for a team effort. Surely no one person, and certainly not I, had the necessary encyclopedic acquaintance with the field or the energy to acquire it. Over the years since then, I privately bemoaned the lack of such a reference work, however the time never seemed available to enlist a team of colleagues to undertake the task of writing it.

Then, in September of 2016, a copy of Dictionnaire de l’argumentation, Une introduction aux études d’argumentation arrived in the mail, the author’s name in self-effacing tiny print under the title on the front cover—my old friend—Christian Plantin. I riffled through the pages. “Accident (fal.)” three-quarters of a page; “Ad hominem” four pages; “Définition” eleven and a half pages; “Éthos” ten pages; “Émotion” five and a half pages; “Dialectique” three and a half pages; and on and on. It has 248 main entries and 67 secondary entries and runs to 635 pages. Although it serves as a dictionary, and is restricted to listing the terms used in argumentation and argumentation theory, with no entries for the names of theorists or of their theories, it is in fact more like an encyclopedia. For in its main entries it refers to and discusses the various different theoretical treatments of these terms. Its list of the references alluded to in the text tops 600. And Plantin consulted some four dozen colleagues to check the accuracy of his accounts (they are listed). This is the reference book I had dreamed of, and Christian Plantin had accomplished it by himself.

There was just one problem: it is written in French. Like it or not, the lingua franca of argumentation studies these days is English, and even if many scholars are bilingual or multilingual, the sad fact remains that if the Dictionnaire were available only in French it would not get nearly the distribution or the usage it deserves. For it should be on the reference shelf of every argumentation scholar and every student of argumentation in the world.

So when I wrote to Christian to thank him for sending me a copy, I suggested that he should try to get the Dictionnaire translated into English. He replied that he agreed, but how to accomplish that enormous task was the problem. Only an expert could know how to translate the technical terms into their English equivalents. Moreover many French terms of art in the field of argumentation have no precise equivalent in English—argument itself is a prime example. There was really only one person eminently suited to the task, namely the author himself. Plantin’s English is excellent and he has the requisite knowledge. So rather than relax and enjoy the much-deserved praise for having written the Dictionnaire, he turned to the gargantuan job of translating the book.

It remained to find a publisher. With the prices of books published by the commercial houses—the big scholarly presses even the prestigious university presses—in the stratosphere, if any of them published it, the book would not be affordable by its primary target audience, namely students. Plantin’s subtitle is, after all, “An introduction to the study of argumentation”. I contacted John Woods, a series editor at College Publications, to help us find out if they might be interested. A non-profit publisher dedicated to producing academic books of high quality and making them available at cost, it seemed an obvious choice. College Publications immediately welcomed the project. And here we have the wonderful result.

The Dictionary of Argumentation differs marginally from the Dictionnaire de l’argumentation. There are 303 entries, 225 main ones and 78 secondary entries. It is targeted at an Anglophone, not a Francophone audience. The author has taken advantage of the opportunity to make minor revisions and corrections.

I commend this book to students and established scholars of argumentation alike. All will discover new information in it. It bears the imprint of its author: astonishing erudition worn lightly; encyclopedic knowledge presented in an informal, accessible style; stuffed with eclectic examples; serious and amusing; with firm opinions and fair treatment of alternatives. It is a tour de force.

J. Anthony Blair

Center for Research in Reasoning, Argumentation and Rhetoric
University of Windsor, Canada

December 2017

Translated by J. Anthony Blair

 

This Dictionary owes everything to Jean-Claude Anscombre, J. Anthony Blair, Oswald Ducrot, Frans van Eemeren, Jean-Blaise Grize, Rob Grootendorst, Charles L. Hamblin, Ralph Johnson, Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca, Chaïm Perelman, Stephen E. Toulmin, Douglas Walton, John Woods — and many others. They introduced new ideas, reconceptualized the field, reconnected it to contemporary scholarship, and opened new fields of research and perspectives whose exploration is far from complete.

Aristotle, Cicero, Quintilian are the founding fathers of Western argumentation studies. The historical and cultural differences that separate us from them undoubtedly create an obstacle to reading them. No doubt influenced by the large body of contemporary American studies in rhetoric and argumentation, the definitions included in this Dictionary integrate their insights, at the same level as contemporary works.

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The general vision employed in this work makes no claim to originality; it seems to me, largely a posteriori, to be the following. Argumentation is approached as a linguistic activity, and more fundamentally, as a semiotic activity, rooted in the ordinary exercise of language. Ordinary speech has first of all an oral and dialogical existence. Key concepts of discourse and interaction studies can be effectively implemented in the practical analysis of everyday argument. This Dictionary articulates the study of argumentation in the framework of discourse studies, under their two aspects, monologal and interactional. This position agrees, for example, with the framework of discourse analysis as it is elaborated in the Dictionnaire d’Analyse du Discours by Patrick Charaudeau and Dominique Maingueneau (Le Seuil, 2002), to which I contributed the entries concerning argumentation. I owe the idea for the present enterprise to their example.

 

Arguing is exercising the critical function of language. Full-blown argumentative situations have a characteristic antiphonic structure, where the participants express and balance the pros against the cons.

Argumentation is both monologue and dialogue, and both are language and thought. Argumentation as reasoning in ordinary language should not be seen as the inconclusive, vague, weak and easy counterpart of scientific reasoning. Critical thinking is at work in everyday private and public human affairs as well as in the most recondite scientific disciplines. The acquisition of knowledge begins with the tools of ordinary language and reasoning, and these are forgotten when they are no longer needed. It is an extraordinary characteristic of ordinary language to be thus capable of engendering other languages capable of going where it can never go itself.

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This Dictionary is based on the experience acquired in teaching and research seminars on argumentation; certain propositions echo the discussions that took place there. The participants in those seminars were, as they no doubt will continue to be, a mix of experienced colleagues teaching and developing research programs in argumentation, junior researchers, and students beginning to develop their vision of the field. No doubt the odds are against appealing to these diverse groups at the same time. However, it is this triple audience that I constantly had in mind during the preparation of this Dictionary, with special emphasis on the last two.

I hope that consulting this Dictionary will prove useful not only to argumentation theorists, but also to the wide community of people wishing to better articulate their visions and practices of argumentation, and who, for that purpose need a meta-language of argumentation. To argue is, in effect, to express oneself – to speak or write, often both – in a space structured by a question defining an issue. This space is characterized by the presence of opponents, and the activity of arguing necessarily leads the speaker to refer to their discourses, that provide an alternative and distinctly different answers to the question. The arguer is inevitably led to speak about antagonistic discourses, whilst also developing “control loops” within his or her own argument.

Arguing is thus a meta-argumentative activity. The ordinary exercise of argumentation presupposes the systematic usage of a discourse about argumentation, or a sort of ordinary meta-language about argumentation, which theorists will develop into a full theory of argumentation. That’s why we hope equally that the practitioners of argument no less than the theoreticians will take some interest in this Dictionary, and that the observations that it contains will be able to be reinvested in argumentative practice.

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Beyond the requests for timely information, which find an answer on the internet, everyone working on argumentation, as in any other field of the human sciences, finds himself or herself confronted by questions of clarification, of definition, and of conceptual coherence.

To answer these questions is not necessarily difficult in an isolated case. But the difficulties increase with the plurality of definitions of the same term, or the plurality of terms corresponding roughly to one and the same definition. Things are further complicated when these definitions overlap, and function in a shifting stylistic continuum, in which, moreover, one may take a certain pleasure. The case of the cluster constituted by the arguments a pari, from similarity, from analogy, from categorization, not to mention per analogiam, is an example of such a situation. If one wants not only to admire, but also to understand, one must sometimes resolve to give up this or that conceptual nuance and accept that certain labels are simple synonyms or translations of one another.

A second major difficulty is that of the global coherence of the definitions. To stick with the example of analogy, one encounters this issue when one adds to the preceding terms the rule of justice and the precedent. Without claiming to give the notional field of argumentation the kind of compact structure that one could dream of in the early days of structuralism, one must not only expose the specificities of the concepts but also their commonalities.

In trying to resolve the first difficulty one runs the risk of arbitrary simplification; to resolve the second, one risks imposing on these notions an arbitrary organization. If one fails in these two ways, one will simply have aggravated the malady for which one was claiming to bring the remedy.

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This is not an encyclopedic dictionary that retraces the discussions about each concept, that presents each theory within its historical developments, its current structure and its research program, and that discusses the strengths and weaknesses of each author. The works cited do not claim to constitute a bibliography or a reading list of argumentation studies.

This Dictionary brings together a collection of relatively technical terms which form a vocabulary shared by argumentation studies and implemented in the analysis of argumentative texts and interactions. From Argumentation to Topic and Waste, their degree of technicality is very different.

Certain terms correspond to terms that are used outside the field of argumentation studies. Only the particular meaning that such terms have within the theory of argumentation feature in this Dictionary. In the entry “Pragmatic” one will not find general considerations on pragmatics as a philosophy or a branch of linguistics, but only a definition of pragmatic argument.

This Dictionary presents 301 entries, 223 basic entries, with the addition of 78 secondary entries.

A main entry defines, comments and illustrates a specific concept, and, when necessary a set of closely related concepts.

A secondary entry refers back to a main entry. The main entry may correspond:

(i) To a more usual label equivalent to, or a translation of the secondary entry, for example “Ad Verecundiam ► Modesty”.

(ii) To an encompassing concept, for example “Amphiboly ► Ambiguity”. The grouping of several secondary entries under the same main, uniting entry prevents dispersions and repetitions and favors the discussion of closely related concepts.

(iii) To a main entry grouping two correlative concepts, which are defined contrastively, for example the secondary entry “Conclusion ► Argument”, “Argument” being an abbreviation referring unambiguously to the main entry, “Argument – Conclusion” (see Conventions, infra).

A system of cross-references connects the entries, to strengthen the conceptual coherence of the whole Dictionary.

The definitions are introductory. According to the fine catachresis used to refer to the items collected in a dictionary, the entries of this Dictionary should straightaway arrange an entrée to the idea. I have sometimes tried to add a bit of spice in the form of a commentary or a note that should open up the idea and prompts a questioning of it.

The examples are of various kinds: some are invented and only aim to give an idea of actual instances of the phenomenon under scrutiny. Others are borrowed from written texts; yet others come from oral exchanges, sometimes from recorded and referenced productions, sometimes simply caught on the fly and noted later; their oral indicators have been retained as much as possible.

The entries are listed according to alphabetical order. The numbering of some entries allows for certain thematic groupings, which should enable the reader to better follow the development of families of related key entries, for example regarding the large issues of argumentative analogy or causality.

One might find it strange that an entry is devoted to this or that minor form: that is because it is not so much minor as overlooked, and because it deserves its proper place in what can be considered the conceptual structure underlying argumentation studies.

The definitions, propositions and assertions presented in this Dictionary are certainly not intended to close down any discussion. They are rather trying to feed the debate, and sometimes to provoke it, pending criticism and improvement. I would be delighted if that were to happen.

Many dictionaries or logical and rhetorical lexicons define certain terms that are relevant to argumentation theory. To our knowledge, however — apart from Sztuka argumentacji – Slownik terminologiczny [The Art of Arguing – Terminological Dictionary] by Szymanek (2004) — there is hardly any other Dictionary of Argumentation.

 

Argumentations that
ESTABLISH vs. EXPLOIT a RELATIONSHIP

Analogy, authority, causality and definition are basic argumentative resources. They can be found in Cicero’s typologies (1st century BC, see collections from Aristotle to Boethius), as well as in Janik, Rieke and Toulmin’s nine “forms of reasoning” (1984), see collections: contemporary Innovations and structurations.

The arguments associated with these four sources fall into two main categories:

(1) Arguments that establish (construct, justify) the claim that:

• • There is a causal connection between two facts
  • There is an analogy between two beings or two organizations of reality
    see categorization; intra-categorical analogy; structural analogy.
  • Such a source is authoritative: see authority, §7.3
  • Such a definition correctly defines such a word, or such a concept.

(2) Arguments that exploit a pre-established (assumed, known) relationship

• • A causal connection
    See cause-to-effect arg.;  arg. from consequence and effect; pragmatic arg.
  • An analogical relationship
    Seen  categorization; intra-categorical analogy; structural analogy.
  • An authoritative source
    See authority, §6 – 67
  • A definition
    See definition3: arguments based on a definition

Arguments of this second type arguments can be refuted on the grounds that the underlying claim of type (1) is incorrect.

Arguments “based on / establishing the structure of reality”: a re-interpretation

According to the above distinction, type (1) arguments establish the structure of reality Type (2) arguments are based on the corresponding local structuration of reality.

The interpretation to this distinction is different from the one found in the Treatise between “Argument based on the structure of reality”  ([1958], §60-77) and “Relations establishing the structure of reality” ([1958], §78-88), see Collections (4).
According to Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca,

— Causal arguments and authority are “based on the structure of reality”.
— Analogy is a relation that “establish the structure of reality”.
— Definition is a “quasi-logical” relation.

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1. The predicative rhetorical genre

The three classical rhetorical genres, deliberative, judicial, epidictic, all relate to civil life. Christian religious rhetoric has developed a new genre, preaching, where persuasion is put to the service of religious faith.

Predication is the action name associated with the verb to preach, and the noun preacher. It has not been affected by the derogatory orientations sometimes associated with these two words in contemporary usage. It is homonymous with the word predication as used in grammar and logic to designate the operation by which a predicate (a verbal group) is associated with a subject in a sentence; and with the word to predicate something upon, that is to base an action or a saying upon:

I predicated my argument on the facts. (tfd, Predicate)

Preaching as an argumentative genre fully complies with the definition of argumentation provided by Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca as a discursive effort “to induce or to increase the mind’s adherence to the theses presented for its assent” ([1958]/1969, p. 4). The theses referred to in this case are religious beliefs, that are articles of faith for the preacher. Assuming that the audience is composed of believers, by preaching to them, the pastor assures their ongoing training and increases their degree of belief, in other words, “the soul’s adherence” to their creed (after Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, [1958], p. 4).

If the audience is composed of unbelievers, the missionary might preach them in order to instigate these same beliefs. If the audience is composed of heretics in a position of strength, rhetoric must give way to dialectic.

The tenants of the Catholic faith are given in the Holy Scriptures, and are commented on by the authorities, the Fathers of the Church. These contents are articulated and applied in sermons by means of various speech techniques, which have established themselves in a sometimes polemical tension between dialectical appeals to reason and rhetorical enthusiasm for faith, S. Faith.

2. The exemplum

The exemplum (plural exempla) is an instrument of preaching which has been particularly developed by the Dominican and Franciscan mendicant orders, from the beginning of the thirteenth century. Structurally, the exemplum is a narrative, exploiting the resources of the fable. The genus is legitimated by the very example of Christ who preached by parables. The exempla present models of action to be followed or avoided.

The exemplum is “a brief narrative given as truthful and intended to be inserted into a discourse (usually a sermon) to convince an audience by a salutary lesson” (Brémond & al. 1982, pp. 37-38). Brémond distinguishes metaphorical and metonymic exempla.

2.1 Metonymic exemplum

In such exempla, the fact is presented as being likely. There is then a certain identity of status between the heroes of the anecdote and the recipients of the exhortation. The parable of the evil rich is told to the rich, and the logicians are told the tale of one of their colleagues, who is tormented in hell for his sins, that is to say, his sophisms.

The following exemplum deals with the fate of souls after death, and especially with purgatory. The lesson it contains is a “Christian denunciation of vain pagan erudition” (Boureau, p. 94), and a call to the logicians to convert to a religious life.

For our edification, it may be useful to know that a harsh sentence is inflicted upon sinners at the end of their lives.
This is what happened in Paris, according to the Parisian Cantor (= Peter the Chanter, Petrus Cantor). Master Silo urged one of his colleagues, who was very ill, to come and visit him after his death and to inform him of his fate. The man appeared before him a few days later, wearing a cloak of parchment covered with sophistic inscriptions and full of flames. The master asked him who he was. He replied, “I am the one who promised you that he would visit.” When asked what his fate was, he said, “This cloak weighs me down and oppresses me more than a tower. They make me bear it for the vainglory which I have derived from the sophisms. The flames with which it is filled represent the delicious and varied furs I wore, and this flame tortures me and burns me”. And as the master found this slight penalty, the deceased told him to stretch out his hand to test the lightness of punishment. On his outstretched hand, the man dropped a bead of sweat, which drilled the hand of the master as fast as an arrow. The Master experienced an extraordinary agony, and the man said to him, “so it is with all my being”. Afraid of the harshness of this chastisement, the master decided to leave the world and enter religion. And in the morning, facing his gathered students, he composed these verses:

To the frogs, I give up croaking /To the ravens, cawing, / To the vain, vanity.
I attach my fate /To a logic that does not fear the conclusive ‘therefore’ of death.

And, abandoning the world, he took refuge in religion.
Jacobus da Varagine, The Golden Legend, written around 1260[1]

The practice of exemplum goes beyond the strictly religious domain. Fontenelle’s “Golden Tooth” is actually a lay metonymic exemplum illustrating the fallacy of finding the cause of a fact that does not exist, S. Cause – Effect.

2.2 Metaphorical exemplum

In such exempla, “the narrative no longer quotes a sample of the rule, but a fact that resembles it” (ibid.):

The hedgehog, it is said, when he enters a garden, takes on a load of apples which he fixes on his prickles. When the gardener arrives, the hedgehog wants to run away, but his load prevents him doing so, and thus he is caught with his apples. […] This is what happens to the unfortunate sinner who is taken, when he dies, with the burden of his sins.
Humbert from Romans, [The Gift of Fear or the Abundance of the Examples], written between 1263 and 1277.[2]

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[1] Quoted after Jacques de Voragine, La Légende Dorée. Text presented by A. Boureau. In J.-C. Schmitt (ed.), Prêcher d’exemples [Preaching Exempla]. Paris: Stock, 1985. P. 7.
[2] Humbert from Romans, Le Don de Crainte ou l’Abondance des Exemples. Trans. from Lat. to French by Chr. Boyer. Lyon: PUL. 2003. P. 116.

Just as it is a structuring feature of ordinary language, subjectivity is a defining condition of argumentation. Argumentative discourse is all about people, their characters, emotions, values and interests, as well as their knowledge and beliefs.

1. The person as an issue

Essentially, when involved in an issue, an individual may be “objectified” and treated in the same way as any other discursive object. In particular, the person may be rhetorically constructed on the basis of a priori doxical knowledge, in order that he or she serve as a basis for pro or contra arguments concerning his or her role in the issue at stake, S. Common Place.

2. Values and interests

Values and interests, even the most specific and bizarre, contribute to the definition of a person’s identity; truth is one of these values. Consequently, they will intervene in all the argumentative operations involving an assessment, such as in an argument from the absurd or in a pragmatic argument. Values and desires are at work when a consequence is defined as absurd, undesirable, or unwanted.

3. Group character and emotions

One’s rhetorical ethos is not defined as an individual, specific, psychological identity, but as the public character of an individual. All the same, rhetorical pathos is composed of a set of public emotions, not private feelings.

Rhetorical theory considers that  group character and emotions play a central role in public persuasion. Critical argumentation and fallacy theories take some distance from such agglomerations of individuals, condemning the futility of their emotions, the baseless charisma and authority of their leaders, abundantly labelled and rejected as “ad –” fallacies”.

When it comes to these issues, a defensive argumentation opposes offensive rhetoric. By enrolling the whole person in the battle of ideas and action, rhetoric adopts an offensive outlook. Conversely, critical approaches to argumentation take rather a secondary, defensive position.

3.1 Pathemic arguments

Points of view come with affects; both are correlative realities. On this basis, a sustained affective activity is a defining feature of an argumentative situation. S. Pathos; Emotion.

3.2 Ethotic argument

Rhetoric proposes a global, multidimensional approach to the person-group social interaction. The character of the audience sets the intellectual and affective conditions of the interaction, as well as the strategic construction of the orator as such, as embodying the values and virtues formally acknowledged by the audience, which can be the seven gifts of the Catholic Holy Spirit as well as the three Aristotelian democratic virtues, or the scientific virtues claimed by a plenary session audience. S. Ethos.

Global ethotic advantage can be analyzed along different dimensions, from charismatic power to scientific prestige, to delegated institutional authority. Among the different form of authority we find expert authority, which consists in well-defined skills, which may be the easiest to assess. Insofar as it satisfies the condition of propositionality, any kind of authority can be sourced, quoted, and valued by default as peripheral evidence. S. Authority.

From a normative point of view, submission to an artfully designed charismatic-authoritarian ethos is analyzed as a fallacy of intellectual inhibition or unjustified humility (ad verecundiam), S. Modesty.

4. Universal or local knowledge

A specific subgroup of these fallacies concerns the knowledge and systems of representation specific to the target, the persons to be convinced or refuted.

From an epistemic point of view, the person is defined as a necessary limited synthetic focus of beliefs and knowledge. Commenting on Whately on the ad hominem, ad verecundiam, ad populum, and ad ignorantiam fallacies, to which he adds the ad baculum and ad misericordiam, Walton notes that these six fallacies taken as a whole are opposed to the ad rem and ad judicium argument (argument aimed at the thing itself, S. Matter). This opposition is based on the fact that the fallacious arguments all contain “a ‘personal’ element, meaning that they are source-based in some ways directed at a source or person (a participant in an argument) rather than at just ‘the thing’ itself. They all have a ‘subjective’ quality, as opposed to the ‘objective’ evidence traditionally appealed to in argumentation” (Walton 1992, p. 6).

These forms of argumentation take as premises the specific representations or circumstances of a person or a group; they are deemed fallacious because of their localism. In contrast to this judgment, the localism of the premises is at the root of the definition of argumentation as a “logic of subjects” (Grize), S. Schematization; Default reasoning. Subjectivity is seen not as a potentially manipulative limitation, but as the stamp of the fact that argumentation irreducibly does not deal with absolute truth but with a revisable process of combining knowledge with human interests, in critical discussions under the supervision of a more or less structured community.

4.1 Causal assertions and human interests

S. Cause to Effect argumentation

4.2 Arguments based on the beliefs of the target

The arguer can choose to base his arguments on the beliefs accepted and the information known by the audience, therefore limiting his discourse to reorganizing and expanding these representations, S. Ethos, §5 Character of the audience; Beliefs of the audience; Concession; Ex datis.

4.3 Arguments based on a specific body of representations

Such arguments are referred to by invalidating labels, as appeals to superstition (ad superstitionem), to imagination (ad imaginationem), to stupidity or intellectual laziness (ad socordiam). These forms are sometimes associated with fallacies of emotion (ad passiones), which is strange, unless we qualify as emotional all the beliefs, nonsensical or not, we do not approve of, S. Faith. S. Collections of arguments.

4.4 Arguments based on the lack of knowledge

This lack of knowledge can be attributed to a person, S. Ignorance, or to humanity at large, S. Vertigo.

5. Silencing the opponent

A set of arguments is oriented towards the invalidation or elimination of the individual as an arguer. To refute the truth of an assertion carried by a person it is shown that it leads to contradictions from the point of view of that person, which may result in silencing the person, S. Ad hominem.

In order to disqualify a point of view, negative characteristics are attributed to the individuals supporting this point of view, either in the particular encounter or in general. These negative features can bear any relation to the question under discussion, S. Personal attack.

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