1. Topic

In general vocabulary, the word topic refers to (MW, Topic):

• 1 a: one of the general forms of argument employed in probable reasoning
  • b: argument, reason
• 2
 a: a heading in an outlined argument or exposition
  • b: the subject of a discourse or of a section of a discourse

The two meanings of topic go from topic₁ a formal, inferential pole (meaning (1)) to a substantial pole (meaning (2)). They fit with the two different meanings of argument used in their definition, S. (To) Argue, Argument:

— Topic₁: According to (1), in a “reasoning” context, argument means “argument₁”. Correlatively, a topic₁ is here an argument₁ scheme or an argumentation derived from such a scheme. With this meaning, it can be considered a translation of the Greek word topos.

— Topic₂: According to (2), in an “exposition” and “subject” context, argument means argument₃. Correlatively, a topic₂ is an argument₃, that is to say, the matter, the content of a discourse.

2. Topos

In contemporary English, the word topos is defined as “a traditional or conventional literary or rhetorical theme or topic” (MW, Topos).

2.1 Topos as “argument scheme” and “topic₁”

In Greek, the word topos (pl. topoi) has the basic meaning of “place”. In argumentative rhetoric, topos is used metaphorically to refer to “the place where arguments are found”; a topic is an argument scheme. So, topos is translated as topic by Freese and as argumentative line by Rhys Robert in their respective translations of Aristotle’s Rhetoric.

In Latin, the corresponding word is locus (pl. loci), which also means “place”, translated as topic by Hubble in his translation of Cicero’s Topica, and as “presumptive proof” by Caplan in his translation of the Rhetorica ad Herennium. In a famous metaphor, Cicero defines the argumentative places (Lat. loci, sg. locus) as “the name given by Aristotle to the ‘regions’ from which arguments are drawn” (Top, I, 8, p. 387). “Region” translates Lat. sedes, which also means “position, ground”; the loci are the foundations or “pattern” of arguments (id., I, 9, p. 389).

In the Argumentation within Language theory, the concept of inferential topos is re-defined as a pair of semantically associated predicates, S. Topos in Semantic.

2.2 Topos as “topic₂”

In the substantial sense, a topic (topos, commonplace) is an endoxon, a formulaic element corresponding to an answer to a “topical question”; or the whole discourse developing such a formula, “the lawyer developed the topos of the well-known peaceful character of the Syldavians”, S. Doxa. Such discourses are suspected to be fake and insincere, because traditional:

it is not easy to distinguish fact from topos in these documents (OD, Topos)

2.3 Topos in literary analysis

The concept of topos (pl. topoi) has been introduced by Ernst-Robert Curtius in literary analysis, to refer to a substantial, traditional thought that the writer develops, comments on and magnifies in the light of the circumstances. From a cultural and psychological perspective, a topos is “an archetype, […] a representation of the collective subconscious as defined by C. G. Jung” (Curtius [1948], vol.1, p.180). For example, the topos associating “the old man and the child” is consistently exploited in advertisements for wealth management and inheritance arrangements.

The topoi can be used to fill a compulsory discursive slot. Thus, to close a presentation, a speaker declares that “he submits quite willingly to possible negative observations, objections or even refutations, which will be truly considered to be help to understand his own data better”.

Curtius’ proposals have given rise to an important research trend on the topoi, especially in Germany (Viehweg, 1953; Bornscheuer 1976, Breuer & Schanze 1981).

3. Common place

1. In argumentation theory, the expression commonplace corresponds to the Latin locus communis, which translates as the Greek topos.

— Often reduced to place (locus, pl. loci), an inferential common place is an inferential topos, or argument scheme.

— A substantial common place is an endoxon, a formulary expression of common thought. Traditional rhetoric specialized in the argumentative use of Substantial Common Places.

2. In the general vocabulary, the expression commonplace is synonymous with cliché, both have the same depreciative orientation. Topos can be used with the same value.

3. In literary analysis, a commonplace is a “substantial topos”, in the sense of Curtius [1948].

4. Argument schemes

The designations, argument type, or argument scheme, or presumptive proof unambiguously designate a general, formal, inferential scheme.

The words topic and commonplace are ambiguous between a formal and a substantial meaning.

The expression argument line is somewhat ambiguous, as it can be used to refer to an argument scheme or to a whole, coherent argumentative strategy, S. Argumentation Scheme; Collections (I).

4. Argument line

The phrase argument line can refer:

— To an argument scheme.

— To a discourse developing a series of co-oriented or convergent arguments, developed by the same arguer to support a conclusion.

— To a corpus of discourses developing a series of co-oriented arguments, presented by allied arguers to support their common conclusion, either in the same interaction or in different verbal or written interventions.

1. Weight of circumstances — Strong will argument

Argumentation by the weight of circumstances invokes the nature of things or the external constraints, as imposing a deterministic solution on a social issue. The decision is presented as causally determined by the context: “facts leave us no choice”, “what happens in the world forces us to do so”.

In 1960, Charles de Gaulle, the President of the French Republic, held a referendum on the question of the independence of Algeria, with which France had been at war since 1954. He urged the people to vote for Algerian independence.

No one can doubt the extreme importance of the country’s response. For Algeria, the right granted to its peoples to dispose of their fate will mark the beginning of a whole new era. Some may regret that prejudices, routines and fears previously prevented the assimilation of Muslims, assuming it were possible. But the fact that they constitute eight-ninths of the population, and that this proportion continues to grow in their favor; the evolution begun in people and in things by the events, and prominently by the insurrection; and, finally, what has happened and what is going on in the world — make these considerations chimerical and these regrets superfluous.
Charles de Gaulle, December 20th 1960 Speech[1].

The strong will argument denies precisely this determinism: “where there is a will, there is a way”. In May and June 1939, the Belgian, British, French and Netherlands armies were totally routed by the German Nazi armies. In a situation that appeared desperate to many, General Charles de Gaulle rejected the armistice that Marshal Petain had just signed with the German Nazi enemy, and from London launched on the BBC his call to continue the fight:

Of course, we were subdued by the mechanical, ground and air forces of the enemy. Infinitely more than their number, it was the tanks, the airplanes, the tactics of the Germans which made us retreat. It was the tanks, the airplanes, the tactics of the Germans that surprised our leaders to the point of bringing them to where they are today.
But has the last word been said? Must hope disappear? Is defeat final? No!
Believe me, I speak to you with full knowledge of the facts and tell you that nothing is lost for France.
[…] Whatever happens, the flame of the French resistance must not, and will not be extinguished.
Charles de Gaulle, Text of the Appeal of June 18, 1940[2]

Major political decisions combine the two forms of argumentation.

2. Naturalistic argument

In law, naturalistic argument refers to the hypothesis of an impotent legislator arguing that it is impossible to legislate in certain areas, or of a judge who waives the application of the law on the pretext of special circumstances, S. Juridical Arguments.

The naturalistic argument is also exploited in the field of religious law; Luther uses it in connection with the prohibition of the marriage of priests by the Pope of the Roman Catholic Church. According to Luther, most priests “[cannot] do without a woman”, at least for their household:

If therefore [the priest] takes a woman, and the Pope allows this, but will not let them marry, what is this but expecting a man and a woman to live together and not to fall? Just as if one were to set fire to straw, and command it should neither smoke nor burn.
The Pope having no authority for such a command [forbidding the marriage of priests], any more than to forbid a man to eat and drink, or to digest, or to grow fat, no one is bound to obey it, and the Pope is answerable for every sin against it.
Martin Luther, Address To The Nobility of the German Nation, [1520][3]

A priori, the naturalistic argument has little to do with the naturalistic fallacy, which systematically values ​​the natural, S. Fallacious (2). However, the accusation of fallacious naturalism might serve to refute the argument of the force of circumstances.

[1] http://fresques.ina.fr/de-gaulle/fiche-media/Gaulle00063/speech-of-20-December-1960.html (20-09- 2013).
[2] http://lehrmaninstitute.org/history/index.html (01-20-2017).
[3] Quoted after http://sourcebooks.fordham.edu/mod/luther-nobility.asp, (01-20-2017).

Threat is used by the stronger to force the weaker to do things in the interest of the stronger (seeking revenge at the same un-ethical level, the weaker may only have recourse to manipulation) At the social level, threats of punishment function in combination with promises of rewards, as a global argument from threat and promises of reward.

1. Ad baculum : argument from threat

Threat speech, or argument from threat, or appeal to fear, (Lat. ad metum; metum, “fear”) has also been called:

— By metonymy, the “argument from the stick” (Lat. ad baculum; baculum, “stick”), or “from prison” (Lat. ad carcerem; carcer, “prison”), or “to the purse” (ad crumenam; crumena, “purse”; by a double metonymy).

— By metaphor, the “thunderbolt argument” (Lat. ad fulmen, fulmen, “lightning; violence”).

The prospect of a more or less imminent danger scares the person off the next planned action and induces new, more or less specific kinds of behavior. The threatened person feels an emotion, ranging from apprehension to fear or panic. The feeling depends on the mode of production and treatment of the source, which may or not be well defined (“we feel that something will happen to us”), and enter into a controllable causality (“we are living in a clash of civilizations”). If the threat is causal, generalized and uncontrollable (“the world is falling apart”) threat discourse will result in anxiety, fear, anguish, and even mass panic.

Two kinds of threat can be identified on the basis of whether or not the source of the danger is an intentional agent:

— The source is intentional, “threatening enemies assail our civilization”.
— The source is non-intentional, the danger comes from the material world, and is interpreted as causal: “the storm threatens the crops”; “you are at risk of cancer”.

The non-intentional source can be human. The “shapes passing by in the fog” for example can be perceived as threatening despite the fact that they are actually employees returning home from the office. This is the difference between N0 terrorizes N1 and Na terrifies Nb. The subject of terrorizes is intentional, N0 wants to frighten N1 (the gang is terrorizing the honest citizens), while the subject of terrifies is not necessarily intentional, and not necessarily human.

Fear speech expresses, inspires and strengthens a feeling of danger and insecurity, through oriented narratives and arguments which bring together the reasons, valid or not, to be afraid. Fear strategies can take two distinct orientations. They can either leave their targets plagued by anxieties, or can propose solutions to control or suppress the danger, S. Pathos; Emotion.

Fear speech can be based upon a real threat (climate change), or an invented one (alien invasion). In both case, the agent can be intentional (terrorists) or non intentional purely causal (climate change). It may or may not be correlated with hate speech.

In the hands of the established power, threat and fear, like joy and reward, can be used as powerful instruments of social cohesion and social control in societies which abide by the doctrine, “let the good rejoice and the wicked tremble”.

Threat speech is no different from fear speech, where the speaker refers to an external threat. Threat speech may also be conveyed by an individual A expressing his or her intention to cause damage or harm to another individual N, if N does not comply with such and such requirement as imposed by A. In this case, the same person occupies the roles of speaker and villain. Such threat speech has an “either… or…” format:

Either you do this for me — which is, I agree, quite unpleasant for you — or I do that to you — which is really much more unpleasant for you.

Whether this second kind of threat speech should be considered an argument or not is disputable. If we are accosted on a street corner and presented with the option of keeping our money or our life, we are likely to make a rational choice, opting to keep our life. When asked to explain where our money has gone, the existence of such a threat will be considered to be a good reason and a fully satisfactory justification for the loss of the money.

At the political level, balanced threats are the basis of nuclear deterrence; and it would be quite irrational not to take into account the fears imposed on the populations affected.

2. Threat and argumentation by the consequences

Threats can be efficiently presented as an argument by the consequences, where causality is veiled under agentivity. Rather than openly taking on the role of a villain, the speaker poses as the unwitting agent of a negative event provoked by the irresponsible behavior of the future victim. The blackmailer presents himself or herself as an advisor, and frames the interlocutor as the one responsible of future misfortune:

Question: Should the company grant a salary increase to its employees?
Labor’s representative: — If there is no increase, we’ll occupy the plant!
Employer’s representative: — If you persist in your unrealistic demands, we’ll be forced to close down the plant and cut back jobs.

The same change of footing is operated by the politician presenting his or her own political decision as motivated by “the order of things”, S. Weight of Circumstances.

3. Arguments from threat and promise

The Chinese philosopher Han-Fei proposes a theory of power as an expert blending of the two measures (Han-Fei, Tao); that is the two basic material interests motivating human actions, punishments and rewards, excluding the rationality issue, or other kinds of value, such as justice.
This kind of management of human actions exploits two antagonistic psychic movements, fear and suffering of punishment, desire and joy resulting from reward. If arguing is making somebody do something, or dissuading somebody from doing something, threat and promise would thus be the two argumentative speech acts par excellence — S. Authority; Pragmatic Argument.
The everyday expression “the carrot and the stick” rightly associates the appeal to financial interest, with the traditional ad baculum argument; which might more fittingly be called ad baculum carotamque argument. The latter is no more “rational” than the former, although it is certainly considered to be more acceptable by many.

Appealing to money is not the only way to get what one wants; rewards and punishments might draw on everything and anything that humans may desire. This might include, in particular, power, pleasure, and money, S. Values.

The ad crumenam argument (Lat. crumena, “purse”), is mentioned in Tristram Shandy, where it refers to the introduction of considerations about money in a debate:

Then, added my father, making use of the argument Ad Crumenam, — I will lay twenty guineas to a single crown piece, […] that this same Stevinus was some engineer or other,—- or has wrote something or other, either directly or indirectly, upon the science of fortification”
Laurence Sterne, The Life and Opinions of Tristram Shandy, gentleman, [1760][1]

4. Appeal to superstition

Lat. ad superstitionem, superstitio, “superstition”

The label appeal to superstition was introduced by Bentham, to refer to the fallacy of “irrevocable commitment”, which prohibits the revision of prevailing political dispositions ([1824], p. 402); S. Political Arguments.

— “Fallacy of vows or promissory oaths; ad superstitionem”: “But we swore!”

— “Fallacy of irrevocable laws”: “But that wouldn’t respect the constitution!”
Superstition is invoked here because of the oath supposedly taken to honor the will of a sacred Supernatural Power, or of the Founding Fathers, “who knew better”, and “to whom we owe everything”. Failing this duty would constitute not only a lack of respect for the authority of the Founding Fathers, but a religious or moral sin provoking some supernatural revenge. It can be assumed that such threats are the flipside to promises that submission to the Law will be duly rewarded. As a consequence, the appeal to superstition as defined here is a subspecies of appeal to threats and promises, made by transcendental powers. In this case, the argument represents a somewhat materialistic version of the argument from faith.

Non-cynical, ordinary citizens consider that politicians must honor their election commitments. It would be difficult for failed politicians to invoke the fallacy of irrevocable commitment to perpetually justify their alliance and agenda reversals.

[1] In The Complete Work of Laurence Sterne. Delphi Classics, 2013, p. 98.

A testimony is a particular kind of authoritative statements, S. Authority:

— Preliminary Conditions:

• • • • The issue I under discussion is related to an event E. Criminal or not, E has an exceptional character.
      • Person W was in a condition to see or hear something about the event E at issue.
      • Some discussants have a limited access, or no access at all to E,
      • So, in the discussion I, W qualifies as a witness to E.

— Essential Conditions: testimonies are subject under a special truth commitment:

• • • • W says T.
      • T is relevant to I; T is presumed to be True.

1. Criticism of testimony

Discourses against testimonies of any kind are based on two options, examination of the fact, questioning of the witness. These discourses may be schematized as follows.

— The fact is in itself not credible, not possible, not probable.

— The witness is not credible because:

• • • • He or she could not see, hear… what he or she pretends to have seen, heard…
      • He or she is partial, biased, or lies.
      • He or she is not competent; he or she has been manipulated; corrupted.
      • In other cases where his or her testimony could be verified, it proved wrong.
      • Other witnesses say otherwise.
      • He or she is the only witness, so his or her testimony is not acceptable (testis unus, testis nullus, “one testimony, no testimony”)

Testimony and criticism of testimony play a particularly important social role in judicial matters and in matters of faith. They also play an important private role in everyday issues, insofar at they underlie the narratives of witnesses to critical life events.

2. Testimony in rhetorical argumentation

In the Topics, Cicero clearly posits judicial testimony as part of the data the court must rely upon, as opposed to discursive proofs, S. “Technical” and “Non-Technical”. According to the modern democratic concept of testimony, witnesses are in principle granted the same status; they and their statements are subject to the same critical examination. The ancient rhetorical concept of testimony is quite different. According to Cicero, in Roman court practice, the weight of a testimony is a priori proportional to the social authority granted to the witness.

For our present purpose, we define testimony as everything that is brought in from some external circumstance in order to gain conviction. Now it is not every sort of person who is worthy of consideration as a witness. To gain conviction, authority is sought; but authority is given by one’s nature or by circumstances. Authority from one’s nature or character depends largely on virtue; in circumstances there are many things which lend authority, such as talent, wealth, age, good luck, skill, experience, necessity, and even occasional fortuitous events. (Cicero, Top., XIX, 73; Hubbell, p. 439)

In this quotation, the mentioned “circumstances” include basic elements determining the social status of the witness. “Necessity” refers to testimony collected under duress and torture. The expression “fortuitous events” refers to emotional speech, emotion being considered a guarantee of truth.

In the Roman world, testimony was actually guaranteed not only by an in-depth examination of the witness and the alleged fact but also by the precise status of a witness, if a citizen, or by the amount of pain the witness could bear, if a slave. The use of torture to gain true information is now morally condemned, and practically recognized as an ineffective means to gather information, “Beer, cigarettes work better than waterboarding”[1].

The concept of testimony in ancient texts covers a wider field than personal testimony about a particular fact. Testimony can also guarantee principles, and in that case, the witnesses are “the ancient authors, the oracles, the proverbs, the sayings of the illustrious contemporaries” (Vidal 2000, p. 60).

3. Testimony in matters of faith

The capacity of truth to be more compelling than any kind of pain is inherent to the Christian tradition of martyrdom. The word martyr comes from the Greek word meaning witness; the martyr is a witness of the divine Word. Martyrdom is a kind of torture; truth is certified through torture. As Pascal states: “I believe those stories only, whose witnesses let themselves be slaughtered” (Thoughts, p. 117).

The validation of testimony through martyrdom leads to a paradox. In reality people have been tortured and killed for a variety of beliefs and values; Giordano Bruno for example is a “martyr of atheism”. The proposal must therefore be reversed, and, according to Saint Augustine’s saying, “it is not the penalty but the cause that constitutes a martyr.”[2] If the cause is bad (heresy), the “martyr” is an offender and has been punished as such.

Confession and testimony

Denials are weak arguments for innocence, but avowals are strong arguments for culpability. When it contradicts a denial, a testimony is believed over and above the denial. But consider the case of a person accusing himself or herself of a horrible murder but confronted with a testimony claiming that materially he or she cannot have committed the crime. The general question is whether avowals, confessions should be trusted over testimonies to the contrary?

Is witnessing reflexive? That is, can I bear witness of myself, of my own actions? The Evangelist John reports that Christ said no, “If I bear witness of Myself, My witness is not true.” (John 5:31)[3]; S. Relations, 2 Reflexivity.

Paradox of weak testimony

The Latin word testis means “witness” and “testicule”. In Roman culture, as in some contemporary cultures, testimony is the reserve of men; a woman’s testimony, if admitted at all, is considered weaker and less credible than that of a man. A single testimony from one man for example, is of equivalent value to that of several women. As a consequence, if a text claims only a woman’s testimony to certify a fact, it can be argued that this is indirect proof of the authenticity of that fact, for, if the fact were forged, the text would have claimed to be supported by a man’s testimony. This argument is developed from the Gospels, which, referring to the resurrection of Christ, mentions that women discovered the empty tomb. The cultural weakness of their testimony is taken to be indirect strong evidence for that fact.

[1] “Mattis to Trump: beer, cigarettes work better than waterboarding”. http://www.military.com/daily-news/2016/11/23/mattis-trump-beer-cigarettes-work-better-waterboarding.html (07-05-2017)

[2] Augustine, Second Discourse on Psalm 34. In St Augustine on the Psalms. Trans. and An. by S. Hegbin, and F. Korrigan, Vol. II, Ps. 30-37. New York & Mahwah: The Newman Press, p. 220.

[3] New King James Version (NKJV); Quoted after https://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=John+5%3A31&version=NKJV (05-05-2017)

1. The opposition “technical” / “non-technical”

Aristotle distinguishes between two instruments of persuasion, or rhetorical proof (pistis):

Of the modes of persuasion some belong strictly to the art of rhetoric and some do not. By the latter I mean such things as are not supplied by the speaker but are there at the outset — witnesses, evidence given under torture, written contracts, and so on. By the former I mean such as we can ourselves construct by means of the principle of rhetoric. (Rhet., I, 2; RR, p. 105)

Rhetoric is a technique, a “techne”, that is “a process that strives for perfection, occurring by means of the deliberate action of a human being” (Lausberg [1960] §1). That is why rhetorical proofs are called technical proofs (or artificial proofs), as opposed to non-rhetorical, or non-technical proofs (Lausberg [1960], § 351-426).

The distinction is made in relation to the judicial situation. “Technical” proofs are discursive, oratorical means of pressure.

“Non technical” proofs are proofs in the contemporary sense of the word. They correspond to the facts submitted to the court, the “given” material facts which the orator cannot manipulate, for example, the public declarations made by the witnesses, or the contracts signed between the two parties. The language of the contracts and the discourse of the witnesses is considered to be free from rhetoric, at least in their basic formulation, whilst the language of the orator is rhetorical, that is, endowed with an autonomous power of persuasion, if necessary, challenging material evidence, S. Pathos.

The technicaL vs. non-technical distinction bears on the three components of rhetorical action:

— Technical logos is defined by the use of topoi, signs, etc.; non-technical logos is defined by the parallel intervention of witnesses, contracts, etc.

— Technical ethos is a speech product, the self-made image of the orator embedded in discourse (Amossy 1999); non-technical ethos is the other-made image of the orator, something like his or her reputation, which can run counter to the first.

— The technical pathos is the strategic emotive communication, and the non-technical pathos corresponds to the spontaneous emotional communication, S. Emotion.

2. A now misleading terminology?

First and most importantly, this terminology is now opaque and counter-intuitive, incompatible with the contemporary use of the word “technical”.
“Non-technical” proofs are just proofs in the ordinary contemporary sense of the word.

All the elements called “non-technical” are the rough material submitted to the court. They may be practically sufficient to settle the issue definitively, yet, “[they] require, very frequently, to be supported or overthrown with the utmost force of eloquence” (Quintilian I. O., V, 2, 2). In other words, the speaker must interpret the testimonies, the content of the contract, the confessions, in order to transform this rough material into data, that is, to orient them towards a conclusion in favor of the party he represents. So, “non-technical proofs” are not free from language and rhetoric.

— The distinction is closely linked with judicial situations. Argumentation also deals with very different situations, such as, for example argumentation developing in everyday semi-technical discourse and presenting mixed kind of proofs. For these reasons, and to highlight terminological difficulties, in this book, the terms “technical” and “non-technical”, when used in their traditional rhetorical sense, are placed within quotation marks.

Such questions may seem somewhat irrelevant, but wrongly so. The opposition has a distinct structuralist nature, emotion, character, and situation being re-defined as discursive objects. This position has proven fruitful; nonetheless, it has its limits. The issue is the definition of the object of argumentation studies: should they be purely discursive data, and we shall then take into account only purely linguistic phenomenon, or contextualized interactional discourse, taking into account the situation and the ongoing collaborative actions?

3. “Non-technical” proofs

3.1 What are “non-technical” proofs

The “non-technical” evidence is the material, the factual elements, brought before the court. They define the issue structuring the debate, and may include elements such as, “witnesses, examinations, and like matters decide on the subject that is before the judges” (Quintilian, IO, V, 11, 44). They might receive a secondary rhetorical treatment, but their existence is beyond the reach of the rhetorician.

The list of non-technical evidence varies somewhat. Aristotle counts as non-technical, “witnesses, evidence given under torture, written contracts, and so on.” (Rhet, op. cit. supra). Quintilian counts as non-technical “precognitions, public reports, evidence extracted by torture, writings, oaths, and the testimony of witnesses, with which the greater part of forensic pleadings are wholly concerned”. (IO, V, 1, 2). Traditional lists include the following elements.

Precedent, authority, rumor

An important means of argument, appeal to authority, has sometimes been considered to be technical, sometimes to be non-technical. Different kinds of authority must be distinguished, and first, the authority of a judicial decision made by a judge recognized for his or her competence, and passed into judiciary custom; in other words, a precedent turned into a law. This is clearly a “given” of the judiciary situation, that is to say, a “non-technical” element. An authoritative statement can also be understood as (a declaration of) a socially recognized personality.

“Precognitions”, prejudices, rumors, public opinion is a form of authority, perhaps linked to the possibility of recourse to an appeal to the populus in Roman law, S. Ad populum.

Contract, written document

Whether or not a contract was signed is a fact, which may be decisive.

Material elements

Material elements, such as the murder weapon, or the bloody tunic of the victim, etc., all make up the judiciary hardware.

Oaths

Oaths guarantee the citizen’s declaration.

Testimony, torture

Taking into account “reports” obtained under torture is shocking, and reminds us that the old democracies and republics put up with slavery and torture. The Rhetoric to Herennius presents the basic arguments about the use of such reports. The first argument advocates that they be considered in court, the second that they be discounted:

We shall speak in favor of the testimony given under torture when we show that it was in order to discover the truth that our ancestors wished investigations to make use of torture and the rack and that men are compelled by violent pain to tell all they know […] Against the testimony given under torture, we shall speak as follows: In the first place our ancestors wished inquisitions to be introduced only in connection with unambiguous matters, when the true statement in the inquisition could be recognized and the false reply refuted; for example, if they sought to learn in which place an object was put, or if there was in question something like that which could be seen, or be verified by means of footprints, or be perceived by some like sign. We then shall say that pain should not be relied upon, because one person is less exhausted by pain, or more resourceful in fabrication than another, and also because it is often possible to know or divine what the presiding justice wishes to hear, and the witness knows that when he has said this his pain will be at an end. (Ad Her., II, VII, 10)

The list of “non technical” proofs might be extended by elements such as the following:

— For some cultures or persuasion, miracles can create a form of non-technical persuasion.

— In the early Middle Ages, the trial by ordeal, or God’s judgment, was also believed to establish the truth in a non-technical way: if the accused is able to pass through the fire more or less alive, he or she is acquitted; if he or she dies, the punishment proves the guilt.

— In contemporary times, it would be necessary to add the forensic proofs, for example the DNA tests. All these proofs would be typically called technical, in contrast with rhetorical or language-based argument.

3.2 Superiority of non-technical evidence

In current cases, the facts, documents, witnesses or material evidence, make it possible to solve the problem and settle the dispute:

When one of the parties had “non-technical” evidence, the case was clear for the judges, and needed only a few words. (Vidal 2000, p. 56).

Factual evidence is clearly essential in the judiciary, language playing of course an important role for the presentation and orientation of facts. Evidence produced by rhetorical arguments is used only when factual evidence is missing, for lack of anything better.

“Non-technical” evidence is paramount in actual judiciary decision. “Technical” evidence comes to the fore in rather special cases, when any legal document, any physical evidence, testimony, etc. is lacking. Such an exceptional situation is staged in the comical anecdote where Tisias opposes Corax. Corax has agreed to teach Tisias his rhetorical skills, and to be paid according to the results obtained by his student. If Tisias wins his first trial, he will pay his master; if he loses, he will have nothing to pay. After completing his studies, Tisias sues his master, claiming that he, Tisias, owes nothing to him, Corax. Indeed, this is Tisias first trial, and either he wins or he loses. First hypothesis, he wins; following the judge’s verdict, he owes nothing to his master Corax. Second hypothesis, he loses; in virtue of their private agreement, he owes Corax nothing. How can Corax meet this challenge? He repeats verbatim Tisias’ pattern of argument but in reverse. First hypothesis therefore Tisias wins the case; by private agreement, Tisias must pay. Second hypothesis, Tisias loses the case; by law, Tisias must pay for the education received. In both cases, Tisias must pay. It is said that the judges kicked out the litigants.

Rhetorical proofs, operating in a language having no contact with the world, are proofs by default. This is a borderline case, not a prototypical case of the argumentative rhetorical use of language, which, in general, operates with elements of reality and conventions that constrain its unbridled use.

To analyze an argumentative text or interaction means to tag them according to three main levels.

1. 1. Delineating the different sequences that compose the text or the interaction under analysis. Characterizing the type and degree of argumentativity of these sequences.
   2. For each argumentative sequence, determining the different lines of argument and their structures; the argument(s), the conclusion(s); the role of the counter-discourses, that is, the kind of mutual criticism and evaluation implemented by each argumentative line.
   3. Specifying the argument schemes.

The analysis of an argumentative sequence must be based on relatively objective criteria, that is to say defined as best as possible, stable and shareable ones, even if not always decisive. The analysis of an argumentative passage is an argumentative activity, whose claims can be criticized and must be justified.

In formal language, one would have markers, that is to say, univocal and automatically identifiable material elements that would allow us to hold discourses such as,

— Presence of marker(s) S: so, this passage is an argumentative sequence.
— Presence of marker(s) A: so, this segment is an argument.
— Presence of marker(s) C: so, this segment is a conclusion.
— Presence of markers T: the underlying argumentation scheme is of such and such a type.

Natural language arguments do not have such markers. Actual linguistic markers are systematically polysemic and polyfunctional. Their strictly argumentative function must be evaluated according to the context. It is as much the context that designates a marker as argumentative as the marker that designates the context as argumentative.

1. Delineating an argumentative sequence

1.1 Sequencing the language flow

At the most general level, if we postulate that language or speech are by nature argumentative the problem of identifying specific argumentative sequences does not arise. If we postulate that, within the macro language datum (text, interaction), only some sequences are more or less argumentative, these sequences must be cut out from the language flow.
A sequence is a relevant analytical unit. The argumentative passages that are exploited in textbooks as well as in scientific presentations, are the product of this first sequencing operation. Sequencing and subsequencing the language flow is, most of the time, a routine operation. The selection of relevant argumentative passages is nonetheless the first problem the analyst must confront, and theirchoice of giving such and such frontiers to the sequence under analysis should therefore be explicit and justified. The correct implementation of this operation supposes a foray into the broader domains of case and corpora building.

In classroom interactions, for example, the sequence, “problem resolution” is distinct from the sequence, “homework and instructions”. In a meeting, the sequence, “agenda setting” is distinct from the sequence “discussion and decision about agenda item 19”. For a participant, identifying the sequence simply means “knowing what we are presently doing”.

Sequences and subsequences of any kind can be defined externally by their boundaries and internally by their own structure and foreground activity.

— Externally, the boundaries of the sequence are transition points characterized by topic changes, by specific closing and opening formulas, and by a re-design of the interaction format.

— From the internal perspective, the sequence is defined by a type of linguistic activity, by a specific interaction format, and by a semantic-thematic coherence, which globally obeys a completion principle. Exactly what a complete sequence consists in depends on the kind of sequence envisaged; the internal principle of completeness of a problem resolution sequence is not the same as that of an agenda setting sequence.

1.2 Delineating argumentative sequences

Argumentative sequences are isolated according to the same internal and external criteria, argumentativity being their specific difference.
Argumentation can be the defining activity of the sequence. It follows that the sequence, “discussion and decision about agenda item n° 19” should normally be highly argumentative. The external boundaries of such an institutionalized argumentative sequence depends upon the rules of the institution.
Argumentation can be an emerging activity in every kind of sequence; for example, somebody disagrees or makes other suggestions during the presentation of the agenda. The left boundary (opening) of an emerging argumentative sequence is characterized by the concretization of an opposition into an argumentative question. The right boundary (closing) can be of any kind, and is sometimes easier to grasp when it is considered in contrast to the following sequence; for example, the Chair looks at the clock and says “Well, I suggest that you further discuss this very interesting point during the coffee break. Thanks for your participation”.

When dealing with a local issue, an argumentative situation may develop and close on the spot, possibly leaving no trace in the memory of the participants.
When dealing with a pre-existing question, such as a socio-scientific issue, the present discussion is just one episode in the larger development of the question as discussed in various settings and crystallized in a specific script. In this case, the question has a story and the sequence is only an episode, which will not close the file.

2. Re-composing argumentative lines: coalitions; argument(s), conclusion(s); criticism and counter-discourse

The internal structure of the argumentative sequence is characterized by the type and the density of the argumentative operations it articulates. Classical analytical points include the following:

— If the text is a multi-speaker interaction or a polyphonic monologue, the analyst must attribute their own to every participant, that is the positions they hold and the roles they play in the global dispute.
Positions are identified as the segment providing, or pointing to, an answer to the argumentative question. Experience shows that this apparently elementary task may be rather challenging.

— Once the exact content of the oppositions and positions has been determined, one can observe the systems of coalition of the relevant positions, as well as their evolution in the dispute.

— The positions being thus localized, one looks at how the surrounding discourse ties with the proposed conclusion-answer, that is to say one identifies the argument(s).
The Indicators of argumentative function, when available, help to identify the passage as an argument or a conclusion.

— The analysis of critical strategies implemented by the participants bears upon the different modalities of counter-discourse management: Direct repetition of other discourses, or evocations, reformulation, of these discourses, rebuttals of the opponents’ arguments. S. Destruction; Refutation; Objection.

— A most interesting point is the observation of the interactions between the the participants, not only the opponent-proponent interactions, but also their interactions with the third parties, and the public at large.

— Observations about the relation between the arguments developed on the spot by the participants and the general script attached to the question, when available, will be always very instructive.

— Further issues involve the global characterization of the argumentative line developed by key participants, as implementing such-and-such strategy.

3. Argument schemes

The argument scheme can be explicitly formulated in the passage as a general law. In order to identify it, one might look for generic statements, which generally function as good supports for the affirmation of values, principles or laws.
To decide upon the correct argumentation scheme, one must investigate whether there is an acceptable paraphrase relationship between the generic discourse corresponding to the argument scheme, and the actual current argumentative discourse under investigation (in classical terms, between the topos and the enthymeme); for a detailed example of this mapping. The operations needed to determine whether such an argument scheme is reflected in the actual argumentation depend heavily on the schema involved. The same concrete argumentative discourse may be matched by several, non-exclusive schemes.

The word syzygy is an adaptation of the Greek word meaning “conjunction”.
In astronomy, a syzygy occurs when three celestial bodies are aligned, like the sun, the earth and the moon during an eclipse of the Moon.

In the traditional Catholic exegesis, there is a syzygy correspondence between two beings, events, actions, when 1) they are not contemporaneous; 2) they bear a strong analogy; 3) and the first prefigures, signifies, or announces the second. The first, the precursor, is called the type and the second is termed the antitype.

The Old Testament introduces the Types, the New Testament presents the Antitypes (this vocabulary is specific, it has nothing to do with the model / anti-model perspective) :

“the Antitype not only repeats but completes and perfects the Type. […] Noah, Abraham, Moses … are “Types” of Christ” (Ellrodt 1980, 38).

The syzygy principle orders history and the world, and, as such, founds the syzygy argument, used to an ever greater extent to establish significant links between the two “Type vs. Antitype” spheres. It exploits the resources of structural nalogy, proportion and proportionality and a variant of the argument of progress: what comes before is analogous to, but has less being and substance than what comes after, in a two-state world.

A variant of the syzygy principle projects the mundane world, considered to be a Type, onto the after-life, or eternal world, its Antitype, where it finds its raison d’être.

The syzygy argument retains its pedagogical function, which is to give the believer an idea of future conditions: the Monarch is the Type, of which the Almighty Father is the Antitype.

For him [Man] also he [God] hath varied the figures of combinations [syzygies], placing before him small things first, and great ones afterwards, such as the world and eternity. But the world that now is, is temporary; that which shall be is eternal.
Clementine Homilies, 3^rd Century (disputed).[1]

Syzygy-like principles can still be used, maybe ironically, to back a historical analysis.

In France, on Brumaire 18th (November 9th), 1799, Napoleon Bonaparte engaged in a coup in order to establish his dictatorship. Half a century later, his nephew, Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte also seized power by force. Karl Marx comments as follows on the relation between these two coups:

Hegel makes this remark somewhat that all the great events and historical personages are repeated, so to speak, twice. He forgot to add: the first time as a tragedy, the second time as a farce […]. And we find the same caricature in the circumstances in which the second edition of the 18th Brumaire appeared.
Karl Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Napoleon, 1851.[2]

The principle, “history repeats itself the first time as a tragedy, the second time as a farce” is an inverted syzygy.

[1] Clementine Homilies. Edimburgh: Clark, 1870, p. 38 (Homily II, Chapter XV. Quoted after www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/anf08.html.

[2] Brumaire is the second month of the French Revolutionary Calender, corresponding to October-November; the Revolutionary year began in Autumn. “The second edition” is the nephew’s coup. Quoted after: www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/download/pdf/18th-Brumaire.pdf. P. 5. (09-20-2013)

The systemic argument is an overall argument, referring to a definition of a whole as a structure in which everything fits together perfectly.
Taken literally, this principle asserts that each element of the system takes its full meaning only in light of its relation to the other elements in the system, and that it must be interpreted and applied accordingly.
This applies to specific laws in collections of laws, as well as to statements and passages in sacred texts and literary masterpieces.

This broad principle covers a set of argumentative techniques appealing to:consistency,  completeness, economy, or (non-)Superfluity

The argument from title postulate that the text is locally coherent.

The application of the a pari, opposite, a fortiori, schemes depends upon the effective realization of these systemic requirements in the considered system.

In the case of law codes, the systematic aspiration is immediately confronted with the de-stabilizing, complex forces of social and historical evolutions.

In the Aristotelian world, the theory of the syllogism covers all reasoning, in science, dialectic or rhetoric. In science, this is in logic, the syllogism is defined as

an argument in which, certain things being laid down, something other than these necessarily comes about through them (Aristotle, Top., I, 1).

The classical syllogism is a discourse composed of three propositions, the “things being laid down” are the premises of the syllogism, and “something other than these necessarily comes about through them” is the conclusion.

Syllogistic inference involves two premises, while immediate inference is based upon one premise, S. Proposition.

The logic of the analyzed propositions concerns the conditions of validity of the syllogism. A valid syllogism is a syllogism such that, if its premises are true, necessarily its conclusion is true (the conclusion of a syllogism does not have to be a necessary truth, it’s a truth that follows necessarily from the premises). The premises of the syllogism cannot be true and its conclusion false.

In Aristotle’s words, the syllogism, is a “demonstration” “when the premises from which the reasoning starts are true and primary, or are such that our knowledge of them has originally come through premises which are primary and true” (ibid.).

1. Terms of the syllogism

The syllogism articulates three terms, the major term T, the minor term t and the middle term M:

— The major term T is the predicate of the conclusion.
The premise containing the great term T is called the major premise.

— The minor term t is the subject of the conclusion.
The premise containing the small term t is called the minor premise.

— The middle term M connects the major and the minor terms, and consequently disappears in the conclusion, which is of the form < t is T >.

2. Figures of the syllogism

The form of the syllogism varies according to the subject or predicate position of the middle term in the major and minor premise. There are four (maybe only three) possibilities, which constitute the four figures of the syllogism, S. Figures. For example, a syllogism where the middle term is subject in the major premise and predicate in the minor premise is a syllogism of the first figure:

Major Premise          M – T              man-reasonable
Minor Premise         t – M                horse-man
Conclusion               t – T                 horse-reasonable

3. Modes of the syllogism

The mode of the syllogism depends on the quantity of the three propositions which constitute the syllogism. A proposition may be universal or particular, affirmative or negative, giving a total of four possibilities.

Each of these four possibilities for the major premise may combine with a minor premise, also admitting four possibilities, to give a conclusion that also admits four possibilities, totaling 4 x 4 x 4 = 64 forms.

Moreover, each of these forms admits the four figures, making all together 256 modes. Some of these modes are valid, others are not.

For example, the first figure of the syllogism corresponds to the case where, a universal conclusion derives from two universal premises. This deduction corresponds to the valid mode:

Major Premise             All human are reasonable
Minor Premise             All Greeks are human
Conclusion                   All Greeks are reasonable

This mode is known as Barbara, where the vowel a marks that the major, minor and conclusion are universal, S. Proposition.

4. Example: the conclusive modes of the first figure

Syllogistic deductions are clearly exposed in the language of set theory.

— Two (non-empty) sets are disjointed if their intersection is empty; they have no elements in common.
— The two sets intersect if they have some elements in common.
— One set is included in the other if all the elements of the first set also belong to the second set.

In what follows, M reads as “set M”, similarly for P and S. The first figure of the syllogism admits four conclusive modes.

A – A – A syllogism

A          every M is P
A          all S are M
A          hence all S are P.

A – I – I syllogism

A          every M is P
I           some S are M
I           hence some S are P

E – A – E syllogism

E          no M is P
A          all S are M
E          therefore no S is P

E – I – O syllogism

E          no M is P
I           some S is M
O          therefore some S is not P

These forms of basic reasoning used in categorization.

5. Evaluation of syllogisms

S. Paralogisms

6. Syllogisms with premise(s) having a concrete subject

The preceding definitions correspond to the traditional (Aristotelian) categorical syllogism, bearing on quantified variables. The word syllogism is also used to refer to a form of reasoning where one premise has a concrete subject. A concrete subject is a subject referring to a unique single individual, by means of various expressions such as this, this being, Peter, the N who.

Syllogisms instantiating a universal proposition are examples of such syllogisms. These assign to an individual the properties of the class to which he or she belongs:

the x are B
this is an x
this is B

The following type of reasoning is based on two concrete propositions can also be called, rather metaphorically, “syllogistic”. It refutes universal propositions such as “all swans are white”:

This is a swan      the proposition refers to a concrete individual
This is black         the proposition attach a property to the same individual
Applied to the same subject, “being black” and “being white” are opposite predicates
Therefore the claim “all the swans are white” is false

7. Syllogistic forms with more than two premises

By extension, one also calls a syllogism an argument based on several arguments either linked, convergent, or again having the form of an epicheirema.

A chain of propositions where the syntactic form and mode of linking more or less mimic those of a syllogism may also be called a syllogism, S. Expression.

The famous syllogism “everything rare is expensive, a cheap horse is a rare thing, so a cheap horse is expensive” is developed on the basis of two contradictory premises, so it is normal that its conclusion be absurd.

Argument ab inutilitate (legis); Lat. utilitas “utility, interest”, lex “law”; argument of uselessness (of the law).

The argument of the superfluity of the law is a matter of legal logic, S. Juridical Argument. As it is based on the principle of legislative economy, it is also referred to as the economy argument, or from uselessness argument.
This argument presupposes that the code is drawn as a system, so that none of its dispositions paraphrases another. The code is supposed to be laconic. So, an interpretation of a law that would make another law redundant, so superfluous, must be rejected: “Under interpretation I, passage A becomes equivalent to passage B, which then becomes redundant and useless. We must therefore favor an alternative interpretation of passage A”. This is a form of argumentation from the absurd (undesirable consequences). The new interpretation will be sought, for example, in the intention of the legislator.

By extension, the argument of the superfluity of the law applies to cases where the application of a law presupposes a state of fact. If entrance to a nightclub is denied to teenagers under 16, there is no need for a law prohibiting selling or serving alcohol to them in these places. Legislation on this would be superfluous.
But if it is forbidden to sell alcohol to people under 16, they might can freely attend these institutions; otherwise the law prohibiting the consumption of alcohol would be superfluous.

Let us assume that a regulation prohibits participants from voting on matters of direct concern to them. The question then is whether the participants can take part in discussions about these issues? Should it be specified in the regulation that their presence in the assembly is authorized?

— Argument by the superfluity of the regulation: Yes, they can participate. No, there is no need for a specific provision. Suffice it to observe that to vote one must be a member of the assembly; if you are forbidden to vote, it is precisely because you are part of the assembly. If you were not in the assembly, then it would be superfluous to forbid you to vote. No further clarification is needed.

— Argument “things which go without saying are better said”: so, let’s introduce the provision, “all those concerned do not take part in the vote but participate in the discussion sessions on the questions concerning them”. The new regulation is safer. In the first case, the price to pay is a subtle semantic inference; in the second, a slight redundancy.

Economy principle applied to sacred texts

The principle of economy applies to sacred texts. Consider the problem of the application of the scheme of the opposite to a prescription expressed as: “do not do this under such and such circumstances”. In ordinary cases, the application of the rule of the opposite leads to the conclusion that: “outside of these circumstances, you can do it”.

Sometimes the Koranic text explicitly mentions the opposite case (Khallâf,1942; Koran, 4-23), according to the scheme:

Do not do this under such and such conditions. Out of these conditions, do so.

Whereas in other cases, the contrary is not explicit:

Do not do this under such and such conditions.

The question in this second case is thus whether one can appeal to the scheme of the opposite to complete the text? If one adds “under other circumstances, do it!”, the literal precision given in the first case is rendered useless. If it is assumed that the Sacred Text is perfect, it expresses nothing useless or superfluous. In this case, nobody has the right to add to it, and to conclude anything about what to do or not to do.

The supreme legislator remaining silent, the judge’s decision will be founded on tradition, or on some other recognized source of legislation.