FALLACY 1: CONTEMPORARY APPROACHES
1. Fallacy: The word
1.1 The Latin word fallacia
Etymologically, the noun fallacy and the adjective fallacious come from the Latin fallacia, which means “deception,” referring to a “trick”, or even a “spell”. This deception can be defined as a verbal deception, as expressed by the adjective fallaciloquus, “[he] who deceives by words, cunning” (Gaffiot [1934], Fallaciloquus). The corresponding verb fallo, fallere means “to deceive someone”, and according to the context, “to disappoint someone’s expectations, to betray the word given to the enemy, to break one’s promise” (id., Fallo).
These meanings show that etymologically the word fallacy does not refer to a logical or dialectical error, but to an interactional manipulation.
1.2 Paralogism, sophism, fallacy
The word fallacy has at least two meanings. On the one hand, the very general meaning of “erroneous belief, false idea” (Webster, Fallacy). On the other hand, it refers to an “invalid” argument or reasoning, the conclusion of which does not follow from the premises, and which may therefore be misleading or deceptive (ibid.).
As an ordinary word, there is no guarantee that fallacy refers to a unique stable, highly interconnected domain of reality that can be systematized. It is not a priori obvious that fallacies can be theorized more coherently than, say, deceptions, blunders or carelessness, to name just a few relatively close terms.
Paralogism has a precise and limited technical use, where it refers to a formally invalid syllogism. The term is of little use outside this specialized field.
Sophism refers to a deliberately misleading discourse, using paralogism or some other maneuver. This imputation of bad intent is not necessarily present when one speaks of paralogism or fallacious discourse.
2. Hamblin, Fallacies, 1970
Hamblin revived the aristotelian theory of fallacies in his book, Fallacies (1970). Just as Perelman revived ancient rhetoric, or rhetorical argumentation, from Aristotle’s Rhetoric, Hamblin reactivated the other Aristotelian source of argumentation as a critical theory from the Topics and the Sophistical Refutations. According to Hamblin, the study of argumentation developed as a critique of bad reasoning, fallacious and specious arguments.
The theories of Argumentation within Language or Natural Logic do not approach the critical question. The New Rhetoric proposes an ideal critical instance, the universal audience, in a different perspective from that generally implemented in fallacy theories.
Hamblin offers the following definition of fallacy. Note that this conceptual definition parallels to the lexicographical definition given above.
Fallacy1 — The common meaning of “erroneous belief” is rejected by Hamblin: “A fallacy is a fallacious argument. […] In one of its ordinary uses, of course, the word ‘fallacy’ means little more than ‘false belief’; but that use does not concern us.” (1970, p. 224; italics in the text).
Hamblin adds that, “there are several kinds of fallacies, or certain fallacies which have been given special names, but which are not really logical fallacies at all, but merely false beliefs” (id., p. 48; italics in the text). In this sense, the word corresponds to a “false concept”, which may itself be deceptive, S. Expression.
Fallacy2 — In this second sense, the word fallacy denotes the counterfeit of an argument [1]:
A fallacious argument, as almost every account from Aristotle onwards tells you, is one that seems to be valid but is not so. (Id.., p. 12)
This definition raises several questions, the first of which being:
What it is for an argument to seem valid? The term ‘seems’ looks like a psychological one, and has often been passed over by logicians, confirmed in the belief that the study of fallacies does not concern them. (Id.., p. 253)
Following Frege, mathematicians have de-psychologized logic. Axiomatized logic is no longer a theory of thought. From this point of view, truth is one, and if error is multiple, it is precisely because it is related to psychology. There is no logical theory of error. In short, a fallacious argument is an argument or reasoning that seems valid to a careless or untrained reader; it is the reader who has a problem.
In the definition of a “fallacious argument” given above, Hamblin uses the word « argument », to refer to a fallacious argumentation (argument + conclusion) since he speaks of validity. in English however, the word argument can also refer to an argumentation by metonymy part / whole, . A fallacy1 is an “erroneous belief” that can obviously serve as a premise for an argumentation. Since ordinary argumentation requires the truth of the arguments, an argumentation based on a false premise (argument) is legitimately considered to be fallacious; this is an authentic fallacy2. In other words, from this fallacious argument due to a false belief, derives a fallacious2 argumentation, a fallacy2. “To appear true or valid”, “to look honest, solid, admissible, credible” is a property common to argument (premises) and argumentations. There is no difference between the former and the latter that would enable us to reject one without necessarily rejecting the other. Like argumentation, fallacious argumentation is a unitary phenomenon, both substantively and formally
The lexical / conceptual distinction between substantive fallacies (fallacy1) and formal fallacies (fallacies2) is generally taken up in the theory of argumentation, as in the following text:
Assumptions, principles, and ways of looking at things are sometimes called fallacies. Philosophers have spoken of the naturalistic fallacy, the genetic fallacy, the pathetic fallacy, the fallacy of misplaced concreteness, the descriptive fallacy, the intentional fallacy, the affective fallacy, and many more. And outside of philosophy, we also hear sophisticated people using the term ‘fallacy’ to characterize things which are neither arguments nor substitutes for arguments. For example, the China expert Philip Kuhn speaks of the hardware fallacy. This, according to him, is the mistaken assumption common among Chinese intellectuals that China can import Western science and technology without importing with it Western (i.e., decadent) values as well. (Fogelin, Duggan 1987, pp. 255-256)
The distinction between form and substance is not easy to maintain. For example, the genetic fallacy, given here as an example of “a way of looking at things”,i.e., a substantive fallacy (fallacy1) can be seen as referring to an argumentation (fallacy2) that evaluates beings and things according to their origin, and which Hamblin admits in his list of authentic formal fallacies.
3. Lists of fallacies
In the chapter entitled “Standard Treatment”, Hamblin proposes four lists of fallacies.
— Aristotle’list in the Sophistical Refutations, see fallacy (2).
— The fallacies or arguments ad —, a list of modern fallacies, designated by Latin labels of this form, see ad — arguments.
— The syllogistic paralogisms.
— The fallacies of scientific method.
Under this last heading Hamblin suggests the following six cases:
— The fallacy of simplism or pseudo-simplicity, (id., p. 45) according to which the simplest explanation is necessarily the best.
— The fallacy of exclusive linearity (ibid.), which assumes that a set of factors is ordered according to a strictly linear progression. The fallacy of linearity neglects the existence of thresholds and breaks in the development of phenomena. This is an extrapolation fallacy: for example, the conductivity of a metal or a solution decreases steadily and then drops abruptly as the temperature approaches absolute zero.
— The genetic fallacy (ibid.), which ostracizes an idea or a practice on the basis of its source or origin: “This is exactly what the Bad Guys Group says”, see authority.
— The fallacy of invalid induction (iibd., p. 46), see Induction; Example.
— The fallacy of insufficient statistics (ibid.).
— The fallacy of hasty generalization (ibid.), which may correspond to the fallacy of accident or induction.
— The naturalistic fallacy (id., p. 48). Moore defines this fallacy of valuing the “natural” as follows:
To argue that a thing is good because it is “natural,” or bad because it is “unnatural,” in these common senses of the term, is therefore certainly fallacious; and yet such arguments are very frequently used. (Moore, 1903, §29; italics in the original)
This amounts to saying that the word natural has a generally positive argumentative orientation, but not for the author’s group. The naturalistic fallacy goes hand in hand with a range of reciprocal fallacies, named after the antonyms of “natural”: culturalist fallacy, etc. see orientation.
Fogelin (see above) adds:
— The descriptive fallacy, a form of the fallacy of expression, see expression.
— The fallacy of misplaced concreteness. Whitehead introduced this term in the field of the philosophy of science, to denote the error of forgetting the distinction between the model and reality, and more generally between words and things.
— The intentional fallacy, is invoked in literary analysis, to condemn the interpretation of a work based on the intentions attributed to the author. It should be noted that, conversely, in the field of law, the argument based on the intentions of the legislator is recognized as perfectly valid.
— The emotional and pathemic fallacies, see emotion; pathos; pathetic fallacy
Many of these so-called fallacies treat scientific language as the norm of ordinary language, and present ordinary arguments as unsatisfactory scientific arguments.
4. Informal Logic and Pragma-Dialectic
Sicen the 1970s, following Hamblin, the literature on fallacies has developped considerably especially within the theoretical frameworks of Informal Logic and Pragma-Dialectic. These works have clearly emphasized the need to systematically take into account the pragmatic conditions under which ordinary language reasoning operates.
In the Informal Logic framework, Woods and Walton represent the first generation to follow on from Hamblin. They questioned the logical and pragmatic conditions for the validity of ordinary arguments (Woods and Walton 1989, 1992). Woods (2013) focuses on “errors of reasoning”, and insists on the necessity of formalism (Woods 2004). Walton, in particular, has developed and systematized a new vision of argument schemes including their “rebuttal factors” (Walton & al., 2008). Argumentation is thus defined as a default reasoning process, that is both consistent with Toulmin’s approach and goes beyond it, see layout of argument.
This development of a counter-discourse-based critique of argumentation differs from the rule-based critique of argumentation developed by the pragma-dialectical school. The pragma-dialectical orientation can be read as follows, “If you want your discussion to progress toward a decent solution, you had better follow such and such a procedure and avoid such and such counterproductive, i.e., fallacious, maneuvers”. The felicity conditions of the argumentative exchange depends on the observance of ten rules.
In principle, each of these ten rules of discussion constitutes a separate and distinct standard or norm for critical discussion. Any violation of one or more of the rules, wo matter which party commits it and at what stage of the discussion, is a possible threat to the resolution of a disagreement, and must therefore be considered an improper discussion move. In the pragma-dialectical approach, fallacies are analyzed as such improper discussion moves in which a discussion rule has been violated. A fallacy is then defined as a speech act that prejudices or frustrates efforts to resolve a difference of opinion and the use of the term “fallacy” is thus systematically linked with the rules of critical discussion. (van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 1995, no pag.)
5. Methodological remarks
Natural argumentation develops in contexts where the question of truth is suspended. It can also arise when a decision has to be made urgently, even if not all the necessary information is available.
The desire to resolve a dispute rationally is the manifestation of a specific and legitimate desire, which is obviously not a prerequisite for argumentation. One can also argue in order to resolve the dispute for one’s own benefit, at any cost, to put an end to the matter; or to uphold the truth, or to protect one’s interests; to spread one’s emotions, to satisfy one’s ego, to fill one’s time, for pleasure…
One may also be interested not in resolving the disagreement but in deepening it. For example, if a new problem has just arisen, it may be more productive and rational, to articulate the problem properly, rather than trying to eliminate it prematurely.
There are interesting arguments, that contain a part of the truth, the whole truth being unknown and not entirely in one camp. On the other hand, a speaker may present a weak or even doubtful argument, in an exploratory way, while explicitly emphasizing its uncertain character. It is therefore impossible to introduce a definition of fallacies based on truth and validity as a single regulatory ideal for all argumentative situations.
5.1 Discursive atomism
In order to criticize an argument, the analyst must first delineate the discursive passage in which the argument is intuitively seen. This basic operation must itself be technically justified, see tagging; indicators. On the other hand, the quality of the argument must be assessed in relation to the argumentative question on which it depends, including the replicas introduced by opponents, see stasis; question; relevance.
2. The arbiter is also a player
The diagnosis of fallacy is supposed to be made by the logician who has the role of fulfilling “meta” function of the evaluator’s in a neutral and objective way. That is, he must perform this role as if he had no interest in the controversial issue, but only in correcting the discourse evaluated according to a priori rules and principles. As Hamblin points out, this position is untenable in the case of “actual practical argument’, (1970, p. 244), see norms; rules; evaluation. The evaluators of social arguments are by no means excluded from the argument; they are also participants among many others.
3. Natural language cannot be eliminated
These elements — an atomistic approach, an arbiter above the fray, reinforced by a strong reductionist tendency —, are all present in the practical advice with which the Encyclopedia of Philosophy concludes its entry on fallacies:
As Richard Whately remarked “…a very long discussion is one of the most effective veils of Fallacy: … a Fallacy which when stated barely… would not deceive a child, may deceive half the world if diluted in a quarto volume.” (Elements of Logic, p. 151). Consequently, an important weapon against fallacy is condensation, extracting the substance of the argument from a mass of verbiage. But this device too has its dangers; it may produce oversimplification, that is, the fallacy a dicto secundum quid, of dropping relevant qualification. When we suspect a fallacy, our aim must be to discover exactly what the argument is; and, in general the way to do this is first to pick out its main outlines, and then to take into account any relevant subtleties or qualifications. (Mackie 1967, p. 179; italics in the original).
Even if one were to agree with this method, the problem of implementing the proposed solution would remain unresolved, since nothing is said about how to deal with natural language and speech, which is somewhat contradictorily regarded as both an insubstantial and a malignant medium.
Natural language, the common vehicle of argument, is accused of dissolving logic into meaningless verbiage that serves to conceal unsavory human interests. Thus, a sustained war against language would be the price to be paid for a correct determination of sound arguments, that is, for the elimination of fallacies, or, to put it plainly, a replacement of ordinary language in all its ordinary functions by some formal language, yet to be discovered.
Moreover, it may be noted that natural language is to natural reasoning what air resistance is to the flight of the “light dove”:
The light dove, in free flight cutting through the air the resistance of which it feels, could get the idea that it could do even better in airless space. Likewise, Plato abandoned the world of the senses because it posed so many hindrances for understanding, and dared to go beyond it on the wings of ideas, in the empty space of pure understanding. (Kant, [1781], p. 129).
Natural language is not an obstacle, but the condition of ordinary argumentation.
4. The diagnosis of fallacy as an argumentative issue
The criticism of arguments does not escape argumentation. First, the diagnosis of fallacy must be justified. This justified diagnosis is only one move in a longer game, not the final move, not the final charge. In a subsequent move, the so-called “fallacious arguer” can exercise his right of reply, and try to refute the charge of fallacy.
And this reply may itself be challenged, and there is no inner rule as to who closes the game.
[1] To use a title from W. Ward Fearnside & William B. Holther (1959). Fallacy: The Counterfeit of Argument, cited in Hamblin 1970. P. 11.