CIRCUMSTANCES
Three types of arguments use the concept of circumstance:
— The fallacy of omitting the relevant circumstances, a criticism addressed to an argument.
— The argument from circumstances or circumstancial argument.
In the phrase “circumstantial ad hominem”, the circumstances alluded to are the characteristics of the person involved in an ad hominem argument.
1. Fallacy of omission of relevant circumstances
The fallacy of omitting relevant circumstances is sometimes referred to by the Latin label secundum quid fallacy, which abbreviates the phrase a dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter, “from a restricted statement to an absolute statement”.
Aristotle classifies the fallacy of omitting relevant circumstances as a type of fallacy “independent of language” (Soph. 4; 165b20; see Fallacy (2), which occurs when an expression is used “absolutely or in a certain respect” (Soph. 5; 166b35):
“If < what is not is the object of an opinion >, then < what is not is >” (ibid.; our emphasis and parentheses).
“What is not is the object of an opinion” is a semantically complete, syntactically integrated utterance, a meaningful unique and complete speech act [1]. All its components are necessary and interdependent; none can be subtracted without changing what the speaker said and meant, and he said one thing.
It is not possible to extract from this complete utterance any arbitrarily chosen segment (here, « the object of an opinion”), as long as it makes some sense, and attribute the truncated segment (here, “what is not is”) to the speaker of the former statement.
Such considerations are crucial when in determining what constitutes an elementary well-formed linguistic formula.
Other examples: the qualified expression “A is (Place, Time)”, “A is here now” can be transformed into the corresponding unqualified expression “A is (Place)”, “A is here”.
Conversely, the unqualified construction “Peter crossed the street” cannot be developed into “Peter crossed the street yesterday”. Note that the reduction of this last sentence to Peter crossed the street is not fallacious.
This kind of de-contextualization of a qualified statement can lead to bad faith criticism:
S1: — The weather is fine! (said in the morning, when the weather is fine).
S2: — Ah hah! And you said that the weather is fine! (said in the evening, when it is raining).
This fallacy ignores relevant contextual data, and treats as an absolute assertion what has been asserted with reservation, in a particular context, with precise reference and intention. This radicalization of claims and positions makes them very easy to refute.
In order be relevant, the refutation must refer precisely to the expression as it is used, and consider all the reservations that are specifically mentioned. The fallacy is particularly pernicious when it pretends that the speaker had said and assumed something that he said only in the course of a discussion as a concession to the opponent.
Prime Minister: — Our country cannot absorb all the misery of the world (S1) but it must take its share (S2).
Political Opponent: — As Mr. Prime Minister said, we cannot welcome all the misery of the world.
The opponent maximized the Minister’s position — The Minister agrees to reject the maximalist position — He reaffirms his non-maximalist position — The opponent unreservedly reaffirms his maximalist position which he attributes to the Minister, without mentioning the Minister’s real position.
In Goffman’s words, in statement S1 the Prime Minister speaks as an Animator, quoting an unknown Principal, whom he opposes; whereas he speaks as the Principal of S2, taking full responsibility for the content and actions, intentions and consequences of what S2 means, S. Roles.
The opponent makes him speak as Principal of S1. The opponent, who is in favor of closing the borders, makes an ally of the Prime Minister who actually rejects his or her position.
2. Argument from circumstances
Argument from circumstances indirectly establishes the existence of a fact, by using peripheral, unnecessary indices of an action that have no real probative value, but nevertheless point to a fact:
Question: — Is he corrupt?
Prosecutor: — Sure. He needed money; we saw him receiving thick envelopes; and yesterday, he bought a brand new car.
Argument by circumstances can help to solve a conjectural question, see stasis, such as “Did he commit this crime?” (Cicero, Top., XI, 50; p. 82). To answer this question, one “[looks] for the circumstances that preceded the fact, that accompanied it, that followed it” (Cicero, ibid; XI, 51, p. 83), interpreting “a date […] the shadow of a body […] pallor… and other indications of trouble and remorse” (id., XI, 53, p. 83). This is part of the technique of investigation:
“He went out muttering…: this is to argue from what precedes the act; we saw him stealing behind a bush…: this is what accompanies it. […] a malicious joy, which he endeavored to conceal, appeared on his face, mingled with terror: which is what follows.”
Bossuet [1677], p. 140, see. Collections (III)
These observed circumstances are probable natural signs.
The argument from circumstances is a powerful instrument in the art of suspicion and the construction of a culprit.
3. Terminological delicacy
On §53 of the Topics Cicero deals with arguments drawn from “consequences, antecedents and contradictory things [ex consequentibus et antecedentibus et repugnantibus]” (Top., XI, 53: 83).
This paragraph deals with logical antecedents and consequences, involving semantically “necessary” connections (id.), referring to questions of a priori and a posteriori reasoning, definition, rules of implication and to the principle of non-contradiction.
Bossuet speaks, in connection with the argument by circumstances, speaks of places “derived from what precedes, from what accompanies and from what follows [the action], ab antecedentibus, ab adjunctis, a consequentibus” ([1677], p.140). Here, the connection of the preceding and subsequent events to the central event is no longer semantic or logical but purely chronological.
[1] Empedocles, for example, argues that « from nothingness nothing can absolutely come into existence and what is cannot perish. »
[2] The change of preposition – ex antecedentibus for the logical consequence and the necessary connection vs. ab antecedentibus for temporal anteriority has nothing to do with this distinction