CRITICISM, RATIONALITIES, RATIONALISATION
1. Rationalities
In the modern and contemporary world, scientific rationality, based on experience and shaped by mathematics has taken the upper hand in the current vision of rationality. Scientific discourse is seen as the prototype of rational discourse, while argumentation is seen as the instrument of reason as reasonableness in human affairs. This position has been strongly reasserted by Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca ([1958]), S. Persuade, convince; Persuasion.
Ordinary discourse in action embodies different kinds of rationalities.
Rationality as common sense — Rationality as common sense can be defined as the art of thinking according to the rules and intuitions embodied in traditional logic and adapted to social needs through rhetorical argumentation. As a scientific concept, this vision of rationality has been shaken to its foundations by the development of axiomatic thought, as exemplified by non-Euclidean geometries or by the invention of the imaginary unit i, such as i2 = −1. In the human sciences, the Freudian invention of the unconscious and the development of studies on ideologies and social determinism, have most certainly challenged the vision of a sovereign subject transparent to itself and consciously in control of its calculations, intentions, discourses and actions. This double crisis directly affects the classical vision of the rational well-intentioned rhetorical speaker.
Rationality as the adaptation of a conduct to a goal — Rationality as the adaptation of behaviour to a goal covers all forms of action guided by a script, a recipe or a pre-established conventional plan. For example, to make a good custard, it is more rational to pour the hot milk over the eggs than to put the eggs in the hot milk, so that the cream is more homogeneous. This principle of rationality merges with the requirement of consistency between action and goal. It is exploited by all forms of refutation that reveal a contradiction in the opponent’s ideas and actions see Ad hominem; Consistency. Since it is human to pursue several goals simultaneously, the resulting practical rationality is constantly destabilised.
Rationality as the adaptation of an action to a goal is compatible with crime. The Marquis de Sade is an excellent arguer. Hence the possibility of delirious and despotic rationalities serving equally perverse ends.
Rationality in relation to a domain — Rationality depends on domains. A given behaviour (with or without a linguistic component) is said to be rational if it conforms to recognised practices in the relevant domain, technical field, scientific paradigm or tradition of thought, see Rules.
Democratic rationality — Democratic rationality is a quality of societies and groups where information is accessible; where free and contradictory examination of socio-political positions and oppositions can develop with a view to effective decision-making; where there is a right of reply; and where the safety of the opponents is ensured. It is a form of society in which the holders of legal power and violence are held accountable for their use.
If the above conditions are to be expressed as a set of rules, they will have to be hierarchical and context-sensitive in order to integrate different genres and practices of rationality
2. Discursive and argumentative rationality
Linguistic rationality — From a linguistic point of view, discourse is considered rational if it is well constructed, if it is understandable, if the speaker can explain it, and if it makes sense in relation to the problem discussed or the task under way.
The paradoxes that arises in an argumentative situation driven by a question is that each of the competing discourses taken in isolation makes sense, but, taken together, they become contradictory. To distinguish between these answers, argumentation theorists need a criterion, that is stronger than meaning, and, to this end, introduce the notion of rational or reasonable discourse into their models. The different families of argumentation theories can be associated with different conceptions of rationality.
Discourse rationality and discourse types — Argumentative discourse is not the only container of discourse rationality. There is not one, but several discursive rationalities: argumentative rationality, narrative rationality, descriptive rationality, and so on. Irrationality manifests itself in incoherent and delirious narratives, descriptions or prescriptions; in any ill-conceived installation diagram that can be called irrational, because it is useless.
Rational discourse and effective rhetoric — Effective rhetoric, focused on persuading an actual, relevant audience is a case of goal-adaptive rationality. It is compatible with verbal and non-verbal manipulation.
Rational discourse as justified and revised discourse — The definition of rational discourse as a justified discourse develops the idea that a discourse is rational-reasonable insofar as its claim is not asserted on the basis of individual certainty, but is openly supported by other propositions, using some kind of public data linked to the claim by some recognised, albeit fragile rule. Its rationality increases when it shows its weaknesses and suggests the directions to be taken to improve it; as Bachelard says, there is no truth, only rectified errors. The Toulminian layout meets these requirements: the Claim is based on Data, according to a Warrant, itself supported by a Backing, and duly Qualified. The critical instance is represented by its trace, the Rebuttal, which indicates the possible points of refutation.
The practice of dialogue, whether at a distance or face to face, can be seen as the exercise of the critical function of language. A speech is more rational when it has been duly criticised, that is, when it has survived a series of contradictory encounters. Criticising does not mean “denigrating” or “rejecting”, but “passing judgement”, positive or negative, on an activity. Observation of the data shows that the partners involved in an argument spend a lot of time evaluating their partner’s arguments (Finocchiaro 1994, p. 21). Argumentative speech is evaluated in a meta-discourse, produced under any conditions, face to face or at a distance in space and in time. Any approach to argumentative discourse that is concerned with empirical adequacy must take this critical dimension into account.
For the New Rhetoric, arguments are evaluated by the participants in the rhetorical event; the rationality of an argument increases with the number and quality of the interested and competent listeners who accept it. The development of human rationality is seen as an evolution from a particular to a universal audience, see Persuasion.
The dialogue models of argumentation place critical activity at the centre of their concerns. Pragma-Dialectic and Informal Logic develop a critique of argumentation based on the notion of fallacy. To detect fallacies, pragma-dialectics uses a system of rules, while informal logicians use the technique of critical questions. S. Paralogism; Sophism; Fallacy; Norm; Rules; Evaluation
3. Rational argumentation, as a “dream of language”
Anscombre’s and Ducrot’s theory of argumentation within language and Grize’s natural logic make no commitment to rationality; they are not irrational but a-rational. Since every discourse is argumentative, the idea of correcting a discourse in order to improve its argumentativity or its rationality makes no sense. These theories are only concerned with the fact that to be rational a discourse must first be meaningful, see Schematization; Orientation.
The Argumentation within language theory proposes a radical critique of the ability of discourse to achieve any kind of rationality. Conclusions are seen as mere semantic developments of the arguments, the argumentation process being driven by the linguistic orientations of the utterances; the discourse develops according to the orientations of natural language, denounced as biases by fallacy theories, in search of a referential, neutral, objective language. In the language of fallacies, this amounts to saying that argumentation in natural language is necessarily circular, i.e., fallacious. It follows that argumentation as a rational process is a “dream of discourse” (Ducrot 1993, p. 234). Following to this metaphor, the rational claim of argument (as found, for example, in Perelman) is seen as a “rationalisation of the dream”, and the criticism of the argumentation, as a “criticism of the dream”, whereas dreams can only be exposed and interpreted as such. see Demonstration.
4. Rationality and rationalisation
Psychoanalysis uses the terms rationalisation or intellectualisation to refer to discursive constructions that are claimed to be rational by the subject in an attempt to explain his or her actions, representations, feelings, symptoms or delirium. Psychoanalysis rejects such reconstructions because the subject has no conscious intellectual access to their true source (Laplanche and Pontalis, 1967, art. [Rationalisation]):
Whenever possible, [the ego] tries to stay in good terms with the id; it dresses up the unconscious commands of the id with its preconscious rationalisations […] In its position halfway between the id and reality, it all too often yields to the temptation to become sycophantic, opportunistic and lying, like a politician who sees the truth but wants to keep his place in the popular favour. (Freud [1923], p. 55).