DISSENSUS

Rhetorical argumentation focuses on persuasion, adherence, communion, consensus, co-construction… These terms sound a lot like moral exhortations, “don’t be different, be the same”; and it’s hard to disagree with the principle of agreement. The emphasis on persuasion and consensus suggests that unanimity would be the normal, healthy state of society, as opposed to the temporarily pathological states of controversy or dissent.

1. The passion for dissent as sin and fallacy

Passion for dissent characterizes polemical exchange; verbal violence is not associated with controversy as it is with polemics. Emotional dramatization and personal involvement are clearly expressed in the speech acts that open the polemical debate: to rise up against, to be outraged, to protest … When it comes to emotional repercussions, controversy and polemic can hurt the feelings of the parties.
The polemicist refuses to close the debate, and allow the other party’s argument to prevail, even if it is the stronger argument. This refusal to yield to the other’s argument is constitutive of the paralogism of obstinacy, stigmatized by Rule 9 of critical discussion, which requires the proponent to bow before a conclusive argument (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 2004, p. 195; see Rules). But who says that the position has been convincingly defended? The polemicist refuses to admit that the point of view his or her opponent’s point of view has been conclusively defended, and claims that the truth of his position is beyond reasonable doubt. As a last resort, he may  appeal to intimate conviction, as a means of preserving a threatened identity.

The condemnation of argumentativeness and polemics has deep historical roots. In the Middle Ages, contentio was considered as a sin of the tongue, see Fallacies as Sins.

Contentio is a war of words. It may be a defensive war waged by a stubborn individual, who refuses to change his position without reason. But contentio most often manifests itself as a display of aggression in one of many forms. It can be an unnecessary verbal attack against one’s neighbor, the purpose of which is not to seek the truth, but simply to manifest aggression (Aymon); a quarrel that, abandoning any search for truth, gives rise to disputes and goes as far as blasphemy (Isidore); an ingenious and malicious argument that goes against the truth in order to satisfy an irresistible desire for victory (Glossa ordinaria); an evil, contentious and violent argument (Vincent of Beauvais); an attack against the truth led by the strength of the clamor [“public outcry”, CP] (Glossa ordinaria, Peter Lombard). Often, however, the contentio appears in texts without ever being defined, as if the connotation of violent verbal antagonism attached to the term were sufficient to indicate that it should be avoided and condemned as a sin. (Casagrande & Vecchio ([1987], p. 213-214)

Contentio is a second-order sin, derived from first-order sins such as envy, conceit and pride. One caveat: the medieval definitions limit the sin of contentio to violent attacks on religious truth. It is not a sin to violently and continuously attack error and sin; in this case, anger becomes a holy anger.

2. Polemics and “deep disagreement”

The concept of deep disagreement was introduced by Fogelin (1985). Deep disagreement concerns incompatible values or metaphysical principles, rather than empirically testable epistemic issues. The resolution of scientific conflicts, including in mathematics and logic, requires technical treatment (Woods 2003), while deep disagreement is more akin to polemics, involving intense personal commitment on the part of the participants. Nonetheless, polemics seems to prefer (face-to-face) confrontation, while deeply disagreeing positions can be developed in parallel and in mutual ignorance, thus appearing beyond the field of argued dialogue.

In human affairs, the existence of such intractable divergences can be seen as a “radically shocking” challenge (Turner & Campolo 2005, p. 1) to the argumentative enterprise itself: “If [Fogelin] were right, what would become of the field? Even more important, arguably, what could be done about deep disagreements themselves? The field and all of the good it meant to accomplish seemed to be threatened all at once” (ibid.).

3. The post-persuasion era and the normality of dissensus

Any serious argumentative debate contains an element of radicalism, that calls for a de-demonization of dissensus, and, consequently, for a re-evaluation of the role of the ratified third parties, who have the power to decide. As Willard, who has written extensively on this subject, writes:

To prize dissensus goes against an older tradition in argumentation, that values ​​opposition less than the rules that constrain it. (Willard 1989, p. 149)

The preference for consensus does not preclude the reality and fertility of dissent. Argumentation studies must confront situations in which disagreements are produced, managed, resolved, reinforced or transformed by their discursive confrontation. Determining which disagreements should be reduced, why and how, and which should be encouraged and deepened is a major social and scientific issue, with critical educational implications.

Argumentation can be used to divide opinions; this is what the discourse of Christ does in the Christian vision of the world:

Do not suppose that I have come to bring peace to the earth. I did not come to bring peace, but a sword. ³⁵ For I have come to turn a man against his father, a daughter against her mother, a daughter-in-law against her mother-in-law, a man’s enemies will be the members of his own household. Matthew 10: 34-36[1]

The first virtue of argumentation is not that it resolves the conflicts, but that it gives words to conflicts; it is a valuable method of managing differences, sometimes reducing them, sometimes increasing them and causing them to multiply. In an overly consensual context, it may be the noble task of argumentation to bring about relevant dissensual discourses, and to value and stimulate the emergence of differences of opinion.

The rule of the majority does not imply that the majority possesses the truth, and is entitled to impose its rule on a disgraced minority that perversely resists the persuasive power of the sublime orator, or refuses to acknowledge the defeat inflicted upon them by the supreme dialectician. One can hypothesize that, in our terrestrial world, the coexistence of contradictory opinions represents the normal state, neither pathological nor transitory, of the socio-political ideological field; deep disagreement is the routine and the rule. Hegelians would add that contradiction is the dialectical engine of history.

In any case, democracy does not eliminate differences, and voting does not eliminate minorities and their opinions. In such conditions « the problem is not to convince others, but to live with them » [2]. Argument is a way of managing differences, sometimes eliminating them, sometimes promoting them for the common good.

[1] Matthew 10:34-36. Quoted after The Bible, New International Version (NIV), www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=Matthew%2010:34-36 (11-08-2017)

[2] “No se trata de convencer sino de convivir”. A. Ortega, “La razón razonable”, El País, 25-09-2006.