EXAMPLE
The word example has two main meanings:
1) Example-1: An element of a category of cases or events that are grouped under the same definition, law or principle. Such an item can help to identify new members of the category, and serve to establish, clarify and explain the definition, law or principle it embodies.
2) Example-2: A way of being or doing that is worthy of imitation, such as setting an example, leading by example, being an example or being a role model for the community.
An exemplary person perfectly synthesizes and embodies the highest moral and professional norms and practices, with whom one can identify.
In addition to the specific forms of argumentation described below, the following forms of argumentation are related to the example: see exemplum; imitation; ab exemplo.
1. The Example in the Aristotelian Rhetorical System
In one version of the Aristotelian rhetorical system, induction and syllogisms are the instruments of scientific discourse, while example and the enthymemes are their counterparts in rhetorical discourse (Rhet, II, 20, 1393a20-25, RR p. 335). There are different kinds of examples:
[Argument by example] has two varieties; one consisting in the mention of actual past facts, the other in the invention of facts by the speaker. Of the latter there are again two varieties, the illustrative parallel and the fable. (Id., 1393a25-30; RR p. 357-358)
The place of examples in a table of rhetorical devices is as follows:
Comparison
Aristotle gives as an example of a “parable”, an analogy drawn from the teachings of Socrates. This parable condemns the practice of drawing lots for magistrates, since one would not “use the lot to select a helmsman from the crew of a ship” (Rhet., II, 20, 1393b5, RR, p. 335); see metaphor.
Fable
Aristotle gives as an example the fable of the horse that wanted revenge on the stag, and thus became a slave to man. This fable applies to the saviors of the fatherland who quickly became tyrants (Rhet, II, 20, 1393a5-25, RR p. 337). as a genre of rhetoric and literature,
Fables, like portraits (see ethos) are genres of rhetoric and literature that have existed since the time of Aesop (620–564 BCE) and continue to this day.
A modern version of the fables could be anecdotes. « iPhone owners are obnoxious. Recently I went camping… » The anecdote then develops, highlighting the terrible behavior of one iPhone user and generalizing it to all iPhone users. In Aristotelian terms, this is an argument based on a real past fact, elaborated as a truth-telling narrative, see precedent.
Other characteristics of anecdotes such as their educational function and conversational entertainment value, and the roles of storyteller and audience bring them closer to tales or fables.
On a strictly argumentative level, anecdotes are difficult to contradict and nearly impossible to refute directly, except with another decisive anecdote, tale or fable, and the quasi impossibility of refuting them directly, except with another decisive anecdote, tale, or fable.
These characteristics suggest that anecdotes have inherited some of the forms and functions of tales and fables.
Actual past facts
The argument from an example based on real past facts is illustrated by two historical events, that lead to the conclusion that “we must prepare for war against the king of Persia and not allow Egypt to be subjugated, » given two past experiences that were unfavorable to the Greeks:
For Darius of old did not cross the Aegean until he had seized Egypt; but once he had seized it, he did cross. And Xerxes again did not attack us until he had seized Egypt, but once he had seized it, he did cross.
(Rhet., II, 20, 1393a30-b5, RR p. 335) – Darius, 522-486 BCE; Xerxes, 486 à 465 BCE.
This is an example of strategic observation closely linked to a specific geographical situation. It can be considered as an historical precedent, that functions like a judicial one. Specialists in the field must rule on a case:
What should we do when the Persian army enters Egypt? or: now that they are in Egypt?
What does the presence of the Persian army in Egypt mean? What will they do next?
To answer these questions, specialists first look for similar cases in the past. In this case, they found two similar cases. While this is not enough to establish a mechanical law, it is sufficient to suggest a strategic response, « they will cross the sea to Europe”, and the correlative decision of action: « let’s prepare for war« .
2. Generalizing from an Example
2.1 Example-Based Law-Like Generalizations
A generalization can be made from a random item (lambda-example), whether idiosyncratic or generic.
2.1.1 Generalization from a random idiosyncratic example
The argument from example is a generalization (induction) based on a single specific case. It takes an observation made about an individual, and generalizes it to all individuals of the same class (or bearing the same name):
This butterfly is blue, so (all) butterflies are blue.
In logic, from « this B is P« , one can only infer “some B are P”. The generalization on the basis of a single specific case, i.e., « from particular this to universal all« , corresponds to the converse of the instantiation of a universal proposiiculartion, « from universal all to particular this » which is valid; if “all I are P » then “this I is P”.
This swan is white, that’s okay, since (all) swans are white.
An argument by example is generally considered as a type of hasty generalization or induction based on a single case. It can also be a case of two-term reasoning.
2.1.2 Scientific Generalization on a Generic Example or Ecthesis
A generic example is a being that clearly manifes all the properties of its genus. It is a prototype of the class, and its best embodiment, see category; intra-categorical analogy. The argument from the generic example is based on such a specimen and leads to conclusions about a given genus (i.e., all the individuals belonging to that genus):
A generic example demonstrates the reasons for the validity of a proposition by performing operations or transformations on a given concrete object, that is considered not in and of itself, but as a characteristic representative of a class. (Balacheff 1999, p. 207).
This process is also known as ecthesis, which is defined as
A technique of demonstration used especially in Euclidean geometry, in which a theorem is proven, by reasoning on a singular figure. Your inference is correct if it does not mention the characteristics peculiar to the drawn figure, but only those characteristics that it shares with all the figures of its kind (Vax 1982, Ecthèse)
2.1.3 Generic example or idiosyncratic individual?
The argument by example is a legitimate extrapolation when it is based on a generic feature. For instance, if you ask how many wings a bird can have, observing any bird will lead you to the correct answer. However, asking what the average weight of a pigeon is, and then observing any pigeon to find the answer is absurd: « This λ-pigeon weighs 322 g, so the average weight of a pigeon is 322 g. »
Since in many cases, it is not known beforehand whether the studied characteristic is essential or random, this distinction is used as an argumentative resource. The proponent argues that the generalization is valid because it is based on an essential property. The opponent argues that the property is accidental and cannot be generalized see classification; accident.
The remains of a single animal belonging to an unknown extinct species can provide a great deal of knowledge about that species; however, the specific conditions of the individual animal considered must be duly recognized. The case of the Neanderthal man is an example of this.
1. Scientists’ views of Neanderthals have changed over time. (From G. Burenhult, « [Towards Homo Sapiens] », 1994 [1])
More specifically: Are the Neanderthals our ancestors or are they a different species?
2. First answer: The Neanderthal man belongs to our species. « It has long seemed obvious that the physical appearance of Neanderthals — and especially those living in Europe — was very different from ours.” However, “despite these physical differences, Neanderthals have long been regarded as direct ancestors of modern humans » (id., p. 66).
Second answer: Neanderthals are a different species. « According to the work of the French paleontologist Marcellin Boule these differences were considered too great; » (id., p. 67), and the Neanderthal man was considered a different species.
The Neanderthal of Marcellin Boule: « Starting in 1911, the paleoanthropologist Marcellin Boule published a detailed study of the Neanderthal skeleton. He created an image that has conditioned the popular perception of Neanderthals for more than thirty years. His interpretations were strongly influenced by ideas of his time about these extinct hominids. Boule described them as a kind of savage and brutal cave men, who dragged their feet and were unable to walk upright. »
“Marcellin Boule described a Neanderthal with a flattened skull, a curved spine (similar to that of a gorilla), semi-flexible lower limbs and large divergent big toes. This description aligns with the ideas of the time about human evolution” (Wikipedia, Marcellin Boule).
4. However, this Neanderthal was severely handicapped. « In 1913, Marcellin Boule exaggerated the differences between Neanderthals and modern humans. He did not realize that the skeleton he studied — the “Old Man of the Chapelle aux Saints” (in Corrèze, France) — was deformed by arthritis, as demonstrated by W. Strauss and A. J. Cave in 1952” (id., p. 67).
“J.-L. Heim describes the subject as severely disabled. The individual suffered from a left hip deformity (epiphysiolysis or rather trauma), a crushed toe, severe arthritis in the cervical vertebrae, a broken rib, and narrowed spinal nerve channels. (Wikipedia, id.)
5. Conclusion: Our Cousins, the Neanderthals: “Today Neanderthals are now considered our cousins rather than as our ancestors, even though they resemble us in many ways” (ibid.).
In short, a generic example can serve as the basis for an abductive generalization, that leads to a rule or regularity concerning a class of cases or individuals. The specificity of individual cases must be specified.
2.2 Argument from the Example
An illustrative example is an example chosen to help understand a concept or law, by providing an instance of it:
A migratory bird is a bird that … For example, the swallow …
Furthermore, if the chosen example is (presented as) typical of the phenomenon, the time-consuming and precarious work of examining a large number of cases becomes unnecessary. In this sense, providing an argument in defense of a general statement simply means finding a clear case to which it applies correctly.
At the very least, the illustrative example shows that the conclusion is not undermined by the first example that comes to mind (see infra, § 6).
When a school essay proposes a maxim for commentary and criticism, the basic argument is to provide an example that clarifies the meaning of the maxim and justifies the maxim’s meaning. This is why the argument from example is considered as the basic form of argument from a pedagogical point of view.
The illustrative example can also be used as an epideictic amplification and persuasion technique.
Whereas an example is designed to establish a rule, the role of illustration is to strengthen adherence to a known and accepted rule, by providing particular instances which clarify the general statement, show the import of this statement by calling attention to its various possible applications, and increase its presence to the consciousness. (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca [1958], p. 357)
2.3 Test Case Example and Refutation by the Counter-Example (arg. in contrarium)
An example does not establish a law, but is theoretically sufficient to refute a generalization. The test case example (or counterexample) is functionnaly different from the illustrative example. It is introduced as an objection to a theory. Then, the proponent must demonstrate that the general principle he is advocating can successfully apply to the case in question.
The argument by counterexample is the standard method of refuting universal propositions “all As are Bs”. This law is refuted by showing an A that is not a B, a strategy is perfectly operative in ordinary argument.
However, the counterexample attack can be neutralized by appealing to exceptional cases, as opposed to default ones. The proponent acknowledges that the law admits exceptions.
Nonetheless, theories as mental constructions are not directly refuted by facts, see refutation by facts.
3. Example 2: “Exemplary Examples »
3.1 Paragons, Model/Antimodel
An unspecified example (λ-example) is one element that makes up a category and is defined by its characteristic features. From a linguistic perspective, it is an element currently called by the name of the category.
Categories are also structured around their prototypical elements, see Categorization; Analogy (I) ; Analogy (II); Precedent.
In the social domain at large, a model is an « exemplary example », or a role model for a particular kind of behavior. The members of the category are judged by him. He is worthy of imitation and attracts identification.
Anti-models typify negative authority; (Perelman, Olbrechts-Tyteca [1958], p. 362).
Etymologically, a paragon is a touchstone for gold or silver. Metaphorically speaking, a paragon of virtue is a touchstone of virtue, that is, his behavior is the sole criterion for recognizing and ranking virtuous people. A paragon is the most excellent prototypical element.
The following example is taken from a television program in which contestants are asked questions and the winner is the one who answers the fastest. The question, read slowly, begins with:
Question: Who is the poe/t
Answer: /Victor Hugo
The slash / marks the moment when the candidate answers, “Victor Hugo”, without waiting for the question to finish, i.e. the clue that would make it possible to identify the poet: « Who is the poet who wrote of the famous verse “Tomorrow, at dawn, at the hour when the countryside turns white »? And “Victor Hugo” was indeed the correct answer.
The conclusion is that Victor Hugo is the paragon of poets in France. This suggests that “who / what is the (name of a category) » could be used as a test to determine the paragon of the category: « What is the animal? – The lion.
The “paragon of anti-models” is Hitler, see authority §6: Refutative uses of authority.
3.2 Imitation
When an individual uses another person as a model, they are imitating that person, see ethos. The choice of a model is not necessarily conscious, whether for a hairstyle or voice intonation. The model is usually unaware of being imitated. This process usually neither expressed linguistically nor clearly argued. Rather, it is based on nonverbal mechanisms of social imitation, the ripple effect, identification, empathy and charisma.
To persuade someone to do something, one can argue by example, citing important people, real or fictional, who have done the same thing. This « argument of exemplary behavior » is a metonymic exemplum, a type of the verbal argument of authority.
More importantly, one can set an example voluntarily in order to show and demonstrate to the other what is desired, hoping to set alignment mechanisms in motion. For instance, one might stop smoking in order to encourage a friend to do the same, without giving grand speeches. As parents are reminded, actions speak louder than words, and they are their children’s primary role models.
This strategy of example can be applied to any form of behavior we wish to instill in another person, such as how to eat, speak, or live a dignified life worthy of reward in the afterlife.
Rather than being a type of argumentation, nonverbal models and examples appear as an alternative to argumentation.
Seduction and repulsion push a person to conform themselves with a model or distance themselves from an antimodel, see authority. They operate differently than verbal arguments. Some kind of persuasion may be involved—a change in belief that correlates with a change in behavior—but not all persuasion comes from argumentation. See « you too! », consensus; ad populum.
[1] G. Burenhult, « Vers Homo Sapiens » [Towards Homo Sapiens]. In Le Premier homme. Preface by Y. Coppens, Paris, Bordas, 1994, p. 67.