MANIPULATION
1. Word and domains
The transitive verb to manipulate, “No manipulates N1” works within two structures:
Manipulate1: N1 refers to an object (non-human, inanimate) (container manipulation) or body parts (spinal manipulation).
Manipulate2: N1 refers to a person as a synthesis of representations and capable of self-determination. Manipulating2 is exploitative; manipulating people is using them as objects or instruments.
To manipulate is the head of a rich and homogeneous family of derivations: manipulation, manipulator, (non-)manipulative, outmanipulate2, “to outdo or surpass in manipulating”, (MW, Outmanipulate).
Manipulation2 can affect all areas of human activity.
— Political, ideological and religious spheres.
— Everyday psychology: a manipulator, manipulative behavior.
— Military domain: White propaganda has a domestic source and targets domestic public opinion; it can be misleading. Black propaganda has a hidden source and purpose. It appears to come from a well-meaning and harmless source, although it comes from an evil or hostile source.
— Commercial action and marketing techniques are used to encourage or manipulate people to buy this rather than that or nothing, using various techniques to “bait and hook” the customer, S. Gradualism.
In these different areas, manipulative influence may overlap, combine or contradict argumentative persuasion.
2. Acting together: from cooperation to manipulation
Manipulation is a resource that can be activated in any situation where a person M is pursuing a goal φ. To achieve this goal, M needs a contribution from another person, N.
2.1 Overt goal negotiation
(i) M believes that φ is in the interest of N, and N agrees
N has a positive representation of φ; he considers φ to be important, pleasant, in his interest; N pursues φ spontaneously, for independent reasons. Thus, M needs N and N needs M; M and N cooperate to achieve φ.
If N’s commitment is less immediate, M will take a more open approach and try to persuade N to associate with him or her in order to realize φ. N knows that M intends to make him do φ, and they will talk about it.
(ii) Doing φ is not really in N’s interest
N doesn’t care about φ. He will not spontaneously cooperate with M in order to achieve φ. M can then act on the will or on the mental representations of N.
(a) Acting on the will to do
In this situation, M can undertake to persuade N to do φ. M threatens N (ad baculum), tries to blackmail or bribe N (ad crumenam), tries to move N to pity (ad misericordiam), tries to charm or seduce N (ad amicitiam), see Threat; Emotion.
N still has a rather negative view of φ. But M’s arguments, if they are arguments at all, have changed N’s willingness to act, and he will eventually agree to act in favor of φ even if he or she does not like it. N does φ reluctantly, as a favor to M. The question is whether N has been manipulated.
(b) Action on representations of the action to be taken
M can reframe φ so that it appears to be pleasant or favorable, in N’s in best interest. As in case (i), N agrees to do φ because it seems beneficial.
In case (a), N will do a job that he knows is dangerous, because it pays well. In case (b), N will do a job, dangerous or not, that he thinks is dangerous. M can combine the two strategies: “You can do it for me, it’s not that dangerous”. These two situations are not necessarily manipulative. M has openly presented the goal φ to N; N has been persuaded to do φ for arguably good reasons; the work may not actually be all that dangerous, and it is well paid.
M acts manipulatively only if he or she knows that the work is dangerous, but knowingly misrepresents it, by concealing the danger from N. Lying is the basis of manipulation.
(iii) Doing φ is against the interests and values of N
Now, φ is clearly against the interests of N. Under normal circumstances, N would automatically oppose M in his or her attitude toward φ. Nevertheless, it is still possible for M to persuade N to do φ deliberately.
— To persuade N to deliberately do something contrary to his interests or values. For example, in an extreme case N could be persuaded to commit suicide or to sacrifice himself, even though he or she does not want to die, in the name of a higher interest or value,:“God, the Party, the Nation, ask you to…”; “You must sacrifice your children to make our cause prevail”.
— Convincing N that the action he is being asked to take, is in his best interest. For example, M urges N to sacrifice himself even if N is doesn’t want to die: “You will go to Heaven”. The discourse and arguments used by M to persuade N to agree to φ are manipulative because they do not respect a hierarchy of values that is considered natural. On the basis of highly questionable arguments, N has been induced to do something that no human being would reasonably commit. This is a case of brainwashing.
2.2 Covert purpose
In the cases described above, N is more or less aware of what he or she is committing to do. Deep manipulation, on the other hand, is characterized by M’s hiding his true intentions or the true nature of the goal φ, which is in fact unacceptable to N. M will use a secondary goal, as a decoy (φd):
(i) φd is positive for N: N is made to believe that it is in his best interest to do φd
(ii) φd fatally leads to φ
(iii) N ignores (2)
(iv) N achieves the deception goal; M pockets the bet.
There is not necessarily any verbal exchange, or even contact between M and N during this process. N may be harmed, and may or may not understand that he or she has been manipulated. N may lose the game without even knowing that he was playing a game. An example could be that of a salesman who sells a large encyclopedia to consumers who are hardly aware that they have bought anything, who can hardly read, who have no use for that kind of book, and who, in any case, cannot afford to pay the bill. The salesman has succeeded in framing the sales interaction, φ, as an ordinary, friendly conversation, φdecoy with no financial implications
3. “Pious lies”
In the past, children refused to take the cod liver oil they needed for their health because it tasted awful, and parents tried to mask the taste by adding sweeteners. The parents’ intentions were good, but they had to hide the fact that it was always the same disgusting cod liver oil. He who Wills the end Will have the Means
Calvin attributes to monks who want to bring people to their salvation by any means necessary, because the end justifies the means. The following excerpt deals with the multiplication of the relics of the true cross:
Now, what other conclusion can be drawn from these considerations but that all these were inventions for deceiving silly folks? Some monks and priests, who call them pious frauds, i.e., honest deceits for exciting the devotion of the people, have even confessed this.
John Calvin, A Treatise on Relics, [1543][1]
The concept and practice of “patriotic fraud” in elections could be seen as a modern version of the practices that Calvin attributes to medieval monks.
4. Manipulation and power practices
The status accorded to manipulation is based on notions of power and action. Should power be exercised through reason and valid argument, or, in a Machiavellian perspective, does it necessarily require the use of violence and lies?
I must confess that the so-called cultured circles of Western Europe and America are incapable of understanding the real balance of power. These people must be considered deaf and dumb.
Telling the truth is a petty-bourgeois prejudice, while lying is often justified by the ends in view. (Lenin, quoted in V. Volkoff, [Disinformation, A Weapon of War], 1986[2]
Discussing the vital need to keep secret the place and time of the Normandy landings, Churchill said:
“In war-time”, I said, “truth is so precious it should always be attended by a bodyguard of lies”. Discussing of Operation Overlord with Stalin at the Tehran Conference, November 30, 1943 [3]
The answer to the previous question could be:
[The] truth is incontrovertible. Panic may resent it, ignorance may deride it, malice may distort it, but there it is.
Winston Churchill, Speech in the House of Commons, May 17, 1916[4]
5. Argumentation and manipulation
5.1 Argumentation and propaganda
The study of discursive schematization is the study of the processes by which the speaker arranges a synthetic, coherent, stable meaning. This constructed meaning is neither a manipulation2, nor reality itself, nor an illusion of reality, but simply a significant view taken of reality, S. . In order to communicate, the speaker must necessarily manipulate1 the discursive material, but this process is not necessarily intended to manipulate2 the interlocutor. Manipulation2 presupposes deliberate falsehood. To assume that all speech is necessarily manipulative would amount to over-dramatize the process of signification.
A very thin thread separates the study of argumentation as defined by the Treatise on Argumentation from that of political propaganda, as defined by Domenach. For Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, “the object of the study of argumentation is the study of the discursive techniques allowing us to induce or to increase the mind’s adherence to the theses presented for its assent.” ([1958]/1969, p. 4; italics in the original). Domenach defines the object of propaganda as “the creation, transformation or confirmation of opinions” through multisemiotic processes (image, music, demonstration and mass mobilization) (Domenach 1950, p. 8). This difference may be that between ratio-propaganda and senso-propaganda as defined by Tchakhotine (1939, p. 152). The former is effective “by persuasion, by reasoning”, and the latter by “suggestion” (ibid.), that is, by manipulation2.
5.2 Manipulation and lying
Lies and hidden intentions decisively contrast argumentation with manipulation; a lie can be an active lie, the assertion of a known falsehood, and a passive lie, the failure to tell the whole truth, or relevant parts of it. Manipulative discourse relies on lies, which may be presented as “alternative facts”. Confusing hints, false cues and misleading perspectives are presented as truths. Spin doctors know how to mix some true information with false information to make it believable.
The denunciation of manipulative discourse is a denunciation of lies; but there is no formal marking of errors and lies; exposing lies requires a substantial knowledge of the subject. For this reason, as Hamblin says, “[the logician] is not a judge or court of appeal: and there is no such judge or court” (1970, p. 244); but, as a responsible citizen, he or she must denounce manipulation in favor of a better-informed picture of reality, see Evaluation.
[1] John Calvin, A Treatise on Relics. Trans. and intro. by Valerian Krasinski. 2nd ed. Edimburg: Johnstone, Hunter & Co, 1870. Quoted from http://www.gutenberg.org/files/32136/32136-pdf.pdf (08-17-2017)
[2] Vladimir Volkoff, La désinformation, arme de guerre. Lausanne: L’Âge d’Homme, 1986, p. 35.
[3] In The Second World War, Volume V: Closing the Ring (1952), Chapter 21 (Tehran: The Crux), p. 338.
[4] Quoted after https://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Winston_Churchill