METONYMY – SYNECDOCHE
Traditionally, the field of rhetoric has been divided into two main areas, one dealing with tropes and figures, and the other deals with argumentation schemes. A semantic and ornamental rhetoric is opposed to a cognitive and functional rhetoric. This approximate opposition can be misleading.
1. Tropes
A trope is defined as an operation “by which a word is given a meaning which is not exactly its the proper meaning” (Dumarsais [1730], p. 69). This definition can be paralleled by that of an argument as an operation “by which a proposition (the conclusion) is given a belief value which is not exactly the proper belief value of that proposition”.
The linguistic mechanisms involved in tropic referential shift bear a significant resemblance to those involved in argument. In both cases, the problem is one of transmission. In the case of a trope, the meaning of one word is transferred to another. In the case of an argument, the belief value of one proposition is transferred to another, and the rules of transfer are similar.
Metaphor, irony, metonymy and synecdoche considered the four “master tropes” (Burke, 1945), are all relevant to the study of argumentation, albeit in quite different ways.
2. Metonymy
2.1 Metonymy as a trope
Consider the classic example of metonymy, “the pen is mightier than the sword”. A pen is “an instrument for writing or drawing with ink…” (MW, Sword), and a sword is “a weapon with a long metal blade and a handle with a hand guard…” (OD, Sword.). In the quoted proverb, pen and sword are used metonymically for “word, thought and discourse, verbal communication…” and “physical violence, military force…” respectively. The global meaning is that “violence does not prevail over reasoned discourse”.
Generally speaking, the semantic scheme of metonymy can be described as follows.
— There is a word {S / C1}, its signifier is S and its content C1: pen/“writing instrument”.
— The signifier S is used metonymically to denote the content C0: pen/“discourse”.
— This transfer of meaning operates under a condition: it needs a backing, expressed in a law of transition such as “C0 is in some relation of contiguity with C1”. Here, “the pen is the instrument with which discourse is produced ».
The subtypes of metonymic schemes are classified according to the nature of the contiguity connection between the contents of C0 and C1, for example:
— Effect for cause, “Death is in the meadow”.
— Instrument for agent, “She is the pen of the president’s pen ».
— Agent (or “cause”) for the work produced: “A new Shakespeare has just come out”.
— Instrument for object produced: “The pen is mightier…”.
— Name of the place where the object is made for the object itself, etc. “I feel like a cognac”.
— Relevant current planned action for a participant: “Sir, your rendezvous just left”.
2.2 Metonymic and argumentative transfer
Figures and arguments need the same kind of support. This can be illustrated by the following examples.
The effect for cause metonymy: “Death is in the meadow”[1] means that phytosanitary products (Ph) (pesticides, also called plant protection products) used in agriculture can cause death (D). The word (signifier) designating the effect (D) now designates (refers to) the cause (Ph).
In the effect-to-cause argument, the (truth-)value predicated on the effect is transferred back to the cause, or to a set of causes:
Metals expand when heated
That metal expanded (is an established fact) SO it was heated (is an established fact)
The tire exploded, so [either C1, or C2, or…] (id.); S. Case-by-Case
Effect-to-cause argument transfers the predicate “— is an established fact” from the effect to the cause.
The word death refers to death; in the case of metonymy, its referential domain is extended so as to include the cause of death, “death refers to phytosanitary products”. In our standard view of reference, a word refers to an object; in fact, it refers centrally to an object, and to the objects contextually related to it; that is, the word (signifier) actually refers to any element belonging to the cluster of these objects, see object of discourse. Ordinary language clearly expresses this fact:
(1) He has a fever, so he has an infection.
(2) Give him an antibiotic, it will reduce the fever.
The antibiotic actually acts on the infection, and the fever in (2) should therefore be regarded as an effect-for-cause metonymic designation of the infection. On the other hand, fever is a natural sign of an infection: “He has a fever, which means he has an infection”: this is exactly what the metonymic analysis says.
A metonymy that designates a work by the name of its author corresponds to an argument that transfers a judgment about its author to a work: “The author of this book supported the former dictator”. The mechanisms of this metonymic transfer from the person to his or her actions and products were studied from the argumentative point of view in Perelman (1952).
3. Synecdoche
As the example of the rendezvous above (§1) shows, metonymic naming can operate on any pair of strongly connected objects, where this connection may be accidental (local), or essential. Synecdoche operates on constituent parts of a whole. The word “metonymy” is sometimes used to refer to both metonymy and synecdoche.
3.1 “Part – whole” and “whole – part” relations
A roof is a component of a house; in “looking for a roof”, roof means “house”, houses being considered prototypical shelters.
Part – whole arguments transfer the predicate associated with the part to a whole. These are supported by the same kind of connection, see Composition and division.
The roof is in bad condition, so the house must not be well maintained.
3.2 Genus for species and species for genus
A synecdoche of a genus for a species uses the name of the genus to refer to one of its species; the name of the genus replaces that of the species: “the animal” for “the lion”. This use is most common in textual co-reference:
We saw a lion. The poor beast was thin and sick.
Based on the same relation, the argument by the genus attaches the predicates of the genus to the species, see taxonomy and category; categorization:
This is a lion, therefore it is an animal, and therefore, it is mortal.
4. The tree and its fruits
The following argument was made in defense of Paul Touvier, leader of the pro-Nazi Militia in Lyon, France, during the German Nazi occupation. Sentenced to death after the war, he escaped and remained in hiding for 25 years. The following excerpt is taken from a letter written by the Rev. Blaise Arminjon, S.J., to the then President of the French Republic on December 5, 1970, in support of Paul Touvier’s petition for clemency:
How are we to believe that he [Touvier] is a “criminal”, or a “bad Frenchman”, when his conduct for twenty-five years, and the education he has given his children, have been so admirable? You know a tree by its fruits.[2]
A Toulminian analysis can be applied to this passage, the warrant for which is provided by the biblical topos, “a tree is known by its fruits”:
For a good tree does not bear bad fruit, nor does a bad tree bear good fruit.
Luke 6:43-45, New King James Version.
But this transitional law also permits an interpretation based on a metonymy. To speak of “the [admirable] conduct of Touvier for twenty-five years” is a way of referring to Touvier metonymically. To say that this conduct is “admirable” is to say metonymically that Touvier is admirable. Similarly, a positive evaluation of the act, “the education that Touvier gave his children is admirable” also spreads metonymically to the agent, Touvier, who is necessarily equally admirable. The same phenomenon can be equally expressed in the language of tropes or in the language of argumentation, both of which implement the same kind of rationality.
[1] La Mort est dans le pré, youtube.com/watch?v=nAMARhJoFaQ
[2] Quoted in René Rémond & others., [Paul Touvier and the Church], Paris, Fayard, 1992, p. 164.