SELF-EVIDENCE
Self-evidence is a feeling of immediate certainty about a state of affairs; when expressed, the corresponding statement is obvious, i.e., it requires no proof or justification, and should be accepted as such, in other words, it cannot be doubted or questioned.
This statement is a-stasic, not debatable see evidentiality; dismissal.
The term apperception is used to denote this form of knowledge which is produced by a conscious perception, and accompanied by reflection.
Knowledge by apperception is opposed to knowledge by inference, and thus to knowledge acquired by argumentation, which is a kind of inference. Three types of apperception, that is to say three main sources of evidence, can be identified and distinguished from each other:
— Self-evidence as the fruit of the divine revelation of a transcendental reality.
— Perceptual self-evidence of sensory data.
— Intellectual self-evidence.
The easiest way to legitimize a claim is to appeal to one of these three sources, see argument-conclusion.
The certainty manifested in a direct, simple assertion corresponds to the certainty associated with apperception, see repetition.
Inferential argumentative belief can be considered inferior to belief based on any kind of evidence: this observation is at the root of the paradoxes of argumentation.
1. Dogma: Revelation as a Source of Certainty
Believers consider the revelation contained in the sacred books to be the best source of certainty. This revelation, which took place in the sacred time of the origins, can be renewed by a special revelation.
In what is now called his Memorial[1], Blaise Pascal has described this experience which produced an immediate and absolute “certainty”:
The year of grace 1654,
Monday, 23 November, Feast of St. Clement, Pope and Martyr, and others in the Martyrology.
Vigil of St. Chrysogonus, martyr, and others.
From about half past ten in the evening to about half past midnight,
FIRE.
GOD of Abraham, GOD of Isaac, GOD of Jacob
not of the philosophers and of the learned
Certainty. Certainty. Feeling. Joy. Peace.
GOD of Jesus Christ.
My God and your God.
Your GOD will be my God.
Forgetting the world and everything, except GOD. […]
2. Self-evidence of the sensory data
Direct physical perception of a state of affairs immediately legitimizes a claim. There is no need to argue to see and claim that the snow is white. As the saying goes, “facts are the best arguments”; the question “Is snow white?” is not debatable (“a-stasic”, see stasis; evidentiality).
From a philosophical point of view, Descartes has rejected the possibility of basing knowledge on sensory data with the hypothesis of the “evil genius” (Descartes [1641], First Meditation).
3. Intellectual intuition
Descartes accepts only intellectual intuition as a source of certainty:
Rule 3 – Concerning objects proposed for study, we ought to investigate what we can clearly and evidently intuit or deduce with certainty, and not what other people have thought or what we ourselves conjecture. For knowledge can be attained in no other way. (Descartes [1628], Rule 3)
Unlike sensory data intuition, intellectual intuition is infallible:
By intuition I mean, not the wavering assurance of the senses, or the deceitful judgment of a misconstructed imagination, but a conception, formed by unclouded mental attention, so easy and distinct as to leave no room for doubt in regard to the thing we are understanding. (Id, Rule 7).
Intellectual intuition is what makes us accept something as “beyond reasonable doubt. For example, we can be fairly certain that if you take a point off a line, you can draw a single second line parallel to that line; or that the square of any negative number is positive.
But these certainties have been challenged by the construction of imaginary numbers and non-Euclidean geometries.
4. Consequences
4.1 Conflict between Sources of Evidence
It may seem that the most unassailable kind of self-evidence is the direct evidence provided by sensory data. However, the following text shows that it can be judged inferior to that which comes from the authority of the sacred text.
The first disagreement among the Companions after the Prophet’s death concerned the reality of his death itself. After the Prophet’s death, ‘Umar ibn al Khattaab, may God be pleased with him, insisted that the Messenger of God did not die, and considered any such talk to be a false rumor spread by the hypocrites, and threatened to punish them for it. This went on until Aboo Bakr appeared on the scene and recited the Qur’anic verse:
‘Muhammad is no more than a Messenger. Many were the Messengers who passed away before him. If he died or were slain, will you then turn back on your heels? Whoever turns back on his heels, not the least harm will he do to God; but God [on the other hand] will swiftly reward those who [serve him] with gratitude’ (3: 144).
And another verse of the Qur’an:
‘Truly you will die [one day], and truly they [too] will die [one day]’ (39: 30).
When ‘Umar heard these verses, his sword fell from his hand and he himself fell to the ground. He realized that the Prophet, may God bless him and grant him peace, had passed away and that the divine revelation had come to an end. […]
Differences over the Burial of the Prophet […]
These were two critical issues [about “the reality of the death of the Prophet” and about “the burial of the Prophet”], that were swiftly resolved simply by resorting to the Qur’an and the Sunnah.
Taha Jabir al ‘Alwani, 1993, The Ethics of Disagreement in Islam, pp. 35-36.[2]
4.2 Subtraction from doubt
The argument, the basis of the argumentative derivation of a conclusion, is presented as being beyond doubt, or, at least, less doubtful than the conclusion. It is conveniently presented as an apperceptive datum, i.e., as something which is as certain as a revelation, as sensible evidence, or intellectual intuition. It follows that the person who refuses to share this data is considered, as dishonorable, weak or idiotic. It is therefore not necessary to refute him or her, since he or she is already slandered, see destruction; dismissal.
Generalized disputability assumes that everyone can be held accountable for his or her beliefs, and that he or she must justify them when asked, so that it is illegitimate to postulate any kind of a priori certainty.
This thesis contrasts with positions that accept certainties of a religious order, such as “there is no God but God”; mathematical, “the square of a positive number is positive”; or simply everyday arguments such as, “I believe that the ground will not collapse under my feet”, see dialectic.
Self-evidence can be opposed to extended argumentability, see conditions of discussion.
[1] Cited after http://www.users.csbsju.edu/~eknuth/pascal.html (07-09-2017).
[2] Taha Jabir al ‘Alwani, 1993, The Ethics of Disagreement in Islam. Herndon: VA: International Institute of Islamic Thought, p. 35-36. Cited after:
archive.org/stream/157627041TheEthicsOfDisagreementByTahaJabirAlAlwani/157627041-The-Ethics-of-Disagreement-by-Taha-Jabir-Al-Alwani_djvu.txt