Argument from SILENCE
In an interaction, the silence of a ratified participant can be a substantial argument tending to reject the discussion (§1).
The classic argument from silence (§2.1) applies in the same way to modern media (§2.2).
In law, the laws on silence defines the right of the accused to remain silent (§3.1), and the obligation to judge even if the law is apparently silent.
1. In interaction: Silence as Disagreement
As in any interaction, a ratified participant in an argumentative interaction, may shut up and remain silent.
Participants and third parties are expected to speak at specific times, according to the specific rules of the interaction, and to remain silent when they don’t have the floor.
Third parties may impose, or suggest, silence on participants, especially when their interventions overlap, when they speak out of their turn, or to disrupt an opponent’s speech.
Conversely, a silent party is not a participant waiting to speak, but a ratified party who is expected to speak and does not speak. This silence can sometimes be interpreted as having an argumentative orientation
For example, “I don’t want to participate”, as an expression of this deliberate silence can be justified by various forms of the ad quietem arguments or appeals to calm, which Bentham considers to be fallacies of delay see political arguments, §3.
The following case is taken from a class discussion on French citizenship and immigration. At the beginning, the students are silent. The teacher thinks that they need some stimulation, and finally, the remarkable interventions of two students clarify the situation, and make explicit the argumentative content of their silence: they don’t speak not because they are stupid or not involved in this class activity, but:
S1 – because we don’t need to discuss it now\
S2 – because the issue has already been satisfactorily resolved\
As the discussion will show, both students have strong positions on the issue and will defend their position vigorously. These positions are actually antagonistic, but converge in the will not to engage in the discussion
The first student’s position is: « French citizenship should be given to those who ask for it »
The second student’s position is: « Our legislation is fine as it is, and politicians should discuss about more pressing issues.
2. Silence as an Argument
2.1 The Classic Argument from Silence
The classical argument from silence corresponds to the Latin argument a silentio or ex silentio, (from silentium, « silence »). The argument is as follows:
– The question is about an hypothetical event: did it or did it not really happen?
– Argument: A text relevant to the question is silent about the event.
– Conclusion: The event did not happen.
Possible refutation: the fact is not mentioned because it is irrelevant to the intent of the text under consideration.
For example, chroniclers record all the outstanding events of their time. If something that normally should have attracted their attention, is not mentioned in their chronicles, we must conclude that nothing really happened.
This can be seen as an application of the principle of completeness to the work of these chroniclers.
Did Syldavia face violent unrest at that time?
If such events had occurred, the chroniclers would have mentioned them, not to mention their regular mentioning of lesser events.
But they mention nothing of the sort.
So, there was no violent unrest at that time.
The value of this argument depends on the quality and quantity of the relevant documentation available for the period in question. It increases considerably if we know that chroniclers regularly record socio-political events.
In the following case, the argument of the silence of the historiographers carries weight:
Metz is perhaps the only city where the Crusaders did not dip their hands in the blood of the Jews. Louis the Younger, on his way to Palestine, assembled his army there, and yet there is no mention of any outrage against the Jews. The silence of history in this matter is worth a positive proof, considering that Metz had historiographers at that time.
Abbé Grégoire, [Essay on the Physical, Moral and Political Regeneration of the Jews], 1789. [1]
If a fact is not mentioned, it maybe because it is irrelevant to the intent of the text under consideration.
The argument of silence is sometimes answered with the argument of the camel: there is no mention of camels in the Qur’an. So, there were no camels in 7th century Arabia, which is quite surprising. The conclusion is nice, but there are several references to camels in the Qur’an (for the mistake, see Borges, Gibbon). A better example might be:
The History of Belgium for Dummies makes no mention of French fries.
So, the Belgians never knew about French fries. [2]
The argument of silence is used to date literary works. Marie de France wrote the Lais (poems about courtly love) at the end of the 12th century. Can we specify the date? The editor of the Lais argues as follows (according to Rychner, 1978 [3]):
1) “In order to date the Lais more precisely, they should be placed in relation to other works of the time.”
2) For this purpose, Rychner invokes “an argument ex silentio, which should be used with caution but which should not be overlooked”
3) First, “there is no evidence in the Lais that Marie had read Eneas by Chrestien de Troie”, a courtly novel, published in 1178.
4) Second, “it is difficult for me to imagine that, having read [Eneas], she would have been able to remain so completely herself and so different from him, in her style and in her general inspiration”.
The conclusion follows: the Lais must have been written before 1178.
The argument from silence is an indirect proof, that can only be used by default, in the absence of direct proof or direct information.
Even if we admit, for the sake of argument, that there is no camel in the Qur’an, this would not prove the “inauthenticity” of the book, (whatever one might mean by “authenticity”), because indirect evidence cannot be used against strong direct evidence. Direct evidence refutes indirect evidence.
2.2 Argument from Media Silence
The argument from media silence is a variant of the classic argument from silence: Nothing happened because all the media (the main trend media, my influencer…) say nothing about it.
The counter-argument goes like this:
The media is silent because it is silenced
The media is silent because they have the same political agenda.
Change influencer! You’ll find all the information you need on the social media.
3. The Law on Silence
3.1 The right to silence
Applied to the case of the suspect who refuses to cooperate and answer the police officer’s questions, the common saying « If you don’t speak, you don’t object » leads to interpreting the silence of the accused as an admission of guilt.
The right to remain silent « derives from the principle of the presumption of innocence« , according to which the prosecution must prove guilt (Dalloz, [Right to remain silent]) [4]).
It follows that the accused does not have to cooperate in the search for the truth, has the right to remain silent and not to contribute to his own incrimination (id.).
3.2 Silence of the law
The argument of the silence of the law could be used by the judge to justify his refusal to rule in a particular case, arguing that the Code of Laws does not contain any article applicable to the claim in question, which therefore cannot be legally qualified.
The argument of the silence of the law is invalidated by a meta-principle that imposes on the court the obligation to judge, under penalty of committing a denial of justice:
The judge who refuses to judge, under the pretext of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the law, may be prosecuted as guilty of denial of justice (Dalloz, [Prohibition of Denial of Justice] [5].
The judge is obliged to interpret the law, i.e., to find in the existing body of law an article which, with an acceptable interpretation, becomes applicable to the case before him.
[1] Abbé [Henri Jean-Baptiste] Grégoire, Essai sur la régénération physique, morale et politique des Juifs. Preface by R. Badinter. Paris, Stock, 1989, note p. 179. [2] I owe this example to Michel Goldberg, who pointed out to me that the Dictionary (2016) reproduced the traditional mistake about camels and the Koran. [3] Jean Rychner, Introduction aux Lais de Marie de France, Paris, Champion, 1978, pp. X-XI.