THREAT and PROMISE
Threats are used by the stronger to force the weaker to do things in the stronger’s interest; to seek revenge on the same unethical level, the weaker may have no choice but to manipulate. On the social level, threats of punishment combined with promises of rewards function as a global argument of threat and promise of reward.
1. Ad baculum : argument from threat
Threat speech, or argument from fear, or appeal to fear, (Lat. ad metum; metum, “fear”) has also been called:
— by metonymy, the “argument from the stick” (Lat. ad baculum; baculum, “stick”), or “from the prison” (Lat. ad carcerem; carcer, “prison”), or “from the purse” (ad crumenam; crumena, “purse”; by a double metonymy).
— By metaphor, the “thunderbolt argument” (Latin ad fulmen, fulmen, “lightning; violence”).
The prospect of a more or less imminent danger deters the person from the next planned action and induces new, more or less specific types of behavior. The threatened person feels an emotion, ranging from apprehension to fear or panic. The feeling depends on the mode of production and treatment of the source, which may or may not be well defined (“we feel that something is going to happen to us”), and enter into a controllable causality (“we are living in a clash of civilizations”). When the threat is causal, generalized and uncontrollable (“the world is falling apart”), the threat discourse leads to anxiety, fear, anguish, and even mass panic.
Two types of threat can be identified based on whether or not the source of the danger is an intentional agent:
— The source is intentional, “menacing enemies are attacking our civilization.
— The source is not intentional, the danger comes from the material world, and is interpreted as causal: “the storm is threatening the crops”; “you are at risk of cancer”.
The non-intentional source can be human. For example, the “shapes passing by in the fog” may be perceived as threatening even though they are actually peacefulemployees returning home from the office. This is the difference between N0 frightening N1 and Na terrifying Nb. The subject of terrorizes is intentional, N0 wants to frighten N1 (the gang is terrorizing the honest citizens), while the subject of terrifies is not necessarily intentional, and not necessarily human.
Fear speech expresses, inspires and reinforces a sense of feeling of danger and insecurity, through oriented narratives and arguments that bring together the reasons, valid or not, to be afraid. Fear strategies can have two diferent orientations. They can either leave their targets plagued by fears, or they can propose solutions to control or suppress the danger, see pathos; emotion.
Fear speech can be based upon a real threat (climate change), or an invented one (alien invasion). In either case, the agent may be intentional (terrorists) or unintentional purely causal (climate change). It may or may not be correlated with hate speech.
In the hands of the established power, threat and fear, like joy and reward, can be used as powerful instruments of social cohesion and social control in societies that adhere to the doctrine of “let the good rejoice and the wicked tremble”.
Threat speech is no different from fear speech, in which the speaker refers to an external threat. Threat speech can also be conveyed by an individual A expressing his or her intention to cause damage or harm to another individual N, if N does not comply with this or that requirement as imposed by A. In this case, the same person occupies the roles of speaker and villain. Such threatening language has an “either… or…” format:
Either you do this for me — which is, I agree, quite unpleasant for you — or I do that to you — which is really much more unpleasant for you.
So will I buy this land from you or your widow?
Whether or not this second type of threatening language should be considered an argument or not is debatable. If we are approached on a street corner and given the option of keeping our money or our life, we are likely to make a rational choice and choose to keep our life. If we are asked to explain where our money has gone, the existence of such a threat will be considered to be a good reason and a perfectly satisfactory justification for the loss of the money.
At the political level, balanced threats are the basis of nuclear deterrence; and it would be quite irrational not to take into account the fears imposed on the affected populations.
2. Threat and argumentation by the consequences
Threats can be effectively presented as an argument by the consequences, where causality is disguised by agentivity. Instead of openly assuming the role of the villain, the speaker poses as the unwitting agent of a negative event provoked by the irresponsible behavior of the future victim. The blackmailer presents himself or herself as an advisor, and frames the interlocutor as the one responsible for future misfortune:
Question: Should the company give its employees a raise?
Labor’s representative: — If there’s no raise, we’ll occupy the plant!
Employer’s representative: — If you persist in your unrealistic demands, we’ll be forced to close down the plant and cut jobs.
The same change of footing is operated by the politician who presents his own political decision as motivated by “the order of things”, see weight of circumstances.
3. Arguments from threat and promise
The Chinese philosopher Han-Fei proposes a theory of power as an expert mixing of the two measures (Han-Fei, Tao); that is the two basic material interests motivating human actions, punishments and rewards, excluding the question of rationality, or other kinds of value, such as justice.
This kind of management of human actions exploits two antagonistic psychic movements, fear and suffering of punishment, and the desire and satisfaction of reward. If arguing is making someone do something, or keeping someone from doing something, then threat and promise would be the two argumentative speech acts par excellence, see authority; pragmatic argument.
The everyday expression “the carrot and the stick” rightly associates the appeal to financial interest, with the traditional ad baculum argument; which might more appropriately be called ad baculum carotamque argument. The latter is no more “rational” than the former, though it is certainly more acceptable by many.
Appealing to money is not the only way to get what one wants; rewards and punishments could be based on anything and everything that people might desire. In particular, this could include power, pleasure, and money, see values.
The ad crumenam argument (Lat. crumena, “purse”), is mentioned in Tristram Shandy, where it refers to the introduction of considerations about money into a debate:
Then, added my father, making use of the argument Ad Crumenam, — I will lay twenty guineas to a single crown piece, […] that this same Stevinus was some engineer or other,—- or has wrote something or other, either directly or indirectly, upon the science of fortification”
Laurence Sterne, The Life and Opinions of Tristram Shandy, gentleman, [1760][1]
4. Appeal to superstition
Lat. ad superstitionem, superstitio, “superstition”
The label appeal to superstition was introduced by Bentham, to refer to the fallacy of “irrevocable commitment”, which prohibits the revision of prevailing political dispositions ([1824], p. 402); see political Arguments.
— “Fallacy of vows or promissory oaths; ad superstitionem”: “But we have sworn!”
— “Fallacy of irrevocable laws”: “But that wouldn’t respect the Constitution!”
Superstition is invoked here because of the oath supposedly taken to honor the will of a sacred Supernatural Power, or the Founding Fathers, “who knew better”, and “to whom we owe everything”. Failure to do so would be not only a lack of respect for the authority of the Founding Fathers, but also a religious or moral sin that would provoke some supernatural vengeance. It can be assumed that such threats are the flip side of promises that submission to the law will be duly rewarded. Consequently, the appeal to superstition as defined here is a subspecies of the appeal to threats and promises made by transcendental powers. In this case, the argument is a somewhat materialistic version of the argument from faith.
Non-cynical, ordinary citizens believe that politicians must keep their campaign promises. It would be difficult for failed politicians to invoke the fallacy of irrevocable commitment to perpetually justify their alliances and agenda reversals.
[1] In The Complete Work of Laurence Sterne. Delphi Classics, 2013, p. 98.
would constitute not only a lack of respect for the authority of the Founding Fathers, but a religious or moral sin provoking some supernatural revenge. It can be assumed that such threats are the flipside to promises that submission to the Law will be duly rewarded. As a consequence, the appeal to superstition as defined here is a subspecies of appeal to threats and promises, made by transcendental powers. In this case, the argument represents a somewhat materialistic version of the argument from faith.
Non-cynical, ordinary citizens consider that politicians must honor their election commitments. It would be difficult for failed politicians to invoke the fallacy of irrevocable commitment to perpetually justify their alliance and agenda reversals.
[1] In The Complete Work of Laurence Sterne. Delphi Classics, 2013, p. 98.