The  domain of argumentation studies can be characterized   according to an underlying system of key features, questions and orientations.

1. Key questions about the role of language

The following table proposes a possible organization of the field according to the role of language and the type of speech situation that is given theoretical prominence. This hypothesis makes it possible to represent the various concepts of argumentation as a tree structure, in which the nodes correspond to the research questions, or crossroads questions, that articulate the field.
Such a representation illustrates that what might at first glance to be an arbitrary dispersion of options, actually reflects the need to take into account  the complex range of argumentative situations.

A vision of argumentation might be characterized as a structured choice among the various options opened up by the following questions.
Other possible starting points will be suggested in §2.

Table : Key features and questions about the role of language in argumentation

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	as a thought activity (2)	The study of reasoning as a purely psycho-cognitive process (2a)
					form of language (7)
		extended (5)
					general form of discourse (8)
				non polyphonic (11)	logic, as an art of thinking (9a)
argumentation (1)			monologue (9)
	as a linguistic cognitive activity (3)			polyphonic (12)	« bene dicendi » rhetoric (10a)
		situated (6)
				without turn-taking (13)	persuasion rhetoric (11a)
			dialogue (10)		dialogue logic (15)
				with turn- taking (14)
					interaction (16)
	as a multimodal activity (4)

 

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(1) Argumentation

(2) AS A THINKING ACTIVITY:
             The study of argumentation as a psycho-cognitive process

 

(3) AS A LINGUISTIC-COGNITIVE ACTIVITY

(5) Extendedg                                              

(7)  as a form of language:  “ARGUMENTATION WITHIN LANGUAGE” 

(8) as the eneral form of discourse: “NATURAL LOGIC”

(6) Situated

(9) monologue 

not polyphonic:       LOGIC AS AN ART OF THINKING   

polyphonic:       « BENE DICENDI” RHETORIC

 

(10) dialog

without  turn-taking:       RHETORIC OF PERSUASION

 with turn-taking:       DIALOGUE LOGIC
                                          INTERACTION                      

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(2) vs. (3) vs. (4): The Cognitive, Linguistic and Multimodal Dimensions of Argumentation

Different general questions could be taken as starting points, and each question would produce a different map of the field. This map is arises from the general question: is argumentation fundamentally a linguistic activity or a cognitive activity — or both?

If argumentation were defined as a pure activity of thinking, expressed in a perfectly transparent language, the study of argumentation would correspond to a psychology of thinking without language.

But mathematical thinking and scientific reasoning require language, as does everyday argumentation, . Language-based approaches to argumentation deal with the cognitive component within the linguistic component. Such approaches are compatible with different positions on the question of thinking and reasoning. Classical Logic, Natural Logic, Informal Logic and cognitive approaches stress the articulation of thought and language in the argumentative activity.

Argumentation is unanimously understood as a discursive practice. The consideration of still and moving images raises the question of how argumentative meanings are able to invest non-verbal semiotic supports. The study of argumentation in work situations also requires us to consider the signifying intention that guides both the action and the argument into account. In both cases, it is necessary to rethink what exactly constitutes a well-constructed corpus within the field of argumentation.

 

(5) vs. (6) — Argumentation as a linguistic-cognitive activity: Extended or situated?

Should argumentation, as a linguistic cognitive process, be considered a local or a general phenomenon? (a special kind of passage / the general form of discourse?)

 

(7) vs. (8) — Extended argumentation: Saussurian langue or discourse?

Two different theories have extended the concept of argumentation to all linguistic activities, the theory of Argumentation within Language (Anscombre, Ducrot 1983) and the theory of argumentation as a Natural Logic (Grize 1982).

The former generalizes the concept of argumentation at the level of language (of Saussurian langue), while the latter enacts the same generalization at the level of speech (parole).

(7) Argumentation, as a condition for well-formed linguistic chain {E1, E2}:
see Orientation

(8) Argumentation as a schematization of the situation

 

(9) vs. (10) — Situated argumentation: Monologue or Dialogue?

If argumentation is restricted to some characteristic forms of discourse, then in which type of discourse is it best exemplified, in monologic discourse, or in dialogue?

 

(11) vs. (12) — Monologue: Logic or Rhetoric?

(11) Logic

(12) Bene dicendi rhetoric, see Rhetoric

 

(13) vs. (14) — Dialogue: With or without turn taking?

According to the externalization principle (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1992, p. 10), dialogical theories either assume that dialogue is the basic form of argumentative activity, or that it is in the form of a dialogue that the argumentative mechanisms of argumentation, can be most clearly seen.

Within this set of dialogical approaches, there are distinctions. Does the dialogue has an exchange structure or not? Does the dialogue admit turns of speech? Do all the participants have equal possibility of taking the floor in the same conditions?

(13) Argumentation, a dialogue without an exchange structure: The Rhetorical Address

The rhetorical address is a special kind of dialogue, with a polyphonic structure; the voices of the others, especially the opponent’s voice, are rincorporated into the discourse of the speaker who has the floor. The audience intervenes only later and indirectly, as a verdict on the case or a decision on the policy.

(15) vs. (16) — A turn-taking dialog: Dialogue logic or natural interaction?

In the case of a dialogue in which there is a possibility of exchange, one of the following two poles will provide the appropriate basis, 1) a logical approach to formal dialogues, or 2) an empirical approach to natural interactions.

(15) Argumentation, a formalized critical dialogue

Since the 1970s the Informal Logic and the Pragma-Dialectic theories have reorientated argumentation studies by giving the priority to the study of argumentation as a kind of dialogue.

Dialectical-critical theories of argumentation reinforce the constraints of dialogue either through a system of rules designed to embody a rational standard, as in Pragma-Dialectic, or through of a system of critical questions, as in Informal Logic. see Norms.

 (16) Argumentation, a type of ordinary interaction

Proto-argumentative activity is triggered by a lack of ratification by the addressee. Depending on the reaction of the interaction partners, the conversation disruption may pass quickly, being absorbed into the flow of the ongoing task they are engaged in. Otherwise, the interaction might develop into a fully-fledged argumentative situation. In either cases, the argumentative situation is fundamentally governed by interactional principles.

This view is compatible with the ancient theory of “argumentative questions” (or stasis, or point to adjudicate).

For each of these points, the question is not which to adopt and which to exorcise, but to clearly articulate the contrast between the approaches they define.

2. Other points of departure

The above table develops from the question of language. Other questions might give rise to alternative maps of the field.

2.1 Kind of rationality?

Truth and rationality can be considered:

• As an attribute of a well-thought monological discourse, best exemplified in logic, as an art of thinking;
• As the consensus of the properly defined universal audience, within the prospect of a rhetoric of persuasion;
• As a social production, the result of a well organized critical dialog to reach the best possible true and rational answer in the course of a dialectical process;
• A a progressive construct, through a closer contact with scientific results, thought and method.

In complete opposition to these guidelines, generalized theories of argumentation maintain an agnostic perspective on rationality, and question the very possibility of reaching it through ordinary discourse.

2.2 Form or function?

Is argumentation (first, better) defined by its function or by its form? This question opposes two theoretical families, one focusing on persuasion, and the other focusing on the structural description and formal representation of argumentative episodes. These two starting points themselves give rise to symmetrical questioning: how to deal with functional aspects in the latter case? What are the structural criteria that ensure the descriptive adequacy of the in the former case?

2.3 Argumentativity, a binary or gradual concept?

For extended theories of argumentation, language (Ducrot) or discourse (Grize) are basically argumentative, S. Orientation; Schematization.

In the case of restricted theories of argumentation, however, some discursive genres (deliberative, epideictic, judicial) or, more broadly, certain kinds of discursive sequences are argumentative and opposed to other non-argumentative genres or other types of sequences. These definitions tend to consider that argumentativity is a binary concept: a sequence is or is not argumentative.

In reference to the language exchanged between partners defending contrasting positions, the argumentativity of a situation is not an all or nothing concept; various forms and degrees of argumentativity can be distinguished.

— A given linguistic situation begins to become argumentative when opposition emerges between two lines of speech, quite possibly without reference to each other, as in an argumentative diptych. This is most probably the basic argumentative structure, each partner repeats and restates his position. S. Disagreement. We can thus go beyond the opposition between narrative, descriptive or argumentative sequences. When a description or a narration is developed in support of an answer to an argumentative question, this narration or description should be considered as fully argumentative and evaluated as such.

— Communication is fully argumentative when the difference is problematized as an argumentative question, with the participants taking roles as proponent, opponent, or third party, S. Roles.

2.4 Central objects?

The various approaches to argumentation are characterized by the nature of their internal assumptions and external assumptions. The former correspond to the organization of the concepts postulated in the system, and the latter, to the kinds of objects taken into consideration. Both types of hypotheses are bound.

The extremities of the branches in any of the preceding “decision trees” represent a pole articulating theoretical views with specific “preferred” objects. To satisfy the requirement of descriptive adequacy each theory must combine its central objects with what it posits as peripheral objects. Decisions as to what is to be considered as central and as peripheral (derived or secondary) data, fall within the domain of external assumptions. Such choices are never self-evident and require justification. So, for example, the decision to give priority to dialogue or to take as reference monologal syllogistic discourse, correspond to two distinct external assumptions regarding the structure of the argumentation field, and clearly put to the fore quite different kinds of data.

This does not imply that second level (often annoying) facts and data are excluded, rather that all phenomena cannot be put on the same level; data must be ordered, and prioritized. In practice, the problem is to determine how the results established on the basis of central facts can be expanded to peripheral data.

Some major types of coupling of internal and external assumptions:

— Rhetorical argumentation, and planned monological speech.
— Dialectical argumentation, and conventionalized dialogues.
— Argumentation as orientation, and pairs of statements.
— Argumentation as schematization, and texts, etc.

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ARGUMENTATION 1: DEFINITIONS

The analysis of argumentation has been intensively and specifically studied since the post-World War II period (references infra) :

The bi-millennial framework of logic as an “art of thinking” in natural language has been taken up and reworked in the new intellectual framework of the post-Fregean mathematical logic as a Substantial Logic, an Informal Logic, or a Natural Logic.

A new vision of argumentation as discourse orientation has been developed in the semantic theory of Argumentation within Language.

Ancient rhetoric has been recast as New Rhetoric. Dialectics has been revisited in relation to pragmatics and speech act theories, and expanded into a powerful critical tool within the framework of Pragma-dialectic.

The perspectives of rhetoric and dialectics are now ubiquitous in contemporary studies and teaching programs on argumentation. The connections between rhetoric, textual linguistics and discourse analysis have been recognized and rearticulated.

The spectacular results of interactions analysis have opened up the immense field of everyday conversational interactions as a specific domain of investigation, where argument as “dispute” intertwines with argument as “good reason”.

The various theories of argumentation developed in the late twentieth century are based on different visions and definitions of their objects, methods and goals. Given this diversity, and the apparent and real discrepancies between definitions, there is a real temptation of synthesize, that is, to look for a definition that, while not trivial, will restore order, unity, simplicity and consensus.
Experience shows, however, that many new definitions intended to replace older ones, simply add to the existing lists, thereby exacerbating the problem that they were intended to solve.

Another solution could be to start with things as they are, that is, to admit that the field of argumentation studies does not develop in the hypothetical-deductive style of starting from an overwhelming “master definition” and deriving its consequences, but rather in a more empirical, data-driven, manner.
In practice, this suggests that one can very well start with a corpus of definitions of the concept of argumentation in order to identify the points of consensus and divergence, while emphasizing the points of view that have proven to be the most fruitful

1. Rhetorical argumentation, an instrument of persuasion

Socrates views and rejects rhetoric as an enterprise in social persuasion through speech. He shares this definition with his opponents, especially Gorgias:

Gorgias — I’m referring to the ability to persuade by speeches judges in a law court, councilors in a council meeting, and assemblymen in an assembly or in any political gathering that might take place. (Plato, Gorgias, 452e; p. 798)

Socrates — Well, then isn’t the rhetorical art, taken as a whole, a way of directing the souls by means of speech, not only in the law courts and on other public occasions, but also in private? (Plato, Phaedrus, 261a ; CW, p. 537)

This defines the common use of the word rhetoric in ancient Greece, what people call rhetoric.
Now what rhetoric is, in its substance — or lack of substance — is another story:

By my reasoning, oratory is an image of a part of politics. (Plato, Gorgias, 463d; CW, p. 807)

Politics is defined as the craft of addressing “the soul » (ibid, 464b, p. 808), and rhetoric is discarded as an insubstantial “image”, an eidolon, a counterfeit of politics. Socrates unreservedly condemns rhetorical discourse aimed at persuasion, as a lie, an illusion, a manipulative enterprise, antagonistic to truth-seeking philosophical discourse.
This unqualified and irrevocable condemnation of rhetoric as counterfeit is at the root of the popular negative meaning of the word, and this obviously includes argumentative rhetoric as well. The criticism of rhetoric is part of the field of rhetoric, and the same is true of the field of argument.

Aristotle positions rhetoric not as a counterfeit but as “the counterpart of dialectic” (Rhet, I, 1, 1354a1; RR p. 95) and defines it as an empirical techne, a craft, oriented toward the study of specific cases:

Rhetoric may be defined as the faculty of observing in any given case the available means of persuasion (Rhet, I, 2, 1355b25; RR, p. 105).

Cicero follows this functional definition:

Cicero Junior: — What is an argument?
Cicero Father — A plausible device [probabile] to obtain belief.
Cicero, Part., II, 5; p. 315

Crassus — As becomes a man well born and liberally educated, I learned those trite and common precepts of teachers in general; first, that it is the business of an orator to speak in a manner adapted to persuade. (Cicero, De Or., I, XXXI; p. 40)

Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca’s “New Rhetoric”  also focuses on persuasion:

The object of the study of argumentation is the study of the discursive techniques allowing us to induce or to increase the mind’s adherence to the theses presented for its assent. ([1958], p. 4; italics in the original)

By focusing on “discursive techniques” and on “the mind’s adherence”, this definition re-builds argumentation studies on the same basis as those of the Aristotelian argumentative rhetoric, persuasive speech. It reconnects the contemporary understanding of argumentation with the experience gained throughout two millennia.

Thesis, mind, presented, assent, discursive techniques: this definition articulates the core concepts of what could be called “the argumentation movement” as a vision of man and discourse in modern democratic societies.

— The claims are theses. This is a philosophical term; the issues addressed by argumentative interventions are complex and high level, “the most rational” (id., p. 7). The Treatise keeps its distance from everyday arguments and minds: it does not address the ignorant, and more: “there are beings with whom any contact may seem superfluous or undesirable…” (id., p. 15).

— These theses are presented to the audience, imposed on

— Moreover, they are presented to the minds of the audience, that is, to men and women wo are endowed with the capacity for choice and decision; and who live under social conditions that allow them to exercise this capacity to the full.
This action on the minds can be contrasted with the manipulation of souls and bodies: souls with their capacities of emotion and sensibility / sensitivity to romantic or mystical appeals; bodies which can be forced to march or vibrate in unison under a musical mantra or image.

— Consent assent results from an explicit judgment of a free and conscious mind. Assent can be given or withdrawn. Expressing one’s assent is in contrast to producing a response under the causal pressure of a stimulus.

— Finally, argumentation is a discursive technique, that is, a form of speech in which speakers can practice and improve.

— The Treatise does not deal with fallacies, but the evaluation of arguments is a central theme of the book. The sound criticism and evaluation of arguments is not a matter for the orator, but for the partner audiences, both particular and universal.

2. Argumentation as a way of dealing with stasis situations

The Rhetoric to Herennius by an unknown author of the first century BC (formerly attributed to Cicero) articulates argumentative rhetoric with the key concept of stasis. In a court of law, the contradiction between the two parties determines the “point to adjudicate” and produces a stasis, which defines an argumentative situation:

The point to adjudicate is established from the accusation and the denial, as follows: Accusation: ‘You killed Ajax.’ Denial: ‘I did not.’ The point to adjudicate: Did he kill him?
(To Her., I, 17; p 53)

Argumentation can thus be generally defined as an institutionally developped instrument for dealing with and resolving stasis situations, see. Argumentative Question.

3. Argumentation as “substantial logic” and default reasoning

According to Toulmin’s “layout of argument”, the argumentative passage is defined by its structure. The capitalized concepts originate from Toulmin.

— A speaker presents a Claim, based on Data that is oriented by general rules or principles, the Backing, and the Warrant. This defines the monologic assertive component of the argument.

— The Claim is defeasible under certain Rebuttal conditions, expressed by a Modal affecting the Claim. This reservation component refers to a dialogic and critical approach of argumentation.

The combination of an assertive and a refutative component in an “argumentative cell”, both linguistically and cognitively, defines reasonable-rational discourse.

This Toulminian complex is often reduced to the main parts of its assertive component “Data, Claim”,

Slavery has been abolished, why not prostitution? I do believe in the progress of civilization.
When snakes come out, it’s going to rain. We know that from experience.

Toulmin makes no reference to rhetoric. But as Bird has pointed out (1961), with his Warrant and Backing, Toulmin has “rediscovered” the more than two-thousand-year-old concept of topic, fundamental to the rhetorical theory of argument.
This approach is fully compatible with a class of classical definitions of rhetorical argument, such as the following,

Cicero senior — I take it that what you desire to hear about is ratiocination, which is the process of developing the arguments. […]
Cicero Junior — Of course, that is exactly what I require.
Cicero Senior — Well then, ratiocination, as I have just said, is the process of developing the argument; but this process is achieved when you have taken certain or probable premises from which you draw a conclusion which appears in itself either doubtful or less probable.
Cicero, Part., XIII, 46; p. 345-347; my italics

How does one make the doubtful a little less doubtful? Like Toulmin, Cicero sees argumentation (“ratiocination”) as a technique to reduce uncertainty.

4. Argumentation as Schematization

According to Jean-Blaise Grize,

As I understand it, argumentation considers the interlocutor not as an object to be manipulated but as an alter ego with whom a vision must be shared. To work on him means to try to change the various representations attributed to him, by highlighting certain aspects of things, hiding others, proposing him new perspectives, and all this with the help of an appropriate schematization. (Grize 1990, p. 40)

Arguing consists in schematizing, or framing the situation for the interlocutor.
Such a generalization extends the concept of argumentation over the whole act of saying something to someone:

Arguing amounts to making some claims that we choose to compose in a discourse. Conversely, asserting (saying) amounts to arguing, simply because we choose to say and put forward some meanings rather than others. (Vignaux 1981, p. 91)

This vision of saying as essentially a rhetorical argumentative activity has deep roots in the rhetorical tradition.

It can be compared to what Quintilian presents as the essence of rhetorical argumentation:

The art of speaking well. (IO, II, 15, 37)

This famous formula is often quoted in Latin, rhetoric is the « ars bene dicendi »; the definition is supplemented by the definition of the orator as “a good man who speaks well”.
Argumentative rhetoric becomes the legislative technique of persuasive speech, guaranteed by the quality of the speaker, see. Ethos.
This vision of rhetoric is the backbone of the classical humanities.

Compared to Grize — who, as far as I know, never quotes Quintilian, no more than Toulmin referred to the classical science of topoi — the only difference is that Quintilian emphasizes the educational dimension of rhetoric, while Grize simply analyzes argumentation as it is found in natural discourse.

This line of thought generalizes rhetoric to all forms of controlled expression, thus founding a Rhetorik der Sprache (Kallmeyer 1996), a “rhetoric of speech”.

5. Argumentation as orientation

Anscombre and Ducrot’s theory of argumentation within language is based on the fact that, in natural language, the argument as a statement is linguistically linked to the conclusion, which is defined as the next statement:

A speaker argues when he presents a statement S1 (or a set of statements) as intended to make a new statement (or a set of new statements), S2, acceptable. Our thesis is that there are linguistic constraints on this construction. For a statement S1 to be given as an argument supporting a statement S2, it is not sufficient that S1 gives reason to admit S2. The linguistic structure of S1 must also satisfy certain conditions in order to constitute an argument for S2 in a speech. (Anscombre & Ducrot 1983, p. 8)

This approach leads to a redefinition of the concept of topos, as a semantic link between two predicates, see Topos in Semantics.

By redefining the argumentative constraint as a linguistic constraint between constraints, Anscombre and Ducrot generalize the concept of argumentation as a property of the linguistic system (langue and not parole “speech”, as defined by de Saussure).

S. Orientation; Argumentative scale.

6. Argumentation between Monologue and Dialogue

Argument seems to be a mode of discourse which is neither purely monologic nor dialogic. (Schiffrin 1987, p. 17)
[I have defined argument as] a discourse through which speakers support disputable positions. (Id., p. 18)

Schiffrin’s work is not primarily concerned to argument. However, this succinct definition, however, perfectly expresses the mixed character of argumentative activity.

7. Argumentation, a discourse submitted to a rational judge

Argumentation is a verbal and social activity, aiming to strengthen or weaken the acceptability of a controversial point of view from a listener or reader, advancing a constellation of proposals to justify (or disprove) that view before a rational judge. (van Eemeren & al. 1996, p. 5)

This definition combines the rhetorical and dialectical positions. It redefines the position of the third party, the judge, not as an empirical, institutional figure, arguing on the basis of the legal corpus of law and jurisprudence shaped by history and sociology, but instead as a normative rational figure, arguing on the basis of a set of independently defined rational principles, S. Norms; Evaluation and Evaluators.

8. Guidelines adopted in this dictionary

(i) An argumentative situation is defined in the Ad Herennium style: a complex dialogic situation opened by an argumentative question.

(ii) An argumentative question is a question to which the arguers (the debaters) give argued answers, possibly both sensible and reasonable, but incompatible, organized in pro- and a contra-discourse.

(iii) These answers express the conclusions (points of view) of the arguers about the issue. The elements of pro- and counter-discourse which support these conclusions have the status of argument for their respective conclusions.

(iv) Argumentative situations come in a variety of degrees and types of argumentativity, according to the kinds of relationship established between the pro- and counter- discourses and to the interactional and institutional parameters framing the exchanges.

Points (i) to (iv) define the external argumentative relevance, as the relevance of a conclusion for a question.

(v) An argumentation, in the monologic sense is defined as the “argumentative cell”, as represented in Toulmin’s layout.
In the broad sense, the word argumentation covers all the verbal and semiotic activities produced in an argumentative situation.

(vi) An argument is an implicit or explicit combination of statements supporting a conclusion.

(vii) The internal argumentative relevance, as the relevance of an argument for a claim is defined in relation to an argument scheme.

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ARGUMENT – CONCLUSION

1. Argument

The word argument is used in various fields, in grammar, logic, literature, and argumentation, with quite different meanings.

— In logic and mathematics, the arguments of a function f are the empty places x, y, z… that characterize the function; the independent entities (variables) organized by the function.

— By analogy, in grammar, the verb plus its subject and object(s) can be considered the counterpart of a function. For example,
to give, corresponds to the three-argument predicate “x gives y to z”;
to love corresponds to a two-argument predicate, “x loves y”.

By replacing each of these variables with an appropriate phrase (i.e., respecting the semantic relation that characterizes the verb), we form a proposition: “Adam gives Eve an apple”, see Proposition.

— In literature, the central argument of a play or a novel corresponds to the plan, the summary, or the guiding principle of the plot. In this sense, the word argument is morphologically and semantically isolated; argument as « a summary » has no relation to conclusion, nor to arguing₁, argumentation.

2. Argument and argumentation

The words argument and proof are used to translate the Greek word pistis and the Latin word argumentum.

2.1 Argument ~ argumentation

By synecdoche, argument often means argumentation: “let the best argument win!”

2.2 Premise, Data, Argument 

— In logic, the premises of the syllogism lead to a conclusion. The premises are propositions that express true or false judgments. The conclusion is a proposition that is different from the premises and that is derived solely from their combination, without the surreptitious introduction of implicit background information into the argument, see syllogism. A premise is not an argument but a component of an argument; the argument is constructed by combining the two premises.

— In argumentation, the conclusion is derived from a piece of information combined with an inferential topic. The situation is the same in Toulmin’s layout of argument, where the data becomes an argument when combined with an often implicit system justification/support « warrant / backing », see Toulmin’s model. The word argument is routinely used to refer to the data element as the head of such combinations.

— In analytic and direct inferences, the conclusion is derived directly from a single statement that is an argument in itself. The conclusion is derived from the form or the semantic content of the statement argument, S. Proposition.

Argument and conclusion are correlative terms. The relation « argument — conclusion » is expressed, more or less precisely by expressions like those listed below. If necessary, “is” can be replaced by « is presented as such by the speaker » (as in line 1, etc.).

The argument	The conclusion
— is a consensual statement, or is presented as such by the arguer)	— is a dissensual, contested, disputed statement
— is more probable than the conclusion	— is less probable than the argument
— is the cognitive starting point in deliberative argumentation — is the end point in justificatory argumentation	— is the end point of deliberative argumentation — is the starting point in justificatory argumentation
— expresses a reason	— searches for a reason
— does not bear the burden of proof	— bears the burden of proof
— is oriented towards the conclusion	— is a projection of the argument
— (in a functional perspective, from the point of view of the speaker determines, legitimates the conclusion	— — determined, legitimated by the argument
— (in a dialogical perspective) accompanies the answer given to the argumentative question	— — is the correct answer to the argumentative question

2.3 Argument: true, probable, plausible, accepted, conceded…

A statement is taken (or presented) as sufficiently true to be used as an argument on very different bases.

— The argument conveys a known fact, an intellectual self-evidence, see Self-Evidence.

The heat of the wax dilates the pores, making the pulling up less painful (Linguee)

— The partners have explicitly agreed on the statement, e.g.as part of   (quasi-) dialectical agreement:

We agree that Syldavia cannot leave the Eurozone now, so we can make further demands on them.

— The speaker has chosen his argument from those that are considered to be true by the audience, even if he or she has personal doubts about its validity, see Ex datis:

You think that Syldavia will never leave the Eurozone, so…

— A simple fact: the statement is challenged, either by the opponent or the audience.

The audience’s acceptance of stable statements, which that may serve to support the conclusion, is always precarious. The opponent’s belief in the truth of a given statement is even less stable. The choice of what will be considered a valid argument is therefore a strategic choice that will change depending on the circumstances, see Strategy.

Challenging the argument — If the argument is to be challenged, it must itself be legitimized. As part of this operation, the argument assumes the status of a claim made by the proponent and supported by a series of arguments. These new arguments serve as sub-arguments in support the overarching claim, see Linked argument; Epicheirema. If no agreement can be reached on any claim, things can, theoretically, go backwards indefinitely and the debate can continue indefinitely. The risks associated with such “deep disagreement” should not be seen as invalidating argumentation as a useful social tool for dealing with social incompatibilities, provided that third parties play their role in well-regulated settings.

3. Claim, Thesis, Conclusion, Viewpoint, Point of view, Standpoint

In argumentation, the conclusion is also called the claim, or standpoint.
A philosophical conclusion is often called a thesis, S. Dialectic.
The set of conclusions drawn from complex data at the end of an abduction process can be a full-blown theory, S. Abduction.

3.1 Point of view, viewpoint, standpoint

In the socio-political domain, a standpoint is an « opinion », possibly justified by arguments. The pragma-dialectical program aims at reducing, resolving, or eliminating differences of opinion. The corresponding expressions « resolving… differences of conclusions, claims, thesis… » are not used.
An argument as a point of view, an opinion, a perspective… expressed in a single sentence is a very special case. Points of view and opinions are usually expressed in complex discourses, supported by equally complex argumentative sub-discourses. The expression point of view can be used to refer to an entire discourse, including the point of view and the good reasons that support it.
In ordinary language, the concept of point of view organizes the speaker’s perceptual reference system:

On the other side of the hedge was a gardener.
On the other side of the hedge was a street.

In one case, the speaker is outside the garden, in the other inside the garden. The concept of point of view used in argumentation is highly metaphorical. It frames the argumentative situation according to the visual metaphor of a spectator within a landscape, which would be the reality, inaccessible as such, if not represented on a map.
The spectator’s vision provides a section of reality that is restructured according to the laws of perspective. The reality referred to by the point of view is only so with respect to a focus, that is, by definition, unstable. In this sense, a point of view is either questionable because it acts as a blinker; or valuable, because it protects one from the objectivist illusion produced by consensus, and from the paranoia of absolute knowledge.

An affirmation corresponds to a point of view if it is traceable to one subjective source, whereas absolute truth, or vision, is independent of any source, or has a universal, absolute source.
The point of view is an inescapable starting point. Points of view are comparable and evaluable. We cannot be without a point of view, but we can define a better point of view; change our point of view, and multiply our points of view. To eliminate differences in viewpoints, one would have to eliminate subjectivity, or the plurality of voices, and decontextualize the discourse.
Scientific discourses routinely do this, but, insofar as argumentative discourse seeks to deal with human affairs, involving (legitimate) interests, values, and their affective correlates, argumentation analysis cannot align itself with scientific language without changing the nature of its objects and goals. The radical elimination of points of view would require the resurrection of Hegel’s absolute subject, or of the objective and omniscient narrator of nineteenth-century novels.

3.2 Conclusion

The opening section of a discourse is its introduction, the closing section its conclusion. The argumentative conclusion is different from the material conclusion that ends an intervention. The argumentative conclusion can be stated, or repeated, in any part of speech, at the beginning or at the end, or both.

The argumentative conclusion is defined in relation to the argument (see table above). In an argumentative monolog, the conclusion is the claim by which the discourse is organized; to which it converges; in which its orientation is materialized; the intention that gives the discourse its meaning, and the ultimate core of the text obtained by condensing it.

The conclusion is more or less separable from the arguments that support it. Once we have reached the conclusion that « Harry is probably a British citizen », we can, by default, act on that belief. But, insofar as the modal probably expresses clear reservations about the whole inferential process, the claim remains open to revision (i.e. is revisable) as the available information changes. The “fire and forget” principle [1] does not work well in argumentation. The conclusion is never completely divorced from the language used in its construction.

A statement S becomes a claim in the following dialogical configuration

(1) — S is asserted by a speaker (as something essential to him, or merely anecdotal)
(2) — S is not ratified by the addressee: non-preferred second turn
(3) — S is reasserted, possibly reformulated by the speaker
(4) — S is explicitly rejected by the interlocutor (reassertion not ratified, i.e.  disagreement ratified)
(5) — Pro- and contra-arguments emerge

At stage (3), the disagreement emerges. At stage (4) the disagreement is ratified as such, a stasis is formed, and S is now a Claim made by the first speaker. At stage (5), the stasis begins to develop

Stage (1) is not a dialectical “opening stage”. The speaker does not necessarily intend to open a dispute. Non-ratification can occur at any time in an interaction, and can involve any foreground or background statement, see Denying; Disagreement. In other words, being a claim is not a property of a statement, but is attached to the treatment of a statement in an interactive configuration.

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[1] “(Of a missile) capable of guiding itself to its target after being fired.” (EOD, fire-and-forget) (11-08-2017)

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To Argue, Argument, Argumentation, Argumentative:
The Words

1. The Words

1.1 To argue ­

The verb to argue has two different meanings which will be referred to, respectively, as to argue₁ and to argue₂:

— To argue₁: “to give reasons for or against; to debate”
— To argue₂: « to engage in a quarrel; to dispute: We must stop arguing and engage in constructive dialogue (tfd, Argue).

The morphological, syntactic, and semantic differences between these meanings are crucial and clear.

Morphology

The word argumentation is derived from to argue₁ via argument₁; it refers only to speech in which a conclusion is supported by good reasons.

Syntax

— To argue_1 is followed by a that clause: “A argues that P”; P is the claim.
— To argue_2 is followed by a double indirect complement: “A argues with B about Q”. Q is neither A‘s nor B‘s claim, but refers to the subject of the dispute.

Semantics

— To argue_₁ means “to give reasons” (MW, Argue) and refers to a semiotic activity (verbal and co-verbal).

— To argue_₂ means “to have a disagreement a quarrel, a dispute” (ibid.), and refers to the wide range of interactions from a lively discussion to outright pugilism, as shown in the following passage, in which the detective Ned Beaumont questions an informant, Sloss:

Ned Beaumont nodded. ‘Just what did you see?’
‘We saw Paul and the kid standing there under the trees, arguing’
‘You could see that as you rode past?’
Sloss nodded vigorously again.
‘It was a dark spot’, Ned Beaumont reminded him. ‘I don’t see how you could’ve made out their faces riding past like that, unless you slowed up or stopped.’
‘No, we didn’t, but I’d know Paul anywhere,’ Sloss insisted.
‘Maybe, but how’d you know it was the kid with him?’
‘It was. Sure it was. We could see enough of him to know that’
‘And you could see they were arguing? What do you mean by that? Fighting?’
‘No, but standing like they were having an argument. You know how you can tell when people are arguing sometimes by the way they stand’
Ned Beaumont smiled mirthlessly. ‘Yes, if one of them’s standing on the other’s face.’ His smile vanished.
Dashiell Hammett, The Glass Key, [1931][1].

1.2 Argument ­

The noun an argument inherits the two meanings of to argue; an argument₁ is a “good reason”, an argument₂ is a “dispute”, possibly including argument₁.
Grimshaw’s book, Conflict Talk. Sociolinguistic Investigations of Arguments in Conversation (1990), deals exclusively deals with arguments₂ “disputes”, and not at all with arguments_1, “good reasons”.

Argument can have two other meanings
Argument₃, as “the abstract, the theme, the subject matter” (of a literary work, etc.).
Argument₄, in mathematics, the variable associated to a function

“Argument is War” — Lakoff and Johnson have discussed the famous equivalence “argument is war”:

Let us start with the concept argument and the conceptual metaphor argument is war. This metaphor is reflected in our everyday language by a wide variety of expressions:

Your claims are indefensible.
He attacked every weak point in my argument.
His criticisms were right on target.
I demolished his argument. […]

“We can actually win or lose arguments” (1980, p. 4)

Lakoff and Johnson call this “the concept argument”. If the preceding conclusion is correct, then, there are not one but two concepts of argument. To argue₂ and argument₂ may be associated with some kind of war; but what about argument₁ and to argue₁?

If interlinguistic comparisons can tell anything about words used as concepts, note that, in French, the first set of metaphors is easily translated word for word; but the expression “we can actually win or lose arguments” is not.

The words to argue, argument, and argumentation have clearly recognizable counterparts in French or Spanish, or in the Romance languages in general:

French argumenter, argument, argumentation
Spanish argumentar, argumento, argumentación

This graphic illustration of the proximity of these words certainly favors the internationalization of the concept. However, there are deep differences between their respective meanings, which can be roughly represented as follows:

English

dispute

good reason

topic

 

French

good reason

topic

 

Spanish

good reason

topic

The French word argument and the Spanish word argumento never refer to a dispute. The field of argumentation studies develops from the common meaning of argument₁, “good reason”.

This suggests that the meaning of to argue₂, argument₂ in a language is independent of the concept referred to by the family to argue₁, argument₁, argumentation.

1.3 Argumentative

According to the Merriam-Webster Dictionary, the adjective argumentative shares the two meanings of its morphological base, argument: « controversial » and « disputatious » (MW, Argumentative). The Merriam-Webster Learner’s Dictionary, however, is more categorical (MWLD, Argumentative):

Argumentative: tending to argue; having or showing a tendency to disagree or argue with other people in an angry way: quarrelsome.

An argumentative person
He became more argumentative during the debate.
An argumentative essay.

By default, in this dictionary, argumentative will be attached to the family “argumentation” (argumentative₁), that is, a semantically derived of argument₁ “good reason”, unless contextually clear or otherwise specified. An argumentative essay is taken to be “an essay that develops an argumentation”; when referring to “a polemical essay” (argumentative₂), its quarrelsome character will be explicitly mentioned.

2. Divergent orientations: the words argumenter, argument  vs arguer, argutie in French

In French, from a morphological point of view, the verb arguer is the basic verb from which all the argu- words are derived:

arguer   → un argument      → argumenter       → une argumentation, etc
« an argument »     « to argue »          « an argumentation », etc.

But arguer_F must be distinguished; to argue does not match argumenter_F, nor does arguer_F. There is a semantic discontinuity between arguer_F and argumenter_F. When S1 says:

S:   — Pierre argumente en faveur de P, “Peter argues that P”

S considers that Peter does give arguments_F. If he or she says:

S:   — Pierre argue que… “Peter argues_F that so-and-so”

S is simply quoting the argumentative discourse of Peter without taking a position on the validity of the arguments offered by Peter, and even suggesting that they might be fallacious. In a newspaper the construction:

The extreme right argues_F that…

introduces an argumentation_F presented as weak or invalid.
That is, the verbs arguer_F and argumenter_F have opposite orientations. The former values discourse content as arguments, while the latter suggests that it only presents pseudo-arguments.

Quibble can be translated in French as argutie_F, a word derived from arguer_F:

These people are the manipulated agents of subversion, carrying out instructions and rehashing quibbles [« répétant des arguties »].

Arguer_F and argutie_F are used only occasionally. Arguer_F can be replaced by argument_F between quotes. Thus, a pro-wind farm group quotes the arguments of its opponents, the anti-wind farm group, as follows:

Let’s look at some of the anti-wind farms ‘arguments’
(Complete example, see Convergent argumentation)

The concept of argument, and argumentation studies, benefit from the strong positive orientation that the words argument and argumentation have in ordinary language.
The same is true for the word and the concept of dialogue, see Interaction, Dialogue, Polyphony.

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[1] Quoted after Dashiell Hammett, The Four Great Novels. Picador, 1982. P. 725-726.

APAGOGICAL argument

« Apagogical » or « apagogic » argument is the name given in law to the argument by the absurd.
According to this argument, unreasonable interpretations of the law must be rejected:

The apagogic argument assumes that the legislator is reasonable and could not have admitted an interpretation of the law that would lead to illogical or unjust consequences. (Perelman 1979, p. 58)

It parallels the psychological argument, which assumes that the legislator is rational and benevolent,see Absurd; Juridical arguments.

According to Alexy, the apagogic argument is one of the four types of arguments that prevail in law, the others being the arguments by analogy, a contrario (opposites) and a fortiori, (1989, cited in Kloosterhuis 1995, p. 140).

ANTITHESIS

The rhetoric of figures defines the antithesis as an opposition between two terms (words or phrases) of opposite meanings, that enter into parallel syntactic constructions.
The argument scheme of opposites is discursively materialized as antithesis.

1. Antithesis as Argumentative Diptych

An argumentative situation emerges with the appearance of a point of confrontation ratified as such, a stasis. It develops into a diptych, characterized by the confrontation of two schematizations, that is to say two sets of descriptions, narratives and arguments that support two opposing conclusions. At this stage, the two discourses develop in opposition to each other, without explicitly taking this opposition into account, S. Stasis. This elementary argumentative situation corresponds to a discursive antithesis.

Such a confrontation could be taken up in a structured monologue that juxtaposes the two sides of the question. Such a monologic diptych features an “antiphony”, that is two voices making incompatible arguments (antioriented arguments) about the same issue. This is typically seen when an individual with a vested interest in an issue engages in internal deliberation, and oscillates between two points of view, acting effectively as a third party. This situation is elaborated as a dilemma whose opposing (anti-oriented) horns are articulated by an and:

I admire your courage and I pity your youth.
Corneille, Le Cid 2, 2, verse 43. Quoted by Lausberg [1960], §796

When the speaker clearly identifies with one of the two voices, the balance of the two voices is broken in favor of one of the positions. The and-dilemma transforms into a but-opposition, which overcomes the antithesis:

… but I pity your youth; so I won’t accept your challenge to a duel.

2. Antithesis, Figure of Speech and Argument

The following argument is structured by the scheme of the opposite:

(D1) He is submissive to the privileged; I do not want to confront him in a weak position.

Exactly like the self-argued description:

(D2) He is submissive to the privileged and powerful, and tough with the weak.

While in (D1), the second member of the scheme “he must be tought with the weak”, remains implicit, (D2) corresponds to a complete expression of the topos. But the two discourses are based on the same mechanisms, the argumentation is “valid” or acceptable insofar as the portrait sounds “true”; both are “convincing”. Description and argument are rooted in the same figure of speech or argument scheme, the antithesis.

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STRUCTURAL ANALOGY

1. Terminology

Structural analogy connects two complex domains, each of which articulates an indefinite and unlimited number of objects and relations between these objects. It combines intra-categorical analogy (a property of objects) with proportional analogy (a property of relations). One could also speak of formal analogy (the domains have the same shape) or borrow the mathematical term “isomorphism”, see Intra-categorical analogy; Proportion.

The term “material analogy” refers to the relationship between two objects when one is a replica of the other. The concept covers various phenomena, such as the relationship between a model and its original, or the relationship between a prototype and the object to be produced. The reasoning based on the model or prototype is then applied to the original.

Structural analogy is used in the following two situations.

(i) A, B, C are similar ­— To determine whether the complex objects or domains A, B, C are similar, one must compare their components and the relationships between them. The result of this investigation will be a claim such as « A, B, C are similar »; « A, B, are indeed similar, but C is something different”, and so on.

One might ask whether the Great Depression of 1929, the Lost Decade of Japan in the 1990s, and the Argentine crisis of 2001 share some significant characteristics. The whole purpose of the study may be to establish a typology of economic crises, without relying — as much as possible — relying on preconceived notions of how people will use the conclusions of this study.

The areas are symmetrical from the point of view of the study, which does not favor any of the areas over the others, but only focuses only on their relationships.

(ii) A is similar to B — A contrario, the importance of the previous situation appears when the series includes the 2008 crisis. Given the topicality of this last crisis, it will certainly be tempting to see if we can « learn lessons » from the previous crises and to apply them to the case of 2008, with the intention of making provisions for the current situation. If the proponent uses the analogy 1929 ~ 2008 to predict a third world war, her opponent can refute the inference by showing that the domains are not similar, and therefore it is impossible to rely on the first instance, in 1929, to infer anything about what will happen in 20** and beyond (see below).

The difference in status between the two domains is expressed in different ways. In his analysis of the metaphor, Richards contrasts tenor and vehicle (1936); Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca speak of theme and phore ([1958], p. 501). A simple way of naming these domains might be comparing domain / compared domain; or, in terms of argument analysis, Resource domain / Target domain.
The argument by analogy works on the asymmetry of the compared domains. Therefore, these two domains are denoted, if necessary by the letter R, the resource field, and Π (Greek capital letter “pi”),   the Problematic domain, targeted by the investigation. The field R is the source or Resource on which the arguer relies to explore the target domain Π, or to derive certain consequences about Π from R. In other words, the resource field R is the argument domain and the target field Π is the inference domain.

The two domains are distinguished from epistemic, psychological, linguistic and argumentative perspectives.

— Epistemically, the resource domain is the best known domain; the target domain is the domain under investigation.
— Psychologically, the intuitions and values that operate in the resource domain are brought to bear in the target domain.
— Linguistically, the resource domain is well covered by a stabilized, familiar and easily spoken language; the target domain is not.
—Practically, we know what to do in the resource domain but we do not know what to do in the target domain.

2. Explanatory Analogy

In Ernest Rutherford well-known analogy  between the atom and the solar system, the resource field is the solar system, the goal domain is the atom:

The atom is like the solar system.

This is a didactic analogy, intended to provide a first intuitive understanding of the atomic structure, taking advantage of a (supposed) better understanding of the solar system. The asymmetry of the fields is obvious: the resource field, the solar system, has been known and understood for a long time. The targeted field, the atom,was new, then poorly understood, inaccessible to direct perception, mysterious.

The explanatory analogy retains some pedagogical merit, however partial. Comparison is not identification, and two systems can be compared only in order to identify the limits of the comparison, that is, the irreducible specificities of each field, cf. infra, §6.

The analogy has explanatory value in the following situation:

In the world Π, the proposition π is badly understood. In a world R, there is no debate about r. Π is isomorphic to R (structural, systemic analogy). The position of π in Π is the same as that of r in R. So, the knowledge, images, commitments associated with r are now transferred to π; π  is now a little better understood; we know how to deal with π.

The analogical relation allows the unknown to be integrated on the basis of the known. As causal explanations, analogical explanations break the insularity of the domains.

The analogy is an invitation to see and treat the problem through the resource. The resource domain is viewed as a model of the target domain. The relationship of the domain under study to the resource domain is treated as  of the relationship of the domain under study to an abstract representation of that domain. Otto Neurath uses a maritime metaphorical analogy to explain his vision of epistemology:

There is no tabula rasa. We are like sailors at sea, who must rebuild their ship without ever taking it to a dock to be dismantled and rebuilt it with better materials. (Otto Neurath, [Protocol Statement],1932/3.[1])

The analogy can be translated literally: “There is no ultimate foundation of knowledge from which we could rebuild all  of our present knowledge without any presuppositions.” This resource is extremely powerful; the image could also be applied to social life: “There is no ‘good explanation’ (meaning « good discussion of our disagreements ») that would allow us to reconstruct a damaged relationship and start from scratch.”

3. Arguments Based on Structural Analogy

In ordinary situations, analogy is used argumentatively, as in the following case:

— In the world Π, we are in a difficult situation; what should we do? Should we accept or reject the perspective π?
— But we know for sure what happens in a world R.
— Fortunately, Π is isomorphic to R (structural, systemic analogy); if necessary we can argue for this.
— The position of π in Π is the same as the position of r in R.
—So we can act, in the world Π, on the basis of the knowledge, images, obligations associated with r (in R) — That is, we can now decide about π.

This argumentative operation implies that “if the domains are analogous, so are their corresponding elements and the relations between them”, which may turn out to be true or false upon further investigation. The analogy gives us something to think about, but proves nothing; the conclusion projected onto Π may be false or ineffective.

4. From Analogy to Metaphor and Back

A language is associated with the resource domain. For example, ​​the human body is referred to in a language that may be incomplete and rather incoherent, but is generally understood, the language of the flow of organic matter, of popular physiology, of good health and illness, of life and death. This language synthetizes and builds a common intuition of the body. Other unfamiliar domains are not equipped with such a dense, effective and functional language. The analogy projects the language of the resource field, the human body, onto the problem field, society. As a result, the target can be problematized in a familiar, non-controversial language; so that social convulsions can be discussed and a cure found. The analogy is an invitation to see the problem through the lens of the resource; full metaphorization allows us to forget the glasses.

The following apologue is based on the analogy « society is like a body », as expressed in the metaphorical phrase “social body”. Note the explicitness of the vocabulary of analogy in the last sectin of the commentary.

The senate therefore decided to send as their spokesman Menenius Agrippa, an eloquent man, who was also accepted by the plebs because he himself was of plebeian origin. He was received into the camp, and it is reported that he told them, in a primitive and uncouth manner, the following fable. ‘In the days when all the parts of the human body did not work together as they do now, but each went its own way and spoke its own language, the other members, indignant at seeing that all that was acquired by their care and labor and service went to the belly, while the belly, undisturbed in the midst of them all, did nothing but enjoy the pleasures provided for it, entered into a conspiracy; the hands were not to bring food to the mouth, the mouth was not to receive it when offered, the teeth were not to chew it. While they, in their resentment, were trying to force the belly by starving it, the members themselves were wasting away, and the whole body was reduced to the last stage of exhaustion. Then it was found that the belly did no idle service, and that the nourishment it received was no greater than that which it gave by returning to all the parts of the body that blood by which we live and are strong, evenly distributed in the veins, after being ripened by the digestion of the food.’ By using this comparison, and showing how the internal discontent between the parts of the body resembled the animosity of the plebeians against the patricians, he succeeded in winning over his audience.
Titus Livius, The History of Rome, Volume 1, Book 2; between 27 and 9 BC [2]

The resource does not necessarily exist before it is used in an analogy. An analogy can create a self-evident resource ex nihilo, as in the following analogy, proposed by Heisenberg in 1955. The danger mentioned in the first line refers to the Cold War era, and the resource concept is “a ship built with such a large amount of steel and iron that its compass, instead of pointing North points toward the iron mass of the ship.” Note again that there is no clear line between structural analogy and metaphor. Heisenberg calls the situation he envisions a metaphor; and in the next line, he uses a construction that expresses an analogy: “Mankind is in the position of a captain”.

Another metaphor might make such a danger even clearer. Through the seemingly un­limited growth of its material power, humanity could be likened to a captain whose ship has been built from such a large amount of steel and iron that its compass, instead of pointing north, is pointing toward the huge iron mass of the ship. Such a ship would get nowhere. It would be blown off course and go around in circles.

But to return to the situation of modern physics, we must admit that the danger exists only if the captain does not know that his compass no longer responds to the magnetic force of the Earth. Once he understands this, the danger is already halved. Because the captain who does not want to turn back, but wants to reach a known or unknown destination, will find a way to steer the boat, either by using new modern compass that does not react to the iron mass of the boat, or by steering in relation to the stars as sailors used to do. It is true that the visibility of the stars does not depend on us, and perhaps we rarely see them today. Nevertheless, our awareness of the limits of our hope for progress presupposes the desire not to go round in circles, but to reach a goal. Once recognized, this limit becomes the first fixed point that allows a new orientation.
Werner Heisenberg, [Nature in Modern Physics], [1955] [3]

5. Structural Analogy as an Epistemological Barrier

Analogy is fruitful in stimulating discovery and invention, useful in teaching and popularizing knowledge. But it becomes an epistemological barrier when the proposed explanation by analogy seems so clear and satisfying that it discourages further inquiry:

For example, blood flows like water. Canalized water irrigates the soil, so blood should also irrigate the body. Aristotle was the first to associate the distribution of blood from the heart to the body with the irrigation of a garden by canals (De Partes Animalium, III, v, 668 a 13 and 34). Galen did not think otherwise. But to irrigate the soil, it is ultimately to get lost in the soil. And this is the main obstacle to a correct understanding of the blood circulation.
Georges Canguilhem, [The Knowledge of Life], 1951.[4]

The systematic rejection of analogy as a tool of knowledge is based on such observations.

6. Refuting Structural Analogies

6.1 Vain Analogy

In an explanation, the explanation (explanans) must be clearer than the thing to be explained (explanandum). An analogical explanation must also satisfy this condition, and if the resource area is even less well known than the area under investigation the analogy will not help to understand of things.

The analogy is also useless if it is used to impress the audience and to show off the speaker’s familiarity with the resource domain. Gödel’s theorem is often used for this purpose (Bouveresse [1999]).

6.2 False Analogy

An argument by analogy can be rejected by showing that there are critical differences between the resource domain and the target domain, that prohibit the projection of the former onto the latter so that no lesson can be learned from the supposed resource domain. For example, in the following passage,  it is argued that the comparison of the 2008 and 1929 crises is marred by the fact that the current situation in Germany has nothing to do with its situation after 1918 and in in the years to come. It is also argued that there is nothing comparable to Hitler and Nazism in the European landscape of 2009:

Jean-François Mondot — Is the economic crisis weakening our civilization? We sometimes hear intellectuals and columnists draw analogies with the 1929 crisis that led to the Second World War.

Pascal Boniface — We often make the mistake of thinking that history repeats itself, and so we make very risky comparisons. Russia bangs its fist on the table, and everyone immediately talks about the Cold War. There is an economic and financial crisis erupts on Wall Street, and immediately an analogy is drawn to 1929, suggesting that Hitler could come to power as a result of these difficulties. But the political circumstances are obviously very different, for no great country is now  being humiliated as Germany was after 1918, and so is seeking revenge. This comparison is easy to make, but it has no basis, neither strategic nor intellectual.
Pascal Boniface, [The Clash of Civilizations is Not Inevitable], 2009.[5]

6.3 Partial analogy

Partial analogy (« misanalogy », Shelley, 2002, 2004) is an analogy that has been criticized and recognized as limited. The two domains cannot be equated. Nevertheless, partial analogy still has a pedagogical use, as seen in the case of the analogy between the solar system and the atom (see §2 above):

A central body: the sun, the nucleus of the atom.
Peripheral elements: the planets, the electrons.
A central mass much greater than the peripheral masses: the mass of the sun is greater than that of the planets; the mass of the nucleus is greater than that of the electrons. —etc.

Differences (analogy breaks):

The nature of the attraction: electric for the atom, gravitational for the solar system.
There are identical atoms, each solar system is unique.
There can be several electrons in the same orbit, whereas there is only one planet in the same orbit, etc.

The fact that the limits of analogy are well known prohibits any automatic transfer of knowledge gained in one field to the other.

6.4 Reverse Analogy

A conclusion C1 has been reached about a target resource on the basis of an analogy drawn from the resource domain R. The opponent argues that the same analogy drawn from the same domain R leads to another conclusion C2 about the same target domain, that is incompatible with C1 (« disanalogy » Shelley, ibid.). These two contradictory conclusions prohibit the use of the resource domain to argue in the target domain.

This is particularly effective because the opponent is conceding to play on her opponent’s home turf. The opponent accepts the proponent’s analogy and examines it more closely  in order to neutralize the proponent’s conclusions. This strategy is used in the refuting argumentative metaphors.

Argument: ­­— This is the heart of our discipline.
Refutation: — That’s true. But disciplines also need eyes to see clearly, legs to move, hands to act, and even a brain to think.
Other refutation — That’s true, but the heart can keep beating very well preserved in a jar.

An advocate of hereditary monarchy speaks against universal suffrage:

Argument:— An elected president, that’s absurd, we don’t elect the  ship’s pilot.
Rebuttal: — There are no natural-born ship’s pilot either.

Both sides are staging the same metaphorical field. This form of rebuttal has the force of an ad hominem refutation, based on the speaker’s own beliefs about the speaker: “You are your own refuter”.

Counter-analogy —  As with any argument, an argument by analogy can be countered with a counter-argument (an argument whose conclusion is incompatible with the original conclusion). This rebuttal can be of any kind, including another argument by analogy, taken from a different resource domain; one analogy balances another analogy:

Argument:   — The university is (like) a business, so …
Rebuttal:     — No, it is (like) a day-care center, an abbey …

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[1] Otto Neurath, “Protokollsätze”. Erkenntnis 3 (1932/3), p. 206. Quoted in A. Beckermann “Zur Inkohärenz und Irrelevanz of Wissensbegriffs”. Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 55, 2001. P. 585. [« On the incoherence and irrelevance of concepts of knowledge ». Journal for Philosophical Research, etc.] [2] Translated by Rev. Canon Roberts, edited. by Ernest Rhys. J. M. Dent & Sons, Ltd., London, 1905. Quoted from; http://mcadams.posc.mu.edu/txt/ah/Livy/Livy02.html. No pag. (11-08-2017)
[3] Quoted from Werner Heisenberg (1962) La Nature dans la Physique Contemporaine. Paris: Gallimard, 1962. P. 35-36. [Nature in Contemporary Physics] [4] Quoted after Georges Canguilhem, La Connaissance de la Vie. Paris: Vrin, 1965. P. 26-27. [The Knowledge of Life.
[5] Pascal Boniface, “Le clash des civilisations n’est pas inévitable”. Interview by J.-F. Mondot, Les Cahiers de Science et Vie, 2009. www.iris-france.org / Op-2009-03-04.php3] (09-20-2013) [“A clash of civilizations is not inevitable”.]

 

INTRA-CATEGORICAL ANALOGY

Intra-categorical analogy is based on the relationship between individuals belonging to the same category. See Categorisation and Nomination for a definition of the concept of category; the process of categorising individuals; the organisation of categories into classifications and the corresponding forms of syllogistic reasoning,

1. From identity to intra-categorical analogy and circumstantial analogy

1.1 Individual identity

An individual is identical with itself (neither similar nor dissimilar); it is not “more or less” identical with itself. This self-evidence establishes the principle of identity “A = A”.

1.2 Identity of indiscernibles

Two different perfectly identical individuals, for example products from the same industrial production chain, are materially identical, i.e. perceptually indistinguishable. Everything that can be said about one can be said about the other; their descriptions coincide, they share all their properties, whether essential (categorical) or accidental (incidental).

Distinction depends on the observer, the layman sees no difference, and believes that “it’s all the same”, while the specialist makes crucial distinctions.

1.3 Intra-categorical analogy

Intra-categorical analogy is the relationship between the members of a category C. All members share, by definition, the characteristics defining the category. The expression “another C” refers to another member of the same category C. Two beings belonging to the same category are identical for this category; a whale and a rat are identical from the point of view of the category “­— be a mammal”. This categorical identity is a partial identity, compatible with major differences; two beings of the same category are said to be analogous or similar. They are comparable in respect of their other non-categorical properties. Chicken eggs are all similar as eggs; one egg is identical to another egg; it is comparable to all other eggs in terms of freshness, size, colour, etc. See Comparison.

1.4 Circumstantial analogy

An individual a who has the characteristics (x, y, z, t), is similar to all individuals who have any of those characteristics, whether essential or incidental.

The descriptors of two objects define the point of view from which they are equivalent; two entities are similar when their descriptions overlap, contain a common part, which may or may not include all or some of their essential characteristics. In other words, this common part generates a category, which may or may not make sense. We might speak of circumstantial analogy..Alice and a snake are identical from the point of view of the category « – is a long-necked egg-eater »,S. Definition.

2. Intra-categorical analogy as induction or deduction

Intra-categorical analogy can be reconstructed as an induction or a deduction:

2.1 As an induction

O is similar to P
P has the properties w, x, y, m
O has the properties w, x, y
So O probably also has the property m.

From an overall judgement of analogy between two entities, based on the shared properties w, x, y … we conclude that if one has the property m then the other most probably also has m. In other words, analogy is driven towards identity.

2.2 As a deduction

O is similar to P
P has the property m
Conclusion: O probably has the property m.

O is similar to P. This means that they share a common set of features, and therefore belong to the category C defined by those features. In conclusion, as members of the same category C, O and P probably share other properties, among them m. This means that the predicate « — is like” is to be interpreted as a weaker form of « — is the same as”; analogy is seen as a weakened identity.

Deduction and induction are considered valid forms of reasoning. The purpose of the discussion about the possibility of reducing analogy to deduction or induction is to determine whether or not analogy is also valid as a form of reasoning. Reasoning by analogy is sometimes used to prove the existence of God, the ideological stakes of this issue are therefore high.

These formulations of the argument by analogy in the form of a dialectical syllogism are rather sterile because they do not emphasize the warranting operations, that contain all the interesting problems. The formulation of the conclusion not as a secure finding but as the product of a heuristic rule of thumb, however, is of great value. The conclusion should be written not as something “probable”, that is a kind of belief, but as a suggestion to do something:

It might be interesting to test P for property m.
It might be interesting to see whether O and P share other properties.

3. Arguments based on intra-categorical analogy

— Categories as a whole are structured according to their respective definition; two individuals belong to the same category if they have the same definition.

— Categories may be gradual, S. Rule of Justice.

— Categorical analogies may be restructured S. A pari; Definition (III). 

4. Refutation of categorical analogy

In one or other aspect, everything is like everything else, and analogies can be more or less “far-fetched”. Any rejected categorical analogy will be dubbed fallacious and denounced as a confusion, an amalgam (Doury 2003, 2006).

Intra-categorical analogy can be refuted by showing that the category created from those two beings is not based on essential features, but on some accidental property; in general, the generated class is deemed irrelevant. The nonsensical analogy “Chinese ~ Butterfly”, ironically discussed by Musil, illustrates the perils of circumstantial analogy, based on the arbitrary choice of a non-essential feature, here the “lemon yellow” color.

There are lemon yellow butterflies; there are also lemon yellow Chinese people. So, in a sense, butterflies can be defined as miniature winged Chinese people. Butterflies and Chinese people are symbolic of sensual pleasure. Here we can see for the first time a glimmer of a possible match, never considered before, between the great period of the moth fauna and Chinese civilization. The fact that butterflies have wings and not the Chinese people is only a superficial phenomenon. […] Butterflies did not invent powder: precisely because the Chinese have done it before them. The suicidal predilection for the lights of some nocturnal species is still an artifact of the past, which is difficult to explain in view of the daylight understanding of this morphological relationship between butterflies and China.
Robert Musil, [Spirit and Experience], [1921] [1]

The analogy relationship has difficulties with transitivity, S. Relation. Intra-categorical analogy is transitive: if A and B on the one hand, B and C on the other hand, are said to be similar because they possess the same essential features, A is thus similar to C. Circumstantial analogy is not transitive: nothing proves that if, on the one hand, the descriptions of A and B have common parts, and, on the other hand, the description of B and C have common parts, then the description of A and C will also have also common parts. Khallaf invokes a traditional analogy to criticize the concatenation of analogies:

A man is walking on the beach trying to find similar shells; once he finds a shell similar to the original, he throws away the original shell and goes on to find a seashell which resembles the second, and so on. When she has found the tenth shell, she should not be surprised to see that it is totally different from the first in the series. (Khallâf [1942], p. 89)

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[1] Quoted in Jacques Bouveresse, Prodiges et vertiges de l’analogie [Prodigies and Dizziness of Analogy]. Paris: Raisons d’Agir, 1999. P. 21-22.

 

ANALOGICAL THINKING

From an anthropological perspective, analogy is a way of thinking that assumes that things, people and events are reflected in each other. For analogical thinking, knowledge is the decoding of similarities; analogy reveals a world of secret connections underlying reality, and creates a “cosmic sense in which order, symmetry, perfection triumph”, a closed world (Gadoffre & al. 1980, p. 50); thus conceived, analogy is the foundation of gnosis. From the perspective of the history of ideas, this way of thinking culminated in the Renaissance, when our “sublunary » world was mapped by analogy with the celestial spheres, and with the divine world i.n general

In one of its manifestations, the doctrine of analogical correspondences validates the following type of argument:

Data: This plant looks like this or that part of the human body.
Conclusion: This plant has a hidden virtue, that is effective in curing the ills that affect the corresponding part of the body.
Guarantee: If the shape of a plant is like a part of the body, then it cures diseases that affect that  part of the body.
Support: This is a divine arrangement.

This form of analogical thinking postulates that plants have hidden medicinal properties. The plant carries a divine signature, that is a representation of the human body part that it can heal. This signature or “analogical sympathy” is a motivated signifier, a similarity or “resemblance” of the given body part. God, in His benevolence, has given this signature to certain plants in order to make them useful to us. Thus, a plant that resembles the eyes, could cure eye irritation.

Since the skin of the quince is covered with small hairs, it bears the “signature” of the hair, and eating the quince can make your hair grow. In the words of Oswald Crollius [1609]:

Data: ‘This downy hair that grows around quinces […] represents hair in some way.” (id., p. 41)
Conclusion: “So, their decoction makes hair grow back, that has fallen out because of smallpox or some similar disease.” (ibid.)
Rationale: The healing power of plants « can be more easily recognized by the signature or analogous and mutual sympathy with the members of the human body with these plants than by anything else. » (ibid., p. 8)
Support: “ »God has given each plant an interpreter so that its natural virtue (but hidden in its silence) may be recognized and discovered. This interpreter can be nothing other than an external signature, that is, a resemblance of form and shape, true indications of its goodness, essence and perfection. » (id., p. 23)
Oswald Crollius, [Treatise on Signatures, or the True and Living Anatomy of the Great and Small Worlds]; [1609] [1]

From this doctrine derives a research programme o research for “those who wish to acquire the true and perfect science of medicine, » « they should devote all their efforts to the knowledge of signatures, hieroglyphics and characters” (ibid., p. 20). The training will enable them to recognise “at first sight, on the surface of the plants, the capacities with which they are endowed” (ibid., p. 9).

Knowledge of the medicinal properties of plants is acquired by learning how to read and understand the “discourse of nature,” that is , by mastering the signs scattered throughout the world. Such an analogical reading of the world is opposed to empirical causal investigation, which consists of observation and experience, practising dissection or prescribing a remedy to the patient and then finding out whether he or she is better, dead, or neither better nor worse. Analogical knowledge is a specific way of thinking, constitutive of magical thinking, which replaces causal knowledge with mysterious correspondences that convey influences, and bypasses the hierarchical system of categories organised according to genus and species, for which it replaces a network of similarities

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[1] Quoted from Oswald Crollius, Traicté des Signatures ou Vraye et Vive Anatomie du Grand et Petit Monde. Milan: Archè, 1976.
[Treatise on Signatures or True and Lively Anatomy of the Large and Small Worlds.

AMBIGUITY

• • The words ambiguity (N), ambiguous (Adj) come from the Latin verb ambigere, “to discuss, to be in controversy”: qui ambigunt ‘those engaged in a discussion’ (Cic. Fin. 2,4)” (Gaffiot, Ambigo). To refer to the issue, to the point on which the partners disagree, Cicero uses the expression “illud ipsum de quo ambiguebatur”, “precisely that – on which – [they] disagree” (ibid.).
    Ambiguitas means « doubt »; the answers given by the Oracles were ambiguous in this sense.
    The word amphiboly is sometimes used in discussing the Aristotelian fallacy of ambiguity. It adapts a Greek word [amphibology] composed of amphi « on both sides”; bolos “throwing on all sides”; logos, « word”, and means “having a double meaning, ambiguous. Literally, an amphiboly is an “explosion of meaning”.

The word ambiguity can be used to refer to three fallacies “dependent on language”, homonymy, amphiboly, and accent. These fallacies are defined as violations of the rule of syllogism or of dialectical reasoning, which requires that language be unambiguous, see Dialectic; Fallacies (2): Aristotle basic list.

Problems of ambiguity arise at the level of words (homonymy, accent), at the level  of sentences (syntactic ambiguity), or at the level of discourse. Such problems are combined with the fact that non-ambiguous sentences may have multiple layers of meaning, see Presupposition; Words as Arguments.

1. Syntactic ambiguity

Sentence ambiguity, discussed by Aristotle from the perspective of a grammar of argumentation, is now seen as a syntactic problem. The famous Chomskyan ambiguous statement “flying airplanes can be dangerous” can be paraphrased as:

Under some circumstances, flying airplanes is a dangerous activity
Airlanes are dangerous when they fly.

These paraphrases are not equivalent. The no less famous statement “The teacher says the principal is an ass” is syntactically ambiguous, it allows for two syntactic structures whose difference is marked by intonation or punctuation:

“The teacher,” says the principal, “is a donkey”
The teacher says: “The principal is a donkey”.

Ambiguity is sometimes an artifact of decontextualization, produced for the sake of grammatical or logical theory. In practice, the addition of a sufficient amount of left and right context is sufficient to clarify the intended meaning, as shown by the re-contextualization of the sentence “We saw her duck” (Wikipedia, Ambiguity), which is four times ambiguous when decontextualized:

We saw her duck swimming in the pool
We saw her duck picking up something on the floor
We do not have a knife, so we saw her duck
She is a clever bridge player, so we saw her duck

Serious ambiguity occurs when the context does not disambiguate the sentence. The reduction of ambiguity to univocity is no less important for the interpretation of texts, sacred and otherwise, than it is for logic. In De Doctrina Christiana, St Augustine gives a rule to be applied when trying to interpret religious texts:

But when proper words make Scripture ambiguous, we must see in the first place that there is nothing wrong in our punctuation or pronunciation. Accordingly, if, when attention is given to the passage, it shall appear to be uncertain in what way it ought to be punctuated or pronounced, let the reader consult the rule of faith which he has gathered from the plainer passages of Scripture, and from the authority of the Church.
Augustine, [397] On Christian Doctrine, in Four Books, (our emphasis)[1]

The rule of interpretation in the highlighted passage appeals to the consistency of the field of theological argument. It applies to the interpretation of the first verse of the first chapter of the Gospel of John, the Genesis. Nothing less than the very concept of God is at stake. It must be shown that the correct “punctuation”, that is the correct reading of this verse, is consistent with the orthodox conception of the Trinity, which affirms  the divine identity and equality of the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit. The reading that ascribes a syntax of coordination to the utterance results in the denial the identity of the Word, that is the Holy Spirit, with God; it must therefore be considered heretical and rejected as such.

3. Now look at some examples. The heretical pointing, « In principio erat verbum, et verbum erat apud Deum, et Deus erat » (In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with
God, and God was), so as to make the next sentence run, « Verbum hoc erat in principio apud Deum » (This word was in the beginning with God), arises out of unwillingness to confess that the Word was God. But this must be rejected by the rule of faith, which, in reference to the equality of the Trinity, directs us to say: « et Deus erat verbum » (and the Word was God); and then to add: « hoc erat in principio apud Deum » (the same was in the beginning with God). (Id., Chap. II, 3)

The disputed passage is a sentence taken from the Sacred Text: « et verbum erat apud Deum et Deus erat » (« the Word was with God₁ and God was »). I can’t and don’t want to touch the theological discussion. I risk the following bracketing, and leave the last word to the wise.

Orthodox bracketing – For Augustine, the orthodox punctuation and construction of the verse is: « In principio erat verbum, et Verbum erat apud Deum, et Deus erat Verbum. ”
(Biblia Sacra…Parisiis, Letouzey et Ané, 1887).

{The Word [was with God] and [was God]}

The argument is not grammatical, but drawn, as indicated above, « from the plainer passages of Scripture, and from the authority of the Church.”

Heretical bracketing:

{[the Word was with God] and [was God]} 

Disambiguation is the foundational operation for the vast and important domain of interpretive argumentation.

2. Word ambiguity: homonymy, polysemy

Two words are homonymous when they have the same signifier (the same spelling (homographs), the same pronunciation (homophones) or both), but completely different meanings. Homonymous words are listed as separate entries in the dictionary:

Mine: “that which belongs to me.” (MW, Mine)
Mine: “a pit or excavation in the earth from which mineral substances are taken” (ibid.).

Polysemous words are semantic particularizations or acceptances of the same signifier within the same grammatical category. In the dictionary, they are listed under the same entry, and correspond to the first subdivision of meaning:

Mine, noun
1 a: a pit or excavation in the earth from which mineral substances are taken. b: an ore deposit.
2: a subterranean passage under an enemy position.
3: an encased explosive that is placed in the ground or in water and set to explode when disturbed.
4: a rich source of supply (id.)

When two different series of derived words come from the same root word, that word is in the process of splitting into two homonyms. This is the case of the three series derived from the word argument, see To Argue, Argument.

2.1 Paralogism and Sophism of Homonymy

A syllogism is fallacious by homonymy when it articulates not three but four terms, one of which is taken in two different senses, see Paralogism.

In the Euthydemus, Plato provides an example of sophisticated practice using a very special kind of homonymy. The sophist Euthydemus, the eponymous character of this dialogue, asks Clinias, “Who are the men who learn, the wise or the ignorant? » (Euth., 275d; p. 712). Poor Clinias blushes and replies that “the wise are the learners”; and six turns of speech later, he must agree that « it is the ignorant who learn » (Euth., 276a – b; p. 713). The young Clinias is quite stunned, and Euthydemus’ followers “broke into applause and laughter” (ibid.). Such sophisms are not intended to deceive their victims, but to destabilize their naive certainties about the language. Through this salutary shock, the public becomes aware of the opacity and the proper form of language, S. Persuasion; Sophism. As Socrates later explains, “the same word is applied to opposite
 sorts of men, to both the man who knows and to the man who does not” (id., 278a, p. 715).

In general, the subject and object of a verb are not interchangeable; the situation in which “A loves B” is different from the situation in which “B loves A”. To learn, to be the host of, to rent are examples of this property:

to rent 1. pay someone for the use of (something, typically property, land, or a car). 2. (of an owner) allow someone to use (something) in return for payment. (MW, Rent)

2.2 Homonyms and Polysemy

The polysemy of words is considered a major source of confusion. Scientific language prohibits both polysemy and homonymy, and requires the use of unambiguous, well-defined terms stabilized in their meaning and syntax, in a given scientific field. Homonymy between a scientific term and a common word is harmless. In physics, the use of the word charm to refer to a particle, the charm quark creates no ambiguity.

In a  natural language argument, the meaning of terms is constructed and recomposed in the course of the discourse, see Object of discourse. The meaning of a word used by the same speaker may change from one stage of the argument to the next. This results from a variety of mechanisms, such as the use of homonymous or closely similar words, or the use of a word in both its literal and figurative senses in the same discourse. For example, when discussing the credit to be given to a person, there may be a, subtle shift between « determining the amount of a loan » and « trusting » that person. In German, the economic discussion of financial debt seems to remain linked to the discussion of moral guilt, the same signifier, Schuld, has these two meanings. (Reverso, Schuld).

Homonymy and polysemy can be readjusted by the operation of distinguo.

3. “Accent”: stress and paronomasia

In a language where word stress is linguistically relevant, shifting the stress from one syllable to another can change the meaning of the word, for example in Spanish (my underlining):

Hacía: stress on the second syllable, 1st pers. sing of the verb hacer, « I did”.
Hacia: stress on the first syllable, means “to, towards”, preposition.

The words seem to be the same, except for the accent (oral and written), but they are actually two different words. Much like the fallacy of homonymy which shifts the meaning of a single signifier, the fallacy of accent also shifts the meaning of the word through a minimal but crucial suprasegmental change. This process occurs as though the difference between the signifiers is not considered salient enough to distinguish between the variations in meaning.

This is a special case of paronomasia (or annominatio), defined as a:

(pseudo-) etymological play on the slightness of the phonetic change on the one hand and the interesting range of meaning which is created by means of the change on the other. In such cases, the range of meaning can be raised to the level of paradox. (Lausberg [1960], §637)

Generally speaking, paronomasia creates a meaning-generating cell, by contrasting or assimilating a word (signifier) W₀ with a minimally different word (signifier) W₁.

In the dialog, the paronomastic resumption of a term functions as a rectification, breaking the orientation of this discourse, S. Orientation Reversal, “this is not a crisis of conscience, this is a crisis of confidence”.

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[1] Book III, Ch. 2, 2. No pag. Quoted from https://www.ccel.org/ccel/augustine/doctrine.txt . (11-08-2017)