INTERPRETATION as Argument
The concept of interpretation is ambiguous.
— In general, it refers to the process of understanding complex texts, see interpretation, exegesis, hermeneutics.
— In rhetorical argumentation, the word interpretation may refer to:
1. A particular kind of stasis.
2. A figure of repetition.
3. An argument scheme, see motives and reasons
1. Stasis of interpretation
In the theory of stasis, the stasis of interpretation corresponds to a specific case of contradiction between the parties, the « legal question. » In court, or, more generally, whenever a debate is based on a written text, and especially on a normative rule, an “interpretation issue ” arises when the two parties base their conclusions on different readings of the text. For example, one party, may base their argument on the letter of the law, while the other argues from its spirit.
2. Figure of repetition
As a figure of discourse, interpretation consists in duplicating a first term by immediately following it with a quasi-synonymous term that is more easily understood.
In the sequence “Term1, Term2”, T2 interprets T1, meaning it explains or clarifies T1‘s meaning.
T2 may be a common-language equivalent of a technical term T1:
We found marasmius oreades, I mean, Scotch bonnets.
The interpretation may be applied to a word or an entire phrase and retain its argumentative orientation. :
The President announced a policy of controlling spending, a “sober state” policy.
However, an opponent’s interpretation may reverse the argumentative orientation of T1:
The president announced a policy of controlling spending—that is, a policy of austerity
This change is marked by the introduction of a reformulating connective (one could say an interpretive connective) such as « in other words,« , « i.e., » « that is to say », « which means that.«
3. Refutation by Interpretation
The Treatise on Argumentation classifies « interpretatio » as a “figure of choice”, and offers an example from Marcus Annaeus Seneca, (also known as Seneca the Elder, or the Rhetorician (-54, +39)). Seneca the Elder is the author of the Controversiae, a collection of legal cases, that were debated by various rhetoricians of his time, in an oratorical contest.
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s example is taken from the first case in the collection ([1958] p. 233), in which a group of expert orators debates the ingenious story of a son who feeds his uncle despite his father’s prohibition. When the tables turn, the father is in trouble, and the son is now feeding his father in spite of his uncle’s prohibition. Thus, the unfortunate son is exiled twice, for the same reason, first by his father, and then by his uncle.
The following passage reports the words of the lawyers who addressed the father on behalf of the son. First speak the lawyer, Fuscus Arellius, followed by Cestius.
Arellius Fuscus concludes by suggesting a question: ‘I thought that, in spite of your prohibition, you wanted your brother to be fed. You seemed to imply as much while delivering your defense, or so I thought.’
Cestius was bolder. He didn’t just say, ‘I thought you wanted it,’ but ‘You wanted it and you still want it today.’ He revealed all the reasons that compelled the father to want it so and concluded, ‘Why are you driving me away? No doubt you are indignant that I have taken your place. »
Seneca the Elder, or the Rhetorician (54 BC – 39 AD),
[Controversies and Suasories], (written at the end of his life).[1]
The two lawyers’ arguments align. Fuscus Arellius argues that the father may have given his command reluctantly. Cestius then « goes further », attributing to the father an intention contrary to his words, “You wanted it and you still want it today.”
Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca view this as an « argumentative figure or a stylistic figure depending on its effect on the audience » ([1958], p. 172), see figure.
The lawyers’ words are clearly argumentative. First, they introduce a stasis, a question about the nature (the qualification) of the act under investigation: “You wanted me to disobey you. So, don’t punish me, but congratulate me for fulfilling your secret wish!”. Second, they implement the « private will versus. public will » scheme by substituting the private, sincere, will, for the publicly affirmed will, made under social pressure, see motives.
4. Refutation Through Interpretation vs. Performative Analysis
In this example, interpretation is an instrument of refutation and defense that opposes an accusation based on a command, that is, on a performative speech act. Austin illustrates his discovery of performativity with an example borrowed from Euripides’s Hippolytus of (I, 612). According to Austin, a command, is valid as soon as it is uttered, regardless of the speaker’s intention.
Surely the words must be spoken ‘seriously’ and so as to be taken ‘seriously’? […]. But we are apt to have a feeling that their being serious consists in their being uttered as (merely) the outward and visible sign, for convenience or other record or for information, of an inward and spiritual act: from which it is but a short step to go on to believe or to assume without realizing that for many purposes the outward utterance is a description, true or false, of the occurrence of the inward performance. The classic expression of this idea is to be found in the Hippolytus (1. 612), where Hippolytus says, “my tongue swore to, but my heart (or mind or other backstage artiste) did not”. Thus “I promise to…” obliges me — puts on record my spiritual assumption of a spiritual shackle.
It is gratifying to observe in this very example how excess of profundity, or rather solemnity, at once paves the way for immorality. (Austin, 1962, pp. 9-10)
Like the son and the father in Seneca’s example, Hippolytus and the nurse, are engaged in highly argumentative interactions. In such situations, semantics, pragmatics, and morality can be discussed and argued. The son acknowledges the facts (he fed his uncle) and pleads not guilty to the charge of disobedience. He claims that the verbal command, what the father said, did not express the the father’s true will. This is a typical example of the contradiction Austin describes between what language actually does and what goes on in the mind of the speaker.
However, it should be emphasized that Austin’s binary distinction is based solely on the verbal aspects of language and excludes all paraverbal modalizations of commands, especially those conveyed through facial expressions. Most importantly in the case of Hippolytus, it also excludes the context of the command.
Thus, the question of the prohibition’s validity remains. According to the father and Austin, the prohibition is valid because the father uttered the relevant formula, and the son is guilty of the double Austinian sin of analytic fallacy and moral perversity.
However, the analysis offered by the Austinian father is questionable. What the father really said is problematic and must be interpreted in the context of the speech act.
This situation is analogous to that of ironic utterances. The addressee hears something incongruous with the context, said by someone who usually speaks seriously. This forces the addressee to interpret of this puzzling utterance.
Similarly, the father has uttered a prohibition that contradicts the natural (doxic) law of brotherly love. The son finds this inconsistent with his father’s true character. Perhaps the father’s verbal utterance was accompanied by a paralinguistic cue, indicating a different intention? Anyway, the son concludes that the command was not given in his father’s true, natural voice but rather in his social voice. Therefore, he must interpret the incongruity.
As Fuscus Arelius argues, the son was justified in feeding his uncle.
Deciding that this latter interpretation is “the correct one” sides with the son and against the father. Deciding that the Austinian interpretation is correct sides with the father against the son. In either case, choosing an analysis means siding with one party or the other.
[1] Translated from the French edition used by Perelman, Sénèque le Rhéteur, Controverses et Suasoires. Translated by H. Bornecque. T. 1. Paris: Garnier Frères, 1932, p. 23-24. https://archive.org/details/Controverseset Suasoires.