FALLACY 1: CONTEMPORARY APPROACHES
1. Fallacy: The word
1.1 The Latin word fallacia
Etymologically, the noun fallacy and the adjective fallacious come from the Latin fallacia, meaning “deception, » « trick”, or even “spell.” This deception can be defined as a verbal deception, as expressed by the adjective fallaciloquus, meaning “[he] who deceives by words, cunning” (Gaffiot [1934], Fallaciloquus). The corresponding verb fallo, fallere means “to deceive someone”, and according to context, “to disappoint someone’s expectations, to betray the word given to the enemy, to break one’s promise » (id., Fallo).
These meanings show that etymologically the word fallacy does not refer to a logical or dialectical error, but rather to an interactive manipulation.
1.2 Paralogism, Sophism, Fallacy
The word fallacy has at least two meanings. First, it has the very general meaning of “erroneous belief, false idea” (MW, Fallacy). Second, it refers to an « invalid » argument or reasoning, whose conclusion does not follow from the premises, and which may therefore be misleading or deceptive (ibid.).
As an ordinary word, there is no guarantee that fallacy refers to a unique stable and highly interconnected domain of reality that can be systematized. It is not obvious a priori that fallacies can be theorized more coherently than deceptions, blunders or carelessness, which are relatively similar terms.
Paralogism has a precise and limited technical use referring to a formally invalid syllogism. The term is of little use outside this specialized field.
Sophism refers to deliberately misleading discourse, that usies paralogisms or other maneuvers. However, the implication of bad intent is not necessarily present when speaking of paralogisms or fallacious discourse.
2. Hamblin, Fallacies, 1970
In his book, Fallacies (1970), Hamblin revives the Aristotelian theory of fallacies, much like Perelman revived rhetorical argumentation. While both refer to the Topics, Hamblin focuses on the Sophistical refutations.
Theories of Argumentation within Language or Natural Logic do not address this critical issue. The New Rhetoric proposes an ideal critical instance, the universal audience, in a different perspective from that generally implemented in fallacy theories.
Hamblin offers the following definition of fallacy. Note that this conceptual definition is parallel to the lexicographical definition given above.
Fallacy1 — Hamblin rejects the common meaning of “erroneous belief”: “A fallacy is a fallacious argument. […] In one of its ordinary uses, of course, the word ‘fallacy’ means little more than ‘false belief’; but that use does not concern us” (1970, p. 224; italics in the text).
He adds that “there are several kinds of fallacies, or certain fallacies which have been given special names, but which are not really logical fallacies at all, but merely false beliefs” (id., p. 48; italics in the text). In this sense, the word corresponds to a “false concept”, which can be deceptive, see expression.
Fallacy2 — In this second sense, the word fallacy denotes a counterfeit argument [1]:
A fallacious argument, as almost every account from Aristotle onward tells you, is one that seems to be valid but is not so. (Id.., p. 12)
This definition raises several questions, the first of which is:
What it is for an argument to seem valid? The term ‘seems’ looks like a psychological one, and has often been passed over by logicians, confirmed in the belief that the study of fallacies does not concern them. (Id.., p. 253)
Following Frege, mathematicians have de-psychologized logic. Axiomatized logic is no longer a theory of thought. From this point of view, truth is one, and if error is multiple, it is precisely because it is related to psychology. There is no logical theory of error. In short, a fallacious argument is one that seems valid to a careless or untrained reader. The problem lies with the reader.
In his definition of a “fallacious argument”, Hamblin uses the word « argument », to refer to a fallacious argumentation (argument + conclusion) since he speaks of validity. The term argument refers to an argumentation by metonymy part / whole.
A fallacy1 is an “erroneous belief” that can obviously serve as a premise for an argumentation. Since ordinary argumentation requires the truth of the arguments, an argumentation based on a false premise (argument) is legitimately considered fallacious; this is an authentic fallacy2. In other words, from this fallacious argument due to a false belief, derives a fallacious2 argumentation, a fallacy2. “To appear true or valid”, “to look honest, solid, admissible, credible” is a property common to arguments (premises) and argumentations. There is no difference between the two that would enable us to reject one without necessarily rejecting the other. Like argumentation, fallacious argumentation is a unitary phenomenon, both substantively and formally.
The lexical / conceptual distinction between substantive fallacies (fallacy1) and formal fallacies (fallacies2) is generally addressed in the theory of argumentation, as in the following text:
Assumptions, principles, and ways of looking at things are sometimes called fallacies. Philosophers have spoken of the naturalistic fallacy, the genetic fallacy, the pathetic fallacy, the fallacy of misplaced concreteness, the descriptive fallacy, the intentional fallacy, the affective fallacy, and many more. And outside of philosophy, we also hear sophisticated people using the term ‘fallacy’ to characterize things which are neither arguments nor substitutes for arguments. For example, the China expert Philip Kuhn speaks of the hardware fallacy. This, according to him, is the mistaken assumption common among Chinese intellectuals that China can import Western science and technology without importing with it Western (i.e., decadent) values as well. (Fogelin, Duggan 1987, pp. 255-256)
The distinction between form and substance is difficult to maintain. For example, the genetic fallacy, which evaluates beings and things according to their origin, is given here as an example of “a way of looking at things”, i.e., a substantive fallacy (fallacy1). However, it can be seen as an argumentation (fallacy2) , that Hamblin acknowledge in in his list of authentic formal fallacies.
3. Lists of fallacies
In the chapter entitled “Standard Treatment”, Hamblin presents four lists of fallacies.
— Aristotle’s list in the Sophistical Refutations, see fallacy 2.
— The fallacies or arguments ad —, a list of modern fallacies, designated by Latin labels of this form, see ad — arguments.
— The syllogistic paralogisms.
— The fallacies of the scientific method.
Under the last heading Hamblin suggests the following six cases:
— The fallacy of simplism or pseudo-simplicity, (ibid., p. 45), which assumes that the simplest explanation is necessarily the best.
— The fallacy of exclusive linearity which assumes that a set of factors is ordered according to a strictly linear progression (ibid.). This fallacy neglects the existence of thresholds and breaks in the development of phenomena. It is an extrapolation fallacy: for example, the conductivity of a metal or a solution decreases steadily and then drops abruptly as the temperature approaches absolute zero.
— The genetic fallacy (ibid.) ostracizes an idea or practice on the basis of its source or origin: “This is exactly what the Bad Guys Group says”, see authority.
— The fallacy of invalid induction (ibid., p. 46), see Induction; Example.
— The fallacy of insufficient statistics (ibid.).
— The fallacy of hasty generalization (ibid.) may correspond to the fallacy of accident or induction.
— The naturalistic fallacy (ibid., p. 48). Moore defines this fallacy as valuing the “natural” as follows:
To argue that a thing is good because it is “natural,” or bad because it is “unnatural,” in these common senses of the term, is therefore certainly fallacious; and yet such arguments are very frequently used. (Moore, 1903, §29; italics in the original).
This suggests that the word natural generally has a positive argumentative orientation, except among the author’s group. The naturalistic fallacy is associated with a variety of reciprocal fallacies, named after the antonyms of “natural”: such as culturalist fallacy, etc. see orientation.
Fogelin (see above) adds:
— The descriptive fallacy, a form of the fallacy of expression, see expression.
— The fallacy of misplaced concreteness. Whitehead introduced this term in the field of the philosophy of science, to denote the error of forgetting the distinction between models and reality, and more generally between words and things.
— The intentional fallacy, is invoked in literary analysis, to condemn interpretations of works based on the intentions attributed to the authors-whereas in law, arguments based on the intentions of legislators are recognized as valid.
— The emotional and pathemic fallacies, see emotion; pathos; pathetic fallacy
Many of these so-called fallacies treat scientific language as the norm of ordinary language, and present ordinary arguments as unsatisfactory scientific ones.
4. Informal Logic and Pragma-Dialectic
Since the 1970s, following Hamblin, the literature on fallacies has grown considerably especially within the theoretical frameworks of Informal Logic and pragma-dialectic. These works have clearly emphasized the importance of systematically considering the pragmatic conditions under which ordinary language reasoning occurs.
Within the Informal Logic framework, Woods and Walton are the first generation to build on Hamblin’s work. They questioned the logical and pragmatic conditions for the validity of ordinary arguments (Woods and Walton 1989, 1992). Woods (2013) focuses on “errors of reasoning”, and emphasizes the importance of formalism (Woods 2004). In particular, Walton has developed and systematized a new vision of argument schemes including their “rebuttal factors” (Walton & al., 2008). Argumentation is thus defined as a default reasoning process, that is consistent with yet goes beyond Toulmin’s approach, see layout of argument.
This counter-discourse-based critique of argumentation differs from the rule-based critique developed by the pragma-dialectical school. The pragma-dialectical orientation can be summarized as follows, “If you want your discussion to progress toward a decent solution, you should follow this procedure and avoid these counterproductive, i.e., fallacious, maneuvers”. The felicity conditions of the argumentative exchange depend on observing ten rules.
Each rules of discussion constitutes a distinct standard or norm for critical discussion. Any violation of one or more of these rules, no matter which party commits it or at what stage of the discussion, threatens to the resolution of the disagreement, and is therefore an improper discussion move. In the pragma-dialectical approach, fallacies are analyzed as such improper discussion moves in which a discussion rule has been violated. A fallacy is defined as a speech act that prejudices or frustrates efforts to resolve a difference of opinion; thus, the term “fallacy” is thus systematically linked with the rules of critical discussion (van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 1995, no pag.)
5. Methodological Remarks
Natural argumentation develops in contexts where the question of truth is suspended. It can also arise when a quick decision must be made, even when not all the necessary information is available.
The desire to resolve a dispute rationally is a legitimate desire, though it is not a prerequisite for argumentation. One may argue in order to resolve a dispute for one’s own benefit, at any cost, to put an end to the matter; or to uphold the truth, to protect one’s interests; to express emotions, to satisfy one’s ego, to pass the time, or for pleasure.
One may also be interested in deepening deepening the disagreement rather than resolving it. For example, when a new problem arises, it may be more productive and more rational to articulate the problem properly than to prematurely try to eliminate it.
Some interesting arguments contain a part of the truth, when the whole truth is unknown and not entirely in one camp. Conversely, a speaker may present a weak or even doubtful argument, in an exploratory manner, while explicitly emphasizing its uncertain nature. It is impossible to introduce a definition of fallacies based on truth and validity as a single regulatory ideal for all argumentative situations.
5.1 Discursive Atomism
To critique an argument, an analyst must first delineate the discursive passage in which the argument is intuitively seen. This basic operation must itself be technically justified, see tagging; indicators. Conversely, the quality of the argument must be assessed based on its larger context, and, more precisely on the argumentative question to which it pertains. This includes the responses introduced by opponents, see stasis; question; relevance.
2. The Arbiter is Also a Player
Logicians are supposed to diagnose fallacies in a neutral and objective way. In other words, they must perform this role as if they had no interest in the controversial issue, only in correcting the evaluated discourse according to a priori rules and principles. However, as Hamblin points out this position is untenable in the case of “actual practical argument,’ (1970, p. 244), see norms; rules; evaluation. Evaluators of social arguments are not excluded from the argument; they are also participants as well.
3. Natural Language Cannot be Eliminated
These elements–an atomistic approach, an arbiter above the fray and a strong reductionist tendency–are all present in the practical advice with which the Encyclopedia of Philosophy concludes its entry on fallacies:
As Richard Whately remarked “…a very long discussion is one of the most effective veils of Fallacy: … a Fallacy which when stated barely… would not deceive a child, may deceive half the world if diluted in a quarto volume.” (Elements of Logic, p. 151). Consequently, an important weapon against fallacy is condensation, extracting the substance of the argument from a mass of verbiage. But this device too has its dangers; it may produce oversimplification, that is, the fallacy a dicto secundum quid, of dropping relevant qualification. When we suspect a fallacy, our aim must be to discover exactly what the argument is; and, in general the way to do this is first to pick out its main outlines, and then to take into account any relevant subtleties or qualifications. (Mackie 1967, p. 179; italics in the original).
Even if one were to agree with the method, the problem of implementing the proposed solution would remain unresolved, since it doesn’t address how to deal with natural language and speech: these are contradictorily regarded as an insubstantial and malignant media.
Natural language, the common vehicle of argument, is accused of dissolving logic into meaningless verbiage that conceals unsavory human interests. Thus, a sustained war against language would be the price to pay for correctly determining sound arguments–for eliminating fallacies. In other words, replacing ordinary language in all its ordinary functions with an as-yet-undiscovered formal language, would be required.
Moreover, it may be noted that natural language is to natural reasoning what air resistance is to the flight of the “light dove”:
The light dove, in free flight cutting through the air the resistance of which it feels, could get the idea that it could do even better in airless space. Likewise, Plato abandoned the world of the senses because it posed so many hindrances for understanding, and dared to go beyond it on the wings of ideas, in the empty space of pure understanding. (Kant, [1781], p. 129).
Natural language is not an obstacle, but the condition of ordinary argumentation.
4. Diagnosing Fallacy as an Argumentative Issue
Criticizing arguments is an argument in itself. First, the diagnosis of a fallacy must be justified. This justified diagnosis is only one step in a larger process, not the final step or charge. Next, the so-called “fallacious arguer” may respond, and attempt to refute the accusation.
This reply may then be challenged, and there are no rules as to who ends the discussion.
[1] To use a title from W. Ward Fearnside & William B. Holther (1959). Fallacy: The Counterfeit of Argument, cited in Hamblin 1970, p. 11.