METAPHOR, ANALOGY, MODEL
In ancient Greek, ‘metaphor’ means ‘transfer’; in the Poetics (1457b), Aristotle defines metaphor as ‘the application to a thing of a name foreign to it’. This definition actually covers the field of tropes (figures of words, see metonymy): In this sense, the metaphor is indeed the ‘queen of figures.’
Metaphor can be defined by the following features and perspectives
(a) Metaphor is a matter of discourse.
(b) There is a metaphor when, in a discourse, a reality is designated by a ‘strange’ term. The term is strange because it does not fit into the isotopy of the discourse in which it appears.
Aristotle defines metaphor as « the application to a thing of a name foreign to it » (Poetics, 1457b), In ancient Greek, ‘metaphor’ means ‘transfer’; this definition actually covers the field of the figures of words.
(c) The receiver is surprised but tries to make sense of the term.
(d) He finds an interpretation based on analogy that makes sense and introduces a new perspective on the subject under discussion.
(e) From an argumentative point of view, the metaphor is successful if it brings a cognitive benefit to the receiver.
From a rhetorical point of view, the metaphor is valued as a cryptic analogy, whose clarification is left to the audience. The main difference between metaphor and analogy is that analogy keeps the two domains it relates separate and distinct, whereas metaphor tends to conflate them.
Metaphor can be a powerful cognitive tool for building a representation of the most complex situation. Metaphor applies the language of a model, i.e. the Resource domain (the metaphorical term) to an actual situation, the Problematic domain, to which belongs the (sometimes missing) metaphorized term, see Structural analogy.
1. Metaphor on trial
In his Rhetoric, Aristotle, considers metaphor to be the most effective instrument of persuasion in ordinary discourse (see §2 below). From the perspective of an anti-rhetorical theory of argumentation, metaphor is highy misleading. But metaphor is also a powerful cognitive tool for building representations, and better understanding complex situations. Metaphor applies the language of a model, i.e. the Resource domain (the metaphorical term) to an actual situation, the Problematic domain, to which the (sometimes missing) « metaphorized » term belongs, see Structural analogy.
If metaphor is defined as a figure, and figures are defined as ornaments, then metaphor is misleading in all its dimensions, S. Fallacy; Ornamental fallacy. The metaphorical statement is false: “The voter is a calf” said Charles de Gaulle; but the voter (proper, literal term) is not a calf (figurative, metaphorical term) the voter is a human being. Metaphor systematically commits a category mistake. Metaphor can also be accused metaphor of creating ambiguity, because it introduces a parasitic level of meaning, the figurative meaning, which runs parallel to the proper, standard meaning.
The metaphor pops up, creating a surprise and introducing an emotion (ad passiones fallacy); it entertains the audience (ad populum fallacy), thus sacrificing docere to placere. It turns the rational arguer into an actor (ad ludicrum fallacy). Metaphor is therefore the discursive distractor par excellence, leading the audience down on a false path, and confusing the honest literalist in his search for truth, see Relevance; Red Herring; Resumption of discourse.
Therefore, metaphor is, and should be, banished from serious argumentative discourse, as well as from scientific language; it can only be helpful if it is reformulated as a comparison (Ortony 1979, p. 191). Nevertheless, it should be emphasized that metaphor is active and welcome in stimulating creativity and facilitating the transmission and popularization of science and science education.
2. Metaphor, the ultimate weapon of persuasion?
Persuasion, pistis, is produced in three ways “(1) by working on the emotions of the judges themselves, (2) by giving them the right impression of the character of the speaker, or (3) by proving the truth of the statements made” (Aristotle, Rhet., 1403b10; RR p. 397), in the latter case, persuasion arising “from the facts themselves” (ibid).
Ideally, the issue should be discussed on the basis of facts and evidence: “we ought in fairness to fight our case with no help beyond the bare facts: nothing, therefore should matter except the proof of those facts” (ibid 1404a1; RR p. 399). But ordinary people are not that perfect, and “owing to the defects of our hearers”, and of our “political institutions”, “the arts of language cannot help having a small but real importance” in public discourse and education-but not in geometry: “nobody uses fine language when teaching geometry” (1404a1-10, RR. p. 399).
Fine language, then, is the most effective tool of persuasion. Persuasion by emotion (pathos) and image (ethos) is produced, orally, by the “oratorical action”; in writing, by the stylistic arrangement of facts, “because speeches of the written or literary kind owe more to their diction than to their thought” (1404a15; p. 401). Metaphor [1] is the supreme tool of written discourse “both in poetry and in prose”; it “gives style clearness, charm and distinction as nothing else can” (1405a1-10; RR, p. 405). The conclusion is clear: metaphor is the ultimate weapon of persuasion, defined as the art of “[hiding one’s] purpose successfully” (1404b20; RR, p. 403), and charming the audience, S. Logos, Ethos, Pathos.
Contemporary approaches to metaphor agree consider that metaphor derives this power from its intrinsic element of surprise, resulting from the perception of an anomaly in the discourse, a rupture, an inconsistency, an incongruity, a contradiction of logic, in short, a discursive coup, to the delight of the audience. Pleasure cannot be refuted, and metaphor is therefore considered to be virtually inaccessible to refutation — in reality, it is: cf. infra, §4
3. Metaphor and interpretive cooperation
By using a metaphor, the speaker openly seeks the interpretive cooperation of the audience; by creating cooperation, the metaphor reinforces the importance of prior agreements. Note that the same functional explanation is given for the derivation of enthymemes from underlying syllogisms. In both cases, the argumentative (i.e. effective, persuasive) function of the enthymematic or metaphorical condensation is to activate the partner, see Enthymeme §5.
This analysis assumes that the non-argumentative metaphorical language, or the non-elliptical syllogism would be transparent, or less complex than the metaphorical language, and that their direct interpretation would not require the same degree of cooperation from the audience, which is not self-evident.
4. Metaphor as analogy
Metaphor finds clever solutions to the riddle of metaphor:
Metaphor is the dreamwork of language and, like all dreamwork, its interpretation reflects as much on the interpreter as on the originator. The interpretation of dreams requires collaboration between a dreamer and a waker, even if they be the same person; and the act of interpretation is itself a work of the imagination. So too, understanding a metaphor is as much a creative endeavor as making a metaphor, and as little guided by rules.
(Davidson 1978, p. 29)
In The Interpretation of Dreams (1900) Freud defines dreamwork as the process by which the latent content of a dream is covered by its manifest content, by displacement, distortion, condensation and symbolism. The metaphor “metaphor / dreamwork” is difficult to reject, even though it commits the fallacy of trying to go ad obscurum per obscurius, that is, of trying to illuminate the dark (metaphor) by the darker (dreamwork).
Metaphor is a model, (Black 1962), and an imperialist model, that urges one to identify the « metaphorized » reality within the metaphorical world:
L1 — we should do something about the economy…
L2 — by “economy-casino” you mean?
L1 — oh yes, all these addicted traders should be banned from the market!
Reconstructed analogy “as addicted gamblers are banned from casinos”
To saying that “the voter is a calf” is to say that “the voter is hesitant, weak and can be manipulated like a calf”, where calves are the stereotypical animal that combines these characteristics. The metaphor opens up new perspectives, and legitimizes a new set of inferences about voters: if they are categorized as calves, they can be made to behave in ways directly contrary to their interests, for example, by being led to a more or less metaphorical slaughterhouse.
Metaphor draws its argumentative power from an analogy that is pushed to identification. Structural analogy explicitly brings two domains together, while respecting their specificities; the domains are confronted, not assimilated. Metaphor makes the comparison implicit, negates the metaphorized domain, assimilates it to the metaphorical one. This is why the reconstruction of the analogy underlying the metaphorical expression betrays the metaphor: it splits apart what the metaphor has united. Peter is a lion: the language referring to lions is replaced by the language referring to a human being; we are not far from the hyper-unified coherent Renaissance world where everything is reflected in everything,, S. Analogical thinking.
5. Jumping from analogy to identity?
Analogy can be defined as a partial identity. The question of possible deep identity, underlying immediately recognizable differences plays an essential role here:
Snowdrifts are like corrugated iron.
Snowdrifts are like dunes.
The syntactic structures of these two statements are identical, both propose to the interlocutor the image of “waves”, and a key common semantic feature, /waving/. But the second comparison is deeper; it opens the way to a theory. It introduces a proportion analogy:
snow : snowdrift :: sand : dune
It suggests that the analogy can be explained by the action of the wind on the snow particles and the sand grains, respectively. It guides the student to construct a physical-mathematical model that covers both phenomena (taking into account the differences between the two types of particles, sandg grains and snowflakes, and their respective laws of agglomeration). From two apparently different phenomena (one can know what a dune is without knowing what a snowdrift is, and vice versa), we arrive at the problem of a unifying abstract representation: can the same physical model account for both phenomena?
The establishment of an analogy can be seen as the first step towards the affirmation of a deep identity. Such a shift, from explanatory analogy to identity is at the center of a class of arguments about analogy, that fit perfectly within the framework of a vision of metaphor, not only as a model but also as the very essence of the metaphorized phenomenon.
6. Mole rats “societies”, human society: metaphor or identity?
The following texts and information are taken from S. Braude & E. Lacey, “A revolutionary monarchy: the society of mole rats”[2]. Mole rats are mammals, specifically hairless rats, that live in “groups” or “communities” (the difference is relevant); they exhibit behaviors reminiscent of those observed in social insects, such as ants or bees. However, this behavior has never been observed in mammals. Hairless mole rats are thus the first mammals with this kind of “social behavior”.
But, when we speak of “social behavior” or “community”, are we using a simple analogical-metaphorical lexicon, a pedagogical or explanatory metaphor? Or are we engaged in a process of describing these newly identified animal behaviors in terms of the existing structures of human societies? Are we suggesting, as in the case of the dunes and snowdrifts, that both phenomena may well have the same foundations, in this case biological? Does the organization of human societies obey the same biological laws as the “societies” of mole rats ? Are we on the way to a sociobiological theory of human societies? Have we stealthily moved from metaphorical language to identification?
This is a strategy of “slippery metaphor”. This strategy is so successful, that it reverses the relationship Target / Resource relationship. Being closer to nature, mole rats, formerly the Target, now become a model for the study of human society, formerly the Resource.
To reject this assimilation, the opponent first lists the terms coming from the Resource field, the human social lexicon:
The phrase “division of labor” is used four times; the word “task” also appears four times; the term “responsible” also appears four times, and “they take care of” once; the terms “cooperation” and “subordinate” are used once each. The term “sexual status” is used three times to refer to the reproductive status of the animals. (G. Lepape, [Research], 1992)
In response to this criticism, the authors of the article set limits to the identification of the two fields:
G. Lepape also claims that our language introduces unfair comparisons that attribute common behavioral traits to mole rats and social insects. This claim surprises us, especially when he writes, “The similarities [between hairless mole rats and social insects] are treated as true homologies”. Our paper is clear on this point: we believe that the behavior of hairless mole rats and eusocial[3] insects show striking similarities. However, we do not see how the language used to describe these similarities can suggest that a common origin of these animals would is the evolutionary basis of these similarities.
Braude & Lacey, id..
The danger here is that we might be tempted to forget that we are dealing with analogy, which is “never more compelling than when it is abolished and ceases to be perceived as an analogy. Becoming invisible, it merges with the order of things.” (Gadoffre 1980, p. 6)
7. Against metaphors
Politicians [are] catering to a public that doesn’t understand the rationale for deficit spending, that tends to think of the government budget via analogies with family finances.
When John Boehner, the Republican leader, opposed US stimulus plans on the grounds that “American families are tightening their belt, but they don’t see the government tightening its belt”, economists cringed at the stupidity. But within a few months the very same line was showing up in Barack Obama’s speeches […]. Similarly, the Labour Party […]
(The Guardian 04-29-2015)[3]
The “stupidity” is that of the inference “families are tightening their belts, SO the state must tighten its belt”. We can reconstruct the justification principle of this argument as a metaphor:
A state, a nation, a country is a family.
You could also think of it as a kind of composition:
The state is made up of families, families tighten their belts, the state must tighten its belt.
In any case, the “state, family” metaphor has deep roots; it is based on the etymology of the word economy, from the Greek oikonomia, “household management”; it is found in the praise of the leader as “father of the nation,” “founding father,” and so on.
Krugman considers that politicians are “catering” (“providing what the public wants, desires or what amuses them”; after d.c, cater) to a public “that doesn’t understand”; so politicians have to use metaphors, however stupid, to adapt to their audience; this is indeed what Aristotle said, see above.
Happy metaphors do serve to charm the audience, but the fact that there are also unhappy metaphors must be fully acknowledged. Where they are used, the interlocutors are not only not “charmed”, they show no pleasure, they “cringe at the stupidity”, that is, “show on their face and bodies their feeling of disgust and embarrassment” (after MW, Cringe). This is exactly how metaphors can be refuted as metaphors.
Then, in a second step, the substantive content can be settled, i.e the de-metaphorized claim that “in times of economic crisis, the state must turn to austerity”. Krugman conducts this substantive refutation in the semi-technical language of economics, combining a priori refutation (theoretically unfounded), falsification (predictions contradicted by facts) and pragmatic refutation (policies inspired by this theory have failed). But a second metaphor remains; if words such as restriction and austerity, have a clearly negative orientation, the expression “tightening one’s belt”, associated with successful dieting, weight loss, slimness, has strong visual, irrefutable positive connotations, inaccessible to refutation.
[1] In the Poetics Aristotle defines metaphor as « the application to a thing of a name foreign to it, by a change from genus to species, from species to genus, from genus to species, or according to a relationship of analogy » (1457b). The expression « applying a name that is foreign to something » actually covers the field of the field of tropes (or figures of speech). In ancient Greek, « metaphor » means « transfer ».
[2] Braude, S. & Lacey E. (1989). Une monarchie révolutionnaire: la société des rats-taupes. La Recherche [Research], a journal of general scientific information] July-August 1989. Comments by G. Le Pape, and reply by the authors in the same magazine, Oct. 1992.
[3] “Living in a cooperative group in which usually one female and several males are reproductively active and the non-breeding individuals care for the young or protect and provide for the group eusocial termites, ants, and naked mole rats” (MW, Eusocial)
[4] www.theguardian.com/business/ng-interactive/2015/apr/29/the-austerity-delusion (15-08-16)