The word norm has two main meanings.

1. The statisticians’ norm, the average

In France, the average age of / for first sexual intercourse is 16.8 years. 27% of young people are sexually active before 16. In a lifetime, the French have, on average, 16.7 partners. Only 10% will be satisfied with the same one all their lives. on average, our contemporaries perform 121 somersaults per year. « 

Source: [http://www.uniondesfamilles.org/sexualite_ en_chiffres.htm] (20-09- 2013)

2. The norm as imperative

Its description involves the injunction of an obligation, which is expressed by a rule whose content belongs to / falls within the particular institution or domain concerned, for example:

Moral and legal domain: Thou shalt not kill

Ordinary civility: Thou shalt respond when spoken to

Proper use of language: Thou shalt not say « I is », thou shalt say « I am »

Rational behavior: Thou shalt not use ambiguous statements; thy tongue shall not be forked

Road driving: Thou shalt remain in control of thy vehicle.

3. Norms in argumentation

The different theories of argumentation have very different relationships with norms; only some express them in the form of rules.

Generalized theories of argumentation

The generalized theories of argumentation, such as the theory of argumentation in language or natural logic, have no relation with norms of morality, truth or rationality. When the theory of argumentation in language speaks of norms, it is about linguistic norms, which are expressed in terms of acceptability or non-acceptability of the statements and of the sequences of statements. The rules considered are the structural forms of language.

Rhetoric as an ars bene dicendi

Argumentative rhetoric as an ars bene dicendi, defines rhetoric as form, “art of speaking well”, and as content “art of saying what is morally good”.

The speech does not have an autonomous standard, its norms are externalized as a moral of discourse, combine with a art of speaking in agreement with the rules of good taste,

Both are diffuse norms, adaptable to the tastes of the time, which would be difficult to transpose into a set of rules.

New Rhetoric

The New Rhetoric takes as a norm the quality of the audience, in particular the universal audience, S. Persuade and convince

The norm is not provided by a system of rules but by an ideal instance, the universal audience.

Classical logic

As a natural form of argumentation, classical logic uses as a norm the rules of the syllogism, S. Syllogistic paralogisms.

Pragma-dialectic

The Pragma-dialectics proposes a system of normative rules, S. Rules; Evaluations and evaluators.

1. A word as a hologram of the argument

Holography is a technique that provides a two-dimensional representation of three-dimensional phenomena. In metaphorical sense, a word can function as the hologram of a whole argumentation (actually a set of co-oriented speeches) and mirror the totality of the argumentative discourse it is part of. The line of discourse is condensed into one of its points, that being the word. Such hologrammatic words are termed oriented (in the Argumentation within Language theory) or biased (in standard Fallacy theory).

Argumentations containing oriented words are considered to be fallacious and sophistical insofar as they actually presuppose the conclusions they apparently construct. The conclusion is embedded in the wording of the argument, and the reasoning is trapped in a vicious circle. Metaphorically, one may say that the target (the conclusion) is tailored to the measure of the arrow (the argument); the arrow cannot miss the target, and is therefore irrelevant.

This is true if an argumentation is considered to be a self-sufficient piece of reasoning, contained in an autonomous discursive episode. If argumentation is seen as an on-going process, however, the orientation of words testifies to the fact that the argumentative discourse not only constructs its conclusion on the spot, but also recalls that this conclusion has been previously established. Oriented words refer to the whole script corresponding to the arguer’s discourse; they are the memory of argumentation, and the clearest example of objects of discourse. The word biased has a negative orientation (“prejudiced; to be avoided”) while orientation, oriented can have a neutral-positive orientation (“taking bearings”), while admitting, if need be, a negative orientation (“biased”).

The global issue is that of the argument orientation and the persuasive definition. The first case involves language data and the second speech activity, in the first case the discourse is biased per se, in the second case it is made biased by the participant.

2. Designations as issues

Let us consider the pro-life vs. free choice debate. If a participant speaks of babies and the other of fetuses, we already know that the former is most probably pro-life and the latter pro-free-choice. The antagonistic words are “loaded” with the antagonistic conclusion towards which they are oriented. Baby refers to a human person, and implies that we must feel for this being all the value-loaded emotions we feel for young children, and treat him or her accordingly. Fetus puts these attitudes between parentheses, and technically refers to a “product of the conception of vertebrates during prenatal development, after the embryonic stage, when it begins to form and to present the distinctive characteristics of the species.” (TLFi, Fetus). A word might be value-loaded in a discourse and not in another. In the developmental discourse of medicine, for example, fetus opposes to embryo and is a non-controversial technical designation, as is baby when referring to a pre-toddler child.
The idea of human selection is generally repulsive. The search for a positive designation for babies which have been genetically selected in order to treat his or her sick brother or sister, continues. Candidate terms include, designer baby, medicine baby, savior baby, doctor baby….

A similar debate is also reflected in the designation for products used as crop treatments, and suspected to be carcinogenic. The terms agro-pharmaceutical product or phyto-sanitary product sound highly chemical, and the latter has even been appropriated by a French association “Phyto-Victims”. Pesticide has also a negative orientation, despite its etymological meaning, “pests killer” (as if the negation of a negation was interpreted as an hyper-negation). The terminological fight continues, and the industry has turned to plant protection product and crop protection product.

The orientation of ordinary words strongly differentiates natural language and logical languages. Biased language can be considered an obstacle to the objective treatment of the issue, and has thus been banned from argumentative discourse as an instrument of monological rationality. The problem is how to agree upon the purification principle, as it could significantly affect most of out common vocabulary.

Categorization operations are not too problematic for plants, animals and other natural species. Things are more complicated when it comes to beings and situations whose designations cannot be agreed upon before the debate, but is actually the very issue at stake.

In the debate about abortion for example, the discussion of the correct designation, fetus or baby, cannot be dissociated from the discussion on the merits and disadvantages of abortion itself.

In practice, the persuadee must assent not only to a position, but also to the corresponding expression, S. Persuasion. It is not possible to remediate biased language by a conventionalism, consisting in agreeing on the meaning of the words before the debate in which they are to be used, refraining from using loaded terms, or creating neutral terms. The discussion of the nature of the object is not separable from the discussion of its name. The fact of being at the heart of a debate results in duplication of the designation of the object. Its objective designation and “real name” will eventually be attributed to it at the end of the debate; objectivity is not a condition but a product of the debate.

The search for “neutral” terms shows, on the one hand, the desire to put ordinary language between parentheses when it comes to serious issues, insofar as it does not correspond to a pure referential and inferential ideals, and, on the other hand, the wish to consider that the debate between rational beings consists only in clarifying semantic misunderstandings, which are the consequence of the defects of natural language. The task of argumentation would be relatively simple if we could assume that some data are accepted as such by both parties; this is true only for peaceful neutral facts, external to the heart of the debate. In the other case, the division of discourses is openly exposed by the use of so-called biased, loaded or oriented designations. The designation is already argumentative, S. Schematization. Agreeing on the designation of facts is a matter of identity, focus, emotional empathy. As there is a conversion to new beliefs, there is a conversion to new facts and words.

1. The mistake about camels in the Koran is traditional and I probably borrowed it from Borges:

A few days ago, I discovered a curious confirmation of the way in which what is truly native can and often does dispense with local color; I found this confirmation in Gibbon’s Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire. Gibbon observes that in the Arab book par excellence, the Koran, there are no camels; I believe that if there ever were any doubt as to the authenticity of the Koran, this lack of camels would suffice to prove that it is Arab. It was written by Mohammed, and Mohammed, as an Arab, had no reason to know that camels were particularly Arab; they were, for him, a part of reality, and he had no reason to single them out, while the first thing a forger, a tourist, or an Arab nationalist would do is bring on the camels, whole caravans of camels on every page; but Mohammed, as an Arab, was unconcerned; he knew he could be Arab without camels. I believe that we Argentines can be like Mohammed; we can believe in the possibility of being Argentine without abounding in local color.

Jorge Luis Borges, The Argentine Writer and Tradition (1951) (my emphasis)
Quoted from https://arabist.net/blog/2006/6/30/borges.html (10-29-2021

Borges is a writer, not a historian. Borges’ Gibbon is a “fiction”, which should not be mistaken for the historical Gibbon.

As the context makes clear,Borges uses the case of camels and the Koran as a resource domain for an analogy about the local color and the Argentine literature, an Argentina without gauchos is paralleled with a Koran without camels (certainly in relation with the Florida – Boedo antagonism)

2. Gibbon, Gagnier and the milk of the camel

Edward Gibbon never said that there was no camel in the Qur’an. Speaking about the life of the Arabs at the time of Mohammed, he praises the camel:

Alive or dead, almost every part of the camel is serviceable to man: her milk is plentiful and nutritious; the young and tender flesh has the taste of veal (¹³)

Footnote 13 […] Mahomet himself, who was fond of milk, prefers the cow and does not even mention the camel. But the diet of Mecca and Medina was already more luxurious (Gagnier, Vie de Mahomet, tom. iii, p. 404).

Edward Gibbon The History of the decline and fall of the Roman Empire, … Vol. IX, New York, Fred de Fau, 1907.

Speaking of Muhammad’s diet, Gagnier actually says,

« milk was the prophet’s most favorite element » (p. 401).

Later, he quotes Muhammad saying:

« Cow’s milk nourishes & sustains the body (…) It is the most commendable of all milks, & it surpasses by its good qualities the milk of Sheep & the milk of Goat, especially by its delicacy and unctuousness » (p. 404).

Jean Gagnier, La vie de Mahomet… [The life of Mahomet…] Amsterdam, Wetstein & Smith. 1748.

This is a hierachization of the milks, topped by goat’s miks, followed by sheep’s milk, followed down by cow’s milk, etc.

The fact that came’s milk is not mentionned is not silence, but a relevant omission, by application of relevance rule, as shown by the possibility to add an etc to capp-off Gagnier’s enumeration.

3 A misreading of Gibbon’s text? A tentative reconstruction

A quick reader goes over the trivial « accessory » (between brackets):

Mahomet himself, [who was fond of milk], prefers the cow and] does not even mention the camel

but on the “essential” beginning and end of the sentence:

Mahomet does not even mention the camel.

This could be seen as a case of omission of relevant circumstances (S. Accident), resulting in a misconstruction of the reference chain and of the topic of the passage.

Finally, since, basically, Muhammad is the Koran, the conclusion is that:

Gibbon says that the Koran does not mention the camel.

QED.

The Port-Royal Logic stigmatizes the technique of the inventio as stimulating the “noxious fertility of common thoughts” (Arnauld and Nicole [1662], p. 235). The same criticism applies to the techniques of elocutio, which stimulates and extolls the abundance of words (copia verborum) S. Ornamental, producing a verbose and redundant discourse:

Among the causes which lead us into error, by a false luster, which prevent our recognizing it, we may justly reckon a certain grand and pompous eloquence. […] for it is wonderful how sweetly a false reasoning flows in at the close of a period which well fits the ear, or of a figure which surprises us by its novelty, and in the contemplation of which we are delighted. (Id., p. 279)

The condemnation of the techniques stimulating the abundance of ideas as well as the abundance of words amounts to a general condemnation of rhetoric, as inherently fallacious. Cicero defines eloquence as copia verborum; that is eloquence; the rejection of eloquence, re-named verbiage to stigmatize its negative orientation, is a turning point in the relations between rhetoric and logic as a criticism of discourse. This fallacy of verbiage is, as it were, the mother of all fallacies. According to Whately:

a very long discussion is one of the most effective masks of the fallacies; […] a fallacy, which, asserted without a veil […] would not deceive a child can deceive half the world if it is diluted in a large quarto (Elements of Logic 1844) (quoted by Mackie, 1967, p. 179).

S. Systemic — Superfluity  — Fallacies (1)  — Fallacies (4): A Moral and Anthropological perspective

1. “Vicious circle”, “begging the question”, “petitio principii”

Petitio principii — In classical Latin, petitio means “request”, and principium “beginning” (Gaffiot [1934], Petitio; Principium). A petitio principii is literally a “request” of the “principles”. Tricot considers that the rendition as “petition of principle” is “vicious”. He notes that “what we ask to grant is not a principle but the conclusion to be proved” (note 2 to Aristotle, Top., VIII, 13, 162a30, p. 359).

The two expressions vicious circle and begging the question are equivalent. The expression vicious circle stresses the cognitive and textual, semantic aspects of the phenomenon, while begging the question emphasizes the dialectical interactional character of the same concept.

The speaker is “begging the question”, that is asking that what is « in question » (the disputed conclusion itself) be granted, as an argument or principle.

The Latin expression petitio principii is used as an equivalent of begging the question.

2. Vicious circle

In the Aristotelian system of fallacies, a vicious circle is a fallacy independent of language, S. Fallacies (2). It is a process of reasoning which seeks to prove a conclusion, by giving as an argument this conclusion itself. Hence the image of the circle. Its schematic form is:

A, since, so, because A.

There are different ways in which to beg a question (Aristotle, Top., VIII, 13).

2.1 Repetition

In ordinary discourse, compound statements “A because A” might be considered as begging the question from a logical point of view:

S1 — Mum, why do I have I to make my bed every morning?
S2 — You have to do it because you have to do it. It’s like that because it’s not otherwise

Nonetheless, despite its format, this is not a vicious circle. The answer is not an invalid justification but a refusal of justification, as testified by the associated mood, exasperation.

2.2 Reformulation

In common cases, there is a vicious circle where the conclusion is a paraphrastic reformulation of the argument:

I like milk because it’s good.

Fortunately I like milk, because if I did not like it I would not drink it, and it would be a pity because it’s so good.

When the very result to be demonstrated is postulated, “this is easily detected when put in so many words; but 
it is more apt to escape detection in the case of different terms,
or a term and an expression, that mean the same thing” (Aristotle, Top, VIII, 13).

In the theory of Argumentation within Language, the concept of orientation^@ introduces a bias which is not so different from mere petitio principii. The statement

Peter is clever, he will solve the problem.

The above example has a misleading deductive appearance, because the predicate “can solve problems” is in fact included in the definition of “is clever”. The misleading inference is actually a reformulation. Reformulations are interesting insofar as they are never strictly synonymous with their basis. Instead, they introduce a semantic shift, which can be productive. Begging the question is deceitful only in so far as it is strictly the same term that is repeated, S. Orientation.

Goethe claims that, in any argumentation, the argument is only a variation of the conclusion; hence it follows that argumentative rationality is simply vain rationalization:

§50 It is always better for us to say straight out what we think without wanting to prove much; for all the proofs we put forward are really just variations on our own opinions, and people who are otherwise minded listen neither to one nor to the other.
Johann Wolfgang von Goethe. Maxims and Reflections.[1]

2.3 Ad hoc general laws

 The Topics point out the frequent case in which one assumes in the form of universal law what is in question in a particular case (ibid.):

Politicians are liars / corrupt. So this politician is a liar / corrupt

This is a most common kind of argumentation. The speaker postulates a one shot, ad hoc principle, in order to apply it to the case at hand. Such cases can also be analyzed as ill-constructed definitions: “being corrupt” is considered an essential characteristic of politicians, whereas it is only an accidental characteristic, S. Definition, Accident.

2.4 Mutual presupposition

Not all vicious circles are reformulations. An objection to the idea of ​​a miracle for example, is that it establishes a vicious circle. Miracles are said to justify the doctrine, to prove that it is true and holy, but a fact is recognized as a miracle only by the doctrine it is supposed to prove. It is a form of resistance to refutation:

S1_1 — This miraculous fact proves the existence of God.
S2_1 — But only those who believe in the existence of God recognize this fact as a miracle

S2 may add that S1 does not recognize other equally surprising facts; to which the latter might reply that:

S1_2 — These other facts are miracles operated by the devil to deceive people.

2.5 Equal uncertainty

The term diallel is used by the Skeptics, with a meaning identical to “vicious circle”:

And the circularity mode occurs when what ought to make the case for the matter in question has need of support from that very matter; whence, being unable to assume either in order to establish the other, we suspend judgment about both. (Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, I, 15, 169)

This definition introduces a new concept of the vicious circle that no longer focuses on a semantic equivalence or an epistemic relation, but on the very definition of argumentation as a technique to reduce the uncertainty of a claim by connecting it to a less doubtful statement, the argument. S. Argumentation. Skeptics will therefore endeavor to show that the argument is systematically no more obvious than the conclusion. In this sense, Skeptics are the first deconstructionists.

3. Circularity in explanation

Circularity is welcome in definitions, but not in demonstrations or explanations. An explanation is circular, if the explanans is at least as obscure as the phenomenon it claims to account for.

[1] Johann Wolfgang von Goethe. Maxims and Reflections. Trans. by E. Stopp. London: Penguin Books, 1998. Quoted after https://issuu.com/bouvard6/docs/goethe_-___maxims_and_reflections__ No pag. Goethe gathered these maxims during all his life.

The appeal to the “true meaning of the word” is advanced in opposition to discourses which are said to use an incorrect, improper or superficial meaning of a given word. This appeal produces a stasis of definition, S. Definition (2). The true meaning of a word can be sought in:

— Its etymological meaning
— Its morphology
— The meaning of the corresponding word in another language.

1. Etymological argument

The label “argument by etymology” corresponds to different kinds of arguments, according to the meaning given to etymology.

1. Under the heading “argument from etymology”, some modern texts discuss phenomena related to related words (Dupleix, 1603).
2. In contemporary use, the etymological meaning of a word is the meaning of the oldest historical root identified in the word’s history. Etymological argument values the meaning of this root by considering that this ancient meaning corresponds to the true and permanent meaning of this word, which has been altered by historical evolution to produce a contemporary perverted and misleading meaning. This etymological meaning is used in argumentation exploiting a definition.

Atom comes from / is a Greek word composed of the negative prefix a- and a noun meaning “cutting”; it means “in-divisible”. So you cannot break the atom.

Democracy comes from / is a Greek word composed of demos “people” kratos “rule”. In Syldavia, the people don’t rule, they vote and forget. Thus, Syldavia is not in a democracy.

The appeal to etymology is itself supported by an argumentation by etymology, since the word etymology is derived from a Greek root ètumos meaning “true”.

Knowledge of etymology being culturally valued, the argument by etymology gives the speaker a certain ethotic posture of majesty and learned authority. It serves very well the strategy of destruction of the discourse “you don’t even know the language you claim to speak”, S. Destruction.

2. Argumentation based on the structure of the word

Lat. notatio, “the act of marking a sign … to designate […] to note”, as well as “etymology” (Gaffiot [1934], Notatio).

Cicero in the Topics defines the argument “ex notatione” (Topics, VIII, 35: 78), translated as “argument by etymology”. This translation takes the word etymology with its ancient meaning, “true”. The true sense of the word under examination is now defined as the meaning reconstructed by the correct analysis of the word (and not as its original historical meaning). One of the examples of argument discussed by Cicero in this context deals with a conflict of interpretation of a compound legal term (still in use today) the postliminium (Top., VIII, 36, p. 78). The postliminium is the right of a prisoner returning to his country to recover the properties and social position he held before his captivity. Cicero’s discussion concerns the establishment of the correct meaning of the word, relying on its linguistic structure, without any clear allusion to its etymology in the contemporary sense of the term.

A contradictory report (joint report) is a report reproducing the declarations of the two parties, and not a self-contradictory verbal report or a report contradicting another.

Argumentation by the structure of the word thus connects two argumentations:

— The first argumentation establishes the meaning of the compound word on the basis of the meaning of its terms and its morphological structure. This form of argumentation is relevant to all idioms whose meaning depends more or less on that of the terms that compose them. It is based upon linguistic knowledge and technique, S. Definition (1).

— A second argumentation exploits the “true” meaning thus established for some legal conclusion, according to the general mechanisms of argumentation by the definition, S. Definition (3).

The argument by the structure of the word functions as a way of avoiding conflict of interpretations.

3. Arguing from the meaning of the word in another language

One can look for the true meaning of the word in other languages, which for various reasons are considered closer to the “origin” or the “essence” of things. One such language is Chinese. The word crisis, for example, can be defined as “a time of intense difficulty or danger” (Google, Crisis). In search of “what crises really are”, one can shift to “what the word crisis really, truly, means”, and call on the word’s Chinese equivalent. The Chinese word meaning crisis is a compound of two word-signs, meaning respectively “danger” and “opportunity”. So crises are opportunities; and, by an argument based on the Chinese definition, we deduce that:

The opportunistic approach of the crisis then takes on its full meaning: Not to seize the opportunity of a crisis, means miss a chance, perhaps hidden, but within reach. (Stéphane Saint Pol, [Wei Ji, A return to the Roots][1])

The argument presupposes that the Chinese language has elaborated and preserved a better concept of crisis, closer to the essence of the thing, and better adapted to the modern world.

[1] www.communication-sensible.com/articles/article0151.php]. (09-20-2013).

In the Argumentation within Language theory of Ducrot and Anscombre, the topoi are defined as general gradual principles, relating predicates, and “presented [by the speaker] as accepted by the group” (Ducrot 1988, p. 103; Anscombre 1995a). The word topos (pl. topoi) will be used to refer to this specific concept as distinct from the classical argument schemes.

Topoi are pairs of predicates (noted by capital letters). The (+) or (–) factor indicates that these predicates are gradual.

This type of inter-predicate linkage was also observed by Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca in their discussion of values ([1958], pp. 115-128).

All predicates are gradual. For example, in a Syldavian subculture, the following topos might structure conversation about “being a real man” (M) and “drinking BeverageB”, (B); this relation is expressed by the topos “(+)M, (+)B”; advertisers claim that “real men drink BeverageB”; the more of BeverageB that one drinks, the more of a “real man” one will be.

The same predicate may be associated by the four topical forms, for example in the following argumentations.

(+) money (–) happiness: “he is a rich financier, so he has many anxieties and sleeps poorly”
(–) money (+) happiness: “money can’t buy happiness”;
“the poor cobbler sings all the day long”[1].

(–) money, (–) happiness: “lack of money is terrible”
(+) money, (+) happiness: “money can buy everything”.

In the case of sport and health:

(+) sport, (–) health: “champions die young”
(–) sport (+) health: “to stay healthy, refrain from sports” (Churchill, “no sport”).

(–) sport, (–) health: “when I stop training, I feel bad”
(+) sport, (+) health: “do a sport, you will feel better”.

In such cases, the predicates are linked by four different topoi <+/- S, +/- H>; nonetheless, communities have preferences, in this case for the two last ones.

These topoi are the exact linguistic expression of the “active associative nodes for ideas” mentioned by Ong (1958, p. 122); S. Collections (I). They express the possible linguistic associations between “having money” and “being happy”, between “living a healthy life” and “practicing sport”. To summarize, current talk about money and happiness prefers the (–, ­–) association, whilst current talk about sport and a healthy life prefers the (+, +) association.

Such associations will emerge in the discourse as reasonable and convincing inferences. In ordinary discourse a complex causal elaboration such as “some/all plant protection products are the/a cause of bees disappearance” boils down in ordinary talk to an accepted, doxical association “+PPP, – bees”.

These expressions are semantic inferences, and are pseudo-reasoning insofar as they say nothing about reality; discourse is an inference machine, an argumentative machine; language can and does speak. This vision legitimates the skepticism of the theory of argumentation in the language with respect to ordinary argumentation as a form of reasoning, S. Criticism. Reasoning emerges from ordinary talk only under specific conditions; there might be a big step between debating and learning (Buty & Plantin 2009).

[1] According to La Fontaine, “The cobbler and the financier”, Fables, Book VIII, Fable 2.

1. Topic

In general vocabulary, the word topic refers to (MW, Topic):

• 1 a: one of the general forms of argument employed in probable reasoning
  • b: argument, reason
• 2
 a: a heading in an outlined argument or exposition
  • b: the subject of a discourse or of a section of a discourse

The two meanings of topic go from topic₁ a formal, inferential pole (meaning (1)) to a substantial pole (meaning (2)). They fit with the two different meanings of argument used in their definition, S. (To) Argue, Argument:

— Topic₁: According to (1), in a “reasoning” context, argument means “argument₁”. Correlatively, a topic₁ is here an argument₁ scheme or an argumentation derived from such a scheme. With this meaning, it can be considered a translation of the Greek word topos.

— Topic₂: According to (2), in an “exposition” and “subject” context, argument means argument₃. Correlatively, a topic₂ is an argument₃, that is to say, the matter, the content of a discourse.

2. Topos

In contemporary English, the word topos is defined as “a traditional or conventional literary or rhetorical theme or topic” (MW, Topos).

2.1 Topos as “argument scheme” and “topic₁”

In Greek, the word topos (pl. topoi) has the basic meaning of “place”. In argumentative rhetoric, topos is used metaphorically to refer to “the place where arguments are found”; a topic is an argument scheme. So, topos is translated as topic by Freese and as argumentative line by Rhys Robert in their respective translations of Aristotle’s Rhetoric.

In Latin, the corresponding word is locus (pl. loci), which also means “place”, translated as topic by Hubble in his translation of Cicero’s Topica, and as “presumptive proof” by Caplan in his translation of the Rhetorica ad Herennium. In a famous metaphor, Cicero defines the argumentative places (Lat. loci, sg. locus) as “the name given by Aristotle to the ‘regions’ from which arguments are drawn” (Top, I, 8, p. 387). “Region” translates Lat. sedes, which also means “position, ground”; the loci are the foundations or “pattern” of arguments (id., I, 9, p. 389).

In the Argumentation within Language theory, the concept of inferential topos is re-defined as a pair of semantically associated predicates, S. Topos in Semantic.

2.2 Topos as “topic₂”

In the substantial sense, a topic (topos, commonplace) is an endoxon, a formulaic element corresponding to an answer to a “topical question”; or the whole discourse developing such a formula, “the lawyer developed the topos of the well-known peaceful character of the Syldavians”, S. Doxa. Such discourses are suspected to be fake and insincere, because traditional:

it is not easy to distinguish fact from topos in these documents (OD, Topos)

2.3 Topos in literary analysis

The concept of topos (pl. topoi) has been introduced by Ernst-Robert Curtius in literary analysis, to refer to a substantial, traditional thought that the writer develops, comments on and magnifies in the light of the circumstances. From a cultural and psychological perspective, a topos is “an archetype, […] a representation of the collective subconscious as defined by C. G. Jung” (Curtius [1948], vol.1, p.180). For example, the topos associating “the old man and the child” is consistently exploited in advertisements for wealth management and inheritance arrangements.

The topoi can be used to fill a compulsory discursive slot. Thus, to close a presentation, a speaker declares that “he submits quite willingly to possible negative observations, objections or even refutations, which will be truly considered to be help to understand his own data better”.

Curtius’ proposals have given rise to an important research trend on the topoi, especially in Germany (Viehweg, 1953; Bornscheuer 1976, Breuer & Schanze 1981).

3. Common place

1. In argumentation theory, the expression commonplace corresponds to the Latin locus communis, which translates as the Greek topos.

— Often reduced to place (locus, pl. loci), an inferential common place is an inferential topos, or argument scheme.

— A substantial common place is an endoxon, a formulary expression of common thought. Traditional rhetoric specialized in the argumentative use of Substantial Common Places.

2. In the general vocabulary, the expression commonplace is synonymous with cliché, both have the same depreciative orientation. Topos can be used with the same value.

3. In literary analysis, a commonplace is a “substantial topos”, in the sense of Curtius [1948].

4. Argument schemes

The designations, argument type, or argument scheme, or presumptive proof unambiguously designate a general, formal, inferential scheme.

The words topic and commonplace are ambiguous between a formal and a substantial meaning.

The expression argument line is somewhat ambiguous, as it can be used to refer to an argument scheme or to a whole, coherent argumentative strategy, S. Argumentation Scheme; Collections (I).

4. Argument line

The phrase argument line can refer:

— To an argument scheme.

— To a discourse developing a series of co-oriented or convergent arguments, developed by the same arguer to support a conclusion.

— To a corpus of discourses developing a series of co-oriented arguments, presented by allied arguers to support their common conclusion, either in the same interaction or in different verbal or written interventions.

1. Weight of circumstances — Strong will argument

Argumentation by the weight of circumstances invokes the nature of things or the external constraints, as imposing a deterministic solution on a social issue. The decision is presented as causally determined by the context: “facts leave us no choice”, “what happens in the world forces us to do so”.

In 1960, Charles de Gaulle, the President of the French Republic, held a referendum on the question of the independence of Algeria, with which France had been at war since 1954. He urged the people to vote for Algerian independence.

No one can doubt the extreme importance of the country’s response. For Algeria, the right granted to its peoples to dispose of their fate will mark the beginning of a whole new era. Some may regret that prejudices, routines and fears previously prevented the assimilation of Muslims, assuming it were possible. But the fact that they constitute eight-ninths of the population, and that this proportion continues to grow in their favor; the evolution begun in people and in things by the events, and prominently by the insurrection; and, finally, what has happened and what is going on in the world — make these considerations chimerical and these regrets superfluous.
Charles de Gaulle, December 20th 1960 Speech[1].

The strong will argument denies precisely this determinism: “where there is a will, there is a way”. In May and June 1939, the Belgian, British, French and Netherlands armies were totally routed by the German Nazi armies. In a situation that appeared desperate to many, General Charles de Gaulle rejected the armistice that Marshal Petain had just signed with the German Nazi enemy, and from London launched on the BBC his call to continue the fight:

Of course, we were subdued by the mechanical, ground and air forces of the enemy. Infinitely more than their number, it was the tanks, the airplanes, the tactics of the Germans which made us retreat. It was the tanks, the airplanes, the tactics of the Germans that surprised our leaders to the point of bringing them to where they are today.
But has the last word been said? Must hope disappear? Is defeat final? No!
Believe me, I speak to you with full knowledge of the facts and tell you that nothing is lost for France.
[…] Whatever happens, the flame of the French resistance must not, and will not be extinguished.
Charles de Gaulle, Text of the Appeal of June 18, 1940[2]

Major political decisions combine the two forms of argumentation.

2. Naturalistic argument

In law, naturalistic argument refers to the hypothesis of an impotent legislator arguing that it is impossible to legislate in certain areas, or of a judge who waives the application of the law on the pretext of special circumstances, S. Juridical Arguments.

The naturalistic argument is also exploited in the field of religious law; Luther uses it in connection with the prohibition of the marriage of priests by the Pope of the Roman Catholic Church. According to Luther, most priests “[cannot] do without a woman”, at least for their household:

If therefore [the priest] takes a woman, and the Pope allows this, but will not let them marry, what is this but expecting a man and a woman to live together and not to fall? Just as if one were to set fire to straw, and command it should neither smoke nor burn.
The Pope having no authority for such a command [forbidding the marriage of priests], any more than to forbid a man to eat and drink, or to digest, or to grow fat, no one is bound to obey it, and the Pope is answerable for every sin against it.
Martin Luther, Address To The Nobility of the German Nation, [1520][3]

A priori, the naturalistic argument has little to do with the naturalistic fallacy, which systematically values ​​the natural, S. Fallacious (2). However, the accusation of fallacious naturalism might serve to refute the argument of the force of circumstances.

[1] http://fresques.ina.fr/de-gaulle/fiche-media/Gaulle00063/speech-of-20-December-1960.html (20-09- 2013).
[2] http://lehrmaninstitute.org/history/index.html (01-20-2017).
[3] Quoted after http://sourcebooks.fordham.edu/mod/luther-nobility.asp, (01-20-2017).

Threat is used by the stronger to force the weaker to do things in the interest of the stronger (seeking revenge at the same un-ethical level, the weaker may only have recourse to manipulation) At the social level, threats of punishment function in combination with promises of rewards, as a global argument from threat and promises of reward.

1. Ad baculum : argument from threat

Threat speech, or argument from threat, or appeal to fear, (Lat. ad metum; metum, “fear”) has also been called:

— By metonymy, the “argument from the stick” (Lat. ad baculum; baculum, “stick”), or “from prison” (Lat. ad carcerem; carcer, “prison”), or “to the purse” (ad crumenam; crumena, “purse”; by a double metonymy).

— By metaphor, the “thunderbolt argument” (Lat. ad fulmen, fulmen, “lightning; violence”).

The prospect of a more or less imminent danger scares the person off the next planned action and induces new, more or less specific kinds of behavior. The threatened person feels an emotion, ranging from apprehension to fear or panic. The feeling depends on the mode of production and treatment of the source, which may or not be well defined (“we feel that something will happen to us”), and enter into a controllable causality (“we are living in a clash of civilizations”). If the threat is causal, generalized and uncontrollable (“the world is falling apart”) threat discourse will result in anxiety, fear, anguish, and even mass panic.

Two kinds of threat can be identified on the basis of whether or not the source of the danger is an intentional agent:

— The source is intentional, “threatening enemies assail our civilization”.
— The source is non-intentional, the danger comes from the material world, and is interpreted as causal: “the storm threatens the crops”; “you are at risk of cancer”.

The non-intentional source can be human. The “shapes passing by in the fog” for example can be perceived as threatening despite the fact that they are actually employees returning home from the office. This is the difference between N0 terrorizes N1 and Na terrifies Nb. The subject of terrorizes is intentional, N0 wants to frighten N1 (the gang is terrorizing the honest citizens), while the subject of terrifies is not necessarily intentional, and not necessarily human.

Fear speech expresses, inspires and strengthens a feeling of danger and insecurity, through oriented narratives and arguments which bring together the reasons, valid or not, to be afraid. Fear strategies can take two distinct orientations. They can either leave their targets plagued by anxieties, or can propose solutions to control or suppress the danger, S. Pathos; Emotion.

Fear speech can be based upon a real threat (climate change), or an invented one (alien invasion). In both case, the agent can be intentional (terrorists) or non intentional purely causal (climate change). It may or may not be correlated with hate speech.

In the hands of the established power, threat and fear, like joy and reward, can be used as powerful instruments of social cohesion and social control in societies which abide by the doctrine, “let the good rejoice and the wicked tremble”.

Threat speech is no different from fear speech, where the speaker refers to an external threat. Threat speech may also be conveyed by an individual A expressing his or her intention to cause damage or harm to another individual N, if N does not comply with such and such requirement as imposed by A. In this case, the same person occupies the roles of speaker and villain. Such threat speech has an “either… or…” format:

Either you do this for me — which is, I agree, quite unpleasant for you — or I do that to you — which is really much more unpleasant for you.

Whether this second kind of threat speech should be considered an argument or not is disputable. If we are accosted on a street corner and presented with the option of keeping our money or our life, we are likely to make a rational choice, opting to keep our life. When asked to explain where our money has gone, the existence of such a threat will be considered to be a good reason and a fully satisfactory justification for the loss of the money.

At the political level, balanced threats are the basis of nuclear deterrence; and it would be quite irrational not to take into account the fears imposed on the populations affected.

2. Threat and argumentation by the consequences

Threats can be efficiently presented as an argument by the consequences, where causality is veiled under agentivity. Rather than openly taking on the role of a villain, the speaker poses as the unwitting agent of a negative event provoked by the irresponsible behavior of the future victim. The blackmailer presents himself or herself as an advisor, and frames the interlocutor as the one responsible of future misfortune:

Question: Should the company grant a salary increase to its employees?
Labor’s representative: — If there is no increase, we’ll occupy the plant!
Employer’s representative: — If you persist in your unrealistic demands, we’ll be forced to close down the plant and cut back jobs.

The same change of footing is operated by the politician presenting his or her own political decision as motivated by “the order of things”, S. Weight of Circumstances.

3. Arguments from threat and promise

The Chinese philosopher Han-Fei proposes a theory of power as an expert blending of the two measures (Han-Fei, Tao); that is the two basic material interests motivating human actions, punishments and rewards, excluding the rationality issue, or other kinds of value, such as justice.
This kind of management of human actions exploits two antagonistic psychic movements, fear and suffering of punishment, desire and joy resulting from reward. If arguing is making somebody do something, or dissuading somebody from doing something, threat and promise would thus be the two argumentative speech acts par excellence — S. Authority; Pragmatic Argument.
The everyday expression “the carrot and the stick” rightly associates the appeal to financial interest, with the traditional ad baculum argument; which might more fittingly be called ad baculum carotamque argument. The latter is no more “rational” than the former, although it is certainly considered to be more acceptable by many.

Appealing to money is not the only way to get what one wants; rewards and punishments might draw on everything and anything that humans may desire. This might include, in particular, power, pleasure, and money, S. Values.

The ad crumenam argument (Lat. crumena, “purse”), is mentioned in Tristram Shandy, where it refers to the introduction of considerations about money in a debate:

Then, added my father, making use of the argument Ad Crumenam, — I will lay twenty guineas to a single crown piece, […] that this same Stevinus was some engineer or other,—- or has wrote something or other, either directly or indirectly, upon the science of fortification”
Laurence Sterne, The Life and Opinions of Tristram Shandy, gentleman, [1760][1]

4. Appeal to superstition

Lat. ad superstitionem, superstitio, “superstition”

The label appeal to superstition was introduced by Bentham, to refer to the fallacy of “irrevocable commitment”, which prohibits the revision of prevailing political dispositions ([1824], p. 402); S. Political Arguments.

— “Fallacy of vows or promissory oaths; ad superstitionem”: “But we swore!”

— “Fallacy of irrevocable laws”: “But that wouldn’t respect the constitution!”
Superstition is invoked here because of the oath supposedly taken to honor the will of a sacred Supernatural Power, or of the Founding Fathers, “who knew better”, and “to whom we owe everything”. Failing this duty would constitute not only a lack of respect for the authority of the Founding Fathers, but a religious or moral sin provoking some supernatural revenge. It can be assumed that such threats are the flipside to promises that submission to the Law will be duly rewarded. As a consequence, the appeal to superstition as defined here is a subspecies of appeal to threats and promises, made by transcendental powers. In this case, the argument represents a somewhat materialistic version of the argument from faith.

Non-cynical, ordinary citizens consider that politicians must honor their election commitments. It would be difficult for failed politicians to invoke the fallacy of irrevocable commitment to perpetually justify their alliance and agenda reversals.

[1] In The Complete Work of Laurence Sterne. Delphi Classics, 2013, p. 98.