1. Traditional logic

1.1 The Aristotelian framework

Aristotle does not use the word “logic” in his logical and ontological writings gathered in the Prior and Posterior Analytics. In his own words, he deals with “demonstrative analytical behavior (reasoning, discourse)”, which corresponds “to the current meaning of the term logic.” (Kotarbinski [1964], p. 5; Woods 2014). The Posterior Analytics defines scientific knowledge:

We attain knowledge through demonstration […] I call demonstration a scientific syllogism. (Post. An., I, 2; Owen, p. 247)

It follows that “it is necessary that demonstrative science should be from things true, first, immediate, more known than, prior to, and the causes of the conclusion” (ibid).

In a note added to this passage, Tricot points out that “syllogism is the genre (“producer of science”) common to demonstrative, dialectical and rhetorical syllogisms; scientific is the specific difference separating demonstration from dialectical and rhetorical syllogisms” (In Aristotle, SA, I, 2, 15-25; Note 3 p. 8). The scientific syllogism produces categorical knowledge, the dialectical syllogism produces probable, that is criticized, knowledge where no categorical knowledge is available, and the rhetorical syllogism produces persuasive representations. The position of persuasion in the rhetoric of Aristotle should be understood within this framework.

Traditional logical theory is based on an analysis of propositions as subject-predicate constructions, on a definition of the relations between the four forms of a general proposition and of a theory of syllogism.

1.2 Neo-Thomist logic

In the Middle Ages, Thomas Aquinas took up the Aristotelian definition of logic and defined it in relation to the reflexivity of the act of reasoning, that is “its ability to reflect upon itself”:

An art is needed to direct the act of reasoning, so that by it a man when performing the act of reasoning might proceed in an orderly and easy manner and without error. And this art is logic, i.e. the science of reason. (Com. Post. An., “Foreword”)

This definition is taken up by the Neo-Thomist tradition, especially by Maritain, who defines logic as:

The art WHICH DIRECT THE VERY ACT OF REASON.
(Maritain 1923, p. 1; capitals in the text)

This definition is taken up by Chenique in his Elements of Classical Logic (1975).

The following definition stresses the normative value of “formal logic” defined as

A science that determines the correct (or valid) forms of reasoning.”
(Dopp 1967, p. 11, italics in the original).

1.3 Logic and inference

In mathematics, logic is defined as :

The discipline that deals with correct inference. (Vax 1982, Logic)

Logic is concerned with the principles of valid inference. (Kneale and Kneale, [1962], p. 1)

S. Inference. Logic is the study of the valid forms of deduction:

Logic has the important function of saying what follows from what. (Kleene, 1967, Chap. 1, §1)

1.4 Logic is a science

Logic, like any science has as its business the pursuit of truth. (Quine, 1959, p. xi)

The Stoics first defined logic not in the manner of Aristotle as an organon, an instrument (in the service of the sciences), but as a science.

1.5 Classical logic

Classical logic (or traditional logic, according to Prior 1967) is by nature a formal logic: it is one of the revolutionary merits of Aristotle to have introduced a systematic use of variables. Classical logic covers a set of theses and techniques synthesizing proposals of Aristotelian, Stoic or Medieval origin. It consists in two parts:

— The logic of analyzed propositions or predicate calculus, and the theory of the syllogism.

—The logic of unanalyzed propositions or propositional calculus, which deals with the construction, using logical connectives, of complex propositions on the basis of simple or complex propositions, and with the determination of valid formulas (logical laws, tautologies).

Classical logic is based on a set of principles, considered to be laws of thought and rational discourse:

— Non-contradiction, “non-(P and non-P)”; a proposition cannot be true and false.

— Excluded middle (excluded third), “either (P or non-P)”; a proposition must be true or false.

— Identity “a = a”, and its practical consequences, such as the principle of indiscernibility and intersubstitutability of the identicals, and the unicity and stability of meaning of the logical symbols in the same universe of discourse (same reasoning).

Contemporary logics no longer regard these principles as laws of thought, but as possible axioms, among others.

The contemporary era saw the multiplication of “unconventional” logical formalisms, sometimes inspired by certain phenomena of ordinary language not taken into account by classical logic, such as time or modality.

2. Logic: An art of thinking, a branch of mathematics

2.1 The three operations of the mind

From Aristotle to the end of the nineteenth century, classical logic was considered the art of thinking correctly, that is, of combining propositions in such a way as to convey the truth of the premises to the conclusion, in a universe of shared and stable symbols and meanings. Logic provides the theory of rational discourse and of scientific argumentation by defining and determining the valid reasoning schemes.

The theory of the three operations of the mind comes from Maritain (1937, §2-3). For a long time, such an approach was abandoned by logicians, who were legitimately motivated by the fantastic potential of expansion and discoveries offered by mathematical models. Nonetheless, it certainly has its place in relation to ordinary thinking, anchored in ordinary language. It indeed illuminates the necessity to take into account the progressive and multi-dimensional construction of an argument, articulating words and concepts into judgments, and propositions into arguing and reasoning. Such a model is quite compatible with the idea of schematization as defined in Grize’s Natural Logic.

(i) Argumentation as a mental process

As a mental process, argumentation is defined as the third “operation of the mind”, apprehension, judgment and reasoning.

— Apprehension: the mind grasps a concept, “man”, then delimits it scope: “some men”, “all the men”.

— Judgment: the mind constructs a proposition, affirming or denying something about this delimited concept: “some men are wise”. This judgment is categorical, it is true or false and nothing else.

— Reasoning: the mind concatenates the judgments without any loss of truth, so as to develop new truths on the basis of known truths.

(ii) Argumentation as a discursive process

In the discursive process, argumentation is defined as the third of the three basic linguistic operations: naming the concept; predicating something of this concept in a statement; and arguing.

— Naming: Speaking of something clearly delimited. The concept is anchored in language by a term according its quantity, S. Proposition.

— Predicating: Saying something about this delimited concept, that is constructing a proposition (a linguistic statement) by imposing a predicate on this term.

— Arguing: Composing the statements orderly into the premises of a discourse so as to produce a new proposition, the conclusion, developed exclusively from the premises which are already known. Argumentation on the discursive level thus corresponds to reasoning on the cognitive level.

In Aristotelian logic, the rules of correct reasoning are given by the theory of syllogism, which distinguishes between valid syllogisms and paralogisms (vicious reasoning, fallacies, sophisms).

2.2 Logic as the art of reasoning and the emergence of scientific method

In modern times, this view of logic as a theory of discursive reasoning and the assimilation of discursive reasoning with scientific reasoning has been destabilized by the emergence of natural sciences and experimental reasoning, based on observation, measurement, prediction and experimentation, all regulated by mathematical calculation. In contemporary times, this evolution has been complemented by the integration of logic into mathematics. The rules of scientific method include and exceed logic.

From the point of view of argumentation, this evolution began in the Renaissance, and can be traced back to Ramus (Ong 1958), for whom judgment, logic and method must be considered as stand-alone operations we would call epistemic or cognitive, independent from rhetoric and language. The mutation appears clearly if one compares the Port-Royal Logic, in its full title: Logic, or, the art of Thinking: Containing, Besides Common Rules, Several New Observations Appropriate for Forming Judgment of Arnauld and Nicole ([1662]) to Condillac’s Treatise on the Art of Reasoning ([1796]). In the latter work, the language of the “art of reasoning” is not syllogistically organized natural language, but geometry. Rhetorical argument is never considered, as shown by the case of analogy, which is reduced to mathematical proportion.

2.3 Mathematization of logic

Logic is by its nature formal, it is interested not in the content (in substance, in the particular objects) of reasoning, but in the form. In contemporary times it has been axiomatized and mathematized. The publication of Frege’s Begriffschrift, “Concept Writing” in 1879 set the point from which logic cannot be seen as an “art of thinking”, but as an “art of calculating”, that is, as a branch of mathematics. At the beginning of the twentieth century, classical logic was overwhelmed by the “twilight of self-evidences” (Blanché 1970, p. 70):

We move from Logic to logics that can be built at will. And this plurality of logics withdraws its privileges to classical logic, which is now merely one system among others, like them a simple formal architecture whose validity depends only on its internal coherence. (Id., p. 71-72)

To become an axiomatic exercise, logic had to renounce its reflexive and critical function over common thought and discourse. It could no longer provide the model of rationally argued discourse or dialectical exchange. Logic is now the mathematical discipline, which was questioned, in the 1950s and 1970s, by the Natural, Non-formal and Substantial logics. Classical logic can indeed also be appended to this list.

2.4 Neo-Thomism: Resistance to the formalization trend

In 1879, the year when Frege published the Begriffschrift, Pope Leo XIII established Thomas Aquinas and his interpretation of Aristotelianism as a quasi-official philosophy of the Catholic Church in the Aeterni Patris Encyclical. This decision was certainly unfortunate, insofar as it promoted an outdated vision of logic. Nonetheless, it has brought about a powerful trend of research and teaching on classical logic as a method of thought and as an analytic frame for natural language cognition. Substantial developments relating to classical logic constructions and interesting considerations on arguments schemes and sophisms can be found in textbooks for the Neo-Thomist philosophical curriculum at a higher level.

Under various agendas, Maritain’s Logic (1923), Tricot (1928), Chenique (1975) reflect this continuing interest in classical logic. This trend may be compared and contrasted with the so-called revivals of rhetoric that developed from the fifties onward.

3. Pragmatic logic and argumentative calculations

In a quite different tradition, that of the philosophy or ordinary language, Toulmin was the first to suggest that the formalization movement in logic required an accompaniment and counterpart able to address “logical practices”, ([1958], p. 6), mobilizing “substantial” and “field-dependent” argument (id., p. 125; p. 15). He sought a logic which would be a “generalized jurisprudence” (id., p. 7), whose primary purpose would be “justificatory” (id., p. 6).

The logico-pragmatic movement including non-formal, substantial, natural, and generally dialogue logics, distances itself from axiomatized formalisms to take into account the ecological conditions of argumentation. People argue in natural language, and in a given context; classical logic does not meet the second condition, but does meet the first, at least for the restricted aspects of language it can deal with.

Unlike other theories of argumentation, and perhaps in opposition to the utter rejection of logic by the New Rhetoric, Informal Logic and Natural Logic have retained the word logic in their name, perhaps to stress the fact that, beyond their specific difference they do belong to a common genre, S. Argumentation Studies; Demonstration; Proof.

These pragmatic logics must combine with ordinary language and subjectivity. Classical logic has its roots in a severely regimented ordinary language, whilst the speaker of natural language is a virtuoso of contextualization, implicitness and polysemy. These characteristics are constitutive of the efficiency, dynamism and adaptability of natural language in ordinary life circumstances and the possibilities of strategic management of the worlds of action and interaction. Nevertheless, these observations do not imply any rejection of logic: the practice of ordinary discourse necessitates logical competences, just as it necessitates some arithmetical capacities: “It takes about two hours to reach the refuge, night will falls in about one hour, we will arrive at the refuge in the dark; that is risky”; “some mushrooms are edible, not all: you can’t cook any mushroom like that, that is risky”.

4. Entries concerning classical logic

— Predicate Logic: S. Proposition; Syllogism

— Propositional Logic: S. Connectives

Linked (or coordinate) argumentation is defined in relation with two different issues, as:

(i) An argumentation whose conclusion is based on several statements combining to produce an argument (whose conclusion is supported by a set of interrelated premises). The issue is about the link between statements, the sum of which constitutes a single argument; the notion of link being then constitutive of that of argument.
(ii) An argumentation whose arguments are sufficient for the conclusion only if they are taken jointly. The issue is about the mode of combining arguments so as to produce a conclusive conclusion. The notion of link is then constitutive of that of conclusive argumentation.

S. Convergence, Linked, Serial

1. Statements combined so as to build an argument

A linked argumentation is defined as an argumentation based on linked premises. A premise (major, minor, S. Syllogism) is defined in relation to a conclusion:

Logic. a proposition supporting or helping to support a conclusion (Dic., Premise)

The expression “linked premises” can therefore sound pleonastic. In reality, propositions or statements are linked so as to function as premises supporting a conclusion.
Syllogistic reasoning has a linked structure: “all members of this Society are more than 30 years old”, is an argument in favor of “Peter is more than 30 years old” only when combined with the proposition “Peter is a member of this Society”.
Representation:

Similarly, according to Toulmin’s representation the assertive component has a linked structure. The “data” statement becomes an argument only insofar as it combines with “warranting” and “backing” statements. S. Layout.
Representation:

2. Convergent and linked argumentation

The concepts of link and convergence do not describe same-level phenomena: several arguments converge to (point to) the same conclusion, whilst several statements are linked in order to build an argument for a given conclusion.
Convergent arguments are made of two or more co-oriented arguments, each of them having, by definition a linked structure, as shown in the preceding paragraph. The complete schema of convergent argumentation therefore looks as follows:

2.1 Arguments linked to produce a conclusive conclusion

The linking effect also affects convergent argumentation, the strength of which is not just in the addition of the individual strength of the added arguments. For example, an argument from necessary signs can combine necessary indices into a necessary and sufficient bundle. Likewise, case-by-case arguments, when exhaustive, benefit from a binding effect, giving to the whole greater strength than would be achieved by the mere addition of each of the parts. S. Signs; Case-by-case.

2.2 Convergent or linked argumentation?

The technique used to answer this question is a) consider a conclusion supported by a set of statements, b) consider a particular statement, c) look what happens if it is false or suppressed (Bassham 2003):

— If what remains is still an argumentation, we are dealing with a convergent argumentation:

Peter is clever and personable, he will be a great negotiator
Peter is clever, he will be a great negotiator
Peter is personable, he will be a great negotiator

All these argumentations are admissible; “Peter is clever” and “Peter is personable” are two convergent, co-oriented arguments giving rise to the same conclusion “ Peter will be a great negotiator”.

— If what remains is not an argumentation, we are dealing with a linked argumentation:

(1) It rained and the temperature is below 0°C, there should be black ice on the road.
(2) It rained, there should be black ice on the road (wrong)
(3) The temperature is below 0°C, there should be black ice on the road (wrong, unless one adds the premise “low temperatures generally goes with wet roads”).

Discourse (1) is an explicit, valid and sound argumentation. Discourses (2) and (3) are still argumentations, but they are not valid and sound as they are. To make them sound, missing premises, corresponding precisely to the suppressed statements, must be added.

The usefulness and practicability of the convergent / linked distinction is challenged (Goddu, 2007). Walton considers that its merit lies in its ability to capture the different conditions of the refutation for the two constructions. To refute a linked argumentation, one must simply show that one of the premises is false or inadmissible; to refute the conclusion of a convergent argumentation, each converging argument must be tested separately (Walton on 1996, p. 175). The arguer can grant one of the arguments in the case of convergent argumentation, but cannot give up a premise in the case of linked argumentation.

Basically, one must decide whether one or more good reasons are involved in the argumentation, that is to say, one must structure the verbal flow by proposing coherent semantic blocks supporting the conclusion.

In The Uses of Argument, Stephen Toulmin presents a general description of the structure of argumentative passages, “the layout of argument” (1958, Chap. III, p. 94-145). This very influential representation is also known as “Toulmin Schema”, “Toulmin Model of Argument” or “Toulmin Argument Pattern” (TAP).

1. The structure of the prototypical argumentative dialogue and monologue

1.1 Argumentation as a polyphonic monologue

The following passage is an elementary argumentative cell, putting together the basic components of argumentative discourse according to Toulmin:

— Harry was born in Bermuda, so, presumably, Harry is a British subject
— Since a man born in Bermuda will generally be a British subject,
on account of the following statutes and other legal provisions ‘…’
— Unless both his parents were aliens / he has become a naturalized American/…(id., p. 103)

The layout of argument combines two major components:

— A central, affirmative component.
— A negative component, staging a challenging voice, that details the “circumstances in which the general authority of the warrant would have to be set aside.” (Id., p. 101)

1.2 Argumentation as dialogue

This discourse can be re-played as a prototypical argumentative dialogue, starting from a question, asked by some investigating third party, and developing under the pressure exerted by a challenger.

(i) An Issue

Question:  — What is the nationality of Harry?

(ii) A Claim — The arguer answers that:

Arguer: — “Harry is a British subject” (ibid., p. 99).

Making this assertion, the arguer “[is thereby committed] to the claim which any assertion necessarily involves”. As a Claim (C), it can be “challenged”:

Challenger: — “What have you got to go on?” (ibid. p. 98)

(iii) Data — In defense, the arguer “must be able to establish [the Claim] — that is, make it good and show that it was justifiable. How is this to be done?” (Id., p. 97): “we shall normally have some facts to which we can point in its support” (ibid.). Here, the arguer gives a fact, or Data (D) to justify the answer:

Arguer: — Harry was born in Bermuda.

Toulmin’s layout is clearly built on a dissensus background. A Claim is “a demand for something rightfully or allegedly due” (WCD, Claim): a claim is put forward in the context of a contestation “to lay claim to, to assert one’s right or title to” (Ibid.).

Data are “things known or assumed; facts or figures from which conclusions can be inferred” (WCD, Data). The quest for data is led with some claim in mind, S. Justification.
Data and Claim are correlative words: Claims require Data, and Data is sought for and selected in function of Claims; they are explicitly connected through a Warrant.

(iv) Warrant — The challenger can still consider that the answer is not fully satisfactory, and “[require]” the speaker to indicate “the bearing on [his/her] conclusion of the data already produced” (id., p. 98):

Challenger: — “How do you get there?” (Ibid.)

The arguer is now required to give a Warrant (W), that is “some rule, principle or inference license” (Ibid.):

Arguer: — “A man born in Bermuda will be a British subject” (id., p. 99).

Now the inquisitive challenger may be “dubious” “whether the warrant is acceptable at all” (id., p. 103):

Challenger: — “You presume that a man born in Bermuda can be taken to be a British subject; […] why do you think that?” (Ibid.).

A warrant is an “authorization or sanction, as by a superior or the law” (WCD, Warrant): the “argument — conclusion” gap is sutured by some authority. It can also be “a justification or reasonable grounds for some act, course, statement or belief” (ibid.). In that case, the warrant would correspond itself to a good reason added to the data; it is generally a law orienting the fact as a data for this claim.
Another warrant would give a different orientation to the same data. For example, the warrant “In Bermuda from late May to October, the climate can be uncomfortably hot and with especially high humidity” would orient the same fact toward the claim “Harry certainly knows how to behave under a humid subtropical climate”.

(v) Backing — The arguer is now required to give a Backing (B), making the Warrant acceptable

Arguer: — I say that “on account of the following statutes and other legal provisions: …” (id., p. 105).

 (vi) Qualifier – Rebuttal — For the preceding moves, the challenger asked for formal clarifications; now, he or she turns to substantial objections, such as:

Challenger: — But “special facts may make this case an exception to the rule, or one in which the law can be applied only subject to certain qualifications” (id., p. 101).

Finally the arguer acknowledges these reservations. His or her Claim is a “presumption”, only “presumably” true, not “necessarily” so. This must be clearly expressed by a Qualifier (Q), “indicating the exceptional conditions which might be capable of defeating or rebutting the warranted conclusion (R)”:

Arguer: — My claim (C) is probably true, insofar we don’t know if “both his parents were aliens [or] he has become a naturalized American” (id. p. 102-103).

The Rebuttal articulates the conditions that, if met, would cancel the reasoning. In integrating the challenger’s contributions into his or her reasoning, the speaker introduces co-operation in a situation of inquiry.

The Qualifier should not be considered as the expression of a vague mental restriction, just in case things do not turn out as expected. It is the trace of substantial Rebuttals, not just any face-saving softener or mitigator; these terms would not express the link with the substantial rebutting counter-discourse.

2. Representation

Toulmin articulates these six basic elements in the following diagram

The chain “Data — Warrant — Backing — Claim” represents the positive component of the model.
The combination “Qualifier + Rebuttal” represents the negative, or default^@ component of the model.

3. Corollaries

3.1. A legal syllogism

Toulmin speaks of his approach to argument as “generalized jurisprudence” ([1958], p. 7). The instance of reasoning illustrating the layout of argumentation corresponds to a legal syllogism, where a law is applied to a fact.

Positive component
Law: Any motorist crossing the yellow line is an infraction and will be fined
Recorded fact: X has crossed the yellow line
Conclusion: This is a violation of the Law and will be accordingly fined

Default Component
Unless X was driving a fireman’s car, an ambulance… on a mission; was participating in a formal parade…; road works were in progress…

The positive component articulates a premise with a general subject (a law), a premise with a concrete subject (or singular proposition, the argument) in order to deduce a proposition with a concrete subject (the conclusion). It corresponds to a categorization^@ process, including an individual into a class, and therefore authorizing the attribution to the individual of the properties and stereotypes characterizing the class. Toulmin’s basic example draws attention to the importance of categorization and intracategorial deduction in ordinary argumentative activity. Nonetheless, the warrants are not restricted to categorizing principled. Actually, a Warrant is an instantiation of an argument scheme^@.

3.2 The “rediscovery of the topoi”

 The Warrant corresponds to the traditional argumentative notion of topos (Bird 1961), or argument scheme^@. A topos is a general statement “warranting” the acceptability of the argument and capable of generating an infinity of particular arguments or enthymemes having the same form.

Ehninger and Brockriede have shown how the concept of warrant could cover the main forms of argument schemes, for example “authoritative arguments” ([1960], p. 293):

— (D) Klaus Knorr states “Soviet leaders calculate that a minor build-up of nuclear power in the NATO countries of Western Europe will add only marginally to the danger of American striking power.
— therefore (C) Soviet leaders calculate that a minor build-up of nuclear power in the NATO countries of Western Europe will add only marginally (to the danger of American striking power).
— Since (W) what Knorr says about the power of nuclear weapons is reliable
— Because (B) Knorr is a professor at Princeton’s Center of International Studies / is unbiased / has made reliable statements on similar matters in the past / etc.
Unless (R) Other authorities more qualified than Knorr say otherwise / special circumstances negate or reduce Knorr’s usual reliability as a witness.

Accordingly, the specific objections and counter-discourses attached to a given argument scheme will come under the Qualifier – Rebuttal subsystem.

3.3 Open foundations

Let us suppose that Harris was born not in Bermuda but in the Falkland Islands (English name) also called Islas Malvinas (Argentine name). Then, the Backing mentioning the statutes on British nationality, would possibly be supplemented by an evocation of the right of occupation, conquest and the right of the strongest, considering the complex history of the islands.

Basing the Warrant on a Backing opens a potential regression to infinity, the guarantee needing itself to be guaranteed. The same regression could be observed on the argument, which may also be challenged.

3.4 Scientific calculation and the erasing of the rebuttal component

Toulmin’s layout is a favorite among scientists interested in argument. The following example, which is less often quoted than the preceding one, corresponds to the expression of a scientific prediction based on a calculation involving laws derived from experience and observation (1958, p. 184):

The general premise is replaced by a calculus based on physical laws. The disappearance of counter-discourse (Modal + Rebuttal) characterizes the transition to mathematical calculus based upon stabilized scientific content

Laughter and seriousness are the manifestations of two antagonistic psychic states. Laughter is a manifestation of a positive emotion, such as joy. Laughter is the opposite of tears and grief, which are manifestations of negative emotions, and also the opposite of seriousness, denoting calm, S. Pathos.

Laughter is a major instrument of discourse disorientation and destruction, S. Orientation; Irony. Laughter and entertainment are classed along with rhetoric, whilst seriousness and austerity are associated with argumentation. In a debate, laughter and seriousness correspond to two antagonistic positioning strategies: if the opponent jokes and laughs, let your answer be stern and to the matter; to an austere technical discourse, answer with a smile and make a pun everybody can understand.

Hamblin mentions three standard ad fallacies of entertainment, which occur in two different discursive and interactional organizations (Hamblin 1970, p 41).

1. The arguer as an entertainer

Ad ludicrum, Lat. ludicrum, “game; show”, which Hamblin translates as “dramatics”.
Ad captandum vulgus, Lat. vulgus, “the populace”; captare, “to seek to seize”.

Rational criticism rejects discursive histrionics, which spare no form of public speech, even conference communications. An address is transformed into a performance. Such shows were put on first by the ancient sophists as staged in Plato’s Euthydemus, S. Sophism. The arguer becomes an actor, “playing to the gallery” or “to the crowd”, referring to an actor whose demagogic play appeals to easy popular tastes, S. Ad populum.

2. The arguer makes fun of the opponent

Ad ridiculum, Lat. ridiculum “ridiculous”

This latter kind of talk is quite distinct from the former. Hamblin uses the labels “appeal to ridicule” and “appeal to mockery” (ibid.). Strictly speaking, this is a kind of refutation by the absurd, whereby the advanced proposition is rejected by indicating that it has unacceptable, counter-intuitive, amoral and laughable consequences, S. Absurd. The ridiculous is not necessarily comic, and laughter may be sarcastic rather than joyful.

Hedge’s seventh rule explicitly excludes laughing about the opponent, “any attempt to […] lessen the force of his reasoning, by wit, caviling, or ridicule, is a violation of the rules of honorable controversy” (1838, p. 162); S. Rules. This is a special case of the prohibition to substitute discourse destruction to argument refutation, S. Destruction.

Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca’s book, The Comic of Discourse (1974), is devoted to the comic exploitation of argumentative mechanisms as jokes.

A co-orientation condition does not suffice to characterize a well articulated convergent argumentation; co-oriented arguments must be consistent. This is the thrust of Freud’s point in The Interpretation of Dreams [1900], in which he uses kettle argumentation as an analogue in order to interpret the content of his dream about “the injection made to Irma”. Both his dream and the following argument are incoherent defense systems putting forward good but incompatible justifications:

I noticed, it is true, that these explanations of Irma’s pains (which agreed in exculpating me) were not entirely consistent with one another, and indeed that they were mutually exclusive. The whole plea — for the dream was nothing else — reminded one vividly of the defense put forward by the man who was charged by one of his neighbors with having given him back a borrowed kettle in a damaged condition. The defendant asserted first, that he had given it back undamaged; secondly, that the kettle had a hole in it when he borrowed it; and thirdly, that he had never borrowed a kettle from his neighbor at all. So much the better: if only a single one of these three lines of defense were to be accepted as valid, the man would have to be acquitted. (Freud [1900], p. 143-144)

The neighbor collates all the possible defensive replicas, as laid down by stasis theory. More justifications could be added, “I am not the one who holed the kettle”; “it’s really a tiny hole”, “very easy to fix” etc.

People justify an answer already given to an argumentative question, while they deliberate on an open argumentative question, when they do not know its answer, either individually (Third parties, S. Role), or when the group has not yet reached a decision.
Deliberation takes place in a situation of doubt about what to do, while justification bears on a decision which has already been taken. The starting point determines the difference between justification and deliberation.

— Deliberation intervenes in contexts of discovery. It develops from argument to conclusion. A decision is to be taken, and I deliberate to construct it through an inner or collaborative deliberation; the arguments condition the conclusion. The argumentation:

Question: Should I resign?
[Deliberation: I weigh up the pros and cons] The answer states the conclusion: I resign.

— In contexts of justification, the discourse proceeds from conclusion to argument. I resigned, this is a practical reality:

Question: Why did you resign? Justify your decision!
Justification: I was sick and didn’t get along with my boss.

A decision has been taken, and, when required to account for it, I explain why I took this decision or made this choice, I recall all the good reasons I had to do so, and, if necessary, I invent new ones. Now, the conclusion determines the arguments.
Deliberation leads to a conclusion introduced by so, therefore; justification enumerate good reasons introduced by since.

The mechanisms of argumentation are valid for justification and deliberation. I deliberate, I reach a conclusion and make my decision. When I am asked to justify this decision, the same arguments, which were deliberative, become justificatory, and explain the decision taken, S. Explanation.

In the case of deliberation, there is real uncertainty about the conclusion, which is constructed in the course of a cognitive and interactional argumentative process. In the case of justification, the conclusion is already there. Justification tends to erase doubt and counter-discourse, whilst stimulating deliberation.
Private arguments put forward during an inner deliberation may have nothing to do with the arguments put forward publicly as a justification for the same conclusion, S. Motives and Reasons.
Situations of pure deliberation and pure justification are border cases in which I do not know what I will conclude or do (full deliberation), and I’m sure I did well (full justification). The same arguer may oscillate between justification and deliberation, for example if, during the justification, he or she questions the decision already taken, or is about to change his or her mind.
If we postulate that any argument that presents itself as deliberative is in fact oriented by a decision which has been taken unconsciously, then anything and everything is in fact justification. Yet the institutional organization of debates reintroduces deliberation. A debate may well be deliberative when each of the parties comes with firmly entrenched and duly justified positions and conclusions. The shock of justifications produces deliberation.

Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca introduce the rule of justice as a fundamental argumentative principle, “all beings of the same category must be treated in the same way”. The rule is illustrated by some categories that have historically regulated the distribution of benefits, “to each according to his merit; to each according to his birth; to each according to his needs” (Perelman [1963], p. 26).

The rule founds claims such as “equal pay for equal work”. It involves distinct operations.

(i) A categorization — First, individuals are categorized as members of a general category, “to be born”; “to have needs”; “to have merit” (admitting that one can deserve a punishment and that to demerit is to have a negative merit); “to be an employee, having worked such and such hours and produced such and such assessable products”.
General rights and duties can be defined with recourse this first level, “all born human beings have the same right to life”. The following practice refers to a strict a pari argument, referring to thieves as a non-hierarchized category, “a thief is a thief”.

General Baclay was also quite a character, but a funny woman, very just in her own way. She shot in the same way women and men, all thieves, whether they had stolen a needle or an ox. A thief is a thief and all were shot. It was fair.
Ahmadou Kourouma, Allah is not obliged. 2000.[1]

(ii) An equality relation — Secondly, there is an equality relation defined as “equality of birth; of needs; of merits; of work”. This relation determines a hierarchy between workers, “P has worked as much as Q or R…; more than A or B…; less than X or Y…”.
Such equipped categories can be represented on oriented scales. The position of an individual upon this scale can be debated, “has X more/less merit than Y?”.
The metric is easy to define in cases of work, when determined by the weight of the fruit picked from the trees for example. Things become more complicated when it comes to scientific production, or when it comes to needs and merits. In any cases, the criteria for prioritizing one individual over another one must be set.

(iii) An allocation scale — Another quite different scoring method must be established in order to define the parallel scales of punishments and rewards (what wages for that level of work?), and the two scales must be coupled.

These two independent rankings ((ii) and (iii)) make the rule of justice more complex than an a pari argument. Gross a pari holds that “work must pay”:

if P works, P has a right to be paid for this work (except if P is a voluntary worker serving a non-profit organization),

while the rule of justice connects two graduated scales.

In addition, it is supposed that the rule of justice is to be applied to all members of the group in a linear order, but actual rules include thresholds. Regarding a tax level, the rule “to each according to his or her income” applies only beyond a certain threshold, and contains tax brackets and smoothing principles.

Other categories may be considered, showing that the rule of justice can also serve in support of injustices:

To each according to his or her gender
To each according to his or her color of skin

The rule of justice excludes arbitrariness, but not injustice. According to the principle “who favors disfavors”, the rule of justice, necessarily creates innumerable injustices. If the benefits are distributed according to merit, they are not distributed according to birth or according to need.
The rule of justice is said to be “just” because it excludes the arbitrariness of the principle “to everyone according to my convenience”; and because the category and the hierarchy have been defined by disregarding the cases to be judged, “the decision is just because the rule existed before your case.” This “justice” is formally just because it allows the application of a legal syllogism.

[1] Ahmadou Kourouma, Allah n’est pas obligé. Paris: Le Seuil, p. 111

Juridical arguments are argument schemes considered by law professionals as the most important and typical in their field, and presented as the basis of “juridical logic” (Perelman, 1979). Such arguments are important for the general theory of argumentation insofar as they illustrate the explicit and controlled implementation, in the field of law, of general principles currently met in ordinary argumentation. They are presented here from this perspective.
Cicero’ Topica is perhaps the first essay to bring together a list of legal inferential principles, which are historically significant in all the classical fields of argumentation study. S. Interpretation 2; Collection 2.

These juridical arguments rule the interpretation of legal texts and their application to concrete cases. They allow the application of a text to a case, possibly by extending its meaning and legal force. Given a fact “f” submitted to legal evaluation on the basis of a code (legal, religious…), it most often happens that the judge can attach “f” to a category M mentioned in the code in order to apply to “f” the legal provisions concerning m.s, the members of the category M. It may also be the case, however, that the code does not contain a category which is immediately relevant to the case at hand. This may occur, for example, if there are equally good reasons to categorize “f” as an M or as an X. This situation corresponds to a stasis of categorization. Such stasis might evolve into a stasis of definition, where the code must be interpreted in order that it also applies to “f”. In such cases, the judge does not simply apply the law, but produces the law.

The process of interpretation is not limited to the juridical domain. Generally speaking, it starts from a proposition P, which is to be interpreted. In the interpretation process, P takes the status of argument, accepted because it belongs to a stock of statements, a Code, a Regulation, a Sacred Text… itself accepted by the community of interpreters or believers. A proposition Q is then derived from P. Q has the status of a conclusion, which corresponds to an interpretation of P. The juridical argument schemes are the basic tools that rule such derivations in the domain of law. The limit of interpretation is fixed by the principle “what is clear must not be interpreted”. This principle enshrines the existence of a literal meaning, based on grammatical data. If, in order to vote in a Syldavian presidential election, a citizen must be 18 and a Syldavian national, nobody meeting only one of the two criteria will be admitted to vote. There is nothing to interpret.

1. Three collections of juridical argument schemes

Specialists in legal arguments offer lists of argument schemes that are particularly important in law. The lists provided by Kalinowski and Tarello are frequently included in the general framework of argumentation studies (Perelman 1979, Feteris 1999, Vannier 2001). We have added the list provided by lawoutlines.com[1] (no author’s name). These three lists make extensive use of Latin terminology.

— Kalinowski (1965) lists 11 argument schemes:

• • • A pari
    • A contrario sensu, or a contrario
    • A fortiori ratione, or a fortiori
    • A maiori ad minus, or from the biggest to the smallest
    • A generali sensu, or argument of the generality of the law
    • A ratione legi stricta
    • Pro subjecta materia, or consistency argument
    • From preparatory work
    • A simili, or argument by analogy
    • Ab auctoritate, or argument from authority
    • A rubrica, or argument from the title

— Tarello (1974 ; quoted in Perelman 1979, p. 55) lists 13 argument schemes:

• • • A contrario
    • A simili, or argument by analogy
    • A fortiori
    • A completudine
    • A coherentia
    • Psychological a.
    • Historical a.
    • Apagogical a.
    • Teleological a.
    • Economical a.
    • Ab exemplo a.
    • Systemic a.
    • Naturalist a.

— Lawoutlines considers 10 argument schemes:

• • • By analogy or argument a pari
    • Of greater justification or argument a fortiori
    • By contrast or argument a contrario
    • Of absurdity or ab absurdum
    • From generality or a generali sensu
    • From superfluity or ab inutilitate
    • From context or in pari materia
    • From subject matter or pro subjecta materia
    • From title or a rubrica
    • From genre or ejusdem generis

2. How many argument schemes?

34 argument schemes are specified.

— Four argument schemes are included in the three lists; arguments:

• • A contrario ; a contrario sensu ; by contrast or a contrario, S. Opposites.
  • A fortiori ratione, a fortiori ; of greater justification or a fortiori, S. A fortiori.
  • A pari argument is considered separately, or as equivalent to the argument by analogy (“by analogy or a pari”).
  • A simili argument is assimilated to analogical argument, S. Analogy; A pari.

— Three argument schemes are common to two lists; arguments:

• • A generali sensu, generalizing argument ; or argument from generality.
  • Pro subjecta materia ; from subject matter.
  • A rubrica ; from title.
  • Apagogical ; from the absurd.

— Fifteen (or twelve) are specific to one of the three lists; arguments:

• • From preparatory work, historical, psychological, teleological, S. Legislator’s Intention.
  • From context or in pari materia, S. Consistency
  • Ratione legi stricta, S. Strict Meaning
  • Ab auctoritate, S. Authority ; Precedent
  • A completudine, S. Completeness
  • A coherentia, S. Non-contradiction ; Consistency
  • Economical, S. Superfluity
  • Ab exemplo, S. Precedent ; Example
  • Systemic
  • Naturalist, S. Weight of circumstances
  • From superfluity or ab inutilitate, S. Superfluity
  • From the same genus, or ejusdem generis.

We thus obtain 22 different legal topics, which may be reduced to 19 if we admit that, under various labels, the argument from preparatory work, the historical, psychological and teleological arguments refer to what Perelman globally terms the “legislator’s intent” (1979, p. 55).

3. Groupings

These 22 legal topics can be divided into sub-groups as follows.

(i) General arguments, not specific to law, operative in any controlled argumentative situation:

• • From consistency (a coherentia)
  • A pari, a simili, analogy
  • From genus
  • A contrario
  • A fortiori

  • Fom the absurd
  • From precedent
  • From authority.

In law, these last two forms of argument are based on, and reinforce, the historical continuity of legal practice.

(ii) Arguments legitimizing interpretations based on the conditions of production of the law. Arguments based on:

• • Preparatory work
  • History (of the law)
  • The legislator’s intention, teleological argument
  • Psychological argument.

(iii) Arguments appealing to the systemic character of the code of laws to legitimate an interpretation. Arguments based on

• • Systemic considerations
  • Coherence (a coherentia, in pari materia)
  • Comprehensiveness
  • Necessity (all the articles of the code are necessary)
  • The title of a section of the code, a rubrica.

These argument schemes aassume that the text to be interpreted is “perfect”, in the sense that it contains neither contradiction nor redundancy. All content is necessary; the text ​​ contains nothing superfluous, or redundant. All elements hang together; they have meaning only by their relation within the structure. This insistence on the systemic character of the legal code could lead to a mechanical view of the law and its application. Ultimately, all the properties of a formal system are attributed to the code.

The establishment of precise definitions of these forms of argumentation within the field of law, their illustration with examples, the determination of the conditions for their application, and the problems connected with their construction and use, fall within the jurisdiction of lawyers.

4. Prescriptive scope of the topics

This set of arguments legitimizes the interpretation of the law in view of application to specific cases. When used in the imperative form, this set of arguments becomes a guide for the drafting of laws. For example, as the argument from superfluity (economic argument, or argument from uselessness) assumes that the laws are not redundant; the legislator will endeavor to avoid any redundancy in the drafting of the law, and the same for the other interpretative principles.

5. Generalization to other fields,

S. Interpretation

[1] Legal tradition-Trahan.doc. P. 21-22.
www.lsulawlist.com/lsulawoutlines/index. php?folder=/TRADITIONS (09-20-2013)

Irony can be considered a pivotal strategy, positioned somewhere between discourse destruction and refutation. Irony ridicules a speech that pretends to be dominant or hegemonic, by implicitly referring to some contextually available irrefutable rebutting evidence.

1. Irony as refutation

Ironic development originates from a hegemonic D₀ discourse. A hegemonic discourse is a discourse which prevails within a group, which has the power to direct or legitimize the actions of the group, and which opposes the discourse of a minority.

In a situation Sit_1, the participant S1, the future target of the irony, claims that D₀, with which S2, the future ironist, disagrees. S2 submits to D₀, although he or she is not convinced of the validity of the argument.

S1_1 (future Target)   — What about taking a shortcut to reach the summit?
S2_1 (future ironist)   — Hmm … It seems that there might be icy zones…
S1_2                             — No problem, I know the place, it’s easy going! (= D₀)
S2_2                             — Oh well then…

Later, in situation Sit_2, when the group finds itself on a rather slippery slope, the ironist takes up S1’s discourse, as the circumstances make this discourse indefensible:

S2_Ironic  — No problem, I know the place, it’s easy going!

This last statement sounds strange:

— In the present circumstances, the statement is absurd.
— If the original discussion has been forgotten, it is interpreted as a humorous euphemism or antiphrasis.
— If it is still present in the memory of the participants, then the statement is entirely ironic: S2_Ironic repeats S1_2, whereas the circumstances show that the statement is obviously, and tragically, false. The mechanism is rather similar to an ad hominem argument, what the adversary says is opposed to what he or she does, and this is clear to all parties involved. The facts being self-evident, S1 is now shown to be wrong and is seen to have misled the company. Irony combines malice and humor, S. Dismissal.

Ironic destruction and scientific refutation can be opposed as follows:

2. Countering the ironic move

Ducrot uses the following example, consisting of a statement and a description of its context:

I told you yesterday that Peter would come to see me today, and you didn’t believe me. Peter being physically present today, I can tell you in an ironic way ‘You see, Peter did not come to see me’. (Ducrot 1984, p. 211).

Some times ago, in S°, the speaker and his or her partner “You” had a debate about whether or not Peter will be coming. The speaker, the (future) ironist lost this debate. Now, the evidence of Peter’s presence “you see” is given as a conclusive argument, as concrete proof, supposed to silence You, proving You wrong. But the game is not necessarily over. Irony is mainly studied on the basis of the isolated ironic statements, whereas it is a sequential phenomenon with two kinds of developments, depending on the target reaction. If he or she stays mute and embarrassed, the ironist wins the game; if he or she retorts, then the game continues. Here, You can reply that he or she can certainly see that Peter is actually there, but that does not prove that Peter came to see the interlocutor:

— No, Peter did not come to see you. He actually came to see your sister.

This refutation or reversal of irony applies the scheme of substitution of a motives.

3. Irony can dispense with markers

In Zürich, Switzerland, in the years 1979-1980, a youth protest movement made quite an impression on the city’s people.

There are two television shows which caused extreme shock in German-speaking Switzerland. The first, a popular show, was disturbed by members of the “Movement”, who put a stop to it. The second, later referred to as “Müller’s Show”[1], showed two militants dressed as members of the bourgeoisie from Zurich, and seriously voicing the opinion that the “Movement” should be repressed with the utmost severity, the autonomous center should be closed etc. The sensationalist media and some individuals orchestrated a campaign of defamation after the shock of this second show. Let us note in passing that the term müllern entered the vocabulary of the movement […]. The creation of paradoxical situations was one specialty of the “movement”.
Gérald Béroud, [Work Values and Youth Movement], 1982[2]

The ironic discourse D consists in the strict repetition, with a straight face, of the primary discourse D₀, as held by the opponents; D and D₀ coincide perfectly. The ironized discourse D₀ is the typical bourgeois argumentative discourse, taken with its contents, its modes of expression, its dress codes, gestures, body postures, modes of arguing following the bourgeois norms of maintaining a calm and courteous atmosphere, ritually invoking some counter-discourse in the role of the “honorable opponent” while ignoring the real existing strong, deep disagreement as well as power and strength relations. The entire practice of the argued, contradictory, quasi-Popperian mode of discussion is ironized and negated by Müller’s sarcastic behavior.

Irony is a borderline case of an argument based on self-evidence. It becomes dramatically prominent in situations where argumentation is vain or impossible. The following remarks were written in Czechoslovakia, a country which at that time, was under the dictatorial rule of a communist regime:

In intellectual circles, the attitude towards official propaganda often results in the same contempt that one feels for the drunkard’s drunkenness or the graphomaniac’s lucubration. As intellectuals particularly appreciate the subtleties of a certain absurd humor, they may read the Rude Pravo editorial or the political discourse printed there for pleasure. But it is very rare to meet someone who takes this seriously.
Petr Fidelius, [Lies Must be Taken Seriously], 1984[3]

[1] Name of the two delegates of the movement, Hans and Anna Müller.

[2] Gérald Béroud, “Valeur travail et mouvement de jeunes”, Revue Internationale d’Action Communautaire 8/48, 1982, note 62, p. 28. Television program (in German) available at: [http://www.srf.ch/player/video?id=05f18417-ec5b-4b94-a4bf-293312e56afe] (09-20-2013).

[3] Petr Fidelius, Prendre le mensonge au sérieux. Esprit, 91-92, 1984, p. 16. The Rude Pravo was the newspaper of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, during the Communist period.

1. The arts of understanding

Hermeneutics, exegesis and interpretation are the arts involved in the understanding of complex texts such as the Bible, the Criminal Code, the Koran, the Iliad, the Communist Manifesto, the Talmud, the Upanishads, etc. (Boeckh [1886], p. 133 ; Gadamer [1967], p. 277 ; p. 280). Texts require an exegesis because they are written in forgotten languages, or are historically distant, or hermetic. The community considers that vital things depend on what such texts precisely say and mean. This meaning is not immediately accessible to the contemporary reader. It must be established and preserved to be transmitted as well as possible.

Hermeneutics is a philosophical approach to interpretation, defined as an effort to share a form of life, a search for empathy with the text, its author, the language and culture in which it was produced. The hermeneutical understanding is thus opposed to the physical explanation sought in the natural sciences, where “to explain” has the meaning of “subsuming under a physical law”.

Psychoanalysis and linguistics have shown that ordinary acts and words also may require interpretation.

The theoretical language of interpretation is complicated by the morphology of the lexicon, as is always the case when a theory develops within ordinary language. What difference should be made between hermeneutics, exegesis and interpretation?
Their three respective lexical series include a term designating the agent exegete, hermeneutist, interpreter; two of them include a noun referring to the process and result, interpretation, exegesis, which, as hermeneutics, can also refer to the field of investigation. Only one series includes a verb, namely to interpret: This verb will therefore be used for the three series, imposing its meaning upon the whole lexical field.

In the philological and historical sense, exegesis is a critical activity whose object is typically a text belonging to a cultural or religious tradition taken in its material conditions of production and original practices, linguistic conditions (grammar, lexicon), rhetorical conditions (genre), historical and institutional context, genesis of the work in its links with the life and milieu of the author. Philological exegesis establishes the text, reveals its meaning(s), contributing thus to resolving conflicting interpretations or articulating different levels of interpretation. It stabilizes the “literal meaning”, that is the core meaning of the text, and thus lays down the material to be interpreted. In a broad sense, exegesis encompasses interpretation; both endeavor to overcome the distance carved by history, between the text and its readers.
The purpose of philological exegesis is to express the meaning of the text; it tries to create the conditions for a certain projection of the reader into the past. Interpretative exegesis (or interpretation, hermeneutics) seeks to reformulate this meaning to make it accessible to a contemporary reader; it actualizes the meaning of the text. This is where the link between hermeneutics and the rhetoric of religious preaching lies.
Exegesis aims at understanding the meaning as expressed by the text; interpretation and commentary push the meaning of the text beyond the text itself. Contrary to philological exegesis, interpretation can be allegorical. The philological interpretation is exoteric, whilst hermeneutics can be esoteric.

2. Rhetoric and hermeneutics

The hermeneutic task is to make intelligible to one person the thought of another via its discursive expression. In this sense, rhetoric as the “art of persuading” is the counterpart of hermeneutics as the “art of understanding”; their directions of fit are complementary.
Rhetoric adopts the perspective of a speaker/writer striving to persuade an addressee, the listener/reader. In contrast, hermeneutics adopts the perspective of a reader/listener striving to understand a speaker/writer addressing him or her through a text.
Rhetoric is related to live speech, taking into account the listener’s beliefs, trying to minimize his or her efforts; hermeneutics is linked to distant speech, to reading; the reader having to adapt to the meaning of the text.

Taken together, hermeneutics and rhetoric establish a dual cultural communicative competence, to understand and to be understood. The rejection of rhetoric in the name of pure intellectual demand results in the transfer of the burden of understanding to the reader, and so requires hermeneutics.

3. Interpretation and argumentation

The interpretative process applies to any discourse component, from words to whole texts, in order to derive their meaning, and this meaning is necessarily (expressed in) another discourse. The interpretive relationship thus binds two discourses, the link between the interpreting and interpreted utterance being made according to transition rules that are not different from the general argumentation schemes.

In the case of argumentation, the argument might be any statement expressing a true or accepted vision of reality. In the case of interpretation, the data, the argument statement, is the utterance to be interpreted, in view of the precise form it has in the text. Once this statement is available, the linguistic mechanisms are the same. If we consider the argument-conclusion relation in its greatest generality, we shall say that the conclusion is what the speaker has in view when the argument is stated, the conclusion being the meaning of the argument. The argumentative relation is therefore no different from the interpretative relation. When the listener/reader has grasped the conclusion of the text, he or she has achieved an authentic understanding of this text. This amounts to considering that meaning is always lacking within the statement, and the statement will be allocated a meaning only in relation to a later statement. Meaning is thus construed within an endless process, S. Orientation.

Just as with argumentation, interpretation is valid insofar as it is based on principles that correspond to a transition law accepted by the interpretative community concerned, the community of jurists or theologians for example:

The rabbis saw the Pentateuch as a unified, divinely communicated text, consistent in all its parts. It was consequently possible to uncover deeper meanings and to provide for a fuller application of its laws by adopting certain principles of interpretation (middot; “measures,” “norms”).
Jacobs & Derovan, 2007, p. 25

The same principles apply to the Muslim legal-religious interpretation (Khallaf [1942]), or to legal interpretation. The argumentative forms used in law are the same as those which govern the interpretation of all texts to which, for whatever reason, a systematic character is attributed. This is because they are considered as the best expression of the legal-rational views of the time, because they flow from a divine source or from an individual genius, S. Juridical Arguments.

This postulate of strong, even perfect coherence is fundamental for the structuralist interpretations of texts, as for the interpretation of legal texts or religious texts, as mentioned in the preceding quotation. It may conflict with the genetic argument constructing the meaning of a text by derivations justified by “preparatory works”, such as the manuscripts, or the intentions of the writer, as they can be grasped through his or her correspondence, for example. Arguments from genetic evidence are one aspect of the philological interpretive work on the text. They may be regarded with suspicion by true believers, for genetic arguments suppose that a non-divine origin, at least partly human, can be attributed to the text.