Archives de l’auteur : Christian Plantin

Juridical Arguments: Three Collections

LEGAL ARGUMENTS

Legal scholars consider legal arguments to be the most fundamental argument schemes in their field. These arguments form the basis of “legal logic” (Perelman, Logique jJuridique, 1979). They are significant to the general theory of argumentation because they demonstrate the explicit and controlled application in the field of law of general principles currently found in ordinary argumentation. This is the perspective from which they are presented here.
Cicero’s Topica is perhaps the first essay to compile a list of historically significant legal principles of inference that are historically significant in all the classical fields of argumentation study, see Interpretation 2; Collection 2.

These legal arguments govern the interpretation of legal texts and their application to concrete cases. They enable the application of a legal text to a case, by potentially extending its meaning and legal force. Given a fact f that is subject to legal evaluation based on a code (legal, religious, etc.), the judge can usually associate f with a category M mentioned in the code in order to apply the legal provisions concerning M to f. In other cases, category M must be interpreted as applying to case H. In such cases, the judge creates the law rather than applying it.
However, the code may not contain a category, N, to the case at hand, h. In this case, category N must be interpreted so that it also applies to h. In such cases, the judge produces the law rather than simply applying it.

The process of interpretation is not limited to the legal field. It applies to a problematic proposition P belonging to a body of statements, a code, a rule, or a sacred text that is accepted by a community of interpreters or believers. The derivation of an interpretation IP  from a passage P, {P, IP} obeys the same rules and principles as the argumentative derivation of a conclusion C from an argument A, {A, CA}. An interpretation is constructed a contrario, by analogy, and so on.

The limit of interpretation is set by the principle that “what is clear must not be interpreted.” This principle establishes the existence of a literal meaning, based on grammatical data. For instance, if a Syldavian presidential election requires voters to be 18 years old, and a Syldavian national, then only those who meet both criteria will be allowed to vote. There is nothing to interpret.

1. Three Collections of Legal Argumentation Schemes

Legal argumentation specialists compile lists of argument schemes that are particularly important in law. Lists provided by Kalinowski and Tarello are often included in the general framework of argumentation studies (Perelman 1979, Feteris 1999, Vannier 2001). We have also included the list from by lawoutlines.com[1] (no author’s name). These three lists extensively use Latin terminology.

 Kalinowski (1965) lists eleven argument schemes:

      • A pari
      • A contrario sensu, or a contrario.
      • A fortiori ratione, or a fortiori.
      • A maiori ad minus, or from greatest to least.
      • A generali sensu, or argument from the generality of the law.
      • A ratione legi stricta, or argument from the strict meaning of the law
      • Pro subjecta materia, or argument from consistency.
      • Argument from preparatory works.
      • A simili, or argument by analogy.
      • Ab auctoritate, or argument from authority.
      • A rubrica, or argument from the title.

 Tarello (1974 ; quoted in Perelman 1979, p. 55) lists thirteen argument schemes:

      • A contrario
      • A simili, or argument by analogy
      • A fortiori
      • A completudine
      • A coherentia,  argument from coherence.
      • Psychological a.
      • Historical a.
      • Apagogical a.
      • Teleological a.
      • Economic a.
      • Ab exemplo a.
      • Systemic a.
      • Naturalistic a.

Lawoutlines considers ten argument schemes:

      • By analogy or argument a pari.
      • Of greater justification or argument a fortiori.
      • By contrast or argument a contrario.
      • From absurdity or ad absurdum (ab absurdo).
      • From generality, a generali sensu.
      • From superfluity, ab inutilitate.
      • From context, in pari materia.
      • From the subject matter (of the law), pro subjecta materia.
      • From the title a rubrica.
      • From genre or ejusdem generis.

2. How many argument schemes?

Thirty-four argument schemes are specified.

— Four argument schemes are included in the three lists; arguments:

    • A contrario; a contrario sensu; by contrast or a contrario, see opposites.
    • A fortiori ratione, a fortiori; of greater justification or a fortiori, see a fortiori.
    • The a pari argument is considered separately, or as equivalent to the argument by analogy (“by analogy or a pari”).
    • The a simili, a simile argument is assimilated to analogical argument, see analogy; a pari.

— Five argument schemes are common to two lists; arguments:

    • A generali sensu, argument from the generality of the law.
    • Pro subjecta materia ; from the subject matter (of the law).
    • Ab inutilitate; Economical arg.; non-redundancy principle.
    • A rubrica; from the title.
    • Apagogical ; from absurdity.

— Ten (or thirteen) are specific to one of the three lists; arguments:

Thus, we obtain twenty-two different legal topics, which can be reduced to nineteen, if we acknowledge that the argument from preparatory work, the historical argument, the psychological argument, and the teleological argument refer, under different labels, to what Perelman calls the « intention of the legislator » (1979, p. 55).

3. Groupings

These twenty-two legal argumentation schemes can be divided into the following sub-groups.

(i) General arguments, that are not specific to law, and are operative in any serious argumentative situation.

    • From consistency (a coherentia).
    • A pari, a simili, analogy.
    • From genus.
    • A contrario.
    • A fortiori
.
    • From absurdity.
    • From precedent.
    • From authority.

In law, the latter two forms of argument are based on, and reinforce, the historical continuity of legal practice.

(ii) Arguments that legitimize interpretations based on the conditions under which the law was produced. Arguments based on:

    • Preparatory work.
    • History (of the law).
    • Intent of the legislator, teleological argument.
    • Psychological argument.

(iii) Arguments that appeal to the systemic character of the code of laws to legitimize an interpretation. Arguments based on

    • Systemic considerations.
    • Coherence, a coherentia, in pari materia).
    • From superfluity, ab inutilitate.
    • Comprehensiveness, a completudine.
    • Necessity : all articles of the code are necessary and non redundant.
    • The title of the section of the code, a rubrica.

These argument schemes assume that the text to be interpreted is “perfect”,

    • It contains no contradictions
    • It contains no redundancies
    • All content is necessary (nothing is missing)
    • All elements are interconnected and have meaning only by virtue of their relation within the structure.

Ultimately, all the properties of a formal system are attributed to the code. This emphasis on the systemic nature of the legal code can result in a mechanical view of the law and its application.

Lawyers establish precise definitions of these forms of argumentation in law, illustrate them with concrete cases, determine the conditions for their application, and address the problems connected with their construction and use.

4. Prescriptive Scope of Argumentation Schemes

This set of arguments allows the law to be interpreted for application to specific cases. When used in the imperative form, it serves as a guide for drafting laws. For example, as the argument from superfluity (economic argument, or argument from uselessness) assumes that laws are not redundant; so the legislators strive to avoid any redundancy when drafting of laws. The same applies to other interpretive principles.

5. Generalization to Other Fields,

See Interpretation


[1] Legal tradition-Trahan.doc. P. 21-22.
www.lsulawlist.com/lsulawoutlines/index. php?folder=/TRADITIONS (09-20-2013)


 

Irony

IRONY

Irony is a key argumentative strategy, positioned somewhere between discourse destruction and refutation. It mocks speech that purports to be dominant or hegemonic, by implicitly referencing irrefutable material evidence available in the context.

1. Irony as Refutation

Irony originates from a hegemonic D0 discourse. A hegemonic discourse dominates a group, has the power to direct or legitimize its actions and opposes the discourse or the sentiment of a minority.

In a situation Sit_1, participant S1, the future « ironized » (= target of the irony) claims that D0.
S2, the future ironist, disagrees with D0. but submits to it, even though he is not convinced of its validity.

S1_1 (future target)   — What about taking a shortcut to the top?
S2_1 (future ironist)   — Hmm… It seems that there might be icy zones.
S1_2                             — No problem, I know the place, it’s easy! (= D0)

S2_2                             — Oh well then…

Later, in situation Sit_2, when the group finds itself on a rather slippery icy slope, the ironist adopts S1’s discourse, precisely when the circumstances render it untenable:

S2_Ironic  — No problem, I know the place. It’s easy!

This last statement sounds strange.
— Under the current circumstances, it is absurd.
— If the original discussion has been forgotten, it is interpreted as a humorous euphemism or antiphrasis.
— If the original discussion is still fresh in the participants’ mind, then the statement is entirely ironic. S2_Ironic repeats S1_2, when the circumstances show that the statement is obviously, and tragically, false.

This mechanism is similar to an ad hominem argument in that what the target says is opposed to what he does, and this is obvious to all involved. Since the facts are self-evident, S1 is shown to be wrong and is seen as having misled the company. Irony combines malice and humor, see dismissal.

Ironic destruction and scientific refutation can be contrasted as follows:

Scientific Refutation Ironic Discourse Destruction
S1 says ‘D0 S1 says ‘D0in situation Sit_1
The opponent S2 quotes D0, and explicitly attributes D0 to S1 The ironist, S2, says ‘D’ in situation Sit_2:
— D repeats, echoes D0
— D = D0 is not explicitly related to its occurrence in Sit_1, but the connection is easy to make. Either everyone remembers, or S2 provides a cue to remember (e.g. S2 imitates S1′s voice)
The opponent refutes D0 with explicit and conclusive arguments Contextual evidence from Sit_2, destroys D = D0.
This evidence is so obvious that (S2 thinks that) it needs no explanation.

2. Countering the ironic move

Ducrot uses the following example,which consists of a statement and a description of its context:

Speaker – I told you yesterday that Peter was coming to see me today, and you didn’t believe me. Since Peter is here today, I can say to you in an ironic way,‘You see, Peter didn’t come to see me’. (Ducrot 1984, p. 211).

Some time ago, in , the speaker and his partner « You«  debated about whether Peter would come. The speaker, the (future) ironist lost the debate. Now, Peter’s presence is offered as a conclusive evidence to prove You wrong and silence You.
However, the game may not be over yet. Irony is primarily studied based on isolated ironic statements, but it is a sequential phenomenon with two types of developments, depending on the target’s reaction. If the target remains silent and embarrassed, the ironist wins. If the target reacts, the game continues. Here, You could reply that one can certainly see that Peter is there, but that does not prove that Peter came to see the speaker:

— No, Peter did not come to see you. He actually came to see your sister.

This refutation or reversal of irony uses the motive substitution scheme.

3. Irony Can Do Without Markers

In 1979–1980, a youth protest movement In Zurich, Switzerland, made quite an impression on the city’s residents.

Two television programs caused extreme shock in German-speaking Switzerland. The first, a popular program, was disrupted by members of the “Movement”, who stopped it. The second program, later referred to as “Müller’s Show”[1], featured two militants dressed as members of the Zurich bourgeoisie. The militants seriously expressed the opinion that the ‘Movement’ should be repressed with the utmost severity, and that the autonomous center should be shut down. Following the shock of the second show, the sensationalist media and certain individuals orchestrated a defamation campaign. Incidentally, the term müllern entered the movement’s vocabulary. Creating paradoxical situations was one of the movement’s specialties.
Gérald Béroud, [Work Values and the Youth Movement], 1982[2].

The ironic discourse D consists of strictly repeating the primary discourse D0, with a straight face. D and D0 coincide perfectly. The « ironized » discourse D0 is the typical bourgeois argumentative discourse, taken with all its contents and modes of expression, its dress codes, gestures, body postures and modes of argumentation intact. It follows the bourgeois norms for maintaining a calm and courteous atmosphere, while ritually invoking a a ritual counter-discourse in the role of the “honorable opponent” while ignoring the real disagreements as well as the power and strength relations. Müller’s sarcastic behavior ironizes and negates the entire practice of the politely argued, contradictory, quasi-Popperian mode of discussion.

Irony is a borderline case of an argumentation based on self-evidence. It emerges dramatically in situations where arguing is futile or impossible. The following remarks were written in Czechoslovakia, when it was under the dictatorial rule of a communist regime.

In intellectual circles, the attitude toward official propaganda is often one of contempt, similar to the contempt one feels toward a drunkard’s drunkenness or a graphomaniac’s writing. Since intellectuals especially appreciate the subtleties of a certain absurd humor, they may enjoy reading the editorials in Rude Pravo [3] or the political discourse printed there. However, it is very rare to find someone who takes them seriously.
Petr Fidelius, [Lies Must be Taken Seriously], 1984[3]


[1] The names of the two delegates of the movement, Hans and Anna Müller.

[2] Gérald Béroud, “Valeur travail et mouvement de jeunes”, Revue Internationale d’Action Communautaire 8/48, 1982, note 62, p. 28. Television program (in German) available at: [http://www.srf.ch/player/video?id=05f18417-ec5b-4b94-a4bf-293312e56afe] (09-20-2013).

[3] Petr Fidelius, Prendre le mensonge au sérieux [taking lies seriously]. Esprit, 91-92, 1984, p. 16. The Rude Pravo was the newspaper of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, during the communist period.


 

Interpretation, Exegesis, Hermeneutics

INTERPRETATION AND ARGUMENTATION

1. The arts of understanding

Hermeneutics, exegesis and interpretation are the arts involved in the understanding of complex texts such as the Bible, the Criminal Code, the Quran, the Iliad, the Communist Manifesto, the Talmud, the Upanishads, etc. (Boeckh [1886], p. 133; Gadamer [1967], p. 277; p. 280). Texts require an exegesis because they are written in forgotten languages, or are historically distant, or are hermetic. The fellowship believes that vital things depend on the precise meaning of such texts. This meaning is not immediately accessible to the contemporary reader. It must be established and preserved to ensure its accurate transmission.

Hermeneutics is a philosophical approach to interpretation, defined as an effort to share a form of life—a search for empathy with the text, its author, and the language and culture in which it was produced.
Thus, hermeneutic understanding is opposed to the physical explanations sought in the natural sciences, where “to explain” means “to subsume under a physical law”.

Psychoanalysis and linguistics have demonstrated that ordinary actions and words also can require interpretation.

The theoretical language of interpretation becomes complicated by the morphology of the lexicon, as is always the case when a theory develops within ordinary language. What is the difference between hermeneutics, exegesis and interpretation?
The three respective lexical series contain a term designating the agent exegete, hermeneutist, interpreter. Two of the series contain a noun referring to the process and result, interpretation, exegesis. These terms can also refer to the field of study, as can hermeneutics. Only one series contains a verb:  to interpret: This verb will therefore be used for the three series, imposing its meaning on the entire lexical field.

In the philological and historical sense, exegesis is a critical activity whose object is typically a text belonging to a cultural or religious tradition. The text is examined in terms of its material conditions of production and original practices, linguistic features (grammar and vocabulary), rhetorical features (genre), and historical and institutional context.  It also considers the genesis of the work and its links with the life and milieu of the (sometimes unknown) author(s).
Philological exegesis
establishes the text and reveals its meaning(s). Thus it contributes thus to resolving conflicting interpretations and articulating different levels of interpretation. It stabilizes the “literal meaning”, or the core meaning of the text, thereby determining the material to be interpreted. Broadly speaking, exegesis encompasses interpretation; both aim to bridge the historical gap between the text and its  contemporary readers.

The purpose of philological exegesis is to express the text’smeaning. It seeks to create conditions that allow readers to project themselves into the past.
In contrast, Interpretative exegesis (or interpretation, hermeneutics) reformulates that meaning to make it accessible to a contemporary reader; It actualizes the meaning of the text. The connection between hermeneutics and the rhetoric of religious preaching lies here.
While exegesis aims to understand the meaning as expressed by the text; interpretation and commentary expand that meaning beyond the text itself. Unlike philological exegesis, interpretation can be allegorical. Philological interpretation is exoteric, whereas hermeneutics can be esoteric.

2. Rhetoric and Hermeneutics

Hermeneutics works on texts and attempts to make them understandable to a distant audience. In this sense, hermeneutics as the “art of understanding” is the counterpart of rhetoric as the « art of persuasion. » Their complementary directions of fit are as follows:
Rhetoric takes the perspective of a speaker or writer striving to persuade an audience, the listener or reader. In contrast, hermeneutics takes the perspective of a reader or listener seeking to understand a speaker or writer addressing them through a distant enigmatic text.

Rhetoric relates to live speech, and considers the beliefs of the audience, in order to minimize effort. Hermeneutics relates to reading distant speech: the reader must adapt to the text’s meaning
Together, hermeneutics and rhetoric establish dual cultural communicative competence, to understand and to be understood. Rejecting rhetoric in favor of pure intellectual demand shifts the burden of understanding onto the reader, and thus requires hermeneutics.

3. Interpretation and Argumentation

The interpretive process applies to any component of discourse , from words to whole texts, in order to derive their meaning, and this meaning is necessarily expressed in another discourse. The interpretive relation thus links two discourses, and the link between the interpreting and the interpreted texts is made according to transition rules that are not different from the general argumentation schemes.

In argumentation, an argument is any statement that expressing a true or accepted view of reality. In interpretation, the data—the argument statement—is the utterance to be interpreted, in its precise form in the text. Once this statement is available, the linguistic mechanisms are the same. If we consider the argument-conclusion relation in its greatest generality, we will say that the conclusion is what the speaker has in mind when he presents the argument, and the conclusion is the argument’s meaning. Thus, the argumentative relation is no different from the interpretive relation. When the listener or reader has grasped the conclusion of the text, they have achieved an authentic understanding of that text. This means that  there is always a lack of meaning  within the statement, and the statement is only given meaning in relation to a later statement. Meaning is thus constructed in an endless process, see orientation.

As with argumentation, interpretation is valid to the extent that it conforms to a transitional laws accepted by the interpreting community concerned, such as the community of lawyers or theologians for example:

The rabbis regarded the Pentateuch as a unified, divinely communicated text, consistent in all its parts. Consequently, by adopting certain principles of interpretation (middot; “measures,” “norms”). it was possible to uncover deeper meanings and to provide for a more complete application of its laws
Jacobs & Derovan, 2007, p. 25

The same principles apply to the Muslim legal-religious interpretation (Khallaf [1942]), or to legal interpretation. The forms of argumentation used in law are the same as those used in interpreting all texts considered to have a systematic character. This is because they are considered to be the best expression of the legal-rational views of the time, either because they come from a divine source or an individual genius, see juridical Arguments.

This postulate of strong, even perfect coherence is fundamental to the structuralist interpretation of texts, as well as to the interpretation of legal or religious texts, as mentioned in the previous quotation. It may conflict with the genetic argument which constructs the meaning of a text through inferences justified by “preparatory works”, such as the manuscripts, or by the author’s intentions, as revealed , for example, by their correspondence. Genetic arguments are one aspect of the philological interpretation of the text.  True believers may view them with suspicion, because genetic arguments assume that the text has a non-divine, at least partially human, origin.


Interpretation

INTERPRETATION as Argument

The concept of interpretation is ambiguous.

— In general, it refers to the process of understanding complex texts, see interpretation, exegesis, hermeneutics.
— In rhetorical argumentation, the word interpretation may refer to:

1. A particular kind of stasis.
2. A figure of repetition.
3. An argument scheme, see motives and reasons

1. Stasis of interpretation

In the theory of stasis, the stasis of interpretation corresponds to a specific case of contradiction between the parties, the « legal question. » In court, or, more generally, whenever a debate is based on a written text, and especially on a normative rule, an  “interpretation issue ” arises when the two parties base their conclusions on different readings of the text. For example, one party,  may base their argument on the letter of the law, while the other argues from its spirit.

2. Figure of repetition

As a figure of discourse, interpretation consists in duplicating a first term by immediately following it with a quasi-synonymous term that is more easily understood.
In the sequence Term1, Term2”, T2 interprets T1, meaning it explains or clarifies T1‘s meaning.
T2 may be a common-language equivalent of a technical term  T1:

We found marasmius oreades, I mean, Scotch bonnets.

The interpretation may be applied to a word or an entire phrase and retain its argumentative orientation. :

The President announced a policy of controlling spending, a “sober state” policy.

However, an opponent’s interpretation may reverse the argumentative orientation of T1:

The president announced a policy of controlling spending—that is, a policy of austerity

This change is marked by the introduction of a reformulating connective (one could say an interpretive connective) such as « in other words,« , « i.e., » « that is to say », « which means that.« 

3. Refutation by Interpretation

The Treatise on Argumentation classifies « interpretatio » as a “figure of choice”, and offers an example from Marcus Annaeus Seneca, (also known as Seneca the Elder, or the Rhetorician (-54, +39)). Seneca the Elder is the author of the Controversiae, a collection of legal cases, that were debated by various rhetoricians of his time, in an oratorical contest.

Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s example is taken from the first case in the collection ([1958] p. 233), in which a group of expert orators debates the ingenious story of a son who feeds his uncle despite his father’s prohibition. When the tables turn, the father is in trouble, and the son is now feeding his father in spite of his uncle’s prohibition. Thus, the unfortunate son is exiled twice, for the same reason, first by his father, and then by his uncle.

The following passage reports the words of the lawyers who addressed the father on behalf of the son. First speak the lawyer, Fuscus Arellius, followed by Cestius.

Arellius Fuscus concludes by suggesting a question: ‘I thought that, in spite of your prohibition, you wanted your brother to be fed. You seemed to imply as much while delivering your defense, or so I thought.’
Cestius was bolder. He didn’t just say, ‘I thought you wanted it,’ but ‘You wanted it and you still want it today.’ He revealed all the reasons that compelled the father to want it so and concluded, ‘Why are you driving me away? No doubt you are indignant that I have taken your place. »
Seneca the Elder, or the Rhetorician (54 BC – 39 AD),
[Controversies and Suasories], (written at the end of his life).[1]

The two lawyers’ arguments align. Fuscus Arellius argues that the father may have given his command reluctantly. Cestius then « goes further », attributing to the father an intention contrary to his words, “You wanted it and you still want it today.
Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca view this as an « argumentative figure or a stylistic figure depending on its effect on the audience » ([1958], p. 172), see figure.
The lawyers’ words are clearly argumentative. First, they introduce a stasis, a question about the nature (the qualification) of the act under investigation: “You wanted me to disobey you. So, don’t punish me, but congratulate me for fulfilling your secret wish!”. Second, they implement the « private will versus. public will » scheme by substituting the private, sincere, will, for the publicly affirmed will, made under social pressure, see motives.

4. Refutation Through Interpretation vs. Performative Analysis

In this example, interpretation is an instrument of refutation and defense that opposes an accusation based on a command, that is, on a  performative speech act. Austin illustrates his discovery of performativity with an example borrowed from Euripides’s Hippolytus of  (I, 612). According to Austin, a command, is valid as soon as it is uttered, regardless of the speaker’s intention.

Surely the words must be spoken ‘seriously’ and so as to be taken ‘seriously’? […]. But we are apt to have a feeling that their being serious consists in their being uttered as (merely) the outward and visible sign, for convenience or other record or for information, of an inward and spiritual act: from which it is but a short step to go on to believe or to assume without realizing that for many purposes the outward utterance is a description, true or false, of the occurrence of the inward performance. The classic expression of this idea is to be found in the Hippolytus (1. 612), where Hippolytus says, “my tongue swore to, but my heart (or mind or other backstage artiste) did not”. Thus “I promise to…” obliges me — puts on record my spiritual assumption of a spiritual shackle.
It is gratifying to observe in this very example how excess of profundity, or rather solemnity, at once paves the way for immorality. (Austin, 1962, pp. 9-10)

Like the son and the father in Seneca’s example, Hippolytus and the nurse, are engaged in highly argumentative interactions. In such situations, semantics, pragmatics, and morality can be discussed and argued. The son acknowledges the facts (he fed his uncle) and pleads not guilty to the charge of disobedience. He claims that the verbal command, what the father said, did not express the the father’s true will. This is a typical example of the contradiction Austin describes between what language actually does and what goes on in the mind of the speaker.

However, it should be emphasized that Austin’s binary distinction is based solely on the verbal aspects of language and excludes all paraverbal modalizations of commands, especially those conveyed through facial expressions. Most importantly in the case of Hippolytus, it also excludes the context of the command.

Thus, the question of the prohibition’s validity remains. According to the father and Austin, the prohibition is valid because the father uttered the relevant formula, and the son is guilty of the double Austinian sin of analytic fallacy and moral perversity.
However, the analysis offered by the Austinian father is questionable. What the father really said is problematic and must be interpreted in the context of the speech act.

This situation is analogous to that of ironic utterances. The addressee hears something incongruous with the context, said by someone who usually speaks seriously. This forces the addressee to interpret of this puzzling utterance.
Similarly, the father has uttered a prohibition that contradicts the natural (doxic) law of brotherly love. The son finds this inconsistent with his father’s true character. Perhaps the father’s verbal utterance was accompanied by a paralinguistic cue, indicating a different intention? Anyway, the son concludes that the command was not given in his father’s true, natural voice but rather in his social voice. Therefore, he must interpret the incongruity.
As Fuscus Arelius argues, the son was justified in feeding his uncle.

Deciding that this latter interpretation is “the correct one” sides with the son and against the father. Deciding that the Austinian interpretation is correct sides with the father against the son. In either case, choosing an analysis means siding with one party or the other.


[1] Translated from the French edition used by Perelman, Sénèque le Rhéteur, Controverses et Suasoires. Translated by H. Bornecque. T. 1. Paris: Garnier Frères, 1932, p. 23-24. https://archive.org/details/Controverseset Suasoires.


 

Interaction, Dialogue, Polyphony

INTERACTION, DIALOGUE, POLYPHONY

Rhetorical approaches to argumentation focus on monological data, whereas dialectical approaches, focus on conventionalized dialogues. Interactional approaches apply the concepts and methods of verbal interaction analysis to everyday argumentation as needed.
Argumentation is necessarily two-sided, developing as both monological and interactional activities. Opposing these two types of argumentative activities would be pointless. Argumentative issues can be relevantly discussed in a variety of speech formats, ranging from philosophical treatises to internet forums to the dinner table conversations, see argumentation (I).

1. Interaction, Dialogue, Argumentative Dialogue

Dialogues and conversations, are two types of verbal interactions. They are characterized by the use of oral language, the physical presence of face-to-face interlocutors, and a key feature: an organized, continuous chain of alternating turns of speaking.

Dialogue is first practiced between humans, and, by extension, between humans and machines. This is not necessarily the case with interaction: particles interact, but do not engage in dialogue. You can refuse dialogue, but not interaction. Social organizations necessarily interact, and they may engage in dialogue to advance their respective interests or resolve their disputes.

Dialogue implies an egalitarian situation. The concept of interaction considers the  inequalities of the participants’ the social status and their specific contributions to the ongoing common task. Interaction focuses on coordinating language with other forms of action (cooperative or competitive) that the participants carry out in complex material environments, including objects manipulation. At work, language is interactional, not conversational. Work conversations tend to exclude work, or overlap with purely automatic work.

The interactive perspective paved the way for studying argumentation in the workplace and its role in acquiring and developing scientific knowledge in laboratory activities. In these activities, argumentative sequences are produced as regulatory episodes, in coordination with the manipulation of objects.

Dialogue has an “aboutness” that distinguishes it from ordinary conversation, which tends to jump from topic to topic. In ordinary usage, the word dialogue has a quasi-prescriptive positive orientation: dialogue is good, we need dialogue. Philosophies of dialogue tend to be strongly humanistic. Those open to dialogue oppose fundamentalists who are closed to it. When two parties engage in dialogue, they commit to negotiation, and ending the dialogue can lead to violence. In this sense, as suggested by the title of Tannen’s book, The Argument Culture: Moving from Debate to Dialogue (1998),  debate, as a potentially acrimonious and vindictive argument2 virtually devoid of reasoning, can be contrasted with reasoned dialogue. We see a progress in the transition from the former to the latter.

Formal approaches to argumentation as a dialogue game first appeared in the second half of the 20th century, as a development of the Aristotelian dialectical rules, see dialectic; logic of dialogue.

2. Dialogism, Polyphony, Intertextuality

The concepts of dialogism, polyphony and intertextuality allow us to apply an interaction-based view of argumentation to be applied to monological argumentative discourse and written texts. Monological discourse is defined as a possibly long and complex, spoken or written discourse by one speaker .

Socrates defines thinking, in its essence, as a special type of dialogue,

a talk which the soul has with itself about the objects under its consideration. (Theaetetus, 189e) [1]

This definition can be used to characterize thinking as an argumentative process in natural language.

2.1 Dialogism

In rhetoric, dialogism is a figure of speech that involves the direct reproduction of a dialogue as a passage within a literary or a philosophical composition.
Mikhail Bakhtin introduced the concept of dialogism, or polyphony, to describe a specific type of fictional arrangement. From a nineteenth-century classical perspective, the fictional characters are, in a sense, either puppets , or supervised by the narrator. Their actions and speeches are framed according to how they contribute to the plot. In a dialogic disposition, however, the narrator is less dominant, and the characters tend to develop autonomous discourses and are relatively free from the obligation to contribute to the plot.

2.2 Polyphony

In music, polyphony « consists of two or more simultaneous lines of independent melody, as opposed to a musical texture with only one voice, monophony » (Wikipedia, Polyphony).
Bakhtin’s concepts of dialogism and polyphony, polyphony can be used metaphorically to describe phenomena corresponding to the monological presentation of a dialogic situation by a single speaker, called the animator of speech, in Goffman’s vocabulary (Ducrot, 1988).

Polyphony theory conceptualizes monological discourse as a polyphonic space, that articulates a series of clearly identified voices, each singing its own tune, that is, expressing a particular point of view. These voices are not attributed to specific individuals, as they are in direct quotations.

A polyphonic approach to connectives and negation has proven particularly fruitful. For instance, the statement “Peter will not attend the meeting” presents two voices. The first voice affirms “Peter will attend the meeting”, and the second voice rejects the first with a “No!” The speaker identifies with the second voice, that of the Principal, assuming responsibility for what is said, see connective; denial.

Notably, a particular Animator can develop a two-sided discourse, that articulates arguments and counterarguments, as in a regular two-person argumentative interaction. This internalized argumentative dialogue is internalized, in an internal confrontation free from the constraints associated with face-to-face interaction. This occcurs when, a character engages in monologic deliberation, as in theater. The polyphonic speaker speaks in one voice, and then in an opposed voice. Finally this dual speaker rejects one side of the argument and accept the other, identifying with that voice.

According to Ducrot, the polyphonic speaker acts as a theater director, staging the voices, and choosing to identify with one of them, see role; persuasion. This concept of identification is central to the theory of argumentation within language. First, the speaker introduces the enunciators, the sources of the points of view evoked in the utterance. Next, the speaker identifies himself with one of these enunciators, this identification is indicated by the grammatical structure. For example, as in the case of denial (see above), in a coordinated stucture “P, but Q” the speaker stages two voices and identifies with one of them, here the second voice asserting Q and its implied conclusion. It should be emphasized that this concept of identification is completely different from to the psychological concept of identification that is discussed in connection discussed in the context of persuasion.

Polyphony is not limited to elaborate monologues. A conversational turn, which is dialogical by nature, can also be polyphonic, as demonstrated by the use of negation. Discrepancies between the interlocutor as a real person and the interlocutor as framed by the speaker can be seen from a polyphonic perspective, see resumption of speech.

The two adjectives, dialogic and dialogical, both refer to dialogue. It might be  interesting to specialize the use of these words to cover distinct aspects of discourse. One could use dialogic, to cover the polyphonic and intertextual aspects of discourse on the one hand, and dialogical to cover the interaction-related phenomena (including their dialogic aspects) on the other. In any case, full-blown argumentation articulates two disputing voices, it is a dialogical activity.

2.3 Intertextuality

According to the classical monolithic view of the speaker, rhetoric considers the arguer to be the source of the speech which he controls and directs at will. However, according to the concept of intertextuality, speech and discourse have their own permanent reality and dynamics, that exist prior to their utterance by an individual. In this sense, speakers are secondary to their speech. Intertextuality diminishes the speaker’s role, considering them only as an agent that  coordinates and reformulates discourses that have already been developed and solidified elsewhere.
S
peakers are not the intellectual source of what is said, rather they are the conscious or unconscious vocalizers of pre-existing content. Discourse does not originate with the speaker, rather the speaker is produced by the discourse. Compared to the classical image of the creative orator « inventing » his arguments, this view of the speaker as a machine that repeats and reformulates inherited arguments and positions is particularly humbling.

In the case of argumentation, these intertextual relations are considered through the notion of an argumentative script, S. Script.


[1] Plato, Theaetetus (189-190). In Plato, Complete Works. Translated by M. J. Levett, rev. Myles Burnyeat. Edited, with an introduction and notes, by John M. Cooper and D. S. Hutchinson. Indianapolis/Cambridge, Hackett. 1997.

SOCRATES:  Now by ‘thinking’ do you mean the same as I do?
THEAETETUS: What do you mean by it?
SOCRATES: A talk which the soul has with itself about the objects under its consideration. Of course, I’m only telling you my idea in all ignorance; but this is the kind of picture I have of it.
It seems to me that the soul when it thinks is simply carrying on a discussion in which it asks itself questions and answers them itself, affirms and denies. And when it arrives at something definite, either by a gradual process or a sudden leap, when it affirms one thing consistently and without divided counsel, we call this its judgment.
So, in my view, to judge is to make a statement, and a judgment is a statement which is not addressed to another person or spoken aloud, but silently addressed to oneself. And what do you think?
THEAETETUS: I agree with that.


 

Intention of the Legislator

INTENT of the author of the text

1. In Law

The argument of the legislator’s intentions interprets the law in accordance with the purpose of the legislative body. The purpose is determined by examining the legislative act itself, its social and historical context, the issues the legislator wanted to address, and the desired solution.

The intention of the legislator can also be determined by reference to the spirit of the law: this is called a psychological argument (Tarello, quoted in Perelman 1979, 58).

This form of argumentation is recognized as relevant in law, see legal logic; appeal to the letter (of the law); strict meaning (of the law).
The legislator’s intention can be determined through a historical, or genetic argument, using data from the law’s history. This history is evident in the preparatory works, the “whereas” section of the law, and parliamentary debates leading to its drafting.

When relying on the previous state of the law, the historical argument assumes that the legislator is conservative and that new legislation must be interpreted within the context of the legal tradition (the presumption of legal continuity).

This argument contrasts with arguments based strictly on the letter or on its strict literal meaning, of the text, as written in the code.

This argument is also known as the teleological argument. Teleology is a philosophical doctrine asserting that every phenomenon can be explained by its end, or  intention.
Teleology answers the questions: « What is it for? » « What is its good?”.

2. In Literature and Philosophy

The scope of this class of arguments extends beyond the legal field. They can be used with any text that an institution recognizes as valid.
For instance, in philosophy or literature, an interpretation of a text may appeal to the author’s intention. This intention can be inferred from  preliminary work, and  data, (e.g., drafts, notes, manuscripts, declared intentions); from psychological data, such as the spirit of the work and the author’s mindset at the time, as understood by the interpreter; and also from the historical context at large.
However, such arguments are considered misleading in structuralist literary analysis, which advocates an immanent approach to literary texts, see fallacy 1.


 

Inference

INFERENCE

1. A Primitive Concept

The concept of inference is primitive, meaning it can only be defined based on equally complex concepts or through an example of inference from the field of logic. For instance, Brody (1967, pp. 66–67) defines inference as « the derivation of a proposition (the conclusion) from a set of other propositions (the premises). » Inference establishes new truths based on known truths.
In an extended sense, the term « inference » refers to any derivation of an accepted proposition based on the prior acceptance of other propositions.

There are two types of inference, inference strictly speaking and immediate inference.
– In immediate inference, the conclusion is derived from a single proposition, see proposition, §4.
Strict, or direct inference is based on two propositions, its premises, see syllogism.

2. Deductive and Inductive Inferences in Traditional Logic

Traditional logic distinguishes between deductive inferences (deduction) and inductive inferences (induction). The valid conclusion from true premises in a syllogistic deduction  is necessarily true (« apodictic »),  while an inductive conclusion is only probable.
Analogical inference is accepted only as a heuristic tool, with no evidential value, see analogy.

Generalization / Restriction – Deduction and induction are considered two complementary processes.
– Induction goes from the particular to the general, or from the general to the most general, « This Syldavian is redheaded, therefore, Syldavians are redheaded. »
– Deduction, on the other hand, goes from the most general to the least general, « All men are mortal, therefore Athenians are mortal,” and then to the individual, « Socrates is mortal. »
However, syllogistic deduction can also generalize:
« All horses are mammals, all mammals are vertebrates, therefore all horses are vertebrates. »

Other forms of reasoning –
According to Aristotle’s view of rhetoric, the enthymeme is the argumentative counterpart of deductive inference, and the example is the counterpart of inductive inference.
Wellman (1971) considers conduction to be a special kind of inference on a par with deduction and induction.
Since Toulmin (1958), the study of everyday reasoning has developed on the basis of an open number of reasoning schemes (argument schemes).

3. Direct Inference and Analytic Statements

An analytic proposition is a proposition that is true “by definition”, i.e., by virtue of its meaning. Good definitions are analytically true, “a single person is an adult unmarried adult.

Direct logical inference is based on quantifiers or “empty words.”
Immediate analytical inference operates on the meaning of the “full words” of the basic proposition, « He is single, so he is not married. »

In arguments such as, “This is our duty, therefore we must do it,” the proposition “we must do it,” introduced by therefore,  is semantically contained in the argument “it is our duty.” By definition a duty is something that people must do. This conclusion, if it is a conclusion at all, is direct.
More generally, an analytic inference is one in which the conclusion is embedded in the argument, and the conclusion merely develops the argument’s semantic content. For example, If I’m told that my colleague recently “quit smoking” I can analytically infer that he or she smoked in the past, see. presupposition.

Consider the following example:

Talking about the birth of the gods implies that at one time the gods did not exist. Talking about the death of the gods is just as impious as talking about their birth. For this, your colleague was recently sentenced to death.

Birth is defined as the “beginning of life.” However, this definition does not directly imply the threatening conclusion; an additional step is required to explicitly define “beginning”, which establishes an equivalence between the time after death and the time before birth. For this reason, the conclusion does not seem as obvious as in the previous cases.

3. Pragmatic Inference

This concept explains how utterances are interpreted in discourse. In the dialogue:

S1    — Did you see anyone I know at the party?
?
S2    Oh yes, Peter, Paul, and Mary.

From S2’s answer, S1 will infer that S2 did not meet anyone else whom they both know. This inference is based on the maxim of quantity: “When asked a question, provide the most accurate information possible, both quantitatively and qualitatively”.
Therefore, if S2 met Bruno at the party–a person known to S1–then S2 can be said to have lied to S1 by omission, see cooperation.


 

Induction

INDUCTION

There are three types of classical inference: analogy, deduction, and induction. Induction goes from the particular to the general. It generalizes the knowledge and information gathered from a limited number of cases to all cases.

I take a marble out of the bag; then a second marble, … then still another marble…
Even though the bag is not empty, I conclude that this is a bag of marybles.

Examining all the remaining objects one by one would be necessary to be sure, but that would take a long time.
A trade-off must be made between 1) the margin of uncertainty I can tolerate and 2) the time it would take to check the entire bag. I choose to save time, I check a few more items and conclude, “this is a bag of marbles.
The induction is based on the similarity of the individuals, possibly based on just one feature, that I consider relevant.

An induction based on a single case is an example.

1. Forms of Induction

Complete induction — Induction is said to be complete and its conclusion is positive (valid, certain), if one proceeds by an exhaustive inspection of each individual. Such a procedure is possible only if one has access to all the members of the set. See definition by enumeration, §2.2.2

Induction from a representative subset to the set — A proposition found to be true in a carefully selected sample can be tentatively extended to the whole:

Forty percent of a representative sample of voters say they will vote for candidate Joni.
Therefore, Joni will receive forty percent of the vote on election day.

Depending on whether the sample is truly representative, and whether the respondents gave sincere answers, as well as assuming they don’t change their minds, the conclusion varies from almost certain to vaguely probable.

Induction from an essential property — Generalizing gfrom an accidental property of one sample to all other samples is risky. If the generalization is based on an essential property, the conclusion is positive, see example:

This is an ordinary Syldavian passport.
This passport mentions the holder’s religious affiliation.
Therefore, all Syldavian passports mention religious affiliation.

2. Refuting induction

A conclusion reached by induction is refuted by showing that it is based on a hasty generalization, i.e., on the examination of an insufficient number of cases. This is done by showing members of the collection who do not possess the that does not possess the desired trait. However, these cases can be considered exceptions, see proof by fact.

3. Induction in Mathematics: Recursive Reasoning

In mathematics, recursive reasoning is a form of induction that leads to positive conclusions (Vax 1982, [Mathematical induction or recursive reasoning]). It is effective in domains such as arithmetic, where a relation of succession can be defined between numbers. First, show that the investigated property holds for 1. Then, demonstrate that if it holds for an individual “i”, it also holds for its successor “i + 1”. The conclusion is that all the members have the tested property.

4. Induction as a Positive Method in Literary History

An inductive argument involves postulating a general law or tendency and testing it on a large number of cases. This process is typical of the positivist science of literature and ideas.

§ 2 The Diffusion of Irreligion among the Nobility and the Clergy
The diffusion of irreligion among the high nobility is considerable. General testimonies abound. Lamothe-Langon says, « Atheism was universal in what was called high society; to believe in God became ridiculous, and we were careful to protect ourselves. » The Memoirs of Ségur, those of Vaublanc, those of the Marquise de la Tour du Pin confirm what Lamothe-Langon writes. At Madame de Hénin, the Princess de Poix, the Duchess of Biron, the Princess of Bouillon, and in the officers were, if not atheists, at least deists. Most of the salons members were “philosophers”, who adopted the spirit of the philosophers, and the great philosophers were their most beautiful ornaments. This can be seen not only in the salons of the philosophers themselves, at d’Holbach’s, Madame Helvetius’s, Madame Necker’s, Fanny de Beauharnais’s (where we find Mably, Mercier, Cloots, Boissy d’Anglas), but also among the great nobility. At the Duchesse d’Enville’s, one meets Turgot, Adam Smith, Arthur Young, Diderot, Condorcet. At the Count de Castellane’s, D’Alembert, Condorcet, and Raynal. At the salons of the Duchesse de Choiseul, the Maréchale de Luxembourg, the Duchesse de Grammont, Madame de Montesson, the Comtesse de Tessé, the Comtesse de Ségur (her mother) Ségur met or listened to Rousseau, Helvétius, Duclos, Voltaire, Diderot, Marmontel, Raynal, Mably. The Hôtel de la Rochefoucauld was the meeting place for the more or less skeptical and liberal noblemen, Choiseul, Rohan, Maurepas, Beauvau, Castries, Chauvelin, Chabot, who met with Turgot, d’Alembert, Barthélémy, Condorcet, Caraccioli, Guibert. Many others that could be mentioned here: the salons of the Duchesse of Aiguillon, who was « very much in love with modern philosophy, that is to say, with materialism and atheism »; Madame de Beauvau, the Duke of Levis, Madame de Vernage, the Count of Choiseul-Gouffier, the Vicomte de Noailles, the Duke de Nivernais, the Prince de Conti, etc.
Daniel Mornet, [The Intellectual Origins of the French Revolution], 1933[1]

The claim to be justified asserts that, “the diffusion of irreligion is considerable in the high nobility”. It is supported by an explicit testimony, accompanied by three others, that are merely evoked. This assertion is followed by a similar statement, “most of the members of the salons are “philosophers” and philosophers are their most beautiful ornaments”, supported by twenty-eight names of philosophers. The lists of names are open;  note that the last quoted name is never preceded by a final « and ».
The argument is compelling, but ad nauseam; reading the lists  can be tedious.

The strength of the asserted principle depends on the number of cases considered. A small number gives reason for skepticism:

It hasn’t been sufficiently appreciated how insignificant is the number of these historical examples is on which the “laws” are claimed to be valid for all the past and future evolution of mankind. [Vico] claims that history is a succession of alternations between a period of progress and a period of regression; he gives two examples. [Saint-Simon] says that history is a succession of oscillations between an organic epoch and a critical epoch; he gives two examples. A third, [Marx], that it is a succession of economic regimes, each of which violently eliminates its predecessor; he gives one single example!
Julien Benda, The Treachery of the Clerks, [1927].[2] Our emphasis.

It should be noted that Benda’s own assertion that, “the number of these historical examples on the basis which a “law” is claimed to be valid for all the past and future evolution of humanity is insignificant”, is supported by three examples.


[1] Daniel Mornet (1933). Les origines intellectuelles de la Révolution Française, 1715-1787. Paris: Armand Colin, pp. 270-271.
[2] Quoted after Julien Benda, La Trahison des clercs. Paris: Grasset, 1975, pp. 224-225.


 

Indicator

Argumentative INDICATORS

Ancient rhetorical theory does not focus much on the connectives that structure argumentative passages. In contemporary times, neither Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca ([1958])  nor Lausberg (1960) pay specific attention to connectives in their respective monumental recreations of the classical system.

However, Toulmin’s “layout of argument” emphasizes the role of linguistic connectives in articulating the elements of the argumentative cell (1958). The warrant is introduced by since; the backing by on account of; the claim (conclusion) by so, and the rebuttal (counter-discourse) by unless. However, Toulmin does not discuss connectives further.
Connectives are a central issue in linguistic approaches to argumentation (Ducrot & al. 1980).

1. Indicators

Argument analysis relies on three levels of indicators:

(1) Boundary indicators, which help to delineate the argumentative sequence.
(2) Internal indicators, which help to identify and articulate the argument and the conclusion within the argument sequence.
(3) Argument scheme indicatorswhich help identify the argument scheme embodied in a given argument.

Various linguistic tools can be used for these operations and can functionally be considered « argument indicators, » not just discourse particles or full semantic words. This label most often refers to the intermediate level of the argument-conclusion structure, where connectives play a prominent role.

1.1 Multifunctionality of Connective Particles

The terminology of connectives and markers of discursive or argumentative structure is rich. Schematically, the framework for the discussion is as follows.
— In logic, logical connectives build complex propositions from simple or complex propositions.
— In natural language, linguistic connectives belong to the category of discursive particles. Grammatically, these particles include conjunctions, prepositions, adverbs, interjections, etc. Some discursive particles such as well, um, right etc., are particularly associated with conversational speech.
— Natural language connectives are multifunctional. Some connectives retain their non-argumentative functions, even in argumentative contexts. For instance, the enumerative and sequential connectives, « first, second, and finally » can be used to list agenda items or  arguments. In an argumentative context, the “list effect” itself can be argumentative, see caseby-case argument; linked arguments.

Other connectives such as since, because, so, therefore, etc., are particularly useful for marking a segment of discourse as an argument or as a conclusion. However while their argumentative function is predominant, it is not exclusive.

In summary, connectives are multifunctional particles that can signal an argument-conclusion relationship.

1.2 Connective Verbs

The argument-conclusion structure, « A so B » can also be articulated by a complete verbal construction:

[A]; this leads me to conclude that [B]

1.3 Connectives Articulate the Semantic Content of Entire Discourses.

Logical connectives articulate precise sets of well-defined simple or complex logical propositions. In contrast, natural language connectives articulate propositions and discourses of undefined length. In the preceding example, [A] and [B] refer to passages of an unspecified length.

Linguistic connectives articulate meanings inferred from such indefinite spans of discourse. For example, a statement such as “and so [Fr. ainsi] Commissioner Valentin put the whole gang in jail” could conclude a novel. The left scope [1] of the connective so sums up all the events since the beginning of Commissioner Valentin’s investigation. The same is true for the connector but, which does not articulate propositions but rather two semantic-pragmatic contents, see the example below, §3.1). See orientation.

1.4 Multifunctionality of Argument Indicators

Argument indicators are not unifunctional words; not all their occurrences are argumentative. Discourse following so or thus is not necessarily a conclusion, and the discourse following because is not necessarily an argument pointing to a conclusion. Thus and because have non-argumentative uses, and excellent arguments do notnecessarily use therefore or because. This means, on the one hand, that peppering a speech with because and therefore does not necessarily make it a good argument. Aristotle had already recognized this strategy and rightly considered it vain, see expression. On the other hand, an interpreter who waits for a so or  because to realize he is in an argumentative situation lacks argumentative, interpretive and interactional competence. Connective particles limit interpretive possibilities by evoking a potential argumentative structure. However, they are not a summons to rouse a sleepy recipient from interpretive torpor.
The discussion of a particle’s argumentative value relates to the argumentative sequence itself. A passage is clearly argumentative if it can be linked it to an argumentative question that sets out both a discourse and a counter-discourse. The argumentative function of a particle is contextual, it is activated when it appears in argumentative contexts.
This general condition does not preclude the practice of the ars subtilior’s practice of reconstructing implicit arguments and conclusions.

When analyzing the linking phenomenon in natural language, it is important to consider the complexity of the grammar of linking terms or expressions.
— Their grammatical category and their specific semantic and syntactic properties.
— Their multifunctionality as argumentative particles.

2. Thus, therefore, so…, since, because…

So can be a conclusion marker, among many other things.  For instance, it can signal the resumption of the main topic of a text or conversation after it has been temporarily put aside. Complicating things further, this non-argumentative resumptive function can be found everywhere, and especially in argumentative contexts. The following example is taken from a lively debate on the attribution of French nationality to immigrants living in France[2]:

je pense que:: toutes ces personnes- et puis aux personnes aussi qui sont venues donc pendant les trente glorieuses on leur doit quand même une certaine forme de respect.

I think that:: all these people— and then also the people who came therefore [Fr. donc] during the post-war boom years, we still owe them a certain amount of respect.

No participant ever doubted that “these people” came “during the glorious thirties”. The reasoning here is

(Argument) they came as workers [donc = therefore] during the post-war boom years”,
(Conclusion) they are entitled to respect.

In fact, donc (=therefore), resumes a statement that is, functionally, not a conclusion but an argument. The structure is certainly not:

* we owe respect to all these people, therefore [Fr. donc] they came during the post-war boom years.

The following intervention is made by a property manager, M, during a conciliation meeting with his tenant, T. The manager recaps his position: he demands a monthly rent increase of 12€  (a very modest amount)  [3].

Moi j’avais d=mandé madame T doit s’en rappeler\ j’avais d=mandé si v=voulez’ ◊ euh: donc euh: quatre vingt francs si v=voulez’ pour arriver à mille trente, par mois, c=qui m=paraissait très raisonnable, très raisonnable’ ◊ vu l’appartement/ et vu son emplacement/ ◊ vous savez qu’un F3 disons tout d=même au deuxième étage’ ◊ relativement confor- table\ […]

[I asked/ Mrs. T certainly remembers\ I asked if you want uh, so [donc] uh: eighty francs f you want to get to a thousand thirty a month=]claim [that seemed very reasonable, very reasonable]modal [considering the apartment/ and considering its location/ (..) you know a three-room apartment let’s say all the same on the second floor’ (..) relatively comfortable\ […] ]argument
Corpus Rent Negotiation (conciliation commission), Clapi Database of spoken French. Our brackets, italics and markings.

T.’s claim is articulated to the context by so [Fr. donc, meaning “so, therefore”], which sounds quite standard. However,  in this claim so does not introduce a conclusion drawn from what comes before, which has already been expressed and repeated.
The so has its classical recall, resumptive function; it just happens that the repeated segment is a claim. Thus, this is an example of a non-argumentative donc = [so, therefore] accompanying a claim, in an strongly argumentative context.  Nonetheless, donc is not here a conclusion marker, but a resumption marker. It just so happens that the repeated segment is a claim.

Other non argumentative functions of so, then, because

can be used to extract and thematize the implicit content of a sentence:
— An encyclopaedic content: All this happened in Greenland, so far up north.

— A semantic content:

S1    — Peter stopped smoking.
S2    — Then you know that he used to smoke?

— An implication of the act of saying something:

S1    — That dress suits you very well!
S2    — Because the others don’t?

3. But

But reverses the argumentative orientation of the propositions it introduces. Nevertheless, no more than so, but is not an inherently argumentative particle, and the argumentative framework and vocabulary cannot account for all its occurrences. In particular but reverses not only argumentative orientations but also narrative and descriptive ones.

3.1 But [Fr. mais], reverses narrative and descriptive orientations.

In general, but is used to reverse any type of orientation: narrative, argumentative, or descriptive. In the following text, but is used to introduce a new narrative development:

August 27: On Friday, I remembered that the annual tax on my car was due to expire. Since I am not one of those people who leave things until the last minute , I went to the tax office to renew it. There was an agent there  for me, or almost. In just a few minutes, everything was done for me over the Internet. I’m all set until next year. But in the meantime…
He walked, and as he walked, tirelessly, with his head held high, swaying to his regular rhythm, dreaming of next year […] ([4])

Such non-argumentative uses of but are quite common. The following passage contains perhaps the most famous occurrence of but in all of French literature. Emma is the heroine of Gustave Flaubert’s novel, Madame Bovary. The entire passage is narrative-descriptive.First, it develops a semantic isotopy: “travel, love, beauty, exotic life, hammocks and gondolas.” But articulates this first isotopy into a second, “husband snoring, children coughing, irritating screeching noises and provincial life”. It would not make sense to impose an argumentative analysis on such a text.

Emma was not asleep; she pretended to be; and while he dozed off by her side she awakened to other dreams.
To the gallop of four horses she was carried away for a week towards a new land, whence they would return no more. They went on and on, their arms entwined, without a word. Often from the top of a mountain they suddenly glimpsed some splendid city with domes, and bridges, and ships, forests of citron trees, and cathedrals of white marble, on whose pointed steeples were storks’ nests. They went at a walking-pace because of the great flag-stones, and on the ground there were bouquets of flowers, offered you by women dressed in red bodices. They heard the chiming of bells, the neighing of mules, together with the murmur of guitars and the noise of fountains, whose rising spray refreshed heaps of fruit arranged like a pyramid at the foot of pale statues that smiled beneath playing waters. And then, one night they came to a fishing village, where brown nets were drying in the wind along the cliffs and in front of the huts. It was there that they would stay; they would live in a low, flat-roofed house, shaded by a palm-tree, in the heart of a gulf, by the sea. They would row in gondolas, swing in hammocks, and their existence would be easy and large as their silk gowns, warm and star-spangled as the nights they would contemplate. However, in the immensity of this future that she conjured up, nothing special stood forth; the days, all magnificent, resembled each other like waves; and it swayed in the horizon, infinite, harmonized, azure, and bathed in sunshine. But the child began to cough in her cot or Bovary snored more loudly, and Emma did not fall asleep till morning, when the dawn whitened the windows, and when little Justin was already in the square taking down the shutters of the chemist’s shop.
Gustave Flaubert, Madame Bovary, [1856][5]

In these two examples, but is not argumentative, it marks an isotopic shift.

3.2 Other Functions of but

But as an Indicator of an Unresolved Contradiction –   In the standard argumentative use of but, the inferred contradiction « E1 but E2″ is resolved in favor of E2, the coordinated construction being co-oriented with E2. In other cases but articulates two opposing arguments without argumentative resolution.

S1    — What should they do today?
S2    — Some want to go to the forest, but others want to go the beach.

Assuming that S2 continues his discourse with a tentative conclusion, conclusion (a) sounds strange, and (b) sounds rather standard:

*(a) So we’re going to the beach.
(b) We don’t know what to do, we’ll have to talk about that.

But as an Indicator of Argumentative Dissociation The concept of argumentative dissociation was introduced by Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca. Dissociation is defined as the splitting of an elementary concept  into two antagonistic meanings, one positive and the other negative, in order to avoid a contradiction ([1958], 550-609), see dissociation.

S1    — I thought you wanted reform?
S2    — We do want reform, but real reform.

Other functions
Correction: in reference to the “beautiful blue Danube”,

In Vienna, the Danube is not blue, but dirty gray

Preface to a second turn of speech, aligned with the first.

S1    — Once again, Peter has failed to graduate
S2    — But that’s just like me!
                                            

4. Other Constructions Bring an Argument to a  Conclusion

An argumentative thus can be paraphrased using a set of verbal constructions that link the argument to the conclusion:

[left context]

 therefore, from there, hence, that is why,
this means, proves, clearly shows that…
  one can (then) conclude that…

[conclusion]

4.1 Connective predicates

Markers of argumentative structure would thus be unduly restricted to “small connective words.” Other constructions, combining anaphoric terms, verbs, or nouns can exlicitly play this role.
Some verbs predicate a conclusion on an argument or an argument on a conclusion. These connective predicates are, in fact, the only undeniable and unambiguous argumentative indicators. We must distinguish between two cases.
In what follows, argument is taken in the sense that it has in the theory of argumentation, not in the sense of “argument of a mathematical function”, see argument)

(1) Conclusion predicate: the conclusion is predicated on the argument.
Subject (argument) + Predicate (conclusion)

from [argument] I infer (that) [conclusion].

V = to conclude, to infer, to deduce…

— [argument] makes it possible to deduce (that) [conclusion].

V = to induce, to show, to demonstrate…

— [argument] proves [conclusion]

V = to prove, to show, to demonstrate, to support, to corroborate, to suggest, to go in the direction of, to motivate, to legitimate, to justify, to entitle, to believe (say, think…)

(2) Argument predicate: The argument is predicated on the conclusion.
Subject (Conclusion) + Predicate (Argument)

[conclusion] ensues from [argument]:

V = to ensue, to result, to follow, to derive…

To argue is not a conclusion predicate, but rather a simple verb denoting speech activity. In “X argues for such-and-such a conclusion”, the subject X must be [+ human]; it cannot be an argument, or a description of a state of affairs. This construction contrasts with the construction “X suggests such-and-such a conclusion” where X can be a discourse or a human being, see (to) argue.

Failing to recognise these distinctions can be particularly damaging in the teaching of argumentation.

4.2 Constructions that Frame Argumentation

All words used to talk about arguments and argumentation can serve as markers of argumentative structure and argumentative function. This class of nominal indicators includes the entire lexicon of argumentation, i.e. the metalanguage of argumentation:(counter)argument, (counter-)conclusion, point of view…, premise, objection, refutation…

This is my conclusion, a consequence, a serious objection, an argument to be considered.

[D1, argument] is given as a good reason to admit, to do [D2, conclusion]
[D1, argument] is stated, stated for the purpose of making [D2, conclusion] acceptable or convincing.

the conclusion, the premise, the objection that…;
against this point of view

We can be sure that “to build the school here, the land is cheaper” is an argument, because it can be satisfactorily paraphrased as follows:

A good reason to build the school here is that the land is cheaper.
The fact that the land is cheaper justifies the decision to build the school there.


[1] The left scope of a connective is the left segment of discourse taken into account for the semantic interpretation of the passage; the same applies for the right scope.
[2] Corpus Debate on Immigration, Clapi Database of Spoken French
http://clapi.univ-lyon2.fr/V3_Feuilleter.php? Num_corpus = 35]. (09-30-2013)
[3] Corpus Negotiation on rents – conciliation commission), Clapi Database of spoken French. Our brackets, italics and markings. http://clapi.univ-lyon2.fr/V3_Feuilleter.php?num_corpus=13]. (09-30-2013)
[4] http://impassesud.joueb.com/news/mali-pendant-ce-temps-la-il-il-marchait]. 07-28-2010. Our emphasis.
[5] Quoted from Gustave Flaubert, Madame Bovary. Trans. by Eleanor Marx-Aveling. Ebook, 2006. http://www.gutenberg.org/files/2413/2413-0.txt


 

Imitation – Paragon – Model

IMITATION, PARAGONS, MODELS

1. Paragons

When it comes to political thought, some events serve as paragons: Munich and the diplomatic defeat of democracies in the face of Nazi expansionism, the genocide of Jews, Gypsies and homosexuals, are all great analogues that function as an anti-model for all current conflicts. For the United States before the Iraq war, Vietnam was the great analogue called to the rescue when it came to opposing military intervention abroad. Paragons serve as “models” for understanding the new events; they work on the principle of precedent, S. Analogy (II); Precedent; Example.

The paragon, person or event, creates a class by analogy, see Categorization; Analogy (I).

A “great analogue” can stage characters that are a source of antonomasia. The antonomasia is the figure of speech by which a member of a category is designated by the name of the paragon of that category: a Daladier or a Chamberlain is a politician who capitulates to a dictator instead of fighting him. This references the behavior of the European politicians Edouard Daladier and Neville Chamberlain in Munich in 1938, as they dealt with Hitler.

Anti-models such as Chamberlain or Daladier represent everything one should not do (Perelman, Olbrechts-Tyteca [1958], p. 362).

Anti-models typify negative authority; the “Model of the Anti-Models” is Hitler, S. Authority §6: Refutative uses of authority.

2. Model

The model is the single most valued member of a hierarchical category.

— It functions as the root of the class, generating the other members of the class.
— It is the most representative element of the category.
— As such, it is the criterion for evaluating the other class members and for integrating new individuals into the category.
— It is considered to be the ideal form, towards which all members of the class tend.

The argument by the model supports the conclusions of the type “this is (not) a good (real, true) X” by comparing the item to evaluate and reference.

In classical culture, the doctrine of imitation is based on the authority of a model. Literary genres are defined by the relationship of their members to a founding model, a founding “father”: Thucydides for history; Aesop and La Fontaine for fables; Aristotle and Cicero for argumentation, etc.

3. Imitation

When an individual identifies with another person this person becomes his model.

Reciprocally, A model is an individual worthy of imitation.

When a model is chosen by an individual, the model is not necessarily conscious of being a model, and the situation is not clearly argumentative, S. Example

In order to get an individual to do something, one can proceed argumentatively, that is  discursively, by arguing through the model, by giving as an example important people, either real or fictional, who have done the same deed. This “argument from exemplarity” can be seen as variant of the verbal argument of authority, a metonymic exemplum.

In addition, one might set an example in order to demonstrate to the other what is desired. For example, one might stop smoking to encourage a friend to stop smoking. Metaphorically speaking, this is an “argument by example”, just as one speaks of an “argument by strength” (appeal to force) when trying to open a stubborn can with a screwdriver.

The strategy  of example can be applied to any forms of behavior we wish to change; how to eat properly, how to speak properly, how to live a dignified life worthy of reward in the afterlife. During this process, there may be some kind of persuasion, i.e.,a  change in belief that correlates with the change in behavior, but not all persuasion comes from argument, see ‘You too’.

By setting an example, the person hopes to set in motion alignment mechanisms. The argument by the example given, plays on nonverbal mechanisms of social imitation, ripple effect, identification, empathy, charisma. Seduction and repulsion are forces distinct from argumentation that push individuals to align with or to distance themselves from another person.

The ethotic argument combines with the argumentation by example, thereby pushing the audience to fully identify with the orator as a model, to commit themselves to full belief in what he or she says and doing what he or she does, see Ethos; Consensus; Ad populum.