The Discourses CHAPTER 6 SCRUTINIZING HEARSAY (p. 152)

22/6.1 — The statements passed from one person to another cannot but be subjected to careftil scrutiny. When a statement is repeated many times, as it is transmitted from one person to the next, white becomes black and black becomes white. Thus, a dog bears some resemblance to an ape, an ape to a monkey, and a monkey to a man, but the man only distantly resembles the dog. This is how the stupid commit enormous errors.

Objet de discours
Discours rapporté

Non Transitivité de la ressemblance (de la relation « ressemble à”

ATC	COMPOSITION EFFECT

The Annals of Lü Buwei BOOK 25, Chap. 2, DIFFERENT TYPES. (p. 627)

25/2.1 — To know that one does not know is the loftiest form of intelligence. The trouble with those who commit errors is that, though they do not know, they nonetheless think themselves knowledgeable. Now, there are many things that, though they appear to be members of a particular class, are not; there are many people who, though they appear to be intelligent, are not. Thus, there is no end to states perishing and people being slaughtered.
Now, eaten separately, the plant asarum and the lei creeper are lethal; but if eaten together, they will increase longevity. Eaten separately, scorpions or aconite are lethal; but eaten together, they will not kill. In the one instance, they sometimes kill and sometimes extend life; in the other, they sometimes kill and sometimes do not. When the class to which a thing belongs is decidedly uncertain, what can be induced about it? Lacquer and water are both liquids; but if you mix the two liquids together, they solidify, and if you steam the lacquer, it will dry out. Copper and tin are both soft, but combine the two soft substances, and they become hard; and if you heat the combination, it liquefies. In the one instance, you dry out the material by making it damp; in the other, you liquefy the material by heating it. When the class to which a thing belongs is decidedly uncertain, what can be induced about it? A small square belongs to the same class as a large square, just as a small horse belongs to the same class as a large horse. But small understanding is not of the same class as great understanding.

25/2.2 — In Lu there was a Prince Chuo who told people, “I can raise the dead.” Someone asked him how he could do this. He responded, “I am definitely able to cure paralysis. Now, if I double the dosage of the medicine I use to cure paralysis, it should be possible to raise the dead.” There definitely are things that can treat the small but not the large, and there are things that can treat the part but not the whole.

25/2.3 — A judge of fine swords said, “The white metal is what makes a sword hard, and yellow metal is what makes it sharp. If you mix them, you will have both hardness and sharpness—and that is a superior sword.” Someone confuted him, saying, “The white metal is what makes a sword dull, and yellow what makes it soft. If you combine them, you will have neither hardness nor sharpness. Moreover, the blade of a soft sword will twist, while that of a hard one will snap. If a sword both twists and snaps, how can it be considered a sharp weapon?”
The true nature of the sword did not change; yet the one took it to be good, the other bad. They accomplished this with their explanations. Therefore, if one listens to explanations with intelligence, then bizarre explanations will cease. If one does not listen to explanations with intelligence, then one will not be able to separate Yao from Jie [1]. This is what causes problems for loyal ministers and what causes the worthy to be dismissed.

25/2.5 — Gaoyang Ying planned to build a house, but the carpenter said, “The time is not yet right. The lumber is still green, so if I add a layer of clay over it, it will surely warp. If you use green wood in building a house, although it will seem fine for now, later it will fall down.”

“if we rely on what you yourself have said, the house will not fall down. As the wood dries, it will get stronger, and as the clay dries, it will get lighter. If you put what is getting lighter on something that is getting stronger, it will not fall down.”

The carpenter was at a loss for words and so did as he was told. When the house was first finished it was fine, but afterwards it did, in fact, fall down. Gaoyang Ying loved to make trivial investigations but did not understand larger principles.

25/2.6 — The thoroughbreds, Ji, Ao, and Lüer raced westward with their backs to the sun, but by evening the sun was in front of them. There definitely are things the eyes cannot see, the intellect cannot grasp, and techniques cannot deal with. We may not understand the explanation of what makes a thing as it is, yet we know it is that way. The sages founded their institutions on the basis of what they knew to be so and did not exercise their minds over the explanation.

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[1] “one will not be able to separate Yao from Jie”

ATC	References

 Texts translated from Chinese

ZHAN GUO CE (Wade-Giles Chan-kuo Ts’e)
« Strategies / Annals) of the Warring States »
Crump, James Irving 1998. Legends of the Warring States: Persuasions, Romances and Stories from the Chan-kuo Ts’e. University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.

CONFUCIUS = KONG ZI 
Confucius_ENO2015 = Confucius, Analects. An online pedagogical translation. Translated by R. Eno (2015).  Version 2.2.1.

DENG XI c. 545 -501 bce
Teng Xi_FORKE1901

CHU HSI & LÜ TSU CH’IEN
Chu Hsi & Lü Tsü CH’IEN_{Wing Tsit Chan}1967 =
Chu Hsi & Lü Tsu Ch’ien (compilers) Chin-ssu lu, Reflections on things at hand. The Neo-Confucian anthology. Trans. Wing Tsit Chan. New York / London : Columbia University Press, 1967.

HAN FEI TZU

Han Fei Tzu_WATSON1996 =
Han Fei Tzu. Basic writings. Trans. by Burton Watson. New York & London, Columbia University Press.

Han Fei Tzü_LIAO 1939.
The complete work of Han Fei tzü with collected commentaries. Translation, Preface, Methodological introduction by W. K. Liao. Quoted after:
http://www2.iath.virginia.edu/saxon/servlet/SaxonServlet?source=xwomen/texts/hanfei.xml&style=xwomen/xsl/dynaxml.xsl&chunk.id=d2.40&toc.id=d2.40&doc.lang=english

HSÜNTZE = XUNZI

LÜ BUWEI
Lü Buwei_{Knoblock & Riegel} 2000 = The Annals of Lü Buwei. A Complete translation and study by John Knoblock and Jeffrey Riegel. Stanford, California, Stanford University Press. 2000.

MENCIUS = MENG TZE
Mencius_LAU1970 =
Mencius. Translated with an introd. and notes by D. C. Lau. Revised edition 2004, Penguin Classics (1st ed. 1970).

Mencius_ENO2016 =
Mencius. An online teaching translation. Trans. R. Eno, 2016.

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BOOK OF RITES
Book of Rites_Legge 1885 =
Summary of the Rules of Propriety, Part 1. In Qu Li, The Classic of Rites. Trans. J. Legge, 1885
Quoted from China Text Project.

SIMA QIan = SE-MA TS’IEN 
Se-ma Ts’ien_CHAVANNES1895 =
Édouard Chavannes, Mémoires historiques de Se-ma Ts’ien, traduits et annotés par Édouard CHAVANNES (1865-1918). 1e éd. E. Leroux, Paris, 1895.

TENG XI = DENG XI c. 545 -501 bce

TSOU YEN
Tsou Yen_GRAHAM1978,

XUNZI = HSÜNTZE

Xunzi_WATSON2003 =
Xunzi – Basic Writings. Translated by Burton Watson. Columbia University Press. 2003.

Hsüntze_DUBS1928 =
Dubs H. H. The works of Hsüntze. Translated from the Chinese with notes by Homer H. Dubs. London, Arthur Probsthain, 1928.

Xunzi_HUTTON2014 =
Hutton. Xunzi. The complete Text. Translated and with an introduction by Eric L. Hutton. Columbia University Press. 2014.

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ZHUANGTZE = TCHOUANG TSEU = CHUANG TZU

Zhuangzǐ_Eno 2010 =
Zhuangzǐ. The Inner Chapters. Translated by Robert Eno. Version 1.0, 2010 .

Chuang Tzu_Legge1891 =
Chuang Tzu. The Writings of Chuang Tzu. Translated by James Legge. In vol. 39 and 40 … Oxford University Press. 1891.

Tchouang-tseu_{Lou Kia-Hway}1969 = 
Lou Kia-Hway — L’œuvre complète de Tchouang-tseu. Paris, Gallimard, 1969

Chuang Tzu_WATSON1964 =
Chuang Tzu, The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu. Trans. B. Watson (1964)

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About Argumentation in China

Casacchia, Giorgio 1989. Les débuts de la tradition linguistique chinoise et l’âge d’or de la linguistique impériale. Dans Auroux, S. [dir.], Histoire des idées linguistiques, T.1 (pp. 431-448). (Liége : Mardaga).

Crump James Irving 1998. Legends of the Warring States: Persuasions, Romances and Stories from the Chan-kuo Ts’e. University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.

Fung Yu-lan (pinyin Feng Yu-lan)
— 1952/1967, A Short History of Chinese Philosophy. Edited by Derk Bodde. New York, The Free Press.
— 1922 A History of Chinese Philosophy, Vol. 1. Period of the Philosophers. From the beginning to circa 100 BCE. Translated by Derk Bodde. Introd., notes, bibliography and index. Princeton, Princeton University Press

Graham, Arthur C.
— 1989. Disputers of the Tao. Philosophical Argument in Ancient China. La Salle, Ill.: Open Court.
— 1978. Later Mohist Logic, Ethics and Science. The Chinese University Press, Chinese University of London. School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London.

Hofmann M., J. Kurtz & A. D. Levine (2020), Powerful Arguments — Standards of Validity in Late Imperial China. Leiden, Brill.

Hofmann, Kurtz & Levine 2020, p. 1. Toward a History of Argumentative Practice in Late Imperial China,   In Hofmann M., J. Kurtz & A. D. Levine 2020, p.1.

Lau, Dim Cheuk. (1963 / 2004). On Mencius’ Use of the Method of Analogy in Argument. In Mencius. Trans. Lau. (New York: Penguin Classics) pp. 200-229 (Reprint 1970 / 2004).

Leslie, Donald. (1964). Argument by contradiction in pre-buddhist Chinese reasoning. Occasional paper 4. Center of Oriental Studies (Canberra: Australian National University)

Loewe Michael (ed.), 1993. Early Chinese Texts: A Bibliographical Guide. The society for the study of early china and the institute of east asian studies, university of california.

Masson-Oursel, Paul, 1912. Esquisse d’une théorie comparée du sorite . Quoted after the Études de philosophie comparée. “Les classiques des sciences sociales”. Site web: http://classiques.uqac.ca.

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Western Approaches to Argument

Aristote. Rhétorique. Traduit par J. H. Freese. (Londres: William Heinemann & New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons) 1926.

Bloom, Allan. (1968). Preface to [his] trans. of Plato’s Republic (Basic Books / Harper & Collins)

Khallâf ‘A.(1997). Les fondements du droit musulman. Trad. de l’arabe (1942). (Paris : Al Qalam).

Perelman, Chaim & Olbrechts-Tyteca, Lucie. (1958) Traité de l’argumentation – La nouvelle rhétorique. (Bruxelles : Université de Bruxelles).

Plantin, Christian. (2005) “Essai d’argumentation comparée : Sur l’argumentation théologico-juridique en islam”. Dans L’argumentation : Histoire, théories, perspectives, chap. 7 (Paris : PUF)

Plantin, Christian, (2016) Dictionnaire de l’argumentation (Lyon : ENS Éditions).
En ligne : Dictionnaire de l’argumentation – Dictionary of Argumentation, (2022)

Sen, Amartya. (2006). The Argumentative Indian. (Allen Lane / Penguin Books)

Toulmin, Stephen E. (1958). The Uses of argument. (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press)

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ATC	Reasoning without theory of reasoning « Chinese civilization never abstracted the forms in which we observe it reasoning in practice«

Cela conduit à s’interroger sur l’universalité des concepts utilisés dans la théorie de l’argumentation. Le degré d’universalité d’un phénomène argumentatif n’est pas déterminé par des considérations a priori, mais est un fait empirique qui peut être déduit en collectant des données qui 1) proviennent d’une variété de langues et de cultures 2) peuvent être clairement rattachées à un même concept. Par exemple, étant donné que des occurrences du modèle d’argumentation a fortiori peuvent être trouvées dans la culture juive, la culture arabo-musulmane, la culture occidentale et la culture chinoise, on peut en déduire que l’argument fortiori a un degré élevé d’universalité. La question est cruciale en ce qui concerne le syllogisme. Parlant des Moïstes, Graham écrit (1989, p. 168)

Although well aware of the difficulties of relating names to objects in the art of discourse, [the Moist] seems to see the lucid and self-evident relations between names as raising no theoretical problems. Chinese civilization never abstracted the forms in which we observe it reasoning in practice, as in this curiously familiar-sounding syllogism of Wang Ch’ung

Man is a thing: though honored as king or noble, by nature he is no different from other things. No thing does not die, how can man be immortal?[1]

Wang Ch’ung utilise un syllogisme valide, qui combine des propositions vraies pour arriver à une conclusion correcte : « Les humains sont des êtres, aucun être n’est immortel, donc aucun humain n’est immortel. » Dans le langage rébarbatif de la logique traditionnelle, ce raisonnement est décrit comme un syllogisme de la quatrième figure, dit galénique, et sur le mode camenes :

tout H est T aucun T n’est I donc aucun H n’est I.

Wang Ch’ung présente cette conclusion incontestable sous la forme d’une question dite « rhétorique », qui est un défi lancé à tout adversaire (Toulmin, 1958, p. 97) ; cela introduit un mouvement dialectique au sein du raisonnement syllogistique.

Graham attribue aux disciples de Mozi[2] « un sens de la preuve rigoureuse [combiné à] un mépris pour les formes logiques » (1989, p. 169). Une analogie peut être faite avec le langage et la grammaire. Selon les spécialistes, les Chinois anciens n’avaient pas de grammaire[3] et ils parlaient certainement un excellent chinois. De même, ils n’ont pas développé de logique (art du raisonnement), et ils argumentaient très bien. En d’autres termes, il n’est pas nécessaire d’avoir une théorie logique de ce qu’est un argument logiquement bien construit et reposant sur des prémisses vraies pour maîtriser une pratique efficace de l’argumentation.

Admettons que cette conclusion puisse (a fortiori ?) être généralisée aux formes d’argumentation non syllogistiques. Une théorie de l’argumentation n’est pas une condition préalable à une pratique efficace de l’argumentation. On peut développer une idée claire et une pratique critique efficace de l’argumentation sans formalisation, c’est-à-dire sans développer un métalangage logique sur le processus d’argumentation et les opérations critiques corrélatives.

Il s’ensuit que l’enseignement de l’argumentation peut se passer de théorie de l’argumentation. Les théories de l’argumentation de type occidental ne sont pas essentielles à l’articulation cohérente des idées. L’argumentation peut être enseignée en montrant et en discutant des exemples paradigmatiques d’arguments et d’argumentation. Ces exemples peuvent être paraphrasés, niés, contredits, généralisés, leurs présupposés et implications peuvent être explorés sans jamais sortir des usages naturels du discours naturel.

On peut avoir une pratique acérée de la critique des arguments sans formaliser ni l’argument ni l’opération critique.

Il n’en reste pas moins qu’il existe des moyens de pratiquer, voire d’enseigner l’argumentation sans théorie de l’argumentation. En d’autres termes, les théories de l’argumentation ne sont pas indispensables pour clarifier les idées et les exprimer en déductions concluantes.

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[1] Wang Chu’ng = Wang Chong, Lun Heng — Philosophical Essays, ch.24; trad. Forke V,I, 335f. (Note Graham). Wang Chong, 27 – c. 97 AD, « developed a rational, secular, naturalistic and mechanistic view of the world and man, and gave a materialistic explanation of the origin of the universe » (Wikipedia).

[2] Mozi (c. 479 – c. 392 av. J.-C.), auteur éponyme de l’ouvrage Mozi.

[3] « Dans la Chine ancienne, quelques siècles avant l’ère chrétienne, la réflexion linguistique avait déjà commencé à produire d’excellents résultats ; nous trouvons d’importantes réflexions sur la nature du langage, des dictionnaires très élaborés, des systèmes de description phonologique et de dialectologie. Cependant, […] l’analyse des structures grammaticales est pratiquement absente. En dehors d’une énorme production d’études sur des mots isolés ou des groupes de mots, il n’y a presque rien sur la description organique de la langue. » (Casacchia, 1989, p. 431).

ATC	LÉVI-STRAUSS, « THE SCIENCE OF THE CONCRETE »  FOUR UNIVERSAL BASIC ARGUMENTATIVE OPERATIONS

These five basic universal argumentative operations ar

1) Categorization
2) Nomination
3) Definition
3) Classification
4) Syllogism and Set Theory

Proper names have their own specifc argumentative resources. The following description applies to common names; the best designation here would be “full words.”

By naming concrete or abstract beings, we attach them to the corresponding category corresponding to this definition, to the name of this category, and to  definition(s) of that  name and that category.
The category associated with the definition of a name groups beings on the basis of the specific characteristics of their member, and/or their similarities with the other members of the category, and-or their resemblance to an exemplary member of this category.

An Aristotelian classification consists in a combination of more or less general categories (genre) and sub-categories (species), typically under the format of a « Porphyrian tree”.
Jorge Luis Borges famous Chinese classification is fictional..

Syllogistic reasoning (“set theory” reasoning) is the most powerful argument scheme exploiting the cognitive resources of a well-done classification.

All A, all B, all C are M
=> some M are A, some are a B, some are C

A syllogism is  evaluated as valid or invalid (“paralogism”) through a specific set of rules (“rules of syllogism”, or, preferably through the Venn diagram method.

***

The classification method that is, naming – defining -systematically categorizing things, is considered by Claude Levi-Strauss as  « the science of the concrete, » [‘la science du concret”] as « the” fundamental science shared by all human beings (1962], ch. 1).

Following Levi-Strauss, we argue that naming – defining – categorizing – classifying a being is the fundamental, universal, most discreet productive and efficient, set of argumentative operations.
Examples can be found in the quoted entries, as well as in the pair a pari argument / argument from the opposite term.

(*) Not to be confused with the use of the same expression in computing.

***

The argument of the name necessarily functions in  the Chinese language as in all languages having « full words », that is a lexicon where speakers find the necessary resources to categorize and designate concrete or abstract beings, events, circumstances, etc.
Thus, the argument of the name must be considered as a linguistic-cognitive universal, and an expression of « subjectivity in language” in action (Benveniste, (1963), p. 259-250).

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Benveniste, 1963 / [1958], De la subjectivité dans le langage. In Problèmes de linguistique générale. Paris, Gallimard. p. 258-266

 

 

ATC	Empirical Universals

« Argumentation Schemes » and « Means of Persuasion »

Toulmin, Rieke, Janik distinguish nine forms of argumentation, «most frequently to be met with in practical situations” (1984, p. 147-155),

Analogy                                     Dilemma                             Generalization
Classification                           Sign                                        Opposites
Cause                                        Degree[*]                             Authority

[*] In the argument from degree, « The different properties of a given thing are presumed to vary in step with one another » (id., p. 155).

Levi (1992) considers that the essential rhetorical means of persuasion used in Chinese are

Metaphor (*)                               Analogy
Example                                      Quoting an authority (*)

Quoting an authority comes with the argument from authority. Metaphor comes with the argument from analogy; Analogy and authority are  common to both lists.

Examples are associated with a number of argumentative operations. They are associated with any law, according to the type / occurrence principle; they are powerful instruments of refutation. Generalizations are based on one or more cases or examples. A paradigmatic example has the value of a general law. Precedents are memorable examples that function as rules. In addition, examples function as crucial cases that, which can disprove a proposed law or generalization (The N are blue – Yes, but that one is red. In everyday language, a counterexample corresponds to an exception:That’s true, but…d)  [2]). As anecdotes, examples can have the most persuasive power in everyday argumentation; when they involve the speaker’s credibility, they are conversationally untouchable, armored against rebuttal: any tentative refutation becomes a personal attack and ruins the conversation.

The first list takes a structural approach to arguement, the second a  functional approach. We will consider both.

Empirical universals

My position is that there are universals in argumentation, because arguments develop potentialities of language, and there are linguistic universals. Languages, like Western languages, know the type/occurrence relationship, categorization and predication,  scalarity (a fortiori), comparison (analogy), etc.
See ATC A Fortiori

The degree of universality of an argumentative phenomenon is not determined by a priori considerations, but is an empirical fact that can be inferred by collecting data that 1) that come from a variety of languages and cultures 2) that can be clearly assigned to the same concept.

For example, since occurrences of the a fortiori argument pattern can be found in Jewish culture, Arab-Muslim culture, Western culture, and Chinese culture, it can be inferred that a fortiori has a high degree of universality.

In what follows, we suggest some  passages from classical Chinese texts as instances of some of these argument schemes.

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ATC	Méthode Deux traductions d’une même analogie

Cet exemple est tiré de la discussion de Mencius[2] avec Gaozi (Kao Tzu)[3] telle qu’elle est rapportée dans le texte de Mengzi. La discussion porte sur deux concepts fondamentaux du confucianisme, human nature, righteousness,morality. Gaozi tente de les éclairer par une analogie avec le saule, dont on fait des tasses et des bols. Mencius rejette vivement cette analogie, qu’il estime inadéquate.

Nous nous bornerons à deux traductions, celle de Robert Eno et celle de Dim Cheuk Lau, soit Mencius_Eno et Mencius_Lau (notre présentation et numérotation),

MengziEno, 6A.1	MenciusLau, VIA 1
1a Gaozi said, “Human nature is like the willow tree, and righteousness is like cups and bowls.	1a Kao Tzu said, Human nature is like the ch’i willow. Dutifulness is like cups and bowls.
1b Drawing humanity and right from human nature is like making cups and bowls from willow wood.”	1b To make morality out of human nature is like making cups and bowls out of the willow.
2a Mencius said, “Can you make cups and bowls from willow wood by following its natural grain, or is it only after you have hacked the willow wood that you can make a cup or bowl?	2a Can you, said Mencius, make cups and bowls by following the nature of the willow? 2b Or must you mutilate the willow before you can make it into cups and bowls?
2c If you must hack the willow to make cups and bowls from it, must you hack people in order to make them humane and righteous?	2c If you have to mutilate the willow to make it into cups and bowls, must you then also mutilate a man to make him moral?
2d Your words will surely lead the people of the world to destroy humanity and right.	2d Surely it will be these words of yours, men in the world will follow in bringing disaster upon morality.

Il s’agit clairement d’un échange de type dialectique entre deux philosophes. Gaozi avance une analogie explicitée par la construction A is like B pour illustrer sa conception de la nature humaine.

Les deux traductions utilisent la même expression, human nature (1a) pour désigner le thème général du débat. Le problème posé par Gaozi concerne l’émergence d’une capacité complexe désignée par les termes suivants (le signe “>” indique que les termes entrent dans la chaîne dont l’ensemble correspond à un même objet de discours),[4]

 

MengziEno	MenciusLau
righteousness (1a) > humanity and right (1b) > [(to make them) humane and righteous (2b) > humanity and right (2c)	dutifulness (1a) > morality (1b) > (to make him) moral (2b) > morality (2c)

Mencius n’intervient pas sur le concept en discussion, mais seulement sur l’analogie utilisée par Gaozi. Il développe l’analogie en mettant au premier plan la nature de la transformation subie par le saule pour devenir bol et tasse

MengziEno	MenciusLau
making cups and bowls from willow wood (1b)	making cups and bowls out of the willow (1b)

Pour désigner le processus affectant le saule, dans les deux traductions, Gaotzi emploie le prédicat abstrait “making C from / out of W”, qui n’a pas d’orientation argumentative définie. Le texte poursuit par une question de Mencius

MengziEno	MenciusLau
2b hacked the willow wood   must you hack people in order to make them humane and righteous?	mutilate the willow   must you then mutilate a man to make him moral?

Toujours dans les deux traductions Mencius adopte en quelque sorte le point de vue du saule. Mencius_Lau utilise le mot mutilate, ayant une orientation argumentative négative. L’expression “mutilating W in order to make C”, met ainsi au premier plan la nature négative de la transformation du saule en bol et en tasse. L’éclairage de l’opération change du tout au tout. Avec hack, Mengzi_Eno ajoute la sensation d’un instrument tranchant, parfaitement cohérent avec l’idée de mutilation “hack W [into] C”.

Et, sur la base de l’analogie proposée par Gaozi lui-même, il transfère l’opération sur les humains (processus marqué par then dans Mencius_Lau)

Nous concluons que les traductions disent clairement ce qu’elles veulent dire, et qu’il s’agit d’une argumentation par analogie, rejetée par l’opposant qui met en défaut cette analogie, en dégageant une faille dans sa structure.

En conséquence, ce cas peut donc être utilisé, sous l’une ou l’autre traduction, à toutes fins utiles lorsqu’il s’agit d’argumentation. La seule réserve porte sur le statut des concepts sur lesquels s’exerce l’analogie (righteouness, dutifulness, humanity, morality), que nous ne sommes pas en capacité de discuter.

 

[1] La référence à la “traduction d’Untel des Analectes de Confucius” sera parfois abrégée comme suit : “Analectes_Untel” avec le nom du traducteur en indice.

[2] Mengzi (= Mencius), 372 – 289 AÈC. Mencius est le nom romanisé du philosophe chinois Meng Ke ou Mengzi, et le titre de l’ouvrage contenant ses paroles.

[3] Gaozi (= Kao-tzu = Gao Buhai), vers 420-350 AÈC « Gaozi était un contemporain de Mencius. L’essentiel de ce que nous savons de lui provient du livre 6 de Mencius, intitulé Gaozi » (Wikipedia, Gaozi).

[4] Pour une présentation de ces concepts et du concept d’éclairage (utilisé infra) de J.-B. Grize, voir Plantin 2016 ou 2022 Objet de discours ; Schématisatisation.

 

 

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The principle of non-contradiction is at the root of reasoning. Everyday argumentation could be defined as a style of conversation in which the principle of coherence applies: If you hold incompatible things in different contexts, you owe the other participants an explanation; if you hold incompatible things in the same context, you make conversation impossible, we have to stop it

Self-coherence of feelings

The following case appeals to the self-coherence of feelings (Leslie 1964):

12.10 Zizhang asked about […] discerning confusion. The Master said […] When one cherishes a person, one wishes him to live; when one hates a person, one wishes him to die – on the one hand cherishing and wishing him life, while on the other hating and wishing him death: that is confusion.
Truly, it is not a matter of riches, Indeed, it is simply about discernment. (Analects_Eno, 12) 

Interpersonal contradiction

Like self-contradiction, interpersonal contradiction demands clarification. Disagreement stimulates intellectual activity.
Confucius says that he prefers disagreement: 

The Master said, Hui is of no help to me. There is nothing in my words that fails to please him. (Analects_Eno, 11, 4)

Nonetheless, it is unpleasant for a teacher to be critically confronted with its own teaching (our presentation:

Zilu appointed Zigao to be the steward of Bi.
The Master said “You are stealing another man’s son!”
Zilu said, “There are people there; there are altars of state there – why must one first read texts and only then be considered learned?”
The Master said, “This is why I detest glib talkers!” (Analects_Eno, 11, 25)

Note Eno: Zilu seems to be invoking lessons Confucius himself taught, much like the ideas in 1.6-7, to confound Confucius himself, which is the basis of Confucius’s response.

Confucius teaches that the basic condition to be called learned can be extended to persons on the way to become a learned person

Analects_Eno, 1.7,
Zixia said: If a person treats worthy people as worthy and so alters his expression, exerts all his effort when serving his parents, exhausts himself when serving his lord, and is trustworthy in keeping his word when in the company of friends, though others may say he is not yet learned, I would call him learned.

In this last passage (1,7), Confucius characterizes a learned person by his correct behavior toward worthy people, his parents, his lord, his friends, and seems to attach only secondary importance to reading texts. In 11, 25 Zilu – a very bold disciple of Confucius –  indirectly reminds him of his former position.

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ATC	Argumentation practice without argumentation theory

The following remarks are based upon A. C. Graham’s views on the Chinese way of argumentation, as presented in his Disputers of the Tao. Philosophical Argument in Ancient China (1989). He writes (1989, p.  168) :

Although well aware of the difficulties of relating names to objects in the art of discourse, [the Moist] seems to see the lucid and self-evident relations between names as raising no theoretical problems. Chinese civilization never abstracted the forms in which we observe it reasoning in practice, as in this curiously familiar-sounding syllogism of Wang Ch’ung:

Man is a thing: though honored as king or noble, by nature he is no different from other things. No thing does not die, how can man be immortal?

Wang Ch’ung [1] uses a valid syllogism, that combines true propositions producing a sound conclusion, « Humans are beings, no being is immortal, no human is immortal.” In the unfriendly language of traditional logic, this reasoning is described as a syllogism of the fourth figure, said Galenic, and in the Camenes mode: « all H is B; no B is I; therefore no H is I. »
Wang Ch’ung presents this incontrovertible conclusion as a so-called “rhetorical » question, which is a challenge to any opponent (Toulmin, 1958: 97); this introduces a dialectical movement within syllogistic reasoning.

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A little further on, Graham attributes to Mozi’s disciples

A sense of rigorous proof [combined with] a disregard for logical forms. (1989, p. 169)

Hsün-tzu, like the later Mohists, has no deductive forms like the syllogism, but does mark off deductive inference as a separate type of thinking. (id. p. 267)

How is this possible? An analogy can be drawn from language and grammar. According to specialists, the ancient Chinese had no grammar [2]; and they certainly spoke excellent Chinese. By the same token, they did not develop a logic (an art of reasoning), and they argued very well. In other words, it is not necessary to have a clear view of what is a valid and sound argument, in order to master an effective practice of such arguments.

*

This conclusion can (a fortiori?) be generalized to non-syllogistic forms of argumentation: A theory of argumentation is not a prerequisite for an effective practice of argumentation.

The point of departure of the workshop and the conference from which this volume [Powerful arguments] emerged is the striking paradox between the abundance of practices and the virtual absence of theories related to the making of powerful arguments in late imperial China. (Hofman, Kurtz, Levine,  2020, p. 1) [3]

One can develop a clear idea and an effective critical argumentative practice without formalization, that is, without developing a a logical meta-language about the process of argumentation, and the correlative critical operations.

It follows that the teaching of argumentation can do without argumentation theory. Western-style theories of argumentation are not essential to the coherent articulation of ideas. Argumentation can be taught by showing and discussing paradigmatic examples of argument. Such examples can be paraphrased, denied, contradicted, generalized; their presuppositions and implications can be explored without ever leaving the level of natural discourse.

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[1] Mozi (c. 479 – c.392 B.C.), eponymous author of the work Mozi.
Wang Chu’ng = Wang Chong, Lun Heng — Philosophical Essays, ch.24; trad. Forke V,I, 335f.  (Note Graham). Wang Chong, 27 – c. 97 AD, « developed a rational, secular, naturalistic and mechanistic view of the world and man, and gave a materialistic explanation of the origin of the universe » (Wikipedia).

[2] « In ancient China, a few centuries before the Christian era, linguistic reflection had already begun to produce excellent results: we find important reflections on the nature of language, very elaborate dictionaries, systems of phonological description and dialectology. However, […] the analysis of grammatical structures is practically absent. Apart from an enormous production of studies on individual words or groups of words, there is almost nothing on the organic description of language » (Casacchia, 1989: 431).

[3] Hofmann M., J. Kurtz & A. D. Levine (2020), Powerful Arguments — Standards of Validity in Late Imperial China. Leiden, Brill.