CONCESSION

Concessions can be negotiated in an organized discussion, or presented as an expression of the speaker’s good will in a monological discourse.

1. Negotiated concession

In negotiated concessions, the arguer modifies his or her original position by lowering the original demand or by conceding a controversial subpoint to the opponent. Strategically, this move may amount to an orderly retreat, possibly for future benefit, in the hope that the opponent will do the same on to another point.

In Aristotelian logical-dialectical games the discussion is about the truth of a statement. The consequence is that it ignores concessions, as a violation of the principle of the excluded middle, statements being considered either entirely true, or entirely false; conclusively defended or not, see Dialectic. In contrast, concession is a key moment in the negotiation process of human affairs, understood as a discussion leading to a reasonable agreement (Kerbrat-Orecchioni, 2000).

By making concessions, the arguer acknowledges that the opponent’s point of view has some validity, while still maintaining the value of his or her own positions and conclusions. The arguer may believe that hisremaining arguments are:

— More persuasive, or of a different nature than the opponent’s
— Not strong arguments, but arguments based on personal values and deep beliefs (identity-based arguments).

The original position should thus be maintained against all odds, according to the formula “I do know, but still …”.

In everyday discussions, concessions are valued as manifestations of openness to others, and as constitutive of a positive ethos. Nevertheless, concessions can be ironic, see Epitrope.

2. Concession as a speech act

In grammar, concessive constructions “A(claim) + C(concession)” coordinate two statements with opposite argumentative orientations, while maintaining the overall orientation determined by the first claim A:

“although C, A”; “certainly C, but A”
“I concede, I understand C but I stand by A”.

C takes up or reformulates the opponent’s speech, or evokes the speech of a fictitious opponent; A reaffirms the speaker’s claim.

Social relations are indeed extremely tense these days, but we still need to continue restructuring the company.

Unlike a negotiated concession, linguistic concession is purely verbal. The speaker sets out:

— First, a virtual character or voice develops the argument that “social relations are extremely tense”, pointing to conclusions such as “stop restructuring of the company”,

—followed by a second argument, that takes the opposite position “we must continue restructuring the company”, and identifies with this second character. In Goffman’s words, the speaker is the animator of A, and the animator and principal of C. In other words, the speaker acknowledges the existence of arguments supporting an opposite conclusion, but at the same time refuses to conclude on this basis. The concession here is a simple acknowledgment of the fact that someone, somewhere, is saying, or could say something opposite to what the speaker claims. This amounts to a de-activation of the argumentative strength of the aforementioned argument. This kind of concession is not at all an expression of the good will of a reasonable negotiator, but a mere phagocytosis and castration of the opponent’s arguments

I know that, you already told me, no need to repeat it!

The two forms of concession can be superimposed, by rationalizing the linguistic concession. One assumes that linguistic concession occurs when the speaker has considered the opponent’s arguments and confronted them with his or her own (even if this examination often leaves no discursive trace), and that, in the end,  he thinks that his arguments are better. But since language takes for real and true what it signifies, a purely linguistic concession automatically produces a negotiated concession effect, whether or not this is really the case. This does not mean that linguistic concession is always mere lip service, but that negotiated concession can only be studied on corpora built for that purpose.

COMPOSITION AND DIVISION
WHOLE AND PARTS argument

Aristotle considers composition or “combination of words” and division to be verbal fallacies, that is fallacies of words, as opposed to fallacies of things or method, see Fallacies 2. They are discussed in the Sophistical Refutations (RS 4) and in the Rhetoric (II, 24, 1401a20 – 1402b5; RR p. 128).

The term argumentation by division is sometimes used to refer to case-by-case argumentation.

1. Grammar of composition and division

Composition and division involve the conjunction and, which can coordinate:

— Phrases:

(1) Peter and Paul came.                   (No and N1) + Verb
(2) Peter smoked and prayed.            No + (V1 and V2)

— Statements:

(3) Peter came and Paul came.            (N + V1) and (N1 + V1)
(4) Peter smoked and Peter smoked     (N + V1) and (N1 + V2)

In Aristotelian logical-grammatical terminology:

(3) and (4) are obtained by division from (1) and (2) respectively
(1) and (2) are obtained by composition from (3) and (4) respectively

The compound and divided statements are sometimes semantically equivalent and sometimes not.

(i) Equivalent — (1) and (3) on the one hand, (2) and (4) on the other hand are roughly equivalent, although it seems that (1), not (3), implies that Peter and Paul came together. In this case, composition and division are possible, and the coordination is used simply to avoid repetition.

(ii) Not equivalent — sometimes phrase coordination (composed statement) is not equivalent to sentence coordination (divided statement). The semantic phenomena involved are of very different kinds.

Peter got married and Mary got married.
≠ Peter and Mary got married.

If Peter and Mary are brother and sister, the custom being what it is, the composition is unambiguous. Without such information, the composition introduces ambiguity.

The operation of division can produce a meaningless discourse:

The flag is red and black.
* The flag is red and the flag is black.

B is between A and C.
* B is between A and B is between C.

Sometimes a syntactic operation applied to a proposition produces a paraphrase of that proposition. At other times, the same operation applied to another proposition having apparently the same structure as the first one produces a proposition that has no meaning, or whose meaning and truth conditions are completely different from those of the original proposition.

2. Aristotelian logic of composition and division

The study of paraphrase systems is a classical object of syntactic theory. Aristotelian logic regards composition and division as a problem of logic. As Hintikka (1987) has repeatedly pointed out, the Aristotelian notion of fallacy is dialogical, see Fallacy (I). The fallacious maneuver confuses the interlocutor, and this is exactly what happens with composition and division. The following case is one of the oldest and most famous illustrations of the fallacy of composition:

This dog is your dog (is yours); and this dog is a father (of several puppies).
So this dog is your father and you are the brother of the puppies.

The interlocutor is disoriented, and everyone finds it very funny (Plato, Euth., XXIV, 298a-299d, pp. 141-142). see Sophism.

Aristotle analyzes this kind of sophistical and sophisticated problem in the Sophistical Refutations and in the Rhetoric under the heading of “Paralogism of composition and division”. He shows that the question extends to a variety of discursive phenomena, under what conditions can judgments made on the basis of isolated statements be “composed” into a discourse in which the statements are connected? The discussion is illustrated by several examples , which, although their formulation may seem contrived, show the full scope of the interpretative issues that are raised

(i) Consider the statement: “It is possible to write while not writing” (RS, 4); it can be interpreted in two ways:

— Interpretation 1 composes the meaning: “one can write and not write at the same time” (ibid.), in the sense of: “one can (write and not write)”. This construction is misleading and absurd.
— Interpretation 2 divides the meaning; if one does not write one still retains the ability to write, viz: « one can know how to write while not writing », which is correct. Under certain circumstances, a person who can write cannot physically do so, e.g., if his hands are tied. The modal force is ambiguous between “having the ability to” and “having the possibility of exercising that ability”.

 (ii) The following example also uses the modal can, this time in its relation to time and circumstances. Consider the statement “if you can carry one thing, you can carry several” (RS, 4, 166a30: 11):

(1) (I can carry the table) and (I can carry the cupboard)

Therefore, by composition of the two statements into one:

(2) I can carry (the table together with the cupboard).

Which is not necessarily the case.

(iii) The fallacy of division is illustrated by the example “five is equal to three and two” (after RS, 4, 166a30, p.12):

— Interpretation (1) divides the meaning, i.e., it divides the utterance into two coordinated propositions, which is both absurd and fallacious:

(five equals three) and (five equals two).

— Interpretation (2) composes the meaning, which is correct:

Five is equal to (three and two)

In the Rhetoric, the notion of composition is discussed with several examples that clearly show its relevance to argumentation. The argument by composition and division “[asserts] of the whole what is true of the parts, or of the parts what is true of the whole” (Rhet, II, 24, 1401a20-30; RR, pp. 381), which makes it possible to present things from quite different angles. This technique of argumentation involves statements constructed around evaluative and modal predicates such as:

— is good; — is just; — is able to —; — can —;
— knows —; — said.

The following example is taken from Sophocles play, Electra. Clytemnestra has killed her husband, Agamemnon. Then their son Orestes kills his mother to avenge his father. Was Orestes morally and legally justified in doing so?

“‘T’is right that she who slays her lord should die’; ‘it is right too, that the son should avenge his father’. Very good: these two things are what Orestes has done.” Still, perhaps the two things, once they are put together, do not form a right act. (Rhet., II. 24, 1401a35-b5, RR, 383).

Orestes justifies what he has done by arguing that his two actions can be composed. His accuser denies the composition.

This technique of decomposing a dubious action into a series of praiseworthy, or at least innocent action, is arguably very productive. Stealing is simply taking the bag that is there, taking it somewhere else, and not putting it back in the same place. The division blocks the overall evaluation.

A second example clearly shows that fallacy and argument are two sides of the same coin:

If a double portion of a certain thing is harmful to health, then a single portion must not be called wholesome, since it is absurd that two good things should make one bad thing. Put thus, the enthymeme is refutative; put as follows, demonstrative “for one good thing cannot be made up of two bad things”. The whole line of argument is fallacious. (Rhet., Ii. 24, 1401a30, RR p.381-383)

The teetotallers begin by an agreeing that “drinking a lot makes you sick”, and they divide: “so having one drink makes you sick”. Permissive people follow the other line: “having a drink is good for your health”, and proceed by composition. Abstainers argue by division, and this is considered to be fallacious by permissive people. Permissive people argue by composition, and this is considered to be fallacious by abstainers.

3. Whole and part argument

The two labels “composition and division” and “part and whole” are considered equivalent in practice (van Eemeren & Garssen, 2009).

3.1 Whole to parts and division

The whole argument assigns to each of its parts a property that is proved on the whole:

If the whole is P, then each of its parts must be P.

If the country is rich, then each of its regions (inhabitants …) must be rich.
The Americans are rich, so this one must be rich; let’s ransom him!

The problem faced by the whole-to-parts argument is the same as that of the division argument: can the property evidenced on the whole be transferred to each of its parts?

3.2 Parts to whole and composition

The argument based on the parts assigns to the whole they make up the properties evidenced on each of its parts:

If every part of a whole is P, then the whole is P.
If every player is good, then the team is good (?).

The problem faced by parts to whole arguments mirrors that of the argument by composition: is the property evidenced by each part also evidenced by the whole?

4. Complex wholes and emergent properties

Accidental or mechanical wholes are composed of a set of unrelated objects in a neighborhood relation. Essential or complex wholes consist of the conjunction of the parts plus some emergent additional properties, that distinguishes them from an inert juxtaposition of components. The degree of complexity of the whole is superior to the simple arithmetical addition of its parts. This process is called the composition effect. Aristotle’s case of the superiority of the group over the individual alleged by is an example of such an effect, see Ad populum.

This issue is also found in rhetoric, where a distinction is made between metonymy and synecdoche, the former focusing upon neighborhood relations and the latter on relations between a complex whole and its parts.

Argument of COMPREHENSIVENESS
A completudine

The evolution of society can manifest itself by the emergence of legal cases that do not find clear solutions in the existing legal system, be it in national, international or human rights legislation (Tarello 1972, cited in Perelman 1977, p. 55).
Nevertheless, the judge has an obligation to judge, i.e., he or she has to give a verdict upon all the cases before him or her, S.. Silence. That is, he or she cannot refuse to decide a case by arguing that there is no law applicable to that case, or that no interpretation of an existing law can settle it.
In other words, the principle of completeness presupposes that the existing legal body of law, properly interpreted, can qualify each and every human action as permitted, tolerated, or prohibited.

Meta-principles such as the following supplement the legal system:

In civil matters, in the absence of specific law, the judge is bound to proceed according to equity. In order to decide according to equity, he must refer to natural law and to reason, or to received usages, when the primitive law is silent.
Fortuné Anthoine de Saint Joseph, [Concordance between the Foreign Civil Code and the Napoleonic Code], 1856.[1]

The argument of comprehensiveness [2] is parallel to the topos of the impotent legislator, the nature of things that makes the application of the law impossible, see Weight of Circumstances.

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[1] Fortuné Anthoine de Saint Joseph, Concordance entre les codes civils étrangers et le Code Napoléon, 2^nd ed. t. II. Paris: Cotillon, 1856. P. 460.
[2] Argument a completudine; Lat. completudo, “completeness”.

Argument from COMPARISON

Comparison is the process of determining whether or not two objects,, two situations, two systems… have some similarities or analogies. A process of comparison is involved in many argumentative activities, so the label argument by comparison (a comparatione) is used with different meanings.
These meanings correspond primarily with the argument: a fortiori; a pari;, by analogy; by example or exemplum.

Comparison and categorization — Comparison is the basis for the categorization-nomination process; the individual to be categorized is compared either with a known individual belonging to the category, or with the prototypical member defining the category. S. Justice

Intra-categorical comparison — Two beings belonging to the same category are identical from the point of view of that category. Nevertheless, they can still be compared in terms of:

— their non-categorical properties; S. Intra-categorical analogy.

— their position relative to a prototypical subcategory of that category. A rat and a whale, for example, are identical insofar as both are mammals; considering that the cow is a prototypical mammal, we can say that a rat, being nearer to a cow than to a whale, is “more” a mammal than a whale.

— Hierarchical categories,by definition, contain built-in comparisons: Bachelor, Master, and Doctorate are three types of academic degrees, listed by ascending order, see a fortiori argument.

Comparison and structural analogy — Establishing a structural analogy also involves a process of comparison.

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INVENTION and COMMON PLACES

The term commonplace corresponds to the Latin locus communis, which translates the Greek topos.

— Often reduced to a place (locus, pl. loci), an inferential commonplace is an inferential topic, or argumentation scheme.

— A substantive commonplace is an endoxon, that is, a formulaic expression of a common idea. Traditional rhetorical invention specialized in the argumentative use of substantive commonplaces.

1. Chapter Heads of Reality

According to Aristotle’s Categories (1b 25 sq.; Tricot, p. 5), events and reality are organized according to a basic ontology, whose ultimate components (categories) are:

Person, Action, Time, Place, Manner, Cause or Reason

The parameters of this is a Western ontology can vary from author to author.

According to Benveniste (1966, ch. VI), these parameters, which are supposed to reflect reality, are also closely related to the Greek language, particularly the system of sentence complementation and to interrogative words.

Category                         Question

Person focus                  Who?                                  Peter
Kind of action                What?                                 met Paul
Quantity                          How many times?          twice
Place                                Where?                              in Washington
Manner                            How.                                  reluctantly
Medium                           How?                                  on Paul’s instigation
Purpose, reason             Why?                                  to discuss their business

The systematic use of this interrogative grid is a survey method for gathering and organizing information about any event.

[Interrogatives] have already been recognized in different languages ​​for different purposes: such as, for speculative purposes, in scholastic Latin: cur?, quomodo?, quando? [why? how? when?]; or for military purposes in German, where the tetralogy Wer? Wo? Wann? Wie? is taught to all military recruits as the framework of information that every scout on a reconnaissance mission must be able to provide and report to their superiors. (Tesnière 1959, p. 194).

This method is known as ”Five Ws” : Who? What? Where? When? Why? –plus How? How many?

When applied to a particular field, these parameters correspond to words with full lexical meaning. For example, a classic guide to political decision-making includes questions such as:

“Honorable? Will the proposed measure be honorable or embarrassing to us?

See political arguments: two collections and infra, the parameters for portraying human beings.

In the Middle Ages, it guided confessors looking for sins, who were anxious not to overlook any (Robertson & Olson, 2017). We can speak of “inquisitorial” questions [1] , in the sense that an inquisition is defined as an “investigation, methodical, rigorous research” (TLFi, Inquisitoire). It is a cornerstone of ordinary Western thought.

The same type of questions also guide moral evaluations. For example an act such as “having carnal intercourse” is considered shameful if it is done “with forbidden persons” (with whom?), or “at the wrong time” (when?) or “in the wrong place” (where?) (Aristotle, 1383b 15-20; RR p. 279).

2. The Rhetorical “Technical” Method

The distinction between rhetorical and non-rhetorical elements,  i.e.  between what belongs to “rhetorical technique” and what does not, is a key aspect of this method. This distinction is nonintuitive, and surprising a priori. This is most evident at the beginning of the rhetorical process, the inventio, or the research of arguments. The grid of questions remains  operative, the radical change lies in how the answers are constructed.

These questions can be answered a posteriori, i.e., after a full documented investigation into the specifics of the case–the kind of work a police investigator is supposed to do. The inspector does fieldwork, the rhetor as such does not. The rhetor can answer a priori, on the basis of endoxa, or preconceived common ideas, that are “ruling ideas ».
In both cases, the collected material must be presented in a convincing discourse to the court and the public. Ultimately, it’s all a matter of language, the result of the concrete investigation makes all  the difference. In any case, rhetorical discourse is particularly powerful in creating doubt and shifting the burden of proof.
When material data is scarce—no witnesses, no contracts, not even a corpse—the case must still be discussed and this is where rhetoric comes in, in full force, not necessarily to manipulate people, but to clarify the situation and circumscribe zones of doubt avoiding for example, the condemnation of an innocent person, for example.

Giving undue prominence to stereotyped ideas in the construction of arguments, leads to strong and indignant criticism of rhetoric as a fallacious verbiage, see ornamental fallacy and §5 below.

Consider the argumentative question “Did Mr. So-and-So commit this horrible murder?”
— The question Who? “Who is the defendant, Mr. So-and-So?”. The subtopic Which country? provides the categorizing information: “Mr. So-and-so is Syldavian,” and likewise for all questions about the person.

— Endoxon about the Syldavians: The Syldavian category is associated with a set of defining endoxic predicates (“the Syldavians are like this”), each of which has a specific argumentative orientation.

The Syldavians are peaceful / bloodthirsty people.

These predicates provide an encyclopedic endoxic semantic definition of the Syldavian.

— The instantiation of the endoxic definition supports the conclusion:

The guilt of Mr. So-and-So is probable / improbable.

Other topical questions about the same Mr. So-and-So will provide different, possibly contradictory, perspectives that the opponent can use.
Such answers can help to organize a previous serious documentation, and a bunch of pre-established judgments  regardless of the outcome of any detailed investigation of the matter.

3. Portrait Based on Commonplaces

Each of these questions can become the source of several sub-questions that can be developed considerably, to produce a detailed grid of investigation. The results produced by this technique depend entirely on the method of inquiry used to answer the questions. An armchair argument where the ‘research’ is based on common sense and commonplaces will produce commonplace conclusions.

A rich set of detailed questions focuses on the key element of rhetorical scenarios: the person (Who?). Quintilian distinguishes the following facets in order to identify a person and compose an a priori rhetorical representation of that person, independent of any concrete information about the situation under discussion.

— “Birth, for people are generally considered to be similar in character to their fathers and forefathers, and sometimes derive motives for living an honorable or dishonorable life from their origins” (Quintilian IO, V, 10, 24 ).

To answer the subquestion “Birth?”, the inquiry about the family gathers information such as “he comes from a well-known honorable family”, or “his father was condemned.” The first piece of information provides arguments that allow one to apply rules such as “like father, like son”, or “he is a chip of the old block”,leading to conclusions such as:

He made a mistake, but his family provides all the necessary guarantees. Good blood cannot lie, he deserves a second chance.

The second piece of information leads to different conclusions:

The father was convicted, so the son has a heavy inheritance. Bring me more information about him!

The saying “the son of the miser is a spendthrift” contradicts the previous conclusion. If the father has a vice, the doxa does not attribute the corresponding virtue to the son, but rather the same vice or an opposite one.

—  “Nation?” (ibid.) and “Country?” (ibid., 25). The answers will introduce national stereotypes: “If he is Spanish, he is proud, if he is British, he is phlegmatic.” These conclusions, “he is proud, he is phlegmatic”, can be useful for the ensuing discussion,  “He is Spanish, so he is proud. He certainly reacted strongly to this personal attack.”

— “Sex? – For you would more readily believe a charge of robbery with regard to a man, and a charge of poisoning with regard to a woman” (ibid.) The prejudiced investigator will follow the commonplace suggestion: he will tend to look for a woman in the second case. A French book, “The Famous Poisoners” (Les Empoisonneuses Célèbres), is devoted exclusively to famous female poisoners.

—  “Age?”, “Education?”, “Bodily constitution? – For beauty is often used as an argument for libertinism, and strength for insolence. Contrary qualities are used to justify for contrary conduct” (id., 25-26). In other words, “He is handsome, he must be a libertine” is more credible, and considered as more probable than “He is handsome, therefore he must live an austere life.” If A is stronger than B, then “A is more aggressive than B” is likely. Therefore, if A and B fought, “surely, A attacked B. » In other words, A bears the burden of proof. These conclusions can be reversed by applying the paradox of plausibility: “Actually, B must have attacked A, because he knew that the evidence will be against A.”

— “Wealth? – For the same charge is not equally credible in reference to a rich man and a poor man, in reference to one who is surrounded with relations, friends and clients, and to one who is destitute of all such support” (id., 26). Commonplaces associated with social roles and positions come under this category. For example, an elderly man from the country, sitting on a bench in the setting sun, will certainly have deep thoughts about the present state of affairs, see rich and poor.

— “Natural disposition –  for avarice, passion, sensibility, cruelty, austerity, and other similar affections of the mind, frequently either cause credit to be given or to be withheld from an accusation” (id., 27). The murder was committed in a peculiarly cruel manner. Peter is cruel, therefore he is the murderer, see circumstances.

— “Manner of living – for it is often a matter of inquiry whether a person is luxurious, or parsimonious, or mean” (ibid.).

The following questions refer to arguments based on desires and motives (ibid.):

— “What a person affects, whether he wishes to appear rich or eloquent, just or powerful” (id., 28)

— “Previous doings and sayings” (ibid.), are used to find motives and precedents.

— “Commotion of the mind, […] a temporary excitement of the feelings, such as anger, or fear” (ibid.), see emotions.

— “Designs” (id., 29)

This set of commonplaces underlies portraits such as:

A man in his thirties. Canadian. West Coast. Athletic. From a well-known and respected family. Has never finished law school. Very friendly with his neighbors. Lives a conventional life. Works in a pharmacy, with limited prospects for the future.

This portrait could be read as a literary draft, as a police report. In any case, it is a set of potential premises.
Doxa-based argumentation uses pieces of information such as “the man is X”, relies on the stereotyped categories attached to X’s, “the X are like this”, and concludes that “the man is like this.” See categorization; cefinition.

4. Literature of Characters

This topology has a derived argumentative function and a direct aesthetic-cognitive function. It builds a bridge between argumentation and literature by providing a technique for constructing  portraits, through the genre of “characters”, such as those of the Greek Theophrastus. We are no longer in the realm of ethos as autofiction, but in the pure world of the ethopoeia, that is, the vivid fictional representation of a “character”, such as « the Miser” or “the Garrulous Person” through their conventional typical manners, discourse and actions. These decontextualized portraits can serve as authorized and respectable sources of information about the represented character and as preparatory exercises for real-life argumentation.
This combination constitutes a coherent educational, aesthetic and cognitive process of controlled writing and thinking—the very antithesis of any automatic writing.

5. “This Noxious Fertility of Common Thoughts” (Port-Royal)

When based solely on linguistic associations and doxa-based knowledge, this technique quickly produces fairly convincing, true-to-life images of things and events. These images are very difficult to refute, because they are merely expressions of shared preconstructed  knowledge. The vicious circle between persuader and persuadee is an example of such a situation, see persuasion.
Such compositions are the opposite of the in-depth characterizations of individuals, that can be developed in psychology or philosophy. They are a perfect stronghold for all positive or negative social prejudices.

Port-Royal condemned this « noxious fertility of the common thoughts » in the strongest terms:

Now, so far is it from being useful to obtain this sort of abundance, that there is nothing which more depraves the judgment, nothing which more chokes up good seed, than a crowd of noxious weeds ; nothing renders a mind more barren of just and weighty thoughts than this noxious fertility of common thoughts. The mind is accustomed to this facility, and no longer makes any effort to find appropriate, special, and natural reasons, which can only be discovered by an attentive consideration of the subject. (Arnauld, Nicole, [1662], III, XVII; p. 235).

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COLLECTION 4: CONTEMPORARY INNOVATIONS
AND STRUCTURATIONS

1. Chaïm Perelman & Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca, A Treatise on Argumentation — The New Rhetoric, 1958

In The New Rhetoric — A Treatise on Argumentation (1958), Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca propose a sophisticated typology of arguments. Some twenty years later, in The Rhetorical Empire [L’Empire Rhétorique, 1977], Perelman takes up the essential elements of the 1958 typology, and makes some significant simplifications. In Juridical Logic [Logique Juridique, 1979] he presents a specific set of legal arguments.

1.1 The typology of the Treatise

According to Conley, the Treatise contains “more than eighty different forms of argument, and illuminating remarks on more than sixty-five figures” (1984, p. 180-181), and contrasts these achievements with “Toulmin’s renegade logic” (ibid.).

The “Forms of argumentation” are described in the third part of the Treatise, entitled “Techniques of argumentation”. They are presented as a set of “association techniques”, (Chap. 1 to 3), along with two other kinds of techniques, the “technique of dissociation” (Chap. 4), and the “Interaction of arguments” (Chap. 5). The latter chapter presents a number of dispositional techniques, and discusses the relative persuasive effects of different arrangements of arguments in a speech, i.e questions of classical “dispositio”.

1.2 The association techniques

The association techniques correspond to the classical argument schemes. They are classified under three categories:

Chap. 1. Quasi-logical arguments
Chap. 2. Arguments based on the structure of reality
Chap. 3. The relations establishing the structure of reality

“Quasi-logical arguments” (§46-59)

This category lists arguments which “lay claim to a certain power of conviction in the degree that they claim to be similar to the formal reasoning of logic or mathematics” (p. 192); this definition should be brought closer to the definition of a fallacious argument as “one that seems to be valid but is not so.” (Hamblin 1970, p. 12), see. Fallacies (1). The category includes the following argument schemes:

• • • 46-49 Contradiction and incompatibility
    • 50 Identity and definition
    • 51 Analyticity, analysis and tautology
    • 52 The rule of justice
    • 53 Arguments of reciprocity
    • 54 Arguments by transitivity
    • 55 Inclusions of the part in the whole
    • 56 Division of the whole into its parts
    • 57 Arguments by comparison
    • 58 Argumentation by sacrifice
    • 59 Probabilities

In The Rhetorical Empire, the chapter on “Quasi-Logical Arguments” essentially recapitulates the class as presented in the Treatise.

“Arguments based on the structure of reality” (§60-77)

From a linguistic point of view, he broad label “argument based on the structure of reality” can be interpreted as referring to arguments that exploit syntagmatic, or metonymic relations. Indeed, this category lists arguments “alleged to be in agreement with the very nature of things” (p. 191); these arguments “make use of [the structure of reality] to establish a solidarity between accepted judgments and others which one wishes to promote” (p. 261). The “causal link” and the “relation of succession” are fundamental to this category.

Arguments within this category include:

• • • 61-63 “Causal link”, “Pragmatic argument”
    • 63-73 discuss arguments in which the person is considered to be a causal agent, such as:
      • • 64-68 “Ends and means”, among which:
        • 65 “Argument of waste”
        • 66 “The Argument of direction”
        • 68-73 “The Person and his acts”, including:
        • 70 “Argument from authority”
        • 73 “The Group and its members”
    • 74-75 extend the notion of “relation of coexistence” to:
    • 74 “Act and essence”
    • 75 “The symbolic relation”
    • 76-77 present “more complex”, second level arguments:
    • 74 “Double hierarchy”
    • 75 “Differences of degree and of order”

The Rhetorical Empire, Chapter VIII, recapitulates the same class of arguments based on the structure of reality under different groupings:

— Relations of succession
— Relations of coexistence
— The Symbolic relation, the double hierarchy argument, argument about the differences of order.

“Relations establishing the structure of reality” §78-88

The inclusive label “Relations establishing the structure of reality” could be interpreted as referring to a set of arguments that exploit paradigmatic or metaphorical relations. This category of relations is defined on the basis of two of its prototypical members, arguments from “the particular case”, and “arguments by analogy”. The following argument schemes come under this category:

• • 78 “Argumentation by example”
  • 79 “Illustration”
  • 80-81 “Model and anti-model”
  • 82-87, On analogy
  • 87-88, On metaphor.

In the Rhetorical Empire, the title “establishing the structure of reality” is not retained; its contents are grouped under two distinct chapters:

Chap. IX, Arguments by example, illustration and model
Chap. X, Analogy and metaphor

This can be construed as a waiver of the distinction between arguments “establishing” the structure of reality, and those “based on” the structure of reality.

It might, however, also be argued that this couple of concepts does not characterize causal arguments in opposition to analogical ones, but indeed applies to both argument schemes. The successful use of an argument “based on” authority, for example, presupposes that the invoked authority has been previously “established”. This distinction is especially helpful in the case of arguments from authority, definition, causality and analogy.

1.3 The dissociation techniques

The basic difference between association and dissociation techniques is that the former operates on judgments; they “establish a solidarity between accepted judgments and others which one wishes to promote” (p. 261); they correspond to argument schemes. In contrast, dissociation techniques operate on “concepts” (p. 411; my emphasis): “[they] are mainly characterized by the modifications which they introduce into notions, since they aim less at using the accepted language than at moving towards a new formulation” (p. 191-192), see Dissociation, Distinguo; Persuasive Definition.

The two terms of the opposition association / dissociation are thus of a very different nature.

2. Toulmin, Rieke, Janik, An introduction to reasoning (1984)


Toulmin, Rieke, Janik consider nine «forms of reasoning» «most frequently to be met with in practical situations (1984, p. 147-155; p. 155).

1. analogy 2. generalization 3. sign 4. cause

5. authority 6. dilemma 7 classification 8. opposites 9. degree

In the argument from degree, « the different properties of a given thing are presumed to vary in step with one another » (id., p. 155)

Like the following one, this restricted group of argumentative schemes has a family resemblance with the classical lists derived from Cicero, see Collections 2.
They are good candidate for universality.

3. Kienpointner, Alltagslogik [Everyday Logic] 1992.

Kienpointner (1992, p. 231-402) synthetizes six contemporary typologies (Perelman, Olbrechts-Tyteca [1958] ; Toulmin, Rieke, Janik 1984 ; Govier 1987; Schellens 1987; van Eemeren, Kruiger 1987; Benoit, Lindsey 1987), summarized in the following table (1992, p. 246):

3.1 Rule-using argument schemes

Classificatory Schemes

Definition
Genus – Species
Part – Whole

Comparison Schemes

Equivalence
Resemblance
Difference
A fortiori

Opposition Schemes

Contradictories
Contraries
Relative terms
Incompatibility

Causal Schemes

Cause – Effect
Consequences
Reason
Means – End

3.2 Rule-establishing argument schemes

Argumentation by example
Inductive argument

3.3 Other schemes

Argument by example, illustrative argument
Arg. by analogy
Arg. by authority

4. Douglas Walton, Chris Reed, Fabrizio Macagno, Argumentation Schemes, 2008.

Walton, Reed and Macagno present an extensive and exhaustive survey including “a user’s compendium of argumentation schemes” (2008, pp. 308-346).

The schemes are consistently referred to as argument schemes, with the exception of (19), (20), (21), which are referred to as argumentation from values, from sacrifice, from the group and its members.

The following list mentions only the main schemes; they may include subtypes.

(1) Authorities: position, expertise, testimony, number (p. 309-314)

1. 1. 1. Argument from position to know
      2. Arg. from expert opinion
      3. Arg. from witness testimony
      4. Arg. from popular opinion, ad populum
      5. Arg. from popular practice.

Arguments (4) are based on what people generally believe, whereas arguments (5) are based on what people generally do.

(2) Example, analogy (p. 315-316)

1. 1. 6. Argument from example
      7. Arg. from analogy
      8. Practical reasoning from analogy

Arguments (7) concern beliefs; arguments (8) concern ways of doing things.

(3) Composition and division (p. 316-317)

1. 1. 9. Argument from composition
      10. Arg. from division

(4 ) Negation, opposition (p. 317-318)

1. 1. 11. Arg. from opposition (contradictory, contrary, converse, incompatible)
      12. Rhetorical argument from opposition

Negation-based argumentation schemes may or may not be logically valid or not; they are often not well defined.

(5) Alternative (p. 318-319)

1. 1. 13. Arg. from alternatives

This scheme concludes by eliminating a member of an alternative because of the requirement of the other member. It corresponds to a case-by-case argument between two cases.

(6) Classification (p. 319-320)

1. 1. 14. Arg. from verbal classification

“for all x, if x has property F, then x can be classified as having property G.”

The set F is contained in the set G.

1. 1. 15. Arg. from definition to verbal classification

If an individual a is defined (categorized) as a D, and if Ds in general have property P, then a has property P.

1. 1. 16. Arg. from vagueness of a verbal classification
      17. Arg. from arbitrariness of a verbal classification

Schemes 16. and 17. conclude with the rejection of an argument as “too vague” or “too arbitrarily defined” in some aspects. These cases can also be seen as an application of Grice’s cooperative principle.

(7) Persons, values, actions and sacrifice (p. 321-327)

1. 1. 18. Argument from interaction of act and person
      19. Arg. from values
      20. Arg. from sacrifice
      21. Arg. from the group and its members

These schemes consider a group whose members are said to share a quality Q, and attribute that quality to each member of the group. A member of a racist group can legitimately be assumed to be racist.

Not all the characteristics of its members can be composed and attributed to the group as such; a large set is not necessarily composed of large elements.

1. 1. 22. Practical reasoning
      23. Two-person practical reasoning

If you have an end, then you must accept the means and steps necessary to attain it.

1. 1. 24. Argument from waste
      25. Arg. from sunk costs

Pages 10-11 (id.) consider as synonyms the labels argument from waste, (with reference to Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca), and argument from sunk costs. Nevertheless, they are discussed here as two separate entries.

(8) Ignorance (p. 327-328)

1. 1. 26. Arg. from ignorance
      27. Epistemic argument from ignorance

This argument covers the case “if it were true, the newspapers would surely be talking about it” (id., p. 99)

(9) Cause, effect; abduction; consequence (p. 328-333)

1. 1. 28. Argument from cause to effect
      29. Arg. from correlation to cause
      30. Argument from sign
      31. Abductive argumentation scheme
      32. Argument from evidence to a hypothesis
      33. Arg. from consequences
      34. Pragmatic argument from alternatives

Scheme (34) is a special case of (33), the choice is between doing/not doing something and suffering/not suffering negative consequences.

(10) Arguments from threat, fear, danger (p. 333-335)

1. 1. 35. Argument from threat
      36. Arg. from fear appeal
      37. Arg. from danger appeal

Schemes (35), (36), (37) schematize different fear strategies.

1. 1. 38. Arg. from need for help
      39. Arg. from distress

(11) Commitments, ethos, ad hominem (p. 335-339)

40. Arg. from commitment
41. Ethotic argument
42. Generic ad hominem
43. Pragmatic inconsistency
44. Argument from inconsistent commitment
45. Circumstantial ad hominem

Scheme (44) distinguishes between committed and not really so.

Schemes (43) and (45) express forms of contradiction between personal commitments and actions.

1. 1. 46. Argument from bias
      47. Bias ad hominem

Patterns (46) and (47) are closely related. According to (46), the argument from bias says: “L is biased, so the conclusions are suspect”. According to (47), the “bias ad hominem”: “L is biased, so I do not trust him”. Biases are relative to a domain, but it is convenient to consider that the whole personality is biased; L has a “false mind”.

(12) Gradualism; slippery slope (p. 339-341)

1. 1. 48. Argument from gradualism

The comments (id. p. 114-115), show that this scheme can be compared to the slippery slope forms, (49) to (53). It expresses the sorite paradox, also mentioned in (52): “If you remove a grain from a pile of grains, you always have a pile; if you remove another grain, you still have a pile … up to what extent?”

1. 1. 49. Slippery slope argument
      50. Precedent slippery slope argument

The slippery slope argument is used to oppose an exception, on the grounds that the exception would open a line of precedent leading to something unacceptable.

1. 1. 51. Sorites slippery slope argument
      52. Verbal slippery slope argument

The slippery slope argument is used to reject the attribution of a property to an object on the grounds that this property is transmitted by contiguity up to an object that obviously does not or should not possess it. This is a variant of the argument to the absurd, based on a demonstration by recurrence.

1. 1. 53. Full slippery slope argument

(13) Rules, exceptions, precedent (p. 342-345)

1. 1. 54. Argument for constitutive-rule claim

Scheme (54) refers to rules of language (synonymy) and to principles of categorization in institutionally codified languages (“D counts as W”).

1. 1. 55. Arg. from rules
      56. Arg. for an exceptional case
      57. Arg. from precedent
      58. Arg. from plea for excuse

When faced with an exceptional case, the usual rule  may be waived (56) or modified (57). Excuses and extenuating circumstances may suspend the rule.

(14) Perception, memory (345-346)

1. 1. 59. Arg. from perception
      60. Arg. from memory

Schemes (59), (60) argue that one can reasonably believe in a given fact on the basis of the perception or memory of this fact.

---

 

COLLECTION 3: TRADITION AND MODERNITY

1. Scipion Dupleix, Logic, or the Art of Speaking and Thinking (1607)
Jacques-Bénigne Bossuet, Logic for the Dauphin (1677)

These works probably have no particular historical significance, but they certainly give an idea of the terminology of the seventeenth century, which clearly resembles the Ciceronian system, see Collections (2).

As the title suggests, Bossuet’s Logic functions as a pedagogical guide to everyday argumentation: ‘Dauphin’ was the title given to the heir to the French kingdom.

Table:
— First column, Bossuet, 1677
— Second column, Dupleix, 1607

The order of the lines is Bossuet’s. For ease of reading, Dupleix’s order of has been changed, so that the same types of arguments are on the same line; the numbering corresponds to the order in Dupleix’s typology.

Bossuet, 1677	Dupleix, 1607
1. Etymology	3. Etymology
2. Conjugates	4. Conjugata
3. Definition	1. Definition
4. Division
5. Genus	5. Genus and Species
6. Species
7. Property
8. Accident
9. Resemblance 10. Dissemblance	6. Similitude, 7. Dissimilitude
11. Cause	13. Cause
12. Effects	14. Effects
13. What comes before1	10. Antecedents1
14. What accompanies1	9. Adjuncts or conjuncts1
15. What follows1	11. Consequents1
16. Contraries	8. Contraries
17. A repugnantibus3
	12. Repugnants
18. All and parts2	2. Enumeration of the parts2
19. Comparison	15. Comparison with things bigger, equal and smaller
20. Example, or Induction

(¹) S. Circumstances

(²) Bossuet’s topic n°18 (here, topic = topos, arg. scheme), “enumeration of the parts” is akin to the topic of definition. For example, what is a “good captain” is defined by enumerating his relevant qualities: brave, wise, etc. Dupleix’s topic n°2, “all and parts” is more related to composition and division

(³) Dupleix’s topic n°12, from “repugnants” refers to predication: “stone” and “man” are repugnant because “ — be a stone” cannot be said of man — whereas Bossuet’s topic n°17, “a repugnantibus”, refers to a kind of ad hominem.

Both typologies prioritize arguments that exploit the resources that contribute to the definition of a word or a concept, with a view to the future use of this definition in syllogistic reasoning. This enumeration of the core set of arguments is followed by the usual enumeration of argument schemes based on causality, analogy, comparison, peripheral circumstances, opposites and induction. This set will reappear under a new reorganization in the New Rhetoric.

2. John Locke, An Essay concerning Human Understanding (1690)
Wilhelm Leibniz, New Essays Concerning Human Understanding (1765)

In An Essay concerning Human Understanding John Locke briefly mentions “four sorts of arguments, that men, in their reasoning with others, do ordinarily make use of to prevail on their assent; or at least so to awe them as to silence their opposition” (IV, 17, “Of Reason”, § 19-22; p. 410). These four arguments are:

— ad verecundiam, S. Ethos; 
Modesty; Authority.
— ad ignorantiam, S. Ignorance.
— ad hominem, S. Ad hominem.
— ad judicium, S. Matter

In his New Essays Concerning Human Understanding, Leibniz comments on this list, and qualifies Locke’s abrupt and general condemnation by taking into consideration the circumstances; see the above mentioned entries. In addition, Leibniz adds a new kind of argument, the argument ad vertiginem, S. Vertigo.

This short list has nothing to do with the previous Ciceronian ones; its purpose is to contrast the first three fallacious arguments with the last one, the only one that “brings true instruction and advances us in our way to knowledge” (op. cit., p. 411). Mathematics and experimental sciences are introduced under the heading ad judicium. Contrary to the classical typologies, these arguments are not associated with a logic itself based on a natural ontology, but rather with the requirements of the scientific method, S. Fallacy. We are thus entering a new argumentative world.

3. Jeremy Bentham, The Book of fallacies (1824) see Political Arguments.

COLLECTIONS 2: ARISTOTLE, CICERO

1. Aristotle, Rhetoric (between 329 & 323 b.c)

1.1 The catalog and its position in the Aristotelian system of proofs

The catalogue of the Rhetoric must be seen within the framework of the Aristotelian typology of the different types of proofs carried by different types of discourses. In this typology of proofs, rhetorical discourse is opposed to diaIectical dialogue and to scientific (syllogistic) discourse. Tricot points out that “syllogism is the genre, scientific (producer of science) [is] the specific difference that separates the scientific demonstration from the dialectical and rhetorical syllogisms” (S. A., I, 2, 15-25; p. 8, note 3). The concept of persuasion in the Rhetoric must be seen in this context: scientific discourse produces apodictic knowledge; dialectical interaction produces probable truth and rhetorical syllogism or enthymeme is an element of persuasive discourse. Thus, by its very definition, rhetorical discourse cannot be probative; in short, the phrase “rhetorical evidence persuades” is a pleonasm.

The catalogue of arguments is located in the subtypology that organizes the rhetorical proofs (proof = pistis, “means of pressure”), as follows

1.2 Wavering distinctions

Aristotle makes the following distinctions between the different types of rhetorical proofs:

The proofs attached to the logos are enthymemes, which correspond to deduction; examples, which corresponds to induction; and arguments based on natural signs, that are probable or certain. Enthymemes and examples are said to be common to the three ancient rhetorical genres (epideictic, deliberative, judicial, S. Rhetoric.)
The articulation of these different kinds of proofs, and the consistency of the text of the Rhetoric such as we read it now, is problematic (McAdon 2003, 2004). The classification of proofs attached to logos has important variants:

(a) “I call an enthymeme a rhetorical syllogism, and an example rhetorical induction. Now all orators produce belief by employing as proofs either examples or enthymemes, and nothing else.” (Rhet., I, 2, 8; Fr., p. 19)

(b) “The materials from which the enthymemes are derived […] being probabilities and signs […].” (Ibid I, 2, 14; p. 25)

(c) “Now the material of enthymemes is derived from four sources — probabilities, examples, necessary signs and signs.” (Ibid II, 15, 8; p. 337)

The example is placed on the same level as the enthymeme in (a), but is considered a form of the enthymeme in (c); enthymemes have four sources in (c), and two in (b). So, it would be risky to look for a rigorous system in these presentations of rhetorical proof, and the above table must be taken as a simple reminder.

1.3 The topoi of the Rhetoric

The Rhetoric enumerates twenty-eight topoi (topics) or “lines of argument” (Rhet, II, 23), as listed in the following table. An enthymeme is a discursive instance of a topos.

They are identified by their English label or by a brief description, both quoted from Freese (F) or Rhys Roberts (RR).

1. 1. 1. “From opposites” (F). S. Opposites
      2. “From similar inflexions” (F). S. Derived words
      3. “From relative terms” (F); “upon correlative ideas” (R). S. Correlative terms
      4. “From the more or less” (F); a fortiori (R). S. A fortiori
      5. “The consideration of time” (F). S. Consistency
      6. “Turning upon the opponent what has been said against ourselves” (F). S. Ethos; A fortiori.
      7. “From definition” (F). S. Definition
      8. “Topic from the different significations of a word” (F). Aristotle explicitly refers to this topos in his Topics. S. Ambiguity.
      9. “From division” (F). S. Case-by-case
      10. “From induction” (F). S. Induction
      11. “From a previous judgment in regard to the same or a similar or contrary matter”, that judgment having been given by one of “those whose judgment it is not possible to contradict” (F). S. Precedent; Ab exemplo; Authority; Modesty; Politeness
      12. “From enumerating the parts” (F). S. Case-by-case
      13. “Since in most human affairs the same thing is accompanied by some bad or good result, […] employing the consequences to exhort or dissuade, accuse or defend, praise or blame” (F). S. Pragmatic argument; Dilemma
      14. [id. 13], “but there is this difference that in the former case [i.e., 13] things of any kind whatever, in the latter [i.e., 13] opposites” (F). S. Pragmatic argument; Dilemma
      15. “Men do not praise the same thing in public and in secret” (F). S. Motives
      16. “From analogy in things” (F). S. Analogy; Opposites.
      17. “Concluding the identity of precedents from the identity of results” Instance: “There is as much impiety in asserting that the gods are born as in saying that they die; for either way the result is that at some time or other they did not exist” (F). S. Consequence; Implication.
      18. “The same men do not always choose the same thing before and after but the contrary” (F).  S. Consistency.
      19. “Maintaining that the cause of something which is or has been is something which would generally, or possibly might be the cause of it; for example, if one were to make a present of something to another, in order to cause him pain by depriving him of it” (F). S. Motives
      20. “Examining what is hortatory and dissuasive, and the reasons which make men act or not” (F). S. Motives
      21. “Things which are thought to happen but are incredible” (F). S. Probable.
      22. “Another line of argument is to refute your opponent’s case by noting any contrast or contradiction of dates, acts or words that it anywhere displays” (RR). S. Contradiction;  Consistency; Ad hominem.
      23. “Another topic, when men or things have been attacked by slander […] consists in stating the reason for the false opinion” (F). S. Motives; Interpretation
      24. “Another topic is derived from the cause. If the cause exists, the effect exists; if the cause does not exist, the effect does not exist” (F). S. Motives
      25. “Whether there was or is another better course than that which is advised, or is being, or has been carried out” (F). S. Consistency; Motives
      26. “Another topic, when something contrary to what has already been done is on the point of being done, consists in examining them together” (F). S. Consistency
          
      27. “Another topic consists in making use of errors committed for purposes of accusation or defense” (F). S. Contradiction; Consistency
          
      28. “From the meaning of a name” (F). S. Proper Name

Even if no clear order emerges from this enumeration, it can be noted that an important subset of topics is essentially concerned with the world of human action and its determination, where motives have been substituted for causes, and behavioral stereotypes about human nature and human motivations have replaced strict scientific causality and taxonomies.

2. Cicero, Topica, “Topics” (44 b.c.)   

Cicero proposes a typology of arguments in an early work, De Inventione, “On Invention” and in his last book on arguments, Topica, “Topics”. Unlike the Topics of Aristotle, which exposes a method for finding and criticizing arguments in the context of a dialectical philosophical exchange, Cicero’s observations and examples always refer to rhetoric as a legal practice. In this context, Cicero makes the following distinction:

• Intrinsic arguments, either “inherent in the very nature of the subject which is under discussion” or “closely connected with the subject which is investigated” (, I, 8; p. 387-389).
• Arguments taken “from external circumstances”, or “extrinsic arguments” (, II, 8; p. 388; IV, 24, p. 397), corresponding to the so-called non-technical arguments, mainly testimonies and their conditions of validity, and including authority (Top., IV, 24; p. 397).

Objects and facts are constructed and discussed on the basis of arguments drawn from five main sources.

Arguments from definition:

— from genus and species of the genus (a genere; a forma generis).
— by enumeration of the parts (partium enumeratio)
— from “etymology” (ex notatione)
— from words of the same family (a conjugata)
— “based on difference” (a differentia).

See Categorization and Nomination; Definition; Genus; Case-by-case; True meaning of the word; Derived Words

Arguments from causal relations

— from efficient causes (ab efficientibus causis)
— from effects (ab effectis).
See Causality.

Arguments from analogy (a similitudine).
See A pari; Intra-categorical analogy; Structural analogy

Arguments from opposites (ex contrario). See Opposites

From circumstances. Arguments: ­

— from antecedents, ab antecedentibus,
— from consequents, a consequentibus
See Circumstances

This short and organized list of arguments is all important in the Western tradition of argumentation studies. They were transmitted in the Middle Ages by Boethius (around 480-524) On Topical Differences (Top., c. 522), and were taken up by medieval logic, dialectic and philosophy. They remained in use until well into the modern era, S. Collections (3).

3. Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria, “The Orator’s Education” (c. 95)

In Book V, Chap. 10 of the Institutes of Oratory, dealing with arguments, Quintilian summarizes a list of 24 argumentative lines (IO, V, 10, 94). A first series deals with common places.
A second series is a catalog of argument schemes: the French translator, J. Cousin, notes that

This list-summary, which seems to be a loan, recalls previous classifications, with their elements arranged in a different order: […] Later rhetoricians condense or develop without apparent reason. (1976, p. 240).

COLLECTION AND TYPOLOGIES OF ARGUMENTATION SCHEMES

Tradition has bequeathed us more or less systematized inventories of argument schemes:

Collections 2: From Aristotle to Boethius
Collections 3: Modernity and Tradition
Collections 4: Contemporary Innovations and Structurations,

and a number ries of questions about them:

— On their nature and number,

— Lists of argument schemes have been and are being compiled; but what is the unifying factor underlying these lists? Do they have a proper systematic organization? Are they amenable to some elementary headings (Blair 2012, Ch. 12 and 13)?

— Where do they come from? Are they recurring, remarkably stable structures that are taken up in argumentative discourses of all kinds? Or are they constructed from the a priori categories of the human mind?

— Are they logical, cultural, or anthropological entities? Are they culture-dependent?

— What kind of historical change, if any, can affect them? The question arises, when  Toulmin, Rieke & Janik’s nine “forms of reasoning” of are compared with the Ciceronian and post-Ciceronian lists of topoi, see Collections (4) and Collections (2).

1. Categorizing arguments: collections and typologies

A class is a set of entities; basically, a typology is a class divided into different subtypes; the same class can admit different subtypes, differently organized, see classification. A catalog can be considered as a single-level typology.

A typology of arguments is a set of topics or argument schemes that connect the argument to the conclusion. Argument typologies include from ten to several dozens of argument schemes.

To categorize a speech segment (an individual, level 0) as a “pragmatic argument” is to identify in this segment the characteristic features that define the pragmatic argument. This operation is itself argumentative, and obeys the rules of argumentation by definition, see Nomination; Definition; Argumentation Scheme.

The idea of argument types, the possibility of making inventories of these types, and of giving these inventories an internal structure in order to build a “typology of topics”, is the very foundation of the theory of rhetorical argumentation. Walter Ong sees these typologies of argumentations as engaged in a perpetual movement of renewal and redefinition:

As the general intellectual tradition changes, the active associative nodes for ideas change, and classification changes too. Revising the tradition has been a common phenomenon in antiquity, when Aristotle differed from the sophists in the list of topics he proposed, Cicero from Aristotle, Quintilian from Cicero, Themistius from all these, and Boethius from all of them again and from Themistius as well. The revision continues in our day with Professor Mortimer Adler’s “Great ideas” (augmented beyond their original hundred), and with such articles as Père Gardeil’s very helpful study of the lieux communs in the Dictionnaire de théologie catholique, where, after reporting Melchior Cano’s description of the loci (which he notes are taken at times verbatim from Agricola) and Cano’s organization of theological loci, Gardeil proposes, in true topical tradition, a still better classification of his own. (Ong 1958, p. 122)

There are many lessons to be learned from this passage. First, it provides us with a definition of topics as “active associative nodes for ideas”, as they have been theorized since the birth of rhetoric in the context of the theory of argumentation in discourse. The particular interest of this passage lies in the description of the taxonomic trap. In order to put an end to the irritating proliferation of typologies, one might be tempted to propose a new and final one, thus bringing everyone to agreement — but, in the end, it seems that an additional typology has been added to an already overloaded list, thus exacerbating the very evil, it was supposed to remedy. This observation can be read as an ironic historical counterpoint to the works that, in that year, 1958, revived reflection on argumentation schemes.

2. The place of collections in the theories of the argumentation

The question of argument schemes plays a key role in some theories of argumentation while in others it is either redefined, or plays only a marginal role.

(i) The question of argument types does not arise in Anscombre and Ducrot’s theory of Argumentation within Language. The concept of topos is defined as a semantic link between predicates. It follows that the number of topoi is extremely large, even uncountable, while classical theories enumerate less than one hundred topoi.

(ii) Grize’s “Natural Logic” is based on the concept of schematization. The operations of “reasoned organization”, or “shoring” essentially amount to the classical concept of a conclusion supported by an argument. The types of arguments correspond to the types of scaffolding. To my knowledge, this line has not been developed further. Grize focuses on inference, causation, explanation.

(iii) In Toulmin’s terminology, a type of warrant corresponds to a type of argument, as shown by Ehninger and Brockriede ([1960]). In addition, Toulmin, Rieke and Janik (1984) proposed a short collection of arguments, see Collections (4). The example illustrating Toulmin’s “layout of argument” corresponds to a very productive topic, the categorization of an individual.

(iv) The concept is central to the New Rhetoric of Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, as well as for Pragma-Dialectic and Informal Logic, see Collections (4).

3. Dimension of the classification: Number of argument schemes

Classical lists of argument schemes tend to propose a relatively large number or argument schemes. Aristotle’s Rhetoric offers a set of twenty-eight schemes, plus some “lines of argument that form the spurious enthymemes” (Rhet., II, 24; RR, p. 379); plus, some rules taken from the Topics. Cicero’s Topica lists a dozen schemes, and Quintilian’s Institutio Oratoria twenty-five. Boethius handed down fifteen forms on to the Middle Ages, see Collections (2).

The Dupleix’s Logic (1607) and Bossuet’s Logic (1677), may probably be regarded as representative, in modern times, of this classical tradition. The former contains fourteen schemes and the latter twenty.

Other modern typologies are quite different: Locke [1690] proposes a typology — if it can be considered as such — consisting of four elements to which Leibniz [1765] adds one. Locke’s scientific world however, is extremely different from, and antagonistic to the rhetorical world of the classics.

Bentham enumerates thirty-one argumentative formulas for the field of political arguments.

In contemporary times, Conley counts “more than eighty different argument types” in Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca Treatise (Conley 1984, p. 180-181) see Collections (4).

4. Forms of collections

In the Rhetoric, Aristotle presents a catalog of twenty-eight randomly listed topoi.

Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca have constructed a clearly organized four-level typology of the various “techniques of argumentation”

— A segment of speech (an individual, level 0) can be categorized as a “pragmatic argument”; that is, this segment presents the essential features that define the pragmatic argument (Level 1).

— Level 1 arguments are grouped into a super-category; for example, a “pragmatic argument” is classified as an “argument based on the structure of reality” (Level 2).

— Level 2 arguments are grouped into the class of the “techniques of association”, (Level 3), one of the two kinds of “techniques of argumentation” (Level 4, top level).

5. Foundations of collections

The collections of argument schemes can be organized in different ways.

(i) From the point of view of their contribution to the growth of scientific knowledge, inconclusive arguments are contrasted with compelling arguments. The latter are generally equated, in modern times, with mathematical demonstration and scientific proof. In Locke’s words, they “bring true instruction with [them] and advance us on our way to knowledge” (Locke [1690], Ch. 17, § 19-22), see Collections (3). Person-centered arguments are irrelevant from this point of view. The same might be said of those arguments that play only with the guilty pleasures of natural language and the nuances of interpersonal relations.

(ii) In terms of their linguistic form, metonymic arguments based on a relationship of contiguity, can be distinguished from the metaphoric arguments based on a relationship of similarity. This distinction reflects the opposition between the arguments “establishing the structure of reality” (analogy type) and those “based on the structure of reality’ (causal type) (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca [1958] p. 261; 350), See Collections (4).

(iii) From the point of view of their productivity. The productivity of an argument scheme depends on the number of actual arguments (enthymemes) derived from it. Intuitively, some topics are very productive. One might think for example of those based on the twin argument schemes of categorization and definition; or arguments based on causal or analogical relations, or from the contraries, etc. Others, including the argument from waste are less productive. Other argument schemes may be more common than their name suggest, such as the argumentative exploitation of syzygies.

(iv) From the point of view of their legitimating power. A good example of organizing argument schemes according to their strength is given by the hierarchy of legal and theological arguments in the Arab-Muslim culture and religion, such as proposed by Khallâf ([1942]). He distinguishes between ten sources, ranked according to their degree of legitimacy. The most legitimate forms are those based on the Qur’an and the Tradition. Those with the weakest degree of legitimacy are, “the laws of the monotheistic peoples”, and, perhaps surprisingly given the present situation, “the opinions of the Prophet’s companions”, in that order. Arguments presented at the time of the emergence of Islam are given the least weight in the hierarchy of arguments. Such was the situation in 1942; it has changed significantly with the rise of Salafism.

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CIRCUMSTANCES

Three types of arguments use the concept of circumstance:

— The fallacy of omitting the relevant circumstances, a criticism addressed to an argument.
— The argument from circumstances or circumstancial argument.
In the phrase “circumstantial ad hominem”, the circumstances alluded to are the characteristics of the person involved in an ad hominem argument.

1. Fallacy of omission of relevant circumstances

The fallacy of omitting relevant circumstances is sometimes referred to by the Latin label secundum quid fallacy, which abbreviates the phrase a dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter, “from a restricted statement to an absolute statement”.

Aristotle classifies the fallacy of omitting relevant circumstances as a type of fallacy “independent of language” (Soph. 4; 165b20; see Fallacy (2), which occurs when an expression is used “absolutely or in a certain respect” (Soph. 5; 166b35):

“If < what is not is the object of an opinion >, then < what is not is >” (ibid.; our emphasis and parentheses).

“What is not is the object of an opinion” is a semantically complete, syntactically integrated utterance, a meaningful unique and complete speech act [1]. All its components are necessary and interdependent; none can be subtracted without changing what the speaker said and meant, and he said one thing.
It is not possible to extract from this complete utterance any arbitrarily chosen segment (here, « the object of an opinion”), as long as it makes some sense, and attribute the truncated segment (here, “what is not is”) to the speaker of the former statement.
Such considerations are crucial when in determining what constitutes an elementary well-formed linguistic formula.

Other examples: the qualified expression “A is (Place, Time)”, “A is here now” can be transformed into the corresponding unqualified expression “A is (Place)”, “A is here”.
Conversely, the unqualified construction “Peter crossed the street” cannot be developed into “Peter crossed the street yesterday”. Note that the reduction of this last sentence to Peter crossed the street is not fallacious.
This kind of de-contextualization of a qualified statement can lead to bad faith criticism:

S1:    — The weather is fine! (said in the morning, when the weather is fine).
S2:    — Ah hah! And you said that the weather is fine! (said in the evening, when it is raining).

This fallacy ignores relevant contextual data, and treats as an absolute assertion what has been asserted with reservation, in a particular context, with precise reference and intention. This radicalization of claims and positions makes them very easy to refute.

In order be relevant, the refutation must refer precisely to the expression as it is used, and consider all the reservations that are specifically mentioned. The fallacy is particularly pernicious when it pretends that the speaker had said and assumed something that he said only in the course of a discussion as a concession to the opponent.

Prime Minister: — Our country cannot absorb all the misery of the world (S1) but it must take its share (S2).
Political Opponent: — As Mr. Prime Minister said, we cannot welcome all the misery of the world.

The opponent maximized the Minister’s position — The Minister agrees to reject the maximalist position — He reaffirms his non-maximalist position — The opponent unreservedly reaffirms his maximalist position which he attributes to the Minister, without mentioning the Minister’s real position.

In Goffman’s words, in statement S1 the Prime Minister speaks as an Animator, quoting an unknown Principal, whom he opposes; whereas he speaks as the Principal of S2, taking full responsibility for the content and actions, intentions and consequences of what S2 means, S. Roles.
The opponent makes him speak as Principal of S1. The opponent, who is in favor of closing the borders, makes an ally of the Prime Minister who actually rejects his or her position.

2. Argument from circumstances

Argument from circumstances indirectly establishes the existence of a fact, by using peripheral, unnecessary indices of an action that have no real probative value, but nevertheless point to a fact:

Question: — Is he corrupt?
Prosecutor: — Sure. He needed money; we saw him receiving thick envelopes; and yesterday, he bought a brand new car.

Argument by circumstances can help to solve a conjectural question, see stasis, such as “Did he commit this crime?” (Cicero, Top., XI, 50; p. 82). To answer this question, one “[looks] for the circumstances that preceded the fact, that accompanied it, that followed it” (Cicero, ibid; XI, 51, p. 83), interpreting “a date […] the shadow of a body […] pallor… and other indications of trouble and remorse” (id., XI, 53, p. 83). This is part of the technique of investigation:

“He went out muttering…: this is to argue from what precedes the act; we saw him stealing behind a bush…: this is what accompanies it. […] a malicious joy, which he endeavored to conceal, appeared on his face, mingled with terror: which is what follows.”
Bossuet [1677], p. 140, see. Collections (III)

These observed circumstances are probable natural signs.
The argument from circumstances is a powerful instrument in the art of suspicion and the construction of a culprit.

3. Terminological delicacy

On §53 of the Topics Cicero deals with arguments drawn from “consequences, antecedents and contradictory things [ex consequentibus et antecedentibus et repugnantibus]” (Top., XI, 53: 83).
This paragraph deals with logical antecedents and consequences, involving semantically “necessary” connections (id.), referring to questions of a priori and a posteriori reasoning, definition, rules of implication and to the principle of non-contradiction.

Bossuet speaks, in connection with the argument by circumstances, speaks of places “derived from what precedes, from what accompanies and from what follows [the action], ab antecedentibus, ab adjunctis, a consequentibus” ([1677], p.140). Here, the connection of the preceding and subsequent events to the central event is no longer semantic or logical but purely chronological.

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[1] Empedocles, for example, argues that « from nothingness nothing can absolutely come into existence and what is cannot perish. »
[2] The change of preposition – ex antecedentibus for the logical consequence and the necessary connection vs. ab antecedentibus for temporal anteriority has nothing to do with this distinction