1. Consensus as agreement

S. Agreement; Persuasion

2 Argument from consensus

The label argument from consensus, appeal to consensus, covers a family of arguments claiming that a belief is true or that things must be done in such and such a way on the basis that everybody thinks or does this, and that other proposals should be rejected. It implies that by flouting the existing consensus, the proponent of a new measure, that is the opponent to consensus, is on the verge of being excluded from this community, S. Burden of proof. These arguments have the general form:

We always thought, desired, did … like that; so buy (please, do…) like that.
Everybody loves the product So-and-So.
Everybody puts Such and Such ketchup on their burger!

The universal consensus argument claims that “all men in all times have thought so and things have always been done that way”. The existence of God has been argued upon the universal consensus argument.

The argument from the relative (partial) consensus covers the argument from majority, the argument from number (Lat. ad numerum; numerus, “number”) and related expressions:

The majority / many people … think, desire, do … X.
Three million Syldavians have already adopted it!
My book sold better than yours.
He is a well-known actor.

Common Sense — The argument of consensus includes the kind of authority generously granted to traditional wisdom or to common sense, S. Authority.

I know that all true Syldavians approve of this decision
Only extremes attack me, all people of common sense will agree with me.

Populist argument is based on a kind of consensus among the people (or attributed to it), S. Ad Populum.

Bandwagon argument and fallacy — The bandwagon argument is a special case of the argument from consensus about an action. The bandwagon being the decorated wagon that leads the orchestra through the city, the bandwagon argument adds joy and enthusiasm to the dry argument from consensus. To climb on the bandwagon is to follow the popular movement, to share in a popular “emotion” in the etymological sense, “a public upheaval”. Joining a party to have fun and sing should not be condemned as systematically fallacious; but, seen by any opposing party, climbing on the bandwagon can be considered as fallacious, as a follow-the-group or follow-my-leader attitude, sheepish behavior, uncritically adopting the views of the most vocal or visible group.

A connective word is a function word that combines several propositions, simple or complex, into a new, integrated, (more) complex proposition.

1. Connectives in propositional calculus

Logical connectives articulate simple or complex well-formed propositions so as to construct well-formed complex propositions, or formulas. Propositional calculus studies logical syntax, that is the rules of construction of well-formed formulas. It determines, among these formulas, which are valid formulas (logical laws, tautologies).

Propositions are denoted by the capital letters P, Q, R… They are said to be unanalyzed, that is, taken as a whole, in opposition with analyzed propositions “[Subject] is [Predicate]” considered in the predicate calculus.

A binary logical connective combines two propositions (simple or complex) P and Q into a new complex proposition “P [connective] Q”. Logical connectives (or connectors) are also called functors, function words or logical operators

The most used connectives are denoted and read as follows:

↔           equivalence, “P is equivalent to Q”,
→           implication, “if P then Q”
&             conjunction, “P and Q ”
V           disjunction, “P or Q ”
W           exclusive disjunction, “either P or Q (not both)”

Logical connectives are defined on the basis of the possible truth-values given to the propositions they combine. A specific logical connective is defined by the kind of combination it accepts between the truth-values of the component proposition.

1.1   The truth tables approach to binary connectives

A logical connective is defined by its associated truth table. The truth table of a “P connec Q” binary connective is a three-column, five-line table.

— The letters P, Q … denote the propositions; the letters T and F denote their truth-values: true (T) or false (F). P and Q are propositions, while truth and falsehood are said of propositions, “P is True”, “P is False”; so the corresponding abbreviating letters use a different typographic character.

P	Q	P connec Q
T	T	(depends on the connective)
T	F	(depends on the connective)
F	T	(depends on the connective)
F	F	(depends on the connective)

— Columns:

The truth-values ​​of the proposition P are expressed in the first column
The truth-values ​​of the proposition Q are expressed in the second column
The corresponding truth-values ​​of the complex formula “P connec Q” are expressed in the third column.

— Lines:

The first line mentions all the propositions to take into account, P, Q and “P connec Q”.
The four following lines express the truth-values of these propositions. As each proposition can be T or F, four combinations must be considered, each corresponding to one line.

1.1.1 Conjunction “&”

By definition, the conjunction “P & Q”

— is true when P and Q are simultaneously true: line 2
— is false when one of the two is false: line 3 and 4; both are false: line 5.

This is expressed in the following truth table:

P	Q	P & Q
T	T	T
T	F	F
F	T	F
F	F	F

This truth table reads:

line 2: “when P is true and Q is true, then ‘P & Q’ is true”
line 3: “when P is true and Q is false, then ‘P & Q’ is false”
line 4: “when P is false and Q is true, then ‘P & Q’ is false ”
line 5: “when P is false and Q is false, then ‘P & Q’ is false ”

1.1.2 Equivalence, “ ↔ ”

The logical equivalence “P ↔ Q” reads “P is equivalent to Q”. This resulting proposition is true if and only if the original propositions have the same truth-values.

Truth table of logical equivalence:

P	Q	P ↔ Q
T	T	T
T	F	F
F	T	F
F	F	T

Under this definition, all true propositions are mutually equivalent, all false propositions are mutually equivalent, regardless of their meaning.

1.1.3 Disjunctions: Inclusive “V”; Exclusive, “W”

The inclusive disjunction “P ∨ Q” is false if and only if P and Q are simultaneously false; in all other cases, it is true.

Truth table of the inclusive disjunction:

P	Q	P V Q
T	T	T
T	F	T
F	T	T
F	F	F

 

The exclusive disjunction <P W Q> is true if and only if only one of the two propositions it conjoins is true. In all other cases it is false.

Truth table of the exclusive disjunction:

P	Q	P W Q
T	T	F
T	F	T
F	T	T
F	F	F

1.1.4 Implication “→”

The logical implication symbol “→” reads “P implies Q”. P is the antecedent of the implication and Q, its consequent.

Truth table of logical implication:

P	Q	P → Q
T	T	T
T	F	F
F	T	T
F	F	T

This table reads:

line 2:       The true implies the true
line 3:       The true does not imply the false
line 4:       The false implies the true
line 5:       The false implies the false

Only truth can be logically derived from truth (line 1), whereas, anything can follow from a false assertion, a truth as well as a falsehood.

The equivalence, conjunction, inclusive disjunction and exclusive disjunction connectives are symmetrical, that is, for these connectives, “P connective Q” and “Q connective P are equivalent (convertible):

P ↔ Q         ↔             Q ↔ P
P & Q          ↔             Q & P
P V Q         ↔             Q ∨ P
P W Q          ↔             Q W P

The implication connective is not convertible; that is “P → Q” and “Q → P” have different truth tables.

The laws of implication express the notions of necessary and sufficient condition:

A  → B (is true)
A is a sufficient condition for B
B is a necessary condition for A

Causal relation may be expressed as an implication. To say that if it rains, the road is wet, means that rain is a sufficient condition for the road to be wet, and that, necessarily, the road is wet when it rains.
The implication thus defined is called material implication; it has nothing to do with the substantial logic of Toulmin.

The implication “P → Q” is false only when P is true and Q false (line 2). In other words, “P → Q” is true if and only if “not-(P & not-Q)” is true.

Line (3) asserts the truth of the implication “If the moon is a soft cheese (false proposition), then Napoleon died in St. Helena (true proposition)”. Like the other logical connectives, the implication is indifferent to the meaning of the propositions it connects. It takes into consideration only their truth-values.​​ The strict implication of Lewis tries to erase this paradox by requiring that for “P → Q” to be true, Q must be deducible from P. This new definition introduces semantic conditions, in addition to the truth-values. This explains why the word “implication” is sometimes taken in the sense of “deductive inference”.

Systems of natural deduction are defined in logic (Vax 1982, Deduction). They have nothing to do with Grize’s Natural Logic.

1.2 Logical laws

Using connectors and simple or complex propositions, one is able to construct complex propositional expressions, for example “(P & Q) → R”. The truth-value of such a complex expression is only a function of the truth of its component propositions. Truth tables can be used to evaluate these expressions. Some of them are always true, they correspond to logical laws.

1.2.1 “Laws of thought”

Binary connectors combine in equivalences known as De Morgan’s laws, considered to be laws of thought. For example, the connectives “&” and “V” enter in the following equivalences:

The negation of an inclusive disjunction is equivalent to the conjunction of the negations of its components:
¬ (P V Q) ↔ (¬P & ¬Q)

The negation of a conjunction is equivalent to the disjunction of the negations of its components:
¬ (P & Q) ↔ (¬P V ¬Q)

Case-by-case argumentation is based upon inclusive disjunction.

1.2.2 Hypothetical (or conditional) syllogism

S. Deduction

1.1.3 Conjunctive syllogism

The following statement expresses a logical law:

If a conjunction is false and one of its components true, then the other component is false

[¬(P & Q) & P] → ¬Q

The corresponding three-steps deduction is known as a conjunctive syllogism:

¬(P & Q)           the major proposition denies a conjunction
P                      the minor affirms one of the two propositions
————
¬Q                   the conclusion excludes the other

An adaptation to ordinary reasoning:

Nobody can be in two places at the same time
Peter was seen in Bordeaux yesterday at 6:30pm (UT)
So, he was not in London yesterday at 6:30 pm. (UT)

Knowing that Peter is suspect; that his interest is to hide that he was actually in Bordeaux, and that the witness is more reliable than the suspect, we may conclude that Peter lied when he pretended to be in London yesterday at 6:30pm.

In the following example, the major of the disjunctive syllogism is the negation of an exclusive disjunction:

¬(P W Q)          a candidate cannot be admitted and rejected
¬P                   my name is not on the list of successful candidates
————
¬Q                   I am rejected

All these deductions are common in ordinary speech, where their self-evidence ensures that they go unnoticed. It would be a mistake not to take them into account on the pretext that, since these arguments are valid, they are not arguments.

2. Connectives in logic and in language

Introductory logic courses make a consistent use of ordinary language to illustrate both the capacities and specificities of logical languages. Generally speaking, logic can be “applied to the usual language” (Kleene 1967: p. 67-73) as an instrument for expressing, analyzing and evaluating ordinary arguments as valid or invalid reasoning. These translation exercises run as follows (id. p. 59):

I will only pay you for your
TV installation only if it works           translated as          P → W
Your installation does not work       translated as          ¬W
So I will not pay you                           translated as          ¬P

Using the truth table method for example, this reasoning is then tested for validity, and declared valid.

In order to identify similarities and differences, natural language components and properties can be compared with their counterpart in a logical language. This enables us to better understand both kinds of languages. Such exercises are helpful when it comes to gaining a better understanding of logical or linguistic systems, and may also be of benefit when it comes to argumentation education. Nonetheless, there are some additional facts which should be taken into one consideration when using this methodology.

(i) The preceding exercise did not focus on the correct combination of the truth-values of semantically independent propositions such as in the logical talk about the moon and Napoleon (cf. supra §1.4). The exercise introduces a strong condition on semantic coherence between the linked propositions, which belong to the same domain of action, in this case, TV installation.

(ii) Natural language connectives do not connect propositions in the way logical connectives do. The former can be said to be between the two propositions, whereas the latter are syntactically attached to the second proposition. Logical connectives and natural language connectives have two different syntaxes.

As a consequence, the right-scope of a linguistic connective is essentially defined by the sentence to which it belongs, whereas its left-scope can be much larger, and may include a whole narration, with various twists and turns:

Thus, the prince married the princess — The End —

Connectors are classically considered as connecting two statements in a complete discourse, such as yet in:

the path was dark, yet I slowly found my way (google)

Nonetheless, in:

 It is good, yet it could be improved (d.c, Yet)

yet introduces a more complex scenario, and the preceding example is not a complete discourse. Yet announces that more indications are to come specifying the weak points of the assessed task.

(iii) In many cases, the logical reconstruction of ordinary reasoning must introduce new propositions which are said to be present but are left implicit in the considered discursive string. This string is then said to contain an “incomplete argument”, S. Enthymeme.

(iv) Logical reasoning does not cover all ordinary reasoning:

I have eaten three apples and two oranges, so I have had my five fruits diet today

First, this apparently crystal clear reasoning is loaded with implicit knowledge, such as “apples are fruits”, “oranges are fruits” and that “no orange is an apple”: “three citrus fruits and two oranges” sum up as five fruits only if none of the mentioned three citrus fruits is an orange.

Second, the critical fact here is that the conclusion is based upon an addition that is easier to solve in arithmetic than in a logical language. Toulmin’s layout would meet this condition by adding a warrant-backing system referring to the laws of arithmetic.

(v) Logical connectives capture only a small part of the linguistic role played by natural language connectives. The connector “&”requires only that the conjoined clauses are true. This property is common to many ordinary words, and, but, yet … and to all concessive words:

The circumstances which render the compound true are always the same, viz. joint truth of the two components, regardless of whether ‘and’, ‘but’ or ‘although’ is used. Use of one of these words rather than another may make a difference in naturalness of idiom and may also provide some incidental evidence to what is going on in the speaker’s mind, but it is incapable of making the difference between truth and falsehood of the compound. The difference in meaning between ‘and’, ‘but’, and ‘although’ is rhetorical, not logical. Logical notation, unconcerned with rhetorical distinctions, expresses conjunction uniformly. (Quine 1959, p. 40-41)

In other words, classical logical theory does not have adequate concepts to deal with phenomena of argumentative orientation, and imposes no obligation in this respect. Quine’s argumentative strategy consists in minimizing the problem and delegating it to rhetoric, seen as a refuse site for problems left unsolved by logical analysis.

And carries with it subtle semantic conditions, for example, a sensibility to temporal succession. If “P & Q” is true, then “Q & P” is true. But these two statements do not contain the same information, and this is no longer a matter of rhetoric, whatever the meaning given to this word:

They married and had many children.
They had many children and were married.

One might consider that, under certain conditions, this logical analysis introduces a third proposition “events succeeded in this order”. For other conditions influencing the use of and, S. Composition and division.

3. No subordination, but bilateral relations

There is no ideal way to envision the relation between logical and natural language; everything depends on the theoretical and practical objectives of the researcher, whether building a conversational robot, developing a formal syntax for ordinary language, or teaching second-level argumentation courses.

Logic is an autonomous mathematical language, that can be constructed from the suggestions of some chosen segments of ordinary language. From the very beginning, the teaching of logic may draw more or less heavily on the resources of ordinary language. The same applies to the teaching of everyday argument in relation to the resources provided by logical language. The teacher is free to make pedagogical choices, and possible alternative approaches should be judged by their results, according to the standard methods used for the evaluation of educational methods.

Conductive arguments are defined by Wellman as third kind of argument, parallel to deduction and induction. In view of examples such as those below (my numbering, CP), he notes that, “it is tempting, therefore, to define a conductive argument as any argument that is neither deductive nor inductive” (1971, p. 51):

(1) You have to take your son to the circus because you promised.
(2) This is a good book because it is interesting and thought provoking.
(3) Although he is tactless and nonconformist, he is still a morally good man because of his underlying kindness and real integrity. (Ibid.)

Wellman distinguishes between three types of conductive arguments

(i) “A single reason is given for the conclusion” (id. p. 55), as in

(4) You ought to help him because he has been very kind to you.
(5) That was a good play because the characters were so well drawn. (Ibid.)

(ii) “In the second pattern of conduction, several reasons are given for the conclusion” (id., p. 56), as in:

(6) You ought to take your son to the movie, because you promised to do so, it is a good movie, and you have nothing better to do this afternoon.
(7) This is not a good book, because it fails to hold one’s interest, is full of vague description, and has a very implausible plot. (Ibid.)

(iii) “The third pattern of conduction is that form of argument in which some conclusion is drawn from both positive and negative considerations. In this pattern, reasons against the conclusion are included as well as reasons for it” (id., p. 57), as in

(8) In spite of a certain dissonance, that piece of music is beautiful because of its dynamic quality and its final conclusion.
(9) Although your lawn needs cutting, you ought to take your son to the movie because the picture is ideal for children and will be gone by tomorrow. (Ibid.)

The key characteristic of conductive reasoning appears to be condition (3), where, depending on the speakers, and with the same reasons, the pros can outweigh the cons or vice versa (Blair 2011). From the same data, another speaker might draw the opposite conclusion.

(8.1) In spite of a certain dynamic quality and its final conclusion, that piece of music is ugly because of its dissonance.

The adjective certain seems to be attached to the connective in spite of, indicating that the speaker will not argue on the basis of this argument (will not identify with this voice), S. Interaction, Dialogue, Polyphony.

A conductive argument does not seem amenable to default reasoning. Their conditions of refutation are different. Default reasoning might be updated or changed when new information is accessed, while conductive reasoning does not depend on information as such. A conductive argument typically deals with values, either moral or aesthetic. The specific issue of conduction is the hierarchization, or balance, of values. Whilst some pairs of values will be very difficult, if not impossible, to balance, others will be quite plausibly balanced. So, sentence (8) for example can be plausibly converted as (8.1), because the three implied values cannot, in my view, be hierarchized, whilst (9) invokes values which seem easier to balance:

(9.1) I know, the movie is ideal for children and won’t be showing in the cinema after tomorrow, but you ought to cut your lawn.

Cutting the lawn seems to be a task which is easy to postpone, in view of the children’s education and their legitimate satisfaction, which might be prioritized. So, in the case of (9), the consensus would be that pros clearly outweigh the cons.

In any case, more complex interactional data could provide some clue as to how dissenting speakers fare when dealing with competing values.

The Treatise on Argumentation insists on the necessity and variety of “prior agreements” between participants to develop an argumentation — that is, an argument₁; no previous agreements are necessary to engage in an argument₂:

For argumentation to exist, an effective community of minds must be realized at a given moment. There must first of all be agreement, in principle, on the formation of this intellectual community, and, after that, on the fact of debating a specific question together: now, this does not come about automatically. (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca [1958], p. 14)

Two different kinds of agreements are mentioned here, and, as the text points out, neither of them can be taken for granted.

1. Formation of speech communities

This first kind of agreement deals with the realization of an “effective community of minds”, constituted upon the free decision taken by the participants. It may be considered as an ideal form of argumentative communication. Its nearest approximation may be philosophical or scientific friendly encounters.

Not all argumentative practices depend on the production of such a community. The court is a prototypical argumentative place, and no prior voluntary agreement must be made with criminals to assure their timely appearance; when necessary, legal coercion may be used. Institutions defining specific forums, problems and rules of interaction determine the social and legal conventions ruling argumentative communities. The existence of these social infrastructures makes it possible to avoid previous cumbersome negotiations among speech communities.

2. Agreement about the issue

To discuss an issue, must we first “agree to discuss this issue together”? As was the case for the kind of agreements described immediately above, the different legal systems establish who has the legal right to determine the charges leading to the appearance of a given party; the defendant does not necessarily agree to discuss the matter, but is summoned by the judge.

Prior discussions may be useful in institutionally structured communities in order to establish the points that will be discussed at a particular meeting. But the agenda is not necessarily decided upon by mutual agreement among the future participants in the discussion; it may be the prerogative of an individual in charge of the organization. On the other hand, the issue itself, may be re-framed during the encounter.

Intellectual communities are also social communities, even when they address questions concerning the human condition in general. The disputability of an issue is itself an argumentative exercise, in the same way as the process of discussing the issue itself. Two quite distinct subquestions must be envisioned, first, a central one, the conditions on the “disputability” of the issue properly said, and second, if all the potential partners agree to discuss such and such issue, a practical issue must be settled, the material conditions on the discussion itself – where, when, who will chair the discussion, etc. — not to mention the shape of the table.

The dispute about the maximization vs. minimization of the right to discuss define what may be called the stasis of stasis.

2.1 Maximizing the right to discuss

Concerning the substantial issue, one can either stress the principle of radical free expression according to which any point of view can be affirmed and challenged, or emphasize the pragmatic conditions of such discussion. The first of the “Ten Commandments for Reasonable Discussants” posits that:

Commandment 1, Freedom rule: Discussants may not prevent each other from advancing standpoints or calling standpoints into question. (van Eemeren, Grootendorst, 2004, p. 190)
S. Rules.

This is also the position taken by Stuart Mill:

If all mankind minus one, were of one opinion, and only one person were of the contrary opinion, mankind would be no more justified in silencing that one person, than he, if he had the power, would be justified in silencing mankind. (Mill, [1859], p. 76)

2.2 Conditioning the rights to discussion

Absolute liberty of expression would give free rein to racist speech, hate speech, collective verbal and non-verbal persecution of the individual chosen as a scapegoat a group, types of speech which many would find unacceptable. If individuals are free to privately discuss anything, provided they can find a partner willing to do so, actual speech communities put conditions on social discussions. For example, the res judicata principle prevents the reopening of an issue which has already been judged, unless a new fact is to be considered.

Moreover, the proper functioning of a speech community must take into consideration the fact that it is not possible to discuss anything (condition on the subject, on the agenda), with anyone (condition on the participants), anywhere and anytime (material conditions on place and time), no matter how (according to what procedure), S. Manipulation:

Some Truths Are Not for Common Ears. It is lawful to speak the truth; it is not expedient to speak the truth to everybody at every time and in every way.
Erasmus, [1524], On the Freedom of the Will. (no pag.)[1]

The Treatise is very sensitive to the “anyone” condition:

There are beings with whom any contact may seem superfluous or undesirable. There are some one cannot be bothered to talk to. There are also others with whom one does not wish to discuss things, but to whom one merely gives orders.
(Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca [1958], p. 15)

Aristotle limits topics of legitimate discussion to the endoxa, and rejects debates questioning “anything”, that is to say, affirmations which in practice nobody doubts:

Not every problem, nor every thesis, should be examined, but only
one which might puzzle one of those who need argument, not punishment or perception. For people who are puzzled to know whether one ought
to honor the gods and love one’s parents or not need punishment, while those who are puzzled to know whether snow is white or not need perception. (Top., 11)

The undisputable refers to three kinds of evidence: sense data evidence, “snow is white”; religious evidence, “we must honor the gods”; and the social evidence “we must love our parents”; these statements are uncontroversial because it is unconceivable that anyone would argue otherwise — in Aristotle’s Athenian society of course. In order for an opinion to be worthy of doubt, it must, on the one hand, fall within the scope of the doxa. That is, it must be part of the defining beliefs of the community, or seriously claimed by some of its honorable members or a subgroup, S. Doxa.

On the other hand, the doubt must be serious, that is motivated. Arguing being a costly activity, one must have a good reason to doubt. In other words, the person who wants to challenge an accepted statement bears the burden of proof.

In the same spirit, the theory of stasis categorizes as uncontroversial (a-stasic) misplaced, badly worded or intractable questions, or, conversely, questions whose answer is obvious, S. Dialectic; Self evidence; Stasis; Argumentative question.

On the legitimizing effects of debate, S. Paradoxes.

3. Agreement on what counts as an argument

Agreements on the community of speech and on the issue must be supplemented by agreements on beings, facts, rules and values ​​(Perelman, Olbrechts-Tyteca [1958], II, 1). Agreements here should establish what counts as an argument: condition of truth; of relevance of the true statement for the defended conclusion; of relevance of the conclusion (defended by a true and relevant statement) for the debate itself, S. Relevance.

When it is impossible to determine whether a statement is true, relevant to a conclusion itself relevant to a debate, a general system of acceptance or tacit agreement is invoked. In serious global disagreements, sub-agreements are difficult to reach; the disputants anticipate their opponent’s conclusion, and know very well that once the argument is accepted, the conclusion will quickly follow, hence the tendency to postulate disagreement as a ruling principle, including upon what should be considered as facts, S. Politeness; Dissensus; Disagreement.

This “appeal to agreement” is actually grounded on an argument by perverse effects, considering that the absence of agreement would condemn the debate to an undesired state of deepening disagreement, that can indeed lead to a collapse of the discussion (Doury 1997). In practice, two facts must be taken into account. Firstly, points of agreement and disagreement can be negotiated on the spot, during the discussion. Secondly, the lack of agreement does not preclude argumentation, it suffices that third parties take the reins of the discussion. The decision of the judge, and more generally that of the third party, is commonly made on the basis of an argument rejected or ignored by one party, or by both, S. Roles. Judicial organizations intervene precisely when no agreement can be passed between the parties; as representing the ruling power, they dispense with agreements — not with arguments.

In general, if one agrees on the data and rules, the conclusion automatically follows; argumentation becomes demonstrative. But argumentation is a linguistic way of dealing with the different in a system of generalized disagreement and uncertainty. There is a decisive incompatibility between the material interests at stake: one can indeed divide the pie, but what is eaten by any one person cannot be shared with the other. Serious, deep, intractable… disagreement between the parties, proponent and opponent, should be considered to be the basic condition of argumentation; that is why third parties have a key role to play in argumentative devices.

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[1] Quoted after Desiderius Erasmus, On the Freedom of the Will. Trans. by E. Gordon Rupp (no pag., no date). www.sjsu.edu/people/james.lindahl/courses/Hum1B/s3/Erasmus-and-Luther-on-Free-Will-and-Salvation.pdf (05-23-17).

Concessions may be negotiated in an organized discussion, or presented as such in a monological discourse.

1. Negotiated concession

Through negotiated concessions, the arguer modifies his or her original position by decreasing the original demand or by granting to the adversary a controversial sub-point. From a strategic point of view, this move may amount to an orderly retreat, possibly for future benefit, hoping that the opponent will do the same when it comes to another point.

Aristotelian logical-dialectical games ignore concessions, as a violation of the principle of excluded middle, things being either entirely true, or entirely false; conclusively defended or not, S. Dialectic. In contrast, conceding is a key moment in the negotiation process of human affairs, understood as a discussion leading to a reasonable agreement (Kerbrat-Orecchioni, 2000).

By making concessions, the arguer recognizes that the opponent’s point of view is to some extent valid, whilst continuing to uphold the value of his or her own positions and conclusions. The arguing party may believe that his or her remaining arguments are:

— More compelling, or of a different type than those of the opponent.
— Not strong arguments, but nonetheless arguments grounded on personal values and deep convictions (identity-based arguments).

The original position should thus be maintained against all odds, according to the formula “I do know, but still…”.

In everyday discussions, concessions are valued as manifestations of openness to the others, and as constitutive of a positive ethos. Nonetheless, concessions may be ironic, S. Epitrope.

2. Concession as a speech act

In grammar, concessive constructions “A(claim) + C(concession)” co-ordinate two statements having opposite argumentative orientations, while retaining the overarching orientation determined by the first proposition A:

“Although C, A”; “certainly C, but A”
“I admit, I understand C but I stick to A”.

C takes up or reformulates the speech of the opponent, or evokes the speech of a fictitious opponent; A reaffirms the speaker’s claim.

Social relations are indeed extremely tense these days, but we must nonetheless go on restructuring the company.

Unlike negotiated concession, linguistic concession is structural. The speaker sets out:

— first, a virtual character or voice developing the argument “social relations are extremely tense”, oriented towards conclusions such as “stop the restructuring of the company”,

—followed by a second argument, putting forward the opposite position “we must go on restructuring the company”, and identifies with this second character. In Goffman’s words, the speaker is the animator of A, and the animator and principal of C. In other words, the speaker recognizes the existence of arguments supporting an opposing conclusion, but at the same time refuses to conclude on this basis. The concession here is a simple acknowledgment of the fact that somebody, somewhere, says, or may say something opposite to that claimed by the speaker. This amounts to a de-activation of the argumentative strength of the aforementioned argument. This kind of concession is by no means the expression of the goodwill of a reasonable negotiator, but a mere phagocytosis and castration of the opponent’s arguments.

The two forms of concession may be superimposed, by rationalizing the linguistic concession. One considers that linguistic concession occurs when the speaker has taken the opponent’s arguments into consideration and confronted them with his or her own (even if this examination often leaves no discursive trace), and that, finally, in the grand scheme of things, he or she thinks that her or his arguments are better. But since language gives for real and true that which it signifies, a purely linguistic concession automatically produces a negotiated concession effect, whether or not it is really the case. This does not mean that linguistic concession is always mere lip service, but that negotiated concession can only be studied on corpora built to that effect.

Aristotle considers composition or “combination of words” and division as verbal fallacies, that is fallacies of words, as opposed to fallacies of things or method, S. Fallacies 2. They are discussed in the Sophistical Refutations (RS 4) and in the Rhetoric (II, 24, 1401a20 – 1402b5; RR p. 128).

The label argumentation by division is sometimes used to refer to case-by-case argumentation, S. Case-by-Case.

1. Grammar of composition and division

Composition and division involve the conjunction and that can coordinate:

— Phrases:

(1) Peter and Paul came.                   (No and N1) + Verb
(2) Peter smoked and prayed.            No + (V1 and V2)

— Statements:

(3) Peter came and Paul came.            (N + V1) and (N1 + V2)
(4) Peter smoked and Peter prayed.     (N + V1) and (N1 + V2)

In Aristotelian logical-grammatical terminology:

(3) and (4) are obtained by division respectively from (1) and (2).
(1) and (2) are obtained by composition respectively from (3) and (4).

The compound and divided statements are sometimes semantically equivalent and sometimes not.

(i) Equivalent — (1) and (3) on the one hand, (2) and (4) on the other hand are roughly equivalent, although it seems that (1), not (3), implies that Peter and Paul came together. In this case, composition and division are possible, and the coordination is used simply to avoid repetition.

(ii) Not equivalent — sometimes phrase coordination (composed statement) is not equivalent to sentence coordination (divided statement). The semantic phenomena involved are of very different types.

Peter got married and Mary got married.
≠ Peter and Mary married.

If Peter and Mary are brother and sister, the custom being what it is, the composition is unambiguous. Without such information, the composition introduces an ambiguity.

The operation of division can produce a meaningless discourse:

The flag is red and black.
* The flag is red and the flag is black.

B is between A and C.
* B is between A and B is between C.

Sometimes a syntactic operation applied to a statement produces a paraphrase of this statement. At other time, the same operation applied to another statement having apparently the same structure as the first one produces a statement that has no meaning, or whose meaning and truth conditions entirely differ from those of the original statement.

2. Aristotelian logic of composition and division

The study of paraphrastic systems is a classical object of syntactic theory. Aristotelian logic considers composition and division as a problem in logic. As Hintikka (1987) has repeatedly pointed out, the Aristotelian notion of fallacy is dialogical, S. Fallacy (I). The fallacious maneuver throws the interlocutor into confusion, and this is precisely what happens with composition and division. The following case is one of the oldest and most famous illustrations of the fallacy of composition:

This dog is your dog (is yours); and this dog is a father (of several puppies).
So this dog is your father and you are the brother of the puppies.

The interlocutor is disoriented, and everyone finds that very funny (Plato, Euth., XXIV, 298a-299d, pp. 141-142). S. Sophism.

Aristotle analyzes this kind of sophistical and sophisticated problem in the Sophistical Refutations and in the Rhetoric under the heading of “paralogism of composition and division”. He shows that the issue extends to a variety of discursive phenomena, under what conditions can judgments made on the basis of isolated statements be “composed” into a discourse of connected statements? The discussion is illustrated by several examples showing the full scope of the interpretation issues that are raised, even if their wording may seem contrived.

(i) Consider the statement: “it is possible to write while not writing” (RS, 4); it can be interpreted in two ways:

— Interpretation 1 composes the meaning: “one can at the same time write and not write” (ibid.), in the sense of: “one can (write and not write)”. The composition is misleading and absurd.
— Interpretation 2 divides the meaning; when one does not write one still retains the capacity to write, meaning: “one can know how to write, while not writing”, which is correct. Under certain circumstances, a person who can write cannot physically do so, for example if one’s hands are tied. The modal power is ambiguous between “having the capacity to” and “having the possibility to exercise that capacity”.

 (ii) The following example also uses the modal can, this time in its relation to time. Consider the statement “if you can carry one thing, you can carry several” (RS, 4, 166a30: 11):

(1) (I can carry the table) and (I can carry the cabinet)

Therefore, by composition of the two statements into one:

(2) I can carry (the table along with the cabinet)

Which is not necessarily the case.

(iii) The fallacy of division is illustrated by the example “five is equal to three and two” (after RS, 4, 166a30, p.12):

— Interpretation (1) divides meaning, that is, it decomposes the utterance into two coordinated propositions, which is both absurd and fallacious:

(Five is equal to three) and (five is equal to two)

— Interpretation (2) composes the meaning, which is correct:

Five is equal to (three and two)

In the Rhetoric, the notion of composition is discussed with several examples that clearly show the relevance of the issue for argumentation. The argument by composition and division “[asserts] of the whole what is true of the parts, or of the parts what is true of the whole” (Rhet, II, 24, 1401a20-30; RR, pp. 381), which makes it possible to present things from quite different angles. This technique of argumentation involves statements constructed around appreciative and modal predicates such as:

— is good; — is just; — is able to —; — can —;
— knows —; — said.

The following example is taken from Sophocles play, Electra. Clytemnestra killed her husband, Agamemnon. Then their son Orestes kills his mother to avenge his father. Was Orestes morally and legally entitled to do this?

“‘T’is right that she who slays her lord should die’; ‘it is right too, that the son should avenge his father’. Very good: these two things are what Orestes has done.” Still, perhaps the two things, once they are put together, do not form a right act. (Rhet., II. 24, 1401a35-b5, RR, 383).

Orestes justifies what he did, arguing that his two actions can be composed. His accuser rejects the composition.

This technique of decomposing a doubtful action into a series of commendable, or at least innocent, acts is arguably very productive. Stealing is just taking the bag that is there, taking it somewhere else, and failing to put it back in the same place. The division blocks the overall assessment.

A second example clearly shows that fallacy and argument are two sides of the same coin:

If a double portion of a certain thing is harmful to health, then a single portion must not be called wholesome, since it is absurd that two good things should make one bad thing. Put thus, the enthymeme is refutative; put as follows, demonstrative “for one good thing cannot be made up of two bad things”. The whole line of argument is fallacious. (Rhet., Ii. 24, 1401a30, RR p.381-383)

Abstainers start from an agreement upon the fact that “having a lot of drinks makes you sick”, and divide: “so having a drink makes you sick”. Permissive people follow the other line: “having a drink is good for health”, and proceed by composition. Abstainers argue by division, and this is considered to be fallacious by permissive individuals. Permissive individuals argue by composition, and this is considered to be fallacious by abstainers.

3. Whole and parts argument

The two labels “composition and division” and “part and whole” are in practice considered equivalent (van Eemeren & Garssen, 2009).

3.1 Whole to parts and division

The argument based on the whole assigns to each of its parts a property evidenced on the whole:

If the whole is P, then each of its parts must be P.

If the country is rich, each of its regions (inhabitants…) must be rich.
Americans are rich, so he is rich; let’s ransom him!

The problem faced by whole to parts arguments mirrors that of the argument by division: can the property evidenced on the whole be transferred to each of its parts?

3.2 Parts to whole and composition

The argument based on the parts assigns to the whole they make up the properties evidenced on each of its parts:

If every part of a whole is P, then the whole is P.
If every player is good, then the team is good (?).

The problem faced by parts to whole arguments mirrors that of the argument by composition: is the property evidenced by each part also evidenced by the whole?

4. Complex wholes and emerging properties

Accidental or Mechanical wholes are composed of a set of disconnected objects in a relation of neighborhood. Essential or complex wholes are made up of the conjunction of the parts plus some emerging extra properties, which distinguishes them from an inert juxtaposition of components. The degree of complexity of the whole is superior to the simple arithmetical addition of its parts. This process is referred to as a composition effect. The case of the superiority of the group over the individual alleged by Aristotle is an example of such an effect, S. Ad populum.

This issue is also found in rhetoric, where a distinction is made between metonymy and synecdoche, the first focusing upon neighborhood relations and the second on relations between a complex whole and its parts.

Argument a completudine; Lat. completudo, “completeness”.

The evolution of society can be manifested by the emergence of legal cases that do not find clear solutions in the existing system of laws, whether in national, international or human rights legislations (Tarello 1972, quoted in Perelman 1977, p. 55).
Nonetheless, the judge is under an obligation to judge, that is, he or she must pass a sentence upon all the cases before him or her, S.. Silence. That is to say, he or she cannot refuse to make a decision upon a case by arguing that there is no law applicable to that case, or that no interpretation of an existing law can settle it.
In other words, the principle of completeness assumes that the existing system of law, duly interpreted, can qualify all and any human act as permitted, tolerated, or prohibited.

Meta-principles such as the following complement the system of laws:

In civil matters, in the absence of specific law, the judge is obliged to proceed in accordance with equity. To decide according to equity, he must call on natural law and on reason, or on the usages received, when the primitive law is silent.
Fortuné Anthoine de Saint Joseph, [Concordance between the Foreign Civil Code and the Napoléon Code], 1856.[1]

The argument of completeness is parallel to the topos of the impotent legislator, the nature of things rendering the application of the law impossible, S. Weight of Circumstances.

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[1] Fortuné Anthoine de Saint Joseph, Concordance entre les codes civils étrangers et le Code Napoléon, 2^nd ed. t. II. Paris: Cotillon, 1856. P. 460.

Comparison is the process of establishing whether or not two individuals, two situations, two systems… present or not some similarities or analogies. A process of comparison is involved in many argumentative activities, such that the label argument by comparison (a comparatione) is used with different meanings.
These meanings primarily correspond with the argument a fortiori, the arguments a pari, by analogy, by example or exemplum.

Comparison and categorization — Comparison is the basis for the categorization-nomination process; the individual to categorize is compared either with a known individual belonging to the category, or with the prototypical member defining the category. S. Justice

Intra-categorical comparison — Two beings belonging to the same category are identical from the point of view of this category. Despite this, they can still be compared in terms of:

— their non-categorical properties; S. Intra-categorical analogy.

— their position relative to a prototypical subcategory of this category. A rat and a whale, for example, are identical insofar as both are mammals; considering that the cow is a prototypical mammal, we can say that a rat, being nearer to a cow than to a whale, is “more” a mammal than a whale.

— Hierarchized categories contain by definition built-in comparisons: Bachelor, Master, and Doctorate are three kinds of academic degrees, listed by ascending order. They can enter in an a fortiori argument.

Comparison and structural analogy — A process of comparison is also involved in establishing a structural analogy.

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The expression commonplace corresponds to the Latin locus communis, which translates the Greek topos.

— Often reduced to place (locus, pl. loci), an inferential common place is an inferential topic, or argumentation scheme.

— A substantial common place is an endoxon, a formulary expression of a common thought. Traditional rhetorical invention specialized in the argumentative use of substantial common places.

1. Topical questions: An ontology for doxa-based argumentation

Everyday argumentation is based on an ontology organizing the world of events according to the following broad parameters:

Person, Action, Time, Place, Manner, Cause or Reason.

These dimensions mirror the system of sentence complementation:

Yesterday,     in Philadelphia,      with great difficulty
Time              Place                        Manner

Peter                     met Paul     to settle their business
Focus person      Action        Cause, Reason

The corresponding interrogative words guide the methodical procedure to follow in order to gather and organize information about an event:

Who? What? When? Where? How? Why?

[Interrogative words] have already been recognized in various languages ​​for different purposes: for speculative purposes, in the Latin of the scholastics: cur?, quomodo?, quando? [why? how? when?]; or for military purposes in German, where the tetralogy Wer? Wo? Wann? Wie? is taught to all military recruits as an information framework that any scout on a reconnaissance mission must be capable of providing and reporting back to his superiors. (Tesnière 1959, p. 194)

These common basic dimensions of reality are rubric or “heads of chapters”, generating more or less general ideas and formulas. Their application is extremely general. They might be used to frame a description or narration of any kind, a scout report, a newspaper article, or an event-based essay. Such questions also guide moral evaluation, for example an action such as “having carnal intercourse” will be evaluated as shameful if that if was “with forbidden persons” (With Whom?), or “at wrong times” (When?) or “in wrong place” (When?) (Aristotle, 1383b 15-20; RR p. 279).

When attached to a particular field, these ontological parameters are expressed using words which have a full lexical meaning. For example, the classical guide to political decisions includes questions such as: “Honorable? Will the proposed measure turn out honorable, or embarrassing for us? S. Political Arguments: Two collections

These questions governing the quest for information about a given issue or event, form the very foundation of rhetorical argumentation. They might be answered a posteriori, that is after a full documented inquiry into the specificities of the case. They can also be answered a priori, on the basis of endoxa, that is pre-conceived ideas. The undue prominence given to stereotyped ideas in the construction of arguments, leads to the strong and indignant criticism of rhetoric as a fallacious verbiage, S. Ornamental fallacy?

2. The method: stereotyped portrait-based argumentation

Consider the argumentative question “Has Mr. So and So committed this hideous murder?”

— The question Who? is applied to the defendant: “Who is this Mr. So-and-So?”. The sub-topos Which nation? provides the categorizing information: “Mr. So-and-so is Syldavian”, and likewise for all questions parameterizing the topical person.

— Endoxon on the Syldavians: to the category Syldavian is attached a set of defining endoxical predicates such as “the Syldavians are like that”, each having a specific argumentative orientation:

the Syldavians are peaceful / bloodthirsty people.

These predicates provide an endoxic encyclopedic-semantic definition of the Syldavian.

— The instantiation of the endoxic definition backs the conclusion:

the guilt of Mr. So-and-So is likely / unlikely.

Other topical questions regarding the same Mr. So-and-So will provide other, possibly contradictory, orientations. Such questions thereby play a role in the creation or dismissal of inculpations or exculpations, shifting the burden of proof on the whim of pre-established judgments, regardless of the outcome of any detailed investigation of the matter.

3. Common place based portrayal in literature and argumentation

Each and every one of these questions can itself become the source of sub-questions, and these can be developed considerably, to produce a detailed grid of investigation. The results yielded via this technique depend entirely on the method of investigation used to answer the question; an armchair argument for which the ‘research’ is based on common sense and common places will deliver commonplace conclusions.

The richest set of detailed questions concerns the key element of these rhetorical scenarios, that being the person (Who?). Their application produces a portrait of this person, which can be taken as a literary feat (if successful), and a base for argumentative categorizing inferences.

These commonplaces serve as ready-made arguments, from which the investigating party may select the most appropriate, depending on his or her aims.

Quintilian identified the following doxically relevant facets of a person in order to compound the a priori rhetorical representation of a person, independently of any concrete information about the action under discussion.

— “Birth, for people are mostly thought similar in character to their fathers and forefathers, and sometimes derive from their origin motives for living an honorable or dishonorable life” (IO, V, 10, 24 ).

To answer the sub-question “Birth?” the inquiry about the family collects information such as “he is from a well-known honorable family”, or “his father was sentenced”. The first information provides arguments allowing for example the application of the rule “like father, like son”, “he is a chip of the old block”, which serves inferences like:

He made a mistake, but his family affords all the necessary guarantees; good blood cannot lie, he deserves a second chance.

The second information leads to different conclusions:

The father was sentenced, so the son has a heavy inheritance. Bring me more information about him!

The commonplace “the miser’s son is a spendthrift” opposes the preceding one. If the father has a vice, the doxa now credits the son not of the corresponding virtue, but either of the same vice or an opposite vice.

—  “Nation?” (ibid.) and “Country?” (id., 25). The answers will introduce national stereotypes: “if he is a Spanish, he is proud, if he is British, he is phlegmatic”. These conclusions, “he is proud, he is phlegmatic”, may prove useful for the discussion to come “he is Spanish, so he is proud, so he certainly strongly reacted to this personal attack”.

— “Sex, for you would more readily believe a charge of robbery with regard to a man, and poisoning with regard to a woman” (ibid.) The prejudiced investigator will follow the commonplace suggestion: in case of poisoning, he will tend to look for a woman. A French book, “The Famous Poisoners” [Les Empoisonneuses Célèbres] is exclusively dedicated to famous female poisoners.

—  “Age?”, “Education?”, “Bodily constitution, for beauty is often drawn into an argument for libertinism, and strength for insolence, and the contrary qualities for contrary conduct” (id., 25-26). In other words, “he is handsome, he must be a debauchee” is more probable than “he is handsome, therefore he must live an austere life”. If A is stronger than B, then “A is more aggressive than B” is likely, and therefore, if A and B had a row, “certainly, A attacked B”, in other words, A bears the burden of proof. These inferences can be turned around by application of the paradox of plausibility: “actually, B must have attacked A, because he knew that the appearances were against A”.

— “Fortune, for the same charge is not equally credible in reference to a rich and a poor man, in reference to one who is surrounded with relations, friends and clients, and one who is destitute of all such support” (id., 26). The commonplaces associated with social roles and positions come under this heading. An elderly man from the countryside, sitting on a bench in the setting sun, will certainly deliver some deep and true thought about the current state of affairs, S. Rich and Poor.

— “Natural disposition, for avarice, passionateness, sensibility, cruelty, austerity, and other similar affections of the mind, frequently either cause credit to be given to an accusation or to be withheld from it” (id., 27): “the assassination was committed in a particularly cruel manner, Peter is cruel, therefore he is the murderer’, S. Circumstances.

— “Manner of living, for it is often a matter of inquiry whether a person is luxurious, or parsimonious, or mean” (ibid.).

The following questions refer to arguments based on desires and motives_ (ibid.):

— “What a person affects, whether he would wish to appear rich or eloquent, just or powerful” (id., 28).

— “Previous doings and sayings” (ibid.), used to find motives and precedents.

— “Commotion of the mind, […] a temporary excitement of the feelings, as anger, or fear” (ibid.), S. Emotions.

— “Designs” (id., 29)

This set of commonplaces underlies portraits such as:

A man in his thirties, Canadian, West Coast, sporty, from a well-known and respected family, has never completed his law education, very kind with his neighbors, living a conventional life, works in a pharmacy, with limited prospect for the future…

This portrait can be read as an (unsuccessful) literary attempt, a police form, etc. In all cases, it is a stock of premises. Doxa-based argumentation is based on pieces of information like “the man is X”, draws on the stereotyped categories attached to Xs, “the X are like that”, and concludes that “the man is like that”, S. Categorization; Definition.

4. The literature of characters

This topology has a derived argumentative function and a direct aesthetic-cognitive function. It is linked to the question of the socio-linguistic or doxical beliefs, that is to the prejudiced identity of the person. It is antagonistic with a problematic of identity as deep being, the psychological nucleus of the person. Providing a technique for the construction of the portrait, it thus establishes a bridge between argumentation and literature through the genre of “Characters”, as those of the Greek Theophrastus, and, more generally, the classical literature of portraits and mores.

We are no longer in the realm of ethos as an autofiction, but in the pure world of the ethopoeia, that is to say, of the fictional representation of a “character”, such as “the Miser” or “the Garrulous person” via his or her typical manners, discourse and actions. Such de-contextualized portraits can be used as authorized and respectable sources about the character which they are used to depict, as prolegomena to the exercise of the argumentation in situation, where they will be applied to a particular person.

Historically, this is part of a coherent educative, esthetic and cognitive process of controlled, systematic writing and thinking, the very antithesis of any uncontrolled automatic writing.

5. “This noxious fertility of common thoughts” (Port-Royal)

When based exclusively on common knowledge, that is language associations and doxa-based knowledge, this technique makes it possible to quickly compose fairly convincing, true-to-life pictures of things and events. Critically, these are justifiably very difficult to rebut, as they are the mere expression of shared preconstructed knowledge. The vicious circle between persuader and persuadee is an example of such a situation, S. Persuasion. Such compositions are not scientific characterizations of the individual, as can be developed in psychology or philosophy, but the perfect stronghold for all positive or negative social prejudices. Port-Royal has severely condemned this “noxious fertility of common thoughts”:

Now, so far is it from being useful to obtain this sort of abundance, that there is nothing which more depraves the judgment, nothing which more chokes up good seed, than a crowd of noxious weeds; nothing renders a mind more barren of just and weighty thoughts than this noxious fertility of common thoughts. The mind is accustomed to this facility, and no longer makes any effort to find appropriate, special and natural reasons, which can only be discovered by an attentive consideration of the subject. (Arnauld, Nicole, [1662], III, XVII; p. 235)

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1. Chaïm Perelman & Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca, A Treatise on Argumentation — The New Rhetoric, 1958

In the New Rhetoric — A Treatise on Argumentation (1958), Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca propose a sophisticated typology of arguments. Some twenty years later, in The Rhetorical Empire [L’Empire Rhétorique, 1977], Perelman takes up the essential elements of the 1958 typology, making some significant simplifications. In Juridical Logic [Logique Juridique, 1979] he presents a specific set of juridical arguments.

1.1 The typology of the Treatise

According to Conley, the Treatise contains “more than eighty different forms of argumentation, and illuminating remarks on more than sixty-five figures” (1984, p. 180-181), and contrasts these achievements with “Toulmin’s renegade logic” (ibid.).

The “forms of argumentation” are described in the third part of the Treatise, entitled “Techniques of argumentation”. They are presented as a set of “association techniques”, (Chap. 1 to 3), along with two other kinds of technique, the “dissociation technique” (Chap. 4), and the “Interaction of arguments” (Chap. 5). This latter Chapter exposes a set of disposition techniques, and discusses the relative persuasive effects of the various arrangements of arguments in a speech, that is, issues in classical “dispositio”.

1.2 The association techniques

The association techniques correspond to the classical argument schemes. They are classified under three categories:

Chap. 1. Quasi-logical arguments
Chap. 2. Arguments based on the structure of reality
Chap. 3. The relations establishing the structure of reality

“Quasi-logical arguments” (§46-59)

This category lists arguments which “lay claim to a certain power of conviction in the degree that they claim to be similar to the formal reasoning of logic or mathematics” (p. 192); this definition should be brought closer to the definition of a fallacious argument as “one that seems to be valid but is not so.” (Hamblin 1970, p. 12), S. Fallacies (1). The category covers the following argument schemes:

• • • 46-49 Contradiction and incompatibility
    • 50 Identity and definition
    • 51 Analyticity, analysis and tautology
    • 52 The rule of justice
    • 53 Arguments of reciprocity
    • 54 Arguments by transitivity
    • 55 Inclusions of the part in the whole
    • 56 Division of the whole into its parts
    • 57 Arguments by comparison
    • 58 Argumentation by sacrifice
    • 59 Probabilities

In The Rhetorical Empire, the Chapter on “Quasi-Logical Arguments” essentially recapitulates the class as presented in the Treatise.

“Arguments based on the structure of reality” (§60-77)

From a linguistic point of view, he broad label “argument based on the structure of reality” may be interpreted as referring to arguments which exploit syntagmatic, or metonymic relations. This category in fact lists arguments “alleged to be in agreement with the very nature of things” (p. 191); these arguments “make use of [the structure of reality] to establish a solidarity between accepted judgments and others which one wishes to promote” (p. 261). The “causal link” and the “relation of succession” are fundamental to this category.

Arguments within this category include:

• • • 61-63 “Causal link”, “Pragmatic argument”
    • 63-73 discuss arguments where the person is considered to be a causal agent, such as:
      • • 64-68 “Ends and means”, among which:
        • 65 “Argument of waste”
        • 66 “The Argument of direction”
        • 68-73 “The Person and his acts”, among which:
        • 70 “Argument from authority”
        • 73 “The Group and its members”
    • 74-75 extend the notion of “relation of coexistence” to:
    • 74 “Act and essence”
    • 75 “The symbolic relation”
    • 76-77 present “more complex”, second level arguments:
    • 74 “Double hierarchy”
    • 75 “Differences of degree and of order”

The Rhetorical Empire, Chapter VIII, recapitulates the same class of arguments based on the structure of reality under different groupings:

— Relations of succession
— Relations of coexistence
— The Symbolic relation, the double hierarchy argument, argument about the differences of order.

“Relations establishing the structure of reality” §78-88

The inclusive label “Relations establishing the structure of reality” might be interpreted as referring to a set of arguments exploiting paradigmatic or metaphoric relations. This category of relations is defined on the basis of two of its prototypical members, arguments from “the particular case”, and “arguments by analogy”. The following argument schemes come under this category:

• • 78 “Argumentation by example”
  • 79 “Illustration”
  • 80-81 “Model and anti-model”
  • 82-87, On analogy
  • 87-88, On metaphor.

In the Rhetorical Empire, the title “establishing the structure of reality” is not retained; its contents are grouped under two distinct chapters:

Chap. IX, Arguments by example, illustration and model
Chap. X, Analogy and metaphor

This can be construed as a waiver of the distinction between arguments “establishing” the structure of reality, and those “based on” the structure of reality.

It might, however, also be argued that this couple of concepts does not characterize causal arguments in opposition to analogical ones, but indeed applies to both argument schemes. The successful use of an argument “based on” authority, for example, presupposes that the invoked authority has been previously “established”. This distinction is especially helpful in the case of arguments from authority, definition, causality and analogy.

1.3 The dissociation techniques

The basic difference between association and dissociation techniques is that the former operate on judgments; they “establish a solidarity between accepted judgments and others which one wishes to promote” (p. 261); they correspond to argument schemes. In contrast, dissociation techniques operate on “concepts” (p. 411; my emphasis): “[they] are mainly characterized by the modifications which they introduce into notions, since they aim less at using the accepted language than at moving towards a new formulation” (p. 191-192), S. Dissociation, Distinguo; Persuasive Definition.

The two terms of the opposition association / dissociation are thus of a very different nature.

2. Toulmin, Rieke, Janik, An introduction to reasoning (1984)


Toulmin, Rieke, Janik consider nine «forms of reasoning» «most frequently to be met with in practical situations «   (1984, p. 147-155 ; p. 155).

1. analogy 2. generalization 3. sign 4. cause

5. authority 6. dilemma 7 classification 8. opposites 9. degree

In the argument from degree, « the different properties of a given thing are presumed to vary in step with one another » (id., p. 155)

Like the following one, this restricted group of argumentative schemes has a family resemblance with the classical lists derived from Cicero, S. Collections 2.

3. Kienpointner, Alltagslogik [Everyday Logic] 1992.

Kienpointner (1992, p. 231-402) synthetizes six contemporary typologies (Perelman, Olbrechts-Tyteca [1958] ; Toulmin, Rieke, Janik 1984 ; Govier 1987; Schellens 1987; van Eemeren, Kruiger 1987; Benoit, Lindsey 1987), summarized in the following table (1992, p. 246):

3.1 Rule-using argument schemes

Classificatory Schemes

Definition
Genus – Species
Part – Whole

Comparison Schemes

Equivalence
Resemblance
Difference
A fortiori

Opposition Schemes

Contradictories
Contraries
Relative terms
Incompatibility

Causal Schemes

Cause – Effect
Consequences
Reason
Means – End

3.2 Rule-establishing argument schemes

Argumentation by example
Inductive argumentation

3.3 Other schemes

Argument by example, illustrative argumentation
Arg. by analogy
Arg. by authority

4. Douglas Walton, Chris Reed, Fabrizio Macagno, Argumentation schemes, 2008.

Walton, Reed and Macagno present an extensive and exhaustive investigation including “a user’s compendium of argumentation schemes” (2008, p. 308-346).

The schemes are consistently designated as argument schemes, with the exception of (19), (20), (21), referred to as argumentation from values, from sacrifice, from the group and its members.

The following list mentions only the main schemes; they may include subtypes.

(1) Authorities: position, expertise, testimony, number (p. 309-314)

1. 1. 1. Argument from position to know
      2. Arg. from expert opinion
      3. Arg. from witness testimony
      4. Arg. from popular opinion, ad populum
      5. Arg. from popular practice.

Arguments (4) are drawn from what people generally believe, whereas arguments (5) refer to what people generally do.

(2) Example, analogy (p. 315-316)

1. 1. 6. Argument from example
      7. Arg. from analogy
      8. Practical reasoning from analogy

Arguments (7) concern beliefs; arguments (8) concern ways to do things.

(3) Composition and division (p. 316-317)

1. 1. 9. Argument from composition
      10. Arg. from division

(4 )Negation, opposition (p. 317-318)

1. 1. 11. Arg. from opposition (contradictory, contrary, converse, incompatible)
      12. Rhetorical argument from opposition

Negation-based argumentation schemes can be logically valid or not; they are frequently not well defined.

(5) Alternative (p. 318-319)

1. 1. 13. Arg. from alternatives

This scheme concludes with the elimination of a member of an alternative due to the requirement of the other member. It corresponds to a case-by-case argument between two cases.

4.6 Classification (p. 319-320)

1. 1. 14. Arg. from verbal classification

“for all x, if x has property F, then x can be classified as having property G.”

Set F is included in set G.

1. 1. 15. Arg. from definition to verbal classification

If an individual a is defined (categorized) as a D, and if Ds generally have property P, then a has property P.

1. 1. 16. Arg. from vagueness of a verbal classification
      17. Arg. from arbitrariness of a verbal classification

Schemes 16. and 17. conclude with the rejection of an argument as “too vague” or “too arbitrarily defined” in some aspects. These cases can also be seen as an application of Grice’s Cooperation Principle.

(7) Persons, values, actions and sacrifice (p. 321-327)

1. 1. 18. Argument from interaction of act and person
      19. Arg. from values
      20. Arg. from sacrifice
      21. Arg. from the group and its members

These schemes consider a group whose members are supposed to share quality Q, and attribute this quality to any member of the group. A member of a racist association can legitimately be supposed to be racist.

Not all characteristics of its members can be composed and attributed to the group as such; a large set is not necessarily composed of large elements.

1. 1. 22. Practical reasoning
      23. Two-person practical reasoning

If one pursues an end, then one must accept the means and steps necessary to attain it.

1. 1. 24. Argument from waste
      25. Arg. from sunk costs

Pages 10-11 (id.) consider as synonyms the labels argument from waste, (with reference to Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca), and argument from sunk costs. Nonetheless, they are discussed here as two separate entries.

(8) Ignorance (p. 327-328)

1. 1. 26. Arg. from ignorance
      27. Epistemic argument from ignorance

This argument covers the case “if it were true, the newspapers would certainly speak of it” (id., p. 99)

(9) Cause, effect; abduction; consequence (p. 328-333)

1. 1. 28. Argument from cause to effect
      29. Arg. from correlation to cause
      30. Argument from sign
      31. Abductive argumentation scheme
      32. Argument from evidence to a hypothesis
      33. Arg. from consequences
      34. Pragmatic argument from alternatives

Scheme (34) is a special case of (33), the choice is between doing/not doing something and suffering/not suffering negative consequences.

(10) Arguments from threat, fear, danger (p. 333-335)

1. 1. 35. Argument from threat
      36. Arg. from fear appeal
      37. Arg. from danger appeal

Schemes (35), (36), (37) schematize different strategies of fear.

1. 1. 38. Arg. from need for help
      39. Arg. from distress

(11) Commitments, ethos, ad hominem (p. 335-339)

40. Arg. from commitment
41. Ethotic argument
42. Generic ad hominem
43. Pragmatic inconsistency
44. Argument from inconsistent commitment
45. Circumstantial ad hominem

Scheme (44) draws a distinction between committed and not really so.

Schemes (43) and (45) express forms of contradictions between personal commitments and actions.

1. 1. 46. Argument from bias
      47. Bias ad hominem

Schemes (46) and (47) are closely related. According to (46), argument from bias: “L is biased, so the conclusions are suspect”. According to (47), “bias ad hominem”: “L is biased, so I do not trust him”. Biases are relative to a domain, but it is convenient to consider that the whole personality is biased; L has a “false mind”.

(12) Gradualism; slippery slope (p. 339-341)

1. 1. 48. Argument from gradualism

The comments (id. p. 114-115), show that this scheme can be likened to the slippery slope forms, (49) to (53). It expresses the sorite paradox, also mentioned in (52): “If you remove a grain from a pile of grains, you always have a heap; if you remove another grain, you still have a heap … up to what extent?”

1. 1. 49. Slippery slope argument
      50. Precedent slippery slope argument

The slippery slope argument is used to reject an exceptional treatment, on the ground that this exception would open a line of precedents leading to something unacceptable.

1. 1. 51. Sorites slippery slope argument
      52. Verbal slippery slope argument

The slippery slope principle is used to reject the assignment of a property to an object because this property is transmitted by contiguity up to an object that obviously does not or should not possess it. This is a variety of argument to the absurd, based on a demonstration by recurrence.

1. 1. 53. Full slippery slope argument

(13) Rules, exceptions, precedent (p. 342-345)

1. 1. 54. Argument for constitutive-rule claim

Scheme (54) relates to rules of language (synonymy) and to principles of categorization in institutionally codified languages (“D counts as W”).

1. 1. 55. Arg. from rules
      56. Arg. for an exceptional case
      57. Arg. from precedent
      58. Arg. from plea for excuse

Confronted with an exceptional case, one can waive the usual rule (56) or change it (57). Excuses and extenuating circumstances can suspend the rule.

(14) Perception, memory (345-346)

1. 1. 59. Arg. from perception
      60. Arg. from memory

Scheme (59), (60) argue that one can reasonably believe in a given fact on the basis of the perception or memory of this fact.

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