Archives de catégorie : Non classé

Causality and Argumentation

1. The causal relationship and its expression

The notion of cause is central in daily argument as well as in scientific argument. It is considered a primitive, intuitively clear notion. This means that ordinary language defines cause only through notions which are equally complex.

Let us consider some possible ways to refer to and think about causal links and processes:

— The cause explains, accounts for its effect; it gives the why, the reason of things. The effect is understood when its cause is known.
— The cause of something is its principle; origin, basis, foundation, grounds; its occasion. The cause is a motor, which triggers, starts a series of effects.
— Humans act as cause; they are agent, maker; author, creator, inspirer, instigator, promoter, producer…; their aims, purposes, intentions, motives and motivations… are considered as causes. Their incitements, inducements instigations, are second-level causes.
— Metaphorically, the cause is thought of as a spark, a ferment, a germ; a root, a seed; a source, a spring. Their cause is the mother of things as they are.

Beyond the specific verbs corresponding to the preceding nouns, different kinds of causal relations are associated with very general verbs such as bring (about), to give (rise to), to make, procure, lift

Like the logical relation of implication, the causal relation can be associated with passages articulated by conjunctions or adverbs:

Since, because …; as soon as …; so … ; when; if … then …

All these terms and constructions might point to some kind of causal relation, and can therefore be considered as causal indicators of a sort, being kept in mind that they can also express other functional relations.

Like analogy relationships, causal relations can dispense with causal indicators. A spontaneous “causal impulse” always suggests a causal relation behind a purely temporal succession, or concomitance (see infra).

Practically, it would be difficult, and is not necessary, to identify and reconstruct all of the multi-level, potential causal relations in a text. Relevant and indisputable causal argumentative causal relations are explicit, in the foreground of the discussion, articulated and thematized in the argumentative lines developed by the participants in the discussion.

2. Time, causal, logical series

Let us consider the causal, logical and temporal series. In the physical world, the cause precedes its consequence (this is not, however, always straightforward). In the logical world the antecedent is to the left of the logical connective ‘’ and the consequent is to its right; in the world at large, events simply follow one another.

Causal series cause effect, consequence
Logical series antecedent consequent, consequence
Time series prior, previous, before
posterior, later, after

The time series includes three terms:

before… / during… / after…
prior, anterior, previous… / simultaneous… / posterior, later, subsequent…

The word consequence is thus used to designate the effect, linked to its physical cause, or the consequent, linked to its logical antecedent. In general, logical relations develop the consequences of hypotheses or postulates. If the length of the side of the square is doubled, its surface is multiplied by four: this result is a consequence, linked to a cause which is a mathematical reason.

Mind your words, you speak of the birth of the gods, so you suggest that at one time, the gods did not exist?

This is not a causal, but a semantic consequence, based on the linguistic meaning of the word “birth”.

3. Argumentations appealing to causes, mobiles…
and effects, consequences…

The terminology of argumentation involving a causal relation might be confusing. We will distinguish between, on the one hand, argumentation establishing a causal relationship, and, on the other, argumentation exploiting a previously established causal relationship.

(i) The cause — effect argumentation establishes a causal relationship between two facts and eliminates “false causes”.

(ii) Several kinds of arguments exploit a pre-established causal relationship. In this second case, we will distinguish between:

— Cause to effect argumentation, going forward from the cause to the effect. A fact-argument considered to be a cause, is claimed to have such effect.

 Effect to cause argumentation, goes in the opposite direction, from the effect to cause. A fact-argument to which a status of effect is attributed, is claimed to have such cause.

Pragmatic argumentation develops first from cause to effect, before returning to the cause. In order to make a decision about a practical measure (assimilated to a cause), one develops its possible positive or negative effects, before arguing back to the cause.

— Argumentations based on motives align the cause-effect relation with the relation from a motive to do something to the corresponding action.

— A priori and a posteriori arguments, propter quid and quia, exploits causal and logical links.


Categorization and Nomination

The term categorization refers to the various cognitive and practical operations through which an individual is integrated into a category and designated by the name attached to that category:

— What is this?   Identification process
— This is a X      Name of the object

The name can be taken from the current lexicon or from a scientifically controlled taxonomy or theory. Categorization as a cognitive and empirical operation cannot be dissociated from nomination, a linguistic operation.
The classical example illustrating Toulmin’s layout of argument is an example of an administrative categorization: the individual Harry is categorized as a British citizen on the basis of the criterion, “— to be born in Bermuda”.

Categorization is the first step to implement an argumentation by definition, “he is a British citizen, so …” S. Argument from definition. In law, categorization corresponds to the legal qualification of an act (is it a crime or an accident?); it determines the law applicable to the case, S. Stasis.

1. Categorization tests: distinctive features and global analogy

An individual is given a name and integrated in a category mainly on the basis of a set of distinctive features or out of a global analogy with an outstanding member of the category.

The categorization by distinctive features is based upon a definition. A definition of a noun is a set of heterogeneous features that can be used to test an individual for the corresponding category. If a significant number of these distinctive features fit with the description of the individual, then this individual belongs to this category, and can be given the corresponding name.
If the categorization-nomination is based on unsystematic, anecdotal features the category is inconsistent: “the bird is gray, the sky is gray, the bird is a cloud, the cloud is a bird” S. Intra-categorical analogy.

The categorization by analogy is based on a common global form (Gestalt) shared by the individual under consideration and a prototypical member of the category: this mushroom looks like a Scotch bonnet, it is a Scotch Bonnet. The prototypical species is the species with which the community is best acquainted with.

The concrete task of nomination–categorization combines the two sets of tools, distinctive features and analogy. The distinctive features can be drawn from the stereotype rather than from any kind of definition; all the features found on the stereotype tend to be considered as essential for the definition of the category, S. Imitation.

Binary and gradual categorization — The categorization made on the basis of essential, distinctive features entails that category predicates are binary: an individual is a member of a category or is not.
If membership within a category is determined simply by stacking any sufficient number of features, category predicates are gradual; the richer the combination of features, the stronger the link with the category. Similarly, a bird which looks more like the prototypical bird than another is “more” a bird than the other one. Category membership becomes gradual, and its top members cannot be transcended; this can be the meaning of the juvenile expression “more X than him, you die”, “cooler than him, you die” in other words, one comes out of the category upwards.

Categorization mistake? — In Alice in Wonderland, the pigeon wrongly categorizes Alice as a serpent:

‘Serpent!’ screamed the pigeon.
‘I’m not a serpent’, said Alice indignantly. ‘Let me alone!’ […]
‘A likely story indeed!’ said the Pigeon in a tone of the deepest contempt. ‘I’ve seen a good many little girls in my time, but never one with such a neck as that! No, no! You’re a serpent; and there is no use denying it. I suppose you’ll be telling me next that you never tasted an egg!’
Lewis Carroll, Alice in Wonderland. [1865] [1].

The pigeon wrongly categorizes Alice as a serpent on the basis of the long neck she is developing in this episode. For the pigeon, this characteristic evokes a snake, so that the pigeon fears for its eggs; and in addition, Alice eats eggs, a feature perhaps inessential for the categorization of beings, but which reinforces the pigeon’s conclusion.
From an essentialist view, the pigeon miscategorizes Alice; “having a long neck” is not a specific difference nor a characteristic proper of snakes; giraffes, herons, swans… are also animals with long necks. Actually, the pigeon classifies Alice from a functional point of view. From the pigeon’s perspective, a long neck is a natural sign of danger and it is wise to apply a precautionary principle, that is to shout “snake!” as people shout “wolf!” when perceiving a strange creature lurking behind the house.

2. Technical categorization

The categorization-nomination can be expressed via a simple judgment about an individual “X is a bastard, it shows immediately”; most designations are not the result of a careful examination of the relevant criteria, but if in doubt, the availability of such criteria proves essential. The mushroom picker who has doubts about the nature of the mushroom he has just picked must engage in a careful process of categorization; the same goes for the municipal employee seeking to determine the rights of an individual applying for social security benefits. First of all, they must refer to the criteria enumerated in the relevant reference books: the encyclopedia of mushrooms in the first case; the decrees and dispositions defining the terms and conditions of attribution of social security benefits in the other. A well-conducted process of categorization will lead to reasoned conclusions, such as:

Y is / is not a marasmius oreades, i.e., a Scotch bonnet.
X is / is not a single parent in the administrative sense of the expression.

The investigating parties will then take the relevant action: keeping the mushroom for eating or throwing it away; accepting or denying the application for social security benefits.

Social Categorization — A parent is defined as “a parent or a person who bears the financial burden of one or more children”. “To be single” is defined as: “to be widowed, divorced, separated or unmarried not cohabiting”. The meaning of parent is finally extended to include “pregnant” and “people having the legal responsibility of a child”.

Natural Categorization — Wikipedia describes the Scotch Bonnet as follows:

Marasmius oreades, the Scotch bonnet, is also known as the fairy ring mushroom or fairy ring champignon. The latter name tends to cause some confusion, as many other mushrooms grow in fairy rings (such as the edible Agaricus campestris, the poisonous Chlorophyllum molybdyte, and many others).
Distribution and habitat — Marasmius oreades grows extensively throughout North America and Europe in the summer and autumn (fall) (June – November in the UK), or year-round in warmer climates. It loves grassy areas such as lawns, meadows, and even dunes in coastal areas.
Description — It grows gregariously in troops, arcs, or rings (type II, which causes the grass to grow and become greener). The cap is 1-5 cm across; bell-shaped with a somewhat inrolled margin at first, becoming broadly convex with an even or uplifted margin, but usually retaining a slight central bump — an « umbo »; dry; smooth; pale tan or buff, occasionally white, or reddish tan; usually changing color markedly as it dries out; the margin sometimes faintly lined.
The bare, pallid stem grows up to about 7cm by 5mm in diameter.
The gills are attached to the stem or free from it, fairly distant (rather a distinctive character), and white or pale tan, dropping a white spore-print. The spores, themselves, are 7-10 x 4-6 µ; smooth; elliptical; inamyloid. Cystidia absent. Pileipellis without broom cells.
This mushroom can be mistaken for the toxic Clitocybe rivulosa which lacks an umbo, is white to grey in color, and has closely spaced decurrent gills.
Wikipedia, Marasmius oreades

If the harvested object thing complies with this description, then it is a Scotch Bonnet. Categorization is achieved on the basis of a set of quite different procedures: observing whether the key elements of a definition by description apply to the individual; looking carefully at the picture showing a prototypical Scotch Bonnet; testing the object for its “elasticity under finger pressure”. Some features of the definition can be checked immediately, for example, by looking at the surroundings:

grassy area —grows gregariously in troops, arcs, or rings (ibid.);

or at the mushroom itself:

a slight central bump: an ‘umbo’ (ibid.);

or practicing a small experimentation:

usually changing color markedly as it dries out (ibid.)

These are positive criteria, that, if met, justify the claim “this is a M. oreades”.

Of special importance for the task of categorizing and giving names, are the distinctive criteria; the umbo criteria proves essential, and, for some other species, vital:

This mushroom can be mistaken for the toxic Clitocybe rivulosa which lacks an umbo, is white to grey in color, and has closely spaced decurrent gills (id.)

In contrast the name-derived criteria “fairy ring mushroom” seems to be a necessary, not sufficient criteria, very risky since it is shared by both edible and toxic species. These are key criteria in the case of categorization issues (cf. infra, §3).

Notably, other parts of the definition may remain puzzling for many: “inamyloid. Cystidia absent. Pileipellis without broom cells”. Categorization is commonly achieved on the basis of a selection of criteria. Once categorization has been performed in view of a reasonable set of elements, it is possible to allocate to the object under examination all of the features mentioned in the definition. It is in this way that categorization connected with definition becomes a powerful argumentative machine, argumentation by definition:

it is a Scotch Bonnet, SOinamyloid, etc.

or, more realistically perhaps:

“Many mushroom connoisseurs are fond of M. oreades” SO, let’s cook it at once!

Over time and with growing experience, this knowledge, manipulations and, most importantly, reasoning will be incorporated in perception, and the mushroom picker will immediately see and recognize Marasmius oreades as such: “look, Scotch Bonnets!”.

 

3. Categorization Issues

The fact that categorization is an argumentation-based process is clearly illustrated by borderline cases, in which the individual or situation under consideration meets some, but not all of the criteria defining the given category.

Let us consider the above-mentioned case of social security benefits, provided by the state to help a single parent to raise a child. The municipal employee receives the following application:

I am currently separated from my husband, who has moved out of the conjugal home, leaving with another woman. We will be taking steps to divorce, but in the meantime, I am living alone with my daughter.

This woman is not divorced, but is apparently engaged in court proceedings, or at least plans to file for divorce. Does she therefore qualify for immediate financial support?

A stasis or conflict of categorization occurs when discourse and counter-discourse are based on conflicting categorizations of the same event, action, or person:

S1_1      — he is a poor guy
S2         — no, he’s a real bastard
S1_2      — no, he is a poor guy, we should pity him

S1_1      — Syldavia is now a great democracy!
S2_1      — how can you talk about democracy in a country that does not respect the rights of minorities?
S1_2      — there are tons of democracies that do not respect the rights of minorities.

Such antagonistic categorizations occur frequently in conversations.
— In dialogue (1), the antagonistic categorizations of the same individual as a poor guy vs. a bastard, are just stated and repeated.

— In dialogue (2), S2_1 rejects the categorization of Syldavia as a democracy, arguing that protecting the right of the minorities is a necessary feature to qualify for being a democracy. S1_2 maintains and backs up his or her appreciation, arguing that democratic regimes, as they are, often fail to respect minority rights. In a very common opposition, S1 categorizes Syldavia on an essentialist criterion, S2 on an empirical criterion, which opens a perfect argumentative situation.


[1] Quoted after Lewis Carroll, Alice in Wonderland, BookVirtual digital edition. P. 71; 72-73. https://www.adobe.com/be_en/active-use/pdf/Alice_in_Wonderland.pdf (11-08-2017).


 

Case-by-Case argument

CASE-BY-CASE Argument

1. Definition

Case-by-case argumentation is an investigative technique that develops in several stages, from questions such as “Something happened under such and such circumstances; what could it be?”:

– First, make an exhaustive inventory of possible cases.
– Second, consider each of these cases. Could it have happened under the circumstances considered?
Eliminate the cases that are incompatible with the circumstances.
– Consider the remaining cases.
– If there are none, the inventory was not exhaustive.
– If there are several, they are equally possible at this point.
-If only one remains, conclude that it is the correct answer to the question « What happened?”

S1 — All this money either comes from an inheritance, or from your work, or has been stolen. If it’s from your work or from an inheritance, you can easily prove it by showing us the relevant documents. No such documents? Then you stole it.

This argument illustrates the classic law of negation of a disjunction, S. Connectives:

P or Q or R” is true; but P is false and Q is false; so necessarily, R is true.

Definitions can be given on a case-by-case basis. A crime, such as impiety, might be defined as a lack of respect for either the gods, their priests or their shrines. To accuse someone of impiety (or to exonerate oneself from this crime) one must show that at least one of the three defining conditions has been disrespected (or none) (after Aristotle, Rhet., II, 23, 1399a5; RR p. 367).

le2. Argument by division

(Perelman, 1977, p. 65) gives the following example of an argument by division:

The tyre exploded because it was worn out, because there were nails on the road, or because of a manufacturing defect. Now, the tyre had just been bought and there were no nails in it. So there was poor workmanship. (Perelman, 1977, p. 65)

This shows that the label “argumentation by division” is homonymous: it can refer either to the argumentation by composition or division, or to the case-by-case argument.

3. Refutating the case-by-case argument

A case-by-case argument is perfectly conclusive if all cases have been considered; it can be rejected on the same case-by-case basis by showing that the enumeration of cases is incomplete:

S2 (in response to S1, above): — No Sir, I just won the lottery, here is the winning ticket!

S3 (in reply to Perelman, above) — Well, Sir, here are some other possibilities. The tyre could have exploded because it was badly inflated, because there was a pothole in the road, because it hit the kerb, because it was overheated (if the driver happened to have just used a torch to loosen a wheel bolt), because the brake was stuck, because it came into contact with an electrical source, because the car was too loaded or too fast… My conclusion is that the investigation continue.


Calm

Appeal to CALM
Ad Quietem Argument

Calm is the emotional and cognitive state of a person who has no cause for concern, especially when there is no urgent issue to address.
Serious argumentative situations are inherently tense. For argumentative2 people, the jolt of adrenaline is welcome. For more peaceful people, this tension can be difficult to deal with, and they may wish to get out of the situ as quickly as possible in order to restore their previous, real or imagined, calm.
The burden of proof can be seen as the price the proponent pays for disturbing the peace of the group.

1. Calm and emotionality

The Aristotelian list of socio-rhetorical emotions contrasts calm with anger, see Emotion. In fact, calm can be contrasted with any strong emotion, whether positive (joy) or negative (anger). Strong emotions are characterised by a marked variation in arousal. Specific actions, speeches and arguments can be used to reduce such arousal and restore a calmer mood, i.e. to calm over-excited people, be they a group of enthusiasts enraged by the prospect of war, or children throwing a tantrum.

2. Appeal to tranquillity

In the political sphere, the appeal to calm was identified and called the ad quietem argument by Bentham (1824; Political Arguments,  §2) . The Latin word quietem is the accusative form of quies, “rest; in politics, peaceful period; neutrality.”
The argument is defined as an attempt to postpone the discussion of a proposal in the hope that the issue will never be raised. The basic appeal to calm discourse takes the following form:

This issue is not that important, it’s already settled, we have other priorities, we’ll discuss it later, you’re the only one who sees it as a problem…
Leave us alone with these things/your obsessions!

The discussion itself is replaced by a meta-discussion about the relevance and timing of the discussion.

Bentham sees this manoeuvre as a fallacy, and places it in the category of ‘fallacies of delay’, directed against freedom of proposal and political innovation.
In the context of the debate on the organisation of the agenda, this move may be perfectly correct. Of course, when voted, the agenda can be attacked for its poor management of urgencies.

The appeal to tranquility values calm as the ideal of a peaceful conservative social state, which may be on the side of apathy, inertia and laziness. Dissatisfied proponents, ready to argue for innovations and changes, possibly speaking in the best common interest, are framed as troublemakers, generating negative adrenaline, that is, anger and anxiety within the group.

Tranquility may be used as an argument for not participating in political and social life:

Voting only concerns men, since women — fortunately for their tranquility [tranquillité] — have no political rights.
Clarisse Juranville, [Handbook of Moral Education and Civic Education], [1911].[1]

The following interventions are taken from a debate on immigration and French nationality, a very topical issue at the time. At the very beginning of the discussion, A, a student, first alludes to the leaflets distributed to the students, then gives a description of the two parties and their positions. Depending on the position of the reader, this description is described as biased or carefully aligned (co-oriented) with her position, which will be openly stated later in the interaction.
Finally, on the basis of a perfect « leave us alone » argumentation, she takes a still implicit but quite clear position in favour of the second party who thinks that limits should be imposed, and would, at a minimum, prefer to postpone the whole discussion. « the government has other priorities at the moment, which are more important, and that it [is] not necessary to reopen this issue.”

Prof —then you say nothing you remain mute/ you have learned nothing from all this, nothing has struck you/ — what are the points/ — so let’s start listing them\ you can give them/ yes/
A — already two points of view actually, finally
Prof — there are two points of view you have seen that there were yes/
A — two opposing parties, well those who want to – like the petition of all the screen actors and filmmakers and so on who want: im- well the nationality code to be unlimited\ and that all the undocumented people be regularised\ so hmm without any limit.
Prof — hm hm hm hm hm (1)
A — and the second point of view is those who say that for there to be a right of the people there must be:: a right of the state\ therefore there must be limits and that:: and also these people are those who say that the government currently has other priorities that are more important and that it wasn’t necessary to go back to that point.
Prof — OK (1)

(1) Ratifies the previous speaking turn, without taking a stand.
Corpus on immigration and French nationality, student workshop[2].


[1] Quoted after Clarisse Juranville (1826-1906), Manuel d’éducation morale et d’instruction civique [Moral and Civic Education Handbook], Paris: Vve P. Larousse.
Quoted after the 5e ed., 1re part Éducation morale [Moral Education]; chap. Le vote [The Vote]; § Les femmes et la politique [Women and Politics]. No Date. No pag.

[2] Corpus Débats sur l’immigration — Participants: ´´Étudiants, Professeur [Corpus corresponding to a classroom debate on immigration — Participants: Students Teacher]. CLAPI database, http://clapi.univ-lyon2.fr/V3_Feuilleter.pdhp? Num_corpus = 35] (07-30-2013).


 

Burden of Proof

BURDEN OF PROOF

The burden of proof [1] plays a fundamental role in argumentation. It is a conservative principle of action in general, like the principle of inertia in physics: “I carry on as beforez unless I have a good reason to change”.

Mill tells an anecdote that vividly illustrates the heavy burden of proof that a conservative society imposed on social innovators, S. Calm.

The propounder of a new truth, according to this doctrine should stand, as stood, in the legislation of the Locrians, the proposer of a new law, with a halter round his neck, to be instantly tightened if the public assembly did not, on hearing his reasons, then and there adopt his proposition. People who defend this mode of treating benefactors, cannot be supposed to set much value on the benefit; and I believe this view of the subject is mostly confined to the sort of persons who think that new truths may have been desirable once, but that we have had enough of them now.([1859]. p. 88)

In a court of law, the burden of proof is expressed in the presumption of innocence “a person is presumed innocent until proven guilty”; that is, the accusation must provide positive evidence of the guilt of the accused. The stabilisation of the burden of proof is an institutional decision that organises the situation; the last word is left to the accused.

In informal social debates, there is no clear preliminary agreement on who supports the burden of proof, and the proponent can try to shift it to the opponent. ​​It becomes a stake in the debate.

The doxa can be defined according to the same principle: an endoxon, i.e. an element of the doxa, is best defined not as a “probable” belief, but as a belief that does not support the burden of proof, and is, therefore, considered to be “normal” by the given group. The individual who challenges an accepted proposition bears the burden of proof, and must provide good reasons. This is why Descartes, ready to reject all his previously established beliefs, must support this radical doubt with the hypothesis of the Evil Genius (Descartes [1641], First Meditation). S. Rules.

When it comes to current trends and fashions, the burden of proof is reversed: “it(s new, it just came out!” is a direct argument for buying the product in question. On the contray, good reasons are needed not to follow fashion, not to adopt new theories, and not to vot for the emerging candidate.

Burden of proof and initiative

Hamblin has redefined the burden of proof in a language game as being on the player who takes the initiative, i.e. makes the first move. This definition can be applied to highly argumentative multi-speaker interactions, where the first turn of speech is usually assigned to the person who supports the proposal under discussion. In a debate on the legalisation of drugs, the facilitator will ask the first question to a supporter of legalisation, not to an opponent.

The burden of proof is on a question and a proposal. If the opponent proposalmakes a counter-proposal, he will bear the corresponding burden of proof.

The burden of proof may vary depending on the group involved, and where the debate takes place. If the doxa of the group is that there should be no prohibition of drug use, then, in this group, the supporter of the prohibition will have to justify his position.


[1] Latin onus probandi; Lat. onus “charge, burden”; probandi, from probare “to make believable, to make accept, to prove”.

Beliefs of the audience

BELIEFS OF THE AUDIENCE
Arguments ad auditorem, ex datis, ex concessis


1. Beliefs of the Audience

In general, the speaker bases his argument on values, facts and principles that are common, traditional, probable or true knowledge, generally known to the audience. He may introduce new ones, possibly after discussion with his interlocutors.

He must also adapt to his audience and, above all, avoid coming into conflict with them. However, their universes of belief do not necessarily overlap. He may hold (or reject) certain facts that his audience ignores or denies (or admits).
He can resolve this delicate situation by prudently basing his argument only on data explicitly or implicitly admitted or held to be true by the audience; he sticks to « what has been granted » by his interlocutor or audience (Chenique 1975, p. 322).
If knowledge of the character of the audience is so important for argumentative rhetoric, it is mainly because it provides the speaker with a large reservoir of ex datis premises, V. Ethos, §5.

Argumentx datis, ex concessis, ad auditorem.

In classical rhetoric, arguments ad auditorem, ex concessis, ex datis correspond to the arguments based on the beliefs of the audience.

Argument ad auditorem, from the Latin auditor, « he who listens », the audience. The term is used by Schopenhauer ([1864], p. 43).

The phrases ex concessis, ex datis. The preposition ex is followed by a noun in the ablative, indicating origin, « drawn from ».
In argument ex datis, datis is the plural ablative of datum, « that which is given » (id.).
In argument ex concessis, concessis is the plural ablative of concessus, (singular ablative concessu) – concessus: « concession, permission, consent; concessu omnium, unanimous consent (Gaffiot).
In our case, ex concessis rather refers to the explicit consent of the audience, and ex datis more generally covers the sense of ‘given’.

The Latin label « argument ex concessis » denotes two forms of argument.
1) A form of argument from authority, referring to the argument from consensus: consensus of participants, general consensus, consensus of nations, even universal consensus. This argument makes it possible to reject a new proposal or suggestion by pointing out to its author that there is (and has been for a long time) a consensus on the point in question (if you came to the meetings, you’d know, we have no time to lose…).
The consensus argument marginalises the opponent and tends to exclude him or her from the group.

2) An argument that develops the beliefs of the audience. The speaker who develops conclusions based on beliefs accepted by the audience is arguing ex concessis. In this sense, the ex concessis argument corresponds to the ex datis argument (Chenique 1975, p. 322).

2. Is the argument based on the belief of the audience manipulative?

In order to argue within his audience’s world of beliefs, the speaker must
1) omit facts (which he believes to be true) when the audience ignores them or believes them to be false;
2) accept facts (which he holds to be false) when the audience holds them to be true.

The question immediately arises as to his attitude to the facts he claims and the values he proclaims. Does he share them, or does he pretend to? The suspicion of lies and manipulation hangs over his entire discourse.

The ex datis argument can be tricky to handle, because it can lead to attributing to the speaker beliefs that he only wields ex datis. The risk is well known in the field of religious argumentation: an author who presents himself as orthodox and who has undertaken to refute heretics can conceal his agreement with the theses he opposes by claiming to treat them only ex datis.
This form of argumentation calls for two principled criticisms, one foundationist and the other deontological.
According to foundationist principles, a conclusion, in order to be valid, must be based on true premises, truths of absolute knowledge; but the premises of ex datis argumentation are based solely on beliefs. That’s why it’s called fallacious: it’s not that the argument is outwardly formatted for this audience, but the more fundamental fact that the argument is only valid for this audience. Insofar as it takes into account a specific audience and the circumstances of the speech, all rhetorical argumentation is contestable from a foundationist point of view. See Subjectivity.
From a deontological point of view, assertions that correspond to the beliefs of the audience are not necessarily endorsed and supported by the speaker himself. However, in accordance with the principle of cooperation, the bona fide audience normally attributes to the speaker the beliefs and information on which he is arguing. If the speaker is better informed than his listeners, e.g. if he knows that P is true (or false) but his listeners believe that P is false (or true), if he has reliable information of which his listeners are unaware, and if he limits himself to taking into account what his listeners believe, then to say that he is arguing ex datis, ex concessis, ad auditores, etc., is simply to say that he is lying and manipulating his listeners. V. Conditions of Discussion; Manipulation.

Banal manipulation

This manoeuvre can be found in trivial speech situations, as in this ex datis threat, which only applies to certain children:

Loc – Santa Claus is going to be very angry about your behaviour!

The speaker addresses the child as if he believes in the existence of Santa Claus, but he himself does not. In practice, he’s reinforcing a superstition, which is reprehensible.

Let’s imagine a speaker who is not superstitious at all, but his interlocutor who refuses to do important things on Friday the 13th. If the important meeting scheduled for Friday the 13th complicates the speaker’s schedule, he can say to Y in a light tone:

Loc – We’ll postpone the meeting until the 20th so we don’t have to do anything on Friday the 13th.

The reason is still superstition, but the real motive remains hidden. Perhaps the speaker is simply planning a long weekend.

The argumentative trilogue neutralises manipulation

If it’s a serious matter, there’s reason to suspect ex post reasoning. Let’s consider a speaker addressing an audience with decision-making powers.
Schematically, we can imagine the following situations where the speaker’s knowledge is not shared by his audience.
– F+: a fact in favour of the conclusion he is defending.
– F-: a fact against the conclusion. Loc is the speaker.

Loc’s state of knowledge
of Loc: the speaker has specific knowledge of the topic.
of the audience P Loc’s action
Loc knows that
P does not know that F+ is true.
P takes F+ to be F and Loc teaches A that F+ is true.
Loc restores the truth by proving that F+ is true.
Loc knows that
F- is true, P ignores that F- is true.
P thinks F- is false, but doesn’t mention F-, manipulation?
Loc casts doubt on F- and those who support F-.
Open field for the opponent.
Loc knows that
P thinks F+ is true. Loc does not mention that F+ is false. Manipulation?
Loc shows that P+ is possible.
Open field for the opponent
Loc knows that
P ignores that F- is false.
P takes F- to be F, and Loc shows P that F- is false.
Loc establishes the truth and proves that F- is true.

If the proposer and the opponent do their jobs unhindered, the audience gets the best possible dose of truth.

Ex datis and ad hominem

Like ad hominem argumentation, ex datis argumentation is based on the beliefs of the audience. Ad hominem argumentation uses these beliefs to show that they are contradictory, without commenting on their validity: « If you really mean what you’ve just said, then you’re contradicting yourself by refusing to support intervention in Syldavia!

Arguing about the audience’s beliefs uses them positively for confirmation purposes. In principle, these data cannot be questioned and the conclusions they allow us to draw are irrefutable by the partner in this discussion. On the basis of this data, the argument concludes positively: « Besides, you said so yourself!

Consider the question: « Should we intervene militarily in Syldavia? »

You admit that Syldavian troops are poorly trained, that they risk being overwhelmed by events, and that unrest in Syldavia could spread to neighbouring countries. We agree that this expansion would threaten our security; and no one denies that we must intervene when our security is threatened. So you agree with me. Come and join us, and join the ranks of those in favour of our presence in Syldavia. See Ad hominem.

This argumentative strategy has something to do with maieutics « the art of leading a person to the truth of his or her convictions », to the conclusion that he or she does not dare to formulate, or is unable to formulate because he or she has not mastered the art of combining statements in order to draw the necessary conclusions.

In philosophy

Kant proposed a distinction between knowledge ex datis, based on experience, and knowledge ex principiis, deduced from first principles.
History is the prototype of ex datis knowledge, philosophy and mathematics the prototypes of ex principiis knowledge; ex datis knowledge is merely a compilation of data. Following the Kantian understanding, we might think that ex datis argumentation is based on empirical data, « on the substance, on the things themselves »; this interpretation would make ex datis a kind of equivalent of ad rem, but this is not the case. The use of ex datis in argumentation is different from its use in philosophy.

Autophagy, Retaliation

AUTOPHAGY – RETRIBUTION

A statement can be self-justifying: S. Self-Argued Claim. This self-defense is made possible by the multi-layered semantic structure of language, and in particular by the fact that words have an orientation, that may well be based on implicit arguments, S. Words as arguments.
Just as it can be self-justifying, it can also be self-defeating. A statement is self-defeating when it expresses a logical or material impossibility, or when it involves a pragmatic contradiction between what is said and the act of saying it.

Perelman calls this phenomenon autophagy. defined as a contradiction arising from the fact that “the assertion of a rule or a principle is incompatible with the conditions or with the consequences of its assertion or application. Such arguments can be called autophagy.
Retaliation is the argument that attacks the rule by highlighting the autophagy” (Perelman 1977, pp. 72-73).

The assertion is incompatible with the asserted fact, “the act itself implies what the words deny” (id. p. 73). Perhaps the best-known case of autophagy is that of the Cretan Epimenides claiming that “all the Cretans are liars”:

There are no more cannibals, we have eaten the last one.

S1 — All statements can be questioned.
S2 — I question this statement.

Retribution is a kind of refutation that reconstructs a claim as pragmatically self-defeating on the basis of its own content and principles. In philosophy, this strategy, known as the epitrope, is used by Socrates to refute the thesis of Protagoras according to which:

Man is the measure of all things: of the things that are, that they 
are, and of the things that are not, that they are not. (Plato, Theaetetus, 152a; CW, p. 169)

According to Socrates, this doctrine has the “most exquisite feature” that if it is true, it is false:

Socrates: — Protagoras admits, I presume, that the contrary opinion to his own opinion (namely, that it is false) must be true, since he agrees that all men judge what is.
Theodorus: — Undoubtedly.
Socrates: — And in admitting the truth of the opinion of those who think 
him wrong, he really admits the falsity of his own opinion?
Theodorus: — Yes, inevitably.
 (Id., 171a-b; OC, p. 190)

This refutation is based on the principle of non-contradiction; to maintain consistency, a skeptic must to doubt this principle.

See Prolepsis; Ad hominem; Ex datis.

 

Authority

AUTHORITY

1. Auctoritas, authority, authoritarian, authoritative

1.1 Latin Auctoritas

The word authority, and, with it, elements of the problematic of authority, comes from Latin and Roman law and custom. According to Benveniste, the words auctor, “author”, auctoritas, “authority” are related to the primary meaning of the verb augere, “to bring forth, to promote” ([1969], no pag.):

In its most ancient uses, augeo (1) does not denote the increase of something that already exists, but the act of producing out of itself; a creative act which causes something to emerge from a nutrient medium and which is the privilege of the gods or the great forces of nature, but not of men (ibid.).
(1) Augeo is the first person singular of the present indicative of augere (CP)

The speech given with auctoritas is creative:

The primary sense of augeo is discovered in auctoritas with the help of the basic term auctor. Every word spoken with authority determines a change in the world; it creates something. This mysterious quality is what augeo expresses, the power that makes plants grow and a law come into being. This is the auctor who promotes, who alone is endowed with the quality […]. In this auctoritas, this gift that is reserved for a handful of people there are hidden and powerful values that can cause something to come into being and can literally bring into existence (ibid.)

Obscure and potent values reside in this auctoritas, this gift which is reserved to a handful of people who can cause something to come into being

This has nothing to do with what we now call an “argument from authority” that supports a belief about a given reality. Ellul describes the institutional exercise of the auctoritas as follows:

The auctoritas is the quality of the auctor. He gives his support, his approval to the act done by another person.In the beginning, it was probably an act of sacred law: one individual performs the legal act, and another validates this act by an intervention that manifests the approval of the gods. (Ellul [1961], pp. 248-249)

The auctoritas is held by the father, the priest, the judge; its use is fundamental to family life, as well as to religious and legal life:

The auctoritas appears as the authority of a person that serves as the basis for a legal act. This act has value and effectiveness only through the auctoritas. […] The pater [« fathe »] gives his auctoritas for the marriage of his son. In religious life, the priest’s auctoritas delimits the domain of the sacred, and draws the boundaries of the profane. In juridical life, the auctoritas delimits the domain of the legitimate and separates it from the illegitimate (ibid).

1.2 Authority, authoritarian, authoritative

The author-authority relationship is now broken, an author may not have so much authority, and the person with authority is not necessarily an author.
Authoritarian and authoritarianism develop along a lexical line that stigmatizes authority.
In contrast, authoritative as “possessing recognized or evident authority” (MW, Authority) refers to a positively oriented lexical line associated with authority.

2. Authority as a social issue

The concept of authority is being redefined and discussed in all the fields of the human sciences, in relation to submission and in opposition to freedom or freedoms. Major studies on authority, power and totalitarianism have marked the last century: in psychology, especially since Stanley Milgram’s shocking experiences on « Obedience to Authority » (1974); in philosophy, with Theodor Adorno’s the study on the “The Authoritarian Personality” of  (1950); in history with Hannah Arendt’s « The Origin of Totalitarianism » (1951); in sociology with Max Weber (1922), whose distinctions between traditional, charismatic, and rational-legal authority are now a part of common knowledge.

In our society, basic authority is expressed through various explicit rules and norms, enforced by law, backed by the police and the legal institutions, in relation with the current political authorities.
Organizations must define a mode of authority to be exercised within their sphere of competence, and to which their members must subscribe.
Like the definition and exercise of authority, resistance to illegitimate authority is a never-ending enterprise.

3. Authority in Argumentation Studies

3.1 Position

Along with the question of authority, the study of discourse engages in a multidisciplinary reflection on the epistemic level (non-truth-conditional conditions of the acceptability of a statement); on social influence (management of the powers of discourse); on interpersonal relations (interactional manifestations and effects of the relative authority positions of the participants).
In the specific field of argumentative rhetoric, the notion of authority is considered in relation to speech: In what identifiable ways, from implicit evocation to explicit invocation, can authority invest a statement? What is an appeal to authority? What are the kinds of critical responses to authoritarian and authoritative speech?

Insofar as it invokes reason and free inquiry, argumentation is antithetical to authority and violence, even when they claim legal and even moral legitimacy. Argumentative speech, however, operates on a razor’s edge. As a critical discourse, it denounces the discourse of authority; as powerful affirmative discourse, it affects the minds of others and seeks to change the representations of the audience in the name of rationality. Argumentation must find a way to be authoritative, without being authoritarian.
Claiming to be the instrument of reason, argumentation studies develop develop a reflection on how this argumentative reason interacts with legitimate social authority, a fundamental element of social life, see Agreement; Role; Persuasion; Evaluation. The ideal of rational persuasion and consensus served by argumentation is invoked, but, on the other hand, the decision rests with the legal-legitimate authority, and the best argument may or may not be reflected in the voter’s decision.

3.2 Forms of argumentation appealing to authority

— Basically, the argument from authority explicitly cites a hetero-attributed authority. It is sometimes specified according to the nature of the source of authority: consensus, ad antiquitatem, ad numerum… (see beow).
— Authority, or lack of authority, can be self-attributed, embodied and manifested in the speaker’s speech and attitudes, see Ethos; Modesty.
— The authority of the testimony is supported by the character and reputation of the witness, and is thus rellated to ethos. The criticism of the testimony is to be compared with that of the expertise.
— The authority of the precedent is based on a previous judgment (in every sense of the word judgment). The case may also have been decided in the fable or parable; see Example; Exemplum.
— Dialectic problematizes discourses supported by various kinds of social authority, see Doxa.

The following sections develop various forms and argumentative uses of authority.

4. The speaker’s Inherent Authority

4.1 Performative auctoritas

The speaker possesses a unique form of authority, the auctoritas which is related to the performativity of different classes of utterances. According to Austin [1962], the performative utterance produces the reality that it states: by saying, “I promise”, I promise. The speaker is the auctor of the reality created, her promise.

4.2 Taking people at their word

When someone says, “Hello! », even if his friendliness is actually fake, the default belief is that this is genuine friendly behavior. Normally, no argument is needed to make someone believe something, it just has to be said; the speaker’s words are be taken at face value; what she says is believed and acted upon without hesitation. When someone is asked “What time is it? », the answer is accepted, without checking the person’s watch.
Statements about inner states, “I feel in good shape today », are regularly accepted by default without question, as are statements made by people with special access to the facts under discussion (witnesses). If having authority means having the power to successfully transmit one’s representations to listeners, this is the most common form of linguistic authority, based on the preference for agreement.

This basic linguistic authority is combined with other types of social authority, that are attributed to the speaker according to the different social identities and roles she plays. These identities and roles cumulate in the displayed authority of the authoritative speaker, precisely as defined by the theory of ethos.

Nevertheless, the preference for agreement is not automatic; recipients routinely disagree, and if they do not, they may be to blame.

5. The Argument of Legal Authority

Authority, in the most common sense of the term, is defined by its claim to compliance and obedience; commands can be obeyed by virtue of their source, without being systematically supported by a lengthy justification.

Context: L has the power and means of coercion in domain D
L
tells O to do F (F is in domain  D)

O does F.

The ideal of authoritarian authority is to exert a direct, causal influence on the behavior of others. If the tyrant’s subjects do not submit to his good reasons or charisma, he can still choose for a harsh punishment or a sweet reward.
Radical authority demands that the person who receives the command obey “like a corpse” (perinde ac cadaver), according to the metaphor used by Ignatius of Loyola uses to illustrate the perfection of the virtue of obedience. For the person who is not a member of the organization, to obey in this way is to reduce oneself to the state of an instrument by renouncing free examination and free will. For a member of the organization, it is simply adherence to the purposeful rationality of the institution as such.

Conversely, orders are invoked as a sufficient justification for action: “I was only following orders”. Such an appeal to authority is diametrically opposed to the philosophy of argumentation, which universalizes the imperative of justification and individual responsibility. It can be challenged by appealing to international human rights conventions on Human Rights and the Geneva Convention.

Everyday democratic authority is the authority of legal and regulatory norms, backed by the monopoly of legal force, enforced by those in power, and implemented by those legally responsible. In such a context, the basic expression of a socially valid legal and democratic argument from authority can be schematized as follows, in the case of judicial authority

Context: There is a system of norms N. One of these norms empowers a judge to enforce this system and gives her the means of coercion necessary for its application.
Person P has done action A, and somebody complains.
The judge assesses, in a procedure that conforms to the requirements of N, whether or not A constitutes a violation of a norm.
If it does, the judge sentences P to F, taking into account that R (justification of the decision).
Willingly or not, P obeys with F.

Judicial sentences are about « making do », not « making believe », that is, convincing the condemned. The recipients of the judge’s good reasons are much more likely to be the judge’s colleagues, or P‘s lawyer, than P herself. P may be convinced of the legitimacy of the punishment by the good reasons given by the judge, but this psychological condition is not necessary. P only has to obey with the judge’s decision, willingly or not. One cannot ask everyone to share the theory of redemptive punishment, and to willingly submit to a sentence, even a democratic one.
Authority cannot force anyone to believe anything. But, since belief manifests itself in words and behavior, “make do” may be indistinguishable from “make believe”: “Kneel down, pray, and you will believe.”

6. The Classical Argument of Authority

6.1 Displayed authority and Cited authority

Critical studies of argumentation make a distinction within ethotic authority, rejecting its seductive charismatic component (shown authority) as fallacious, in order to discuss only its expert component (cited authority), see Ethos.
In the case of ethotic authority, the speaker is the source of authority. Authority is « self-authorized » or self-founded. What is said is believed or obeyed because such and such a person says so.
In the case of the classical argument from authority, the speaker legitimates her argument by referring to a pre-existing, external authoritative, source: authority is hetero-founded. The technical study of this hetero-founded authority lies within the more general framework of discourse repetition, reformulation, reinterpretation, see Resumption of speech.

6.1 Rhetorical argumentation of authority and the authority store

Authority is at the foundation of topos # 11 of Aristotle’s Rhetoric:

Another line of argument is based on some decision already pronounced, whether on the same subject, or on one similar to it, or one contrary to it. Such a proof is most efficacious when everyone has always so decided; but if not everyone, then at any rate, most people; or when all, or most of the wise or good men have so decided, or the actual judges of the present question, or those whose authority they accept, or people whose decision they cannot gainsay because they have complete control over them, or those whom it is not proper to gainsay, such as the gods, or one’s father, or one’s teachers.
(Rhet., II, 23, 1398b15-30, RR, p. 365)

The “decisions” to be made may be intellectual or judicial.
On this basis, later rhetoricians list the authorities that can be used to strengthen a party’s position. In the legal field, the Rhetoric to Herennius proposes ten « formulae » [loci comunes, « commonplaces », see Topos) « to strengthen an accusation »:

The first commonplace is taken from authority, when we recall how great a concern the matter under discussion has been to the immortal gods, to our ancestors, or to kings, states, barbarian nations, wise men, the senate; and again, especially how sanction in these matters has been provided by laws. (Ad Her., II, 48)

These authorities are distinct from the judicial precedent, and can support any form of speech. Quintilian considers them authoritative for the same legal situation,

Whatever can be adduced as expressing the opinion of nations or people, or of wise men, eminent political figures, or illustrious poets. 37. Nor will common sayings, established by popular belief, be without their use in this way. (IO, V, 11, 36-37)

This store of authority will be used extensively, with some adjustments; gods should read God:

— Authority of Books, tradition, ancestors (ad antiquitatem). The argument of progress is opposed to this form of authority.
— The famous verses, proverbs, fables, parables…
— The Chinese, the Americans…
— The authority of the media, professionals, scientists, professors…
— Truths from the mouths of children, the rich, the poor
— The authority of large numbers, prestige of the majority consensus, of a particular group…

These forms of authority are cumulative: the scientific authority of the master is sometimes mitigated by the charismatic authority of the guru.

All these varieties of authority can be invoked; some can be embodied by the speaker as a Chinese, an expert, a poor person, a member of a distinguished community.

6.2 Invoked authority: the classical argument from authority

The classical argument of authority exploits an authority taken from the authority store. It is based on a quotation, and can be schematized as follows (see Hamblin 1970: 224 et seq.):

S:   — A is an authority, A says that P; therefore, P is true and indisputable.

Or, put simply, “A says that P”, when the context clearly establishes that A is an authority, and that S is itself defending P, or a position co-oriented with P.
The prototypical example in this category is that of Pythagoras quoted by his disciples, « he said it himself«  (« ipse dixit »). Pythagoras, of course, has nothing to do with the matter; it is the speaker who quotes him as an authority.

Authority can justify actions, beliefs, or a combination of both:

S:     — That’s how they hold their fork and knife in New York.
S:     — The Master said that compassion is wrong
S:     — I never give money to homeless people, I read in a book that it’s just encouraging laziness.

6.3 Evoked Authority

When analyzing discourse based on an external authority, one must take into account the fact that the quotation is not always direct and open. The speaker may also use an allusion to refer indirectly to a discourse, that is considered authoritative because it is dominant, prestigious or associated with an expert. Through the subtle use of terms such as “discursive formation”, “ideological state apparatuses”; “the great other” … I suggest my knowledge of and complicity  withrespectively with the thought of Foucault, Althusser, Lacan, etc.

Citing an authority in support of a proposition has repercussions on the ethos of the speaker. When the Greek messenger Orestes says to Pyrrhus, “All the Greeks speak to you through my voice[1], he does more than quote the Greeks, he embodies the authority he quotes. Self-quotation does not add much authority to what is said, but quoting a respected authority enhances the personal authority of the speaker. The master’s voice comes from the speaker’s mouth, the speaker identifies with him, reframes the exchange accordingly, and hopes that the audience will follow.

The philosophy of argument invokes an ideal of exposure to refutation, according to which it is perfectly legitimate to argue with authority, if the argument is explicit, if one knows exactly who said what and when. This rational demand for explicitness is opposed to burying authority in the depths of discourse in order to protect it from possible refutation.

7. Expert authority

From a logical-scientific point of view, a discourse is sound if it collects and articulates true propositions, in order to deduce a new true proposition, according to procedures accepted in the relevant community. In argumentation, the acceptance of a proposition or a global vision is based on authority when it is not based on an examination of the good reasons that support it, or on a direct examination of the correspondence of the proposition with things themselves, but relies on the source and the channel through which the information was transmitted.
The argument from authority substitutes peripheral, indirect evidence for direct evidence or examination, which is considered inaccessible, too costly, or too tedious. Such everyday practice is justified by a principle of economy, division of labor, or simply because someone else was more qualified, or in a better position to tell how events unfolded. It works quite well and rationally, as a default argument, that can be edited as more information becomes available. From this perspective, authority removes nothing and no one  from dispute, it simply shifts the burden of proof to the person challenging it, S. Dialectic.

The argument of authority is therefore a form of argumentation when it exposes the authority which it claims. One could oppose the authoritarian support of a statement, as supported by the socio-discursive position of the speaker, to the argument of authority, hetero-founded, whose source is clearly exposed. In other words, the argument of authority is neither authoritarian nor fallacious when it is invoked to open the debate, , but it is when it claims to close the discussion, S. Modesty.

The method of counter-discourse provides a principle for evaluating and criticizing arguments from authority. Referring to the structure of the argument of authority, discourses against authority are directed as follows.

7.1 Against the Citation itself

S: — A says that Qo

The refutation questions the citation as such or the relevance of the citation to the present discussion. This move preserves the status of A‘s status as an authority.

— A did not say Q; Q does not correspond to the letter of what A actually said.
— Q is quoted out of context.
— Q is a misquote of A; it contains elements of rewording and mischievous redirection.
— As meant by A, Q is not relevant to the present issue (Q is misinterpreted)

7.2 Against the Authority Cited

— A has changed her mind, as evidenced by her recent statements.

— A has no direct evidence, so A is not a real authority on point Q.

— There is no consensus among experts; “A+, a greater expert, rejects Q”.

— Applying the ad hominem argument to the source A: Q is incompatible, contradictory, with other statements (or prescriptions) of A.

— A has spoken outside of her area of ​​expertise; she is not an expert in the precise area referred to by Q-type assertions.

— A is not an expert, his or her views are outdated;

— A is wrong, and has been wrong many times in the past.

— A is biased, manipulated, paid to say what she says.

— A can be dismissed with a personal attack (ad personam): “A is not an expert but a fool”.

7.3 Arguments for Establishing Expert Authority

One can distinguish between two different strategies in dealing with authority: arguments that establish an authority as such, and arguments that exploit an established authority. This distinction is of general value, see Causality, Definition, Analogy. Discourses (7.1) against authority attack the use made of authority, whereas discourse (7.2) attacks the authority itself.
It follows that discourse (7.2) against authority reflects a discourse defining a legitimate expert:

A is speaking in his field of expertise, and is aware of the state of the matter; A‘s system is coherent; A has direct evidence, reputable experts agree with what A says; A‘s previous predictions have been proven correct.

7.3 Against the Person who Submits to Authority

The focus on interaction shifts the focus from the claim of authority itself to the relationship of authority. The criticism is now directed at the pusillanimity of the interlocutor.

7.4 Counterargument ad rem

Finally, the opponent can argue that Q can be countered with direct arguments i.e. arguments that deal with the issue at hand, and are not based on authority but on scientific reason, or historical knowledge, which are considered superior to lazy appeals to authority.

8. Refutative Uses of Authority

8.1 Refutative Uses of Positive Authority

The preceding paragraphs deal with authority in the sense that it serves to support a claim. Such an authoritative assertion  can be used to rebut a claim:

S1:      — P!
S2
:      — X says the opposite, and she knows what she is talking about!

If X and S1 share the same affiliation, the refutation combines authority and ad hominem.
Positive authority can also be used to destroy not the content of what is said, but the claim to authority and thus the competence of the speaker:

S1:     — P!
S2:      — That’s exactly what Perelman is saying!
           — We’ve known that since Aristotle!

Thinking is an inner dialog? We’ve known that since Plato! [2]

8.2 Negative authority: “Reductio ad Hitlerum

Negative authority is used to refute a claim in the following case:

S1:     — P!
S2:      — H says exactly the same thing!

H is a person, a party rejected by the community of speech to which S2 belongs, or by the third parties arbitrating the discussion, or possibly by S1 herself; H is an anti-authority, an anti-model, see Imitation.
In the case of a positive authority, the proponent associates the statement with an authority. Here, the the opponent makes the connection between the disputed statement and the negative authority.

Hitler is the paragon of the negative authorities, whose words cannot be repeated. The reductio ad Hitlerum ends any argument.

Last year, you may recall, a number of financial-industry barons went wild over very mild criticism from President Obama. They denounced Mr. Obama as being almost a socialist for endorsing the so-called Volker rule, which would simply prohibit banks backed by federal guarantees from engaging in risky speculation. And as for their reaction to proposals to close a loophole that lets some of them pay remarkably low taxes — well, Stephen Schwarzman, chairman of the Blackstone Group, compared it to Hitler’s invasion of Poland.
Paul Krugman, “Panic of the Plutocrats”, 2011.[2]


[1] Racine, Andromache, 1667. I, 2. Quoted from: http://www.poetryintranslation.com/PITBR/French/AndromacheActI.htm#anchor_Toc169494154 (11-08-2017)

[2] SOCRATES: Very good. Now by ‘thinking’ do you mean the same as I do?
THEAETETUS: What do you mean by that?
SOCRATES: A conversation that the soul has with itself about the objects it contemplates. Of course, I’m only telling you my idea in all ignorance; but this is the kind of picture I have of it. It seems to me that when the soul thinks, is simply carries on a discussion in which it asks itself questions and answers them itself, affirming and denying. And when it arrives at something definite, either by a gradual process or by a sudden leap, when it affirms one thing consistently and without divided counsel, we call that its judgment. So, in my opinion, judge is to make a statement, and a judgment is a statement that is not addressed to another person or spoken aloud, but silently addressed to oneself. And what do you think?
THEAETETUS: I agree with that.

Plato, Theaetetus, 189e-190d. Translated by M. J. Levett, Rev. Myles Burnyeat. In Plato, Complete Works. Edited, with introduction and notes by John M. Cooper; associate editor D. S. Hutchinson. Hackett, Indianapolis/Cambridge, 1997.

[2] www.nytimes.com/2011/10/10/opinion/panic-of-the-plutocrats.html? _r = 1&ref=global-home (11-08-2017)


Assent

ASSENT

Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca discuss the effects of argumentation on the basis of an opposition between to persuade and to convince, the former being a local achievement involving a particular audience, while the latter is a global achievement involving the universal audience. The functional definition of argumentation given at the beginning of the Treatise, however, does not use these terms but speaks of “adherence of minds” and “assent”. In this passage, argumentation is seen as an activity aimed at “inducing or increasing the adherence of the mind” to “theses” that are “presented for its assent” (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1958, p. 4).

The concept of assent refers to Newman’s Grammar of Assent (1870).

The Stoic theory of knowledge defines assent as a voluntary act of the soul that occurs when the soul receives a true impression; this process implies a pre-established harmony between the will and the mind. “The soul wants truth”, and truth is index sui, its own mark. The mark of the true impression is the assent given to it. The skeptics reject this harmony between true representation and assent; truth is not capable of self-certification, i.e. one can give its assent to false representations.

Suspension or abstention from assent, is the basis of the skeptical method of attaining tranquility (ataraxia):

The skeptical way is called […] aporetic either, as some say, from its being puzzled and questioning about everything or from its being at a loss as to whether to assent or dissent. (Sextus Empiricus, Outlines, I, iii)

Assent may be given or withheld by an act of the will:

I think it a very great feat to resist one’s perceptions, to withstand one’s vague opinions, to control one’s inclination to give assent to propositions; […] Carneades performed a Herculean work when, as it had been a wild and formidable monster, he extracted assent, that is to say, vague opinion and rashness from our minds. (Cicero, Ac. II, 34; trans. Yonge, p. 74)

Skepticism characterizes the argumentative situation as a standoff between two equal (isosthenic) and opposing discursive forces, which imposes a suspension of assent, see Force; Stasis.

Common language regards assent as an action. Assent can be given or withheld, just as agreement or authorization can be given or withheld. Rhetorically, the problem of assent complicates the concept of persuasion, by giving the recipient an active role in the process. While people are passively persuaded, they are actively giving their assent. This maintains a balance between the speaker and the audience, as the speaker’s efforts to persuade the audience correspond to the audience’s ability to grant or withhold assent. Withheld assent plays a role in all varieties of rational exchange because it creates a state of doubt that characterizes the third party position, S. Roles.

Assent to a proposition is characterized by varying degrees, as one moves from opinion to belief to knowledge:

— The lowest degree corresponds to opinion, defined as a belief accompanied by an awareness that there are other equally valid opinions.
— The middle degree is that of belief. There are other beliefs, that are not considered false, but less valid than one’s own.
— The strongest degree is that of conviction. The convinced person considers that the proposition to which he or she adheres is true and that opposing arguments are fallacious, perverse or insane.

According to Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, persuasion produces belief, while conviction produces a generalized belief, that defines socially legitimized knowledge.

Argumentation Studies: Contemporary Developments

ARGUMENTATION STUDIES:
SOME CONTEMPORARY DEVELOPMENTS

The long history of argumentation studies spans the history of rhetoric, dialectics and logic. Argumentation studies emerged as an autonomous field only after the Second World War; but it is possible to identify inflections during this short history.

1. The Long History: Dialectics, Logic, Rhetoric

Greek and Latin antiquity ­— From the perspective of classical disciplines, argumentation studies is related to logic, “the art of thinking correctly”; to rhetoric, “the art of speaking well and addressing a group”; and to dialectics, “the art of interacting well, articulating one’s interventions and thoughts with those of others”.
This triad is the basis of the system in which argumentation has been conceptualized, from the time of Aristotle until the late nineteenth century. Argumentation is seen as a theory of convincing reasoning in ordinary language. The central issues are the theory of argument schemes theory, and the theory of validity and soundness, depending on the quality of the premises and the reliability of the principles used to derive conclusions from these premises. see Dialectic; Logic; Rhetoric.

Modern Times — Walter Ong has commented on the decline of dialectical practices (1958) since the Renaissance, the reduction of rhetoric to figures of speech and considerations of literary style, and the critique and rejection of the Aristotelian logic as the exclusive or essential tool of scientific thought. New scientific methods based on observation and experimentation, with increasing use of mathematics, were thought.

Late nineteenth century, early twentieth century — At the end of the nineteenth century rhetorical argument is delegitimized as a source of knowledge. Logic is formalized and becomes a branch of mathematics. The tradition of argumentation studies remains active in law and theology.

2. A symptom: the titles

In French, until the publication of Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca’s Treatise on Argumentation, the books entitled Argumentation were pamphlets containing arguments on specific topics, not theoretical books about argumentation in general, as shown by their full titles:

1857 – Discussion of Etherization Considered from the Standpoint of Medical Responsibility – Argumentation. By Marie Guillaume Alphonse Devergie.
1860 – Arguments on the administrative law of the municipal administration. By Adolphe Chauveau.
1882 – The question of water before the Medical Society of Lyon. Argumentation in reply to Mr. Ferrand. By Mr. Chassagny. BY P.-M. Perrellon.
1922 – Argumentation of the Polish proposal about the border in the industrial part of Upper Silesia.

The content and field of the argument are specified by an additional subtitle: argumentation on, about … The title Argumentation corresponds to modern titles such as “An Essay on —” or “Thesis”; it refers to a textual genre. Thus, it seems that the emergence of the genre “[Theoretical work on] Argumentation” coincided with the disappearance of the genre « Argumentation [on —]« .

In English – Toulmin’s book « The Uses of Argument » apparently” (1958) seems to come in a traditional line of books titled “Argument”. Some of these books offer “an argumentation” in support of a position, such as the following:

Yale C., Some Rules for the Investigation of Religious Truth; and Some Specimens of Argumentation in its Support, 1826.

Others are textbooks for teaching composition and debate:

Brewer E. C., A Guide to English Composition: And the Writings of Celebrated Ancient and Modern Authors, to Teach the Art of Argumentation and the Development of Thought, 1852
Foster, W. T., Argumentation and Debating, 1917.
Baird A. C., Argumentation, Discussion and Debate, 1950.
Lever R., The Arte of Reason, Rightly Termed Witcraft; Teaching a Perfect Way to Argue and Dispute, 1573.

The best known may be:

Whately R., Elements of Rhetoric Comprising an Analysis of the Laws of Moral Evidence and of Persuasion, with Rules for Argumentative Composition and Elocution, 1828.

In the first half of the twentieth century, many such books were published,  mixing didactic purposes were mixed with more theoretical considerations. Toulmin’s work, howeer, does not fit into this tradition, tied to education, to the practices of Speech Communication Departments or English Departments in the United States. No such book is listed in his bibliography, and he cites no work from the field of rhetoric.

In fact, both Toulmin and Perelman both break with a modern tradition and establish a new foundation in the treatment of the concept of argument.

3. 1958 and After: The Constitution of the Field of Argumentation Studies

3.1 A Key Date, 1958 

Chaïm Perelman, Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1958, Traité de l’Argumentation. La Nouvelle Rhétorique = 1969, The New Rhetoric — A Treatise on Argumentation.
Stephen E. Toulmin, 1958, The Uses of Argument.

These two titles are the best known in an impressive constellation of works that all help to define, positively or negatively, the new field of argumentation studies.

— On “Public Relations”: a non rhetorical and non argumentative perspective on persuasion:

Vance Packard, 1957, The Hidden Persuaders.

— On the language of propaganda:

Sergei Chakhotine, 1939, Le Viol des foules par la Propagande Politique.
= 1940, The Rape of the Masses – The Psychology of Totalitarian Political Propaganda.
Jean-Marie Domenach 1950. La Propagande Politique [Political Propaganda]

— In law:

Theodor Viehweg, 1953, Topik und Jurisprudenz. Ein Beitrag zur rechtswissenschaftlichen Grundlagenforschung = 1993, Topics and Law. A Contribution to Basic Research in Law.

— On the rhetorical foundations of literature and Western culture:

Ernst Robert Curtius, 1948, Europäische Litteratur und Lateinisches. Mittelalter.
= 1953, European Literature and the Latin Middle Ages.

— An historical and systematic reconstruction of the field of rhetoric

Heinrich Lausberg, 1960, Handbuch der literarischen Rhetorik.
= 1998, Handbook of Literary Rhetorik. Foundation for Literary Study.

— A history of the adventures of dialectic and rhetoric at the time of the Renaissance

Walter J. Ong, 1958, Ramus. Method and the Decay of Dialogue.

3.2 Extended theories of argumentation

These theories have been developed since the 1970s, mainly in French:

— In a linguistic perspective:

Oswald Ducrot, 1972, Dire et ne pas Dire [To Say and Not To Say] — 1973, La Preuve et le Dire [Proving and Saying] — & al. 1980, Les Mots du Discours [The Words of Discourse] Jean-Claude Anscombre et Oswald Ducrot, 1983, L’Argumentation dans la Langue [Argumentation within Language]

— From a discursive and cognitive point of view:

Jean-Blaise Grize, 1982, De la Logique à l’Argumentation [From Logic to Argumentation]

3.3 The Dialectical and Critical approaches

The work of Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca work is seen as a revival of rhetorical argumentation, which has its origins in Aristotle’s Rhetoric. In the same vein, Hamblin’s seminal work revived argumentation as a dialectical and critical thinking, based on the concept of fallacies, which originated in Aristotle’s On Sophistical Refutations:

Charles L. Hamblin, 1970, Fallacies

3.4. The Pragma-Dialectical Trend

Since the 1980s, Frans van Eemeren and Rob Grootendorst have developed the “Pragma-dialectical” approach. They reformulated the study of argumentation in terms of speech acts, linguistic pragmatics and a new conception of dialectics. They developed a powerful system of guidelines for evaluating  arguments as a system of rules for the rational resolution of differences of opinion, S. Norms; Rules; Evaluation.

Frans H. van Eemeren & Rob Grootendorst, 1984, Speech Acts in Argumentative Discussions A Theoretical Model for the Analysis of Discussions Directed Towards Solving Conflicts of Opinion.
Frans H. van Eemeren & Rob Grootendorst, 1992, Argumentation, Communication, and Fallacies.
Frans H. van Eemeren & Rob Grootendorst, 2004, A Systematic Theory of Argumentation – The Pragma-Dialectical Approach.

Since 1986, a reference conference on argumentation is organized has been held in Amsterdam every four years. The series of proceedings proposes an up-to-date vision of the discipline (van Eemeren & al. (1987, 1991, 1995, 1999, 2003, 2006, 2010).

3.5 The Informal Logic Trend

The “Informal Logic” of Anthony Blair, Ralph Johnson, Douglas Walton and John Woods combines argumentation studies with a logic and a philosophy that take into account the ordinary dimensions of speech and reasoning. The focus is on the evaluation of the arguments and their educational applications in the development of critical thinking. The concept of argument scheme is defined to include their corresponding counterarguments, and, on this basis, a new approach to argument criticism is developed.

Howard Kahane, 1971, Logic and Contemporary Rhetoric The Use of Reason in Everyday Life.
Ralph H. Johnson & J. Anthony Blair, 1977, Logical Self-Defense.
Ralph H. Johnson, 1996, The Rise of Informal Logic.
Anthony Blair & Ralph H. Johnson, 1980, Informal Logic – The First International Symposium.
John Woods & Douglas Walton, 1989, Fallacies. Selected Papers 1972-1982.
Douglas Walton, Chris Reed & Fabrizio Macagno, 2008, Argumentation Schemes.
Anthony Blair, 2012, Groundwork in the Theory of Argumentation.

3.6 Argumentation and ordinary interactions

The Pragma-Dialectic and the Informal Logic schools of argumentation place particular emphasis on dialogue. The first works to integrate the perspectives of conversation and interaction analysis are found in:

Robert Cox & Charles A. Willard (eds), 1982, Advances in Argumentation Theory and Research.
Jacques Moeschler (1985). Argumentation et Conversation. [Argumentation and Conversation] Frans H. van Eemeren & others (eds), 1987, Proceedings of the [ISSA] Conference on Argumentation 1986.

4. Relations with Other Disciplines

The leading research programs maintain various relationships with the rhetorical, dialectical and logical heritage, as well as with language studies, philosophy and education. The table below attempts to give an idea of these relationships.

0: no significant link

+: the number of stars indicates the importance of the link

 

New Rhetoric Arg. within Language Natural
Logic
Fallacies
(Hamblin)
Pragma-
dialectics Informal Logic
Rhetoric +++ + + 0 ++ +
Dialectic + 0 0 +++ +++ +++
Classical Logic 0 0 +++ +++ ++ +++
Grammar,

Linguistics

0 +++ ++ 0 ++ +
Philosophy +++ + + ++ + +++
Teaching,

Education

++ 0 0 0 + +++

5. Dialogues between the main trend theories

The arrows represent commonalities, solidarities or affiliations between different schools

6. Argumentation studies, argumentation scholars:
How to name the field and its specialists?

The talk about of the “revival of the field of argumentation” in the fifties should be taken with a grain of salt. First, the phrase is ambiguous: it does not refer to the field of argumentative practices; but to the theory of argumentation, the meta-language used to study this practice. Second, it is also a bit simplistic: although discontinuous, reflections on argumentation have been going on for more than two millennia, not half a century. The point is that, since the fifties, a learning community has formed around a large and diverse corpus of studies that take as their object a set of practices that are directly characterized as argumentative.

How do we identify a field of study, its object and its specialists? The situation is clear when each of these different realities is designated by a specific term. This is the case for example with the economists, specialists of economics, whose object is the study of the economy (production and consumption of goods and services). But the term argumentation refers both to the object of study, as in “everyday argumentation”, and to the study itself, when, especially in the titles of books, “argumentation” shortens “theory of argumentation”.

The spectacular appearance of papers and books entitled “… Argumentation …” hides a deeper reality, the change in the disciplinary status of logic. All the ancient books entitled Logic, dealing with the logic of terms, quantifiers, connectors, analyzed and non-analyzed propositions, etc., are actually theories, logic-based treatises on argumentation, such as, for example the Port-Royal Logic, or The Art of Thinking ([1662]). Basically, we now use the word argumentation to refer to a field of study or to a theoretical book because, since the mathematization of logic in the late nineteenth century, the title Logic can only be used in the domain of formal logic, and is no longer available as a reference to natural language argumentation. Exceptions are rare. In French, one can think of works such as the Elements of classical logic (François Chenique 1975, vol. I: The art of thinking and judging; t II. The art of reasoning), or especially Jacques Maritain’s Introduction to Logic ([1923]), which is perhaps one of the last books to offer, under the heading of Logic, a traditional “art of thinking”, inspired by neo-Thomistic philosophy. This logic is, in this respect, the first in the series of “non formal”, “substantial”, “natural” logics… that flourished at the end of the last century; it is a treatise on argumentation as a theory of logical reasoning within natural language.

So we are left with the problem of naming the field by a single unambiguous term. Following the example of polemology, the study of war, it could be called argumentology. following the same line, the corresponding professionals would be called argumentologists, a figure clearly distinct from that of the arguers. But the word sounds jargon-laden and slightly ridiculous. In any case, usage will have the last word, and, at present, no one seems to feel an urgent need for such words. Argumentology does not appear in the monumental and foundational Proceedings on the Fourth International Conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation of 1999; one instance in 2003, one in 2007; and no occurrence of argumentologist or any derived name of that kind (van Eemeren & al. (eds.), 1999, 2003, 2007).