RESUMPTION OF SPEECH – STRAW MAN FALLACY

The term straw man fallacy refers to a specfic instance of a broader phenomenon: the resumption and representation of discourse and meaning.

The argumentative space is an interactive and textual arena organized around an argumentative question. Within this space, co-oriented, anti-oriented, and third-party discourses articulate and overlap. Argumentative interventions constantly refer to and influence each other in various ways, ranging from explicit quotation, to more or less distorted repetition and reformulation, to the most allusive expression.

1. Resumption of speech

1.1 Direct, explicit quotation

An explicit quotation is expressed in a passage between quotation marks, it includes its space-time coordinates, so as to construct an unambiguous object: who said what, when and where.

Explicit quotations can be rejected by showing that they are incomplete, unduly decontextualized, or misunderstood by the author of the quotation, see authority; circumstances. Accordingly, an interpretive stasis may arise over what the text really means and what the author has really said. It may be argued that a direct quotation is already an interpretation, and an indirect quotation certainly is, see interpretation.

In the case of a direct quotation, the source text exists.

The term « straw man fallacy » refers to a specific instance of a broader phenomenon: the resumption and representation of discourse and meaning.

The argumentative space is an interactive and textual arena organized around an argumentative question. Within this space, co-oriented, anti-oriented, and third-party discourses articulate and overlap. Argumentative interventions in this space constantly refer to and influence each other in various ways, ranging from explicit quotation to more or less distorted repetition and reformulation to the most allusive expression.

1. Resumption of speech
1. Direct, explicit quotation

An explicit quotation is expressed in a passage between quotation marks and includes its space-time coordinates to construct an unambiguous object: who said what, when, and where.

However, explicit quotations can be rejected if they are incomplete, decontextualized, or if the author of the quotation has misunderstood them. Consequently, there may be an interpretive stasis over what the text really means and what the author has really said.

One could argue that a direct quotation is already an interpretation; certainly, an indirect quotation is see « interpretation. »
In the case of a direct quotation, the source text exists. In the case of an indirect quotation, however, the following cases, the very existence of such a text is problematic.

1.2 Indirect quotation

An indirect quotation of a position is presented by the speaker as a reformulation that paraphrases or rephrases the original statement, it in order to clarify its meaning and intent. An indirect quotation may be dismissed as tendentious or ludicrous if it proposes an unfair reinterpretation of the original position by implying something that was never said, see Orientation;Epitrope; Prolepsis

1.3 Allusion

An allusion to another discourse is merely a trace that allows one to roughly locate the source discourse, without the possibility of identifying the author or the work. Its vague character is its best guarantee against contradiction, and a veil of mystery suits some kinds of authority well.

2. Anticipating contradictions

The discourse can also be attributed to a voice staged in a polyphonic space. This is seen in the case of anticipated objections, see interaction; prolepsis.

3. Straw Man

The discrepancy between what the quoted party says and what the quotation makes them say form the basis for the fallacy known as the straw man or scarecrow fallacy.

An irrefutable rebuttal must relate to what the other person actually said, see relevance. This requirement has a clear meaning in the case of written and referenced statements. In ordinary discourse, no statement is completely out of context, and its meaning is always open to interpretation. Therefore, it is often unclear whether someone has said something in full. In an argumentative situation, what the other person has actually said is not a prerequisite but an issue in the argument, not a prerequisite.

The straw man fallacy is a charge of malicious misrepresentation of the divergent discourse. The phrase is a metaphor for straw man, which literally refers to:

a mass of straw formed to resemble a man. (Thes., Straw man).

As a metaphor, a straw man is:

1. a weak or imaginary opposition (such as an argument or adversary) set up only to be easily refuted.
2. a person set up to serve as a cover for a usually questionable transaction (Merriam-Webster, Straw man).

Given meaning (1), the straw man or scarecrow strategy is a tendentious, repulsive, and self-refuting, reformulation, of a previously statement.
Given meaning (2), the straw man strategy corresponds to a position that obscures the speaker’s true position. Such a position is advanced in order to mislead the public or the speaker’s opponents on a false track, see red herring.

Argumentative STRATEGY

A strategy is a complex set of coordinated actions, planned by an actor in order to achieve a specific goal. Strategies can be either adversarial or cooperative.
Adversarial are developed in non-cooperative arenas, such as war, game of chess, or commercial competition. Such strategies are used to gain a decisive advantage over a competitor who is pursuing an antagonistic goal. Antagonistic strategies are covert, and are discovered by the adversary as they are implemented, see manipulation. Cooperative strategies are developed by partners working together to achieve a common goal, that benefits both. The strategic intent is transparent to all partners. For example, a research strategy is an action plan to solve a problem; teachers and students work together to implement a pedagogical strategy.

In the military field, the strategy is developed before combat operations and tactics are developed during combat operations; tactics refer to the local implementation of a global strategy.

1. Argumentative Strategies

An argumentative strategy is a set of speech choices planned and coordinated to support and enforce a claim before an audience.
Argumentative strategies are a subset of language and communication strategies, speech and text construction strategies, and interaction strategies.

An argumentative strategy is adversarial when it is designed to help the speaker gain the upper hand over the opponent. What one loses, the other gains.

There are two cases in which argumentative strategies can be cooperative:
— First, when the speakers have the same argumentative role, share a common point of view and cooperate to support it.
— Second, they may have different roles, and without identifying with those roles, they may cooperate in constructing a common solution.

The term argumentative tactics is not commonly used, but could be useful to refer to local argumentative phenomena as part of the global argumentative action. The decision to use such argumentation schemes can be seen as a tactical move, an implementation of a general policy. However, this is not sufficient to define an argumentative strategy which requires the use of different kinds of instruments, at all levels of discourse, such as the coordination of word choice, argument choice and self-representation (as open/closed to objections for example).
An argument scheme can be identified on the basis of a short passage, while the study of a strategy requires an extended corpus that fully represents a position.

2. Some argumentative strategies

The first strategic level is that of choosing the answer to the question, see stasis.

– A defensive strategy merely aims at blocking the opponent’s discourse, especially by refuting his arguments and/or ruining the discourse.

– A counterproposal strategy ignores the opponent’s proposition P and argues a proposition Q that is incompatible with P. In such a context, argumentation may take an explanatory turn, see explanation; rhetorical question.

– Bentham has identified types of political parliamentary strategies (§2) which he calls fallacious, but which can be fallacious or fair.

– Strategies of authority
– Strategies instilling fear or hatred
– Strategies of stalling
– Strategies of confusion, an inexhaustible group.

These strategies group together sets of arguments that basically aim to postpone debate in the hope that it will never take place. Overall, they might be called « pre-emptive strategies« :  “The conditions are not yet right for you to join the European Union ».

– Conciliatory vs. breakthrough strategies are characterized by the acceptance vs. refusal of concessions, the flexibility vs. radicalization of the proposals presented as compatible / incompatible. Conciliatory strategies use information accepted by the audience, presenting the conclusions and their recommendations as a continuation, a logical consequence, of previous beliefs and actions. Disruptive strategies defy the audience, rejecting all its representations in order to replace them with new ones. The first strategy is reformist, the second is revolutionary.

3. Two Strategies of the Apostle Paul in Confronting the Athenians

These last two strategies are used successively by Paul, the apostle of Christianity.
First, in the following passages, he addresses the Athenians for the first time. In order to meet this new audience  (captatio benevolentiae) he begins his speech with a reference to the their own  culture and beliefs, see rhetoric; beliefs of the audience.
Continuity: Paul’s focus on his audience is evident in the underlined phrases.

21 The one amusement the Athenians and the foreigners living there seem to have is to discuss and listen to the latest ideas. 22 So Paul stood before the whole council of the Areopagus and made this speech: “Men of Athens, I have seen for myself how extremely scrupulous you are in all religious matters,
23 because, as I strolled around looking at your sacred monuments, I noticed among other things an altar inscribed: To an Unknown God. In fact, the unknown God you revere is the one I proclaim to you.
Acts of the Apostles, 17, 21-23[1]

Nevertheless, the message was met with skepticism by the Athenians. In particular, they questioned the resurrection of the dead.

Later, under very different circumstances, Paul claims a break between his message and “the wisdom of the wise”.
Disruption: the two underlined passages are a challenge to all classical Greek culture.

17 For Christ did not send me to baptize, but to preach the gospel, not in cleverness of speech, so that the cross of Christ would not be made void. 18 For the word of the cross is foolishness to those who are perishing, but to us who are being saved it is the power of God. 19 “I will destroy the wisdom of the wise, and the cleverness of the clever I will set aside.” 20 Where is the wise man? Where is the scribe? Where is the debater of this age? Has not God made foolish the wisdom of the world? 21 For since in the wisdom of God the world through its wisdom did not come to know God, God was well pleased through the foolishness of the message preached to save those who believe. 22 For indeed Jews ask for signs and Greeks search for wisdom; 23 but we preach Christ crucified, to Jews a stumbling block and to Gentiles foolishness.
First Letter of St. Paul to the Corinthians, 17-23.[2]

3. “Strategic Maneuvering”

Pragma-dialectics has introduced the concept of strategic maneuvering to reconcile dialectical and rhetorical demands. The rhetorical demand is defined as a search for efficiency: each party wants its point of view to triumph as it is. The dialectical demand is the search for rationality. During an encounter, each party pursues these two goals simultaneously. In practice, the dialectical dimension is evaluated according to the pragma-dialectical rules for the rational resolution of a disagreement. The rhetorical dimension is essentially communicative and presentational. In particular, it updates the classical requirement that the issue and position must be presented in the correct language or format for the target audience (van Eemeren, Houtlosser 2006).

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[1] Cited after www.catholic.org/bible/book.php?id=51&bible_chapter=17 (05-05-2017)

[2] Cited after www.biblescripture.net/1Corinthians.html (05-05-2017)

STASIS

The word stasis is of Greek origin; it is translated in Latin as quaestio, and, “in modern parlance”, as issue (Nadeau 1964, p. 366).

As used in rhetorical argumentation, the word stasis is a medical metaphor; medicine is a valuable source of examples and an important analogical resource domain for argumentative theory see natural sign.
In medicine, a stasis is defined as “a slowing or stoppage of the normal flow of a bodily fluid or semifluid” (MW, Stasis). A stasis results in congestion, that is, in “an excessive accumulation especially of blood or mucus in an organ” (MW, Congest), and the medical arts must be applied to restore the proper flow of fluids.

Similarly, in the realm of human action and interaction, a situation of stasis occurs when the consensual circulation of discourse is blocked by a contradiction or a doubt, and the arts of argument must be employed to restore the normal, cooperative flow of dialogue. Nadeau defines the situation of stasis as “a position of balance or rest” established between two opposing discourses (id., p. 369).
In a state of stasis, the equilibrium is that of an aporia: “the Greek verb aporein describes the situation of the person who, faced with an obstacle, finds no way through, finds no passage”; the associated psychic state is embarrassment (Pellegrin 1997, art Aporia). In philosophical usage, an aporia is an unresolvable contradiction.

1. The classical theory of stasis

The first systematic formulation of a theory of stasis is found in Hermagoras of Temnos (late 2nd century BC; Benett 2005). The technique of stasis was used by rhetoricians before Hermagoras, but he was the first to formally identify and name the concept along with four basic types of stasis (Nadeau 1964, p. 370). This theory is best known through the treatise On Stasis of Hermogene of Tarsus, a Greek rhetorician of the second century (Hermogene, AR; Patillon 1988).

Hermogene distinguishes between:

(i) On the one hand, misconceived questions, on which no argumentative debate can be built, either because their answer is obvious, or because they are undecidable; these questions are “incapable of stasis” (id., p. 385); in other words, they cannot be discussed rationally.
(ii) On the other hand, are the well-conceived questions, which can be discussed rationally.

Hermogene organizes the different kinds of general, well-conceived questions as follows (after Patillon, p. 57 sq.).

– Stasis of conjecture: Is the fact established?
– Stasis on the definition, on “the name of an act” (Nadeau, p. 393): Someone robs a private person in a temple; is he a temple plunderer?
– The next step is the qualification of the act; it can be rational (discussed on the basis of good reason) or legal (discussed on the basis of an existing law).

The legal qualification is discussed along the following lines (from Patillon, p. 59).

The accused does not admit to the maliciousness of the fact: antilepsis (“contradiction, objection”, Bailly, [Antilepsis])

The defendant admits to the malice of the fact: opposition

• He accepts responsibility: compensation
• He rejects responsibility:

— and blames the victim: counter-accusation
— and blames someone or something else:

≠ who or what can be guilty: report of accusation
≠ who or what cannot be guilty: excuse

3. The authentic “rhetorical question”

A stasis is a question, the knot of a conflict that articulates a judicial action in order to resolve it. The Rhetoric at Herennius defines the first stage of a judicial encounter as the determination of the question that constitutes the cause (Ad Her., I, 18, 17):

The issue [constitutio] is determined by the joining of the primary plea of the defense with the charge of the plaintiff (Ad Her., I, 18, 11)

Quintilian explains that the first thing he does to resolve an argumentative situation is to find the quæstio, the question, or the issue. The question “arises” when a statement made by one party is contradicted by the other party. Notice that the following text assumes that adultery was a crime; that it was legal to kill an adulterer; and, apparently, that the executioner was prosecuted for killing the man while also killing the woman:

5. So, first of all, then, (and this is not difficult to determine, but must be examined first and foremost) I settled what each party wished to establish, and then by what means, in the following way. I considered what the prosecutor would say first: either an admitted point or a contested point. If it was admitted, the question could not be in it. 6. I would then proceed to the defendant‘s answer and consider it in the same way. Sometimes, too, what was elicited there was admitted. But as soon as there was any disagreement, the question arose.
The procedure was like this: ‘You killed a man’ -‘I did kill him”. The fact is admitted, so I pass on. 7. The accused should give a reason why he killed him. He may say ‘It is lawful to kill an adulterer with an adulteress’. It is admitted that there is such a law. We can then move on to a third point, that may be disputed. ‘They were not guilty of adultery’ – ‘they were’. So, the question arises.
(IO, VII, 1, 5-7; my emphasis).

The question, that is to say, the point to be judged, is inferred from the nature of the accused’s response to the accuser. If the parties agree, the facts are considered to be established or « peaceful »; if they disagree, they are disputed.

Early in On Invention, Cicero criticizes Hermagoras for taking too general a view of argumentative questions, including philosophical as well as scientific questions: “Can the senses be trusted? What is the shape of the world? How big is the sun?” (On Inv., I, 8, VI). Cicero limits the theory of questions to those belonging to the proper domain of the orator, the epidictic, deliberative, and judicial genres. The concept of question, however, has no such predetermined limit.

The concept of stasis as a question is the counterpart in the rhetorical domain of the Aristotelian concept of problem in the dialectical domain (Aristotle, Top., I, 11, 104b-105a10, pp. 25-28); a question is a rhetorical problem. The theory of stasis is the theory of “rhetorical questions” in the proper sense:

The constitutio of the auctor ad Herennium, is thus the functionally dual stasis of Greek rhetoric […] whose psychical counterpart is the articulate question, or, as Sextus Empiricus (Against the Geometricians, III, 4) styled it, the “rhetorical question” (Dieter 1950, p. 360). [1]

This meaning of the term rhetorical question is quite different from the current meaning, which denotes a question to which the speaker knows the answer, knowing that his interlocutors also know the answer, and whose value is that of a challenge to potential opponents. To avoid confusion, we’ll use the term argumentative question, see argumentative question.

4. Example

Faced with the accusation, “You stole my moped!”, the defendant can adopt different strategies that determine the nature of the ensuing debate.

(1) Deny having committed the act; the fact is not established (“conjectural stasis”)

I didn’t even touch your moped!

(2) Admit that was a theft, and blame someone else:

It’s not me, it’s him!

Idem, blaming the author of the accusation:

It’s not me, it’s you, who accuses me, but you destroyed your own moped to get the insurance premium.

This strategy, like the strategy of reorientation of the fact, manifests the tendency to radical refutation, by symmetrical inversion, see reciprocity; causality.

 (3) Recognizing the fact, denying that it was a theft, and re-categorizing the action under a more honorable label, see categorization. This can be accomplished by a number of different strategies:

But this is my moped; you stole it from me last year!
But this moped is mine, you pretended to buy it, but you never paid me.
I didn’t steal it, I borrowed it. I asked your permission.

(4) The same, but with various extenuating circumstances:

The gang leader made me do it.
I was just taking my grandmother to the hospital

(5) The same, apologizing:

I made a mistake, Mr. President.

(6) Recuse the tribunal (stasis on the procedure); disqualify the accuser:

It is not for the victor to judge the vanquished.
But who are you to judge me?
It suits you (= the accuser), you the gang leader, to complain about a theft! This should be settled by a good fist fight, as usual.

 (7) Admit the fact and claim to be proud of it:

You were drunk, I saved your life by taking your moped, and you should thank me!

Perhaps because of its spectacular character, the last case is known in the rhetoric of figures as an antiparastasis, see orientation.
All these strategies are equally interesting, and all might deserve to be known by a specific name.

Some of these strategies are mutually exclusive, see kettle argumentation.

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[1] I couldn’t find this main reference in my edition.

SOPHISM, SOPHIST

The words sophism, sophist refer to very different realities in philosophy and in ordinary language.

1. The Historical Sophists

In ancient Greece, the Sophists were the first to implement a philosophy of language in their interactions with their fellow citizens. Through calculated discursive interventions called “sophisms” by their opponents, the Sophists destabilize the peaceful current representations of the world as seen through current language. They emphasize the “arbitrariness” of language (in the Saussurian sense of “arbitrary”), and thus provoking naive speakers who consider language to be transparent and unproblematic. These discourses are not intended to deceive their listeners, but to show them the paradoxes of their current thinking and discourse.

In the Euthydemus, Plato stages Socrates deconstructing sophistical arguments, such as the following. Dionysodorus is a sophist, Ctesippus his naive interlocutor:

[Dionysodorus:] — […] And your father turns out to be […] a dog.
— And so does yours, said Ctesippus.
— You will admit all this in a moment, Ctesippus, if you answer my questions, said Dionysodorus. Tell me, have you got a dog?
— Yes, and a brute of a one too, said Ctesippus.
— And has he got puppies?
— Yes indeed, and they are just like him.
— And so, the dog is their father?
— Yes, I saw him mounting the bitch myself, he said.
— Well then: isn’t the dog yours?
— Certainly, he said.
— Then since he is a father and is yours, the dog turns out to be your father, and you are the brother of the puppies, aren’t you?
Plato, Euthydemus, 298d-e. CW, p. 737

This argument is not intended to convince Ctesippus that he is the son and brother of a dog. The Sophist does not deceive his partners, he leaves them perplexed and angry.

The Sophists devised thought-provoking paradoxes such as the following one:

Antiphon the Sophist claimed that the law, by obliging man to testify the truth in courts, often compels us to do wrong to one who has done us no harm, that is, to contradict the first precept of justice.
Émile Bréhier, [History of Philosophy], 1928.[1]

The Sophists, along with the Skeptics, represent an essential intellectual movement for argumentation theory. The Sophists established the principle of debate between irreducibly contradictory discourses, as the basic cases presented in Antiphon’s Second Tetralogy, about a prosecution for accidental homicide; the case is discussed as follows:

First speech for the prosecution
Reply to the same charge
Second speech for the prosecution
Second speech for the defense[2]

The intellectual and social contributions of the historical Sophists have been stigmatized by Platonic idealism which has imposed on them deformations that persisted until Hegel and have survived in common language.
The ancient sophists were no more sophists in the modern sense of the word than Duns Scott was a dunce.

2. Contemporary Use: The Sophism, an Intentional Paralogism

In contemporary usage, a sophism is an eristic discourse, that is, a deceptive and manipulative discourse whose intentions are difficult to unmask.
Since any kind of discourse can be denounced by calling it a “sophism”, the concept is essential for analyzing the polemical reception of argumentative discourse.

A sophism is a paralogism wrapped in malicious language, produced to pull the rug out from under the opponent. The distinction between sophisms and paralogisms is based on an accusation of deceptive intent, which may or may not be properly substantiated.
Paralogism is on the side of error and stupidity; sophism is a paralogism that serves the interests or passions of its author. According to the principle of “who benefits from the crime?”, such an “error” is accused of malice by the recipient and potential victim. One moves from description to the accusation which is embedded in the negative contemporary use of sophist, sophistry, see fallacies: Aristotle fundamental list, Paralogism.

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[1] Émile Bréhier, Histoire de la Philosophie, Vol. 1, Antiquité et Moyen Âge [Antiquity and  the Middle Ages] Paris: PUF, 1981, p. 74.

[2] Antiphon, Second Tetralogy. KJ. Maidment, ed. Cited after www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0020%3Aspeech%3D3

SLIPPERY SLOPE counterargument

The slippery slope counterargument is another name for the argument of gradualism and direction. It consists in saying that such a controversial action, A, apparently convincingly supported by such and such arguments, should not be accepted, even if it seems reasonable, because, if it were, the same principles and arguments could be repeated, now to argue for another action of the same kind A+, which is much more controversial, and then for another action A++, which one would find quite unacceptable. In practice, accepting A removes all possible limits, “once you start, you can’t stop.
The slippery slope counter-argument is based on the precautionary principle, which aims to avoid the risk of expanding the decision made.

In a debate on the legalization of drugs, a participant proposes the legalization of cannabis:

AC. — [Legalization, or rather domestication] will not eliminate the problem of drugs. But it is a more rational solution, that will eliminate the mafias, reduce crime, and also reduce all the fantasies that feed drug use itself and are part of drug marketing.

The opponent counters this pragmatic argument with a slippery slope argument,

You legalize cannabis, fine. Then cocaine, then opium, then heroin… And what about crack? You have got to legalize that too. And then ice, and then new products, all the nastiness that man is capable of creating. They will have to be legalized as they come along, otherwise the black markets will organize themselves around the products that remain prohibited.
Le Nouvel Observateur [The New Observer][1], October 12-18, 1989

For a refutation of the same position based on its perverse consequences, see pragmatic argument; for a refutation based on the very formulation and definition of the project, see related words.

2. The slippery slope refutation is based on the following operations

Question: — What should we do about the drug problem?
S1 — We should legalize hashish, for this or that reason.

Opponent S2 is reluctant to accept this suggestion, even though the reasons given by S1 are not entirely unacceptable. However, S2 refuses to engage in S1’s reasoning process on the basis of the following analysis of the situation.

(i) Consider the broader graded category that includes the objects in question, see categorization; classification:

The category “drugs” includes cannabis, cocaine, then opium, then heroin, crack, ice and so on.
Cocaine is worse than cannabis, … and ice is worse than crack.

So, cannabis is the low point, the weak point through which one enters the graded category of drugs.
Note that this graded category is open to the worst products, as noted by the generic clause « and all the nastiness that man is capable of creating ».

(ii) An evaluation
The decision to legalize cannabis may be controversial, but the legalization of heroin would clearly be unacceptable, and the legalization of crack cocaine would be unthinkable, even outrageous. This gradation reflects gradation (i).

(iii) A driving mechanism
The decision to legalize cannabis is related to the decision to legalize cocaine, opium, etc.; the same question will inevitably arise about these harder drugs:

Should we legalize cocaine? Should we legalize opium?

The legalization of cannabis would set a precedent; the same arguments used to justify the legalization of cannabis (“eliminate the mafias, reduce crime, and also reduce all the fantasies about drug use”) could well be used to legalize cocaine, opium, even crack and ice. Given the success of these arguments in justifying the legalization of cannabis, it would be almost impossible to dismiss them if they were to be used to justify the legalization of cocaine, etc. By accepting A, one has taken a decisive step toward accepting A+ and A++.

(iv) Conclusion: Let’s reject the legalization of hashish

The structure of the slippery slope argument parallels that of the argument from waste:

Slippery slope: Don’t start! if you do, you won’t be able to stop!
Argument from waste: Since you started, you must continue!

The gradualist strategy and the slippery slope argument consider a hierarchical class of elements, see gradualism. The question is should the status of these items be changed?
The gradualist favors a change of status, and advocates a gradual, progressive dissolution of the existing hierarchy.
The opponent believes that the status of the top elements cannot be changed in any way, and uses a slippery slope argument to counter the gradualist by opposing any change, however slight, in the status of the lower elements.

The driving mechanisms invoked (often implicitly) at level 3 can be very different:
— Psychological: “To steal an egg is to steal an ox.
— Organic, causal: The slippery slope label is metaphorical, and clearly illustrates the physical movement of an ever-accelerating physical fall. One could also think of a domino effect, where the first domino to fall pushes the second domino down, and the importance of each falling domino becomes greater and greater.

— Strategic: Bad intentions can be attributed to the proponent. The opponent may admit (as he implicitly does in our example) that the proponent is well-intentioned, that her stated goal is indeed her authentic goal, and that she does not see the extreme consequence that could result, see motives and reasons. In this case, the proponent is portrayed as a naive or idealistic advocate, who doesn’t see the consequences of what she is advocating, but still maintains her moral integrity. This development reflects Hedge’s recommendation, not to attribute hidden and manipulative intentions to the adversary (sixth rule for honorable controversy, see rules §2.2).

Nevertheless, with a polemical intent, the advocate could be portrayed as a Machiavellian character developing a gradualist strategy, with the manipulative intent of implementing progressively the most extreme measures, starting with the relatively benign one. Cannabis would be the bait that initiates a priming strategy.

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[1] Le Nouvel Observateur is a French weekly political and cultural newspaper.

SORITE

The word sorite comes from the Greek word soros, which means, “heap”.
A sorite is a discourse that progresses by repeating the same syntactic form, with the same discursive function.

1. The Sorite Paradox

The sorite of the heap is one of the famous paradoxes proposed by Eubulide, a Greek philosopher, contemporary of Aristotle. The paradox progresses by repeating the same action:

One grain of wheat is not enough to make a heap of wheat, nor two grains, nor three grains, and so on.
In other words, if n grains do not make a heap, then n + 1 will not make a heap.
So no number of grains of wheat can make up a heap of wheat.

Similarly, and if you take one grain out of a heap of wheat, you still have a heap of wheat, and so on, down to the last grain. So, a grain of wheat is itself a heap of wheat. [1]

This paradox can be illustrated by any collective name: cluster, crowd, flock, army, collection, bouquet, collective…

2. Rhetorical Sorite

A rhetorical sorite (gradatio, climax) is a discourse that progresses by repeating the same cause-effect, begetter-begotten relationship, or simply a temporal sequence of related events, building up to a climax, as in the following poem:

 Cursed be
The father of the woman
Of the blacksmith who forged the iron of the axe
With which the woodcutter fell the oak
In which was carved the bed
Where the great-grandfather was born 
Of the man who drove the car
In which your mother
Met your father!

 Robert Desnos, [The Dove of the Ark], [1923]. [2]

3. Logical Sorite

In logic, the term sorite is sometimes used to refer to a polysyllogism, a chain of syllogisms in which the conclusion of rhe preceding syllogism is used as a premise for the next.
Serial argumentation corresponds to the same phenomenon.
The « heap » property is common to sorites properly speaking, to polysyllogism and to linked argumentation, but the mechanisms of concatenation are specific to each case.

4. Chinese Sorite

The term « Chinese sorite » or « Confucian sorite » is used by Masson-Oursel ([1912], p. 17) to designate « arguments [argumentations] expressing a sequence of means implemented by human activity in view of an end » (1912, p. 20). Eno (2016, p.11) speaks of “sorite” or “chain syllogism”[2].
The sorite posits a desirable state and considers the stages on way to it. The progressive sorite starts from the first stage and proceeds to the final goal. The source of the progression may be considered causal, instrumental or indeterminate, in which case the succession appears purely temporal.

The regressive sorite states the goal and enumerates the stages backwards, to the first, basic stage.

In the short Confucian treatise The Great Learning, a regressive sorite is immediately followed by a progressive sorite with identical content. Regressive sorite:

In ancient times, those who wished to make bright virtue brilliant in the world first ordered their states; those who wished to order their states first aligned their households; those who wished to align their households first refined their persons; those who wished to refine their persons first balanced their minds; those who wished to balance their minds first perfected the genuineness of their intentions; those who wished to perfect the genuineness of their intentions first extended their understanding; extending one’s understanding lies in aligning affairs.
The Great Learning, R. Eno, p. 12

In the progressive sorite, « the first condition spreads, as it were, into new conditions which arise from each other. Thus, in Mencius IV, 1, § 27, each term is united with the next by the expression: ‘the main fruit (chĕu) of A is B' ». (Id., p. 19). The preceding regressive sorite corresponds to the following progressive sorite:

Only after affairs have been aligned may one’s understanding be fully extended. Only after one’s understanding is fully extended may one’s intentions be perfectly genuine. Only after one’s intentions are perfectly genuine may one’s mind be balanced. Only after one’s mind is balanced may one’s person be refined. Only after one’s person is refined may one’s household be aligned. Only after one’s household is aligned may one’s state be ordered. Only after one’s state is ordered may the world be set at peace.
The Great Learning. R. Eno, p. 12

The difference between the progressive and regressive sorites is purely in the textual organization of the steps that make them up. These steps are listed in the form of a parallelism: « if A, then B« . This expression belongs to the « if… then… » family, which is used to indicate the logical implication that gives the sorite the appearance of reasoning. Masson-Oursel proposes a second formulation that expresses the progression (or regression) characteristic of the sorite:

Each step forward represents an anticipation that is subsequently justified, thanks to the formula: « in view of B, there is a way, a path to follow (yeou tao); A being given, then (seu) B is given. (Masson Oursel, 1912, p. 20).

These sorites describe a cursus educationis, the Confucian program of education. Progress along this path is not determined by any logical or causal inference. It is a way shown by the master to his privileged disciples, leading to the fulfillment of their human nature.

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[1] The concept of a heap is three-dimensional, typically pyramid-shaped. Two or three grains cannot constitute a heap because they do not fit, or fit poorly, on top of each other, the heap is not stable. On the other hand, it is possible to form a heap of four grains, from a base of three grains. Therefore, we could say that the heap of grains starts with four grains.

[2] Robert Desnos, La Colombe de l’Arche, 1923. In Œuvres [Works]. Paris: Gallimard, Quarto, 1999, p. 536.

[3] http://hdl.handle.net/2022/234242

 

Argument from SILENCE

In an interaction, the silence of a ratified participant can be a substantial argument tending to reject the discussion (§1).
The classic argument from silence (§2.1) applies in the same way to modern media (§2.2).
In law, the laws on silence defines the right of the accused to remain silent (§3.1), and the obligation to judge even if the law is apparently silent.

1. In interaction: Silence as Disagreement

As in any interaction, a ratified participant in an argumentative interaction, may shut up and remain silent.
Participants and third parties are expected to speak at specific times, according to the specific rules of the interaction, and to remain silent when they don’t have the floor.
Third parties may impose, or suggest, silence on participants, especially when their interventions  overlap, when they speak out of their turn, or to disrupt an opponent’s speech.
Conversely, a silent party is not a participant waiting to speak, but a ratified party who is expected to speak and does not speak. This silence can sometimes be interpreted as having an argumentative orientation

For example, “I don’t want to participate”, as an expression of this deliberate silence can be justified by various forms of the ad quietem arguments or appeals to calm, which Bentham considers to be fallacies of delay see political arguments, §3.
The following case is taken from a class discussion on French citizenship and immigration. At the beginning, the students are silent. The teacher thinks that they need some stimulation, and finally, the remarkable interventions of two students clarify the situation, and make explicit the argumentative content of their silence: they don’t speak not because they are stupid or not involved in this class activity, but:

S1  – because we don’t need to discuss it now\
S2  – because the issue has already been satisfactorily resolved\

As the discussion will show, both students have strong positions on the issue and will defend their position vigorously. These positions are actually antagonistic, but converge in the will not to engage in the discussion
The first student’s position is:   « French citizenship should be given to those who ask for it »
The second student’s position is: « Our legislation is fine as it is, and politicians should discuss about more pressing issues.

2. Silence as an Argument

2.1 The Classic Argument from Silence

The classical argument from silence corresponds to the Latin argument a silentio or ex silentio, (from silentium, « silence »). The argument is as follows:

– The question is about an hypothetical event: did it or did it not really happen?
– Argument: A text relevant to the question is silent about the event.
– Conclusion: The event did not happen.

Possible refutation: the fact is not mentioned because it is irrelevant to the intent of the text under consideration.

For example, chroniclers record all the outstanding events of their time. If something that normally should have attracted their attention, is not mentioned in their chronicles, we must conclude that nothing really happened.
This can be seen as an application of the principle of completeness to the work of these chroniclers.

Did Syldavia face violent unrest at that time?
If such events had occurred, the chroniclers would have mentioned them, not to mention their regular mentioning of lesser events.
But they mention nothing of the sort.
So, there was no violent unrest at that time.

The value of this argument depends on the quality and quantity of the relevant documentation available for the period in question. It increases considerably if we know that chroniclers regularly record socio-political events.
In the following case, the argument of the silence of the historiographers carries weight:

Metz is perhaps the only city where the Crusaders did not dip their hands in the blood of the Jews. Louis the Younger, on his way to Palestine, assembled his army there, and yet there is no mention of any outrage against the Jews. The silence of history in this matter is worth a positive proof, considering that Metz had historiographers at that time.
Abbé Grégoire, [Essay on the Physical, Moral and Political Regeneration of the Jews], 1789. [1]

If a fact is not mentioned, it maybe because it is irrelevant to the intent of the text under consideration.

The argument of silence is sometimes answered with the argument of the camel: there is no mention of camels in the Qur’an. So, there were no camels in 7th century Arabia, which is quite surprising. The conclusion is nice, but there are several references to camels in the Qur’an (for the mistake, see Borges, Gibbon). A better example might be:

The History of Belgium for Dummies makes no mention of French fries.
So, the Belgians never knew about French fries. [2]

The argument of silence is used to date literary works. Marie de France wrote the Lais (poems about courtly love) at the end of the 12th century. Can we specify the date? The editor of the Lais argues as follows (according to Rychner, 1978 [3]):

1) “In order to date the Lais more precisely, they should be placed in relation to other works of the time.”
2) For this purpose, Rychner invokes “an argument ex silentio, which should be used with caution but which should not be overlooked”
3) First, “there is no evidence in the Lais that Marie had read Eneas by Chrestien de Troie”, a courtly novel, published in 1178.
4) Second, “it is difficult for me to imagine that, having read [Eneas], she would have been able to remain so completely herself and so different from him, in her style and in her general inspiration”.

The conclusion follows: the Lais must have been written before 1178.

The argument from silence is an indirect proof, that can only be used by default, in the absence of direct proof or direct information.
Even if we admit, for the sake of argument, that there is no camel in the Qur’an, this would not prove the “inauthenticity” of the book, (whatever one might mean by “authenticity”), because indirect evidence cannot be used against strong direct evidence. Direct evidence refutes indirect evidence.

2.2 Argument from Media Silence

The argument from media silence is a variant of the classic argument from silence: Nothing happened because all the media (the main trend media, my influencer…) say nothing about it.

The counter-argument goes like this:

The media is silent because it is silenced
The media is silent because they have the same political agenda.
Change influencer! You’ll find all the information you need on the social media.

3. The Law on Silence

3.1 The right to silence

Applied to the case of the suspect who refuses to cooperate and answer the police officer’s questions, the common saying « If you don’t speak, you don’t object » leads to interpreting the silence of the accused as an admission of guilt.
The right to remain silent « derives from the principle of the presumption of innocence« , according to which the prosecution must prove guilt (Dalloz, [Right to remain silent]) [4]).
It follows that the accused does not have to cooperate in the search for the truth, has the right to remain silent and not to contribute to his own incrimination (id.).

3.2 Silence of the law

The argument of the silence of the law could be used by the judge to justify his refusal to rule in a particular case, arguing that the Code of Laws does not contain any article applicable to the claim in question, which therefore cannot be legally qualified.
The argument of the silence of the law is invalidated by a meta-principle that imposes on the court the obligation to judge, under penalty of committing a denial of justice:

The judge who refuses to judge, under the pretext of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the law, may be prosecuted as guilty of denial of justice (Dalloz, [Prohibition of Denial of Justice] [5].

The judge is obliged to interpret the law, i.e., to find in the existing body of law an article which, with an acceptable interpretation, becomes applicable to the case before him.

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[1] Abbé [Henri Jean-Baptiste] Grégoire, Essai sur la régénération physique, morale et politique des Juifs. Preface by R. Badinter. Paris, Stock, 1989, note p. 179.

[2] I owe this example to Michel Goldberg, who pointed out to me that the Dictionary (2016) reproduced the traditional mistake about camels and the Koran.

[3] Jean Rychner, Introduction aux Lais de Marie de France, Paris, Champion, 1978, pp. X-XI.

 

SERIAL ARGUMENTATION

Serial argumentation (Beardsley 1975, cited in Wreen 1999, p. 886) is also called subordinate argumentation (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1992).
In logic it corresponds to polysyllogism, see sorite; epicheirema.

A serial argumentation is an argumentation in which an established conclusion is used as an argument for a new conclusion, up to an ultimate conclusion.
Each argumentation that contributes to the global serial argumentation has its own structure, either simple or convergent. It can correspond to any kind of argument scheme.

A polysyllogism is represented as follows:

Arg_1 => Concl_1 = Arg_2 => Concl_2 = Arg_3 => …
Arg_n => Concl_n = Arg N+1 => …

The elementary serial argumentation is best represented as (see below, §1):

Arg_1 => Concl_1 = Arg_2 => Concl_2

1. Serial argumentation and polysyllogism

The critical problem with such chains of argumentations is the stability and reliability of the repeated underlying deduction principle
In the polysyllogism each step is governed by syllogistic laws and the transmission of the truth is flawless from the first argument to the final conclusion.
In a chain of arguments, there is no guarantee that the principle of inference, must remain the same at each step.

Consider an argument by analogy:

A is analogous to B, B is analogous to C, … and Y is analogous to Z
Is Z analogous to A?

Z would be analogous to A if the reason, that is, the element on which the analogy is based remained the same. But if it changes at each step, you can start with a shell and end up with a motorcycle.

The same is true for argumentative causality:

The following pragmatic argument develops a causal chain from an unusually dry spring to the resignation of the president.

The weather was hot, so there is a shortage of recolts (botanical causality)
— so the price of bread goes up (economic causality)
— so  social unrest increased (social causality)
— so the king had to resign (political causality).

Historians propose such plausible sequences, but only as one explanatory factor among others. The plausibility of the conclusions diminishes as the reasoning proceeds. In such a series, at each step, the weight of the refutations grows exponentially at each step, until the chain breaks and the domino effect stop.

Interpretive reasoning has the same problem

B is an interpretation of A, C is an interpretation of B, D is an interpretation of C.
Is D an interpretation of A?

This is why some Arabic schools of jurisprudence refuse to interpret the text of the Holy Qu’ran. They believe that only the starting point, the letter of the text can be considered certain, and that engaging in interpretation would trigger a slippery slope process, leading to an unpredictable result, that may contradict the original and undisputed content of the sacred text.

2. Serial or Convergent?

Difficulties can arise in reconstructing of concrete arguments, as the following example from Bassham (2003, p.72) shows:

Peter is stubborn, he is a Taurus, he will not know how to negotiate.

1. First Interpretation, as a Serial Argumentation

In a serial argumentation, the conclusion of the first argumentation serves as an argument in the second argumentation:
(A) Peter is a Taurus so he is stubborn; (B) since he is stubborn, he will not know how to negotiate.
= Peter is stubborn (indeed, since…) he is a Taurus; therefore, he will not know how to negotiate.

(A) First argumentation:
(1) Peter is a Taurus, so (2) he is stubborn.

(A.i) — Technical definition of “being a Taurus”: “the Taurus sticks to his positions without being willing to change them.”[1]
(A.ii) — Instantiation of the definition: “Peter sticks to his positions without being willing to change.”
(A.iii) — Lexical definition of stubborn: “who is obstinately attached to his opinions, and his decisions; who is insensitive to the reasons and arguments against them”
(A.iv) — (A1) and (A.iii) are in a paraphrase relationship.
(A.v) — Conclusion: (2) Peter is stubborn.

(B) Second argumentation:
(2) Peter is stubborn; therefore (3) he will not know how to negotiate.

(B.i) — Technical definition of negotiation: “Negotiation involves the confrontation of incompatible interests at various points which each interlocutor attempts to make compatible through a series of mutual concessions.” (Wikipedia, [Negotiation])
(B.ii) — According to the lexical definition above (A.iii) , “being stubborn” and “making concessions” are opposites.
(B.iii) — Opposites cannot be predicated on the same subject, Peter.
(B.iv) — Conclusion: (3) Peter will not know how to negotiate.

The chain (A) + (B) is a serial argumentation:

Taurus, so stubborn; stubborn, so bad negotiator
Arg_1 => Concl_1; [Concl_1=Arg_2] => Concl_2

2. Second Interpretation, as Convergent Argumentation

In convergent argumentation, two arguments support the same conclusion.

(C) First argumentation
(1) Peter is a Taurus, (3) he will not negotiate.

(C.i) — The two technical definitions (Ai.) and (B.i) are contradictory.
(C.ii) = (Biii)
(C.iii) — Conclusion: (3) Peter will not know how to negotiate.

Or:

(C.i’) — Technical definition: “The negotiator must remain flexible, calm, and exercise self-restraint.”[2]
(C.ii’) — “Taurus’ tendency to accumulate feelings and resentments also makes him capable of strong anger.”[3]
(C.iii’) — (C.i’) and C.ii’) are contradictory.
(C.iv”) = (Biii)
(C.v’) — Conclusion: (3) Peter will not know how to negotiate.

(D) Second argumentation
(2) Peter is stubborn, (3) he will not negotiate.

(D.i) — (A.iii) and (B.i) are opposites, see (B.ii).
(D.ii) = (Biii)
(D.ii) — Conclusion: (3) Peter will not be able to negotiate.

The chain (A) + (B) is now a convergent argumentation:

Both constructions develop entirely on the basis of definitions. These reconstructions perfectly illustrate the central theme of the theory of argumentation in language: both constructions develop entirely on the basis of semantic content.

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[1] http://www.astrologie-pour-tous.com/taureau.html (20.09.2013)
[2] Jean-Paul Guedj, 50 Fiches pour négocier avec efficacité [50 leaflets to negotiate effectively], Paris: Bréal, 2010, p. 123.
[3] www.astronoo.com/zodiaque/zodiaqueTaureau.html (20.09.2013).

SELF-EVIDENCE

Self-evidence is a feeling of immediate certainty about a state of affairs; when expressed, the corresponding statement is obvious, i.e., it requires no proof or justification, and should be accepted as such, in other words, it cannot be doubted or questioned.
This statement is a-stasic, not debatable see evidentiality; dismissal.

The term apperception is used to denote this form of knowledge which is produced by a conscious perception, and accompanied by reflection.
Knowledge by apperception is opposed to knowledge by inference, and thus to knowledge acquired by argumentation, which is a kind of inference. Three types of apperception, that is to say three main sources of evidence, can be identified and distinguished from each other:

— Self-evidence as the fruit of the divine revelation of a transcendental reality.
— Perceptual self-evidence of sensory data.
— Intellectual self-evidence.

The easiest way to legitimize a claim is to appeal to one of these three sources, see argument-conclusion.
The certainty manifested in a direct, simple assertion corresponds to the certainty associated with apperception, see repetition.
Inferential argumentative belief can be considered inferior to belief based on any kind of evidence: this observation is at the root of the paradoxes of argumentation.

1. Dogma: Revelation as a Source of Certainty

Believers consider the revelation contained in the sacred books to be the best source of certainty. This revelation, which took place in the sacred time of the origins, can be renewed by a special revelation.
In what is now called his Memorial[1], Blaise Pascal has described this experience which produced an immediate and absolute “certainty”:

The year of grace 1654,
Monday, 23 November, Feast of St. Clement, Pope and Martyr, and others in the Martyrology.
Vigil of St. Chrysogonus, martyr, and others.
From about half past ten in the evening to about half past midnight,
FIRE.
GOD of Abraham, GOD of Isaac, GOD of Jacob
not of the philosophers and of the learned
Certainty. Certainty. Feeling. Joy. Peace.
GOD of Jesus Christ.
My God and your God.
Your GOD will be my God.
Forgetting the world and everything, except GOD. […]

2. Self-evidence of the sensory data

Direct physical perception of a state of affairs immediately legitimizes a claim. There is no need to argue to see and claim that the snow is white. As the saying goes, “facts are the best arguments”; the question “Is snow white?” is not debatable (“a-stasic”, see stasis; evidentiality).

From a philosophical point of view, Descartes has rejected the possibility of basing knowledge on sensory data with the hypothesis of the “evil genius” (Descartes [1641], First Meditation).

3. Intellectual intuition

Descartes accepts only intellectual intuition as a source of certainty:

Rule 3 – Concerning objects proposed for study, we ought to investigate what we can clearly and evidently intuit or deduce with certainty, and not what other people have thought or what we ourselves conjecture. For knowledge can be attained in no other way. (Descartes [1628], Rule 3)

Unlike sensory data intuition, intellectual intuition is infallible:

By intuition I mean, not the wavering assurance of the senses, or the deceitful judgment of a misconstructed imagination, but a conception, formed by unclouded mental attention, so easy and distinct as to leave no room for doubt in regard to the thing we are understanding. (Id, Rule 7).

Intellectual intuition is what makes us accept something as “beyond reasonable doubt. For example, we can be fairly certain that if you take a point off a line, you can draw a single second line parallel to that line; or that the square of any negative number is positive.
But these certainties have been challenged by the construction of imaginary numbers and non-Euclidean geometries.

4. Consequences

4.1 Conflict between Sources of Evidence

It may seem that the most unassailable kind of self-evidence is the direct evidence provided by sensory data. However, the following text shows that it can be judged inferior to that which comes from the authority of the sacred text.

The first disagreement among the Companions after the Prophet’s death concerned the reality of his death itself. After the Prophet’s death, ‘Umar ibn al Khattaab, may God be pleased with him, insisted that the Messenger of God did not die, and considered any such talk to be a false rumor spread by the hypocrites, and threatened to punish them for it. This went on until Aboo Bakr appeared on the scene and recited the Qur’anic verse:

‘Muhammad is no more than a Messenger. Many were the Messengers who passed away before him. If he died or were slain, will you then turn back on your heels? Whoever turns back on his heels, not the least harm will he do to God; but God [on the other hand] will swiftly reward those who [serve him] with gratitude’ (3: 144).

And another verse of the Qur’an:

‘Truly you will die [one day], and truly they [too] will die [one day]’ (39: 30).

When ‘Umar heard these verses, his sword fell from his hand and he himself fell to the ground. He realized that the Prophet, may God bless him and grant him peace, had passed away and that the divine revelation had come to an end. […]

Differences over the Burial of the Prophet […] These were two critical issues [about “the reality of the death of the Prophet” and about “the burial of the Prophet”], that were swiftly resolved simply by resorting to the Qur’an and the Sunnah.
Taha Jabir al ‘Alwani, 1993, The Ethics of Disagreement in Islam, pp. 35-36.[2]

4.2 Subtraction from doubt

The argument, the basis of the argumentative derivation of a conclusion, is presented as being beyond doubt, or, at least, less doubtful than the conclusion. It is conveniently presented as an apperceptive datum, i.e., as something which is as certain as a revelation, as sensible evidence, or intellectual intuition. It follows that the person who refuses to share this data is considered, as dishonorable, weak or idiotic. It is therefore not necessary to refute him or her, since he or she is already slandered, see destruction; dismissal.
Generalized disputability assumes that everyone can be held accountable for his or her beliefs, and that he or she must justify them when asked, so that it is illegitimate to postulate any kind of a priori certainty.
This thesis contrasts with positions that accept certainties of a religious order, such as “there is no God but God”; mathematical, “the square of a positive number is positive”; or simply everyday arguments such as, “I believe that the ground will not collapse under my feet”, see dialectic.
Self-evidence can be opposed to extended argumentability, see conditions of discussion.

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[1] Cited after http://www.users.csbsju.edu/~eknuth/pascal.html (07-09-2017).

[2] Taha Jabir al ‘Alwani, 1993, The Ethics of Disagreement in Islam. Herndon: VA: International Institute of Islamic Thought, p. 35-36. Cited after:
archive.org/stream/157627041TheEthicsOfDisagreementByTahaJabirAlAlwani/157627041-The-Ethics-of-Disagreement-by-Taha-Jabir-Al-Alwani_djvu.txt

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SELF-ARGUED CLAIM

1. Argumentation as a Composition of Statements

1.1 Argument, Conclusion, Inferense License, Rebuttal

This fully explicit combination corresponds to Toulmin’s layout of argument, which articulates the argumentative unit around five elements, Data, Claim, the two-level transition principle, Warrant and Backing, and finally, a Qualifier referring to the argument’s rebuttal conditions ([1958], Ch. 3).

1.2 Argument, Conclusion, Inference License

It is generally assumed that the link between argument and claim is provided by a topos, an argument scheme, which is often left implicit.
The consistency of a chain:

The wind is blowing, it will rain.

is based on the empirically observed regularity:

When this kind of wind blows, it usually rains.

From an epistemic perspective, there is “more” in the argument than in the conclusion, in that the argument is more reliable than the conclusion, which is only a hypothetical projection of the argument.
From a semantic perspective however, there is “less” in the argument than in the conclusion, in that the conclusion is more than an analytical development of the argument, it is the product of that argument enriched and structured by its combination with a general scheme or topos.

1.1 Argument, Conclusion

Consider a discourse, consisting of two statements, {S1, S2}. This sequence is argumentative if it can be paraphrased with some of the following sentences:

S1 backs, supports, motivates, justifies, … S2
S1, because, therefore, so, thus, … S2
E2, because, since, as, given that, … S1

The theory of argumentation within language formulates the same relation in a way that has proved extremely fruitful: the conclusion, it is what the speaker has in mind or in view, what he or she is getting at, when he or she produces the argument:

The speaker puts forward D1, in order to, in view of… D2.
The reason why he states D1 is D2.
The meaning of D1, that is, the direction in which it aims, the sense… of D1 is D2.
And, finally, “D1, i.e., that is to say, in other words, that means, … D2”

S: — You say you have homework, does that mean you are not going out with us tonight?

Thus, a conclusion can be introduced not by a connector or an indicator of consequence, but by a connector of reformulation.

Claim D2 essentially “repackages” the argument, revealing the contextual meaning of the statement as an argument. The interlocutor fully understands the statement-argument, only when the conclusion is grasped see orientation.
This is the crucial difference between logical inference and argumentative inference, which would be more properly called argumentative derivation.

2. Argumentation as Self-justified Conclusions

From the standpoint of epistemology, in order to be valid an argumentation must be expressed in a coordinated sequence “S1 (argument), S2 (claim)”, such that the claim is not a reformulation of the argument. It follows that it must be possible to evaluate each statement independently. This is the case in the following sentence, “The wind has increased, it will rain”, which expresses two independently observable facts, the fact that there is wind and the fact that it will rain a little later. The first fact is measured by an anemometer, the second by a rain gauge, two devices that operate on completely different principles.

In ordinary discourse, the conclusion may be present explicitly in the argument as a parenthetical element , or implicitly as the orientation of one of its key words.
In the same way the statement expressing the argument may also be embedded in the concluding claim as a subordinate clause, or somehow integrated into a component phrase of the statement expressing the claim:

These people are coming to work in our country, welcome them!
→ Let us welcome these people who are coming to work!

Finally, the argument is absorbed in the meaning of one key term of the statement,

→ Let us welcome these workers!

In both cases, the argument is contained in the word (Empson [1940]); the global statement is self-argued, it expresses a complete perspective, that presents itself as obvious, irrefutable.

Scientific language has one level of meaning, while natural language has several; explicit meaning is based on implicit meanings. This essential fact distinguishes scientific languages from natural languages.
Arguments loaded with the predetermined conclusion that they “support” can be considered to be “biased”, fallacious, and censored as such. But this is a rather desperate maneuver. It makes little sense to pretend to develop critical thinking about human affairs while ignoring or condemning the medium and substance that is, and probably will continue to be for some time to come, the very stuff of all transactions concerning human affairs.

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