FALLACIES 2: ARISTOTLE’S FOUNDATIONAL LIST
Argumentation studies are related to two Aristotelian sources, on the one hand, the rhetorical and dialectical theories in Rhetoric and Topics, and on the other hand, the critical analysis of fallacious sequences (fallacies, apparent enthymemes) in Prior Analytics, Rhetoric and primarily Sophistical Refutations (Woods 2014). The latter forms the basis of the “standard treatment of the fallacies” as reconstructed by Hamblin (Fallacies, 1970).
Definitions from the Sophistical Refutations are used in all works dealing with fallacious arguments. The title, Sophistical Refutations, is ambiguous. First, according to the classic joke, it is not ‘an adequate description of the contents of the book’,i.e., a set of refutations that would be sophistical. The book analyzes and rejects the refutations as practiced by the Sophists.
Aristotle distinguishes between two types of paralogisms. He defines first paralogisms that “depend on the language used”, and second, paralogisms that are “independent of language” (SR, 4). The “language” referred to is the language used in a dialogue, as practiced by dialecticians or sophists.
The Rhetoric lists ten “lines of argument that form the spurious enthymemes” (Rhet, ii, 24, 1400b35-01a5, RR 379), which are clearly related to language. Note that the parallelism between enthymeme and false enthymeme may lead us to believe that the preceding enthymemes, as listed in Rhet., II, 23 are valid, but this is not the case, see collections 2; expression.
1. The Fallacies in the Sophistical Refutations
The six linguistic fallacies of Aristotle are listed in the first column of the following table.
|
Six fallacies “dependent on language” or “verbal fallacies” (lat. in dictione ) |
|
| 1. Homonymy | Lat. æquivocatio; ambiguity, equivocation — see ambiguity |
| 2. Amphiboly | Gr. [amphibolia] — see ambiguity |
| 3. Composition | Lat. fallacia compositionis, composition of words — see composition and division |
| 4. Division of words | Lat. fallacia divisionis, see composition and division |
| 5. Accent | Lat. fallacia accentis ; wrong accent — see ambiguity |
| 6. Form of expression | Lat. fallacia figuræ dictionis, misleading expression — see. expression |
This terminology may seem obscure, but its purpose is perfectly clear. It establishes the basic principles of a « logical grammar for argumentation » by critiquing of language and discourse. This grammar supports the production of reasoned texts and speeches that anticipate their criticism.
The seven fallacies considered “independent from language”, are listed in the first column of the following table.
|
Seven fallacies “independent of language”, RS 4 (=166b-168b) |
|
| 1. “Accident” | Lat. fallacia accidentis — see accident; definition; categorization. |
| 2. “The use of an expression absolutely or not absolutely but with some qualification of respect or place, or time, or relation.” | Lat. a dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter — see circumstances; distinguo. |
| 3. “That which depends upon ignorance of what ‘refutation’ is.” | Lat. ignoratio elenchi; misconception of refutation; evasion of the question — see question; relevance; resumption of speech |
| 4. “That which depends upon the consequent” | Lat. fallacia consequentis — see implication; causality. |
| 5. “That which depends upon assuming the original conclusion.” | Lat. petitio principii ; assumption of the original point; begging the question — see vicious circle |
| 6. “Stating as cause what is not the cause.” | Lat. non causa pro causa, non cause as cause — see cause-effect |
| 7. “The making of more than one question into one.” | Lat. fallacia quæstionis multiplicis, many questions; complex question — see many questions |
These fallacies are actually methodological mistakes.
2. Fallacies, Inferences and Dialectical Games
In contemporary terminology, an invalid inference is commonly called a fallacy. According to Hintikka, the Aristotelian concept of fallacy refers to something invalid, but not to an invalid inference:
The error in thinking that the traditional fallacies are faulty inferences is what I propose to dub “the fallacy of fallacies”. It is the fallacy whose recognition will, I hope, put a stop to the traditional literature on so-called fallacies. (1987, p. 211)
In other words, a fallacy cannot be defined simply as, “a fallacious argument.” Only some, but not all fallacies can be “thought of as mistaken logical or conceptual inferences” (ibid.). Hintikka considers a fallacy to be essentially a move that violates a rule in a dialectical game. He defines dialectical games as “information-seeking questioning processes (interrogative games)” (ibid.). In this sense, the concept of fallacy has been adopted in the pragma-dialectical theory.
Linguistic fallacies examine the conditions that a proposition must satisfy in order to qualify as a premise in a correct syllogistic inference. The fallacy of accident is the consequence of an error in the methodology of definition. The fallacy of misconception of refutation reflects a poor understanding of the issues involved in the discussion. Asking many questions is also a forbidden move in dialectical games, where problems must be serialized to avoid implicit agreements. These different cases clearly demonstrate the non-inferential nature of the fallacies, and their links to rule-based dialogical games, in the latter two cases.