Lat. a generali sensu; Lat. generalis “general”, sensus “thought, idea”.

In law, the argument of the generality of the law posits that the law must be applied in all its extension, “we must not introduce distinctions where the law does not”. General terms should not be given a particular meaning. In other words, law is non-negotiable. Possible exceptions must be explicitly laid down in the relevant regulation, for example, while generally prohibited, the consumption of canna­bis may be tolerated in some specific places complying with the existing regulation.

In public places, people’s behavior must comply with law plus specific rules of the place. Rules are by nature more flexible than laws, but, when strictly enforced, these rules also obey the principle of generality. If the rule of the school states in general terms that “the use of mobile phones is prohibited during the course”, then its application is general, and admits no exception or distinction. One cannot argue that the regulation is especially valid for “the lower grades”, or that an exception must be made for students “urgently managing their bank account”, or for “students who have a good academic standing”.

S. Strict meaning

Some argumentative questions can be quickly and privately solved (“who is going to take out the trash?”); others cannot be solved so easily and are brought before specialist, established social institutions. An argumentative forum is a more or less institutionalized physical social space dedicated to the treatment of argued issues. Such a space may or may not have a decision-making capacity. Interventions are ruled by the norms and customs that characterize the forum, in the first place the specific codification of the turns at speech as defined by the rights to the floor, S. Rules. Such rules give meaning and consistency to the expression “local rationality”.

The concept of a forum, with its institutional accompaniment and its concrete regulations, must be taken into account for the analysis of the social exercise of argument. This approach enables us to go beyond an idealized view of argumentation as an exercise subject only to the law of dialectical reason, regulating verbal exchanges between two artificially de-socialized actors, S. Roles.
The crucial question of the burden of proof relates not only to the state of opinion (doxa) at the time of the discussion, but also to the forum where the discussion takes place, S. Burden of proof.

Tribunals and political assemblies can be seen as typical forums. There are many others “argument marketplaces”, where viewpoints are calculated, expressed and traded to inform practical decisions, are part of the fabric of democratic societies. Consider the dispute over the legalization of drugs in Syldavia, a true participatory democracy. The issue will be discussed in a huge range of forum, from the subway carriage, to the family table, at the pub on the corner, in the city conference room, by the commissions drawing up the political parties’ official positions, by the National Congress, the Law Commission, etc. Some of these forums are intended for the expression of disputes and have the power to voice a decision or opinion on the matter, others serve simply to amplify and popularize the debate rather than close it.

The following passage is taken from a 2002 speech given by Alfredo Cristiani, President of El Salvador from 1989 to 1994. In 1992, under his presidency, the Chapultepec Peace Agreements were signed, ending a twelve-year civil war between the extreme right and Marxist guerrillas. His 2002 speech was delivered on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of these agreements[1].

We cannot understand the importance of what happened in El Salvador if we limit ourselves to the recent past. The crisis that swept the Salvadorian nation over the last decade did not come out of nothing, nor has it been the fruit of isolated wills. This crisis, so painful and tragic, has ancient and profound social, political, economic and cultural roots. In the past, one of the pernicious flaws in our national form of life was the lack or insufficiency of the spaces and mechanisms [de los espacios y mecanismos] necessary to allow the free play of ideas, the natural development of the various political projects which stem from freedom of thought and to act; in short, the lack of a real democratic living environment.

According to Plato, sophistic discourse reigns over public forums and institutional places, in particular, over the court and the assembly, dominated by professional sophists. That is why Socratic dialectic interaction, oriented solely by the search for truth, takes place in a very special, de-socialized argumentative place, in the natural setting of a locus amœnus: a hot day, a stream, a tree, a light breeze and grass to lie down on:

Phaedrus:    — […] All right, where do you want to sit while we read?[[2]]
Socrates:     — Let’s leave the path here and walk along the Ilisus; then we can sit quietly wherever we find the right spot.
Phaedrus:    — How lucky, then, that I am barefoot today—you, of course, are always so. The easiest thing to do is to walk right in the stream; this way, we’ll also get our feet wet, which is very pleasant, especially at this hour and season.
Socrates:     — Lead the way, then, and find us a place to sit.
Phaedrus:    — Do you see that very tall plane tree?
Socrates:     — Of course.
Phaedrus:    — It’s shady, with a light breeze; we can sit or, if we prefer, lie down on the grass there.
Socrates:     — Lead on, then.
Phaedrus:    — Tell me, Socrates, isn’t it from somewhere near this stretch of the Ilisus that people say Boreas carried Orithuia away?
Socrates:     — So they say.
Phaedrus:    — Couldn’t this be the very spot? The stream is lovely, pure and clear: just right for girls to be playing nearby.

Plato, Phaedrus, I229a-c. CW, p. 509.

[1] archivo.elsalvador.com/noticias/especiales/acuerdosdepaz2002/nota18.html (09-20-2013)

[2] The speech of Lysias, that Phaedrus “[holds] in [his] left hand under [his] cloak”.

The word force is used with three distinct meanings:

1. 1. Argument from or by force, S. Threat -Promise
   2. Force of things, S. Weight of Circumstances
   3. Force of an argument, this entry

The graduated concept of force of an argument exists in opposition to the binary notion of valid or invalid argumentation. An argument is strong (or weak) either in itself or relative to another argument. This force is evaluated according to different criteria.

1. Inherent strength of an argument scheme

In scientific fields, to be strong an argument must first of all be valid. That is to say that it must develop according to a method which is accepted in the given scientific field. Yet, an argument can be valid and not so strong, that is to say, really relevant and interesting for the discussion of such and such hypothesis.

From a philosophical point of view, one might consider that some argument schemes are by nature stronger than others. The strength of an argument is thus determined on the basis of ontology. An adept of moral realism will consider that an argument based on the nature of things and their definition is stronger than a pragmatic argument; a practical mind will think the opposite.

2. Strength and effectiveness

In relation to a goal such as persuasion, the strongest argument will be the most efficient, the argument that most quickly achieves the arguer’s goal, whether it be selling a product or electing a president. A degree of strength can be attributed to the argument on the basis of an impact study carried out on the relevant target population, S. Persuasion.

3. Strength of an argument and acceptability by an audience

The New Rhetoric defines the strength of the argument according to the extent and quality of the audiences that accept it, S. Persuade, Convince.

4. Strength and linguistic reinforcement of arguments

Two arguments oriented towards the same conclusion belong to the same argumentative class, S. Orientation. Both bring some support to this conclusion. Within the same argumentative class, the strength of an argument can be determined by reference to an objective gradation, such as the scale of temperature, or it may simply be allocated to the argument by the speaker, who value such argument over another. The hierarchization is marked by the means of argumentative morphemes (for example, even) and realizing or de-realizing modifiers. The arrangements of the arguments on argument scales are governed by the laws of discourse.

The term figure is used in syllogistic, in fallacy theory and in rhetoric with different meaning

1. Figures of the syllogism

The figures of the syllogism correspond to the different forms of the syllogism, according to the position of the middle term in the premises.

2. Fallacy of “figure of speech”

The fallacy of misleading expression is sometimes referred to as the fallacy of figure of speech.

3. Figures of Rhetoric

The figures of rhetoric are variations in the manner of signifying “which give to the discourse more grace and vivacity, luster and energy” (Littré, Figure). Dictionaries of rhetoric include entries in the field of argumentation, even though they are primarily concerned with literary rhetoric. For example, the dictionary “Gradus. The literary processes ­— Dictionary (Dupriez, 1984), includes the entries argument, argumentation, argument, deduction, enthymeme, epicheirema, example, induction, refutation, paralogism, premise, reasoning, sophism… These basic concepts within the field of argumentation do not belong specifically to the literary domain.

The word figure is used to cover tropes and figures of speech. Metaphor, irony metonymy and synecdoche are considered to be the “four master tropes”. The metaphor as a model has a clear argumentative function. There is correspondence between the mechanisms of metonymy and synecdoche and those that legitimize the passage from an argument to a conclusion. Moreover, irony argues from a self-evident situation.

The expression figure of speech can actually refer to any salient and recurrent form of discursive organization. This is why the enthymeme can be considered as a figure, the enthymemism, along with refutation or prolepsis. Other figures of rhetoric, from antanaclasis (S. Orientation) to analogy and interpretation correspond to well-identified argument schemes.

Other figures play a role in the construction of argumentative structures. For example, a figure of syntactic disposition, such as parallelism, can act as an analogy or antithesis indicator, S. Analogy; Antithesis.

The figures of opposition are all directly interpretable as argumentative, insofar as they correspond to various modes of presentation of the discourse vs. counter-discourse confrontation.

Without reducing each and every figure to a feature of the argumentative situation, it can be observed that the classical definition of argumentation is based on the idea that arguing constitutes an attempt to gain acceptance for a discourse (conclusion) on the basis of good reasons (argument). A clear index of such acceptance is the resumption, repetition, and development of the convincing discourse, particularly as fragments or slogans. Since to have things repeated, it is necessary to facilitate their memorization, figures of sounds and every kind of rhetorical pun can be used to that effect, and must be viewed as a feature of argumentation.

When taking sides truth and rationality, fallacy theory calls for a criticism of language and speech as vectors of error and deceit, S. Evaluation; Norms. Other cultures gave other foundations to the criticism of speech. Reconstructing the history of the “sins of language” in the Middle Ages, Casagrande & Vecchio (1991) have demonstrated the link between speech and sin. The issue then was not to build a rational discourse, but a sinless, “impeccable” discourse, if not a holy one. The nature of the misconduct has shifted: what was declared sinful in the name of religion is now considered to be fallacious or sophistical in the name of rationality. Whether sin or fallacies, salvation of the soul or rational guidance of the mind, it is always a matter of regimenting verbal behavior, disciplining one’s speech and pen.

Casagrande and Vecchio synthesize data from various medieval treatises into a list of fourteen sins. This list can be widely interpreted in terms of misleading interactional argumentative behaviors. These sins-fallacies intend to rule the interaction in a religious context where hierarchy and valorization of authority occupy a central position, S. Politeness.

Making a connection between fallacy theory and “sins of the tongue” is not indulging in any kind of derisio, neither to one nor to the other party. This connection, on the contrary, is intended to show how deep the anthropological roots of discourse criticism are.

1. Sins against truth

1.1 Lying

Telling the truth, all the truth and nothing but the truth is certainly a basic commitment for a non-fallacious debate. Lying, as saying something false to someone who has no access to truth, is a sin in the system of theological norms, and a fundamental violation of Grice’s cooperative^@ principle S. Manipulation

1.2 Aggravated lying: perjury and false testimony

In judicial rhetoric, oath and testimony, two major instruments to establish the truth, are considered to be non-technical proofs, S. “Technical’ and “Non-technical” evidence. Their violation corresponds to two aggravated lies, the sins of perjury, perjurium, and false testimony, falsum testimonium.

2. Six sins of interaction

2.1 Against disputes

Rivalry, conflict, fight (contentio), and discussion (disputatio) are names denoting the very activity of disputing. It can thus be said that arguing is potentially considered sinful at its very core. It is the sin of the intellectual monks, and no doubt, that of Abelard. The passage from the peccaminous to the fallacious is explicit in the Port-Royal Logic, in which the excessive love of dispute, the spirit of contradiction, is condemned as a sophism of self-esteem (n°6 and 7), a fundamental feature of the character of “those who contradict” (Arnauld and Nicole [1662], p. 272); S. Fallacies (IV). The debate is subject to a moral imperative: the contradiction must be genuine, not “malignant and envious” (ibid.) – or, to move on to judicial pathology, querulous. Such a debate might be legitimately declined.

We then discern two families of sins of interactional positioning, on the one hand, the sins “towards the other”, the partner with whom we argue (§ 2.2), and, on the other hand, the sins committed “towards oneself” as a speaker (§2.3). In both cases, it is a question of banishing illegitimate treatments of the partners of the interaction, S. Politeness.

2.2 Three kinds of sins towards the partner

Undue negative treatment: offensive remarks (contumelia) or slander (detractio). These two sins are a form of personal attacks, or ad personam fallacies. The derisio, as a contemptuous mockery, could be associated with this fallacy, S. Ad hominem; Dismissal.

Negative treatment under the cover of the positive: this is the mechanism of refutation by self-evidence as implemented through irony, ironia. This intention to hurt the other is dealt with only laterally in contemporary theories of irony.

Undue positive treatment: flattery (adulatio), and even simple praise (laudatio). These two sins involve the same interactional mechanisms as found in the fallacy of modesty^@, ad verecundiam, where the speaker humiliates himself unduly before his partner. Adulatio and laudatio encourage pride, and pride is a sin. Logic, religion, and politeness speak with one voice, S. Modesty; Politeness.

2.3 Two kinds of sins against oneself

Undue positive treatment, in other words, boasting, iactantia. This ethotic sin stigmatizes the projection in the discussion of an overly positive self-image, S. Ethos. According to politeness theory, the iactantia sins against modesty.

Undue negative treatment is the symmetrical sin of the sin of undue positive treatment of the partner, S. Modesty. The taciturnitas, sin of the person who keeps silent when he should speak, can be related to the ad verecundiam fallacy in which “human respect” inhibits criticism.

4. Murmuring: a sophism of insubordination

A person who complains against authority commits the sin of murmur (murmur), S. A fortiori. A person who refuses to yield to the force of the best argument having little to oppose to it, save an intimate conviction or sense of justice, is guilty of the same kind of fallaciousness, S. Dissensus; Rules. Insubordination is irrational, illegal, peccaminous.

5. The sin of eloquence

Eloquence, seen as an abundance of words, amplification, repetition, magnification, is the source of all fallacies, S. Verbiage. The same evaluation should apply to idle speech (vaniloquium), as well as to chatter (multiloquium).

6. Flaring into a passion: ad passiones

Some remaining sins are difficult to connect to the problematic of fallacies, perhaps because they directly involve the relation to the sacred: the prohibition of obscene words (turpiloquium), blasphemy (blasphemia) and the curse (maledictum). Nonetheless, these sins can have an ad personam function. Above all, they have an emotional import, so they certainly relate to the ad passiones group. Blasphemy is anger against god, and cursing, anger against the other; obscene words can be used to support many passions, including insulting.

To sum up, the theory of the sins of language is a critical theory of discourse taking into account:

— The “non-technical” problems of lying or attesting the truth.
— The spirit of the discussion.
— The relative interactional positions of the participants.

7. The “rules of the devil”

This list of fallacies-sins does not mention violations of logical rules, such as the assertion of the consequent (confusion of necessary and sufficient conditions, S. Deduction. One would think that it is because the logical domain, by nature escapes the religious norm. In the Muslim tradition, however, one can find the vocabulary of sin applied to paralogisms, which Al-Ghazali considers as “rules of the devil” (Bal., p. 171; Deg.). A medieval exemplum also puts the logician into hell, assimilated to the sophist, S. Exemplum.

Antoine Arnauld and Pierre Nicole conclude the third part of their Logic, or the Art of Thinking (1662) with two chapters devoted to sophisms and bad reasoning. Chapter XIX, “Of the different ways of reasoning which are called Sophisms”, takes up the Aristotelian fallacies; Chap. XX, “Of the bad reasonings which are common in Civil Life and in Ordinary Discourse” repositions the concept of fallacious reasoning an anthropological and moral issue about fallacious discourse and discussion.

1. The Aristotelian fallacies

The list of “ways of evil reasoning that we call sophisms” merges the Aristotelian linguistic and non-linguistic fallacies, S. Fallacies (3).

The linguistic fallacies are grouped under two headings. The list does not mention the fallacy of many questions, and adds two new types of fallacies independent of language, “incomplete enumeration”, and “defective induction”.

2. On the bad reasonings in civil life

Chapter XX “Of the bad reasonings which are common in Civil Life and in Ordinary discourse” is much more original. Its consists of two parts:

Of the sophisms of self-love, of interest, and of passion.
Of the false reasonings which arise from objects themselves.

These sophisms and bad reasoning no longer reflect logical or scientific concerns, and have no connection with dialectics. On the basis of a thorough and hypercritical description of the discussant’s concrete behavior, they emphasize the difficulties in bringing a debate to a successful completion and show how deceitful and useless dispute can be when truth is at stake. More than an appeal to follow rules for discussion, the conclusion is an ascetic appeal to moral reformation of the disputants. It should be kept in mind that the religious and philosophical disputes over Jansenism and Cartesianism form the background of the disillusioned discussions mentioned in this chapter.

In the following, the various sophisms and bad reasoning are designated by an expression extracted from their definition.

2.1 “Of the sophisms of self-love, of interest, and of passion”

(1) “To take our interest as the motive for believing a thing” — The first of the causes which determine belief is the spirit of belonging to “some nation, or profession, or institution” (Id., p. 268). Beliefs are not determined by truth and reality, but by the social position of the believer. The disputant borrows his beliefs from the group in which he finds “his interest” and his identity.

(2) “[The] delusions of the heart” (Id., p. 269) — This sophism expresses the ad passiones fallacies of love and hate (ad amicitiam, ad amorem, ad odium), it is a variant of pathetic argumentation:

 ‘I love him, therefore, he is the cleverest man in the world; I hate him; therefore, he is nobody’. (Ibid.)

(3) Those “who never distinguish their authority from reason”, and

decide everything by a very general and convenient principle, which is, that they are right, that they know the truth; from which it is not difficult to infer that those who are of their opinion are deceived, — in fact, the conclusion is necessary. (Ibid.)

The claim to the truth of the self-centered person comes from immediate certainty (in the profane as in the sacred domain), whereas it would require an argument, S. Authority; Modesty. This can be read as a criticism of the Cartesian’s criterion of truth, as clear and distinct ideas. Interest and self-love better determine clarity and distinctness than truth does.

(4) “The clever man[‘s]” sophism is related to the preceding one:

‘If this were so, I should not be a clever man; now, I am a clever man; therefore, it is not so.’ (Id., p. 270)

Enthymemes:

‘What,’ said they, ‘if the blood circulates, […] if nature does not abhor a vacuum […] — I have been ignorant of many important things in anatomy and in physics. These things, therefore, cannot be’.  (Ibid).

This is another fallacy ad passiones, the fallacy of pride, ad superbiam.

These first four “sophisms” are not precisely sophisms insofar as they are self-deceiving as well as other-deceiving. Nor are they correctly called fallacies insofar as they are not public reasoning, propositionally expressed. Their premises remain unsaid, perhaps unconscious:

I’m a Syldavian, Syldavians are always right, therefore, I’m right.
I’m right, therefore my opponent is wrong.
I hate him; therefore, he is a nobody.
I know everything, thus what I don’t know is false.
Interests, inflated egos and passions, are epistemological obstacles ingrained in human nature.

Chapter XIX reiterates the classical belief that education about argument requires thorough knowledge of language and a good training in logic. Chapter XX adds that first of all, the arguer has to work on himself (sophisms (1)-(4) and avoid the pitfalls of argumentative interactions (sophisms (5)-(9)): This is the substantial content of the following subset, which complements the first moral and psychological subset with factual observation of the interactional behavior of seasoned arguers.

(5) “Those who are in the right, and those who are in the wrong, with almost the same language make the same complaints and attribute to each other the same vices” (Id., p. 271). From this empirical observation follows a recommendation to the wise and thoughtful, about how to properly advocate truth in a controversy.

First Recommendation to the arguers: don’t start a debate before having “[thoroughly establish] the truth and justice of the cause which they maintain”.

Only when these rules have been correctly applied can one shift to a meta-discussion about the bad argumentative manners of the opponent. This of course presupposes that one can decide that the rules have been correctly applied.

(6)“The spirit of contradiction”, is a “malignant and envious disposition”:

“Someone else said such a thing; it is therefore false. I did not write that book; it is, therefore, a bad one”. This is the source of the spirit of contradiction so common amongst men, and which leads them, when they hear or read anything of another, to pay but little attention to the reasons which might have persuaded them, and to think only of those which they think may be offered against it. (p. 272)

(7) “The spirit of debate”

Thus, unless at least we have been accustomed by long discipline to retain the perfect mastery over ourselves, it is very difficult not to lose sight of truth in debates, since there are scarcely any exercises which so much arouse our passions. (p. 277),
Observations (6) and (7) have a clear link with the sin of contentio, S. Fallacies as Sins of the Tongue.
From the observation that “speaking of ourselves, and the things which concern us” can “excite envy and jealousy” comes a new recommendation: when advocating truth, self-exposure should be minimized, and the arguers should rather “seek, by hiding in the crowd, to escape observation, in order that the truth which they propose may be seen alone in their discourse” (p. 273).

(8) “The Complaisant”

For as the controversial hold as true the contrary of what is said to them, the complaisant appear to take as true everything which is said to them. (p. 278)

This sophism of acceptance without examination, at least of refusal to take a position, corresponds exactly to the ad verecundiam fallacy of Locke, S. Modesty. This is different but nonetheless related with the blamed character alluded to in (7), who “in the midst of [the discussion] become obstinate and are silent, affecting a proud contempt, or a stupid modesty of avoiding contention” (p. 277). S. Modesty; Contempt.

(9) “The determination to defend our opinion” leads us to

no longer to consider whether the reasons we employ are true or false, but whether they will avail to defend that which we maintain. We employ all sorts of reasons, good or bad, in order that there may be some to suit everyone. (p. 279).

The whole section closes with a kind of final recommendation:

To have no end but truth, and to examine reasonings with so much care, that even prejudice shall not be able to mislead us. (p. 276)

As observed in (5), each discussant will say that is precisely what he or she does. The attempt to expose the sophism seems to be doomed from the start, as if, in a conflictual dialogue, we were condemned never to know who speaks the truth.

2.2 “Of the false reasoning which arise from objects themselves”

This section focuses on the following points:

— There is only a small margin between truth and error; cf. supra (5):

In the majority of cases, there is a mixture of truth and error, of virtue and vice, of perfection and imperfection (p. 277)

— Rash induction also applies to human affairs; cf. supra §1, “incomplete enumeration”, and “defective induction”:

[Men] judge rashly of the truth of things from some authority insufficient to assure them of it, or by deciding the inward essence by the outward manner. (p. 284)

Decisions are made on the basis of “exterior and foreign marks.” (ibid.), that is peripheral arguments.

— “We rarely avoid judging purposes by the event”, a very relevant point:

If somebody succeeds, he had carefully planned his deeds; if he fails, he miscalculated. (p. 283)

No distinction is made between “the fortunate and the wise.” (Ibid)

— About “pompous eloquence”, S. Verbiage.

1. Francis Bacon, Novum Organum, 1620

Hamblin considers Francis Bacon’s New Organon as a psychological turning point in the conception of fallacies (Hamblin 1970, p. 146; Walton, 1999). Bacon presents his concept of “idol” as the scientific counterpart of logical or dialectical fallacies. An idol is an obstacle to the (inductive) edification of scientific knowledge.

The word idol comes from a Greek term meaning “simulacrum, phantom” (Bailly, [eidolon]). According to Bacon, a fallacy is a simulacrum, a phantom of argument, produced under the influence of towering idols, defined as false Gods altering human reasoning:

XXXIX. Four species of idols beset the human mind, to which (for distinction’s sake) we have assigned names, calling the first Idols of the Tribe, the second Idols of the Den, the third Idols of the Market, the fourth Idols of the Theater. ([1620], p. 20)

— The Idols of the Tribe, that is of the whole of humanity. These idols are the deformations imposed upon reality by the innate structure of the human mind, which is not a tabula rasa but an “uneven mirror” (id.). Its a priori categories distort reality.

— The Idols of the Den are the product of the education and history of each individual, that is to say, prejudices or other evidences, exerting their powers through “Authority” (id., p. 21).

— The Idols of the Market place are the words themselves, which “still manifestly force understanding, throw everything into confusion, and lead mankind into vain and innumerable controversies and fallacies” (id., p. 21).

— The Idols of the Theater correspond to “the various dogmas of peculiar systems of philosophy, and also from the perverted rules of demonstration” (id., p. 22).

These Idols include fallacious inferences as well as substantial fallacies.

2. John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 1690

In a brief section of his Essay, Locke reflects “on four sorts of arguments, that men in their reasonings with others, do ordinarily make use of to prevail on their assent or at least so to awe them as to silence their opposition” ([1690], p. 410). This definition of an argument perfectly suits what is a rhetorical argument as pressure exerted on the audience, S. Logos – Ethos – Pathos. These four sorts of arguments are (id., p. 410-412):

“The argumentum ad verecundiam”, S. Modesty
“The argumentum ad ignorantiam”, S. Ignorance
“The argumentum ad hominem”, S. Ad hominem
“The argumentum ad judicium”, S. Matter.

Locke rejects the first three arguments on the ground that, at best, they “may dispose me, perhaps, for the reception of truth, but help me not to it”:

For, 1. It [ad verecundiam] argues not another man’s opinion to be right because I, out of respect, or any other consideration but that of conviction, will not contradict him. 2. It [ad ignorantiam] proves not another man to be in the right way, nor that I ought to take the same way, because I know not a better. 3. Nor does it follow that another man is in the right way because he has shown me that I am in the wrong. I may be modest, and therefore not oppose another man’s persuasion; I may be ignorant, and not be able to produce a better; I may be in error, and another may show me that I am so. This may dispose me, perhaps, for the reception of truth, but helps me not to it (id., 411).

The concept of fallacy is redefined independently of any Aristotelian consideration. The only valid arguments are arguments ad judicium, that is to say “proofs drawn from any of the foundations of knowledge or probability” (ibid.); truth “must come from proofs and arguments and light arising from the nature of things themselves” (id., 412). Note that whilst the fallacious arguments correspond to argument schemes, the argument ad judicium does not correspond to just one argument scheme but to any kind of argument recognized as scientifically valid.

Leibniz ([1765]) nuanced this strict vision of fallacious arguments (see the above mentioned entries).

Argumentation studies are related to two Aristotelian sources, on the one hand, the rhetorical and dialectical theories of the Rhetoric and the Topics, and on the other hand, the critical analysis of fallacious sequences (fallacies, apparent enthymemes) in the Prior Analytics, the Rhetoric and mainly in the Sophistical Refutations (Woods 2014). This last line is the basis of the “standard treatment of the fallacies” as reconstructed by Hamblin (Fallacies, 1970).

The definitions from the Sophistical Refutations are taken up in all works dealing with fallacious arguments. The title, Sophistical Refutations, is ambiguous. Firstly, according to the classic joke, it is not ‘an adequate description of the contents of the book’, that is to say, a set of refutations (concerning well defined theses) which would be sophistical, but a refutation of the Sophists’ arguments. The book analyses and rejects the refutations as practiced by the sophists, or “how the sophists refute”.

Aristotle draws a broad distinction between two sets of paralogisms. He defines, on the one hand, paralogisms that “depend on the language used”, and on the other, paralogisms which are “independent of language” (SR, 4). The “language” referred to is the language used in a dialogue, as practiced by the dialecticians or the sophists.

The Rhetoric lists ten “lines of argument that form the spurious enthymemes” (Rhet, ii, 24, 1400b35-01a5, RR 379), clearly related to language. Note that this parallelism enthymeme / spurious enthymeme may lead us to believe that the preceding enthymemes, as enumerated in Rhet., II, 23 are valid, which is not the case. S. Collections (2); S. Expression.

1. The fallacies in the Sophistical Refutations

The six Aristotelian linguistic fallacies are listed in the first column of the following table:

This terminology may seem obscure, but its purpose is perfectly clear; it serves to establish, through a critique of language and discourse, the basic principles of a “logical grammar for argumentation”, supporting the production of reasoned texts and speeches anticipating their criticism.

The seven fallacies considered “independent from language”, are listed in the first column of the following table

These fallacies are actually methodological mistakes.

2. Fallacies, inferences and dialectical games

In contemporary terminology, an invalid inference is often referred to as a fallacy. According to Hintikka, the Aristotelian concept of fallacy refers to something invalid, but not to an invalid inference:

The error in thinking that the traditional fallacies are faulty inferences is what I propose to dub “the fallacy of fallacies”. It is the fallacy whose recognition will, I hope, put a stop to the traditional literature on so-called fallacies. (1987, p. 211)

In other words, a fallacy cannot be simply defined as, “a fallacious argument”; just some, but not all fallacies can be “thought of as mistaken logical or conceptual inferences” (ibid.). Hintikka considers that a fallacy is essentially a move which transgresses a rule in a dialectical game, dialectical games being defined as “information-seeking questioning processes (interrogative games)” (ibid.). It is in this sense that the concept of fallacy has been taken up in the pragma-dialectical theory.

Linguistic fallacies examine the conditions a proposition must fulfill in order to qualify as a premise in a correct syllogistic inference. The fallacy of accident is the consequence of an error in the methodology of definition. Misconception of refutation reflects a poor understanding of the issues involved in the discussion and the problem. Many questions is also a forbidden move in dialectical games, where problems must be serialized to avoid implicit agreements. These different cases clearly demonstrate the non-inferential nature of fallacies, and, for the latter two, their links to rules-based dialogue games.

1. Fallacy: The word

1.1 The Latin word fallacia

Etymologically, the noun fallacy and the adjective fallacious come from the Latin fallacia, which means “deceit”, referring to a “trick”, or even a “spell”. This deceit can be defined as a verbal deceit, as expressed by the adjective fallaciloquus, “[he] who deceives by words, astute” (Gaffiot [1934], Fallaciloquus). The corresponding verb fallo, fallere means “to deceive someone”, and according to the contexts, “to disappoint the expectations of someone, to betray the word given to the enemy, to break his promises” (id., Fallo). These meanings show that etymologically the word fallacy does not refer to a logical or dialectical mistake but to an interactional manipulation.

1.2 Paralogism, sophism, fallacy

Fallacy — The word fallacy has at least two meanings. On the one hand, the very general meaning of “erroneous belief, false idea” (Webster, Art. Fallacy). On the other hand, it refers to an “invalid” argumentation or reasoning, the conclusion of which does not follow from the premises, and which may therefore be misleading or deceptive (ibid.).

Being an ordinary word, there is no guarantee that fallacy refers to a unique stable, highly connected domain of reality that can be systematized. It is not a priori obvious that fallacies can be theorized more coherently than, for example, errors, deceptions, blunders or carelessness, just to mention some relatively close terms.

Paralogism has a precise and restricted technical use, in which it refers to a formally invalid syllogism. This term is of little use outside this specialized field.

Sophism refers to a deliberately misleading discourse, using paralogism or any other maneuver. This imputation of bad intention is not necessarily present when one speaks of paralogism or fallacious discourse.

2. Hamblin, Fallacies, 1970

Hamblin revived the theory of fallacies in his book, Fallacies (1970). As Perelman revived ancient rhetoric, or rhetorical argumentation, from Aristotle’s Rhetoric, Hamblin reactivated the other Aristotelian source of argumentation as a critical theory from the Topics and the Sophistical Refutations. Following Hamblin, the study of argumentation developed as a critique of bad reasoning, fallacious and specious arguments.

The Argumentation within Language or the Natural Logic theories do not approach the critical question. The New Rhetoric proposes an ideal critical instance, the universal audience, in a different perspective from that generally implemented in fallacy theories.

Hamblin gives the following definitions of fallacy. It should be noted that this conceptual definitions is parallel to the lexicographical definition given above.

Fallacy₁ — The ordinary meaning of “erroneous belief” has been dismissed by Hamblin: “a fallacy is a fallacious argument. […] In one of its ordinary uses, of course, the word ‘fallacy’ means little more than ‘false belief’; but this use does not concern us.” (1970, p. 224; italics in the text).

Hamblin adds that, “there are several varieties of fallacies, or particular fallacies which have received special names, but which are not really logical fallacies at all, but merely false beliefs” (id., p. 48; capital in the text). In this sense, the word corresponds to a “false concept”, which may clearly be itself deceitful, S. Expression.

Fallacy₂ — In this second sense, the word fallacy designates the counterfeit of argument[1]:

A fallacious argument, as almost every account from Aristotle onwards tells you, is one that seems to be valid but is not so. (Id.., p. 12)

This definition brings up some questions, the first one being:

What it is for an argument to seem valid? The term ‘seems’ looks like a psychological one, and has often been passed over by logicians, confirmed in the belief that the study of fallacies does not concern them. (Id.., p. 253)

Following Frege, mathematicians have de-psychologized logic. Axiomatized logic is no longer a theory of thought. From this point of view, truth is one, and if error is multiple, it is precisely because it is related to psychology. There is no logical theory of error. In short, a fallacious argument is an argument or argument that seems valid to a negligent or untrained reader; it is the reader who has a problem.

In the definition of a “fallacious argument” given above, Hamblin refers to a fallacious argumentation, since he speaks of validity. In English however, the word argument can also denote an argumentation. A fallacy₁ is an “erroneous belief” which can obviously serve as a premise for an argumentation. Since ordinary argumentation demands the truth of the arguments, an argumentation based on a false premise is legitimately deemed to be fallacious; this is an authentic fallacy₂. In other words, from this fallacious argument (erroneous belief), derives a fallacious₂ argumentation, a fallacy₂. “To appear to be true or valid”, “to look honest, solid, admissible, credible” is a property common to arguments and argumentations. There is no difference between the first former and the latter which would enable us to reject one without forcibly rejecting the other. Like argumentation, fallacy is a unitary phenomenon, both substantial and formal.

The lexical / conceptual distinction between substantial fallacies (fallacy₁) and formal fallacies (fallacies₂) is generally taken up in the theory of argumentation, as in the following text:

Assumptions, principles, and ways of looking at things are sometimes called fallacies. Philosophers have spoken of the naturalistic fallacy, the genetic fallacy, the pathetic fallacy, the fallacy of misplaced concreteness, the descriptive fallacy, the intentional fallacy, the affective fallacy, and many more. And outside of philosophy, we also hear sophisticated people using the term ‘fallacy’ to characterize things which are neither arguments nor substitutes for arguments. For example, the China expert Philip Kuhn speaks of the hardware fallacy. This, according to him, is the mistaken assumption common among Chinese intellectuals that China can import Western science and technology without importing with it Western (i.e., decadent) values as well. (Fogelin, Duggan 1987, p. 255-256)

The distinction between form and substance is not easy to maintain. For example, the genetic fallacy, given here as an example of “a way of looking at things”, that is, a substantial fallacy (fallacy₁) can be seen as referring to an argumentation (fallacy₂) which evaluates beings and things according to their origin, and which Hamblin admits in his list of authentic formal fallacies.

3. Lists of fallacies

In the chapter entitled “Standard Treatment”, Hamblin proposes four lists of fallacies.

— The list of Aristotle in the Sophistical Refutations, S. Fallacy (2).
— The fallacies or arguments ad —, a list of modern fallacies, designated by Latin labels of this form, S. Ad — Arguments.
— The syllogistic paralogisms.
— The fallacies of scientific method.

Under this last heading Hamblin proposes the following six cases:

— Fallacy of simplism or pseudo-simplicity, (id., p. 45), according to which the simplest explanation is necessarily the best.
— The fallacy of exclusive linearity (ibid.), assumes that a series of factors is ordered according to a strictly linear progression. The fallacy of linearity neglects the existence of thresholds and ruptures in the development of phenomena. This is an extrapolation fallacy: for example, the conductivity of a metal or a solution decreases steadily and then drops abruptly when approaching absolute zero temperature.
— The genetic fallacy (ibid.), ostracizes an idea or a practice on the basis of their source or origin: “This is exactly what the Bad Guys Group says”, S. Authority.
— Fallacy of invalid induction (id., p. 46), S. Induction; Example.
— Fallacy of insufficient statistics (ibid.).
— Hasty generalization (ibid.), which may correspond to the fallacy of accident or induction, S. Accident; Induction.
— The naturalistic fallacy (id., p. 48). Moore defines this fallacy of valuing the “natural” as follows:

To argue that a thing is good because it is “natural,” or bad because it is “unnatural,” in these common senses of the term, is therefore certainly fallacious; and yet such arguments are very frequently used. (Moore, 1903, §29; italics in the original)

This amounts to saying that the word natural has a generally positive argumentative orientation, but not for the author’s group. The naturalistic fallacy goes hand in hand with a range of reciprocal fallacies, named after the antonyms of “natural”: culturalist fallacy, etc. S. Orientation.

Fogelin (see above) adds:

— The descriptive fallacy, a form of fallacy of expression, S. Expression.
— The fallacy of misplaced concreteness. Whitehead introduced this expression in the field of the philosophy of science, to denote the error of forgetting the distinction between the model and reality, and more generally between words and things.
— The intentional fallacy, is invoked in literary analysis, to condemn the interpretation of a work based on intentions attributed to the author. It should be noted that, conversely, in the field of law, the argument based on the intentions of the legislator is recognized as being entirely valid.
— The emotional and pathemic fallacies, S. Emotion; Pathos; Pathetic fallacy

Many of these so-called fallacies view scientific language as the norm of ordinary language, and represent ordinary arguments as unsatisfactory scientific arguments.

4. Informal Logic and Pragma-Dialectic

From the 1970s onwards, following Hamblin, the literature on fallacies underwent considerable developments, particularly within the theoretical frameworks of Informal Logic and Pragma-Dialectic. These works have clearly highlighted the necessity of systematically taking the pragmatic conditions under which ordinary language reasoning operates into account.

In the Informal Logic framework, Woods and Walton represent the first generation to follow on from Hamblin. They questioned the logical and pragmatic conditions of validity ordinary arguments (Woods and Walton 1989, 1992). Woods (2013) focuses on “errors of reasoning”, insisting on the necessity of formalism (Woods 2004). Walton has in particular developed and systematized a new vision of argument schemes including their “rebuttal factors” (Walton & al., 2008). Argumentation is consequently defined as a default reasoning process, which is both consistent with, and goes beyond Toulmin’s approach, S. Layout.

This development of a counter-discourse based criticism of argument is different from the rule-based criticism of argument developed by the pragma-dialectical school. The Pragma-Dialectic orientation can be read as follows, “if you want your discussion to progress towards a decent resolution, you had better follow such and such a procedure and avoid such and such counter-productive, that is, fallacious, maneuvers”. The felicity conditions of the argumentative exchange are dependent upon the observation of ten rules.

In principle, each of these ten discussion rules constitutes a separate and different standard or norm for critical discussion. Any infringement of one or more of the rules, whichever party commits it and at whatever stage in the discussion, is a possible threat to the resolution of a difference of opinion and must therefore be regarded as an incorrect discussion move. In the pragma-dialectic approach, fallacies are analyzed as such incorrect discussion moves in which a discussion rule has been violated. A fallacy is then defined as a speech act that prejudices or frustrates efforts to resolve a difference of opinion and the use of the term “fallacy” is thus systematically connected with the rules for critical discussion. (van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 1995, no pag.)

5. Methodological remarks

Natural argumentation develops in contexts where the question of truth is suspended. It might also arise when a decision has to be taken as a matter of urgency, even when all necessary information is not available.

Wanting to solve a dispute rationally is the manifestation of a specific and legitimate desire, which is obviously not a prerequisite for arguing. One can also argue to solve the dispute to one’s own advantage, at all cost, to end this affair; or to uphold the truth, or to protect one’s interests; to spread one’s emotions, to satisfy one’s ego, to fill time, for enjoyment… One might also be interested not in solving but rather in deepening the difference of opinion. If a new issue has just arisen, for example, it may be more productive and more rational, to properly articulate the problem, rather than to prematurely seek to eliminate it.

One might also be interested not in solving, but rather in increasing the difference of opinion. If a new issue has just arisen, for example, it may be more productive, even more rational, to properly articulate the problem and the dispute, rather than seeking to eradicate any discussion.

There are interesting arguments, which contain a portion of truth, the whole truth being unknown and not entirely in a single camp. On the other hand, a speaker can put forward a weak or even doubtful argument, in an exploratory way, while explicitly emphasizing its uncertain character. It is therefore impossible to introduce a definition of fallacies based on truth and validity as a single regulatory ideal in all argumentative situations.

5.1 Discursive atomism

To criticize an argument, the analyst must first delineate the discursive passage in which this argument is intuitively seen. This basic operation must itself be technically justified, S. Tagging; Indicators. On the other hand, the quality of the argument must be assessed in relation to the argumentative question on which it depends, including the replicas introduced by opponents, S. Stasis; Question; Relevance.

2. The arbitrator is also a player

The diagnosis of fallacy is supposedly made by the logician who has the role of fulfilling the evaluator’s “meta” function in a neutral and objective way. That is to say that he or she must fulfill this role as if he or she had no interest in the controverted issue, but only an interest in the correction of discourse evaluated according to a priori rules and principles. As Hamblin points out, this position is untenable in the case of “actual practical argument’, (1970, p. 244), S. Norms; Rules; Evaluation. The evaluators of social arguments are by no means excluded from the argument; they are also participants like any others.

3. Natural language cannot be eliminated

These elements — an atomistic approach, an unbiased arbitrator, augmented by a strong reductionist tendency —, all feature in the practical advice by which the Encyclopedia of Philosophy concludes the entry on fallacies:

As Richard Whately remarked “…a very long discussion is one of the most effective veils of Fallacy: … a Fallacy which when stated barely… would not deceive a child, may deceive half the world if diluted in a quarto volume.” (Elements of Logic, p. 151). Consequently, an important weapon against fallacy is condensation, extracting the substance of the argument from a mass of verbiage. But this device too has its dangers; it may produce oversimplification, that is, the fallacy a dicto secundum quid, of dropping relevant qualification. When we suspect a fallacy, our aim must be to discover exactly what the argument is; and, in general the way to do this is first to pick out its main outlines, and then to take into account any relevant subtleties or qualifications. (Mackie 1967, p. 179; italics in the original).

Even if one were to agree with the method, the problem of implementing the proposed solution would remain unsolved, nothing being said about how to deal with natural language and speech, seen somewhat contradictorily as an insubstantial and vicious medium.

Natural language, the common vehicle of argument, is accused of dissolving logic in an insignificant verbiage which serves to mask unsavory human interests. Thus, a sustained war against language would be the price to pay for a correct determination of sound arguments, that is, for eliminating fallacies. Nonetheless, it may be noted that natural language is to natural argument what air resistance is to the flight of the “light dove”:

The light dove, in free flight cutting through the air the resistance of which it feels, could get the idea that it could do even better in airless space. Likewise, Plato abandoned the world of the senses because it posed so many hindrances for understanding, and dared to go beyond it on the wings of ideas, in the empty space of pure understanding. (Kant, [1781], p. 129).

Natural language is not an obstacle, but the condition of ordinary argumentation.

4. The diagnosis of fallacy is an argumentative issue

Criticism of argument does not escape argumentation. First, it has to be justified. This justified diagnosis is just a move in a longer game, not the final one, not the terminal charge. This justified diagnosis is just one move in a longer game, it is by no means a final, conclusive or terminal act. In a subsequent move, the so-called “fallacious arguer” can exercise his or her right of reply, and try to rebut the accusation of fallacy. This reply can itself be challenged, and there is no rule as to who closes the game.

[1] To use a title of W. Ward Fearnside & William B. Holther (1959). Fallacy: The Counterfeit of Argument, quoted in Hamblin 1970. P. 11.

Lat. ad fidem argument, fides, “faith”.

Revealed truth can be used either as arguments, or disputed as claims.

1. Revealed truths as arguments

Revealed truths can be used as arguments justifying some conduct; we follow the Law because our God has given it to us; because He will reward His Followers, the Good, and punish the Wicked. Appeals to religious beliefs may be dismissed as appeals to superstition, S. Threat.

2. Revealed truths as claims

Faith and religious mysteries can be opposed to reason and argument. Thomas Aquinas discusses “whether sacred doctrine is a matter of argument?” and quotes St. Ambrose’s categorically negative response: “Put arguments aside where faith is sought” (ST, Part 1, Quest.1, Art. 8)[1].

For a believer, revealed truths have precedence over all other forms of truth; trying to demonstrate a revealed truth would degrade it. It should be emphasized that, for a believer, renouncing to argue does not imply submitting to the argument from authority, since he or she considers that authority has a human origin, while faith has a divine origin. Whether religious tradition is of human or divine origin is a controversial issue among theologians.

But the precedence of faith does not invalidate the necessity of argument. Thomas Aquinas distinguishes three kinds of situations, depending on whether one addresses Christians, heretics or unbelievers.
— Where a speaker is addressing a Christian audience, argumentation will have two significant uses. The first use is to connect two articles of faith, to show that one can be logically deduced from the other. For example, if somebody believes in the resurrection of Christ, then he or she must believe in the resurrection of the dead. In addition, arguments may be used to extend the domain of faith to deeper truths, derived from the elementary ones.

— When arguing with heretics who agree on some point of the dogma, an argument will be built upon this point to show that they must also accept the validity of other connected points. The technique is basically the same as in the previous case.
In both cases, argumentation about matters of faith is based on arguments postulated as true because they are taken from the corpus of revealed truths.

— Where confronting unbelievers, the argument will essentially be ad hominem, showing that their beliefs are contradictory (after Trottman 1999, p. 148-151).

As can be seen, the Angelic Doctor does not exclude situations of deep disagreement from the field of argumentation, S. Disagreement.

3. Superstition

S. Threat and Promises

[1] Quoted after Thomas Aquinas, The Summa Theologica. Benziger Bros, 1947. Translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province. http://dhspriory.org/thomas/summa/FP/FP001.html#FPQ1OUTP1 (11-08-2017)