When applied to discourse, dismissal is a method of processing out the opponent’s discourse, on the brink of refutation and destruction.

1. Dismissal as the concluding stage of refutation

An argument can be dismissed after due consideration. In that case, dismissal is the last step of a conclusive refutation.
The standard forms of refutation are based on a substantial examination of the content of the rejected speech, or on more or less relevant considerations about the person holding it. Even in the latter case, the rejection is, however badly argued, at least backed by some justificatory discourse.

2. Dismissal without consideration of the dismissed argument
(ad lapidem)

The opponent can dismiss a discourse simply by declaring that the bad quality of the proposed argument is self-evident and self-denouncing:

No comment.
Your arguments are shabby, insufficient, miserable, distressing
I will not give your statement the honor of a refutation.
What you say is not even false.

Uncle Toby’s reaction, “whistling half a dozen bars of Lillabullero”, is a case of such reaction “when any thing, which he deem’d very absurd, was offerd”,  S. Ab –, ad –, ex –.

In ancient rhetoric, this move declaring the argument to be “childish” or “obviously absurd or practically null”, is called apodioxis, (Dupriez 1984, Apodioxis; Molinié 1992, Apodioxis), S. Pathetic argument.

The opponent can dismiss an argument as self-refuting in perfectly good faith, which can lead to paradoxical situations. If the discourse of Big Jones is really self-denouncing, then:

One should give Big Jones a greater say, the more he speaks, the more foolish he appears, the fewer votes he will get.

But this is a perilous strategy, inspired more by the arguer’s self-confidence than by any self-evidence about the discourse.

To top it all off, the opponent may adopt a strategy of irony, and contribute to the dissemination of the opponent’s speech. This is the extraordinary case reported by Wayne Booth about events taking place in his university, where students were clashing with their University administration:

At one point, things got so bad that each side found itself reduplicating broadsides produced by the other side, and distributing them, in thousands of copies, without comment; to each side it seemed as if the other side’s rhetoric was self-damning, so absurd had it become. (Booth 1974, p. 8-9)

S. also Dismissal (Companion

Obviously, the other side cannot even hear such a disqualification, which targets third parties. Used in particularly contentious argumentative situations, such a maneuver makes any deal between the discussants impossible, S. Conditions of discussion.

From the ethotic perspective, such a (non-) arguer displays a kind of moral indignation, whereas the opponent can accuse her of arrogance and contempt.

Ad lapidem argument (Lat. lapis, “stone”)

The name of this argument is derived from a famous incident in which Dr. Samuel Johnson claimed to disprove Bishop Berkeley’s immaterialist philosophy (that there are no material objects, only minds and ideas in those minds) by kicking a large stone and asserting ‘I refute it thus’ (after Wikipedia, Ad lapidem).

This clear contempt of verbal argument is akin to “the proof of the pudding is in the eating”, a practical proof by facts and action.

1. Preference for agreement

Argument is a means of deriving a new consensus from an established consensus, S. Agreement; Persuasion. Such a construction can be seen as the “macro” expression of a trend observable at the “micro” level of the interactional sequence, preference for agreement. This concept is fundamental for the organization of turns of speech in interaction.

In an adjacency pair, the first turn “prefers”, i.e., is oriented towards a specific kind of second turn. The preferred response to an invitation is acceptance, rather than refusal; proposals are made to be accepted and not rejected; affirmations are put forward to be ratified, not to be rejected, etc.
The preferred sequence is unmarked; the second speaker aligns with the first; agreement is a given, a minimal linguistic mark may suffice: (yes, OK, let’s go…), or a quasi-verbal ratification (mm hm) or a minimal bodily action (nodding).
The preference for agreement is also reflected in practices such as the avoidance of frontal opposition, the absence of ratification of emerging disagreements and the preference for micro-adjustments to reach an agreement without explicitly bringing up the disagreement for an overt discussion.

The dispreferred sequence is marked, that is to say, it contains specific features such as hesitation, presence of pre-turns (underlined in S2_2) and justifications (bold characters in S2_2):

S1_1 — What are you doing tonight?
S2_1 — Well I don’t know …
S1_2 — Come for a drink!
S2_2 — (silence) hmm, well, you know, I’d prefer not to, I have got a little work to do.

Giving reasons for accepting an invitation is almost an offense:

S1 — Come to dinner tomorrow night!
S2 — With pleasure, it’ll mean I won’t have to cook, and I will take down the trash.

This preference for agreement is not a psychological fact, but an observational conversational regularity. It can be compared with Grice’s principle of co-operation, or with Ducrot’s observations on the polemical effect produced by second turns which do not accept the presuppositions of the first turn, S. Presupposition.

2. Conversational divergences and overt arguments

Face to face disagreement is expressed by a series of specific coordinated behaviors, either verbal “I don’t agree”, or paraverbal: fights for the floor; interruptions; non collaborative overlappings; accelerated speech flows; raised voices; negative regulators, heads shaking, sighs, agitation — or ironic excesses of signs of approval; non-addressed partner behavior, etc.

Sequences of conversational divergence appear randomly; they follow unforeseen patterns; they have a potentially negative impact on the goals of the overall interaction; they introduce a delicate balance between somehow sacrificing one specific vision of things to maintain good relations with the other party; or taking the risk of damaging the relationship to maintain and sharpen extreme difference of opinion. In the majority of cases, conversational disagreements are resolved immediately, through step-by-step micro-adjustments and negotiation, to be forgotten.

At other times, conversational divergences serves to deepen differences. When conversational divergences are explained and disagreement ratified, each position backed by arguments and counter-arguments, the interaction becomes strongly argumentative. Such interactions can be momentous, kept in mind, ruminated upon and elaborated. They may generate new interactions, referring to the root disagreement, where the parties will develop planned interventions. The treatment of what has become an issue is now the rationale of these interactions.

3. Enantiosis: emerging argumentation

The argumentative role of an opponent may develop from his or her interactional role as a listener, ratifying the existence of an argumentative situation, where two discourses concerning the same topic are in explicit competition.

During a friendly conversation at a party, between people who barely know each other:
S1 — if we watch the TV candidates debate together tonight, maybe we should know something about each other, personally I vote for candidate Smith.
S2 — oh, well, for me it’s not quite so…

Before this exchange, S2 is simply the interlocutor of S1. During the exchange, a political divergence emerges, which initiates a restructuring of the interaction, that can lead to a re-framing of the interlocutors as political antagonists. A full-blown argumentative situation can develop from that point, depending on whether or not the subsequent turns will thematize the emerging opposition.

The figure of rhetoric called enantiosis seems particularly well suited to designate this transitional moment, where opposition is looming large without yet being ratified by the participants. The Greek adjective [enantios] can mean:

1. 1. Being in front of, such as shores that face each other; things that are offered to the gaze of somebody.
   2. With an orientation towards ​​hostility, which stands in front of: “those in front of us”, that is the enemy; in general, the opposing party, the adversary.
   3. Opposed, contrary to: the opposite party, the opponent (after Bailly, [enantios]).

According to this development of meaning, in a dialogue, the adjective enantios refers first to the person standing here, in front of you, for example, in the interlocutor’s position. The idea of ​​hostility appears in a second instance, and then the interlocutor becomes the opponent (the “adversarius” in a rhetorical encounter, Lausberg [1960], §274).

The word enantiosis is also used as a synonym of “antithesis”, and can refer to oppositions such as “good vs. bad; even vs. odd”; one vs. multiple” (Dupriez 1984, Énantiose). This kind of binary opposition is characteristic of the sometimes Manichaean diptych corresponding to antagonistic argumentation. The semantic palette of enantiosis covers the dynamics of this emergence and the initial stabilization of the argumentative situation:

4. “Deep disagreement”

S. Dissensus

A dilemma is a schematization of a situation as an alternative whose terms are equally undesirable. Used as an argumentative strategy, the dilemma corresponds to a case-by-case refutation, consisting in cornering one’s opponent by showing that all his or her lines of defense lead to the same negative conclusion:

Either you were aware of what was going on in your services, and you are an accomplice, at least passively, of what has happened, and you must resign. Or you were not aware, then you do not control your services, and you must resign. Either way, you will have to resign.

A dilemma can be rejected as poorly built, as a false dilemma, an artificial radicalization of a more complex opposition, which can be reconstructed in order to show that there is a third way out of the dilemma, S. Case-by-case.

If I have clear and strong support from the citizens to remain in office, the future of the new Republic will be secured. If not, there can be no doubt that it [the new Republic] will immediately collapse and that France will have to endure, this time without remedy, a confusion of the State even more disastrous than that which it once knew.
Charles de Gaulle, 4 Nov. 1965 Speech, announcing his candidacy for the December 1965 presidential election[1]

This relatively common practice of framing the political situation can be rephrased as the slogan “it’s either me or chaos”. A supporter of the speaker will take this statement as offering a realistic clear-cut choice between good and evil. An opponent will reject it as an arrogant and inadequate means of pressure. Undecided citizens may see it as the expression of a real dilemma, a choice to make between two equally undesirable options.

[1] http://fresques.ina.fr/jalons/fiche-media/InaEdu00101/de-gaulle-Fact-de-candidature-en-1965.html] (11-08-2017). The last phrase alludes to the June 1940 military rout.

The argumentative forms of rebuttal are based upon what is said, that is to say upon a critical examination of the content of the rejected speech, of its relevance to the current issue, or upon considerations related to the person who holds it. Good or bad, the refutations are explicitly argued.
Argumentative discourse, as any discourse, can be put under attack, either by such an argued refutative discourse or through more radical, linguistic or non-linguistic coups. Speech destruction tries to impair, cancel, exclude, the targeted speech; to make nonsense of what it says, leaving it devoid of substance and import; to make it unbearable, untenable, repulsive — and, first of all, to make it innocuous, to ensure that it will have no practical impact upon the group.

1. Discourse destruction and freedom of expression

In view of their material exclusion from the public sphere, argued beliefs and proposals can be neutralized by the legal prohibition of their expression, and the imprisonment of the opponents. This can be seen as attacks on freedom of expression; nonetheless, many democratic countries agree to prohibit by law hate speech as an incitement to crime.
Free expression can also be hindered by popular demonstrations, thus making public expression inaudible, by means of shouting, blowing horns, etc.

2. Destruction through interactional behavior

In ordinary face-to-face situations, discourse can be destroyed by non-verbal interactional maneuvers, the most radical being the refusal to listen, and let the others listen, the discourse of the other. Agreement is manifested by various phenomena of ratification, and, conversely, a simple lack of ratification, the inertia of the partner, may induce the speaker to withdraw the speech, S. Disagreement.

The following interaction takes place in a high school physics lab. The lesson is on the notion of force, and exploits a small device, a stone suspended from a gallows.[1] The two male students F and G are working in pair. The question asked by the teacher is:

What are the objects that act on the stone?

Puzzled, the two students look at the teacher. Then, still addressing the class, she adds:

Well, I took an object in the most general sense that is to say, all that can act on the stone er: visibly or invisibly if— well\

Then, student F immediately answers the teacher’s question, addressing his partner:

Well the air/ the air/ … the air it acts the air when you do that the air\

After an interruption, F resumes his argumentation, waving vigorously his arm up – down – up, intensely addressing his partner (simplified transcription):

When you do that there will be air afterwards since y’know when you make a fast movement like that\ it is the same there is the air\ I’m sure\ but here for now we do not answer that yet but/

Then student G, playing with the stone, says:

There is the attraction\

F‘s argument is perfectly in line with Toulmin’s model of argument. The claim is “the air [acts upon the stone]”. It is supported by an appeal to analogy, “it’s the same”, referring to an arguing ad hoc gestures, mimicking and emphasizing some self-evident fact. The conclusion is duly emphatically modalized, “I’m sure” — and immediately withdrawn: “but for now we do not answer that yet”. In view of this strongly asserted argument, this withdrawal is quite unexpected. It is understandable only in view of the interactional behavior of the conversation partner G, who stares at the stone and gives no sign of ratification throughout, not even signaling that he is listening to F‘s argument (with whom he gets on very well, as shown by their following fully collaborative exchanges).

3. Rejecting the expression

An embarrassing discourse can be destroyed through a criticism focusing upon the style and expression of the opponent without taking into consideration the argument itself. The reply “I don’t agree” actually demonstrates a high level of cooperation.
Ancient rhetoric enumerates a trio of major linguistic qualities of discourse, quality of language, clarity and vivacity of expression (respectively latinitas, perspicuitas and ornatus). Destruction strategies can develop out of any of these points.

3.1 Quality of the language

“You are hardly understandable, you don’t even know the language you pretend to speak, you use dialect expressions you should try to speak classical Syldavian”. In a polemical situation, the opponent can reject a priori a discourse arguing from its grammatical defects. It would be wrong to think that these strategies are marginal or ineffective:

In an uncertain spelling, Mrs. X challenges the evaluation of her language skills by the jury of the competition.

Mrs. X failed her exam about her language skills. Now, she disputes the jury’s decision, and the jury answers mentioning the “uncertain spelling” of her complaint letter. Stricto sensu, these misspellings do not prove that her exam paper was also misspelled, but can certainly be used as a suggestion to that effect. In any case it justifies a charge for neglect, showing a disregard for the jury, which is enough to devaluate the significance of her complaint.

3.2 Clarity and vivacity of the expression

Similar devastating strategies appeal to the lack of clarity of expression: “the presentation was unclear and confusing”, or vivacity “so boring!”.

It is of course better for an argumentative speech to be grammatically correct, clear and interesting. On the other hand, it is human nature to consider correct, clear, and interesting the speeches with which one agrees. This is not just a psychological or bad faith issue; it has a cognitive relevance. The discourse with which one agrees is better known; its deep principles being well accepted, it is easier to recover the ellipsed contents and the missing links; its variations are better tolerated; it is better memorized, etc. When it comes to an opponent’s discourse, it is relatively natural to translate as speech defects the corresponding difficulties, and to conclude by denying that the minimum conditions of mutual comprehension are satisfied.

Making fun and puns out of the opponent’s discourse, is a popular way to get rid of the problems and arguments defended S. Laughter and Seriousness; Orientation Reversal

4. Leaving aside the argumentative details

A class of refutative maneuvers refers to the opponent’s discourse without considering its argumentative details, for example:

— Declaring the discourse sub-argumentative, unworthy of a refutation, S. Dismissal.
— Misrepresenting the argument, S. Resumption of speech.

5. Disqualifying the arguer

Personal attacks against the speaker set aside the argument and try to disqualify the arguer.

For other forms on the verge of destruction and propositional refutation, S. Refutation

[1] Example taken from the VISA database: https://visa-video.ens-lyon.fr/visa-web/ (09-20-2017).

1. Argumentations based on word derivation

A derived word is a word formed on a base or a stem word combined with a prefix or a suffix. A derivational family is made up of all the words derived from the same root or base word.

The argument based on derivatives uses this mechanism of morphological derivation. As the signifier of the root word is found in the derived word, one may think that the meaning of the root word is also transferred to the derivative, which is not necessarily the case. The president of a rather powerless commission of conciliation addressed his fellow members of this commission as commissioners; this clever label gives him and his colleagues the authority associated with the word (police) commissioner and some superiority over the people who appeal to the commission.

The argumentation by derivative exploits a sense of semantic obviousness arising from the morphological similarity between words belonging to the same derivational family, which produces a statement apparently impossible to deny, because true by virtue of its seeming analytical form, “A is A”:

I am human, nothing human is foreign to me

This famous speech made by General de Gaulle uses such self-argued statements, S. Self-argued Claim

As for the legislative elections, they will take place within the period established by the Constitution, unless the whole French people are to be gagged, preventing them from speaking as they are prevented from living, by the same means that prevent students from studying, teachers from teaching and workers from working. (Charles de Gaulle, Speech on May 30, 1968[1])

In a well-made world, “students study, teachers teach and workers work” if not, the semantic disorder argues the abnormality of beings who don’t act according to their essential principle.

These self-evident arguments are based on a license to infer according to which the derivational families are semantically consistent. The morphological similarity may obscure deep semantic differences between the root word and the derived word, which meaning may range from the conservation of the root meaning, to opposition between their connotations or argumentative orientations, to the complete independence of meanings in synchrony. By a kind of antanaclasis S. Orientation Reversal, §1, the following exchange plays on the opposite argumentative orientations of words belonging to the same lexical family, politic:

S1 — By signing this compromise at a convenient moment, the president made a highly political decision.
S2 — We are just witnessing a new example of the President’s usual politicking

The French present participle-adjective aliénant, “alienating”, and the past participle-adjective aliéné, “alienated”, derive morphologically from the verb aliéner, “alienate”, but have two different meanings. Aliénant refers to socio-political conditions whilst aliéné refers to severe mental conditions. In the following case, the speaker rebuts a social claim by aligning the former on the latter:

If you find your work alienating [Fr. aliénant], then we will direct you to an asylum [Fr. asile d’aliénés].

Arguments based on word derivations are strictly dependent on the linguistic structure of the specific language considered.

Rebuttal — The argument by derivation can be rejected as a fallacy of form of expression. The identity of the visible forms of the derivative word with its base word suggests that their meanings are the same; but this supposition is misleading, S. Expression. They are therefore refuted as “plays on words” by highlighting the differences in meaning between root word and derived word. In turn, this rebuttal will be rejected as “semantic nitpicking”.

2. Other designations and related forms

Topic of related words

Cicero considers the same argumentative device under the label topic of related terms (coniugata), that is “arguments based on words of the same family”; related terms are terms such as “wise, wisely, wisdom” (Top., III, 12, p. 391):

If a field is “common” (compascuus), it is legal to use it as a common pasture (compascere). (Ibid.)

Since it is a common field, the sheep can graze there in common. But does that mean that all herds can graze there simultaneously or successively?

Topic of the derivative

Topic n° 2 of Aristotle defines the “topic of derivative” as follows:

Another topic is derived from similar inflexions, for in like manner the derivative must either be predicable of the subject or not; for instance, that the just is not entirely good, for in that case good would be predicable of anything that happens justly; but to be justly put to death is not desirable. (Rhet., II, 23, 2; Freese, p. 297)

This is a dialectical exercise. Problem: “Is the just desirable?”, that is to say, is the predicate “— is good, desirable” part of the essential definition of the word just? The answer is no, because “If you find that the just is desirable, then you find that being justly put to death just is desirable”, which is rarely the case.

Etymology, notatio nominis, conjugata

For Bossuet there are two kinds of topics drawn from the noun.

— On the one side, the topic “drawn from etymology, in Latin notatio nominis, that is from the root the words originate from, like ‘to be a master, you have to master the masters’.” (after Reverso; Fr. “if you are king [roi], then reign! [régnez]”. The example corresponds to Cicero conjugata.

— On the other side, the scheme “taken from words that have all the same origin, called conjugata”, giving as an example of this relationship the pair homo / hominis, two inflected forms of the same word.

The terminology might seem a little confusing, but the bottom line is clear, whenever two terms are linked by morphology, lexicon or etymology, the conclusions established for one of the two can be transferred to the other.

[1] Quoted after http://archives.charles-de-gaulle.org/pages/espace-pedagogique/le-point-sur/les-textes-a-connaitre/discours-du-30-mai-1968.php (11-08-2017)

The speech act of denying operates on words and on sentences.

1. Word negation

The lexical relation of opposition can connect morphologically different words, or pairs of words produced by prefixation.

The attachment of a prefix to a base word or to a root morpheme produces a new word, belonging to the same grammatical category. Negative prefixes produce derived negative terms. The base term and the derived terms are antonyms, that is opposites.

Frequently, the derived negative word serves to add a “not” to the whole semantic content of the positive word:

agree, agreement => don’t agree / dis-agree / dis-agreement.

Negative derived words do, however, tend to become independent:

they made, reached an agreement / they made, reached ^≠a disagreement

The specific nature of the opposition between base and derived words is idiosyncratic, that is, it is not possible to attach a semantic-lexical rule to the negative prefix in order to pinpoint the meaning of the derived word from the meaning of the base word.

Various negative prefixes can operate on the same basis:

social => unsocial, asocial, antisocial, nonsocial (after WCD)

Some dis- words do not have a positive counterpart, but are clearly negative, for example to discard: “to get rid of… useless, unwanted.” (MW, art. Discard).

Argumentation based on derived words is characterized by the fact that it leaves aside the variation of meaning between the base word and its derivative, in particular negative derivatives, S. Derived words.

2. Sentence negation

A negative statement E1 can be analyzed as not-E° (but cf. 2.3). Total negation rejects E° as globally untrue, incorrect, inadequate; it dismisses, turns down, refutes, rebuts, rectifies, … the primitive statement E°. Partial negation rectifies a segment or a feature of E°.

From the point of view of practical argumentation analysis, and following Ducrot (1972), there are three main types of sentence negation.

2.1 Dialogic negation

E° corresponds to an existing statement previously produced by another participant in the same linguistic action. This “confrontational metalinguistic negation” (Ducrot 1972, p. 38) is basic for refutation. Examples (after Ducrot, s. d).

— Rejection of a claim:

L0:   — The next presidential election will be held in two years.
L1:   — No, it will take place next year.

— Invalidation of a presupposition:

L0:   — Peter stopped smoking
L1:   — No, Peter never smoked.

— Rectification of the degree:

L0:   — Flood damages are substantial
L1:   — No, they are not substantial, they are indeed negligible / catastrophic.

— Correction of a linguistic rule:

L0:   — Look at the childsi
L1:   —No, Not the childs, the children.

— Correction of a contextual mismatch:

Student to teacher: — Wyhh, it’s 3.30! (end of class; in a whining and demanding tone)
Teacher to student: — No, it’s not 3.30! (said in the same tone), it is 3.30 (said in a factual and positive tone)

When working on a corpus of texts or argumentative interactions, the practical rule for the analysis of a negative statement E1 = “not E°” is to browse through the previous context for an addressed statement E° (or something close to the semantic content of E°). If there is one then, E1 rectifies E°, and the precise nature of the rectification can be specified, in the broad context of the argumentative question structuring the exchange.

E° may be in the “short” or “long” memory of the interaction. When dealing with a complex argumentative situation, that is to say with a question debated at different times, on various places according to several genres and formats, the discursive distance to retrieve E° may be rather long.

2.2 Polyphonic negation: E° is not recoverable in the context

There is no actual statement or semantic content corresponding to E°, for example when the speaker of E1 anticipates a foreseeable objection, S. Prolepsis. In that case, according to Ducrot’s original and robust version of the polyphonic nature of language, we can consider that the negative utterance articulates two voices, that of the rectifier and that of the rectified. As in the preceding case, the speaker adopts the position of the rectifier. Ducrot speaks in such cases of “conflictual polemical negation” (ibid.).

The two uses of negation, according to whether E° is or is not recoverable in context, are perfectly continuous. If the E° statement cannot be recovered in the immediate context, one will opt for a polyphonic analysis, referring the contents to voices, and not to actual participants, S. Interaction, Dialogue, Polyphony. There will however remain some doubt as to the precise scope of the rectification operated by the negation.

2.3 Descriptive negation

Ducrot mentions the case of a “descriptive negation”, which could not be split into two antagonistic voices:

Some uses of a syntactically negative sentence have neither conflictual nor opposing character. Negation is used without paying attention to its negative character, without, therefore, introducing into it any idea of dispute or doubt. Thus, to point out that today the weather is perfectly fine, I can use a negative sentence “not a cloud in the sky” as well as a positive sentence “the sky is perfectly blue and clear”. (Ibid.)

Such negative sentences have an autonomous meaning. This analysis is suitable for negative polarity statements, from which it is impossible to retrieve an underlying positive statement:

You can’t hold a candle to him.

It is also appropriate for negative prefix words without corresponding positive terms (see above).

3. Denying

The dialogic character of negation is systematically exploited in psychoanalysis, in which the negative utterance is considered to be the result of a negotiation between the conscious and the unconscious:

The manner in which our patients bring forward their associations during the work of analysis gives us an opportunity for making some interesting observations. “Now you’ll think I mean to say something insulting, but really I’ve no such intention.” We realize that this is repudiation, by projection, of an idea that has just come up. Or: “You ask who this person in the dream can be. It’s not my mother.” We amend this to: “So it is his mother.” In our interpretation we take the liberty of disregarding the negation and of picking out the subject matter alone of the association. It is as though the patient had said: “it’s true that my mother came into my mind as I thought of this person, but I don’t feel inclined to let the association work.”
Thus the content of a repressed image or idea can make its way into consciousness, on condition that it is negated. Negation is a way of taking cognizance of what is repressed; indeed it is already a lifting of the repression, though not, of course, an acceptance of what is repressed. We can see how in this the intellectual function is separated from the affective process. (Freud, [1925], p. 235)

4. Argumentative strategies using various forms of negation

The relation between discourse and counter-discourse is fundamental for the definition of an argumentative situation, negation and denial are therefore at the very foundation of argumentation studies.

S. Contradiction; Non contradiction principle
Figures of Opposition
Opposite words;— Opposites – A contrario —  Refutation by the opposite
Destruction of Speech; Objection; Refutation; Counter-argumentation.

To demonstrate comes from the Latin demonstrare “to show, to point out”. To demonstrate and to show verbs are synonymic in some contexts: “in what follows, I’ll show (= demonstrate) that…”.
In ordinary life, people engage in demonstrations of friendship, solidarity, affection… making an exhibition, a show of their sentiments, as they give proofs of love.The word demonstration, even in its most abstract uses, keeps a link with the visual and pictorial; if a proof involves touching with the finger, a demonstration shows. Argumentation has no such metaphorical backgrounds; it originates and deploys within language.

In rhetoric, besides the meaning of “proof”, the word demonstration is used with two totally different meanings.
— A demonstration is a vivid representation of an event or a state of affairs as a picture, for an audience or a reader, put in the position of witness of the represented event. This figure is also called evidence or hypotyposis (Lausberg [1960], § 810).
—The demonstrative genre is another name for the epideictic or panegyric or laudatory genre, next to the deliberative and judicial genres (Lausberg [1960], § 239).

Demonstration is often opposed to argumentation as defining two different cultures without contact and communication, the world of science vs. the world of human affairs, the world of truth vs. that of opinion. This popular opposition is often considered a definitional characteristic of argumentation. Nonetheless, its substance and actual scope, the precise relations between argumentation and demonstration, should be considered as an essential issue for the development of argumentation studies.

1. The hypothetico-deductive demonstration, ideal of proof?

In logic, a demonstration is a discourse proceeding from axioms to theorem, according to specified deduction rules. The construction of a demonstrative sequence is guided by intentionality, since it aims at a stopping point, a remarkable, detachable result, the theorem.

A proof has been formalized if it can be presented as a mathematical demonstration. Formal proof is seen as characteristic of science as pure calculus, and is sometimes considered as the ideal of proof. This vision is contrasted with science as a description of reality (geography, zoology), or as a combination of calculation, observation and experimentation (physics, chemistry).

In the sciences, a demonstration is a discourse, bearing on true propositions: (true by hypothesis; or as a result of observations or experiments carried out according to a validated protocol; or as results obtained from previous demonstrations), and leading to a new, stable, true, proposition. Such a proposition marks a step forward in the field, and is likely to guide further developments in research.

Scientific practice presupposes many non-formal linguistic, cognitive or material operations, other than demonstration. Such operations might include grasping a situation, formulating the problem, conceiving a hypothesis, defining an experience, realizing an experimental setup, manipulating the objects and instruments, selecting, observing and describing the relevant data, making quantitative measurements and the relevant calculation, checking the results, imagining new experiences, drawing conclusions, editing the results for oral communication and publication, answering the colleagues’ objections, revising the claims, etc. We might add to this all the professional argumentative situations in which researchers must apply for new funding, write or evaluate a research project or to employ a new colleague. These argumentative operations require the coordinated management of technical, mathematical and natural languages, including a variety of semiotic media, figures, tables, schemes and diagrams. Argumentation in natural language plays a key role in all these mixed activities.

2. Two distinct fields: What we know, what we do

Argumentation deals with what is to be believed. Argumentation concerns the question of proof and demonstration, but goes beyond this. The exploratory function of argumentation extends beyond its epistemic role, to practical discussion (internal or external) of what, in view of one’s current interests, would be the most sensible next move. So for example, one might ask, “should I apply for this or that position, buy this or that car, ignore or accept offers of negotiation”. And human affairs extend still further, beyond the realm of practical decisions; generally speaking, argumentative situations emerge as soon as any kind of choice is possible. Argumentative situations can thus arise in regard to antagonistic feelings, what is really worthy of admiration or love, S. Emotions. In these areas the language of proof and demonstration does not makes sense, whereas the language of argument does.

One might think that in the case of certain issues concerning true beliefs and accurate scientific predictions, doubt is provisional, and that any doubt will be removed in view of scientific progress. When considering situations involving human agents, however, doubt is an essential component. In such situations, it is often impossible to completely dispel doubt, and one can legitimately ask what would have happened if …

We turn to argumentation when the data is incomplete or of poor quality and the assumptions and laws imperfectly defined; the deductions are, therefore, subject to a continuous principle of revision. As the last resort, we are referred to the question of time: an argued claim is a bet. Linked with urgency and occasion, argumentation is a time-limited process, different from the unlimited time afforded to the philosophical or scientific demonstration. There are essential differences in the modus operandi of argumentation and demonstration, their fields of application and the kind of problem they can apply to.

When operating in the field of knowledge, argumentation has an exploratory and creative function which goes beyond its demonstrative and critical function, S. Abduction. Argumentation produces hypotheses, opens up discussions and triggers the critical process of verification and revision.

Demonstration is by definition related to a domain; argumentation may combine heterogeneous evidence. Argumentation is the art of hierarchizing not only values^,, but also proofs and demonstrations. If one wants to explore the possibilities and economic interests of a major environmental management works, constructing a channel between the Green and the Yellow Oceans, for example, then the technical proofs, solutions and objections offered by geologists, economists and ecologists must be articulated and confronted with those of neighbors, citizens, investors and politicians. The negotiation will take place in view of calculations and technical proofs each as unique as the others, and argumentation in natural language will have to fully exert its synthetizing function.

3. Argumentation-proof and argumentation-demonstration:
The heritage

Several theories of otherwise very different orientations come together in order to oppose argumentation to demonstration. Historically, the notions of demonstration and argumentation inherited through Western tradition were developed in ancient Greece. Demonstration in science and mathematics (Archimedes, Euclid) was built without relation to argumentation in social affairs. According to Lloyd, Aristotle elucidated “the explicit concept of rigorous proof” ([1990], p. 77) in a scientific context where four types of argument were currently used:

The first of these is arguments in the legal and political domains, the second those in early Greek cosmology and medicine, the third mathematics in pre-Aristotelian period, and the fourth deductive arguments in philosophy. The first two relate primarily, to informal, the second pair to rigorous proof. (Ibid.)

The unity of the disciplines of proof can be shown by the examination of their vocabulary:

The same vocabulary, not only of evidence, examination, judgment, but also proof, appears also outside the specifically legal or political domain, notably in a variety of contexts in early Greek speculative thought. Both cosmology and medicine, and some extended passages from the Hippocratic Corpus merit particular attention. (Id., p. 78)

In Aristotle’s work, convincing rhetorical argumentation is characterized by its differences with valid logical demonstration (and probable dialectical deduction). Since then, argumentation has been conventionally referred to logical demonstration, to argumentation-demonstration, and not to argumentation-proof such as exemplified in the practices of scientists, practitioners, historians, police investigators, etc. Argumentation is most strongly linked to these practices, in virtue of its substantial nature and its relationship to practical action. For example, the essential concept of argumentative question does not derive from a logical concept, but from the medical descriptive concept of stasis, that is a state in which physiological fluids are blocked, and, metaphorically collaborative speech and actions are suspended.

This non-operational opposition between demonstration and argumentation, which now functions as a commonplace, has been considerably restated and strengthened by the New Rhetoric, as well as by the non-referentialist positions of the theory of Argumentation within Language.

4. Demonstration against argumentation?

Demonstration and logical proof are classically opposed to argumentation on the basis of their premises and modes of inference. Things go much deeper than that, however. Natural language and discourse are inherently subjective, that is self- and we-related, focused on the “here” and “now”, S. Subjectivity. Words allow synonymy, homonymy and polysemy; their meaning is context-sensitive. Syntactic constructions must be interpreted. Discourse is figurative. Meaning and reference are negotiated and managed by relevance principles. These processes are stigmatized as being inherently “vague and elastic”; but the polymorphism of language should simultaneously be praised for its adaptability to new situations and its rule-changing capacity.

At a general level, it should be noted, firstly, that there is no reason to favor elementary logical demonstration over other scientific activities, of which it is, unquestionably a distinguished member. Secondly, oppositions make sense only if the opposed domains are comparable. Experimentation, mathematics, computerization, have taken the techno-sciences worlds apart, and it does not make much sense to compare a paper in a scientific journal publishing cutting edge research with a column in a newspaper.

4.1 The New Rhetoric

Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca’s Treatise has constructed a powerful, autonomous concept of argument by rejecting emotions out of the field of argument on the one hand, and by setting argumentation against demonstration on the other. The purpose of the Treatise is to circumscribe an autonomous discursive domain, where speech develops cut off from demonstration and emotion. In the very words of the Treatise, the couple argumentation / demonstration functions as an “antithetical pair” (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca [1958], p. 422.), whose terms are the subject of a genuine “breaking of connecting links” or “dissociation” (id. p. 411 sq.). Systematically, the Treatise opposes argumentation to demonstration, as can be checked on every occurrence of the word demonstration mentioned in the index. This strategy, constitutes one of the building blocks of the Treatise.

The fundamental question of the difference of languages between argumentation and demonstration, is not addressed. In the Treatise, the form of demonstration opposed to argumentation is taken in a particular discipline, formal logic, which would be prototypical of demonstration as the inaccessible ideal of argumentation. This hardened and simplified image of demonstration promotes the antagonism argumentation / demonstration. This results in the exclusion of anything concerning sciences from the Treatise:

We seek here to construct such a theory [of argumentation] by analyzing the methods of proof used in the human sciences, law and philosophy. We shall examine arguments put forwards by advertisers in their newspapers, politicians in speeches, lawyers in pleadings, judges in decisions, and philosophers in treatises ([1958], p. 10)

No reference is made to any kind of scientific activity. Argumentation addresses human affairs only, and demonstration concerns mathematics and science. exclusively. The gap between “the two cultures” (Snow, 1961) is thus effective at the very foundation of argumentation as a discipline.

4.2 The Argumentation within Language theory

This theory considers that argumentative orientation is an essential characteristic of the semantic level of language, and concludes to the impossibility of developing argumentation as good reasons in discourse and interaction. Consider the following passage:

It has often been remarked that discourses concerning everyday life cannot achieve “demonstrations” in the logical sense of the word. Aristotle already noted that, by opposing to the necessary demonstration of the syllogism the incomplete and only probable argumentation of the enthymeme. Perelman, Grize, Eggs insisted on this idea. At first I thought I was merely following this tradition, my only originality being to refer to the nature of language the necessity of substituting argumentation for demonstration. I thought that the words of language were the cause or the sign of the fundamentally rhetorical, or, as we said, the “argumentative”, character of discourse. But I am now led to say much more. Not only do words not allow demonstration, but likewise they do not allow that degraded form of demonstration that would be argumentation. Argumentation is only a dream of discourse, and our theory should rather be called « the theory of non-argumentation” (Ducrot 1993, p. 234).

As Ducrot’s structuralist framework reduces the order of speech to that of language (Saussurian langue), it is quite coherent to deny any principle of intelligibility to argumentation in discourse.

5. Arguing the non-demonstrative character of argumentation

The refutation of the possibly demonstrative nature of ordinary discourse is threatened by skeptical paradoxes and exposed to self-refutation. It is difficult to argue about the argumentative or non-argumentative character of natural language discourse, whilst using natural language discourse.

Interaction studies have taught us a great deal about what everyday life discourses can achieve. Brief, local reasoning is accomplished in sequences in which language combines with action to achieve operational conclusions. We define, categorize, articulate causes and effects, and make analogies, which are all more or less insufficient, but which are all susceptible to criticism and rectification. Sometimes, these result in the satisfaction of all parties concerned.

By means of some conventions and adjustments, more sophisticated reasoning episodes can be developed in ordinary language. If the syllogism constitutes an example of a necessary demonstration, since the syllogism consists of a sequence of utterances in natural language, words allow at least syllogistic demonstration. All the same, figures and calculus are not entirely foreign to natural language, which also allows for some correct geometrical conclusions, so that the tenon exactly fits the mortise. Not only a logic, but also an everyday geometry, arithmetic, physics… underpin linguistic practices, and no metaphysical lack stops them from concluding properly, as shown by the following little calculation:

The Abbé du Chaila is one of the essential architects of the repression of the Protestants of the Cevennes, in Southern France. His murder is the origin of the Camisards’ war, in the 18th century.
The date of birth of the future abbot of Chaila remains a mystery, due to the disappearance of parish registers. It should be at the beginning of the year 1648. Indeed, François’s parents, Balthazar de Langlade and Francoise d’Apchier, were married on the 9th of April 1643 and had successively eight boys and two girls in ten years, at a rate of a child a year. François being the fifth child of the family was thus born in 1648, the four previous brothers being born in 1644, 1645, 1646 and 1647.
Robert Poujol, [The Abbé du Chaila (1648-1702)], 2001[1].

Any assertion about the demonstrative character of argumentation in general is hard to assess, regardless of the prestige of the authority supporting it. Arguments from natural signs, case-by-case arguments cannot be treated as an appeal to authority or arguments by analogy. Ordinary argumentative discourse might combine entirely heterogeneous types of arguments and fields of evidence, including rather technical and scientific episodes. One might argue correctly in natural language; sometimes, some truth emerges from judicial and historical debates when properly framed and managed; and argumentation plays a role in science acquisition.

6. Argumentation in science education

Other connections have to be found between argumentation and scientific activities. The great rule followed by Quine to construct his formal logic shows the way:

This course is prompted by an inclination to work directly with ordinary language until there is a clear gain in departing from it. (1980, p. x).

Mutatis mutandis, we will say that the teaching and learning of scientific method are necessarily anchored in natural language and everyday argumentation, and that they depart from them only when they find a decisive gain in doing so. This leads to a focus on argumentation as an instrument for knowledge acquisition.

Demonstrative-scientific proof can be considered, on the one hand, as a finished product, impeccably exposed in published papers and textbooks; and, on the other hand, as a process, which can leave room for dialogue, arguments and rectification and progression. Argumentation being on the side of the process, its claims are in the making. It might therefore be an interesting option to orient the arguer’s capacity towards the exploration of scientific domains, monitored by competent advisers.

Finally, we must consider the question as to whether there is a break or a continuity between argumentation and demonstration. This is certainly a very important philosophical and epistemological issue, yet it is quite different from the empirical issue as to how best to construct scientific capacities. The teacher might consider that the gap is a fact (Duval 1992-1993, 1995) and choose to break with ordinary language and practices, as did teachers of “modern mathematics” in the seventies in France. They might otherwise try to use everyday capacities to build knowledge. Gap and continuity are pedagogical choices and constructs.

Science acquisition, scientific “enculturation” and education are key situations for the development of argumentation studies (Erduran & Jiménez-Aleixandre 2007). The humanities remain largely trapped in a conception of argumentation based on logocentric discourses, in which all and everything can be claimed. From this conception, a comfortable antagonism has been developed, with “logical demonstration” serving as a convenient antagonist. The repositioning of argumentation as a complex, combinatorial activity which seeks to manage heterogeneous evidence in possibly complex material contexts enables us to distance ourselves from this traditional logocentric vision. Discussions between two mechanics disagreeing on how to repair a failing engine, or two students disagreeing on the shape of the beams coming out of the lens are as prototypical of what is an argumentative situation as an ideological debate where the language is perpetually referred to itself.

The research program on argumentation in science education emerged in the late 1990s and early 2000s. It now represents a key field of development for argumentation in the near future (Baker 1996, De Vries, Lund, Baker 2002; Buty & Plantin 2009; Erduran & Jiménez-Aleixandre 2008).

[1] Poujol R. L’ Abbé du Chaila (1648-1702). Montpellier: Les Presses du Languedoc, 2001. P. 31.

Stevenson ([1938]) introduced the concept of persuasive definition in the following terms:

In any “persuasive definition” the term defined is a familiar one, whose meaning is both descriptive and strongly emotive. The purport of the definition is to alter the descriptive meaning of the term, usually by giving it greater precision within the boundaries of its customary vagueness; but the definition does not make any substantial change in the term’s emotive meaning. And the definition is used, consciously or unconsciously, in an effort to secure, by this interplay between emotive and descriptive meaning, a redirection of people’s attitudes. (Stevenson [1938], p. 210-211)

To make a definition persuasive, within Stevenson’s meaning, its descriptive content must be redefined, whilst its “emotional force” must be kept intact so as to be applied to the redefined content. Stevenson gives the following example; A and B are “discussing a mutual friend” (id, p. 211.)

— A points out a number of shortcomings of that person (education, conversation, literary references, subtlety of spirit) and concludes that “he is definitely lacking in culture.”

— B describes this friend under a number of favorable lines (imagination, sensibility, originality) and concludes that “he is a man of far deeper culture than many of us who have had superior advantages in education”.

First, both A and B value culture, and are willing to give the word culture and the judgment “X is a cultured person” a positive emotional orientation. Moreover, the word culture has a vague descriptive sense; B carves out of this descriptive sense a new definition, and shows that it fits their mutual friend. Stevenson analyses B‘s argumentative move as follows

His purpose was to redirect A‘s attitudes, feeling that A was insufficiently appreciative of their friend’s merits (id., p. 211).

The argumentative trick is located at point (b), that is:

(a) B wishes to value his friend.
(b) He redefines culture “within the boundaries of its customary vagueness” according to qualities possessed by his friend;
(c) and he concludes that his friend is cultured;
(d) and the friend benefits from the positive opinion associated with the idea of culture and cultured person.

Thus, a persuasive definition redefines the descriptive contents of a term not on the basis of context-free, objective general considerations, but with a view to applying this term to a pre-determined person, a singular case. This is what would make it deceptive. It should be noted however that Stevenson attributes a persuasive definition to B only. Yet it might be argued that A also carves his definition out of the vague meaning of “culture”, “within the boundaries of its customary vagueness”. A thus has a persuasive definition, in much the same way as B, of “culture” as literary references, etc., allowing him to exclude the common friend from the circle of the cultivated. A seeks to influence B just as much as B tries to influence A.

Point (d) implies that the argumentative orientation (called here “the emotive content”) is independent of the cognitive content, and not affected by the redefinition. Thus, this orientation has to be attached directly to the signifier.

As it operates a redistribution of meaning, persuasive definition exploits the processes of distinguo and dissociation.

A persuasive definition is a definition that does not meet the condition of separability between, on the one hand, the construction process of the definition, and, on the other hand, the use of the definitional features to include an individual or a special case in the category it determines and calls it by the category’s name. In other words, a persuasive definition is a definition which is conditioned by the intention of including a specific object, that is, an ad hoc definition, imagined or altered on the spot, for the purpose at hand, S. Orientation.

The criteria of what is “good school task” must be applied regardless of the categorization of such work in or out of that category. A skewed definition does not meet this criterion:

A good school task is a task in which student get involved and on which they worked hard. My son spent his weekend on his history course. Thus he handed in an excellent piece of work, and deserves a good grade.

The category “is a good school task” has been redefined so that it can apply to Mr. Doe’s son, leaving aside the contents of the work, traditionally regarded as the decisive factor. The target has been re-designed to fit the arrow, and the limited capacities of the archer.

1. Definition in the categorization process

Categorization is the process through which an individual is identified as belonging to a category, and is given the name of this category, S. Categorization and Nomination. The definition is the reservoir of essential features allowing this identification.

2. Argumentation exploiting a definition

The definition (the definiens) of a word or an expression (boy, scotch bonnet, democracy, single parent, educated person, British citizen, natural disaster…) provides a stock of definitional features applicable to all the beings, individuals, institutions, events… designated by the definiendum (belonging to the category named by the word). Argumentation by definition applies the definition of the name to a being designated by that name. It operates as follows:

1. 1. An argument: a statement of the form “I is a D”: I is an individual (identified, categorized, perceived, named… as) “a D”.
   2. A license to infer, found in the definition of D considered as authoritative.
   3. A conclusion: everything said of the D or with them can be truly said of I.

A definition (a definiens) is a rich set of proposals about “what that kind of being is”. It includes doxical assertions based on common knowledge about these beings, to be found in the examples illustrating the definiens as well as in the definiens properly said. To call a being “a D” is to allocate to this being all the properties defining the name “D”, as well as scripts, duties and obligations attached “to Ds”. In other words, the definition (the definiens) of “what is a D” is a stock of inference licenses applicable to all the persons and objects called D.

Using the definition allows inferences of the following type, S. Common Place.

— “Harry is a British citizen”: this claim expresses a categorization of the person Harry, derived from the information that he was born in Bermuda, S. Layout. The categorization (“— is a British Citizen”) corresponds to a local modeling of the person “as-a-British-citizen”, which makes it accessible to the inferential definitional machine. Armed with this information, we can draw from the knowledge stock that defines “what it is to be an Englishman”, and conclude, according to the needs of the moment, that:

He takes tea at five
He will need a drop of milk
We can certainly address him in English
If he has committed a crime abroad, his judicial treatment will be led according the relevant international convention

— “My dear, you’re a little girl!” Traditional wisdom says that girls are like this, should do this and that, etc. So, my daughter, you’re like that, and you must behave accordingly:
— “This is a Scotch bonnet” so, it is “very aromatic, it is delicious prepared in an omelet”; better yet, you can “dry it out, and use it as an aromatic”[1], S. Categorization.
— “Now you are undoubtedly one of the great democracies” so we can re-establish diplomatic relations and encourage our citizens to spend their vacation on your beaches.
— “Mrs. Doe is a mother who lives alone” so, on the basis of such and such administrative and financial provisions, she is entitled to a single parent allowance of a certain amount.
— “Mrs. Smith is a PhD student” so she enjoys certain rights and must fulfill certain duties defined by the PhD Charter in force at the university where she is enrolled.
— “He is a bastard” so I do not trust him.

Argumentation by definition ascribes to a definite being a feature actually found in the definition of its name, as found in a dictionary or an encyclopedia. More broadly, it attaches to a being any feature borrowed from the stereotyped notion of the kind of beings bearing that name.
Argumentation by definition is the epitome of what Billig calls “bureaucratic thinking”, which is fundamental in everyday life (Billig [1987], p. 124).

If the criteria used for categorization are defined within a rigorous scientific framework, then argument by definition will be an essential scientific tool. Similarly, in the legal domain, the criteria qualifying an act make it possible to apply the legal syllogism, which delivers routine legal decisions.

3. Lexical definitions as inferential resources for categorization and argumentation from the definition

Some basic argumentative inferences embedded in a word are made explicit in its lexical definition and are suggested in the examples of its usage. Language dictionaries are stocks of accepted ideas and accepted connections between ideas; as such, they provide legitimate inferences from and to a word in the language and culture to which they belong (Raccah 2014) S. Orientation. These inferences are considered rational and convincing insofar as they are the expression of a shared semantic heritage, the treasure trove of discursive rationality. Let us consider the word rich. By merging the definitions of some current dictionaries, we are able to gain some insight into the elementary “licenses to infer”, diversions, or “drifts” from and to this word, that is, the semantic inferences which characterize a basic understanding of the word “rich”. The following information comes from definitions from MW, tfd; CD).

(i) … so he is rich. This claim is justified:

— On an analytical basis: … (he has) a lot of money; of valuable assets, SO he is rich
— On the basis of signs: … (he owns) expensive materials, workmanship (such as mahogany furniture), SO, he is rich
— On the basis of his or her moral character and motives:
he is determined to get rich quickly,  SO, he will probably become rich

 (ii) He is rich, so… On the same analytical basis, or from signs, one can deduce:

… (he has) a lot of money; of valuable assets
… (he owns) expensive materials, workmanship (such as mahogany furniture)
… he does not have to work
… he has forgotten his humble background —

This last conclusion admits of exceptions: He is rich, but…

… Even when he became rich and famous, he never forgot his humble background.

(iii) An implicit principle, “everybody can get rich” eliminates two rebuttals:

Having a humble background:
Even when he became rich and famous, he never forgot her humble background:

Lacking of formal education:
A lack of formal education is no bar to becoming rich.

(iv) A main opposition: the rich vs. the poor, allows the application of the topic from opposites:

There’s one law for the rich and another for the poor.

[1] Entry Mousseron in J. and J. Manuel Montegut (1975). Atlas des Champignons [Atlas of Mushrooms] Paris: Globus, 1975.