OPPOSITION

The relationship of opposition between (opposite) words is roughly equivalent to the lexical relationship of antonymy. These terms cover a number of classical lexical oppositions such as:

Male / female: terms in a two-dimensional opposition (classical gender regime).
Obligatory / permissible / forbidden: terms in a multidimensional opposition.
Sight / blindness: terms in a possession / deprivation relation.
Mother / son: correlative terms.

These relations of opposition are exploited in various argumentative maneuvers, involving negation,and/or terms and propositions containing opposite terms:

– Negation, see denying.
– Rhetorical figures of opposition, see opposition (in French).
– Opposition between terms, see correlative terms.
– Opposition between propositions: see contradiction; contrary and contradictory
– The argument scheme of the opposites predicates a contrary predicate upon a contrary subject, see argumentative scale.
— The refutation by the observation of the opposite rejects the predication “A is P” based on the constatation that the opposite predicate, Q, is actually true of A, see refutation.

Refutation and destruction by an opposite

A statement of fact admitting an opposite can be refuted by establishing that its opposite is true, see opposite, opposition.

A statement can be invalidated by the use of a misleading opposite.
It only makes sense to attribute a quality to an entity if it also makes sense to attribute  the opposite quality to the same entity.

If entity A cannot receive the predicate O1, then it cannot receive its opposite O2, Friendly and unfriendly are opposites.
L1: – Peter acted in a friendly way (so you should be grateful to him.
L2: – To say he acted in a friendly way, he must have had  the possibility of acting in an unfriendly way.

It is ironic to praise poor people for their sobriety because to be praised for sobriety, they must first have enough to eat.
Who can say that he’s brave if he’s never had the chance to prove it?
He can’t say otherwise, so what he says isn’t relevant.

This can be generalized. For a statement to provide meaningful information in a given situation, the opposite statement must also be meaningful.

In today’s Le Figaro , the CEO of EDF claims that the French nuclear power plants are in very good condition. It’s hard to imagine him saying  he could have said the opposite. (France Culture Radio News, 04/18/2011; the CEO of EDF is in charge of the French nuclear park).

This is a very powerful tool for destroying discourse. An entire argument can be dismissed on this basis. He cannot speak otherwise because of his position: “As a teacher, you have to speak in this way.”

OBJECTION

Like refutations, objections are reactive, non-preferred second-turn interventions, that oppose the conclusions of the first turn, the target discourse.

In terms of content, objections can be considered politely toned down refutations, that may still have the full force of a refutation. Presenting a refutation as an objection is a small price for logic to pay in the name of civility.

However, objections can also be seen as weak, indecisive refutations, that are easily dismissed. To refute is to shoot down, while to object is merely an attempt to stop,  or at best to weaken, the position under scrutiny.

Whether a rebuttal is considered an objection or a refutation depends on the kind of dialogue that develops between the participants. In a logical language game, one cannot claim that all swans are white and simultaneously concede that this particular swan is black. Conclusive counterarguments count as refutations. In ordinary language, however I might argue that in general, swans are white, while conceding the existence of black swans as exotic exceptions.

The same kind of argument can be treated as either a refutation or a concession. For example, as a refutation,  an objection might emphasize a negative consequence of the interlocutor’s proposal:

— But if you build the new school here, the students’ commute will take half an hour longer.

This counter-argument can be contextually constructed as a refutation:

— and this is clearly unacceptable, classes start at 7.30 a.m., and some commuting students  already spend more than an hour commuting. The new school cannot be built here!

or as an objection:

— We’ll have to create a new bus route for commuter students, but this is still the best place to build the new school!

Objection and refutation have essentially different interactional statuses; objections are cooperative, while refutations are antagonistic. The objecting party is a dialectical figure, essential in cooperative everyday argumentative dialogue.

While refutations seek to close the debate, without listening to the answers, objections keep the dialogue open. They correspond to the problematic of the discourse under discussion, which is accepted as a working hypothesis. Objections are framed as a search for better answers. They seek explanations, precisions and modalizations. They accept being only partially answered or integrated as the case may be.

The ethos and emotional states expressed by refutation and objection differ greatly. Refutation wants the last word and is associated with aggression. Objection evokes a spirit of moderation, collaboration and openness.

In a proleptic discourse, referring to possible negative observations, the speaker mentions “objections”, not “refutations”, followed by a but structure:

It could be objected that P [prolepsis], but R [answer to the objection, proposal reinforced]

See refutation; concession; prolepsis.

OBJECT OF DISCOURSE 

Jean-Blaise Grize introduced the concept of a discourse object (« discursive object »; French objet de discours) in connection with the schematization process. An object of discourse is an entity or situation that is the focus of a given discourse and is constantly redesigned throughout the discourse or interaction.

1. Cluster of a word

At the linguistic level, the cluster of an object [“faisceau d’objet”] is studied based on the term that designates this object. It is defined as:

The set of aspects normally associated with the object. Its elements are of three kinds: properties, relations, and patterns of action. Thus, the cluster of « rose » includes properties such as « to be red, » relationships such as « to be more beautiful than, » and action patterns such as « to fade » (Grize 1990, p. 78-79). (Grize, 1990, pp. 78–79).

The cluster attracted by an object is defined at the notional level. It does not coincide either with linguistic categories such as those used in semantic analysis (id., p. 79), with lexicographical elements used in dictionaries, with elements associated with the object psychologically, or with ontological features claiming to grasp the being of the object, see categorization. A word’s cluster results from an aggregation of discourses using that word (id., p. 78), see orientation; words as arguments; inference; polyphony. This concept can be compared to the stereotypes associated with a word, or, better, to the set of its preferred linguistic collocations, as established in corpus linguistics.

2. The cluster of a discourse object

At the discourse level, the elements that make up the cluster attached to a specific object of discourse are not known a priori, but are constructed empirically, on the basis of the study of the actual discourse, or corpus, being analyzed. A specific object of discourse develops through the progressive aggregation of contextual properties attributed to it in that discourse, the entities associated with it, the events it participates in.

The study of discourse objects focuses on their plasticity, as they are progressively produced and transformed in discourse, including their mode of introduction, and the evolution of the contexts to which they are attached. This study overlaps with the grammatical study of designation paradigms (Mortureux 1993). A designation paradigm is the set of words and expressions forming the anaphoric chain associated with an evolving discourse object. This study is part of the analysis of textual cohesion and coherence, and overlaps with basic rhetorical observations about shifts in meaning.

Discourse objects can be contrasted with “logical objects.” Classical logic refers to stable objects. According to the principle of identity every occurrence of the sign (signifier) “a” is strictly equivalent to another. Consequently, any variation in the scope of the reference of “a” introduced in the development of discourse are considered fallacious, see fallacy; ambiguity.

 3. Objects of discourse in argumentative situations

A discourse may concern a large number of objects, and studying the development of each one may be impractical; therefore, limits must be set. As far as argumentation studies are concerned, they must focus on the most relevant objects, that is, on conflicting  central and peripheral objects, and primarily on those mentioned in the formulation of the argumentative question. Just as peaceful, uncontroversial, assertions are taken to be true, uncontroversial objects are taken to be real and stable in their reference.
Controversial objects are associated with controversial claims. Observing their discursive development, and correlatively establishing their contrastive characterization is a simple and practical method for revealing their precise argumentative relevance.

Workers or undocumented immigrants?

The following data, taken from a discussion between students, concern the conditions that a person must fulfill in order to obtain French citizenship. The key question “Who? Who can obtain French citizenship?” immediately structures the debate, see invention. The two antagonistic positions taken by the participants are clearly reflected in the two systems, of designations they use to answer the question “who?”

— All the students agree that there is an unproblematic group, that should have an automatic right to French citizenship, namely, “the persecuted”.

— One group of students supports the claim that “the process of acquiring citizenship should be facilitated”. Immigrants are constructed as people who have a right to French citizenship. These individuals are referred to as:

Workers; people who came to work during prosperous times.
People we asked to come.
People we welcomed.
People who have been here for a long time;
Their relatives;
Their children – born in France – born in another country

— Another group of students supports the claim that “the process of obtaining citizenship should be tightened.” In this set of aligned (cooriented) discourses, immigrants are portrayed as people who do not have the right to French citizenship. These individuals are referred to as:

Undocumented immigrants
People with problems; having or creating problems
Illegal immigrants;
Immigrants by “practicality” (i.e., economic migrants)
« Everyone”, (i.e., indiscriminate foreigners, people asking for citizenship).

In reality, among those who apply for French citizenship, there are certainly both undocumented immigrants and people who came to France many years ago to work. Nevertheless, each group of students schematizes immigrants (as a group) as either one (undocumented) or the other (workers).

For another example of divergent constructions of causality as an object of discourse, see cause – effect.

This method can be used to show how a particular « light » is cast on an object of discourse, how it is “spotlighted” (Grize), or given a discursive “presence” (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca’s [1958], 115-120).

NON-CONTRADICTION PRINCIPLE

1. In logic

In logic, the principle of non-contradiction prohibits the affirmation of contradictory propositions. In other words:

— The conjunction “P and not-P” is a contradiction, and, as such, is a self-destructive proposition, that is necessarily false.
— The disjunction “P or not-P” is necessarily true.

One of the two propositions P or not-P must be true, both cannot be true at the same time. The same thing cannot both be and not be. This principle is considered  as a law of thought in classical logic and an axiom in contemporary logic. A logical system that respects the principle of non-contradiction contains no antinomies and  is said to be consistent.

Negation — Using the truth table method, the negation operator is defined as follows:

This table expresses the principle of the excluded middle. It reads:

Line 1: ‘if P is true, then not-P is false’.
Line 2: ‘if P is false, then not-P is true’.

2. In natural language

The application of the non-contradiction principle to everyday language is complex, because:
— It presupposes that P is either unambiguously true or false, not far from true or practically false, true or not according to the circumstances.
— There are natural language utterances that cannot be said to be either true or false, such as « Come back tomorrow! » or « I promise to come back tomorrow. »

Many forms of argument appeal to the principle of non-contradiction , albeit under different names. See ad hominem; dialectic; contradiction; consistency.

The principle of non-contradiction applies not only to logical and argumentative discourse, but to any kind of discourse. Inconsistent narratives or descriptions for example, are rejected as such.

According to the basic rule of Aristotelian dialectic, any discourse that leads to a contradiction is irrational and must be abandoned. Hegelian dialectics sees the motor of history in the ongoing treatment of contradictions. Cynical politicians can invoke Hegel to hide their opportunism:

Stalin’s speech on the Five-Year Plan serves as a passionate apology for contradiction as a “vital value” and an “instrument of struggle”. One of Lenin’s great strengths was his ability never to feel imprisonned by what he had preached as true the day before. Mussolini’s famous words “Let us beware of the deadly trap of coherence” could be endorsed by anyone intending to work within unpredictable currents they cannot.
Julien Benda, [The Betrayal of the Intellectuals], [1927][1]

Affirming of a paradox as an oxymoron enables one to endure the contradiction: “O wound without scar!”. Rather than being deemed absurd or fallacious and dismissed, such a paradoxical assertion triggers a search for the deeper, symbolic meaning of the words wound and scar used in this context.
This interpretive approach goes a step further than hastily dismissing it as a  “fallacy”.

[1] Julien Benda, La Trahison des Clercs, [1927]. Excerpt from the preface to the 1946 edition. Paris: Grasset, 1975, pp. 78-79.

Argument from NATURAL SIGN

A natural sign is a perceptual datum, an actual material fact or object,  that is materially connected, either necessarily or ambiguously, to another fact or object or state of things that is not perceptually accessible.

Natural signs are typically undeniable facts, “as certainties, we have, in the first place, what is perceived by the senses, such as what we see, what we hear, as signs [signa] or indications” (Quintilian, V, 10, 12).

Natural signs are quite different from linguistic signs, in which the link between signifier and signified is social and arbitrary, nor are they global analogues of what they “represent”, as in the case of analogical thought. Nor are they a symbolic representation of the associated phenomenon.
The natural sign is merely a part of the phenomenon through which the observer can access the whole phenomenon as a whole. The connection between the present natural sign and its absent counterpart may be:

The very first manifestation of a phenomenon: a red setting sun / rainy weather tomorrow.
A remnant of something that has disappeared: the leftovers / the meal.
A part of a whole: a strand of hair / a person.
An effect of a cause: being tired / having worked.

1. Natural signs, clues and traces

Clue is an accurate synonym for material sign, since looking for clues involves an “intricate procedure or maze of difficulties”, or be trying “to find something, understand something, or solve a mystery or puzzle” (MW, Clue). These descriptions fit well with exploratory argumentative situations. Generally speaking, an argument is a clue to a conclusion.
Etymologically, a clue is ‘a ball of thread’; hence, one used to guide a person out of a labyrinth” (OD, Clue). Clues are typically sought “in the detection of a crime”: “police officers are still searching for clues” (ibid.). However, clue is also used to refer to a “piece of information” given to someone, which is not a natural sign in the sense discussed in this entry.

Traces, such as fingerprints (necessary signs), or tire marks (probable sign), are a special kind of natural sign. However, insofar as traces are remnants, “a mark […] left by something that has passed”, not all material signs are traces; smoke is a correlate of actual fire, not a trace of fire — but but ashes are.

Index, indication and indicator can also be used in the sense of “natural sign”.

2. Reasoning on probable and necessary signs

The relationship between a natural sign and its counterpart is inferential in nature:

Anything that [when it is, another thing is, or when it has come into being the other has come into being before or after], is a sign of the other’s being or having come into being.
(Aristotle, P. A., II, 27; my italics for the sign and underlining for the counterpart).

A tentative reformulation: α is a sign of another thing A, if when  α is the case, then A is the case; or when α occurs, then A is about to occur or has just occurred

In the Aristotelian system, enthymemes are developed from natural signs and probabilities (P. A., II, 27); see enthymeme; probable.

These inferences are used in concrete arguments, such as:

I can see smoke, the house must be on fire.
Peter’s face is flushed, he must have a fever.

The quality of the argument depends on the nature of the link used. If the sign is necessary, the argumentat is conclusive. If it is probable, the possible claim is somewhat more probable than it would be without the argument. Probable signs reduce uncertainty, see abduction.

Probable signs are distinct from human and social probabilities.

— A necessary sign (tekmerion) is associated with a material entity or state of affairs. It corresponds to material, empirical necessity (not logical necessity):

A scar / an old wound.
Calloused hands / being a workman.
Smoke / fire.
Footprints in the sand / people on the island.

Such signs thus have the force of proof, the associated syllogism is valid, as in the following propter quid argument, see. a priori

Law (major): A woman who has milk has given birth (if M, then B)
Sign (minor): This woman has milk.
Conclusion: This woman has given birth.

— Probable (contingent) signs (semeion) can correspond to several related independent realities. Contingent signs are ambiguous, whereas necessary signs are unambiguous

Being tired is a possible sign of having worked.
Being flushed is a possible sign of having a fever.

Typically, peripheral indicators are not necessary signs: “He has a guilty look so he must be feeling guilty, so he is guilty”, see circumstances. The corresponding syllogism is not valid:

Law:                Women who have given birth are pale.
Sign:               This woman is pale.
Conclusion:    This woman has given birth.

A necessary condition is considered sufficient: one may simply have a naturally pale complexion, or one may be pale because one is ill. The probable sign is only a fragment of evidence (judicial); it can support a suspicion, but it is not a proof.

The human body is an inexhaustible source of natural signs. White hair and flexible skin are natural signs that indicate the person’s age and general physical condition. In medicine, co-occurring unnecessary signs are grouped into a syndrome, which is defined as “a group of signs and symptoms that occur together and characterise a particular abnormality or condition” (MW, Syndrome). For example, Samter’s syndrome

Samter’s Triad also known as aspirin-sensitive asthma, is a chronic disorder consisting in asthma, recurrent sinus disease with nasal polyps, and a sensitivity to aspirin and other non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drugs (NSAIDs).[1]

The presence of these three conditions together provides a basis for a conclusive medical reasoning: if a patient has asthma and is sensitive to aspirin, it is highly likely that they will also have nasal polyps. They should be evaluated for this third condition.
Individually these signs may be inconclusive, but taken together, they can form a body of conclusive evidence. For example, an area of ​​the body may be red, because it has been rubbed; hot, because it is starting to burn; painful or swollen because of an accidental blow. But if it is red, painful, hot and swollen at the same time, then we can say that it is inflamed, see convergent argumentation.

In the following passage, to guess the enemy’s intentions, the soldier observes their actions and movements, deducing a conclusion from a cluster of converging signs.

The writer Roland Dorgelès had “the singular privilege of baptising a war”, as “the Phony War” [la drôle de guerre], referring to the strangely calm situation on the front between September 3rd 1939, the date of the declaration of war, and May 10th 1940, the date of Nazi’s Germany’s invasion of Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and France. His book, The Phony War, is a series of reports from the front during this period. In April 1940 he was stationed at an observation post in Alsace.

Looking down on the enemy lines from above was like looking down on the enemy lines from a balcony. The sergeant who never lost sight of the ennemy, now knows their habits, where they came from, and where they went.
‘There, he points out, they are digging a sap. Look at the disturbed earth… That gray house has certainly been reinforced… Look at the embrasures… And what about those tiles over there? Most of the workers are there right now. I counted sixty of them, coming back from the site with lamps this morning: so they must be digging underground.

MOTIVE – REASON

An individual’s will, intentions, desires, motives, reasons… can be interpreted as the causes of their actions, which are then considered to be the effects or consequences of this “inner” causation. Conversely, actions are evaluated and interpreted according to their motives and reasons which are seen as their causes. The consistency requirement imposes this causal structure on human motivation.

1. Argumentation from the existence of reasons for action

Two basic Aristotelian topoi (argument schemes, sg. topos) implement the law of causality in human action by substituting reasons and motives for causes. If the cause exists, then the effect follows. In other words, if a person has a motive or a reason to do something, they will do it as soon as the opportunity  arises.As of the topos # 20 of the Rhetoric states:

Consider inducements and deterrents, and the motives people have for doing or avoiding the action in question. (Rhet., II, 23, 20; RR, p. 373)

The basic topos is:

You wanted it, so you sought it!
He who wants the end wants the means.

This topos is also used in the pathetic argument. Here, it supports an accusation:

You had a motive, you talked about it, the opportunity arose, and you did it!

Or a defence:

L1:     — You did it!
L2:      — I had no reason to do it, in fact, I had reasons not to do it.

Similarly, in topos #24, cause means “reason to do”:

Another topic is derived from the cause. If the cause exists, the effect exists; if the cause does not exist, the effect does not exist. […] For example, Leodamas […] (id., II, 23, 24; F. p. 319).

2. Arguments about the “real reasons”

The following argument schemes substitute a hidden motivation for a publicly claimed good reason, just as a true cause can be substituted for a false one, see interpretation:

— Topos # 15 substitutes a hidden, self-serving motive for a publicly claimed noble reason. It is used to accuse or refute an opponent.

— Topos # 23 rejects a malicious interpretation given to an action by providing an acceptable and respectable explanation for the alleged guilty motive. It is used to clear someone from a charge.

— Topos # 19, on the other hand, changes the benevolent interpretation of an action into a malevolent one.

2.1 Publicly displayed good reasons and real private ugly intentions

According to topos #15 of Aristotle’s Rhetoric:

The things people approve of openly are not those which they approve of secretly: openly, their chief praise is given to justice and nobleness, but in their heart they prefer their own advantage. […] This is the most effective of the forms of argument that contradict common opinion. (Rhet. II, 23, 15; RR, p. 369)

The argument highlights a (possible) private, hidden, bad motive, in order to refute the public, honourable, good reason given to justify an action.

S1:   — In supporting this charity, I am fighting for a noble cause!
S2:    — You are mainly fighting for your own publicity.

S1:    — We are fighting a war to restore democracy and human rights in Syldavia
S2:    — You are fighting a war to get their oil.

In the second dialogue, S1 justifies the war, S2 does not oppose the war, he simply presents a realpolitik argument presented as the true reason for war.

2.2 A laudable motive substituted for a blameworthy one

This argument corresponds to topos # 23, “useful for men who have been really or seemingly slandered”:

To show why the facts are not as supposed; pointing out that there is a reason for the false impression given. (Rhet., II, 23, 23; RR p. 375)

Embodied in the enthymeme:

She embraces him because he is her son, not because he is her lover.

Topos # 23 is the opposite of topos # 19. It helps to exculpate by substituting an honourable motive for the offensive one:

I hit him to save him from drowning, not to hurt him!

The is reinterpreted action is reevaluated: “You must congratulate me and not blame me!” see stasis; interpretation; orientation.

2.3 The poisoned chalice

The wording of topos # 19,–“some possible motive for an event or state of things is the real one”–may seem puzzling. It fits the enthymemes:

A gift was given in order to cause pain through its subsequent withdrawal.

Gods give to many great prosperity, / Not out of good will towards them, but to make / Their ruin more conspicuous. (Rhet., II, 23, 19; XX p. 371)

The topos involves a dramatic negative reinterpretation of an act that was previously viewed positively.

He seduced her not out of love but out of hate to make her suffer by leaving her.

This is the principle behind the “dinner game”, « They invited me not as a friend, but to make fun of me.” This technique is particularly effective for destroying a sense of gratitude, see emotion.

Appeal to MODESTY:
AD VERECUNDIAM 

1. The argument ad verecundiam

« Verecundia » means « modesty » or « humility. » The Latin term « argumentum ad verecundiam, » translates as « argument from, or appeal to modesty« .
This argument is used by someone who bows before the speech and the good reasons offered by a person whom they consider superior. It typically ratifies an act of submission to the ethos.
The ad verecundiam argument is the interactional correlate of an appeal to authority, not an appeal to authority. Note that, in the following key passage, Locke refers to ad verecundiam as arising from a fear of violating “modesty”.

The first [fallacious argument] is to allege the opinion of men, whose parts, learning, eminency, power, or some other cause has gained a name, and settled their reputation in the common esteem with some kind of authority.
When men are established in any kind of dignity, it is thought a breach of modesty for others to derogate any way from it, and question the authority of men who are in possession of it.
This is apt to be censured as carrying with it too much pride, when a man does not readily yield to the determination of approved authors, which is wont to be received with respect and submission by others: and it is looked upon as insolence for a man to set up and adhere to his own opinion against the current stream of antiquity; or to put it in the balance against that of some learned doctor, or otherwise approved writer. Whoever backs his tenets with such authorities thinks he ought thereby to carry the cause, and is ready to style it impudence in any one who shall stand out against them. This I think may be called argumentum ad verecundiam. (Locke [1690], p. 410).

This argument is fallacious:

It argues not another man’s opinion to be right because I, out of respect, or any other consideration but that of conviction, will not contradict him. [Locke, 1690], p. 411).

Similarly, topic #11 of the Rhetoric argues “from a previous judgment in regard to the same or a similar or contrary matter”. Such a precedent-setting judgment must have been made by an authority, one of “those whose judgment it is not possible to contradict” (Aristotle, Rhet., II, 23, 12; F. 309), that is to say, “it would be disgraceful to contradict him” (ibid.; my italics), be he a father, a god, a teacher or a wise man. Courtesy is argumentatively oriented in favor of the submission to the status quo.

2. Authority or Pusillanimity? Ad Verecundiam, or Misplaced Modesty

Locke describes an interaction, in which one partner “alleges” an authoritative opinion. The qualities that give an opinion authority have either a social source (“parts, learning, eminency, power,dignity”) or an intellectual source (“learning, approved author, learned doctor approved writer”), see ethos. Such sources do have a legitimizing power, see dialectic. Note that religious authorities are not mentionned.

It must be emphasized that Locke is not censoring the expression of, or the reference to authoritative opinions in the first round of speech; rather the critizing the unquestioning acceptance of such an authority. The problem does not lie in the appeal to authority in the first round, but rather in the fear of an aggressive third round that prohibits criticism of this authority.
The condemnation ad verecundiam protests the censorship of this second round by an internal impulse of modesty, and the feeling of one’s own inadequacy (however legitimate iy may be!). This censorship is a preventive reaction to a potential threat from a third round that aims to silence objectiond addressed to the authority. The third round itself does not address the substance of the objection to the second round (through an argument ad judicium, see matter.) It merely substitutes a negative evaluation of the person who holds it–an personal attack ;that wouls invoke “a breach of modesty, too much pride, insolence, impudence”, i.e., a maneuver of intimidation, see  respect. The problem then is not in the authoritative first round, but in the inhibiting foreboding of an aggressive third round. As the label “argument ad verecundiam” indicates, the fallacy is committed by the interlocutor, the overly modest person who does not object for fear of making a scene. This is a fallacy of cowardice or spinelessness; not primarily a fallacy of authority. Verecundia is the (misplaced sense of) shame that prevents one from saying out loud what one is thinking. It is a betrayal of our duty to truth.

4. Justified modesty

When it comes to authority itself, the problem is twofold. In the first round, participant S1_1 has “alleged” an authoritative opinion, which may be a perfecty reasonable move. Suppose that in a second round, S2 can overcome his ad verecundiam inhibition and express his dissenting opinion quite freely. If, in a third round, S1_2 silences S2_1′s remarks in the name of authority, while at the same time criticizing his opponent for his boldness and pride then S1 is arguing from authority, which is certainly a fallacious move.
Some situations, however,are embarrassing. If S1 quotes Einstein in his (Einstein’s) area of expertise, and S1 has a good background in physics and S2 has none, then a humble lay speaker S2 would be wise to ask for more explanation before voicing his doubts. If not, S1_2 could legitimately give in to an , authoritative exasperation.

3. A fallacy in dialogue

The problem of authority is thus recast as one of authoritarian interaction, i.e.,  a dialogue in which a claim of authority is expressed in the first speech turn, and exploited in the third turn to silence the objections, considering that the quoted authority gives the caster the power to end the discussion. This use of authority is in a direct contrast to the use of authority in a dialectical game. The problem does not lie so much in the quoting of authority as in the possibility of contradicting authority. Modesty, respect, concern not to cause the other to lose face, rules of politeness, preference for agreement are all intellectual inhibitors. All these constraints define a typically anti-dialectical situation, see Dialectic.

Authority is accepted as a fact, the problem lies in the possibility of questioning that authority . Authority is deceptive only when it claims to escape from dialogue, to silence its opponent, and not to answer his counter-discourse. The conclusion is that what is deceptive or not, is a dialogue move. It is impossible to say whether a statement like “The Master said it!” is fallacious or not; it all depends on the position of the statement in the dialogue. If it is an opening statement, it is not misleading. If it is a closing statement, intended to silence the critic, it is.

APPEAL TO MODERATION
Ad Temperentiam [1]

1. Appeal to Moderation vs. Appeal to Radicalism

In politics, moderation is opposed to radicalism or extremism, just as reformism is opposed to revolution. Arguments from moderation emphasize stickin to the practical, compromising, taking inclusive positions, and changing things little by little.
The appeal to radicalism emphasizes the urgency of decisions, the need for new beginnings, avoiding dead ends in discussions. It also emphasizes the will to remain faithful to principles that can be framed as antinomies, “freedom or death”.

gTwo opposing ethos and emotional states are associated with moderation and radicalism: respectively conservative vs. progressive; open to dialogue and compromise vs. uncompromising; realist vs. idealist; serenity vs. exaltation; etc.

2. The Middle Ground Argument

The middle-ground argument justifies an action by showing that it does not satisfy any of the opposing parties. The speaker takes the position of the responsible third party, see roles.

Stay away from extremes.

The fact that both the far right and the far left are attacking my policy clearly shows that it is a good policy.

Christianity has restored true proportions in architecture, as in other arts . Our temples, larger than those of Athens, and smaller than those of Memphis–the right balance, where beauty and taste par excellence prevail.
Chateaubriand, [The Genius of Christianity], 1802[1]

The intermediate position is valued. Reason and virtue “stand in the middle” (Lat. in medio stat virtus):

Neither rash nor cowardly, but courageous.

However, an arguer who chooses the middle ground risks being stigmatized as indecisive, or unwilling to examine the arguments of the parties in detail: “let’s stop the discussion, meet in the middle and split the difference”.
The case of Solomon’s judgment shows that some issues that cannot be so easily divided.

[1] Latin. argument ad temperentiam, lat. temperentia, “moderation, measure, restraint”
[2] Quoted from François René de Châteaubriand, Le Génie du christianisme. Part 3, Book 1, Chapter 6. Tours: Mame, 1877, p. 194-195.

METONYMY – SYNECDOCHE

Traditionally, the field of rhetoric has been divided into two main areas, one dealing with tropes and figures, and the other deals with argumentation schemes. Semantic and ornamental rhetoric is opposed to cognitive and functional rhetoric. However, this distinction can be misleading.

1. Tropes

A trope is defined as an operation “by which a word is given a meaning that is not exactly its proper meaning” (Dumarsais [1730], p. 69). This definition can be paralleled by that of an argument, which is defined as an operation “by which a proposition (the conclusion) is given a belief value that is not exactly the proper belief value of that proposition.”

The linguistic mechanisms involved in trope referential shifts bear a significant resemblance to those involved in arguments. In both cases, the problem is one of transmission. In the case of a trope, the meaning of one word is transferred to another. In argument, the belief value of one proposition is transferred to another. The rules of transfer are similar in both cases.

Metaphor, irony, metonymy and synecdoche considered the four “master tropes” (Burke, 1945), are all relevant to the study of argumentation, albeit in quite different ways.

2. Metonymy

2.1 Metonymy as a Trope

Consider the classic example of metonymy, “The pen is mightier than the sword. » A pen is “an instrument for writing or drawing with ink…” (MW, Pen), and a sword is “a weapon with a long metal blade and a handle with a hand guard…” (OD, Sword). » In the quoted proverb, the words pen and sword are used metonymically for “words, thoughts and discourse, verbal communication…” and “physical violence, military force…” respectively. The overall meaning is that “violence does not prevail over reasoned discourse.”

The semantic scheme of metonymy can be described as follows.

— There is a word {S / C1}, whose signifier is S and whose content is C1, pen/“writing instrument.”
— The signifier S is used metonymically to denote the content C0, pen/“discourse.”
— This transfer of meaning operates under the condition that it has a backing, expressed by a law of transition such as “C0 is in some relation of contiguity with C1.” In this case, “the pen is the instrument with which discourse is produced.”

Subtypes of metonymic schemes are classified according to the nature of the connection between the contents of C0 and C1. For example:

— Effect for cause, “Death is in the meadow.”
— Instrument for agent, “She is the pen of the president.”
— Agent (or “cause”) for the work produced: “A new Shakespeare has just come out.”
— Instrument for object produced: “The pen is mightier…”
— Name of the place where the object is made for the object itself, etc. “I feel like cognac.”
— Relevant current planned action for a participant: “Sir, your rendezvous just left.”

2.2 Metonymic and argumentative transfer

Figures and arguments require similar support. This can be illustrated by the following examples.

The effect for cause metonymy: “Death is in the meadow”[1] means that phytosanitary products (Ph)  (pesticides, also called plant protection products) used in agriculture can cause death (D). The word (signifier) designating the effect (D) now designates (refers to) its cause (Ph).

In the effect-to-cause argument, the truth-value predicated on the effect is transferred back to the cause, or a set of causes:

Metals expand when heated.

The metal expanded (is an established fact), SO it was heated (is an established fact)

The tire exploded, so [either C1, or C2, or…] (id.); see case-by-Case

The effect-to-cause argument transfers the predicate “— is an established fact” from the effect to the cause.

The word death refers to death. In the case of metonymy, its referential domain is extended to include the cause of death, “death refers to phytosanitary products.”
In our standard view of reference, a word refers to an object. In fact, it refers centrally to an object, and to objects that are contextually related to it. In other words, the word (signifier) actually refers to any element belonging to the semantic cluster of these objects.
Ordinary language clearly expresses this fact:

(1) He has a fever, so he has an infection.
(2) Give him an antibiotic, it will reduce the fever.

The antibiotic actually acts on the infection;  so, the fever in (2) is an effect-for-cause metonymic designation of the infection. On the other hand, fever is a natural sign of an infection: “He has a fever, which means he has an infection”: this is exactly what the metonymic analysis says.

Metonymy designating a work by the name of its author corresponds to an argument that transfers a judgment about the author to the work: “The author of this book supported the former dictator.”
Perelman (1952) studied the mechanisms of this metonymic transfer from the person to his or her actions and products from an argumentative point of view.

3. Synecdoche

As the example of the rendezvous above  in §1 shows, metonymic naming can operate on any pair of strongly connected objects, where this connection may be accidental (local), or essential. Synecdoche operates on constituent parts of a whole. The term “metonymy” is sometimes used to refer to both metonymy and synecdoche.

3.1 “Part–Whole” and “Whole–Part” Relations

For instance, a roof is a component of a house. In “looking for a roof”, roof means “house”, houses being considered prototypical shelters.

Part–whole arguments transfer the predicate associated with the part to the whole. These arguments are supported by the same kind of connection, see composition and division.

The roof is in bad condition, so the house must not be well maintained.

3.2 Genus for Species and Species for Genus

In a synecdoche of genus for species, the name of the genus is used to refer to one of its species. The name of the genus replaces the name of the species. For example, “the animal” replaces “the lion.” This use is most common in textual co-reference.

We saw a lion. The poor beast was thin and sick.

Based on the same relationship, the argument by the genus attaches the predicates of the genus to the species, see taxonomy and category; categorization:

This is a lion, therefore it is an animal, and therefore, it is mortal.

4. The tree and its fruits

The following argument was made in defense of Paul Touvier, the leader of the pro-Nazi militia in Lyon, France, during the Nazi occupation. He was sentenced to death after the war, he escaped and remained in hiding for 25 years. The following is an excerpt from a letter written by the Rev. Blaise Arminjon, S.J., to the then president of France on December 5, 1970, in support of Paul Touvier’s petition for clemency:

How can we to believe that he [Touvier] is a “criminal”, or a “bad Frenchman”, when his conduct for twenty-five years, and the education he has given his children, have been so admirable? A tree is known by its fruits.[2]

A Toulminian analysis can be applied to this passage, the warrant for which is provided by the biblical topos, “A tree is known by its fruits.”

For a good tree does not bear bad fruit, nor does a bad tree bear good fruit.
Luke 6:43-45, New King James Version.

This transitional law also permits an interpretation based on a metonymy. Speaking of “the [admirable] conduct of Touvier for twenty-five years” is a metonymic reference to Touvier metonymically. Saying that “the education that Touvier gave his children is admirable” spreads metonymically to the agent, Touvier, who is necessarily equally admirable.

The same phenomenon can be equally expressed through a trope or an argument, both implement the same kind of rationality.

[1] La Mort est dans le pré, youtube.com/watch?v=nAMARhJoFaQ
[2] Quoted in René Rémond & al,, Paul Touvier et l’Eglise [Paul Touvier and the Church], Paris, Fayard, 1992, p. 164.

METAPHOR, ANALOGY, MODEL

In Ancient Greek, ‘metaphor’ means ‘transfer. » In the Poetics (1457b), Aristotle defines metaphor as ‘the application to a thing of a name foreign to it. In the Poetics  Aristotle defines metaphor as « the application to a thing of a name foreign to it by a change from genus to species, from species to genus, from genus to species, or according to a relationship of analogy » (1457b). This definition actually encompasses the field of tropes or figures of words, see metonymy. In this sense, the metaphor is indeed the ‘queen of figures.’

Metaphors can be defined by the following features and perspectives.
(a) Metaphor is a matter of discourse.
(b) A metaphor occurs when a reality is designated by a ‘strange’ term in a discourse. The term is strange because it does not fit into the isotopy of the discourse in which it appears.
(c) The receiver is surprised and tries to make sense of the term.
(d) They find an interpretation based on analogy that makes sense and introduces a new perspective on the subject under discussion.
(e) From an argumentative point of view, the metaphor is successful if it provides  a cognitive benefit to the receiver.

From a rhetorical point of view, the metaphor is valued as a cryptic analogy, whose meaning is left to the audience to decipher. The main difference between a metaphor and an analogy is that an analogy keeps the two domains it relates to separate and distinct, while a metaphor tends to conflate them.

1. Metaphor on trial

In his Rhetoric, Aristotle considers metaphor to be the most effective instrument of persuasion in ordinary discourse. However, from the perspective of an anti-rhetorical theory of argumentation, metaphor is highly misleading. But metaphor is also a powerful cognitive tool for building representations, and better understanding complex situations. Metaphor applies the language of a model, i.e. the Resource domain (the metaphorical term) to an actual situation, the Problematic domain, to which the (sometimes missing) « metaphorized » term belongs, see structural analogy.

If metaphor is defined as a figure, and figures are defined as ornaments, then metaphor is misleading in all its dimensions, see. fallacy; ornamental fallacy. The metaphorical statement is false: “The voter is a calf” said Charles de Gaulle. but the voter (proper, literal term) is not a calf (figurative, metaphorical term) the voter is a human being. Metaphor systematically commits a category mistake. It can also be accused of creating ambiguity, because it introduces a parasitic level of meaning: the figurative meaning, which runs parallel to the proper, standard meaning.

The metaphor creates a surprise and introduces an emotion (ad passiones fallacy); it entertains the audience (ad populum fallacy), thus sacrificing docere (teaching information) to placere (pleasure). It transforms the rational arguer into an actor (ad ludicrum fallacy). Therefore metaphor is the discursive distractor par excellence, leading the audience down on a false path, and confusing the honest literalist in his search for truth, see relevance; red herring; resumption of discourse.

Therefore, metaphor is, and should be, banished from serious argumentative discourse, as well as from scientific language. It can only be helpful if it is reformulated as a comparison (Ortony 1979, p. 191). Nevertheless, it should be emphasized that metaphor is active and welcome in stimulating creativity and facilitating the transmission and popularization of science and science education.

2. Metaphor, the Ultimate Weapon of Persuasion?

Persuasion, pistis, is produced in three ways “(1) by working on the emotions of the judges themselves, (2) by giving them the right impression of the character of the speaker, or (3) by proving the truth of the statements made” (Aristotle, Rhet., 1403b10; RR p. 397), in the latter case, persuasion arises “from the facts themselves” (ibid).

Ideally, the issue should be discussed based on facts and evidence: “we ought in fairness to fight our case with no help beyond the bare facts: nothing, therefore should matter except the proof of those facts” (ibid 1404a1; RR p. 399). But ordinary people are not that perfect. “Owing to the defects of our hearers”, and of our “political institutions”, “the arts of language cannot help having a small but real importance” in public discourse and education-but not in science: “Nobody uses fine language when teaching geometry” (1404a1-10, RR. p. 399).

Fine language is therefore the most effective tool of persuasion. Persuasion by emotion (pathos) and image (ethos) is produced, orally, by the “oratorical action”, and in writing, by the stylistic arrangement of facts, “because speeches of the written or literary kind owe more to their diction than to their thought” (1404a15; p. 401). Metaphor is the supreme tool of written discourse “both in poetry and in prose”. It “gives style clearness, charm and distinction as nothing else can” (1405a1-10; RR, p. 405). The conclusion is clear: Metaphor is the ultimate weapon of persuasion. It is the art of “[hiding one’s] purpose successfully” (1404b20; RR, p. 403), and charming the audience, see, logos, ethos, pathos.

Contemporary approaches to metaphor agree consider that metaphor derives this power from its intrinsic element of surprise, which results from perceiving an anomaly in the discourse, a rupture, an inconsistency, an incongruity, or a logical contradiction–in short, a discursive coup, that delights the audience. Since pleasure cannot be refuted, metaphor is considered virtually inaccessible to refutation. In reality, it is: see below, §4

3. Metaphor and Interpretive Cooperation

By using a metaphor, the speaker openly seeks the audience’s interpretive cooperation. By doing so, the speaker reinforces the importance of prior agreements. Note that the same functional explanation is given for the derivation of enthymemes from underlying syllogisms.In both cases, the enthymematic or metaphorical condensation’s argumentative function (i.e., its effectiveness and persuasiveness) is to activate the audience, see enthymeme §5.n

This analysis assumes that the nonargumentative metaphorical language, or the nonelliptical syllogism would be transparent, or less complex than the metaphorical language, and that their direct interpretation would not require the same degree of cooperation from the audience. This assumption is not self-evident.

4. Metaphor as Analogy

Metaphor provides clever solutions to the riddle of metaphor.

Metaphor is the dreamwork of language and, like all dreamwork, its interpretation reflects as much on the interpreter as on the originator. The interpretation of dreams requires collaboration between a dreamer and a waker, even if they be the same person; and the act of interpretation is itself a work of the imagination. So too, understanding a metaphor is as much a creative endeavor as making a metaphor, and as little guided by rules.
(Davidson 1978, p. 29)

In The Interpretation of Dreams (1900) Freud defines dreamwork as the process by which the latent content of a dream is covered by its manifest content, through displacement, distortion, condensation and symbolism. The metaphor “metaphor / dreamwork” is difficult to reject, even though it commits the fallacy of trying to go ad obscurum per obscurius, that is, of trying to illuminate the dark (metaphor) by the darker (dreamwork).

Metaphor is a model, (Black 1962), and an imperialist one at that, that urging one to identify the « metaphorized » reality within the metaphorical world.

L1 — We should do something about the economy.
L2 — The “economy-casino” you mean?
L1 — Oh yes! All these addicted traders should be banned from the market!

The reconstructed analogy is “as addicted gamblers are banned from casinos.”

Saying that “the voter is a calf” means saying that “the voter is hesitant, weak and can be manipulated like a calf”, where calves are the stereotypical animal that combines these characteristics. This metaphor opens up new perspectives, and legitimizes a new set of inferences about voters. If voters are categorized as calves, then they can be made to behave in ways that are contrary to their interests. For example, they can be led to a more or less metaphorical slaughterhouse.

A metaphor draws its argumentative power from an analogy that is pushed to identification. A structural analogy explicitly brings two domains together, while respecting their specificities. The domains are confronted, not assimilated. A metaphor makes the comparison implicit, negates the metaphorized domain, and assimilates  it to the metaphorical one. This is why reconstructing of the analogy underlying a metaphorical expression betrays the metaphor: it splits apart what the metaphor has united. For example, in Peter is a lion, the language referring to human beings is replaced by the language referring to lions. We are not far from the hyper-unified coherent Renaissance world where everything reflects in everything else, see analogical thinking.

5. Jumping from analogy to identity?

Analogy can be defined as a partial identity. The question of deep underlying identity, despite immediately recognizable differences plays an essential role here.

Snowdrifts are like corrugated iron.
Snowdrifts are like dunes.

The syntactic structures of these two statements are identical, both propose the image of “waves” to the interlocutor, and both share the key semantic feature of « waving. » But the second comparison is deeper and opens the way to a theory. It introduces a proportional analogy:

snow : snowdrift :: sand : dune

This analogy suggests that the wind acts similarly on snow particles and sand grains. This analogy help students construct a physical-mathematical model covering both phenomena (taking into account the differences between sand grains and snowflakes, and their respective laws of agglomeration). Starting with two seemingly different phenomena–one can know what a dune is without knowing what a snowdrift is, and vice versa–we arrive at the problem of a unifying abstract representation. Can the same physical model account for both phenomena.
Establishing an analogy is the first step toward affirming a deep identity. This shift, from explanatory analogy to identity is central to a class of arguments about analogy that considers metaphor, not only as a model but also as the essence of the metaphorized phenomenon.

6. Mole Rats “Societies”, Human Society: Metaphor or Identity?

The thesis – The following texts and information are taken from S. Braude and E. Lacey, “A Revolutionary Monarchy: The Society of Mole Rats”[2]. Mole rats are mammals, specifically hairless rats, that live in “groups” or “communities” (the difference is significant). They exhibit behaviors similar to those observed in social insects, such as ants or bees. However, this behavior has never been observed in mammals. Hairless mole rats are thus the first mammals with this kind of “social behavior.”
When we speak of « social behavior » or « community », are we using a simple analogical-metaphorical lexicon, for a pedagogical presentation, or an explanatory metaphor? Are we engaged in describing these newly identified animal behaviors in terms of existing human societal structures? As in the case of the dunes and snowdrifts, are we suggesting, that these social phenomena may well have the same foundations, in this case biological? Do human societies obey the same biological laws as the “societies” of mole rats? Are we on the way to a sociobiological theory of human societies? Have we stealthily moved from metaphorical language to identification?
This is a strategy of “slippery metaphor.” Note that this strategy reverses the Target / Resource relationship. Being closer to nature, mole rats, formerly the Target, are now a model for studying of human society, formerly the Resource.

A criticism: the words used betray a deep assimilation – To reject this assimilation, the opponent first lists the terms coming from the Resource field, the human social lexicon:

The phrase “division of labor” appears four times; as do the word “task” and “responsible”. The phrase “they take care of” appears once, as do the term “cooperation” and “subordinate.” The term “sexual status” is used three times to refer to the animal’s reproductive status. (G. Lepape, [Research], 1992)

A reply – In response to this criticism, the authors of the article limit the identification of human societies with animal groups.

G. Lepape also claims that our language makes unfair comparisons by attributing common behavioral traits to mole rats and social insects. This claim surprises us, especially when he writes, “The similarities [between hairless mole rats and social insects] are treated as true homologies.” Our paper is clear on this point: we believe that the behavior of hairless mole rats and eusocial[3] insects shows striking similarities. However, we do not see how the language used to describe these similarities suggests that a common origin of these animals constitutes the evolutionary basis of these similarities.
Braude & Lacey, ibid..

The danger here is that we might be tempted to forget that we are dealing with an analogy, which is “never more compelling than when it is abolished and ceases to be perceived as an analogy. Becoming invisible, it merges with the order of things.” (Gadoffre 1980, p. 6)

7. Against metaphors

Politicians [are] catering to a public that doesn’t understand the rationale for deficit spending, that tends to think of the government budget via analogies with family finances.
When John Boehner, the Republican leader, opposed US stimulus plans on the grounds that “American families are tightening their belt, but they don’t see the government tightening its belt”, economists cringed at the stupidity. But within a few months the very same line was showing up in Barack Obama’s speeches […]. Similarly, the Labour Party […]
(The Guardian 04-29-2015)[3]

The “stupidity » lies in the inference that « families are tightening their belts, SO the state must tighten its belt.” We can reconstruct the justification principle of this argument as a metaphor:

A state, a nation, a country is a family.

You could also think of it as a kind of composition:

The state is made up of families, families tighten their belts, the state must tighten its belt.

In any case, the “state, family” metaphor has deep roots. It is based on the etymology of the word economy, which comes from the Greek oikonomia, meaning “household management.” This metaphor is evident in the praise of leaders as “father of the nation,” and “founding father.”

Krugman considers that politicians « cater » to a public « that doesn’t understand, » by providing what they want, desire, or find amusing. Thus politicians must use metaphors, however stupid they may be, to adapt to their audience. This is indeed what Aristotle said, see above.

Happy metaphors serve to charm the audience, but the existence of unhappy metaphors must also be acknowledged. Upon hearing such a metaphor, the audience does not feel “charmed”; rather they show no pleasure, but “cringe at the stupidity”, displaying their disgust and embarrassment through their faces and bodies” (after MW, Cringe). This is exactly how metaphors can be refuted as metaphors.

Then, in a second step, one can address the substantive content, i.e., the de-metaphorized claim that « in times of economic crisis, the state must turn to austerity. » Krugman conducts this substantive refutation in the semi-technical language of economics, combining a priori refutation (theoretical unfoundedness), falsification (contradicted predictions) and pragmatic refutation (failed policies).
However, a second metaphor remains: Words such as restriction and austerity, have a clearly negative orientation. The expression “tightening one’s belt”, associated with successful dieting, weight loss and slimness, has a strong positive visual, orientation, that is inaccessible to refutation.

[2] Braude, S. & Lacey E. (1989). Une monarchie révolutionnaire: la société des rats-taupes. La Recherche [Research], a journal of general scientific information] July-August 1989. Comments by G. Le Pape, and reply by the authors in the same magazine, Oct. 1992.

[3] “Living in a cooperative group in which usually one female and several males are reproductively active and the non-breeding individuals care for the young or protect and provide for the group eusocial termites, ants, and naked mole rats” (MW, Eusocial)

[4] www.theguardian.com/business/ng-interactive/2015/apr/29/the-austerity-delusion (15-08-16)