1. Causal argumentation

Cause-to-effect or effect to cause arguments presupposes the existence of a causal link, while causal argumentation establishes the existence of a causal link.

Causal argumentation occurs when a causal link is at issue.

For example, we notice that, on the one hand, (1) that the use of pesticides is intensifying, and (2) that bees are disappearing. Is there a causal relationship between these two facts, are the following statements true?

The use of pesticides causes the disappearance of bees.
Pesticides are used and bees disappear (causal reading).

There may be disagreement about this kind of conclusion, even if there is agreement on the facts under consideration:

We use pesticides and the bees disappear, that’s true. But…

The causal investigation starts with a salient fact, as “bees disappear”, “the climate seems to be changing”, and the cause of this is problematic. Generally, several facts can be evoked as possible causes, and possible explanations of the phenomenon. This creates a stasis of causality, expressed via the confrontation of these two hypotheses, for example in the case of climate change, taken as a fact:

S1:    — the increase in solar activity causes the change of climate.
S2:    — the increasing emission of greenhouse gases causes climate change.

These explanatory causes integrate themselves within broader theories on the climatic equilibrium of the terrestrial globe. Broad conceptions of the physical and social world are in confrontation through such local causal affirmations.

Affirmation of causal relationships are therefore based on elaboration of crucial experiments and the retrieval of key observations. Causes are determined according to the methodology relevant to the given domain.

Ordinary causal experimentation also involves observation and experience. So for example, if I suffer a mild allergy reaction, I must consider what the possible allergens might be which have caused it. I might observe that yesterday I went to the swimming pool and ate strawberries. There are two possible allergenic, strawberries or chemical products used in the pool. I might conduct the following checks, eating strawberries without going swimming, and going swimming without eating strawberries. If I am unlucky, I’ll have to investigate further and perhaps see a specialist, who will proceed in much the same way. If I am lucky, however, I’ll suffer a (controlled) mild allergic reaction in one case and not in the other, and will be able to identify the allergen. As the allergic reaction is undesirable, I pragmatically reason, in view of the negative consequence, I change my behavior, and so eliminate the cause.

2. Refutation of causal assertions

The correct establishment of causal relationships is a fundamental requirement, both in science and in ordinary life. The priority given to the correct determination of causal relations is the basis of Aristotelian thought. The “false cause” fallacy is committed when a causal relation is asserted between two phenomena that in fact have no causal relation between them. This fallacy is sometimes designated by its Latin name non-causa pro causa, “‘non-cause’ taken for a cause”, S. Fallacious (2).

“Smoking causes cancer”: strictly speaking, the positive existence of such a relationship is difficult to establish. It can only be considered as a remainder, persisting when all other possibilities have been discarded. Causal imputation might be revised. If we are to confirm that a link of the causal type does exist between two facts, it is necessary to answer a set of standard objections which oppose the existence of a causal relation.

2.1 The alleged effect does not exist

The causal assertion “the use of pesticides is the cause of the disappearance of the bees” is refuted by showing that although the bees have disappeared from a certain area, there are still as many bees as before if a larger, more general area is considered. The bees have not disappeared, they have simply migrated.

The facts must be confirmed, before looking for and discussing their causes. This methodological rule is well illustrated by the famous case of the golden tooth, described by Fontenelle.

Let us be well assured of the matter of fact, before we trouble our selves with inquiring into the cause. It is true, that this method is too slow for the greatest part of mankind, who run naturally to the cause, and pass over the truth of the matter of fact; but for my part, I will not be so ridiculous as to find out a cause for what is not.
This kind of misfortune happened so pleasantly, at the end of the last age, to some learned Germans, that I cannot forbear speaking of it. “In the year 1593, there was a report that the teeth of a child of Silesia of seven years old dropped out, and that one of gold came in the place of one of his great teeth. Horstius, a profesor of physic in the university of Helmstad, wrote in the year 1595, the history of this tooth, and pretended that it was partly natural and partly miraculous, and that it was sent from God to this child, to comfort the Christians who were then afflicted by the Turks.” Now fancy to your self what a consolation this was, and what this tooth could signify, either to the Christians or the Turks. In the same year, (that this tooth of gold might not want for historians) one Rullandus wrote the history of it: two years after, Ingolsteterus, another learned man, wrote against the opinion of Rullandus concerning this golden tooth; and Rullandus presently makes a fine learned reply. Libavius, another great man, collected all that had been said of this tooth, to which he added his own opinion. After all, there wanted nothing to so many famous works, but the truth of its being a tooth of gold. When a Goldsmith had examined it, he found that it was only a leaf of gold laid on the tooth with a great deal of art. Thus they first compiled books, and then they consulted the goldsmith.
Nothing is more natural than to do the same thing in all other cases. And I am not so much convinced of our ignorance, by things that are, and of which the reasons are unknown, as by those which are not, and for which we yet find out reasons. That is to say, as we want those principles that lead us to the truth, so we have others means that not only do we not have the principles that lead to truth, but we have others which are exceeding well with that which is false.
Bernard Le Bouyer of Fontenelle, The History of the Oracles [1686][1],

2.2 The effect exists independently of the alleged cause

The determining cause has a consistent impact. If C is the cause of E, we cannot have C without E. If a metal is heated, it necessarily expands. It follows that a causal statement can be rejected by showing that the effect persists when the cause is absent. To refer again to the example above, if it can be shown that bees also disappear from areas where pesticides are not used, pesticides cannot be considered to blame for the fall in bees’ number.

2.3 There is no causality but concomitance

In that case, A both regularly accompanies and precedes B without being the cause of B. The cock sings regularly before the break of day, but it is not the cause of the sunrise. Taking an antibiotic might be accompanied by a feeling of exhaustion, but the cause of this exhaustion is not the antibiotic but the infection that it fights. The general principle to check whether a causal relation exists is to suppress the agent which is the suspected cause; if the so-called effect is still there, there is no causal link between the two facts. If the cock is eliminated, for example, the sun still rises; if we do not take antibiotics, we will still be exhausted and perhaps even more.

The use of pesticides is concomitant with the disappearance of bees; but in areas where pesticides cease to be used, bees’ numbers continue to fall at the same rate. The cause is to be sought elsewhere: perhaps climate change is to blame?

Such erroneous causal imputation are well identified in the ancient theory of fallacies, which denotes them by two Latin expressions:

— Fallacy of the antibiotic: cum hoc, ergo propter hoc:

“with A, therefore because of A”: A accompanies B, so A is cause of B.

— Fallacy of the cock: post hoc, ergo propter hoc:

“after A, therefore because of A”: B appears after A, so A is cause of B.

2.4 Another cause may have the same effect

One can be tired because one has been physically exhausted, because one has an infection, or because one is depressed.

2.5 Not one, but several causes: complex causality

It may be necessary for several causes to exist in conjunction in order that they produce some effect. This is the case of economic crises, or lung cancer.

The determination of causes establishes the responsibility of the human agents who have set the causal machinery in motion. If the causality is complex, it is possible for the defendants to argue that they are responsible only for a causal factor, which would not alone have given rise to the relevant problem. Upon being arrested, a person dies. The autopsy shows that this person was suffering from a weak heart:

Lawyer:    — If the police had treated him gently, he would not have died. The police are responsible.
Police:      — If he had not been sick before, he would not have died. The police are not responsible.

In cases of heavy pollution, the authorities apologize to people suffering from respiratory diseases: “people without such respiratory issues have no problem”.

2.6 The effect feeds the cause

Feedback is a sort of causal circle: atomic fusion raises the temperature and the rise of temperature accelerates fusion. In the social field, this kind of mechanism is invoked to reject a particular measure, arguing that it will not alleviate the issue in question, but rather aggravate it:

L1:      — To fight recession, public services must be strengthened / reduced.
L2:      — But the strengthening / reduction of public services will reinforce the recession.

One can always refute a measure by asserting that it will have certain unwanted consequences which will outweigh any potential advantage, S. Pragmatic argument. In the example given above, the refutation is radical, the perverse effect being not a side effect, as yet unnoticed by the author of the proposition, but exactly the reverse of the intended effect. This is a case of pure and simple inversion of causality (see infra), which is frequent in polemical discourse.

2.7 Self-fulfilling prophecies

In the case of self-fulfilling prophecies, the announcement of an event is the cause of the event:

S1_1:     — In truth, I tell you: there will be a food shortage!
So people run into the shops and there is a food shortage.
S1_2:     — You see, I told you so!
S2:        — If you hadn’t have caused the people to panic, there wouldn’t have been a shortage.

Self-fulfilling prophecies are close to manipulation:

We are certainly going to war, so we must rearm and warn the population. … Now we are the strongest, and our people are behind us. We can wage war.

2.8 Conversion of cause and effect

The reversal of cause and effect is a form of refutation common in ordinary argument. Two facts A and B vary concomitantly. To account for this concomitance, some assert that there is a causal link from A to B, others claim a link from B to A. The protagonists defend the converse propositions, “A is the cause of B” and “B is the cause of A”. Do we cry because we are sad? Or are we sad because we cry? Does aggression provoke fear? Or does fear result in aggression?

L1:        — I am afraid of dogs, they can attack and bite!
L2:        — No, they attack because they see that you’re scared.

L1:        — OK, I’m aggressive, that’s because they persecute me!
L2:        — No, they persecute you because you’re aggressive.

In the first case, the affair originates with the dog and the supposed bully, in the second case with the self-claimed victim. It is said that single people are more likely to commit suicide than people with a partner. We might therefore ask whether single people have such problems because they are single, or whether they are single because they have such problems? This form of refutation by permutation of the cause and effect is simple and radical. It is worth noting, however, that it is not always possible to apply this process, as seen above, in the case of bees and pesticides.

This causal shift is particularly popular in ordinary causal argumentation. This play on permutation of terms illustrates the pervasiveness of language-based argumentation schemes. It is easier and more exciting to argue that politics determines morality or that morality determines politics, than to argue that there is no link, or very complex ones, between morality and politics, S. Converse.

2.9 Causality, subjectivity, responsibilities

The causal chain might be badly cut: the expression of causality as “A is the cause of B” is a potentially misleading simplification. Every cause is itself caused, except God, who is said to be his own cause and cause of all that ensues. The phenomenon designated as the cause can itself be constructed as the effect of a deeper cause, and its effects as new causes of new effects. We are therefore not dealing with a link between two terms, but with a real causal chain of potentially infinite length.

Consider the deadly events which took place in Sheffield on Sunday, April 16, 1988. They were extensively reported and commented on in the French press. On the following day, the front page of L’Équipe (a sports newspaper) read as follows:

The Horror!
Eighty-four people were killed on Saturday in Sheffield stadium, where the Liverpool-Nottingham FA Cup semi-final took place.

Typically, this kind of event causes anxiety which in turn stimulates the search for causal explanations. Readers will ask themselves “Why? How can such things be possible?” The same day, the headlines in Le Figaro newspaper (news and opinions) were:

Football: Why so many dead?
Four explanations for the drama:

• • The madness of supporters • Police negligence
  • The age of the stadium • Inadequate relief

The answers provided in the newspaper refer to a broad causality for the first question, and to a narrow causality for the others. The same day, the newspaper Libération (news and opinions) asserts a broad causality:

94 dead in Sheffield stadium
Deadly stadium
Crushed to death by the throng of supporters, victims who had come to see the Liverpool-Nottingham Forest football match made a dramatic tribute to the most popular sport in Thatcher’s Britain.

Still the same day, L’Humanité newspaper (news and opinions) combines local causes and so-called deeper causes:

After the drama of Sheffield, Liverpool in mourning
The Last Stage of Horror

90 dead and at least 170 wounded, such is the appalling toll of the Hillsborough catastrophe. The vast majority of victims are children and young people from working class backgrounds who had come to support their teams. The age of the stadiums and their segregational character, and the hold that money has on the world of football are now in the dock. The destruction of industry and the resulting disorganization of leisure activities all have their share of responsibility in the transformation of sports into high-risk activities.

Examination of the causal chain mobilizes specialists in each of the areas of responsibility mentioned. Police officers and judges investigate narrow causalities, whilst sociologists, economists, politicians and historians discuss long-term causalities and responsibilities. In short, what is the cause? The fragility of the victims’ rib cage, the poor quality of care to victims, the tardy response of the emergency services, the incompetence of the police services, the poor standard of the stadium, the financial greed of the organizers, the supporters’ behavior, unemployment, social exclusion, the capitalist system…? To assign a cause is to assign responsibility and apportion blame and perhaps even bring shame upon the relevant parties. This case shows that causality functions as a discursive object, S. Cause — Effect.

Moreover, the causal chains intermingle and combine into a “fabric of causes”. Argumentation is based on this fabric, as “causal threads” are picked up and cut at a given point. This point determines the nature of the chosen cause attached to the salient problematic event considered as an “effect”. The selection of a cause, correlatively, determines the responsible agent, person or institution, to blame or to praise. All the process depends on the interests and aims of the arguing party. The speaker fully projects his own subjectivity on the causal chain he or she has selected, and on the cause he or she has isolated. It would therefore be quite illusory to consider that ordinary arguments based on causal links are ipso facto more rigorous and less subjective than arguments based, for example, on analogy.

[1] Bernard Le Bouyer of Fontenelle, The History of the Oracles. Glasgow: R. Urie, 1753. P. 14-15.

1. The causal relationship and its expression

The notion of cause is central in daily argument as well as in scientific argument. It is considered a primitive, intuitively clear notion. This means that ordinary language defines cause only through notions which are equally complex.

Let us consider some possible ways to refer to and think about causal links and processes:

— The cause explains, accounts for its effect; it gives the why, the reason of things. The effect is understood when its cause is known.
— The cause of something is its principle; origin, basis, foundation, grounds; its occasion. The cause is a motor, which triggers, starts a series of effects.
— Humans act as cause; they are agent, maker; author, creator, inspirer, instigator, promoter, producer…; their aims, purposes, intentions, motives and motivations… are considered as causes. Their incitements, inducements instigations, are second-level causes.
— Metaphorically, the cause is thought of as a spark, a ferment, a germ; a root, a seed; a source, a spring. Their cause is the mother of things as they are.

Beyond the specific verbs corresponding to the preceding nouns, different kinds of causal relations are associated with very general verbs such as bring (about), to give (rise to), to make, procure, lift…

Like the logical relation of implication, the causal relation can be associated with passages articulated by conjunctions or adverbs:

Since, because …; as soon as …; so … ; when; if … then …

All these terms and constructions might point to some kind of causal relation, and can therefore be considered as causal indicators of a sort, being kept in mind that they can also express other functional relations.

Like analogy relationships, causal relations can dispense with causal indicators. A spontaneous “causal impulse” always suggests a causal relation behind a purely temporal succession, or concomitance (see infra).

Practically, it would be difficult, and is not necessary, to identify and reconstruct all of the multi-level, potential causal relations in a text. Relevant and indisputable causal argumentative causal relations are explicit, in the foreground of the discussion, articulated and thematized in the argumentative lines developed by the participants in the discussion.

2. Time, causal, logical series

Let us consider the causal, logical and temporal series. In the physical world, the cause precedes its consequence (this is not, however, always straightforward). In the logical world the antecedent is to the left of the logical connective ‘→’ and the consequent is to its right; in the world at large, events simply follow one another.

The time series includes three terms:

before… / during… / after…
prior, anterior, previous… / simultaneous… / posterior, later, subsequent…

The word consequence is thus used to designate the effect, linked to its physical cause, or the consequent, linked to its logical antecedent. In general, logical relations develop the consequences of hypotheses or postulates. If the length of the side of the square is doubled, its surface is multiplied by four: this result is a consequence, linked to a cause which is a mathematical reason.

Mind your words, you speak of the birth of the gods, so you suggest that at one time, the gods did not exist?

This is not a causal, but a semantic consequence, based on the linguistic meaning of the word “birth”.

3. Argumentations appealing to causes, mobiles…
and effects, consequences…

The terminology of argumentation involving a causal relation might be confusing. We will distinguish between, on the one hand, argumentation establishing a causal relationship, and, on the other, argumentation exploiting a previously established causal relationship.

(i) The cause — effect argumentation establishes a causal relationship between two facts and eliminates “false causes”.

(ii) Several kinds of arguments exploit a pre-established causal relationship. In this second case, we will distinguish between:

— Cause to effect argumentation, going forward from the cause to the effect. A fact-argument considered to be a cause, is claimed to have such effect.

— Effect to cause argumentation, goes in the opposite direction, from the effect to cause. A fact-argument to which a status of effect is attributed, is claimed to have such cause.

— Pragmatic argumentation develops first from cause to effect, before returning to the cause. In order to make a decision about a practical measure (assimilated to a cause), one develops its possible positive or negative effects, before arguing back to the cause.

— Argumentations based on motives align the cause-effect relation with the relation from a motive to do something to the corresponding action.

— A priori and a posteriori arguments, propter quid and quia, exploits causal and logical links.

The term categorization refers to the various cognitive and practical operations through which an individual is integrated into a category and designated by the name attached to that category:

— What is this?   Identification process
— This is a X      Name of the object

The name can be taken from the current lexicon or from a scientifically controlled taxonomy or theory. Categorization as a cognitive and empirical operation cannot be dissociated from nomination, a linguistic operation.
The classical example illustrating Toulmin’s layout of argument is an example of an administrative categorization: the individual Harry is categorized as a British citizen on the basis of the criterion, “— to be born in Bermuda”.

Categorization is the first step to implement an argumentation by definition, “he is a British citizen, so …” S. Argument from definition. In law, categorization corresponds to the legal qualification of an act (is it a crime or an accident?); it determines the law applicable to the case, S. Stasis.

1. Categorization tests: distinctive features and global analogy

An individual is given a name and integrated in a category mainly on the basis of a set of distinctive features or out of a global analogy with an outstanding member of the category.

The categorization by distinctive features is based upon a definition. A definition of a noun is a set of heterogeneous features that can be used to test an individual for the corresponding category. If a significant number of these distinctive features fit with the description of the individual, then this individual belongs to this category, and can be given the corresponding name.
If the categorization-nomination is based on unsystematic, anecdotal features the category is inconsistent: “the bird is gray, the sky is gray, the bird is a cloud, the cloud is a bird” S. Intra-categorical analogy.

The categorization by analogy is based on a common global form (Gestalt) shared by the individual under consideration and a prototypical member of the category: this mushroom looks like a Scotch bonnet, it is a Scotch Bonnet. The prototypical species is the species with which the community is best acquainted with.

The concrete task of nomination–categorization combines the two sets of tools, distinctive features and analogy. The distinctive features can be drawn from the stereotype rather than from any kind of definition; all the features found on the stereotype tend to be considered as essential for the definition of the category, S. Imitation.

Binary and gradual categorization — The categorization made on the basis of essential, distinctive features entails that category predicates are binary: an individual is a member of a category or is not.
If membership within a category is determined simply by stacking any sufficient number of features, category predicates are gradual; the richer the combination of features, the stronger the link with the category. Similarly, a bird which looks more like the prototypical bird than another is “more” a bird than the other one. Category membership becomes gradual, and its top members cannot be transcended; this can be the meaning of the juvenile expression “more X than him, you die”, “cooler than him, you die” in other words, one comes out of the category upwards.

Categorization mistake? — In Alice in Wonderland, the pigeon wrongly categorizes Alice as a serpent:

‘Serpent!’ screamed the pigeon.
‘I’m not a serpent’, said Alice indignantly. ‘Let me alone!’ […]
‘A likely story indeed!’ said the Pigeon in a tone of the deepest contempt. ‘I’ve seen a good many little girls in my time, but never one with such a neck as that! No, no! You’re a serpent; and there is no use denying it. I suppose you’ll be telling me next that you never tasted an egg!’
Lewis Carroll, Alice in Wonderland. [1865] [1].

The pigeon wrongly categorizes Alice as a serpent on the basis of the long neck she is developing in this episode. For the pigeon, this characteristic evokes a snake, so that the pigeon fears for its eggs; and in addition, Alice eats eggs, a feature perhaps inessential for the categorization of beings, but which reinforces the pigeon’s conclusion.
From an essentialist view, the pigeon miscategorizes Alice; “having a long neck” is not a specific difference nor a characteristic proper of snakes; giraffes, herons, swans… are also animals with long necks. Actually, the pigeon classifies Alice from a functional point of view. From the pigeon’s perspective, a long neck is a natural sign of danger and it is wise to apply a precautionary principle, that is to shout “snake!” as people shout “wolf!” when perceiving a strange creature lurking behind the house.

2. Technical categorization

The categorization-nomination can be expressed via a simple judgment about an individual “X is a bastard, it shows immediately”; most designations are not the result of a careful examination of the relevant criteria, but if in doubt, the availability of such criteria proves essential. The mushroom picker who has doubts about the nature of the mushroom he has just picked must engage in a careful process of categorization; the same goes for the municipal employee seeking to determine the rights of an individual applying for social security benefits. First of all, they must refer to the criteria enumerated in the relevant reference books: the encyclopedia of mushrooms in the first case; the decrees and dispositions defining the terms and conditions of attribution of social security benefits in the other. A well-conducted process of categorization will lead to reasoned conclusions, such as:

Y is / is not a marasmius oreades, i.e., a Scotch bonnet.
X is / is not a single parent in the administrative sense of the expression.

The investigating parties will then take the relevant action: keeping the mushroom for eating or throwing it away; accepting or denying the application for social security benefits.

Social Categorization — A parent is defined as “a parent or a person who bears the financial burden of one or more children”. “To be single” is defined as: “to be widowed, divorced, separated or unmarried not cohabiting”. The meaning of parent is finally extended to include “pregnant” and “people having the legal responsibility of a child”.

Natural Categorization — Wikipedia describes the Scotch Bonnet as follows:

Marasmius oreades, the Scotch bonnet, is also known as the fairy ring mushroom or fairy ring champignon. The latter name tends to cause some confusion, as many other mushrooms grow in fairy rings (such as the edible Agaricus campestris, the poisonous Chlorophyllum molybdyte, and many others).
Distribution and habitat — Marasmius oreades grows extensively throughout North America and Europe in the summer and autumn (fall) (June – November in the UK), or year-round in warmer climates. It loves grassy areas such as lawns, meadows, and even dunes in coastal areas.
Description — It grows gregariously in troops, arcs, or rings (type II, which causes the grass to grow and become greener). The cap is 1-5 cm across; bell-shaped with a somewhat inrolled margin at first, becoming broadly convex with an even or uplifted margin, but usually retaining a slight central bump — an « umbo »; dry; smooth; pale tan or buff, occasionally white, or reddish tan; usually changing color markedly as it dries out; the margin sometimes faintly lined.
The bare, pallid stem grows up to about 7cm by 5mm in diameter.
The gills are attached to the stem or free from it, fairly distant (rather a distinctive character), and white or pale tan, dropping a white spore-print. The spores, themselves, are 7-10 x 4-6 µ; smooth; elliptical; inamyloid. Cystidia absent. Pileipellis without broom cells.
This mushroom can be mistaken for the toxic Clitocybe rivulosa which lacks an umbo, is white to grey in color, and has closely spaced decurrent gills.
Wikipedia, Marasmius oreades

If the harvested object thing complies with this description, then it is a Scotch Bonnet. Categorization is achieved on the basis of a set of quite different procedures: observing whether the key elements of a definition by description apply to the individual; looking carefully at the picture showing a prototypical Scotch Bonnet; testing the object for its “elasticity under finger pressure”. Some features of the definition can be checked immediately, for example, by looking at the surroundings:

grassy area —grows gregariously in troops, arcs, or rings (ibid.);

or at the mushroom itself:

a slight central bump: an ‘umbo’ (ibid.);

or practicing a small experimentation:

usually changing color markedly as it dries out (ibid.)

These are positive criteria, that, if met, justify the claim “this is a M. oreades”.

Of special importance for the task of categorizing and giving names, are the distinctive criteria; the umbo criteria proves essential, and, for some other species, vital:

This mushroom can be mistaken for the toxic Clitocybe rivulosa which lacks an umbo, is white to grey in color, and has closely spaced decurrent gills (id.)

In contrast the name-derived criteria “fairy ring mushroom” seems to be a necessary, not sufficient criteria, very risky since it is shared by both edible and toxic species. These are key criteria in the case of categorization issues (cf. infra, §3).

Notably, other parts of the definition may remain puzzling for many: “inamyloid. Cystidia absent. Pileipellis without broom cells”. Categorization is commonly achieved on the basis of a selection of criteria. Once categorization has been performed in view of a reasonable set of elements, it is possible to allocate to the object under examination all of the features mentioned in the definition. It is in this way that categorization connected with definition becomes a powerful argumentative machine, argumentation by definition:

it is a Scotch Bonnet, SO “inamyloid, etc.

or, more realistically perhaps:

“Many mushroom connoisseurs are fond of M. oreades” SO, let’s cook it at once!

Over time and with growing experience, this knowledge, manipulations and, most importantly, reasoning will be incorporated in perception, and the mushroom picker will immediately see and recognize Marasmius oreades as such: “look, Scotch Bonnets!”.

3. Categorization Issues

The fact that categorization is an argumentation-based process is clearly illustrated by borderline cases, in which the individual or situation under consideration meets some, but not all of the criteria defining the given category.

Let us consider the above-mentioned case of social security benefits, provided by the state to help a single parent to raise a child. The municipal employee receives the following application:

I am currently separated from my husband, who has moved out of the conjugal home, leaving with another woman. We will be taking steps to divorce, but in the meantime, I am living alone with my daughter.

This woman is not divorced, but is apparently engaged in court proceedings, or at least plans to file for divorce. Does she therefore qualify for immediate financial support?

A stasis or conflict of categorization occurs when discourse and counter-discourse are based on conflicting categorizations of the same event, action, or person:

S1_1      — he is a poor guy
S2         — no, he’s a real bastard
S1_2      — no, he is a poor guy, we should pity him

S1_1      — Syldavia is now a great democracy!
S2_1      — how can you talk about democracy in a country that does not respect the rights of minorities?
S1_2      — there are tons of democracies that do not respect the rights of minorities.

Such antagonistic categorizations occur frequently in conversations.
— In dialogue (1), the antagonistic categorizations of the same individual as a poor guy vs. a bastard, are just stated and repeated.

— In dialogue (2), S2_1 rejects the categorization of Syldavia as a democracy, arguing that protecting the right of the minorities is a necessary feature to qualify for being a democracy. S1_2 maintains and backs up his or her appreciation, arguing that democratic regimes, as they are, often fail to respect minority rights. In a very common opposition, S1 categorizes Syldavia on an essentialist criterion, S2 on an empirical criterion, which opens a perfect argumentative situation.

[1] Quoted after Lewis Carroll, Alice in Wonderland, BookVirtual digital edition. P. 71; 72-73. https://www.adobe.com/be_en/active-use/pdf/Alice_in_Wonderland.pdf (11-08-2017).

1. Definition

Case-by-case argumentation is a technique of inquiry developing in several stages, from questions like “What happened, what can happen?”:

— First, make an inventory of possible cases.
— Second, consider each of these cases.
— Third, sum up the cases considered and see if examination leads to the elimination of all possible cases but one.
— Fourth, conclude that the last remaining case should be chosen or is real and true.

S1       — All this money, either comes from a legacy or is your labor, or has been stolen. If it comes from your labor income or from a legacy, it’ll be easy for you to prove it by showing us the relevant documents. No documents of that kind available? So you stole it.

This argument illustrates the classical law of negation of a disjunction, S. Connectives:

“P or Q or R” is true; but P is false and Q is false; so necessarily, R is true.

Definitions can be given on a case-by-case basis. A crime, such as impiety, might be defined as a lack of respect for either the gods, their priests or their shrines. To accuse someone of impiety (or to exonerate oneself from that crime) one must show that one of the three defining conditions has been disrespected (or not) (after Aristotle, Rhet., II, 23, 1399a5; RR p. 367).

2. Argument by division

Argument by division is illustrated by the following example:

The tyre exploded because it was worn out, because there were nails on the road, or because of a manufacturing defect. Now, the tyre had just been bought and no nails were found in it. So there was bad workmanship. (Perelman, 1977, p. 65)

This shows that the label “argumentation by division” is homonymic: it can refer either to the argumentation by composition or division, or to the case-by-case argument.

3. Refutation of the case-by-case argument

A case-by-case argument is perfectly conclusive if all cases have been considered; it can be rejected on the same case-by-case basis by showing that the enumeration of cases is incomplete:

S2 (as a reply to S1, supra): — No Sir, I just won the lottery, here is the winning ticket!

S3 (as a reply to Perelman, supra) — Well, Sir, here are some other possibilities. The tire might have exploded because it was badly inflated, because there was a pothole on the road, because it hit the curb, because it has been overheated (if the driver happens to have just used a torch to unscrew a wheel bolt), because the brake was glued, because it had been brought into contact with an electrical source, because the car was too loaded or was running too fast… My conclusion is that the investigation must go on.

Lat. ad quietem arg.; quies, “rest; in politics, peaceful period; neutrality”.

Calm is the emotional and cognitive state of a person having no reason for concern, in particular, having no urgent issue to address.
Serious argumentative situations are inherently tense. The involved participants themselves may wish to wish to get out of it as soon as possible, in order to restore their former, real or imagined tranquility. But it would be best not to have to debate: the burden of proof is the price paid by the proponent for disturbing the tranquility of the group. 

1. Calm and emotionality

The Aristotelian list of socio-rhetorical emotions opposes calm to anger, S. Emotion. In fact, calm may be opposed to any strong positive or negative emotion. Strong emotions are characterized by a marked variation of arousal. Specific actions, speech and arguments might be used to reduce such excitation and re-instill a quieter mood, that is to calm down overexcited people, be they a group of enthusiasts enraged by the prospect of a war, or children throwing a tantrum.

2. Appeal to tranquility

In the political sphere, the ad quietem maneuver has been identified and labelled ad quietem by Bentham (1824; S. Political Arguments). It is defined as an attempt to postpone the discussion of a proposal in the hope that the issue will never be addressed.
Discourses amplifying the following topics are central to this move:

This issue is not so important, already settled, we have other priorities, we’ll discuss that later, you are the only one to see that as a problem…
Leave us alone with these things!

A meta-discussion about the relevance and timing of the discussion is substituted for the discussion itself. Bentham regards this maneuver as fallacious, and classifies it in the category of “fallacies of delay”, directed against freedom of proposition and political innovation.

The appeal to tranquility values calm as a peaceful conservative social state, which may side with apathy, inertia and laziness. Dissatisfied proponents, ready to argue for innovations and changes, speaking possibly in the best common interest, are framed as troublemakers, instilling adrenaline, excitation, anger and anxiety within the group.

Tranquility may be invoked as an argument for not participating in political and social life:

Voting concerns only men, since women — fortunately for their tranquility — do not have political rights.
Clarisse Juranville, [Handbook of Moral Education and Civic Instruction], [1911].[1]

The following interventions are taken from a debate on immigration and French nationality, a quite topical issue at that time. At the very beginning of the discussion A, a female student,  first alludes to the handouts that were distributed to students, then, she  gives a carefully worded and slightly oriented description of the two parties and of their positions. Finally, on the basis of a perfect “leave us in peace” argumentation, she takes an implicit but clear stand in favor of the party holding that “the government currently has other priorities that are more important and that it [is] not necessary to go back to this point”:

 Prof:       then you say nothing stay mute/ you learned nothing from all that, nothing struck you/ — you what are the points/ — so let’s start listing them\ you can give them/ yes/
A:             already two points of view actually, finally
Prof:        there are two points of view you have seen that there was yes/
A:             two parties that oppose well those who want to— as the petition of all the screen actors and filmmakers etcetera who want that: im- well the nationality code be unlimited\ and that all the— undocumented people be regularized\ therefore hmm without any limit
Prof:        hm hm hm hm (1)
A:            and the second point of view is those who say that for there to be a right of the people there must be:: a right of state\ therefore precisely there must be limits and that:: and also these people are those who say that the government currently has other priorities that are more important and that it was not necessary to go back to that point\
Prof:        OK (1)

(1) ratifies the previous turn, without taking a stand.
Corpus On Immigration and French Nationality, Student Workshop.[2]

[1] Quoted after Clarisse Juranville, Manuel d’éducation morale et d’instruction civique civique [Manual of moral education and civic instruction], Paris: Vve P. Larousse.
Quoted after the 5^e ed., 1^re part Éducation morale [Moral Education]; chap. Le vote [The Vote]; § Les femmes et la politique [Women and Politics]. No Date. No pag.

[2] Corpus Débats sur l’immigration — Débat étudiants [Debates on immigration — Students]. CLAPI data base, http://clapi.univ-lyon2.fr/V3_Feuilleter.php? Num_corpus = 35] (07-30-2013).

• • Lat. onus probandi; Lat. onus “charge, burden”; probandi, from probare “to make believable, to make accept, to prove”.

The burden of proof plays a fundamental role in argument. It is a conservative principle, like the principle of inertia in physics: “I keep doing business as usual unless I have a good reason to change”. Mill reports an anecdote that vividly illustrates the heaviness of the burden of proof imposed by a conservative society upon social innovators, S. Calm.

The propounder of a new truth, according to this doctrine should stand, as stood, in the legislation of the Locrians, the proposer of a new law, with a halter round his neck, to be instantly tightened if the public assembly did not, on hearing his reasons, then and there adopt his proposition. People who defend this mode of treating benefactors, cannot be supposed to set much value on the benefit; and I believe this view of the subject is mostly confined to the sort of persons who think that new truths may have been desirable once, but that we have had enough of them now.([1859]. p. 88)

In court, the burden of proof is expressed by the presumption of innocence “a person is presumed innocent until proved guilty”; that is, the accusation must provide positive evidence of the accused’s guilt. The stabilization of the burden of proof is an institutional decision, organizing the situation; the last word is left to the defendant.

In informal social debates, there is no clear preliminary agreement about who supports the burden of proof, and the proponent can try to shift it onto the adversary. ​​It becomes a stake of the debate.

The doxa can be defined according to the same principle: an endoxon, that is a fragment of the doxa, is best defined not as a “probable” belief, but as a belief which is not subject to the burden of proof, and is, accordingly, considered to be “normal” by the given group. The individual challenging an accepted proposition bear the burden of proof, and has to provide good reasons. This is why Descartes, willing to reject all his pre-established beliefs, must back this radical doubt by the hypothesis of the Evil Genius (Descartes [1641], First Meditation). S. Rules.

When it comes to current trends and fashions, the burden of proof is reversed: “it is new, it has just come out!” is a direct argument for buying the product in question. Good reasons are instead needed for not following fashion, not adopting new theories, and not voting for a new candidate.

Burden of proof and Initiative

Hamblin has redefined the burden of proof in a language game as attributed to the player taking the initiative, that is, making the first move. This definition can be transposed to highly argumentative multi-speaker interactions, where the first turn is generally allocated to the person supporting the proposal to be discussed. In a debate on the legalization of drugs, the facilitator addresses the first question to a supporter, not to an opponent of legalization.

The burden of proof relates to a question and a proposal. If the opponent makes a counter-proposal, he will bear the corresponding burden of proof.

The burden of proof may vary with the group involved, and where the debate takes place. If the doxa of the group is that no prohibition should apply to drug consumption, then, in this group, the supporter of the prohibition will have to justify his stance.

Arguments based on the beliefs and character of the audience are opposed to those based on the substance of the issue.

In classical rhetorical argumentation, the orator must not only know the case and the law, but also the judge, that is the people he or she intends to address and convince and the opponent he or she is going to face and refute. Before engaging in the quest for arguments, he or she must gather information about the ethos of the audience and of the opponent; that is about their beliefs, habits and general character, including their previous discourses and positions. The orator exploits this information either positively to confirm his or her position, or negatively to reject the opponent’s position:

— The ex datis argument positively exploits the natural ethos of the audience to infer a positive conclusion, S. Ex datis.
— The ad hominem argument exploits the information about the opponent’s discourses and beliefs in a negative way, by exhibiting their inconsistencies, S. Ad hominem.

A statement can be self-justified: S. Self-Argued Claim. This self-defense is made possible by the multi-layered semantic structure of language, and in particular by the fact that words have an orientation, which may be well grounded on implicit arguments, S. Words as arguments. Just as it can be self-justified, a statement can be self-defeated. A statement is self-defeated when it expresses a logical or material impossibility, or when it involves a pragmatic contradiction between what is said and the act of saying it.

This phenomenon is also called autophagy. Perelman defines autophagy as a contradiction arising from the fact that “the assertion of a rule or a principle is incompatible with the conditions or with the consequences of its assertion or application. Such arguments can be called autophagy. Retaliation is the argument that attacks the rule by highlighting the autophagy” (Perelman 1977, p. 72-73).

The assertion is incompatible with the fact asserted, “the very act implies what the words denies” (id. p. 73). Perhaps the best-known case of autophagy is that of the Cretan Epimenides affirming that “all the Cretans are liars”:

There are no more cannibals, we have eaten the last one.

S1 — All statements can be questioned.
S2 — I question this statement.

Retaliation is a kind of refutation reconstructing a claim as pragmatically self-defeating on the basis of its very content, and in virtue of its own principles. In philosophy, this strategy, known as the epitrope, is applied by Socrates to refute Protagoras’ thesis according to which:

Man is the measure of all things: of the things which are, that they 
are, and of the things which are not, that they are not. (Plato, Theaethetus, 152a; CW, p. 169)

This doctrine exhibits that “most exquisite feature” that if true, it is false:

Socrates: — […] Protagoras admits, I presume, that the contrary opinion about his own opinion (namely, that it is false) must be true, seeing he agrees that all men judge what is.
Theodorus: — Undoubtedly.
Socrates: — And in conceding the truth of the opinion of those who think 
him wrong, he is really admitting the falsity of his own opinion?
Theodorus: — Yes, inevitably.
 (Id., 171a-b; OC, p. 190)

This refutation is based on the principle of non-contradiction; to maintain consistency, a Skeptic will have to doubt this principle.

S. Ad hominem; Ex datis.

1. Auctoritas, authority, authoritarian, authoritative

1.1 Lat. Auctoritas

The word authority, and hence elements of the problematic of authority, originates in Latin and Roman laws and custom. According to Benveniste, the words auctor, “author”, auctoritas, “authority” are linked to the primary meaning of the verb augere, “to bring out, to promote” ([1969], no pag.):

In its oldest uses, augeo (1) denotes not the increase in something which already exists, but the act of producing from within itself; a creative act which causes something to arise from a nutrient medium and which is the privilege of the gods or the great natural forces, but not of men (ibid.).
(1) Augeo is the first person singular of the present indicative of augere (CP)

The speech delivered with auctoritas is creative:

The primary sense of augeo is discovered in auctoritas with the help of the basic term auctor. Every word pronounced with authority determines a change in the world; it creates something. This mysterious quality is what augeo expresses, the power which causes plants to grow and brings a law into existence. That one is the auctor who promotes, who alone is endowed with the quality […]. Obscure and potent values reside in this auctoritas, this gift which is reserved to a handful of people who can cause something to come into being and can literally bring into existence (ibid.).

This has nothing to do with what we call now an “argument from authority” supporting a belief about a given reality. Ellul describes the institutional exercise of the auctoritas as follows:

The auctoritas is the quality of the auctor. It gives its support, its approval to the act done by another person. At first it was probably an act of sacred law: an individual makes the legal act, and another validates this act by an intervention which manifests the agreement of the gods. (Ellul [1961], p. 248-249)

The auctoritas is held by the father, the priest, the judge; its use is foundational for family life, as well as for religious and legal life:

The auctoritas appears as the authority of a person who serves as a basis for a legal act. This act has value and efficiency only by the auctoritas. […] The pater [“father”] gives his auctoritas to the marriage of his son. In religious life, the auctoritas of the priest delimits the domain of the sacred, and draws the boundaries of the profane. In juridical life, the auctoritas delimits the domain of what is legitimate, separating it from the illegitimate (ibid).

1.2 Authority, authoritarian, authoritative

The author-authority relation is now broken, an author may have not so much authority, and the person having authority is not necessarily an author.
Authoritarian and authoritarianism develop along a lexical line which stigmatizes authority.
In contrast, authoritative as “possessing recognized or evident authority” (MW, Authority) refers to a positively oriented lexical line associated with authority.

2. Authority as a social issue

The concept of authority is redefined and discussed in all the fields of the human sciences, in relation to submission and in opposition to freedom or freedoms. Major studies on authority, power and totalitarianism marked the last century: in psychology, particularly since the resounding experiences of Stanley Milgram on “Obedience to Authority” (1974); in philosophy, with the study of the “The Authoritarian Personality” of Theodor Adorno (1950); in history with Hannah Arendt’s “The Origin of Totalitarianism” (1951); in sociology with Max Weber (1922), whose distinctions between traditional, charismatic, and rational-legal authority are now a part of common knowledge.

In our society, basic authority is expressed through various explicit standards regulations and norms, enforced by law, backed by the police and the legal institutions, in relation with the current political authorities.
Organizations have to define a mode of authority that they exercise within their field of competence, and to which their members must subscribe.
Like the definition and exercise of authority, resistance to illegitimate authority is a never-ending enterprise.

3. Authority and Argumentation Studies

3.1 Position

Along with the issue of authority, the study of discourse engages in a multidisciplinary reflection on the epistemic level (non-truth conditional conditions of acceptability of statement); on social influence (management of the powers of discourse); on interpersonal relationships (interactional manifestations and effects of the relative positions of authority of the participants).
In the specific field of argumentative rhetoric, the notion of authority is considered in relation to speech: In which identifiable ways, from implicit evocation to explicit invocation, can authority invest a statement? What is an appeal to authority? What are the types of critical responses to authoritarian or authoritative speeches?

To the extent that it refers to reason and free inquiry, argumentation is antithetical to authority and violence, even if they avail themselves of legal and even moral legitimacy. Argumentative speech, however, operates on a knife-edge. As a critical discourse, it denounces the discourse of authority; as strong affirmative discourse, it impacts upon the others’ minds and aspires, in the name of rationality, to change the representations of the audience. Argumentation has to find a way to be authoritative, without being authoritarian.
Claiming to be the instrument of reason, argumentation studies develop towards reflection on how this argumentative reason interacts with legitimate social authority, a fundamental element of social life, S. Agreement; Role; Persuasion; Evaluation. The ideal of rational persuasion and consensus served by argumentation is invoked, but, on the other hand, the decision rests with the legal power that be, and that the best argument may or may not be reflected in the voter’s decision.

3.2 Forms of argumentation appealing to authority

— Basically, the argument from authority explicitly quotes a hetero-attributed authority. It is sometimes specified according to the nature of the source holding the authority: consensus, ad antiquitatem, ad numerum… (see infra).
— Authority, or lack of authority, may be self-attributed, incarnated and manifested in the speaker’s speech and attitudes, S. Ethos; Modesty.
— The authority of the testimony is supported by the character and reputation of the witness, and is thus connected with ethos. The criticism of the testimony is to be compared with that of the expertise.
— The authority of the precedent rests upon an earlier judgment (in all the meanings of the word judgment). The cause may also have been decided in the fable or parable; S. Example; Exemplum.
— Dialectic problematizes discourses supported by various kinds of social authority, S. Doxa.

The following paragraphs develop different forms and argumentative uses of authority.

4. The speaker’s inherent authority

4.1 Performative auctoritas

he speaker holds a unique form of authority, the auctoritas linked to the performativity of different classes of statements. According to Austin [1962], the performative utterance produces the reality that it states: by saying, “I promise”, I promise. The speaker is the auctor of the reality created, her promise.

4.2 Taking their word for it

If a speaker says, “hello!”, even if his friendliness is actually feigned, the default belief is that this is true friendly behavior. Ordinarily, no argument is needed to make somebody believe something, it must simply be stated; as a general rule, the speaker’s words are be taken at face value; what she says is believed and acted upon without hesitation. When somebody is asked “What time is it?”, the answer is accepted, no need to check the respondent’s watch.
Assertions about inner states, “I feel in good shape today”, are, by default, accepted without question, as are assertions made by individuals with special access to the facts under discussion (witnesses). If having authority means having power to successfully transmit one’s representations to the listeners, this is the most common form of linguistic authority, based on the preference for agreement.

This basic linguistic authority combines with other kinds of social authorities, which are attributed to the speaker according to the various social identities and roles he or she plays. These identities and roles cumulate in the shown authority of the authoritative speaker, precisely as defined by the theory of ethos.

Nonetheless, the preference for agreement is not automatic; recipients routinely disagree, and if not, they may be to blame.

5. Argument of legal authority

Authority, in the most common sense of the term, is defined by its claim to compliance and obedience; orders are obeyed by virtue of their source, without being systematically backed by a lengthy justification.

Context: L holds the power and means of coercion in domain D
L tells O to do F (F is in the area of D)
O does F.

The ideal of authoritarian authority is to exert a direct, causal influence on the behavior of others. If the tyrant’s subjects are not submissive to his good reasons or charisma, she can still opt for a hard punishment or a sweet reward.
Radical authority demands that the person who receives the order obey “like a corpse” (perinde ac cadaver), according to the metaphor Ignatius of Loyola uses to illustrate the perfection of the virtue of obedience. For the person who is not a member of the organization, to obey in this way is to reduce oneself to the state of an instrument by renouncing free examination and free will. For a member of the organization, it is simply to trust the goal-related rationality of the institution as such.

Conversely, orders are invoked as a sufficient justification for action: “I only obeyed the orders”. Such an appeal to authority is diametrically opposed to the philosophy of argumentation, which universalizes the imperative of justification and individual responsibilities. It can be challenged by appealing to the international conventions on Human Rights and the Geneva Convention.

Everyday democratic authority is the authority of legal and regulatory norms, backed by the monopoly of legal violence, enforced by the powers that be, and implemented by the persons legally in charge. In such a context, the basic expression of a valid legal and democratic argument from authority can be schematized as follows:

Context: There is a system of norms N. One of these norms empowers a judge to enforce this system and gives her the means of coercion necessary for its application.
Person P has done action A, and somebody complains.
The judge assesses, in a procedure conforming to the requirements of N, whether or not A constitutes a breach of a norm.
If it does, the judge sentences P to F, considering that R (justification of the decision).
Willingly or not, P complies with F.

Court sentences are about “making do”, not “making believe”, that is, convincing the convict. The recipients of the judge’s good reasons are much more the judge’s colleagues, or P‘s counsel, than P herself. P may be convinced of the legitimacy of the punishment by the good reasons given by the judge, but this psychological condition is not necessary. P must only comply with the judge’s decision, willingly or not. One cannot ask everyone to share the theory of redeeming punishment, and to gladly submit to a condemnation, even a democratic one.
Authority cannot force someone to believe something. But, as belief is manifest in words and behaviors, “make do” may be indistinguishable from “make believe”: “kneel down, pray, and you will believe.”

6. Classical argument of authority

6.1 Shown authority and quoted authority

Critical studies of argumentation draw a distinction within ethotic authority, rejecting as fallacious its seductive charismatic component (shown authority), to discuss only its expert component (quoted authority) S. Ethos.
In the case of ethotic authority, the speaker is the source of authority. Authority is « self-authorized » or self-founded. What is said is believed or obeyed because such and such a person says so.
In the case of the classical argument from authority, the speaker legitimizes her argument by quoting a preexisting, external authoritative, source: authority is hetero-founded. The technical study of this hetero-founded authority lies within the more general framework of discourse repetition, reformulation, reinterpretation, S. Resumption of speech.

6.1 Rhetorical argument of authority and the authorities stores

Authority is at the foundation of topos No. 11 of Aristotle’s Rhetoric:

Another line of argument is founded upon some decision already pronounced, whether on the same subject, or on one like it, or contrary to it. Such a proof is most effective if everyone has always decided thus; but if not everyone, then at any rate, most people; or if all, or most, wise or good men have thus decided, or the actual judges of the present question, or those whose authority they accept, or people whose decision they cannot gainsay because they have complete control over them, or those whom it is not seemly to gainsay, as the gods, or one’s father, or one’s teachers.
(Rhet., II, 23, 1398b15-30, RR, p. 365)

The “decisions” to be made can be intellectual or judicial. On this basis, later rhetoricians list the authorities likely to be called upon to strengthen the position of a party. In the judicial field, the Rhetoric to Herennius proposes ten “formulae” [loci comunes, “common places”, S. Topos) “to amplify an accusation”:

The first commonplace is taken from authority, when we call to mind of what great concern the matter under discussion has been to the immortal gods, to our ancestors, or kings, states, barbarous nations, sages, the Senate; and again, especially how sanction has been provided in these matters by laws. (Ad Her., II, 48)

These authorities are distinct from the judicial precedent, and can support any form of speech. Quintilian, for the same judicial situation, considers as authoritative,

whatever can be adduced as expressing the opinions of nations or people, or of wise men, eminent political characters, or illustrious poets. 37. Nor will common sayings, established by popular belief, be without their use in this way (IO, V, 11, 36-37).

This authorities store will be extensively used, with some adjustments; Gods should read God:

— Authority of Books, tradition, ancestors (ad antiquitatem); the argument of Progress is opposed to this form of authority.
— The famous verses, proverbs, fables, parables…
— The Chinese, the Americans…
— Authority of the media, professionals, scientists, professors…
— Truths from the mouths of children, the rich, the poor…
— Authority of large numbers, prestige of the majority consensus, of a particular group…

These forms of authority are cumulative: the scientific authority of the Master is sometimes mitigated by the charismatic authority of the Guru.

All these varieties of authority can be quoted; some can be incarnated by the speaker as a Chinese, an expert, a poor, a member of a distinguished community.

6.2 Invoked authority: the classical argument from authority

The classical argument of authority exploits an authority taken from the authority store. It is based on a quotation, and can be schematized as follows (see Hamblin 1970: 224 et seq.):

S:   — A is an authority, A says that P; therefore, P is true and indisputable.

Or, put simply, “A says that P”, when the context clearly establishes that A is an authority, and that S itself defends P, or a position cooriented with P.
The prototypical example in this category is that of Pythagoras quoted by his disciples, “he said it himself” (“ipse dixit”). Pythagoras has of course nothing to do with the matter; it is the speaker who quotes him as an authority.

Authority can justify ways of doing, beliefs, or combine both:

S:     — That’s how they hold their fork and knife in New York.
S:     — The Master said that pity is fallacious
S:     — I never give money to homeless people, I read in a book that’s just encouraging laziness.

6.3 Evoked authority

When analyzing discourse backed by an external authority one must consider the fact that the quotation is not always direct and open. The speaker can also proceed by allusion referring indirectly to a discourse, considered as authoritative because dominant, prestigious or associated with an expert. By subtly using the expressions “discursive formation”, “ideological state apparatuses”; “great other” … I suggest my knowledge and complicity respectively with the thinking of Michel Foucault, Althusser, Lacan, etc.

Quoting an authority in support of a proposition has ethotical repercussions. When the Greek messenger Orestes says to Pyrrhus, “All the Greeks speak to you by my voice” [1], he does more than quoting the Greeks, he incarnates the authority he quotes. Self-quotation does not grant much authority to what is said, quoting a prestigious authority however does improve the personal authority of the speaker. The Master’s voice comes from the speaker’s mouth, the speaker identifies with Him, reframes the exchange accordingly, and hopes that the audience will follow.

The philosophy of argumentation invokes an ideal of exposure to refutation, according to which it is perfectly legitimate to argue by authority, if the argument is explicit, if one knows exactly who said what and when. This rational requirement of making explicit is opposed to the burying of authority into the depths of discourse in order to shield it against a possible refutation.

7. Expert authority

From a logical-scientific point of view, a discourse is sound if it collects and articulates true propositions, in order to deduce a new true proposition, according to procedures accepted in the relevant community. In argumentation, the acceptance of a statement or a global vision is based on authority if it is not based upon a review of the good reasons supporting it, or upon a direct examination of the statement’s conformity with things themselves, but relies on the source and channel through which the information was communicated.
The argument from authority substitutes peripheral, indirect evidence for direct evidence or examination, which is considered inaccessible, too costly, or too tiring. Such daily practice is justified by a principle of economy, division of labor, or simply because someone else was more qualified, or in a better position to tell how events have gone. It works quite well and rationally, as a default argument, which can be edited when more information becomes available. Seen from this perspective, authority subtracts nothing and nobody from dispute, it simply shifts the burden of proof to the person who challenges it, S. Dialectic.

The argument of authority is therefore a form of argumentation when it exposes the authority which it claims. One could oppose the authoritarian support of a statement, as backed by the socio-discursive position of the speaker, to the argument of authority, hetero-founded, whose source is clearly exposed. In other words, when invoked to open the debate, the argument of authority is neither authoritarian nor fallacious, but it is if it claims to close the discussion, S. Modesty.

The counter-discourse method provides a principle of evaluation and criticism of arguments from authority. Referring to the structure of the argument of authority, discourses against authorities are directed as follows.

7.1 Against the quotation itself

S: — A says that Q

The rebuttal challenges the quote as such or the relevance of the quotation to the present discussion. This move preserves the status of A as an authority.

— A did not say Q; Q does not conform to the letter of what A actually said.
— Q is quoted out of context.
— Q is a misquote of A; it contains elements of reformulation and mischievous
                    reorientation.
— As meant by A, Q is not relevant to the present issue (Q is misinterpreted)

7.2 Against the authority quoted

— A has changed her mind, as testified by her more recent statements.

— A has no direct evidence, so A is not a real authority on point Q.

— There is no consensus among experts; “A⁺, a greater expert, rejects Q”.

— By application of the ad hominem argument to the source A: Q is incompatible, contradictory, with other assertions (or prescriptions) of A.

— A has spoken outside of his area of ​​expertise; she is not an expert in the precise field referred to by Q-type claims.

— A is not an expert, his or her views are outdated;

— A is mistaken, and has often been mistaken in the past.

— A is biased, manipulated, paid to say what she says.

— A can be dismissed by a personal attack (ad personam): “A is not an expert but a jester”.

7.3 Argumentations establishing expert authority

One can distinguish between two distinct strategies dealing with authority: arguments establishing an authority as such, and arguments exploiting an established authority. This opposition has a general value, S. Causality, Definition, Analogy. Discourses (7.1) against authority attacks the use made of authority, whereas discourse (7.2) attacks the authority itself.
It follows that discourses (7.2) against authority mirrors a discourse defining a legitimate expert:

A speaks in his sphere of competence, and is aware of the state of the matter; A‘s system is coherent; A has direct evidence, serious experts agree with what A says; the previous anticipations made by A are proven correct.

7.3 Against the person who submits to authority

The interaction framework shifts the focus from the statement of authority itself to the relationship of authority. Criticism is now aimed at the pusillanimity of the interlocutor.

7.4 Counter-argumentation ad rem

Finally, the opponent can argue that direct arguments can be opposed to Q, that is argument dealing with the matter at hand, and drawn not from authority but from scientific reason, or from historical knowledge, considered as superior to lazy appeals to authority.

8. Refutative uses of authority

8.1 Refutative uses of positive authority

The preceding paragraphs address authority inasmuch as it serves as support for an affirmation. Such an authoritative assertion  can be used to rebut a claim:

S1:      — P!
S2:      — X says the opposite, and she knows what she is talking about!

If X and S1 share the same affiliation, the refutation combines authority and ad hominem.
Positive authority can also be used to destroy not the content of what is said, but the claim to authority and therefore the competence of the person holding the discourse:

S1:     — P!
S2:      — That’s exactly what Perelman says!
           — We’ve known that since Aristotle!

Thought is an inner dialogue? We’ve known that since Plato! [2]

8.2 Negative authority: “Reductio ad Hitlerum”

Negative authority is used to rebut a claim in the following case:

S1:     — P!
S2:      — H says exactly the same thing!

H is a person, a party rejected by the speech community to which S2 belongs, or by the third parties arbitrating the discussion, or possibly S1; H is an anti-authority, an anti-model, S. Imitation.
In the case of a positive authority, the proponent connects the statement with an authority. Here, the connection of the disputed statement with the negative authority is made by the opponent.

Hitler is the paragon of the negative authorities, whose words cannot be repeated. The reductio ad Hitlerum puts an end to any argument.

Last year, you may recall, a number of financial-industry barons went wild over very mild criticism from President Obama. They denounced Mr. Obama as being almost a socialist for endorsing the so-called Volker rule, which would simply prohibit banks backed by federal guarantees from engaging in risky speculation. And as for their reaction to proposals to close a loophole that lets some of them pay remarkably low taxes — well, Stephen Schwarzman, chairman of the Blackstone Group, compared it to Hitler’s invasion of Poland.
Paul Krugman, “Panic of the Plutocrats”, 2011.[2]

[1] Racine, Andromache, 1667. I, 2. Quoted after: http://www.poetryintranslation.com/PITBR/French/AndromacheActI.htm#anchor_Toc169494154 (11-08-2017)

[2] SOCRATES: Very good. Now by ‘thinking’ do you mean the same as I do?
THEAETETUS: What do you mean by it?
SOCRATES: A talk which the soul has with itself about the objects under its consideration. Of course, I’m only telling you my idea in all ignorance; but this is the kind of picture I have of it. It seems to me that the soul when it thinks is simply carrying on a discussion in which it asks itself questions and answers them itself, affirms and denies. And when it arrives at something definite, either by a gradual process or a sudden leap, when it affirms one thing consistently and without divided counsel, we call this its judgment. So, in my view, to judge is to make a statement, and a judgment is a statement which is not addressed to another person or spoken aloud, but silently addressed to oneself. And what do you think?
THEAETETUS: I agree with that.

Plato, Theaetetus, 189e-190d. Translated by M. J. Levett, rev. Myles Burnyeat. In Plato, Complete Works. Edited, with Introduction and Notes, by John M. Cooper; Associate Editor D. S. Hutchinson. Hackett, Indianapolis/Cambridge, 1997.

[2] www.nytimes.com/2011/10/10/opinion/panic-of-the-plutocrats.html? _r = 1&ref=global-home (11-08-2017)

Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca discuss the effects of argumentation on the basis of an opposition between to persuade and to convince, the former being a local achievement involving a particular audience, while the latter is a global achievement involving the universal audience. The functional definition of argumentation provided at the opening of the Treatise, however, does not use these concepts but speaks of “adherence of minds” and “assent”. In this passage, argumentation is seen as an activity aiming “to induce or to increase the mind’s adherence” to “theses” that are “presented for its assent” (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1958, p. 4).

The concept of assent refers to Newman’s Grammar of Assent (1870).

The Stoic theory of knowledge defines assent as a voluntary act of the soul which occurs when the soul receives a true impression; this process implies a pre-established harmony between the will and the mind. “The soul wants truth”, and truth is index sui, its own mark. The mark of the true impression is the assent granted to it. The skeptics reject this harmony between true representation and assent; truth is not capable of self-certification, that is, one can give its assent to false representations.

The suspension or abstention of assent, is the basis of the skeptical method to achieve tranquility (ataraxia):

The Skeptic Way is called […] aporetic either, as some say, from its being puzzled and questioning about everything or from its being at a loss as to whether to assent or dissent. (Sextus Empiricus, Outlines, I, iii)

Assent may be granted or refused by an act of will:

I think it a very great exploit to resist one’s perceptions, to withstand one’s vague opinions, to check one’s propensity to give assent to propositions; […] Carneades achieved a Herculean labor when, as it had been a savage and formidable monster, he extracted assent, that is to say, vague opinion and rashness from our minds. (Cicero, Ac. II, 34; Trans. Yonge, p. 74)

Skepticism characterizes the argumentative situation as a standoff between two equal (isosthenic) and opposed discursive forces, which imposes a suspension of assent, S. Force; Stasis.

Common language considers assent to be an action. Assent can be given or suspended, in the same way that one can give or suspend an agreement or an authorization. From a rhetorical point of view, the problematic of assent makes the concept of persuasion more complex, by granting some activity to the recipient. Whilst people are passively persuaded, they actively grant their assent. This maintains a balance between the speaker and the audience, in that the speaker’s effort to persuade his or her audience corresponds the audience’s capacity to grant or to refuse his or her assent. Withheld assent plays a role in all varieties of rational exchanges, as it brings about a state of doubt which characterizes the third party position, S. Roles.

The assent granted in regard to a proposition is characterized by varying degrees, as one moves from opinion to belief and knowledge:

— The lowest degree corresponds to opinion, defined as a belief accompanied by the awareness that there are other equally valid opinions.
— The intermediate degree is that of belief. There are other beliefs, considered not false, but less valid than one’s own belief.
— The strongest degree is that of conviction. The convinced party considers that the proposition to which he or she adheres is true and that opposing arguments are fallacious, perverse or insane.

According to Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, persuading produces belief, while convincing produces a generalized belief, defining social, legitimized knowledge.