EMOTION

1. Definitions

1.1 Psychology

From a psychological point of view, emotion is a syndrome, a temporary synthesis of different states:

— A psychic state of consciousness.
— A neurophysiological state, whether perceptible to the subject or not, such as the goosebumps associated with emotions such as fear or pleasure; or an adrenaline rush associated  with anger.
— An altered self-presentation, including changes in facial expression, body posture and specific attitudes and emergence of actions, such as the fight-or-flight response, characteristic of fear.
— A cognitive state, including a structured representation of reality.

The direction of causality between these components is debated. Common sense suggests that the psychological state determines the neurophysiological and attitudinal changes, “he cries because he is sad”. However, when a person is placed in the physical state corresponding to a particular emotion, they will experience that emotion. Thus, literally, “he is sad because he cries” (James, 1884).

1.2 Basic Emotions

The emotions listed by Aristotle in the Rhetoric and adopted by Latin rhetoricians can be considered as the very first set of basic social emotions in the Western world, see pathos.

Modern philosophers propose their own lists of emotions. For example, Descartes claims that there are only six “simple and primitive” passions, “wonder, love, hate, desire, joy, and sadness. […] All the others are composed of some of these six or are species of them » ([1649], §69).

Psychologists define basic emotions as universal and independent of language ​​and culture. These lists vary and are more or less developed. They generally include fear, anger, disgust, sadness, joy, surprise. Ekman (1999) lists the following ones: amusement, anger, contempt, contentment, disgust, embarrassment, excitement, fear, guilt, pride in achievement, relief, sadness-distress, satisfaction, sensory pleasure, and shame.

In theology, the seven deadly sins–pride, envy, anger, sadness (acedia: sloth, depression), avarice, gluttony, lust, can be seen as emotional leaks; they are sins insofar as they are left uncontrolled.

1.2 Emotions and Mood: Phasic and thymic

Moods are defined as stable or thymic affective states. In contrast, emotions are phasic, i.e, they develop in an event structure, according to a bell-shaped curve, see calm.

1.3 Emotions and Situations

An emotion is related to a situation. Causal theories of emotion analyze situations as stimuli that mechanically produce corresponding responses, that is, the corresponding emotions.
However, this view does not explain the possibility of emotional injunctions or disagreements about emotions (see below).
In fact, emotions are not related to some kind of objective situations, but rather to subjective perceptions of situations; the stimulus is a situation under a certain description. In other words, the perceived emotional situation is part of the emotion itself.

A distinction can be made between emotion as it is experienced and emotion as it is framed in the experiencer’s discourse. The relationship between experienced emotion and spoken emotion is analogous to that between time as an extra-linguistic reality, and tense as the linguistic form that language gives to time. The object of rhetorical-argumentative treatment of emotion is the emotion-tense, whereas psychology focuses on the emotion-time.

2. Argumentative emotions

Serious argumentative situations are inherently emotional. Contradiction, whether conflictive or not, disrupts routine beliefs and plans of action. For example, having to make a decision creates tension at the social, cognitive, and emotional levels. The arguer must confront an uncomfortable situation in which relationships with the others, social statuses and representations of the everyday world are potentially threatened.  Personal identities based on these representations are also destabilized.

2.1 Emotions as Issues in Argumentative Discourse

The situation associated with an emotion is not a causal source of that emotion.  For example, when it rains there is no argument about whether one will get wet.
In contrast, emotions are negotiable. This is evidenced by the existence of emotional injunctions, such as:

“Time for Outrage!”(Stéphane Hessel)
“A Call for Indignation” (Ignacio Ramonet)
“Indignant? We Should Be” (Simon Kuper).[1]

In a given situation, there can be significant differences in the emotional states of the participants:

S1 — Let us weep! The father of the nation is dead!
S2 — Let’s rejoice! The tyrant is dead!

S1 -— I’m not afraid!
S2 — You should be.

An emotion is a point of view. In the second example, S2 starts a debate by disagreeing with S1, and must explain his emotional position. S2 must reveal his reasons for being afraid and justify his feelings. Conversely, S1 is now at risk of being refuted by S2, and being left with an inappropriate emotion.

As with argumentation in general, we can distinguish between cases in which emotions are argued explicitly, and cases in which the argument is left implicit, and leaves us with an orientation toward a particular, unnamed, emotion. In both cases, the source  of the emotion lies in the participants’ perception of the situation. Ultimately, the formatted situation and the experienced emotion form a cohesive unit. Therefore, in order to justify an emotion, one must provide a detailed account of what happened along with the corresponding  subjective emotional evaluations.
This formatting process follows a relatively simple system of “emotional parameters”, that determine the nature and intensity of the emotion, depending on the predictability and pleasantness of the situation is, its origin, distance, control, and the experiencer’s norms and values (after Scherer [1984a], p. 107; 1984b).

2.2 The Rhetoric: How Emotions are « Done » and « Undone »

Aristotle’s Rhetoric provides an excellent description of the thematic structure of speeches that construct or deconstruct specific emotions.  The book is not about the psychology of emotions but rather it is a treatise on what discourse can do with emotions and how an emotional social thrust can be controlled, reconstructed or refuted. The focus is not on the nature of anger or calmness, but rather on how discourses that are likely to provoke or tranquilize anger are constructed. From an argumentative perspective, this is why action predicates should be preferred to substantives when referring to emotions. For example:

— To anger vs. to cool down the anger.
— To inspire friendship vs. to break with friends.
— To frighten vs. to encourage.
— To feel shame vs. to despise others’ opinions and behave shamelessly.
— To be grateful vs. to feel no obligation.
— To pity vs. to be indifferent.
— To incite rivalry, jealousy and envy vs. to incite a spirit of open competition.

Emotions belong in the realm of discursive action. In Rhetoric, they are defined based on typical scenarios, activated and developed by the speaker. This description of the discursive strategies that generate emotions is one of the major achievements of rhetorical argumentation theory.
Anti-oriented discourses construct and refute anti-oriented emotions. Speech alters representations, thus arousing or appeasing or counterbalancing emotions, just as any point of view can be fought, turned back, or circumvented.

Examples of pity and anger can illustrate these basic argumentative techniques.

2.2 Pitiful vs Merciless

Moving to pity: 

A pities B when he considers that B is the victim of an undeserved evil; and when A is well aware that he may one day suffer from the same evil (after id., 1385b10-15, RR, p. 291).

For A to feel compassion for B, the distance between them must be properly calibrated: one feels pity towards people who are similar and close to us. Distance plays an essential role in the construction of emotion, not as an objective metric, but as a cultural, language-based notion.

According to this description, pity should not be considered an automatic feeling. In particular, those who have nothing to fear for themselves would be insensitive to pity. 
According to the theory of the moral character (mores) of the audience, the successfull construction of an emotion depends on a good analysis of the audience, see ethos.

In other words, to directly induce pity, B must show that he is suffering, and that he does not deserve it, and that the same thing could happen to you. Then, of course, these substantial commonplaces must be reinforced.
If pity is constructed according to these parameters, it is considered justified, decent and reasonable.

Rejecting misplaced pity — Walton has shown how the target can resist misplaced pity, that is, how to construct a discourse against pity, enabling the target to remain calm, unmoved, and not yield to a movement of undue pity. This discourse is first constructed along a specific “information line”, about the situation. The appeal to pity is relevant only if the situation and the  domain allows for personal involvement. For instance, scientific discourse excludes subjectivity, and does not permit appeals to pity, which are then deemed “irrelevant” (Walton 1992, p. 27): “I beg you, publish my paper!« .

When relevant, appeals to pity routinely function in the general conflict of pro and contra arguments, concerning personal involvement. In the case of dismissed workers, for instance, the appeal to compassion (ad misericordiam) is pitted against the need to preserve the interests of shareholders (ad pecuniam vs. ad misericordiam), to position the company well in the market (ad rivalitatem vs. ad misericordiam), or to preserve the jobs of other workers in the company (ad misericordiam vs. ad misericordiam).

2.3 Anger: Getting Angry and Calming Down

Argumentation theory has glorified the appeal to pity with a Latin name, ad misericordiam. From an argumentative point of view, however, there is no reason to distinguish pity from other emotions. All emotions should all be given the same lexical consideration, particularly the appeal to anger, « ad iram« , a highly arguable and argumentative emotion.

Make angry — Anger is a basic rhetorical emotion. If a speaker intends to incite public anger, he will express feigned or real righteous indignation or holy anger, and will adopt a virtuous ethos. To produce the same virtuous ethos, the opponent will denounce rage, fury and hatred, see pathos.

Discursive representations play an essential role in these oppositions. In order to make A angry with B, the speaker must show to A that:

— B despises, offends and mocks A;
— B is an obstacle to A‘s plans and wishes,
— B derives pleasure from it.
— A suffers and seeks revenge by harming B.
— A fantasizes about and enjoys his future revenge.

These are the basic lines of inflammatory speech. It should be noted that anger is not an atomic emotion, a crude response to the bite of a stimulus, but rather the complex result of an aggregate of interactive emotions such as humiliation, contempt and even pleasure. The rationality or morality of anger depends on properly constructing a sense of injustice. Anger can be fully virtuous, rational and emotional, when these distinctions are significant.

Anger triggers the mechanisms of revenge. In a typical serial episode, the anger constructed and justified in the first sequence, transforms into an argument for subsequent action.

Anger is not hatred; anger can be justified rationally, but hatred cannot. There is no acceptable reason for hatred. From a religious point of view, hate speech is a sin against the fundamental commandment of charity: « Love one another!« , at least  “Bear with one another!”.

From anger back to calm — To calm a person, A angry with B, B‘s advocate will develop a discourse on the following substantial topoi:

• A‘s expression of anger is expressed in a contradictory way and unreasonable.
• B‘s behavior towards A was not contemptuous, mocking, insulting, or outrageous.
• B was misunderstood; he was joking; had no hostile intentions.
• B behaves this way with loved ones.
• B is sorry, and offers apologies and compensation.
• Anyway, B has already been punished.

The reassuring discourse will conclude that all of this happened a long time ago, and that the situation has changed. See kettle.

[1] Stéphane Hessel (2011). Time for Outrage! London: Charles Glass Books.
Ignacio Ramonet (2011).  http://www.ipsnews.net/2011/02/a-call-to-outrage/(11-08-2017)
Simon Kuper (2011). Quoted after https://www.ft.com/content/280c9816-192c-11e0-9311-00144feab49a?mhq5j=e1 (11-08-2017)

DIALECTICS

Dialectic and dialogue have the same Greek etymology dia- + legein, dia- “through”, legein “to say”. The prefix dia- is different from the prefix di– which means “two”. Etymologically, a dialogue is not a two-person conversation (which could be called a dilogue). The condition is not on the number of participants, but on discourse circulation. However, the historical notion of dialectic does refer to a two-partner dialogue.

1. The ancient dialectical method

Aristotelian dialectic is a dialogical method used to resolve problems of the form « P or not P? », such as « is it good to be rich or not? », by eliminating one of the options, in a standardized question-answer interaction using dialectical syllogisms.

Dialectic is a philosophical tool used in the a priori search for the definition of fundamental concepts. In this function of clarifying first principles, it has been replaced by axiomatization.

1.1 Dialectical reasoning

As « mathematical science » and « rhetorical argument », « dialectical reasoning » proceeds by syllogism and induction (Aristotle, Post. An., I, 1). While scientific syllogistic deduction proceeds from « true and primary » premises, dialectic uses generally accepted premises (Top. I, 1), or simple “opinions”, endoxon:

Our treatise proposes to find a line of inquiry whereby we shall
 be able to reason from opinions that are generally accepted about
every problem propounded to us, and also shall ourselves, when standing up to an argument, avoid saying anything that will obstruct us. (Ibid.)

The word endoxa translates as “probable premises” or as “accepted ideas”. The strict deduction rules of the syllogism are replaced by argument schemes.

D’après les Seconds analytiques, le raisonnement dialectique « [prend] les prémisses comme comprises par l’adversaire » (Aristote, S. A., i, 1, 5 ; p. 2). Le jeu se déroule entièrement dans le système de croyance du Répondant, il a pour fonction de tester la cohérence de ce système, V. Ad hominem.

1.2 Dialectical game

The dialectical game is played by two partners, the Respondent and the Questioner (Brunschwig 1967, p. 29). It is a limited interaction governed by strict rules, which proceeds by questions and answers, with a winner and a loser.

— The Respondent first chooses to assert P or not P.
— The Questioner must refute the proposition that the Respondent has chosen to support, by means of total questions (yes or no questions).

Based on these answers, the Questioner attempts to make the Respondent to admit a statement which contradicts his original assertion. If the Questioner succeeds, then he wins the dialectical game; if he or she fails, the Respondent will win.

Dialectical refutation by contradictory consequences has the following form:

Peter asserts “S is P”.
On the one hand, S possesses the Q attribute, the doxa says so and the adversary admits it.
On the other hand, P possesses non-Q attributes.
If S were P, it would have to possess the non-Q attribute.
So Peter is saying incompatible things about S.

Peter holds that power is a good.
But everyone agrees that power corrupts.
Corruption is evil.
Good is incompatible with evil.
To be good, power would have to exclude corruption.

Or again: you say that so-and-so is a super champion; you admit, like everyone else, that a super champion doesn’t dope; but so-and-so does dope, so he’s not a super champion.

You contradicts what you say with the consequences of what you say: You assert opposites about the same being (he does drugs and he’s a super champion): This form of refutation, used in philosophical dialectical exchange, is at the root of ordinary refutation.

From a linguistic point of view, the art lies in the construction of non-P. In fact, what is said by the proposer is something like S is X ; his opponent constructs X as non-P, through a series of argumentative paraphrases, V. Contraries; Absurd.

1.3 Dialectical discussion and social authority

To be worthy of a dialectical debate, the proposition discussed in a dialectical debate is an endoxon, that is to say, it must be endorsed by some social or intellectual authority; in other words, it must be an endoxon

Now a dialectical proposition consists in asking something that is held by all men or by most men or by philosophers, i.e., either by all, or by most, or by the most notable of these. (Top., 10)

This authority of opinion is not an all-or-nothing question. It is derived from the authority of different social groups, according to a gradation that goes from the quantitative to the qualitative, from the opinion of humankind (universal consensus) to the authority of “enlightened opinion” to that of an illustrious person, see Doxa.
The Aristotelian continuum values different orders of endoxa. We are far from the vision of the doxa as cliché or stereotype as “ready to think”, or, just as mechanically, “ready to denounce”. Endoxa are opinions worth of discussing ; they enter in the definition of what a thesis is:  A thesis is « a supposition of some eminent philosopher that conflicts with the general opinion ».

The philosopher must be eminent, “for to take notice when any ordinary person expresses views contrary to men’s usual opinions would be silly” (Aristotle, Top., I, 11). In other words, “if it were the first comer who emitted paradoxes, it would be absurd to pay attention to it” (Aristotle, Top., Brunschwig, I, 1, 100b20, p.17). The authority that frames the debate is clearly socially referenced as such.

It is noteworthy that it is the plurality and competition between authorities — and not the appeal to authority — that is placed at the center of intellectual debate. Authority is invoked not to close the discussion but rather to open it. To say that a proposal is supported by an authority is not to say that it is true, but to say that it deserves discussion.

2. The scholastic dispute

The scholastic dispute (disputatio) corresponds to the medieval practice of a dialectical game. It is an instrument of research and teaching, based on a specific substantive question, as proposed by a master. At the end of the discussion, the master proposes a solution and refutes the arguments against it (Weijers 1999).

3. The revival of dialectic

The ancient dialectical method, which had been in decline since the Renaissance (Ong 1958), was reconstructed in the second half of the twentieth century within the framework of logical dialog games. It has been brought to the forefront of argumentation studies by the Pragma-Dialectic and by the Informal Logic programs. The Pragma-Dialectic program of Frans van Eemeren and Rob Grootendorst (1996, etc.) is a “New Dialectic”, a counterpart of Perelman’s “New Rhetoric” (van Eemeren, Grootendorst, 1996 “La Nouvelle Dialectique” [“The New Dialectic”]). In the Informal Logic framework, the study of “logical dialogue games” has been developed by Douglas Walton (Walton 1984; Walton 1998, The New Dialectic).

The terms Proponent and Opponent used to refer to the central partners in an argumentative situation, are borrowed from this dialectical theory. Unlike the Proponent of a substantial proposition in an argumentative situation, the Respondent in the dialectical game does not have to provide a positive proof of his claim, but simply has to avoid being led into a self-contradiction.

Continuing of a general definition of dialectic as, “the practice of reasoned dialogue, [the art] of argument by questions and answers” (Brunschwig 1967, p. 10), one can consider that the conversational process is “dialectical” insofar as 1) it relates to a specific and mutually agreed problem; 2) it is played out between equal partners, 3) it is driven by the search for the truth,  justice or the common good; 4) the speech circulates freely between the partners, yet  5) it respects explicitly established rules.

4. Aristotelian dialectic and Hegelian dialectic

Unlike Aristotelian dialectic, Hegelian dialectic does not proceed by eliminating the false, but by synthesizing of the antagonistic positions. The original opposition is not resolved but abolished and transcended. Aristotelian dialectic is based on the principle of non-contradiction, whereas Hegelian dialectic tends toward something “beyond” contradiction.

However, going beyond contradiction should not mean that a speaker can engage in an inconsistent discourse:

[HL] claims that “since the world is torn by contradictions, only dialectic (which admits the contradiction) makes it possible to consider it as a whole and to find out its meaning and direction”. In other words, since the world is contradiction, the idea of ​​the world must be contradictory. The idea of ​​a thing must be of the same nature as this thing: The idea of ​​blue must be blue.
Julien Benda, The Treason of the Intellectuals, [1927][1]

5. Rhetoric and ancient dialectic

The use of syllogistic deduction is the hallmark of science ; dialectics is legislative, serving to discuss a priori foundations that will serve as premises for scientific deduction; rhetoric has an executive function : it deals with current, public affairs, involving law, politics and, with the development of Christianity, religious belief.

– According to their ancient definitions, dialectic and rhetoric are the two arts of discourse. Argumentative rhetoric is “the counterpart of dialectic” (Aristotle, Rhet, I).

– Dialectic is a technique of discussion between two partners, based on (short) questions and answers. The object of rhetoric is long and continuous monological speech addressed to an audience.

–Dialectic deals with philosophical theses . Rhetoric is concerned with specific social or political issues.

– Rhetoric and dialectic use the same foundations of inference,topoi, applied to plausible statements, endoxa, components of a doxa,

[1] Quoted after Julien Benda, La Trahison des Clercs. Excerpt from the Preface to the 1946 edition. Paris: Grasset, 1975. P. 63.y

DOXA

The contemporary word doxa is modeled on the ancient Greek word for “opinion, reputation, what is said of things or people.” Doxa corresponds to a set of socially predominant, fuzzy, sometimes contradictory, representations, considered in their current linguistic formulation. The word doxa shares the disparaging meaning of cliché or commonplace, and can be given the meaning of “ideology” or “dogma”, especially when called into question (Amossy 1991, Nicolas 2007). Its derived adjective is doxic (or doxical).

The Aristotelian view of doxa, on the contrary, is clearly positive. Aristotle defines the endoxa (singular endoxon) as the common opinions of a community:

These opinions are said to be « generally accepted, » meaning they are accepted by everyone or by the majority or by the philosophers, i.e., by all, or by the majority, or by the most notable and illustrious of them. (Aristotle, Top., I, 1)

Therefore, an endoxic idea is an idea based on a form of social authority, ranging from the authority of the common people, to that of the wise (see dialectic), according to a gradation ranging from purely quantitative to qualitative and from the universal human consensus to the authority of the enlightened opinion.
Endoxic is an antonym of paradoxic or paradoxical. The Latin translation of the adjective endoxos is probabilis, meaning “probable”.

The endoxa are targets of philosophical criticism aimed at common sense and common opinion. This criticism extends to conclusions based on the endoxon–inferential topic system, used in dialectic and rhetoric. Yet, calling a proposition endoxic, is not pejorative; endoxa are the foundation of deliberative speech.

It is well known that Aristotle confides, under conditions of scrutiny, in the collective representations and the natural vocation of mankind toward truth. (Brunschwig, Preface to Aristotle, Top., p. xxv)

Rhetoric and dialectic are both based on endoxa. Dialectical arguments test endoxa, and rhetorical arguments exploit them, pro and contra, in the context of a particular deliberation.

In a judicial situation, the salient doxic elements may determine who bears the burden of proof. In other words, they determine who is initially suspected, or accused by rumor, see common place.

The following argument schemes rely on the authority of the doxa:

— Appeal to common belief, see authority.
— Appeal to the feeling of the crowd, see ad populum.

DOUBT

Doubt is a a specific cognitive and physical behavior commonly associated with argumentative situations, generally accompanied by a feeling of discomfort.

— As a psychological state, doubt implies discomfort and apprehension, see explanation; emotion. Argumentation is a costly and time-consuming activity, from the cognitively, emotionally and interactionally. Non-argumentative individuals are reluctant to engage in an argumentative situations, where they will have to face the resistance from the other party.

— At the cognitive level, to doubt is to be in a state of suspended assent to a proposition, or a state of indecision about what to do.

— From a linguistic point of view, doubtful propositions are formulated by the speaker, without affirmation or denial. In Goffman’s terms, the speaker is, at most, the « author » of the proposition, not the ‘principal’; the speaker is not committed to the statement, see roles.

— From an interactional point of view, a turn of speech is doubted if it is neither ratified nor openly rejected by the interlocutor, see disagreement; question. Such rejection cannot remain unfounded and reservations must be justified, by presenting arguments in support of an alternative point of view, or by refuting the reasons given in support of the original proposal.

— In a full-blown argumentative situation, neither party necessarily assumes doubt. One party may be absolutely certain of the truth and validity of their argument, and argue in perfectly good faith that P is true or the right thing to do, meanwhile the other party may be certain that it is not the true. A third party takes on the doubt.

Dialogue outsources these different operations by giving them specific linguistic forms and microsocial configurations.

Argumentative Doubt, Cartesian Doubt, Skeptical doubt

Argumentative doubt is opposed to Cartesian doubt. Descartes rejects “all such merely probable knowledge and makes it a rule to trust only what is fully known and incapable of being doubted » ([1628], Rule II; Geach). He establishes a system of certain beliefs on the basis of the only absolute certainty, the cogito: “I think, therefore I am.”. This type of doubt is opposed to skeptical doubt:

Cartesian doubt does not consist of floating, uncertainly, between affirmation and negation. Rather, it clearly shows that what is in doubt is either false, or not self-evident enough to be true. Skeptical doubt regards uncertainty as the normal state of thought. However, Descartes, regards it as a disease to be cured. Even when considering the arguments of the skeptics ,he does so with a spirit quite opposite to theirs. (Gilson, Note 1, p. 85. to Descartes [1637])

DISSOCIATION

1. Dissociation as a fundamental argumentative technique

The concept of dissociation was introduced by Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca. According to them, there are two types of argumentation techniques: “association and dissociation” ([1958], p. 190).

The former of these concerns two or more propositions, that make up an argument, while the latter operates on a single concept.
The technique of dissociation is thus placed on a par with the large and varied set of association techniques, i.e., argument schemes. This shows the importance that Perelman attaches to the concept.

2.Dissociation as a conceptual reorganization

Perelman defines dissociation as the splitting of the meaning of a word or concept, in order to avoid a contradiction.
The meaning of the problematic term T is reformulated as containing an internal contradiction, “an incompatibility”, “an antinomy”, and dissociation is the mechanism by which it can be resolved ([1958], 550-609).
T is split into a term T₁ and a term T₂, this operation involves a negative evaluation of T₁ and a positive evaluation of T₂.

Dissociation appears as a kind of “semantic cleansing”, by which an unwanted content or connotation, T₁, can be disposed of. The concept of reality can thus be divided, « dissociated », into the pair T₁ = appearance vs. T₂ = reality, the latter being “the true reality”.

While the primitive status of what is given as the starting point of dissociation is undecided and indeterminate, the dissociation in Terms 1 and 2 will value the aspects corresponding to term 2 and will devalue the aspects that oppose it. Term I, the appearance, in the narrow sense of this word, is only illusion and error.
(Perelman 1977, p. 141)

Dissociation is the key operation for extracting a concept from the ordinary meaning of a word, not for analyzing a concept as a synthesis of two distinct but equally important concepts, see distinguo.

3. Linguistic aspects of dissociation

Reasoning by dissociation is characterized first of all by the opposition between appearance and reality. This can be applied to any notion, by using adjectives such as apparent, illusory on the one hand, real, true on the other. To use an expression such as apparent peace or genuine democracy is to indicate the absence of genuine peace, or the presence of an apparent democracy: one of these adjectives refers to the other. (Id., p. 147)

The linguistic markers of dissociations are very diverse:

A prefix such as pseudo- (pseudo-atheist), quasi– not– the adjective alleged, the use of quotes indicate that we are dealing with the term I, while the capital letter (Being), the definite article (the solution), the adjective unique or true denote a term II. (Id., p. 148)

Other dissociations are stabilized as pairs of antithetical terms or “philosophical pairs” such as “opinion / science; sense knowledge / rational knowledge; body / soul; just / legal, etc.” (Perelman [1958], 563). Some of these dissociated pairs are traditional and constitute the oppositions that generate foundational ideological discourses.

As with all antonymic pairs, one term is linguistically preferred to the other, and this preference can be reversed. The T₁ vs. T₂ opposition “superficial vs. deep” can be reversed by praising the superficial — “the skin is the deepest thing there is” (Paul Valéry). The pair, “rhetoric, argumentation” can be seen as an « antagonist pair », engaged in permanent revolving evaluations.

4. Dissociation as shielding

Dissociation is a dialogue strategy:

X: — Well old boy, that’s democracy!
Y: — There is democracy and there is democracy.

X seems to have the upper hand in the discussion. Y resists with a typical dissociation that allows him to get rid of the embarrassing democracy proposed by X as a pseudo-democracy. The reply introduces a stasis of definition

Dissociation has a concessive facet. For example, one might assume that some intellectuals would make good businessmen, while conceding that they are only a tiny minority. Dissociation does the same thing, but by completely excluding of the subcategory « intellectual businessmen » from the general category, “intellectuals”:

(1)    S1    — When it comes to business, intellectuals are hopeless
         S2    — Or they are not really intellectuals.

(2)    S1_1     — Germans drink beer.
        S2         — Not Hans!
        S1_2     — Normal, Hans is not a real German.

In (2) S2 refutes S1₁ by producing of an opposite case. S1₂ recognizes that Hans is German and does not drink beer, and maintains his original claim by splitting the category “German” into « true Germans vs. not true Germans ». The modification of the argument may or may not be justified; S1 may have responded:

S1_3      — But Hans is not a real German, he grew up in the United States

– Suppose that Americans drink less beer than Germans. S1_3 introduces a line of justification showing that Hans deviates from the stereotype of the true German.
This new category created by S1_3 is based upon an explicit criterion, that is independent of the current discussion. In the previous dialogue, the only contextually available criterion is « beer drinking ». The word Germans in S1 refers to all Germans; if Germans are redefined as true Germans on the basis of the criterion, “Germans who drink beer”, then the statement S1₁ is indeed compelling, since “Germans who drink beer” do drink beer.

Category rectification serves to exclude individuals from the category being reanalyzed. In politics, this strategy opposes the, “true Syldavian” as good citizens in order to exclude other citizens as, “bad citizens”. In practice, dissociation transforms a previously necessary and sufficient condition (to be a Syldavian one must be a Syldavian citizen) into a necessary one, « to be a true Syldavian, one must have Syldavian nationality and share our ideology ».

In the following case, “La Réunion” [1], that is “the people living in La Réunion”, is opposed to “the true Réunion”, an ad hoc subcategory of this group.

Roland Sicard (RS) is the host of the television program. Marine Le Pen is the candidate for the National Front (“Front National”, a far-right party) in the 2012 French presidential elections. Gilbert Collard (GC) is a lawyer, president of her support committee.
RS   — good morning Gilbert Collard […] er- a word about Marine Le Pen’s trip to La Réunion\ she was heckled, one feels that the National Front candidates are still in a lot of trouble abroad/?
GC   — Listen I know La Réunion very well because I was there very often as a lawyer and then in particularly sensitive cases and— there are: uh, two Réunions uh there’s a Réunion which is instrumentalized that organizes the usual reception committee for Marine Le Pen they’re quite insignificant eh\ well and then ther’s the real Réunion made up of men with divergent views of – women with opi – but that’s no more difficult in the overseas departments than in metropolitan France anyway\ no I don’t think what makes it difficult is the instrumentalization of the media hmm […]
TV program [Home Truths] France 2, 08 Feb., 2012.[2]

S. Opposite words; Categorization; Orientation

5. Distinguo and dissociation

According to Perelman, the dissociation technique is, “hardly mentioned by traditional rhetoric, for it is especially important for the analysis of systematic philosophical thought” (1977, p. 139). An example is taken from Kant, for whom natural sciences postulate a universal determinism while morality postulates the freedom of the individual; hence the necessity of dissociating the concept reality, a confused notion, into a phenomenal reality, in which determinism reigns, and a noumenal reality in which the individual can freely choose and act on his decision.
These sub-concepts are in a complementary oppositional relationship, as contradictories. The goal is not to nullify one of these dimensions, as in the case of dissociation.

Ancient rhetoric has the concept of distinguo. The distinguo is an operation of clarification performed on a concept that is considered possibly « confusing ». In order to clarify the concept, the distinguo performs a kind of content analysis, and rearranges the semantic and cognitive content of the word in different subdomains, for example to clearly define the position of the subject of an investigation, as in example (1) (§1)
Such an operation is the basic task of the lexicographer when she decides whether the signifier to be defined has only one meaning, or several related meanings (polysemy), or several unrelated meanings (homonymy). At this point, the operation does not involve any special treatment or evaluation of the relatively independent semantic or cognitive subdomains.

Dissociation goes one step further by deciding that one of these components is to be evaluated positively, the other negatively and considered negligible for the discussion.

[1] The Réunion Island is an overseas French department, East of Madagascar.
[2] TV program Les Quatre Vérités France 2. Feb. 8, 2012.

DISMISSAL

When applied to discourse, dismissal is a method of processing out an opponent’s discourse, on the brink of refutation and destruction.

1. Dismissal as the final stage of refutation

An argument can be dismissed after due consideration. In this case, dismissal is the final step of a conclusive refutation.
The standard forms of refutation are based on a substantial examination of the content of the rejected speech, or on more or less relevant considerations about the person holding it. Even in the latter case, the refutation, however poorly argued, is at least backed by some justificatory discourse.

2. Rejecting the argument without considering it (ad lapidem)

The opponent can reject a discourse simply by declaring that the bad quality of the proposed argument is self-evident and self-denouncing:

No comment.
Your arguments are shabby, inadequate, miserable, distressing
I will not give your statement the honor of a rebuttal.
What you say is not even wrong.

Uncle Toby’s reaction, “whistling half a dozen bars of Lillabullero” “when any thing, which he deem’d very absurd, was offerd”  is an example of such reaction ,  S. Ab –, ad –, ex –.

In ancient rhetoric, this move which declares the argument “childish” or “obviously absurd or practically null », is called apodioxis, (Dupriez 1984, Apodioxis; Molinié 1992, Apodioxis), S. Pathetic argument.

The opponent may, in good faith, dismiss an argument as self-refuting, which leads to paradoxical situations. If Big Jones’ discourse is truly self-refuting, then:

The more he talks, the more foolish he appears, the fewer votes he will get.

But this is a dangerous strategy, inspired more by the self-confidence of the arguer’s confidence in his party’s arguments than by any self-refuting evidence about Big Jones’ discourse.

Finally, the opponent may adopt a strategy of irony, and contribute to the spread of his opponent’s speech. This is the extraordinary case reported by Wayne Booth about events taking at his university, in s which students were clashed with their university administration:

At one point, things got so bad that each side found itself reduplicating broadsides produced by the other side, and distributing them, in thousands of copies, without comment; to each side it seemed as if the other side’s rhetoric was self-damning, so absurd had it become. (Booth 1974, p. 8-9)

See also Dismissal (Companion

The other side cannot even hear such a dismissal, which is obviously directed at third parties. Used in particularly contentious argumentative situations, such a maneuver makes any deal between the discussants impossible, see Conditions of discussion.

From an ethotic perspective, such a (non-) arguer displays a kind of moral indignation, while the opponent may accuse her of arrogance and contempt.

Ad lapidem argument (Lat. lapis, “stone”)

The name of this argument is derived from a famous incident in which Dr. Samuel Johnson claimed to disprove Bishop Berkeley’s immaterialist philosophy (that there are no material objects, only minds and the ideas in those minds) by kicking a large stone and saying ‘I refute it thus’ (Wikipedia, Ad lapidem).

This clear disdain for verbal argument is akin to « the proof of the pudding is in the eating », a popular practical proof by facts and actions.

DISAGREEMENT

1. Preference for agreement

Argumentation is a means of deriving a new consensus from an existing one, see Agreement; Persuasion. Such a construction can be seen as the “macro” expression of a tendency that can be observed at the “micro” level of the interactional sequence, the preference for agreement. This concept is fundamental to the organization of speech turns in interaction.

In an adjacency pair, the first turn “prefers”, i.e., is oriented toward a certain type of second turn. The preferred response to an invitation is acceptance, rather than refusal; proposals are made to be accepted rather than rejected; affirmations are put forward to be ratified, not to be rejected, and so on.
The preferred sequence is unmarked; the second speaker follows the first; agreement is the  default. A minimal linguistic mark may suffice: (yes, OK, let’s go…), or a quasi-verbal ratification (mm hm) or a minimal physical action (nod).
The preference for agreement is also reflected in practices such as the avoidance of frontal opposition, the absence of ratification of emerging disagreements and the preference for micro-adjustments to reach an agreement without explicitly bringing up the disagreement for open discussion.

The dispreferred sequence is marked, i.e. it contains specific features such as hesitation, the presence of pre-turns (underlined in S2_2) and justifications (bolded in S2_2):

S1_1 — What are you doing this evening?
S2_1 — Well I don’t know …
S1_2 — Come for a drink!
S2_2 — (silence) hmm, well, you know, I’d rather not, I have got a little work to do.

Giving reasons for accepting an invitation is almost an insult:

S1 — Come to dinner tomorrow night!
S2 — With pleasure, it means that I won’t have to cook, and I will take out the garbage on the way down when I leave home.

This preference for agreement is not a psychological fact, but an observed conversational regularity. It can be compared to Grice’s principle of cooperation, or with Ducrot’s observations on the polemical effect of second turns that do not respect the presuppositions of the first turn, see Presupposition.

2. Conversational disagreements and open arguments

Face-to-face face disagreement is expressed by a series of specific coordinated behaviors, either verbal “I don’t agree”, or paraverbal: struggles for the floor; interruptions; non-collaborative overlaps; accelerated speech flows; raised voices; negative regulators, head shaking, sighs, excitement, loud ironic excesses of signs of agreement, or unaddressed partner behavior, etc.

Sequences of conversational divergence occur randomly; they follow unpredictable patterns; they have a potentially negative impact on the goals of the overall interaction; they introduce a delicate balance between somehow sacrificing a particular view of things in order to maintain good relations with the other party; or taking the risk of damaging the relationship in order to maintain and sharpen extreme disagreements. Most of the time, conversational disagreements are resolved immediately, through incremental micro-adjustments and negotiations, and forgotten

At other times, conversational divergences serve to deepen differences. When conversational divergences are explained and disagreements are ratified, with each position supported by arguments and counterarguments, the interaction becomes highly argumentative. Such interactions can be consequential, remembered, pondered and elaborated upon. They can generate new interactions, that refer back to the original disagreement, where the parties will develop planned interventions. The handling of what has become an issue is now the rationale for these interactions.

3. Enantiosis: Emergent argumentation

The argumentative role of an opponent can develop from his interactional role as a listener, ratifying the existence of an argumentative situation, in which two discourses concerning the same topic are in explicit competition.

During a friendly conversation at a party, between people who hardly know each other:
S1 — if we are going to watch the candidates’ TV debate together tonight, maybe we should know something about each other, personally I vote for candidate Smith.
S2 — oh, well, for me it’s not quite so…

Before this exchange, S2 is simply S1‘s interlocutor. During the exchange, a political divergence emerges, that initiates a restructuring of the interaction, that may lead to a reframing of the interlocutors as political antagonists. From this point, a full-blown argumentative situation can develop, depending on whether or not subsequent moves will thematize the emerging opposition.

The figure of rhetoric called enantiosis seems particularly well suited to designate this transitional moment, in which opposition is looms large without yet being ratified by the participants. The Greek adjective [enantios] can mean:

1. 1. Being in front of, as in opposite shores facing each other; things offered to one’s gaze.
      
   2. With an orientation towards ​​hostility: which stands in front of: “those in front of us”, that is the enemy; in general, the opposing party, the adversary.
   3. Opposed, contrary to: the opposite party, the opponent (after Bailly, [enantios]).

According to this development of meaning, in a dialogue, the adjective enantios first refers to the person standing here, in front of you, for example, in the position of the interlocutor. In a second instance, the idea of ​​hostility appears, and then the interlocutor becomes the opponent (the “adversarius” in a rhetorical encounter, Lausberg [1960], §274).

The word enantiosis is also used as a synonym for « antithesis », and can refer to oppositions such as “good vs. bad; even vs. odd”; one vs. multiple” (Dupriez 1984, Énantiose). This kind of binary opposition is characteristic of the sometimes Manichaean diptych corresponding to antagonistic argumentation. The semantic palette of enantiosis covers the dynamics of this emergence and the initial stabilization of the argumentative situation:

4. “Deep disagreement”

See Dissensus.

DILEMMA

A dilemma is a schematization of a situation as an alternative whose terms are equally undesirable. Used as an argumentative strategy, the dilemma corresponds to a case-by-case refutation, consisting in forcing your opponent by showing that all his or her lines of defense lead to the same negative conclusion:

Either you were aware of what was going on in your department, and you are an accomplice, at least passively, of what has happened, and you must resign. Or you were not aware, then you do not control your department, and you must resign. Either way, you must resign.

A dilemma can be rejected as poorly constructed, as a false dilemma, an artificial radicalization of a more complex opposition, which can be reconstructed in order to show that there is a third way out of the dilemma, see Case-by-case.

If I have clear and strong support from the citizens to remain in office, the future of the new Republic will be secured. If not, there can be no doubt that it [the new Republic] will immediately collapse and that France will have to endure, this time without remedy, a confusion of the State even more disastrous than that which it once knew.
Charles de Gaulle, Nov. 4,1965, speech, announcing his candidacy for the December 1965 presidential election[1]

This relatively common practice of framing the political situation can be rephrased as the slogan “it’s either me or chaos”. A supporter of the speaker will take this statement as offering a realistic clear choice between good and evil. An opponent will reject it as an arrogant and inappropriate strong-arm tactic. Undecided citizens may see it as the expression of a real dilemma, a choice to make between two equally undesirable options.

[1] http://fresques.ina.fr/jalons/fiche-media/InaEdu00101/de-gaulle-Fact-de-candidature-en-1965.html] (11-08-2017). The last sentence alludes to French military rout of June 1940.

DESTRUCTION OF SPEECH

The argumentative forms of rebuttal are based on what is said, that is, on a critical examination of the content of the rejected speech, of its relevance to the current issue, or on considerations related to the person who holds it. Good or bad, the refutations are explicitly argued.
Argumentative discourse, like any discourse, can be attacked, either by such an argued refutative discourse or by more radical, linguistic or non-linguistic coups. Speech destruction seeks to impair, nullify, exclude, the targeted speech; to make nonsense of what it says, to render it devoid of substance; to make it repulsive — and, above all, to make it harmless, to ensure that it will have no practical effect on the group.

1. Discourse destruction and freedom of expression

In view of their material exclusion from the public sphere, controversial beliefs and proposals can be neutralized by the legal prohibition of their expression, and the imprisonment of their proponents. This can be seen as an attack on freedom of expression; but many democratic countries agree to legislate against hate speech as an incitement to crime.
Freedom of expression can also be hampered by popular demonstrations, where public expression is made inaudible, by shouting, blowing horns, etc.

2. Destruction by interactional behavior

In ordinary face-to-face situations, discourse can be destroyed by nonverbal interactional maneuvers, the most radical of which is the refusal to listen, and let others listen to the discourse of others. Agreement, which is manifested through various phenomena of ratification, and, conversely, a simple lack of ratification, the inertia of the partner, can cause the speaker to withdraw her speech, S. Disagreement.

The following interaction takes place in a high school physics lab. The lesson is on the concept of force, and uses a small apparatus, a stone hanging from a gallows.[1] The students work in pairs, and we’ll follow students F and G. The question asked by the teacher is:

What are the objects acting on the stone?

The two students look at the teacher in confusion. Then, still addressing the class, she adds:

Well, I took an object in the most general sense that is to say, anything that can act on the stone er: visibly or invisibly if – well\

Then, Student F immediately answers the teacher’s question, by turning to his partner:

Well the air/ the air/ … the air it acts the air when you do that the air\

After a pause, F resumes his argumentation, by vigorously waving his arm up – down – up, while intensely addressing his partner (simplified transcription):

If you do that there will be air afterwards because you know when you make a fast movement like that\ it’s the same there’s the air\ I’m sure\ but here for now we don’t answer that yet but/

Then student G, playing with the stone, says:

There is attraction\

F‘s argument is perfectly in line with Toulmin’s model of argument. The claim is “the air [acts on the rock]”. It is supported by an appeal to analogy, “it is the same”, which refers to an ad hoc gesture of argumentation, that mimics and emphasizes some self-evident fact. The conclusion is duly emphatically modalized, “I am sure » — and immediately withdrawn: “but for now we are not answering that yet”. In view of the strongly asserted argument, this withdrawal is quite unexpected. It is understandable only in view of the interactional behavior of the interlocutor partner G, who stares at the stone and gives no sign of ratification throughout, not even signaling that he is listening to F‘s argument.
This attitude should not be interpreted as contempt for his partner, with whom he gets along very well, as the following fully collaborative exchange shows.

3. Rejecting the expression

An embarrassing discourse can be destroyed by a criticism that focuses upon the style and expression of the opponent without considering the argument itself. The response “I don’t agree” actually demonstrates a high level of cooperation.
Ancient rhetoric identifies a trio of major linguistic qualities of discourse, quality of language, clarity and vividness of expression (latinitas, perspicuitas and ornatus respectively). Destructive strategies can develop from each of these points.

3.1 Quality of Language

“You are hardly understandable, you don’t even know the language you pretend to speak, you use dialect expressions you should try to speak classical Syldavian”. In a polemical situation, the opponent may reject a discourse a priori on the basis of its grammatical errors. It would be wrong to think that these strategies are marginal or ineffective:

In an uncertain spelling, Mrs. X challenges the evaluation of her linguistic skills by the jury of the competition.

Ms. X failed her language proficiency test. Now, she disputes the jury’s decision, and the jury responds by mentioning the “uncertain spelling” in her complaint letter. Strictly speaking, these misspellings do not prove that her exam paper was also misspelled, but they can certainly be used as an indication. In any case it justifies a charge of negligence, which shows a disregard for the jury, which is sufficient to devalue the importance of her complaint.

3.2 Clarity and vividness of expression

Similarly, devastating strategies appeal to the lack of clarity of expression: “the presentation was unclear and confusing”, or its vividness “so boring!”.

Of course, it is  better for an argumentative speech to be grammatically correct, clear and interesting. On the other hand, it is human nature to consider correct, clear, and interesting the those speeches with which we agree. This is not just a psychological or bad faith issue; it has a cognitive relevance. The discourse with which one agrees is better known; its deep principles are fully accepted, it is easier to recover the ellipses and missing links; its variations are better tolerated; it is better memorized, etc. When it comes to an opponent’s discourse, it is relatively natural to translate the corresponding difficulties as speech defects, and to conclude by denying that the minimum conditions for mutual understanding are met.

Making fun and puns out of the opponent’s discourse, is a popular way to get rid of the problems and arguments defended S. Laughter and Seriousness; Orientation Reversal

4. Ignoring the argumentative details

A class of refutative maneuvers refers to the opponent’s discourse without considering its argumentative details, e.g.:

— Declaring the discourse sub-argumentative, unworthy of a refutation, S. Dismissal.
— Misrepresenting the argument, S. Resumption of speech.

5. Disqualifying the Arguer

Personal attacks against the speaker set aside the argument and try to disqualify the arguer.

For other forms on the verge of destruction and propositional refutation, S. Refutation

[1] Example taken from the VISA database: https://visa-video.ens-lyon.fr/visa-web/ (09-20-2017).

Argument from DERIVED WORDS

1. A seemingly analytical form

A derived word is a word formed from a base or a stem (root) word combined with a prefix or a suffix : Work, worker – (to) do, (to) undo
A derivational family is made up of all the words that are derived from the same root or base word.

The argument based on derived words uses this mechanism of morphological derivation. Since the signifier of the root word is found in the derived word, one might think that, « obviously », the meaning of the root word is also transferred to the derived word, which is not necessarily the case. The global statement is apparently undeniable, because it is true by virtue of its apparently analytical form, « A is A »:

I am human, nothing human is alien to me.

The president of a rather powerless conciliation commission of addressed his colleagues in this commission as commissioners; this clever label gives him and his colleagues the authority associated with the word (police) commissioner and a certain superiority over the people who appeal to the commission.

A famous speech by General de Gaulle uses such self-justifying statements:

As for the legislative elections, they will be held within the period established by the Constitution, unless the entire French people is to be gagged, prevented from speaking as they are prevented from living, by the same means that prevent students from studying, teachers from teaching and workers from working. (Charles de Gaulle, speech on May 30, 1968 [1])

In a well-made world, “students study, teachers teach and workers work” if not, the semantic disorder argues the abnormality of beings who don’t act according to the name of the category to which they indisputably belong. See Confucius on the Rectification of names.

2. Semantic differences between the root word and the derived word

The morphological similarity may hide deep semantic differences between the root word and the derived word, which meaning may range from the preservation of the root meaning, to the opposition of their connotations or argumentative orientations, to the complete independence of meanings in synchrony.

Different orientations of derived words

The French present participle adjective aliénant, “alienating”, and the past participle adjective aliéné, “alienated”, are morphologically derived from the verb aliéner, “to alienate”, but have two different meanings. Aliénant refers to socio-political conditions while aliéné refers to serious mental conditions.
In the following case, the speaker rejects a social claim by aligning the former with the latter:

If you find your work alienating [Fr. aliénant], then we will direct you to an asylum
[Fr. asile d’aliénés, « insane asylum »].

Anti-oriented derived words

By means of a kind of antanaclasis see Orientation Reversal, §1, the following exchange plays with the opposite argumentative orientations of words belonging to the same lexical family:

By signing this timely compromise, the president has made an opportune highly political decision.
Again, the president has compromised himself with his usual opportunistic, politicking!

Rebuttal

The argument by derivation is therefore refuted as a “play on words”, by pointing out the differences in meaning between the root word and the derived word. This rebuttal is in turn,  rejected as “semantic nitpicking”, see Expression.

2. Other designations and related forms

2.1 Aristotle, topos of derivation

Topos # 2 of Aristotle defines the “topos of derived words” as follows:

Another topic is derived from similar inflexions, for, in like manner, the derivative must either be predicable of the subject or not; for instance, that the just is not entirely good, for in that case good would be predicable of anything that happens justly; but to be justly put to death is not desirable. (Rhet., II, 23, 2; Freese, p. 297)

This is a dialectical exercise. Problem: “Is the just desirable?” that is to say, is the predicate « — is good, desirable » part of the essential definition of the word just? The answer is no, because “If you think that the just is desirable, then you think that being justly put to death is desirable”, which is rarely the case.

2.2 Cicero, topos of conjugata 

Cicero considers the same argumentative device under the label topic of related terms (coniugata), that is, « arguments based on words of the same family »; that is, terms such as “wise, wisely, wisdom” (Top., III, 12, p. 391):

If a field is “common” (compascuus), it is lawful to use it as a common pasture (compascere). (Ibid.)

Since it is a common field, the flock of any member of the community may graze there in common. But does this mean that all the flocks of the members of the community can graze there at the same time or one after the other?

2.3 Bossuet (1677): etymology, notatio nominis, conjugata

For Bossuet there are two kinds of topoi exploiting derivations.

1. The topos “drawn from etymology, in Latin notatio nominis, that is from the root from which the words come, like ‘to be a master, one must master the masters’.” (Bossuet 1677, ch. 20; example after Reverso; Fr. “if you are king [roi], then reign! [régnez]”).

The example corresponds to Cicero conjugata.

— On the other side, the scheme “taken from words that have all the same origin, called conjugata”, giving as an example of this relationship the pair homo / hominis, two inflected forms of the same word. (Id.). Unlike the case of lexical derived words, the meaning of the word does not vary according to its grammatical case.

The terminology may seem a bit confusing, but the bottom line is clear: whenever two terms are linked by morphology, lexicon or etymology, the conclusions drawn for one of the two can be applied to the other.

[1] Quoted after http://archives.charles-de-gaulle.org/pages/espace-pedagogique/le-point-sur/les-textes-a-connaitre/discours-du-30-mai-1968.php (11-08-2017)
[2] To rein (Fr. régner) Latin, regnum “royal authority”, “sovereignty”, “kingdom”, is derived from rex, regis “king” (Fr. roi)