COLLECTION AND TYPOLOGIES OF ARGUMENTATION SCHEMES

Tradition has bequeathed us more or less systematized inventories of argument schemes:

Collections 2: From Aristotle to Boethius
Collections 3: Modernity and Tradition
Collections 4: Contemporary Innovations and Structurations,

and a number ries of questions about them:

— On their nature and number,

— Lists of argument schemes have been and are being compiled; but what is the unifying factor underlying these lists? Do they have a proper systematic organization? Are they amenable to some elementary headings (Blair 2012, Ch. 12 and 13)?

— Where do they come from? Are they recurring, remarkably stable structures that are taken up in argumentative discourses of all kinds? Or are they constructed from the a priori categories of the human mind?

— Are they logical, cultural, or anthropological entities? Are they culture-dependent?

— What kind of historical change, if any, can affect them? The question arises, when  Toulmin, Rieke & Janik’s nine “forms of reasoning” of are compared with the Ciceronian and post-Ciceronian lists of topoi, see Collections (4) and Collections (2).

1. Categorizing arguments: collections and typologies

A class is a set of entities; basically, a typology is a class divided into different subtypes; the same class can admit different subtypes, differently organized, see classification. A catalog can be considered as a single-level typology.

A typology of arguments is a set of topics or argument schemes that connect the argument to the conclusion. Argument typologies include from ten to several dozens of argument schemes.

To categorize a speech segment (an individual, level 0) as a “pragmatic argument” is to identify in this segment the characteristic features that define the pragmatic argument. This operation is itself argumentative, and obeys the rules of argumentation by definition, see Nomination; Definition; Argumentation Scheme.

The idea of argument types, the possibility of making inventories of these types, and of giving these inventories an internal structure in order to build a “typology of topics”, is the very foundation of the theory of rhetorical argumentation. Walter Ong sees these typologies of argumentations as engaged in a perpetual movement of renewal and redefinition:

As the general intellectual tradition changes, the active associative nodes for ideas change, and classification changes too. Revising the tradition has been a common phenomenon in antiquity, when Aristotle differed from the sophists in the list of topics he proposed, Cicero from Aristotle, Quintilian from Cicero, Themistius from all these, and Boethius from all of them again and from Themistius as well. The revision continues in our day with Professor Mortimer Adler’s “Great ideas” (augmented beyond their original hundred), and with such articles as Père Gardeil’s very helpful study of the lieux communs in the Dictionnaire de théologie catholique, where, after reporting Melchior Cano’s description of the loci (which he notes are taken at times verbatim from Agricola) and Cano’s organization of theological loci, Gardeil proposes, in true topical tradition, a still better classification of his own. (Ong 1958, p. 122)

There are many lessons to be learned from this passage. First, it provides us with a definition of topics as “active associative nodes for ideas”, as they have been theorized since the birth of rhetoric in the context of the theory of argumentation in discourse. The particular interest of this passage lies in the description of the taxonomic trap. In order to put an end to the irritating proliferation of typologies, one might be tempted to propose a new and final one, thus bringing everyone to agreement — but, in the end, it seems that an additional typology has been added to an already overloaded list, thus exacerbating the very evil, it was supposed to remedy. This observation can be read as an ironic historical counterpoint to the works that, in that year, 1958, revived reflection on argumentation schemes.

2. The place of collections in the theories of the argumentation

The question of argument schemes plays a key role in some theories of argumentation while in others it is either redefined, or plays only a marginal role.

(i) The question of argument types does not arise in Anscombre and Ducrot’s theory of Argumentation within Language. The concept of topos is defined as a semantic link between predicates. It follows that the number of topoi is extremely large, even uncountable, while classical theories enumerate less than one hundred topoi.

(ii) Grize’s “Natural Logic” is based on the concept of schematization. The operations of “reasoned organization”, or “shoring” essentially amount to the classical concept of a conclusion supported by an argument. The types of arguments correspond to the types of scaffolding. To my knowledge, this line has not been developed further. Grize focuses on inference, causation, explanation.

(iii) In Toulmin’s terminology, a type of warrant corresponds to a type of argument, as shown by Ehninger and Brockriede ([1960]). In addition, Toulmin, Rieke and Janik (1984) proposed a short collection of arguments, see Collections (4). The example illustrating Toulmin’s “layout of argument” corresponds to a very productive topic, the categorization of an individual.

(iv) The concept is central to the New Rhetoric of Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, as well as for Pragma-Dialectic and Informal Logic, see Collections (4).

3. Dimension of the classification: Number of argument schemes

Classical lists of argument schemes tend to propose a relatively large number or argument schemes. Aristotle’s Rhetoric offers a set of twenty-eight schemes, plus some “lines of argument that form the spurious enthymemes” (Rhet., II, 24; RR, p. 379); plus, some rules taken from the Topics. Cicero’s Topica lists a dozen schemes, and Quintilian’s Institutio Oratoria twenty-five. Boethius handed down fifteen forms on to the Middle Ages, see Collections (2).

The Dupleix’s Logic (1607) and Bossuet’s Logic (1677), may probably be regarded as representative, in modern times, of this classical tradition. The former contains fourteen schemes and the latter twenty.

Other modern typologies are quite different: Locke [1690] proposes a typology — if it can be considered as such — consisting of four elements to which Leibniz [1765] adds one. Locke’s scientific world however, is extremely different from, and antagonistic to the rhetorical world of the classics.

Bentham enumerates thirty-one argumentative formulas for the field of political arguments.

In contemporary times, Conley counts “more than eighty different argument types” in Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca Treatise (Conley 1984, p. 180-181) see Collections (4).

4. Forms of collections

In the Rhetoric, Aristotle presents a catalog of twenty-eight randomly listed topoi.

Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca have constructed a clearly organized four-level typology of the various “techniques of argumentation”

— A segment of speech (an individual, level 0) can be categorized as a “pragmatic argument”; that is, this segment presents the essential features that define the pragmatic argument (Level 1).

— Level 1 arguments are grouped into a super-category; for example, a “pragmatic argument” is classified as an “argument based on the structure of reality” (Level 2).

— Level 2 arguments are grouped into the class of the “techniques of association”, (Level 3), one of the two kinds of “techniques of argumentation” (Level 4, top level).

5. Foundations of collections

The collections of argument schemes can be organized in different ways.

(i) From the point of view of their contribution to the growth of scientific knowledge, inconclusive arguments are contrasted with compelling arguments. The latter are generally equated, in modern times, with mathematical demonstration and scientific proof. In Locke’s words, they “bring true instruction with [them] and advance us on our way to knowledge” (Locke [1690], Ch. 17, § 19-22), see Collections (3). Person-centered arguments are irrelevant from this point of view. The same might be said of those arguments that play only with the guilty pleasures of natural language and the nuances of interpersonal relations.

(ii) In terms of their linguistic form, metonymic arguments based on a relationship of contiguity, can be distinguished from the metaphoric arguments based on a relationship of similarity. This distinction reflects the opposition between the arguments “establishing the structure of reality” (analogy type) and those “based on the structure of reality’ (causal type) (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca [1958] p. 261; 350), See Collections (4).

(iii) From the point of view of their productivity. The productivity of an argument scheme depends on the number of actual arguments (enthymemes) derived from it. Intuitively, some topics are very productive. One might think for example of those based on the twin argument schemes of categorization and definition; or arguments based on causal or analogical relations, or from the contraries, etc. Others, including the argument from waste are less productive. Other argument schemes may be more common than their name suggest, such as the argumentative exploitation of syzygies.

(iv) From the point of view of their legitimating power. A good example of organizing argument schemes according to their strength is given by the hierarchy of legal and theological arguments in the Arab-Muslim culture and religion, such as proposed by Khallâf ([1942]). He distinguishes between ten sources, ranked according to their degree of legitimacy. The most legitimate forms are those based on the Qur’an and the Tradition. Those with the weakest degree of legitimacy are, “the laws of the monotheistic peoples”, and, perhaps surprisingly given the present situation, “the opinions of the Prophet’s companions”, in that order. Arguments presented at the time of the emergence of Islam are given the least weight in the hierarchy of arguments. Such was the situation in 1942; it has changed significantly with the rise of Salafism.

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CIRCUMSTANCES

Three types of arguments use the concept of circumstance:

— The fallacy of omitting the relevant circumstances, a criticism addressed to an argument.
— The argument from circumstances or circumstancial argument.
In the phrase “circumstantial ad hominem”, the circumstances alluded to are the characteristics of the person involved in an ad hominem argument.

1. Fallacy of omission of relevant circumstances

The fallacy of omitting relevant circumstances is sometimes referred to by the Latin label secundum quid fallacy, which abbreviates the phrase a dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter, “from a restricted statement to an absolute statement”.

Aristotle classifies the fallacy of omitting relevant circumstances as a type of fallacy “independent of language” (Soph. 4; 165b20; see Fallacy (2), which occurs when an expression is used “absolutely or in a certain respect” (Soph. 5; 166b35):

“If < what is not is the object of an opinion >, then < what is not is >” (ibid.; our emphasis and parentheses).

“What is not is the object of an opinion” is a semantically complete, syntactically integrated utterance, a meaningful unique and complete speech act [1]. All its components are necessary and interdependent; none can be subtracted without changing what the speaker said and meant, and he said one thing.
It is not possible to extract from this complete utterance any arbitrarily chosen segment (here, « the object of an opinion”), as long as it makes some sense, and attribute the truncated segment (here, “what is not is”) to the speaker of the former statement.
Such considerations are crucial when in determining what constitutes an elementary well-formed linguistic formula.

Other examples: the qualified expression “A is (Place, Time)”, “A is here now” can be transformed into the corresponding unqualified expression “A is (Place)”, “A is here”.
Conversely, the unqualified construction “Peter crossed the street” cannot be developed into “Peter crossed the street yesterday”. Note that the reduction of this last sentence to Peter crossed the street is not fallacious.
This kind of de-contextualization of a qualified statement can lead to bad faith criticism:

S1:    — The weather is fine! (said in the morning, when the weather is fine).
S2:    — Ah hah! And you said that the weather is fine! (said in the evening, when it is raining).

This fallacy ignores relevant contextual data, and treats as an absolute assertion what has been asserted with reservation, in a particular context, with precise reference and intention. This radicalization of claims and positions makes them very easy to refute.

In order be relevant, the refutation must refer precisely to the expression as it is used, and consider all the reservations that are specifically mentioned. The fallacy is particularly pernicious when it pretends that the speaker had said and assumed something that he said only in the course of a discussion as a concession to the opponent.

Prime Minister: — Our country cannot absorb all the misery of the world (S1) but it must take its share (S2).
Political Opponent: — As Mr. Prime Minister said, we cannot welcome all the misery of the world.

The opponent maximized the Minister’s position — The Minister agrees to reject the maximalist position — He reaffirms his non-maximalist position — The opponent unreservedly reaffirms his maximalist position which he attributes to the Minister, without mentioning the Minister’s real position.

In Goffman’s words, in statement S1 the Prime Minister speaks as an Animator, quoting an unknown Principal, whom he opposes; whereas he speaks as the Principal of S2, taking full responsibility for the content and actions, intentions and consequences of what S2 means, S. Roles.
The opponent makes him speak as Principal of S1. The opponent, who is in favor of closing the borders, makes an ally of the Prime Minister who actually rejects his or her position.

2. Argument from circumstances

Argument from circumstances indirectly establishes the existence of a fact, by using peripheral, unnecessary indices of an action that have no real probative value, but nevertheless point to a fact:

Question: — Is he corrupt?
Prosecutor: — Sure. He needed money; we saw him receiving thick envelopes; and yesterday, he bought a brand new car.

Argument by circumstances can help to solve a conjectural question, see stasis, such as “Did he commit this crime?” (Cicero, Top., XI, 50; p. 82). To answer this question, one “[looks] for the circumstances that preceded the fact, that accompanied it, that followed it” (Cicero, ibid; XI, 51, p. 83), interpreting “a date […] the shadow of a body […] pallor… and other indications of trouble and remorse” (id., XI, 53, p. 83). This is part of the technique of investigation:

“He went out muttering…: this is to argue from what precedes the act; we saw him stealing behind a bush…: this is what accompanies it. […] a malicious joy, which he endeavored to conceal, appeared on his face, mingled with terror: which is what follows.”
Bossuet [1677], p. 140, see. Collections (III)

These observed circumstances are probable natural signs.
The argument from circumstances is a powerful instrument in the art of suspicion and the construction of a culprit.

3. Terminological delicacy

On §53 of the Topics Cicero deals with arguments drawn from “consequences, antecedents and contradictory things [ex consequentibus et antecedentibus et repugnantibus]” (Top., XI, 53: 83).
This paragraph deals with logical antecedents and consequences, involving semantically “necessary” connections (id.), referring to questions of a priori and a posteriori reasoning, definition, rules of implication and to the principle of non-contradiction.

Bossuet speaks, in connection with the argument by circumstances, speaks of places “derived from what precedes, from what accompanies and from what follows [the action], ab antecedentibus, ab adjunctis, a consequentibus” ([1677], p.140). Here, the connection of the preceding and subsequent events to the central event is no longer semantic or logical but purely chronological.

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[1] Empedocles, for example, argues that « from nothingness nothing can absolutely come into existence and what is cannot perish. »
[2] The change of preposition – ex antecedentibus for the logical consequence and the necessary connection vs. ab antecedentibus for temporal anteriority has nothing to do with this distinction

Argument from CAUSE TO EFFECT

Causal argumentation claims the existence of a causal link.
Argumentation from effect to cause, or argumentation by the consequences, assumes the existence of a causal link and concludes from an effect to a cause.

Argumentation from cause to effect assumes the existence of a causal law (a cause-effect relationship). The actual occurrence of the cause is materialized by the necessary occurrence of the effect. Argument:

There is a state of affairs c. This state of affairs c falls into the category of facts C.
Cause- Effect Rule: There is a known causal law linking state of affairs C to state of affairs E.
Conclusion: C will / must have an effect e, of type E.

The argumentation from cause allows prediction:

This bridge is made of metal.
When heated, this metal expands by a certain coefficient.
In summer the bridge will expand by such and such amount.

The argumentation from cause to effect can be refuted by showing that the causal relation it presupposes is poorly constructed, see Causal argument

Pragmatic argument

This preceding argument from cause to effect can be supplemented by a pragmatic argument.
Step (3) of a pragmatic argument consists in an argument from a cause to an (hypothetical) effect, an evaluation of this effect, followed by step (4) consisting in an argument from this effect to a cause:

Such dilatation can have dangerous consequences: Expansion can twist metal.

Precautions must therefore be taken:

Adequate expansion space must be provided for the bridge deck.

Argument from the existence of a motive for action to the action proper
The argument from motive to action mirrors the argument from cause to effect:

He had the desire and the ability to do it, he found the opportunity: so, he did it.

CAUSAL argumentation

Causal argumentation establishes the existence of a causal relationship, whereas cause-to-effect or effect-to-cause arguments assumes the existence of a causal relationship.

1. Questions about causality

Causal argumentation occurs when a causal relationship is at issue. For example, we observe that (1) the use of pesticides is increasing, and (2) bees are disappearing. Is there a causal connection between these two facts? Are the following statements true?

The use of pesticides is causing bees to disappear.
Pesticides are used and bees disappear! (causal reading of the coordinated construction)

There may be disagreement about this type of conclusion, even if there is agreement about the facts under consideration:

We use pesticides and the bees disappear, that’s true. But…

The causal inquiry begins with a salient fact, such as “the bees are disappearing,” “the climate seems to be changing”, and we don’t understand why. Generally, several facts can be evoked as possible causes, and possible explanations of the phenomenon. This creates a stasis of causality, expressed by the confrontation of these hypotheses, for example in the case of climate change, taken as a fact:

S1:    — the increase in solar activity causes the climate change.
S2:    — the increase in greenhouse gas emissions causes climate change.

These explanatory causes are themselves integrated into broader theories of the climatic equilibrium of the terrestrial globe. Broad conceptions of the physical and social world are confronted through such local causal affirmations.

Affirmations of causal relationships are therefore based on the elaboration of crucial experiments and the retrieval of key observations. Causes are determined according to the methodology relevant to the given domain.

Ordinary causal experimentation also involves observation and experience. For example, if I have a mild allergic reaction, I need to consider what the possible allergens might be which have caused it. I might observe that yesterday I went to the swimming pool and ate strawberries. There are two possible allergens, strawberries or chemicals used in the pool. I can do the following checks, eat strawberries without going swimming, and go swimming without eating strawberries. If I’m unlucky, I’ll have to investigate further and perhaps see a specialist, who will take a systematic approach. If I’m lucky, however, I’ll have a (controlled) mild allergic reaction in one case and not in the other, and I’ll be able to identify the allergen. Since the allergic reaction is undesirable, I pragmatically reason that, given the negative consequence, I will change my behavior, and thus eliminate the cause.

2. Refuting causal claims

The correct establishment of causal relationships is a fundamental requirement, both in science and in ordinary life. The priority given to the correct determination of causal relations is the foundation of Aristotelian thought. The “false cause” fallacy is committed when a causal relationship is claimed between two phenomena that in fact have no causal relationship between them. This fallacy is sometimes referred to by its Latin name non-causa pro causa, “‘non-cause’ taken for a cause”, see Fallacious (2).

The positive existence of a causal relationship is difficult to establish. Sometimes it can only be considered as the residual explanation that remains when all other possibilities have been discarded.
To confirm that there is a causal relationship between two facts, it is necessary to answer a number of standard objections to the existence of a causal relationship.

2.1 The claimed effect does not exist

The causal claim “the use of pesticides is the cause of the disappearance of the bees” is refuted by showing that although the bees have disappeared from a particular area, there are still as many bees as before when a larger, more general area is considered. The bees have not disappeared, they have simply migrated.

The facts must be confirmed, before looking for and discussing their causes. This methodological rule is well illustrated by the famous case of the golden tooth, described by Fontenelle.

Let us be well assured of the matter of fact, before we trouble our selves with inquiring into the cause. It is true, that this method is too slow for the greatest part of mankind, who run naturally to the cause, and pass over the truth of the matter of fact; but for my part, I will not be so ridiculous as to find out a cause for what is not.
This kind of misfortune happened so pleasantly, at the end of the last age, to some learned Germans, that I cannot forbear speaking of it. “In the year 1593, there was a report that the teeth of a child of Silesia of seven years old dropped out, and that one of gold came in the place of one of his great teeth. Horstius, a profesor of physic in the university of Helmstad, wrote in the year 1595, the history of this tooth, and pretended that it was partly natural and partly miraculous, and that it was sent from God to this child, to comfort the Christians who were then afflicted by the Turks.” Now fancy to your self what a consolation this was, and what this tooth could signify, either to the Christians or the Turks. In the same year, (that this tooth of gold might not want for historians) one Rullandus wrote the history of it: two years after, Ingolsteterus, another learned man, wrote against the opinion of Rullandus concerning this golden tooth; and Rullandus presently makes a fine learned reply. Libavius, another great man, collected all that had been said of this tooth, to which he added his own opinion. After all, there wanted nothing to so many famous works, but the truth of its being a tooth of gold. When a Goldsmith had examined it, he found that it was only a leaf of gold laid on the tooth with a great deal of art. Thus, they first compiled books, and then they consulted the goldsmith.
Nothing is more natural than to do the same thing in all other cases. And I am not so much convinced of our ignorance, by things that are, and of which the reasons are unknown, as by those which are not, and for which we yet find out reasons. That is to say, as we want those principles that lead us to the truth, so we have others means that not only do we not have the principles that lead to truth, but we have others which are exceeding well with that which is false.
Bernard Le Bouyer of Fontenelle, The History of the Oracles [1686][1], original translation text.

2.2 The effect exists independently of the alleged cause

The determining cause has a consistent effect. If C is the cause of E, we cannot have C without E. When a metal is heated, it necessarily expands. It follows that a causal claim can be refuted by showing that the effect persists in the absence of the cause. To return to the example above, if it can be shown that bees also disappear from areas where pesticides are not used, then pesticides cannot be considered to be responsible for the decline in bee population.

2.3 There is no causality but concomitance

In this case, A both regularly accompanies and precedes B without being the cause of B. The rooster regularly sings before dawn, but it is not the cause of the sunrise. Taking an antibiotic may be accompanied by a feeling of exhaustion, but the cause of this exhaustion is not the antibiotic but the infection it is fighting. The general principle for testing the existence of a causal relationship is to eliminate the agent that is the suspected cause; if the so-called effect is still there, there is no causal relationship between the two facts. For example, if the so-called effect is still there, there is no causal link between the two facts. If the rooster is eliminated, for example, the sun still rises; if we do not take antibiotics, we will still be exhausted and perhaps even more so.

The use of pesticides goes hand in hand with the disappearance of bees; but in areas where pesticides are no longer used, the number of bees continues to decline at the same rate. The cause is sought elsewhere: perhaps climate change is to blame?

Such false causal attributions are well identified in the ancient theory of fallacies, which denotes them by two Latin expressions:

— Antibiotic fallacy: cum hoc, ergo propter hoc: — “with A, therefore because of A”.
A accompanies B, therefore A is cause of B.

— Rooster’s fallacy: post hoc, ergo propter hoc — “after A, therefore because of A”.
B occurs after A, so A is cause of B.

2.4 Another cause can have the same effect

You may be tired because you are physically exhausted, because you have an infection, or because you are depressed.

2.5 Not one, but several causes: complex causality

It may be necessary for several causes to exist together in order to produce an effect. This is the case with economic crises, or lung cancer.

Identifying the causes determines the responsibility of the human agents who set the causal machinery in motion. When causality is complex, it is possible for the defendants to argue that they are responsible for only one causal factor, which, alone,  would not alone have caused the problem in question. A person dies after being arrested. The autopsy shows that this person suffered from a weak heart:

Lawyer:    — If the police had treated him gently, he would not have died. The police are responsible.
Police:      — If he had not been sick before, he would not have died. The police are not responsible.

In cases of severe pollution, the authorities tell the public that « only people with respiratory problems have a problem« .

2.6 The effect feeds the cause

Feedback is a kind of causal cycle: nuclear fusion raises the temperature and the rise in temperature accelerates fusion. In the social field, this kind of mechanism is invoked to reject a particular measure, on the grounds that it will not alleviate the problem in question, but rather aggravate it:

L1:      — To fight the recession, public services must be strengthened / reduced.
L2:      — But the increasing / reducing public services will make the recession worse.

You can always argue against a measure by claiming that it will have certain undesirable consequences that outweigh any possible advantage, see. Pragmatic argument. In the example above, the objection is radical, because the perverse effect is not some side effect, that the author of the proposition has not yet noticed, but exactly the opposite of the intended effect. This is a case of pure and simple inversion of causality (see infra), which is common in polemical discourse.

2.7 Self-fulfilling prophecies

In the case of self-fulfilling prophecies, the announcement of an event is the cause of the event:

S1_1:     — In truth, I tell you: there will be a shortage of food!
So people run to the stores and there is a shortage of food
S1_2:     — See, I told you so!
S2:        — If you hadn’t panicked the people, there wouldn’t have been a shortage.

Self-fulfilling prophecies are close to manipulation:

We are going to war for sure, so we have to rearm and warn the population. … Now we are the strongest, and our people are behind us. We can wage war.

2.8 Reversal of cause and effect

Reversing cause and effect is a common form of refutation in ordinary argumentation. Two facts A and B vary simultaneously. To account for this concurrence, some claim that there is a causal connection from A to B, while others claim a connection from B to A. Are we crying because we are sad? Or are we sad because we are crying? Does aggression cause fear? Or does fear cause aggression?

L1:        — I am afraid of dogs, they can attack and bite!
L2:        — No, they attack because they see that you’re afraid.

L1:        — OK, I’m aggressive, that’s because they chase me!
L2:        — No, they’re chasing you because you’re aggressive.

It is said that single people are more likely to commit suicide than people with a partner. We might ask, then, whether single people have such problems because they are single, or whether they are single because they have such problems? This form of refutation by permutation of the cause and effect is simple and radical. It is worth noting, however, that it is not always possible to apply this process, as seen above, in the case of bees and pesticides.

This causal shift is particularly popular in ordinary causal reasoning. This game of term permutation of terms illustrates the ubiquity of language-based argumentation schemes. It is easier and more exciting to argue that politics determines morality or that morality determines politics, than to argue that there is no or a very complex connection between morality and politics, see. Converse.

2.9 Causality, subjectivity, responsibility

There is no isolated cause, but a causal chain: the expression of causality as “A is the cause of B” is a potentially misleading simplification. Every cause is itself caused, except God, who is said to be his own cause and the cause of all that follows. The phenomenon called the cause can itself be constructed as the effect of a deeper cause, and its effects as new causes of new effects. We are therefore not dealing with a connection between two concepts, but with a real causal chain of potentially infinite length.

Consider the deadly events that took place in Sheffield on Sunday, April 16, 1988. They were widely reported and commented upon in the French press. The following day, the front page of L’Équipe (a sports newspaper) read as follows:

The horror!
Eighty-four people were killed on Saturday in the Sheffield stadium, where the FA Cup semi-final between Liverpool and Nottingham was being played.

Typically, this kind of event creates anxiety which in turn stimulates the search for causal explanations. Readers will ask themselves “Why? How can this be possible?” On the same day, the headlines in Le Figaro newspaper (news and opinions) were:

Football: Why so many dead?
Four explanations for the tragedy:

• • The madness of the fans • The negligence of the police
  • The age of the stadium • Inadequate emergency services

The newspaper’s answer suggest a broad causality for the first question, and to a narrow one for the others. On the same day, the newspaper Libération (news and opinions) asserts a broad causality:

94 dead in Sheffield stadium
Deadly stadium
Crushed to death by the crowd, the victims who had come to watch the football match between Liverpool and Nottingham Forest paid a dramatic tribute to the most popular sport in Thatcher’s Britain.

Still the same day, L’Humanité newspaper (news and opinions) combines local concerns to the so-called deeper causes:

After the drama of Sheffield, Liverpool in mourning
The final stage of the horror

90 dead and at least 170 injured, that is the terrible toll of the Hillsborough disaster. The vast majority of the victims were children and young people from working class backgrounds who had come to support their teams. The age of the stadium and its segregating character, and the power of money in the world of football are now on trial. The destruction of industry and the resulting disorganization of leisure activities have all contributed to the transformation of sport into a high-risk activity

The investigation of the causal chain mobilizes specialists in each of these areas of responsibility. Police officers and judges investigate narrow causalities, while sociologists, economists, politicians and historians discuss long-term causalities and responsibilities. In short, what is the cause? The fragility of the victims’ rib cage, the poor quality of care for the victims, the late response of the emergency services, the incompetence of the police, the poor standard of the stadium, the financial greed of the organizers, the behavior of the fans, unemployment, social exclusion, the capitalist system…? Assigning a cause means assigning responsibility and blame, and perhaps even shaming the parties involved. This case shows that discursive causality is a discursive object.

Moreover, the causal chains intermingle and combine to form a “web of causes”. Argumentation is based on this fabric, as “causal threads” are picked up and cut at a given point. This point determines the nature of the chosen cause associated with the salient problematic event considered as an “effect”. The selection of a cause, correlatively, determines the responsible agent, person or institution, to be blamed or praised. The whole process depends on the interests and goals of the arguing party. The speaker fully projects his own subjectivity onto the causal chain he has chosen, and onto the cause he or she has isolated. It would therefore be quite illusory to think that ordinary arguments based on causal links are ipso facto more rigorous and less subjective than arguments based on, say, analogy.

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[1] Bernard Le Bouyer of Fontenelle, The History of the Oracles. Glasgow: R. Urie, 1753. P. 14-15.

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CAUSALITY

1. The expression of causality

The concept of cause is central to both everyday and scientific argument. It is regarded as a primitive, intuitively clear concept. This means that ordinary language defines cause only in terms that are equally complex.

Let us consider some ways of referring to and thinking about causal connections and processes:

— The cause explains, accounts for its effect; it gives the why, the reason for things. The effect is understood when its cause is known.

— The cause of something is its principle; its origin, its basis, its reason, its occasion. The cause is a motor, that triggers, sets in motion a series of effects.

— Human beings act as causes; they are agents, makers; authors, creators, inspirers, instigators, promoters, producers…; their aims, purposes, intentions, motives and motivations… are considered as potential causes. Their incitements, inducements, instigations, are second level causes.

— Metaphorically, the cause is thought of as a spark, a ferment, a germ; a root, a seed; a source, a spring. Their causes are the mothers of things as they are.

In addition to the specific verbs corresponding to the preceding nouns, different kinds of causal relations are associated with very general verbs such as to bring about, to give rise to, to make, to procure, to lift…

Like the logical relation of implication, the causal relation can be associated with clauses expressed by conjunctions or adverbs:

Since, because …; as soon as …; so … ; when …; if … then …

These terms and constructions can indicate to some kind of causal relationship, and can therefore be considered as causal indicators of some kind, bearing in mind that they can also express other functional relationships

Like analogical relations, causal relations can do without causal indicators. A spontaneous “causal impulse” always suggests a causal relationship behind a purely temporal sequence, or concurrence (see infra).

2. Temporal, causal, logical, sequences

The temporal sequence is articulated by three moments: before … / during … / after …  In the temporal world, events coexist (are simultaneous) or follow one another (precede / follow); there is no “temporal loop”.

The causal sequence: In the material world, apart from feedback loops, the cause precedes its effect or consequence.

The logical implication: In the logical world, the antecedent is to the left of the logical connective ‘→’ and the consequent, or logical consequence, is to the right.
See Logical Connective (Implication); Deduction.
Logical relations develop the consequences of hypotheses or postulates. If the length of the side of a square is doubled, its area is multiplied by four: this result is a consequence linked to a cause which is a mathematical reason.

In natural language, semantic implications are based on the linguistic content of the word, here the word “birth”.

Mind your words, you speak of the birth of the gods, are you saying that the gods did not exist at one time?

3. Argumentation dealing with causality

3.1 When causality is at the focus of the argument

It is not necessary for argumentative analysis, and in practice would be a never-ending task, to try to identify and reconstruct all the multi-level, potential causal relations in an argumentative text.
The key methodological point is that, in order to be of interest for argumentative analysis, the causal relationship must be the focus of an argumentative question or sub-question. This is an adaptation of Quintilian’s principle: « as soon as a disagreement emerges, the question arises », see Stasis. If the disagreement is about a causal relationship, this relationship comes to the fore, is dealt with in the lines of argument developed by the participants, etc., and as such, become an object for argumentative analysis.

3.2 Argumentation establishing / exploiting a causal relationship

We will distinguish between two types of argumentation:
— Argumentation that establishes or denies the existence of a causal relationship between two facts or events. The existence or non-existence of a causal relationship is the conclusion of the argument.

— Argumentation that exploits a previously established causal relationship. The argument presupposes the existence of the causal relationship.

(i) Cause-effect argumentation establishes a causal relationship between two facts and eliminates “false causes”.

(ii) Several types of argument exploit a previously established causal relationship. In this second case, we distinguish between:

— Cause-to-effect argumentation, going forward from cause to effect. A fact-argument considered to be a cause, is claimed to have such an effect.

— Effect-to-cause argumentation, going backward from effect to cause. A fact to which a status of effect is ascribed, is claimed to have such a cause, see Abduction.

— Pragmatic argumentation. In order to decide about a practical measure, the measure is assimilated to a cause, which will have such and such positive or negative effects and the assessment is reported to the alleged cause.

— Argumentation based on motives aligns the relationship between a motive to do something and the corresponding action with the cause-effect relationship.

— A priori and a posteriori arguments, propter quid and quia arguments make use of causal and logical connections.

 

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CATEGORIZATION – NOMINATION

Categorization refers to the various cognitive and practical operations by which an individual is integrated into a category and designated by the name attached to that category:

— What is this?   Asking for the identification of an unnamed object
— This is a X      Name attached to a category

We will consider first current objects which names are taken from the lexicon or from a popular scientific taxonomy or theory, such as those exploited in the dictionaries of current language. The case of emergent categories and the associated neological process involved will be mentioned separately.

Categorization as a cognitive and empirical operation cannot be separated from nomination, a linguistic operation. The classic example illustrating Toulmin’s layout of argument is an example of an administrative categorization: the individual Harry is categorized as a British citizen on the basis of the criterion, “— to be born in Bermuda”.

Categorization is the first step in implementing an argumentation by definition, “he is a British citizen, so …”. In law, categorization corresponds to the legal qualification of an act (is it a crime or an accident?); it determines the law applicable to the case, S. Stasis.

1. Categorization tests: distinctive features and global analogy

An individual is given a name and placed in a category on the basis of a set of distinctive features or on the basis out of a global analogy with an outstanding member of the category.

Categorization by distinctive features is based upon a definition. A definition of a noun is a set of heterogeneous characteristics that can be used to test an individual for the corresponding category. If a significant number of these characteristics fit the description of the individual, then the individual belongs to that category, and can be given the corresponding name.
If the categorization and naming are based on unsystematic, anecdotal features, the category is inconsistent: “the bird is grey, the sky is grey, the bird is a cloud, the cloud is a bird” see Intra-categorical analogy.

Categorization by analogy is based on a common global form (Gestalt) shared by the individual under consideration and a prototypical member of the category: this really looks like a Scotch bonnet, it must be a Scotch Bonnet.

The concrete tasks of nomination and categorization combine the two sets of tools, distinctive features and analogy. The distinctive features can be drawn from the stereotype rather than from any kind of definition; all the features found on the stereotype tend to be considered as essential for the definition of the category and to qualify as a member of  that category.

Binary and gradual categorization — Categorization made on the basis of essential, distinctive features means that category predicates are binary: an individual is a member of a category or is not.
If membership within a category is determined simply by stacking any sufficient number of features, category predicates are gradual; the richer the combination of features, the stronger the association with the category. Similarly, a bird that looks more like the prototypical bird than another is “more” a bird than the other one. Category membership becomes gradual, and its top members cannot be surpassed; this can be the meaning of the juvenile expression “more X than him, you die”, “cooler than him, you die” in other words, one comes out of the category upwards.

Categorization mistake? — In Alice in Wonderland, the pigeon wrongly categorizes Alice as a snake:

‘Serpent!’ screamed the pigeon.
‘I’m not a serpent’, said Alice indignantly. ‘Let me alone!’ […]
‘A likely story indeed!’ said the pigeon in a tone of the deepest contempt. ‘I’ve seen a good many little girls in my time, but never one with such a neck as that! No, no! You’re a serpent; and there is no use denying it. I suppose you’ll be telling me next that you never tasted an egg!’
Lewis Carroll, Alice in Wonderland. [1865] [1].

The pigeon wrongly categorizes Alice as a snake because of the long neck she develops in this episode. For the pigeon, this feature is reminiscent of a snake, so that the pigeon fears for its eggs; and furthermore, Alice eats eggs, a feature that may not be essential to the categorization of beings, but which reinforces the pigeon’s conclusion.
From an essentialist point of view, the pigeon miscategorizes Alice; “having a long neck” is neither a specific difference nor a characteristic proper of snakes; giraffes, herons, swans… are also animals with long necks. In fact, the pigeon classifies Alice from a functional point of view. From the pigeon’s perspective, a long neck is a natural sign of danger and it is wise to apply the precautionary principle, i.e. to cry “snake!” the way people shout “wolf!” when they see a strange creature lurking behind the house.

2. Technical categorization

The categorization-nomination may be expressed by a simple judgment about an individual “X is a bastard, you can see that immediately”; most designations are not the result of a careful examination of the relevant criteria, but when in doubt, the availability of such criteria proves essential. The mushroom picker who is in doubt as to the nature of the mushroom he has just picked must engage in a careful process of categorization; the same goes for the municipal oficial ho is trying to determine the rights of a person applying for social security benefits. First of all, they must refer to the criteria listed in the relevant reference books: the mushrooms encyclopedia in the first case;  and the decrees and regulations defining the conditions for granting social security benefits in the second. A well-conducted categoriation process will lead to well-founded conclusions, such as:

Y is / is not a marasmius oreades, i.e., a Scotch bonnet.
X is / is not a single parent in the administrative sense of the expression.

The investigators will then take the appropriate action: keep the mushroom to eat or throw it away; accept or deny the application for social security benefits.

Social Categorization — A parent is defined as “a parent or a person who bears the financial burden of one or more children”. “To be single” is defined as: “being widowed, divorced, separated or unmarried and not living together”. The meaning of « parent » is finally extended to include “pregnant” and “people who have the legal responsibility of a child”.

Natural Categorization — Wikipedia describes the Scotch Bonnet as follows:

Marasmius oreades, the Scotch bonnet, is also known as the fairy ring mushroom or fairy ring champignon. The latter name tends to cause some confusion, as many other mushrooms grow in fairy rings (such as the edible Agaricus campestris, the poisonous Chlorophyllum molybdyte, and many others).
Distribution and habitat — Marasmius oreades grows widely throughout North America and Europe in the summer and autumn (fall) (June – November in the UK), or all year round in warmer climates. It loves grassy areas such as lawns, meadows, and even dunes in coastal areas.
Description — It grows gregariously in clumps, arcs, or rings (type II, which makes the grass to grow and become greener). The cap is 1-5 cm in diameter; bell-shaped with a slghtly inrolled margin at first, becoming broadly convex with a flat or raised margin, but usually retaining a slight central bump — an « umbo »; dry; smooth; pale tan or buff, occasionally white, or reddish tan; usually changing colour markedly as it dries out; the margin sometimes faintly lined.
The naked, pale stem grows up to about 7cm by 5mm in diameter.
The gills are attached to the stem or free from it, fairly distant (rather a distinctive character), and white or pale tan, dropping a white spore print. The spores, themselves, are 7-10 x 4-6 µ; smooth; elliptic; inamyloid. Cystidia absent. Pileipellis without broom cells.
This mushroom can be mistaken for the toxic Clitocybe rivulosa which lacks an umbo, is white to grey in colour, and has closely spaced decurrent gills.
Wikipedia, Marasmius oreades

If the harvested item complies with this description, then it is a Scotch bonnet. Categorization is made on the basis of a n umber of quite different procedures: observing whether the key elements of a definition by description apply to the individual; looking carefully at the picture showing a prototypical Scotch bonnet; testing the object for its “elasticity under finger pressure”. Some features of the definition can be checked immediately, for example, by looking at the surroundings:

grassy area —grows gregariously in clusters, arcs, or rings (ibid.);

or at the mushroom itself:

a slight central bump: an ‘umbo’ (ibid.);

or practicing a small experiment:

usually a marked change in color as it dries out (ibid.)

These are positive criteria, which, if fulfilled, justify the claim that  « this is a M. oreades ».

For the task of categorizing and naming, the distinguishing criteria are particularly important; the umbo criterion proves to be essential, and, for some other species, vital:

This mushroom can be mistaken for the toxic Clitocybe rivulosa which lacks an umbo, is white to grey in color, and has closely spaced decurrent gills (id.)

In contrast the name derived criteria “fairy ring mushroom” seems to be a necessary, but not sufficient criterion, very risky as it is shared by both edible and toxic species. These are key criteria in the case of categorization issues (cf. infra, §3).

Other parts of the definition may remain puzzling to many: “Inamyloid. Cystidia absent. Pileipellis without broom cells”. Categorization is usually based on a selection of criteria. Once a categorization has been made in terms of a reasonable set of elements, it is possible to assign to the object under consideration all of the features mentioned in the definition. In this way, categorization combined with definition becomes a powerful argumentation machine, argumentation by definition:

it is a Scotch Bonnet, SO “Inamyloid, etc.

Or, perhaps more realistically:

“Many mushroom connoisseurs are fond of M. oreades” SO, let’s cook it now!

With time and experience, this knowledge, these manipulations and, above all, this reasoning will be incorporated into the perception, and the forager will immediately see and recognize Marasmius oreades as such: “look, Scotch bonnets!”.

3. Problems of categorization

The fact that categorization is an argumentation-based process is clearly illustrated by borderline cases, where the person or situation in question meets some, but not all, of the criteria defining the given category.

Let us consider the above case of social benefits, provided by the state to help a single parent to raise a child. The municipal employee receives the following application:

I am currently separated from my husband, who has left the marital home, to live with another woman. We are taking steps to divorce, but in the meantime, I am living alone with my daughter.

This woman is not divorced, but is apparently involved in court proceedings, or at least planning to file for divorce. Does she therefore qualify for immediate financial assistance?

A stasis or conflict of categorization occurs when discourse and counter-discourse are based on conflicting categorizations of the same event, action, or person:

S1_1      — He is a poor guy
S2         — No, he’s a real bastard
S1_2      — No, he is a poor guy, we should feel sorry for him

S1_1      — Syldavia is a big democracy now!
S2_1      — How can you talk about democracy in a country that does not respect the rights of minorities?
S1_2      — There are plenty of democracies that do not respect minority rights.

Such antagonistic categorizations occur frequently in conversations.
— In dialogue (1), the antagonistic categorizations of the same individual as a poor guy vs. a bastard, are simply stated and repeated.

— In dialogue (2), S2_1 rejects the categorization of Syldavia as a democracy, arguing that protecting the right of the minorities is a necessary feature to qualify as a democracy. S1_2 maintains and supports his assessment by arguing that democratic regimes, as they are, often fail to respect minority rights. In a very common opposition, S1 categorizes Syldavia according to an essentialist criterion, S2 according to an empirical criterion, which opens a perfect argumentative situation.

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[1] Quoted after Lewis Carroll, Alice in Wonderland, BookVirtual digital edition. P. 71; 72-73. https://www.adobe.com/be_en/active-use/pdf/Alice_in_Wonderland.pdf (11-08-2017).

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CASE-BY-CASE Argument

1. Definition

Case-by-case argumentation is an investigative technique that develops in several stages, from questions such as “Something happened under such and such circumstances; what could it be?”:

• First, make an exhaustive inventory of possible cases.
• Second, consider each of these cases. Could it have happened under the circumstances considered?
  Eliminate the cases that are incompatible with the circumstances.
• Consider the remaining cases.
  – If there are none, the inventory was not exhaustive.
  – If there are several, they are equally possible at this point.
• If only one remains, take it as the correct answer to the question
  « This is what happened!”

Example:

S1 — All this money either comes from an inheritance, or from your work, or has been stolen. If it’s from your work or from an inheritance, you can easily prove it by showing us the relevant documents. No such documents? Then you stole it.

This argument illustrates the classic law of negation of a disjunction, S. Connectives:

“P or Q or R” is true; but P is false and Q is false; so necessarily, R is true.

Definitions can be given on a case-by-case basis. A crime, such as impiety, might be defined as a lack of respect for either the gods, their priests or their shrines. To accuse someone of impiety (or to exonerate oneself from this crime) one must show that at least one of the three defining conditions has been disrespected (or none) (after Aristotle, Rhet., II, 23, 1399a5; RR p. 367).

Case-by-case argument is a « proof by elimination”, an indirect proof, as opposed to a direct, substantial proof.

2. Argument by division

Perelman (1977, p. 65) gives the following example of an argument by division:

The tire exploded because it was worn out, because there were nails on the road, or because of a manufacturing defect. Now, the tyre had just been bought and there were no nails in it. So, there was poor workmanship. (Perelman, 1977, p. 65)

This shows that the label “argumentation by division” is homonymous: it can refer either to the argumentation by composition or division, or to the case-by-case argument.

3. Refutating the case-by-case argument

A case-by-case argument is perfectly conclusive if all cases have been considered; it can be rejected on the same case-by-case basis by showing that the enumeration of cases is incomplete:

S2 (in response to S1, above): — No Sir, I just won the lottery, here is the winning ticket!

S3 (in reply to Perelman, above) — Well, Sir, here are some other possibilities. The tire could have exploded because it was badly inflated, because there was a pothole in the road, because it hit the curb, because it was overheated (if the driver happened to have just used a torch to loosen a wheel bolt), because the brake was stuck, because it came into contact with an electrical source, because the car was too loaded or too fast… My conclusion is that the investigation must continue.

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Appeal to CALM
AD QUIETEM Argument

Calm is the emotional and cognitive state of a person who has no cause for concern, especially when there is no urgent issue to address.
Serious argumentative situations are inherently tense. For argumentative₂ people, the jolt of adrenaline is welcome. For more peaceful people, this tension can be difficult to deal with, and they may wish to get out of the situ as quickly as possible in order to restore their previous, real or imagined, calm.
The burden of proof can be seen as the price the proponent pays for disturbing the peace of the group.

1. Calm and emotionality

The Aristotelian list of socio-rhetorical emotions contrasts calm with anger, see Emotion. In fact, calm can be contrasted with any strong emotion, whether positive (joy) or negative (anger). Strong emotions are characterized by a marked variation in arousal. Specific actions, speeches and arguments can be used to reduce such arousal and restore a calmer mood, i.e. to calm over-excited people, be they a group of enthusiasts enraged by the prospect of war, or children throwing a tantrum.

2. Appeal to tranquility

In the political sphere, the appeal to calm was identified and called the ad quietem argument by Bentham (1824; Political Arguments,  §2) . The Latin word quietem is the accusative form of quies, “rest; in politics, peaceful period; neutrality.”
The argument is defined as an attempt to postpone the discussion of a proposal in the hope that the issue will never be raised. The basic appeal to calm discourse takes the following form:

This issue is not that important, it’s already settled, we have other priorities, we’ll discuss it later, you’re the only one who sees it as a problem…
Leave us alone with these things/your obsessions!

The discussion itself is replaced by a meta-discussion about the relevance and timing of the discussion.

Bentham sees this maneuver as a fallacy, and places it in the category of ‘fallacies of delay’, directed against freedom of proposal and political innovation.
In the context of the debate on the organization of the agenda, this move may be perfectly correct. Of course, when voted, the agenda can be attacked for its poor management of urgencies.

The appeal to tranquility values calm as the ideal of a peaceful conservative social state, which may be on the side of apathy, inertia and laziness. Dissatisfied proponents, ready to argue for innovations and changes, possibly speaking in the best common interest, are framed as troublemakers, generating negative adrenaline, that is, anger and anxiety within the group.

Tranquility may be used as an argument for not participating in political and social life:

Voting only concerns men, since women — fortunately for their tranquility [Fr tranquillité] — have no political rights.
Clarisse Juranville, [Handbook of Moral Education and Civic Education], [1911].[1]

The following interventions are taken from a debate on immigration and French nationality, a very topical issue at the time. At the very beginning of the discussion, A, a student, first alludes to the leaflets distributed to the students, then gives a description of the two parties and their positions. Depending on the position of the reader, this description is described as biased or carefully aligned (co-oriented) with her position, which will be openly stated later in the interaction.
Finally, on the basis of a perfect « leave us alone » argumentation, she takes a still implicit but quite clear position in favor of the second party who thinks that limits should be imposed, and would, at a minimum, prefer to postpone the whole discussion. « the government has other priorities at the moment, which are more important, and that it [is] not necessary to reopen this issue.”

Prof —then you say nothing you remain mute/ you have learned nothing from all this, nothing has struck you/ — what are the points/ — so let’s start listing them\ you can give them/ yes/
A — already two points of view actually, finally
Prof — there are two points of view you have seen that there were yes/
A — two opposing parties, well those who want to – like the petition of all the screen actors and filmmakers and so on who want: im- well the nationality code to be unlimited\ and that all the undocumented people be regularized\ so hmm without any limit.
Prof — hm hm hm hm hm (1)
A — and the second point of view is those who say that for there to be a right of the people there must be:: a right of the state\ therefore there must be limits and that:: and also these people are those who say that the government currently has other priorities that are more important and that it wasn’t necessary to go back to that point.
Prof — OK (1)

(1) Ratifies the previous speaking turn, without taking a stand.
Corpus on immigration and French nationality, student workshop. [2].

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[1] Quoted after Clarisse Juranville (1826-1906), Manuel d’éducation morale et d’instruction civique [Moral and Civic Education Handbook], Paris: Vve P. Larousse.
Quoted after the 5^e ed., 1^re part Éducation morale [Moral Education]; chap. Le vote [The Vote]; § Les femmes et la politique [Women and Politics]. No Date. No pag.

[2] Corpus Débats sur l’immigration — Participants: ´´Étudiants, Professeur [Corpus corresponding to a classroom debate on immigration — Participants: Students Teacher]. CLAPI database, http://clapi.univ-lyon2.fr/V3_Feuilleter.pdhp? Num_corpus = 35] (07-30-2013).

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BURDEN OF PROOF

The burden of proof [1] plays a fundamental role in argumentation. It is a conservative principle of action in general, like the principle of inertia in physics: “I carry on as before, unless I have a good reason to change”.

Mill tells an anecdote that vividly illustrates the heavy burden of proof that a conservative society imposed on social innovators, see calm.

The propounder of a new truth, according to this doctrine should stand, as stood, in the legislation of the Locrians, the proposer of a new law, with a halter round his neck, to be instantly tightened if the public assembly did not, on hearing his reasons, then and there adopt his proposition. People who defend this mode of treating benefactors, cannot be supposed to set much value on the benefit; and I believe this view of the subject is mostly confined to the sort of persons who think that new truths may have been desirable once, but that we have had enough of them now. ([1859]. p. 88)

In a court of law, the burden of proof is expressed in the presumption of innocence “a person is presumed innocent until proven guilty”; that is, the accusation must provide positive evidence of the guilt of the accused. The stabilization of the burden of proof is an institutional decision that organizes the situation; the last word is left to the accused.

In informal social debates, there is no clear preliminary agreement on who supports the burden of proof, and the proponent can try to shift it to the opponent. ​​It becomes a stake in the debate.

The doxa can be defined according to the same principle: an endoxon, i.e. an element of the doxa, is best defined not as a “probable” belief, but as a belief that does not support the burden of proof, and is, therefore, considered to be “normal” by the given group. The individual who challenges an accepted proposition bears the burden of proof, and must provide good reasons. This is why Descartes, ready to reject all his previously established beliefs, must support this radical doubt with the hypothesis of the Evil Genius (Descartes [1641], First Meditation). S. Rules.

When it comes to current trends and fashions, the burden of proof is reversed: “it(s new, it just came out!” is a direct argument for buying the product in question. On the contray, good reasons are needed not to follow fashion, not to adopt new theories, and not to vot for the emerging candidate.

Burden of proof and initiative

Hamblin has redefined the burden of proof in a language game as being on the player who takes the initiative, i.e. makes the first move. This definition can be applied to highly argumentative multi-speaker interactions, where the first turn of speech is usually assigned to the person who supports the proposal under discussion. In a debate on the legalisation of drugs, the facilitator will ask the first question to a supporter of legalization, not to an opponent.

The burden of proof is on a question and a proposal. If the opponent proposalmakes a counter-proposal, he will bear the corresponding burden of proof.

The burden of proof may vary depending on the group involved, and where the debate takes place. If the doxa of the group is that there should be no prohibition of drug use, then, in this group, the supporter of the prohibition will have to justify his position.

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[1] Latin onus probandi; Lat. onus “charge, burden”; probandi, from probare “to make believable, to make accept, to prove”.

BELIEFS OF THE AUDIENCE
Arguments ad auditorem, ex datis, ex concessis

1. Beliefs of the Audience

In general, the speaker bases his argument on values, facts and principles that are common, traditional, probable or true knowledge, generally known to the audience. He may introduce new ones, possibly after discussion with his interlocutors.

He must also adapt to his audience and, above all, avoid coming into conflict with them. However, their universes of belief do not necessarily overlap. He may hold (or reject) certain facts that his audience ignores or denies (or admits).
He can resolve this delicate situation by prudently basing his argument only on data explicitly or implicitly admitted or held to be true by the audience; he sticks to « what has been granted » by his interlocutor or audience (Chenique 1975, p. 322).
If knowledge of the character of the audience is so important for argumentative rhetoric, it is mainly because it provides the speaker with a large reservoir of ex datis premises, V. Ethos, §5.

Argument ex datis, ex concessis, ad auditorem.

In classical rhetoric, arguments ad auditorem, ex concessis, ex datis correspond to the arguments based on the beliefs of the audience.

Argument ad auditorem, from the Latin auditor, « he who listens », the audience. The term is used by Schopenhauer ([1864], p. 43).

The phrases ex concessis, ex datis. The preposition ex is followed by a noun in the ablative, indicating origin, « drawn from ».
In argument ex datis, datis is the plural ablative of datum, « that which is given » (id.).
In argument ex concessis, concessis is the plural ablative of concessus, (singular ablative concessu) – concessus: « concession, permission, consent; concessu omnium, unanimous consent (Gaffiot).
In our case, ex concessis rather refers to the explicit consent of the audience, and ex datis more generally covers the sense of ‘given’.

The Latin label « argument ex concessis » denotes two forms of argument.
1) A form of argument from authority, referring to the argument from consensus: consensus of participants, general consensus, consensus of nations, even universal consensus. This argument makes it possible to reject a new proposal or suggestion by pointing out to its author that there is (and has been for a long time) a consensus on the point in question (if you came to the meetings, you’d know, we have no time to lose…).
The consensus argument marginalizes the opponent and tends to exclude him or her from the group.

2) An argument that develops the beliefs of the audience. The speaker who develops conclusions based on beliefs accepted by the audience is arguing ex concessis. In this sense, the ex concessis argument corresponds to the ex datis argument (Chenique 1975, p. 322).

2. Is Appealing to the Audience’s Beliefs Manipulative?

In order to argue within his audience’s world of beliefs, the speaker must
1) omit facts (which he believes to be true) when the audience ignores them or believes them to be false;
2) accept facts (which he holds to be false) when the audience holds them to be true.

The question immediately arises as to his attitude to the facts he claims and the values he proclaims. Does he share them, or does he pretend to? The suspicion of lies and manipulation hangs over his entire discourse.

The ex datis argument can be tricky to handle, because it can lead to attributing to the speaker beliefs that he only wields ex datis. The risk is well known in the field of religious argumentation: an author who presents himself as orthodox and who has undertaken to refute heretics can conceal his agreement with the theses he opposes by claiming to treat them only ex datis.
This form of argumentation calls for two principled criticisms, one foundationist and the other deontological.
According to foundationist principles, a conclusion, in order to be valid, must be based on true premises, truths of absolute knowledge; but the premises of ex datis argumentation are based solely on beliefs. That’s why it’s called fallacious: it’s not that the argument is outwardly formatted for this audience, but the more fundamental fact that the argument is only valid for this audience. Insofar as it counsiders a specific audience and the circumstances of the speech, all rhetorical argumentation is contestable from a foundationist point of view. See Subjectivity.
From a deontological point of view, assertions that correspond to the beliefs of the audience are not necessarily endorsed and supported by the speaker himself. However, in accordance with the principle of cooperation, the bona fide audience normally attributes to the speaker the beliefs and information on which he is arguing. If the speaker is better informed than his listeners, e.g. if he knows that P is true (or false) but his listeners believe that P is false (or true), if he has reliable information of which his listeners are unaware, and if he limits himself to taking into account what his listeners believe, then to say that he is arguing ex datis, ex concessis, ad auditores, etc., is simply to say that he is lying and manipulating his listeners. V. Conditions of Discussion; Manipulation.

2.1 Small Arrangements with Truth: Banal Manipulation.

This manoeuvre can be found in trivial speech situations, as in this ex datis threat, which only applies to certain children:

Loc – Santa Claus is going to be very angry about your behavior!

The speaker addresses the child as if he, the speaker, believes in the existence of Santa Claus, but he himself does not. In practice, he’s reinforcing a superstition, which is reprehensible.

Let’s imagine a speaker who is not superstitious at all, but his interlocutor who refuses to do important things on Friday the 13th. If the important meeting scheduled for Friday the 13th complicates the speaker’s schedule, he can say to Y in a light tone:

Loc – We’ll postpone the meeting until the 20th so we don’t have to do anything on Friday the 13th.

The reason is still superstition, but the real motive remains hidden. Perhaps the speaker is simply planning a long weekend.

2.2 The trilogue can Hinder Manipulation

In complex situations, the triloge of Proponent, Opponent, Third party (arbiter(s), and/or an audience with the power to decide) limits the risk of first-degree, face-to-face, manipulation.
If the proponent lies or misrepresents the facts, it is the job of the opponent to straighten out the narrative proposed to the assembly,  giving it the best possible dose of truth.

Serious manipulation occurs when lies invest the sphere of power, political power, the power of money, the power of media and social media. Then nothing can guarantee that the truth will eventually prevail in the face of systematic background manipulation.

3. Ex datis and Ad Hominem

Like ad hominem argumentation, ex datis argumentation is based on the beliefs of the audience. Ad hominem argumentation uses these beliefs to show that they are contradictory, without commenting on their validity: « If you really mean what you’ve just said, then you’re contradicting yourself by refusing to support intervention in Syldavia!

Arguing about the audience’s beliefs uses them positively for confirmation purposes. In principle, these data cannot be questioned and the conclusions they allow us to draw are irrefutable by the partner in this discussion. On the basis of this data, the argument concludes positively: « Besides, you said so yourself!

Consider the question: « Should we intervene militarily in Syldavia? »

You admit that Syldavian troops are poorly trained, that they risk being overwhelmed by events, and that unrest in Syldavia could spread to neighboring countries. We agree that this expansion would threaten our security; and no one denies that we must intervene when our security is threatened. So, you agree with me. Come and join us, and join the ranks of those in favour of our presence in Syldavia. See Ad hominem.

This argumentative strategy has something to do with maieutics « the art of leading a person to the truth of his or her convictions », to the conclusion that he or she does not dare to formulate, or is unable to formulate because he or she has not mastered the art of combining statements in order to draw the necessary conclusions.

Ex Datis/Ex Principiis In Philosophy

Kant proposed a distinction between knowledge ex datis, based on experience, and knowledge ex principiis, deduced from first principles.
History is the prototype of ex datis knowledge, philosophy and mathematics the prototypes of ex principiis knowledge; ex datis knowledge is merely a compilation of data. Following the Kantian understanding, we might think that ex datis argumentation is based on empirical data, « on the substance, on the things themselves »; this interpretation would make ex datis a kind of equivalent of ad rem, but this is not the case. The use of ex datis in argumentation is different from its use in philosophy.