KETTLE Argumentation

A co-oriented condition is unsufficient to characterize a well-articulated convergent argumentation. Co-oriented arguments must be consistent. This is the essence of Freud’s point in The Interpretation of Dreams [1900], in where he uses the kettle argument as an analogy to interpret the content of his dream about “the injection given to Irma.”
Both the dream and its interpretation are incoherent defenses, offering good but incompatible justifications.

I noticed, it is true, that these explanations of Irma’s pains (which agreed in exculpating me) were not entirely consistent with one another, and indeed that they were mutually exclusive. The whole plea–for the dream was nothing else–reminded one vividly of the defense put forward by the man who was charged by one of his neighbors with having given him back a borrowed kettle in a damaged condition. The defendant asserted first, that he had given it back undamaged; secondly, that the kettle had a hole in it when he borrowed it; and thirdly, that he had never borrowed a kettle from his neighbor at all. So much the better: if only a single one of these three lines of defense were to be accepted as valid, the man would have to be acquitted. (Freud [1900], pp. 143-144)

The neighbor collects all the possible defenses, as laid out in the stasis theory.

(1) The accused denies the accusation: « I returned it undamaged”, creating a question of fact (conjectural stasis): “Did the neighbor or did he not return the cauldron in good condition?« 

(2) The accused then claims that « the kettle had a hole in it when he borrowed it« .
This contradicts what he said in (1) and what he will say in (3). Thus, he produces a kind of counter-accusation, shifting the responsibility for the damage to his accuser or a third party, hence the question « Who pierced the kettle?« 

(3) The accused finally claims that “I never borrowed your kettle”. He thus denies what he had implicitly admitted in (1), which leads a second question of fact: “Did he borrow the kettel?”

The damage could also be recognized as such and reduced: It’s a tiny hole, it’s nothing at all, and can beeasily repaired.

In fact, in the case of the kettle as presented by Freud, one could argue that the unconscious is not defending itself, but preparing the conscious defense, similar to how an accused person hesitates between different defense strategies. A little linguistic editing allows these strategies to be adjusted:

It was not a formal loan of equipment (3) but a request for friendly and one-time assistance. Your kettle was in bad condition (2) when I borrowed it from you, it was leaking, and it was bound to end up leaking badly. In fact I returned it to you in the same condition (1). Therefore, you are responsible for the poor condition of the pot. In any case it wasn’t me but your friend Peter made the soup in your pot that evening.

The unconscious does not argue any worse than the conscious mind.

In practice, the main thing is that the various defenses are convergent (co-oriented). To eliminate their contradictions, it is enough to resort to polyphony, and have different allied speakers express them, if possible at different times, or before different instances, or even as hypotheses.

The Chinese writer Lao She (1899-1966) “was one of the first victims of the Cultural Revolution.” After being tortured, “he was found dead on August 24, 1966. The official version is that he committed suicide by drowning” (Wikipedia, Lao She). However, this version of events is disputed by Simon Leys.
Regarding this issue, the Western Maoists have adopted an original defense strategy, which is articulated in three points. First, Lao She did not commit suicide; it is a Taiwanese invention. (2) By the way, his suicide is perfectly explicable, given his bourgeois mentality. (3) Anyway, his affair is completely uninteresting and does not deserve further attention.
Simon Leys, Essays on China, 1998. [1]

The adverbs “by the way” and “anyway” present (2) and (3) as superfluous additions to the background, (1) which should be sufficient to settle the matter, see indicator.

As in the case of the cauldron, eliminating the contradictions is as simpe as having them voiced by allied speakers, if possible at different times, or before different instances. They can even be presented as floating hypotheses, which should be seriously investigated.

Coherence of Convergent Argumentation

We refer to this as a kettle argument, but we should really be  talking about the argumentation of the kettle to denote a discourse that supports a conclusion from a series of convergent arguments that exonerate the speaker, but which are incompatible with each other, see convergence; coherence; ad hominem; contrasts.

The cauldron case shows that, for convergent argumentation to be well-formed, the arguments must be both co-oriented and coherent. In any case, introducing introduction of a simple but removes the incoherence: « I don’t need any clothes, but since there’s a sale, I’ll buy some. » But is a favorite of the subconscious.

 

JUSTIFICATION – DELIBERATION

People justify an answer to an argumentative question that has already been posed and accepted, either individually, or as a third parties,  or as a group that has now reached a decision.  They deliberate on an open argumentative question, when the participants  have not yet reached a decision.
Deliberation occurs when there is doubt about what to do or believe, whereas justification occurs after a decision has been made.
The starting point determines the difference between justification and deliberation.

— Deliberation intervenes in contexts of discovery. It moves from argument to conclusion. A decision must be made, so I deliberate to construct it through internal or collaborative deliberation. The arguments condition the conclusion. The argumentation:

Question: Should I resign?
Deliberation: I weigh the pros and cons.
The answer states the conclusion: I resign.

— In the context of justification, the discourse shifts from conclusion to argument. I have resigned, this is a practical reality.

Question: Why did you resign? Justify this unexpected decision!
Justification: I was sick and didn’t get along with my boss.

When I have to account for a decision I’ve made, I explain it. I recount the good reasons I made it, and, if necessary, invent new ones. In this case, the conclusion determines the arguments.
Deliberation leads to a conclusion introduced by so, therefore; while justification in introduces good reasons with since.

The mechanisms of argumentation apply to both justification and deliberation. I deliberate, I reach a conclusion and make my decision. When I am asked to justify the decision, I use the same arguments, that were deliberative to explain it.

In the case of deliberation, there is real uncertainty about the conclusion, which emerges during the course of a cognitive and interactive process.
In the case of justification, the conclusion is already there. Justification tends to eliminate doubts and counterarguments, while stimulating the production of new arguments.
Private arguments made during internal deliberation may not align with the arguments given publicly to justify the same conclusion, see motives and reasons.

Situations of full deliberation and full justification are borderline cases. In the first case, I hesitate between several options, while in the second case I fully assume my decision and I’m sure I did well.
The same arguer may oscillate between justification and deliberation if, for example, during justification, he questions the decision he has already made, or is about to change his mind.

If we assume that every argument presented as deliberative is actually oriented toward an unconscious decision, then everything is justificatory.
However the institutional organization of debates reintroduces deliberation. A debate may well be deliberative if both parties come with firmly established and duly justified positions and conclusions. The clash of opposing justifications produces deliberation.

Rule of JUSTICE

Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca introduce the rule of justice as a fundamental argumentative principle: “All beings of the same category must be treated the same.”
This rule governs the distribution of benefits: “To each according to his merit, his birth, his merits” (Perelman [1963], p. 26).

This rule underlies claims such as “equal pay for equal work.” It involves the following operations:

(1) A categorization — First, individuals are categorized as members of a general category, “to be born”; “to have needs”; “to have merit” (acknowledging that one can deserve a punishment and that having demerit is having negative merit); “to be an employee, who has worked such-and-such hours and produced such-and-such valuable products.”
General rights and duties can be defined with reference to this first level; “All human beings have the same right to life.” The following practice refers to a strict a pari argument, classifying thieves as a non-hierarchical category: “A thief is a thief”.

General Baclay was quite the character–a funny woman, very just in her own way. She shot women and men alike–all thieves–whether they stole a needle or an ox. A thief is a thief and they were all shot. It was just.
Ahmadou Kourouma, Allah is not obligated. 2000.[1]

(2) An equality relation and a hierarchy — Second, there is an equality relation defined as “equality of birth, needs, merits, work.”
A hierarchy of individuals is derived from this relationship: “P has worked as much as Q or R…; more than A or B…; less than X or Y…”.

Such equipped categories can be represented on oriented scales. The position of an individual on this scale can be discussed: “Does X have more/less merit than Y?”
This metric is easy to define in cases of work. For example, it can be determined by the weight of the fruit picked from the trees. However, things become more complicated when it comes to scientific production, or when it comes to needs and merits. In any case, criteria must be established to prioritize to one person over another.

(3) A corresponding allocation scale — Another ranking method must be established in order to define the parallel scales of sanctions and rewards. For example, what is the appropriate wage for that level of work?.
Then, the two scales must be coupled.

These two independent valuations ((2) and (3)) make the rule of justice more complex than an a pari argument. An a pari argument holds that “work must pay.” If P works, then P has a right to be paid for that work (unless P is a volunteer working for a nonprofit organization. The rule of justice connects two graduated scales.

Furthermore, it is assumed that the rule of justice is applied to all group members in a linear order. Actual rules include thresholds. For example, with respect to the level of taxation, the rule “to each according to his or her income” applies only above a certain threshold, and incorporates tax brackets and smoothing principles.

Other categories can be considered, showing that the rule of justice can be used to justify injustice:

To each according to their sex.
To each according to their color.

The rule of justice excludes arbitrariness, but not injustice. According to the principle of “favor disfavor”, the rule of justice, necessarily creates innumerable injustices. When the benefits are distributed according to merit, they are not distributed according to birth or need.
The rule of justice is said to be “just” because it excludes the arbitrariness of the principle “to each according to my convenience”; and because the categories with their corresponding hierarchy and the allocation scale have been defined by disregarding the cases to be judged. Thus, “the decision is just because the rule existed before your case. This “justice” is formally just because it allows the application of the legal syllogism.

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[1] Ahmadou Kourouma, Allah n’est pas obligé. Paris: Le Seuil, p. 111.

LEGAL ARGUMENTS

Legal scholars consider legal arguments to be the most fundamental argument schemes in their field. These arguments form the basis of “legal logic” (Perelman, Logique jJuridique, 1979). They are significant to the general theory of argumentation because they demonstrate the explicit and controlled application in the field of law of general principles currently found in ordinary argumentation. This is the perspective from which they are presented here.
Cicero’s Topica is perhaps the first essay to compile a list of historically significant legal principles of inference that are historically significant in all the classical fields of argumentation study, see Interpretation 2; Collection 2.

These legal arguments govern the interpretation of legal texts and their application to concrete cases. They enable the application of a legal text to a case, by potentially extending its meaning and legal force. Given a fact f that is subject to legal evaluation based on a code (legal, religious, etc.), the judge can usually associate f with a category M mentioned in the code in order to apply the legal provisions concerning M to f. In other cases, category M must be interpreted as applying to case H. In such cases, the judge creates the law rather than applying it.
However, the code may not contain a category, N, to the case at hand, h. In this case, category N must be interpreted so that it also applies to h. In such cases, the judge produces the law rather than simply applying it.

The process of interpretation is not limited to the legal field. It applies to a problematic proposition P belonging to a body of statements, a code, a rule, or a sacred text that is accepted by a community of interpreters or believers. The derivation of an interpretation I_P  from a passage P, {P, I_P} obeys the same rules and principles as the argumentative derivation of a conclusion C from an argument A, {A, C_A}. An interpretation is constructed a contrario, by analogy, and so on.

The limit of interpretation is set by the principle that “what is clear must not be interpreted.” This principle establishes the existence of a literal meaning, based on grammatical data. For instance, if a Syldavian presidential election requires voters to be 18 years old, and a Syldavian national, then only those who meet both criteria will be allowed to vote. There is nothing to interpret.

1. Three Collections of Legal Argumentation Schemes

Legal argumentation specialists compile lists of argument schemes that are particularly important in law. Lists provided by Kalinowski and Tarello are often included in the general framework of argumentation studies (Perelman 1979, Feteris 1999, Vannier 2001). We have also included the list from by lawoutlines.com[1] (no author’s name). These three lists extensively use Latin terminology.

— Kalinowski (1965) lists eleven argument schemes:

• • • A pari
    • A contrario sensu, or a contrario.
    • A fortiori ratione, or a fortiori.
    • A maiori ad minus, or from greatest to least.
    • A generali sensu, or argument from the generality of the law.
    • A ratione legi stricta, or argument from the strict meaning of the law
    • Pro subjecta materia, or argument from consistency.
    • Argument from preparatory works.
    • A simili, or argument by analogy.
    • Ab auctoritate, or argument from authority.
    • A rubrica, or argument from the title.

— Tarello (1974 ; quoted in Perelman 1979, p. 55) lists thirteen argument schemes:

• • • A contrario
    • A simili, or argument by analogy
    • A fortiori
    • A completudine
    • A coherentia,  argument from coherence.
    • Psychological a.
    • Historical a.
    • Apagogical a.
    • Teleological a.
    • Economic a.
    • Ab exemplo a.
    • Systemic a.
    • Naturalistic a.

— Lawoutlines considers ten argument schemes:

• • • By analogy or argument a pari.
    • Of greater justification or argument a fortiori.
    • By contrast or argument a contrario.
    • From absurdity or ad absurdum (ab absurdo).
    • From generality, a generali sensu.
    • From superfluity, ab inutilitate.
    • From context, in pari materia.
    • From the subject matter (of the law), pro subjecta materia.
    • From the title a rubrica.
    • From genre or ejusdem generis.

2. How many argument schemes?

Thirty-four argument schemes are specified.

— Four argument schemes are included in the three lists; arguments:

• • A contrario ; a contrario sensu ; by contrast or a contrario, see opposites.
  • A fortiori ratione, a fortiori ; of greater justification or a fortiori, see a fortiori.
  • The a pari argument is considered separately, or as equivalent to the argument by analogy (“by analogy or a pari”).
  • The a simili, a simile argument is assimilated to analogical argument, see analogy; a pari.

— Five argument schemes are common to two lists; arguments:

• • A generali sensu, argument from the generality of the law.
  • Pro subjecta materia ; from the subject matter (of the law).
  • Ab inutilitate; Economical arg.; non-redundancy principle.
  • A rubrica ; from the title.
  • Apagogical ; from absurdity.

— Ten (or thirteen) are specific to one of the three lists; arguments:

• • From preparatory work, historical, psychological or teleological arguments, see the legislator’s Intention.
  • From context or in pari materia, see consistency.
  • Ratione legi stricta, see strict meaning.
  • Ab auctoritate, see authority ; precedent.
  • A completudine, see comprehensiveness.
  • A coherentia, see non-contradiction ; consistency.
  • Ab exemplo, ab exempli,  see precedent ; example.
  • Systemic arg.
  • Naturalistic arg., see weight of circumstances.
  • From the same kind, or ejusdem generis, same genus.
    

Thus, we obtain twenty-two different legal topics, which can be reduced to nineteen, if we acknowledge that the argument from preparatory work, the historical argument, the psychological argument, and the teleological argument refer, under different labels, to what Perelman calls the « intention of the legislator » (1979, p. 55).

3. Groupings

These twenty-two legal argumentation schemes can be divided into the following sub-groups.

(i) General arguments, that are not specific to law, and are operative in any serious argumentative situation.

• • From consistency (a coherentia).
  • A pari, a simili, analogy.
  • From genus.
  • A contrario.
  • A fortiori
.
  • From absurdity.
  • From precedent.
  • From authority.

In law, the latter two forms of argument are based on, and reinforce, the historical continuity of legal practice.

(ii) Arguments that legitimize interpretations based on the conditions under which the law was produced. Arguments based on:

• • Preparatory work.
  • History (of the law).
  • Intent of the legislator, teleological argument.
  • Psychological argument.

(iii) Arguments that appeal to the systemic character of the code of laws to legitimize an interpretation. Arguments based on

• • Systemic considerations.
  • Coherence, a coherentia, in pari materia).
  • From superfluity, ab inutilitate.
  • Comprehensiveness, a completudine.
  • Necessity : all articles of the code are necessary and non redundant.
  • The title of the section of the code, a rubrica.

These argument schemes assume that the text to be interpreted is “perfect”,

• • It contains no contradictions
  • It contains no redundancies
  • All content is necessary (nothing is missing)
  • All elements are interconnected and have meaning only by virtue of their relation within the structure.

Ultimately, all the properties of a formal system are attributed to the code. This emphasis on the systemic nature of the legal code can result in a mechanical view of the law and its application.

Lawyers establish precise definitions of these forms of argumentation in law, illustrate them with concrete cases, determine the conditions for their application, and address the problems connected with their construction and use.

4. Prescriptive Scope of Argumentation Schemes

This set of arguments allows the law to be interpreted for application to specific cases. When used in the imperative form, it serves as a guide for drafting laws. For example, as the argument from superfluity (economic argument, or argument from uselessness) assumes that laws are not redundant; so the legislators strive to avoid any redundancy when drafting of laws. The same applies to other interpretive principles.

5. Generalization to Other Fields,

See Interpretation

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[1] Legal tradition-Trahan.doc. P. 21-22.
www.lsulawlist.com/lsulawoutlines/index. php?folder=/TRADITIONS (09-20-2013)

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IRONY

Irony is a key argumentative strategy, positioned somewhere between discourse destruction and refutation. It mocks speech that purports to be dominant or hegemonic, by implicitly referencing irrefutable material evidence available in the context.

1. Irony as Refutation

Irony originates from a hegemonic D₀ discourse. A hegemonic discourse dominates a group, has the power to direct or legitimize its actions and opposes the discourse or the sentiment of a minority.

In a situation Sit_1, participant S1, the future « ironized » (= target of the irony) claims that D₀.
S2, the future ironist, disagrees with D₀. but submits to it, even though he is not convinced of its validity.

S1_1 (future target)   — What about taking a shortcut to the top?
S2_1 (future ironist)   — Hmm… It seems that there might be icy zones.
S1_2                             — No problem, I know the place, it’s easy! (= D₀)
S2_2                             — Oh well then…

Later, in situation Sit_2, when the group finds itself on a rather slippery icy slope, the ironist adopts S1’s discourse, precisely when the circumstances render it untenable:

S2_Ironic  — No problem, I know the place. It’s easy!

This last statement sounds strange.
— Under the current circumstances, it is absurd.
— If the original discussion has been forgotten, it is interpreted as a humorous euphemism or antiphrasis.
— If the original discussion is still fresh in the participants’ mind, then the statement is entirely ironic. S2_Ironic repeats S1_2, when the circumstances show that the statement is obviously, and tragically, false.

This mechanism is similar to an ad hominem argument in that what the target says is opposed to what he does, and this is obvious to all involved. Since the facts are self-evident, S1 is shown to be wrong and is seen as having misled the company. Irony combines malice and humor, see dismissal.

Ironic destruction and scientific refutation can be contrasted as follows:

Scientific Refutation	Ironic Discourse Destruction
S1 says ‘D0’	S1 says ‘D0’ in situation Sit_1
The opponent S2 quotes D0, and explicitly attributes D0 to S1	The ironist, S2, says ‘D’ in situation Sit_2: — D repeats, echoes D0 — D = D0 is not explicitly related to its occurrence in Sit_1, but the connection is easy to make. Either everyone remembers, or S2 provides a cue to remember (e.g. S2 imitates S1′s voice)
The opponent refutes D0 with explicit and conclusive arguments	Contextual evidence from Sit_2, destroys D = D0. This evidence is so obvious that (S2 thinks that) it needs no explanation.

2. Countering the ironic move

Ducrot uses the following example,which consists of a statement and a description of its context:

Speaker – I told you yesterday that Peter was coming to see me today, and you didn’t believe me. Since Peter is here today, I can say to you in an ironic way,‘You see, Peter didn’t come to see me’. (Ducrot 1984, p. 211).

Some time ago, in S°, the speaker and his partner « You«  debated about whether Peter would come. The speaker, the (future) ironist lost the debate. Now, Peter’s presence is offered as a conclusive evidence to prove You wrong and silence You.
However, the game may not be over yet. Irony is primarily studied based on isolated ironic statements, but it is a sequential phenomenon with two types of developments, depending on the target’s reaction. If the target remains silent and embarrassed, the ironist wins. If the target reacts, the game continues. Here, You could reply that one can certainly see that Peter is there, but that does not prove that Peter came to see the speaker:

— No, Peter did not come to see you. He actually came to see your sister.

This refutation or reversal of irony uses the motive substitution scheme.

3. Irony Can Do Without Markers

In 1979–1980, a youth protest movement In Zurich, Switzerland, made quite an impression on the city’s residents.

Two television programs caused extreme shock in German-speaking Switzerland. The first, a popular program, was disrupted by members of the “Movement”, who stopped it. The second program, later referred to as “Müller’s Show”[1], featured two militants dressed as members of the Zurich bourgeoisie. The militants seriously expressed the opinion that the ‘Movement’ should be repressed with the utmost severity, and that the autonomous center should be shut down. Following the shock of the second show, the sensationalist media and certain individuals orchestrated a defamation campaign. Incidentally, the term müllern entered the movement’s vocabulary. Creating paradoxical situations was one of the movement’s specialties.
Gérald Béroud, [Work Values and the Youth Movement], 1982[2].

The ironic discourse D consists of strictly repeating the primary discourse D₀, with a straight face. D and D₀ coincide perfectly. The « ironized » discourse D₀ is the typical bourgeois argumentative discourse, taken with all its contents and modes of expression, its dress codes, gestures, body postures and modes of argumentation intact. It follows the bourgeois norms for maintaining a calm and courteous atmosphere, while ritually invoking a a ritual counter-discourse in the role of the “honorable opponent” while ignoring the real disagreements as well as the power and strength relations. Müller’s sarcastic behavior ironizes and negates the entire practice of the politely argued, contradictory, quasi-Popperian mode of discussion.

Irony is a borderline case of an argumentation based on self-evidence. It emerges dramatically in situations where arguing is futile or impossible. The following remarks were written in Czechoslovakia, when it was under the dictatorial rule of a communist regime.

In intellectual circles, the attitude toward official propaganda is often one of contempt, similar to the contempt one feels toward a drunkard’s drunkenness or a graphomaniac’s writing. Since intellectuals especially appreciate the subtleties of a certain absurd humor, they may enjoy reading the editorials in Rude Pravo [3] or the political discourse printed there. However, it is very rare to find someone who takes them seriously.
Petr Fidelius, [Lies Must be Taken Seriously], 1984[3]

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[1] The names of the two delegates of the movement, Hans and Anna Müller.

[2] Gérald Béroud, “Valeur travail et mouvement de jeunes”, Revue Internationale d’Action Communautaire 8/48, 1982, note 62, p. 28. Television program (in German) available at: [http://www.srf.ch/player/video?id=05f18417-ec5b-4b94-a4bf-293312e56afe] (09-20-2013).

[3] Petr Fidelius, Prendre le mensonge au sérieux [taking lies seriously]. Esprit, 91-92, 1984, p. 16. The Rude Pravo was the newspaper of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, during the communist period.

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INTERPRETATION AND ARGUMENTATION

1. The arts of understanding

Hermeneutics, exegesis and interpretation are the arts involved in the understanding of complex texts such as the Bible, the Criminal Code, the Quran, the Iliad, the Communist Manifesto, the Talmud, the Upanishads, etc. (Boeckh [1886], p. 133; Gadamer [1967], p. 277; p. 280). Texts require an exegesis because they are written in forgotten languages, or are historically distant, or are hermetic. The fellowship believes that vital things depend on the precise meaning of such texts. This meaning is not immediately accessible to the contemporary reader. It must be established and preserved to ensure its accurate transmission.

Hermeneutics is a philosophical approach to interpretation, defined as an effort to share a form of life—a search for empathy with the text, its author, and the language and culture in which it was produced.
Thus, hermeneutic understanding is opposed to the physical explanations sought in the natural sciences, where “to explain” means “to subsume under a physical law”.

Psychoanalysis and linguistics have demonstrated that ordinary actions and words also can require interpretation.

The theoretical language of interpretation becomes complicated by the morphology of the lexicon, as is always the case when a theory develops within ordinary language. What is the difference between hermeneutics, exegesis and interpretation?
The three respective lexical series contain a term designating the agent exegete, hermeneutist, interpreter. Two of the series contain a noun referring to the process and result, interpretation, exegesis. These terms can also refer to the field of study, as can hermeneutics. Only one series contains a verb:  to interpret: This verb will therefore be used for the three series, imposing its meaning on the entire lexical field.

In the philological and historical sense, exegesis is a critical activity whose object is typically a text belonging to a cultural or religious tradition. The text is examined in terms of its material conditions of production and original practices, linguistic features (grammar and vocabulary), rhetorical features (genre), and historical and institutional context.  It also considers the genesis of the work and its links with the life and milieu of the (sometimes unknown) author(s).
Philological exegesis establishes the text and reveals its meaning(s). Thus it contributes thus to resolving conflicting interpretations and articulating different levels of interpretation. It stabilizes the “literal meaning”, or the core meaning of the text, thereby determining the material to be interpreted. Broadly speaking, exegesis encompasses interpretation; both aim to bridge the historical gap between the text and its  contemporary readers.

The purpose of philological exegesis is to express the text’smeaning. It seeks to create conditions that allow readers to project themselves into the past.
In contrast, Interpretative exegesis (or interpretation, hermeneutics) reformulates that meaning to make it accessible to a contemporary reader; It actualizes the meaning of the text. The connection between hermeneutics and the rhetoric of religious preaching lies here.
While exegesis aims to understand the meaning as expressed by the text; interpretation and commentary expand that meaning beyond the text itself. Unlike philological exegesis, interpretation can be allegorical. Philological interpretation is exoteric, whereas hermeneutics can be esoteric.

2. Rhetoric and Hermeneutics

Hermeneutics works on texts and attempts to make them understandable to a distant audience. In this sense, hermeneutics as the “art of understanding” is the counterpart of rhetoric as the « art of persuasion. » Their complementary directions of fit are as follows:
Rhetoric takes the perspective of a speaker or writer striving to persuade an audience, the listener or reader. In contrast, hermeneutics takes the perspective of a reader or listener seeking to understand a speaker or writer addressing them through a distant enigmatic text.

Rhetoric relates to live speech, and considers the beliefs of the audience, in order to minimize effort. Hermeneutics relates to reading distant speech: the reader must adapt to the text’s meaning
Together, hermeneutics and rhetoric establish dual cultural communicative competence, to understand and to be understood. Rejecting rhetoric in favor of pure intellectual demand shifts the burden of understanding onto the reader, and thus requires hermeneutics.

3. Interpretation and Argumentation

The interpretive process applies to any component of discourse , from words to whole texts, in order to derive their meaning, and this meaning is necessarily expressed in another discourse. The interpretive relation thus links two discourses, and the link between the interpreting and the interpreted texts is made according to transition rules that are not different from the general argumentation schemes.

In argumentation, an argument is any statement that expressing a true or accepted view of reality. In interpretation, the data—the argument statement—is the utterance to be interpreted, in its precise form in the text. Once this statement is available, the linguistic mechanisms are the same. If we consider the argument-conclusion relation in its greatest generality, we will say that the conclusion is what the speaker has in mind when he presents the argument, and the conclusion is the argument’s meaning. Thus, the argumentative relation is no different from the interpretive relation. When the listener or reader has grasped the conclusion of the text, they have achieved an authentic understanding of that text. This means that  there is always a lack of meaning  within the statement, and the statement is only given meaning in relation to a later statement. Meaning is thus constructed in an endless process, see orientation.

As with argumentation, interpretation is valid to the extent that it conforms to a transitional laws accepted by the interpreting community concerned, such as the community of lawyers or theologians for example:

The rabbis regarded the Pentateuch as a unified, divinely communicated text, consistent in all its parts. Consequently, by adopting certain principles of interpretation (middot; “measures,” “norms”). it was possible to uncover deeper meanings and to provide for a more complete application of its laws
Jacobs & Derovan, 2007, p. 25

The same principles apply to the Muslim legal-religious interpretation (Khallaf [1942]), or to legal interpretation. The forms of argumentation used in law are the same as those used in interpreting all texts considered to have a systematic character. This is because they are considered to be the best expression of the legal-rational views of the time, either because they come from a divine source or an individual genius, see juridical Arguments.

This postulate of strong, even perfect coherence is fundamental to the structuralist interpretation of texts, as well as to the interpretation of legal or religious texts, as mentioned in the previous quotation. It may conflict with the genetic argument which constructs the meaning of a text through inferences justified by “preparatory works”, such as the manuscripts, or by the author’s intentions, as revealed , for example, by their correspondence. Genetic arguments are one aspect of the philological interpretation of the text.  True believers may view them with suspicion, because genetic arguments assume that the text has a non-divine, at least partially human, origin.

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INTERPRETATION as Argument

The concept of interpretation is ambiguous.

— In general, it refers to the process of understanding complex texts, see interpretation, exegesis, hermeneutics.
— In rhetorical argumentation, the word interpretation may refer to:

1. A particular kind of stasis.
2. A figure of repetition.
3. An argument scheme, see motives and reasons

1. Stasis of interpretation

In the theory of stasis, the stasis of interpretation corresponds to a specific case of contradiction between the parties, the « legal question. » In court, or, more generally, whenever a debate is based on a written text, and especially on a normative rule, an  “interpretation issue ” arises when the two parties base their conclusions on different readings of the text. For example, one party,  may base their argument on the letter of the law, while the other argues from its spirit.

2. Figure of repetition

As a figure of discourse, interpretation consists in duplicating a first term by immediately following it with a quasi-synonymous term that is more easily understood.
In the sequence “Term₁, Term₂”, T₂ interprets T₁, meaning it explains or clarifies T₁‘s meaning.
T₂ may be a common-language equivalent of a technical term  T₁:

We found marasmius oreades, I mean, Scotch bonnets.

The interpretation may be applied to a word or an entire phrase and retain its argumentative orientation. :

The President announced a policy of controlling spending, a “sober state” policy.

However, an opponent’s interpretation may reverse the argumentative orientation of T₁:

The president announced a policy of controlling spending—that is, a policy of austerity

This change is marked by the introduction of a reformulating connective (one could say an interpretive connective) such as « in other words,« , « i.e., » « that is to say », « which means that.« 

3. Refutation by Interpretation

The Treatise on Argumentation classifies « interpretatio » as a “figure of choice”, and offers an example from Marcus Annaeus Seneca, (also known as Seneca the Elder, or the Rhetorician (-54, +39)). Seneca the Elder is the author of the Controversiae, a collection of legal cases, that were debated by various rhetoricians of his time, in an oratorical contest.

Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s example is taken from the first case in the collection ([1958] p. 233), in which a group of expert orators debates the ingenious story of a son who feeds his uncle despite his father’s prohibition. When the tables turn, the father is in trouble, and the son is now feeding his father in spite of his uncle’s prohibition. Thus, the unfortunate son is exiled twice, for the same reason, first by his father, and then by his uncle.

The following passage reports the words of the lawyers who addressed the father on behalf of the son. First speak the lawyer, Fuscus Arellius, followed by Cestius.

Arellius Fuscus concludes by suggesting a question: ‘I thought that, in spite of your prohibition, you wanted your brother to be fed. You seemed to imply as much while delivering your defense, or so I thought.’
Cestius was bolder. He didn’t just say, ‘I thought you wanted it,’ but ‘You wanted it and you still want it today.’ He revealed all the reasons that compelled the father to want it so and concluded, ‘Why are you driving me away? No doubt you are indignant that I have taken your place. »
Seneca the Elder, or the Rhetorician (54 BC – 39 AD),
[Controversies and Suasories], (written at the end of his life).[1]

The two lawyers’ arguments align. Fuscus Arellius argues that the father may have given his command reluctantly. Cestius then « goes further », attributing to the father an intention contrary to his words, “You wanted it and you still want it today.”
Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca view this as an « argumentative figure or a stylistic figure depending on its effect on the audience » ([1958], p. 172), see figure.
The lawyers’ words are clearly argumentative. First, they introduce a stasis, a question about the nature (the qualification) of the act under investigation: “You wanted me to disobey you. So, don’t punish me, but congratulate me for fulfilling your secret wish!”. Second, they implement the « private will versus. public will » scheme by substituting the private, sincere, will, for the publicly affirmed will, made under social pressure, see motives.

4. Refutation Through Interpretation vs. Performative Analysis

In this example, interpretation is an instrument of refutation and defense that opposes an accusation based on a command, that is, on a  performative speech act. Austin illustrates his discovery of performativity with an example borrowed from Euripides’s Hippolytus of  (I, 612). According to Austin, a command, is valid as soon as it is uttered, regardless of the speaker’s intention.

Surely the words must be spoken ‘seriously’ and so as to be taken ‘seriously’? […]. But we are apt to have a feeling that their being serious consists in their being uttered as (merely) the outward and visible sign, for convenience or other record or for information, of an inward and spiritual act: from which it is but a short step to go on to believe or to assume without realizing that for many purposes the outward utterance is a description, true or false, of the occurrence of the inward performance. The classic expression of this idea is to be found in the Hippolytus (1. 612), where Hippolytus says, “my tongue swore to, but my heart (or mind or other backstage artiste) did not”. Thus “I promise to…” obliges me — puts on record my spiritual assumption of a spiritual shackle.
It is gratifying to observe in this very example how excess of profundity, or rather solemnity, at once paves the way for immorality. (Austin, 1962, pp. 9-10)

Like the son and the father in Seneca’s example, Hippolytus and the nurse, are engaged in highly argumentative interactions. In such situations, semantics, pragmatics, and morality can be discussed and argued. The son acknowledges the facts (he fed his uncle) and pleads not guilty to the charge of disobedience. He claims that the verbal command, what the father said, did not express the the father’s true will. This is a typical example of the contradiction Austin describes between what language actually does and what goes on in the mind of the speaker.

However, it should be emphasized that Austin’s binary distinction is based solely on the verbal aspects of language and excludes all paraverbal modalizations of commands, especially those conveyed through facial expressions. Most importantly in the case of Hippolytus, it also excludes the context of the command.

Thus, the question of the prohibition’s validity remains. According to the father and Austin, the prohibition is valid because the father uttered the relevant formula, and the son is guilty of the double Austinian sin of analytic fallacy and moral perversity.
However, the analysis offered by the Austinian father is questionable. What the father really said is problematic and must be interpreted in the context of the speech act.

This situation is analogous to that of ironic utterances. The addressee hears something incongruous with the context, said by someone who usually speaks seriously. This forces the addressee to interpret of this puzzling utterance.
Similarly, the father has uttered a prohibition that contradicts the natural (doxic) law of brotherly love. The son finds this inconsistent with his father’s true character. Perhaps the father’s verbal utterance was accompanied by a paralinguistic cue, indicating a different intention? Anyway, the son concludes that the command was not given in his father’s true, natural voice but rather in his social voice. Therefore, he must interpret the incongruity.
As Fuscus Arelius argues, the son was justified in feeding his uncle.

Deciding that this latter interpretation is “the correct one” sides with the son and against the father. Deciding that the Austinian interpretation is correct sides with the father against the son. In either case, choosing an analysis means siding with one party or the other.

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[1] Translated from the French edition used by Perelman, Sénèque le Rhéteur, Controverses et Suasoires. Translated by H. Bornecque. T. 1. Paris: Garnier Frères, 1932, p. 23-24. https://archive.org/details/Controverseset Suasoires.

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INTERACTION, DIALOGUE, POLYPHONY

Rhetorical approaches to argumentation focus on monological data, whereas dialectical approaches, focus on conventionalized dialogues. Interactional approaches apply the concepts and methods of verbal interaction analysis to everyday argumentation as needed.
Argumentation is necessarily two-sided, developing as both monological and interactional activities. Opposing these two types of argumentative activities would be pointless. Argumentative issues can be relevantly discussed in a variety of speech formats, ranging from philosophical treatises to internet forums to the dinner table conversations, see argumentation (I).

1. Interaction, Dialogue, Argumentative Dialogue

Dialogues and conversations, are two types of verbal interactions. They are characterized by the use of oral language, the physical presence of face-to-face interlocutors, and a key feature: an organized, continuous chain of alternating turns of speaking.

Dialogue is first practiced between humans, and, by extension, between humans and machines. This is not necessarily the case with interaction: particles interact, but do not engage in dialogue. You can refuse dialogue, but not interaction. Social organizations necessarily interact, and they may engage in dialogue to advance their respective interests or resolve their disputes.

Dialogue implies an egalitarian situation. The concept of interaction considers the  inequalities of the participants’ the social status and their specific contributions to the ongoing common task. Interaction focuses on coordinating language with other forms of action (cooperative or competitive) that the participants carry out in complex material environments, including objects manipulation. At work, language is interactional, not conversational. Work conversations tend to exclude work, or overlap with purely automatic work.

The interactive perspective paved the way for studying argumentation in the workplace and its role in acquiring and developing scientific knowledge in laboratory activities. In these activities, argumentative sequences are produced as regulatory episodes, in coordination with the manipulation of objects.

Dialogue has an “aboutness” that distinguishes it from ordinary conversation, which tends to jump from topic to topic. In ordinary usage, the word dialogue has a quasi-prescriptive positive orientation: dialogue is good, we need dialogue. Philosophies of dialogue tend to be strongly humanistic. Those open to dialogue oppose fundamentalists who are closed to it. When two parties engage in dialogue, they commit to negotiation, and ending the dialogue can lead to violence. In this sense, as suggested by the title of Tannen’s book, The Argument Culture: Moving from Debate to Dialogue (1998),  debate, as a potentially acrimonious and vindictive argument₂ virtually devoid of reasoning, can be contrasted with reasoned dialogue. We see a progress in the transition from the former to the latter.

Formal approaches to argumentation as a dialogue game first appeared in the second half of the 20th century, as a development of the Aristotelian dialectical rules, see dialectic; logic of dialogue.

2. Dialogism, Polyphony, Intertextuality

The concepts of dialogism, polyphony and intertextuality allow us to apply an interaction-based view of argumentation to be applied to monological argumentative discourse and written texts. Monological discourse is defined as a possibly long and complex, spoken or written discourse by one speaker .

Socrates defines thinking, in its essence, as a special type of dialogue,

a talk which the soul has with itself about the objects under its consideration. (Theaetetus, 189e) [1]

This definition can be used to characterize thinking as an argumentative process in natural language.

2.1 Dialogism

In rhetoric, dialogism is a figure of speech that involves the direct reproduction of a dialogue as a passage within a literary or a philosophical composition.
Mikhail Bakhtin introduced the concept of dialogism, or polyphony, to describe a specific type of fictional arrangement. From a nineteenth-century classical perspective, the fictional characters are, in a sense, either puppets , or supervised by the narrator. Their actions and speeches are framed according to how they contribute to the plot. In a dialogic disposition, however, the narrator is less dominant, and the characters tend to develop autonomous discourses and are relatively free from the obligation to contribute to the plot.

2.2 Polyphony

In music, polyphony « consists of two or more simultaneous lines of independent melody, as opposed to a musical texture with only one voice, monophony » (Wikipedia, Polyphony).
Bakhtin’s concepts of dialogism and polyphony, polyphony can be used metaphorically to describe phenomena corresponding to the monological presentation of a dialogic situation by a single speaker, called the animator of speech, in Goffman’s vocabulary (Ducrot, 1988).

Polyphony theory conceptualizes monological discourse as a polyphonic space, that articulates a series of clearly identified voices, each singing its own tune, that is, expressing a particular point of view. These voices are not attributed to specific individuals, as they are in direct quotations.

A polyphonic approach to connectives and negation has proven particularly fruitful. For instance, the statement “Peter will not attend the meeting” presents two voices. The first voice affirms “Peter will attend the meeting”, and the second voice rejects the first with a “No!” The speaker identifies with the second voice, that of the Principal, assuming responsibility for what is said, see connective; denial.

Notably, a particular Animator can develop a two-sided discourse, that articulates arguments and counterarguments, as in a regular two-person argumentative interaction. This internalized argumentative dialogue is internalized, in an internal confrontation free from the constraints associated with face-to-face interaction. This occcurs when, a character engages in monologic deliberation, as in theater. The polyphonic speaker speaks in one voice, and then in an opposed voice. Finally this dual speaker rejects one side of the argument and accept the other, identifying with that voice.

According to Ducrot, the polyphonic speaker acts as a theater director, staging the voices, and choosing to identify with one of them, see role; persuasion. This concept of identification is central to the theory of argumentation within language. First, the speaker introduces the enunciators, the sources of the points of view evoked in the utterance. Next, the speaker identifies himself with one of these enunciators, this identification is indicated by the grammatical structure. For example, as in the case of denial (see above), in a coordinated stucture “P, but Q” the speaker stages two voices and identifies with one of them, here the second voice asserting Q and its implied conclusion. It should be emphasized that this concept of identification is completely different from to the psychological concept of identification that is discussed in connection discussed in the context of persuasion.

Polyphony is not limited to elaborate monologues. A conversational turn, which is dialogical by nature, can also be polyphonic, as demonstrated by the use of negation. Discrepancies between the interlocutor as a real person and the interlocutor as framed by the speaker can be seen from a polyphonic perspective, see resumption of speech.

The two adjectives, dialogic and dialogical, both refer to dialogue. It might be  interesting to specialize the use of these words to cover distinct aspects of discourse. One could use dialogic, to cover the polyphonic and intertextual aspects of discourse on the one hand, and dialogical to cover the interaction-related phenomena (including their dialogic aspects) on the other. In any case, full-blown argumentation articulates two disputing voices, it is a dialogical activity.

2.3 Intertextuality

According to the classical monolithic view of the speaker, rhetoric considers the arguer to be the source of the speech which he controls and directs at will. However, according to the concept of intertextuality, speech and discourse have their own permanent reality and dynamics, that exist prior to their utterance by an individual. In this sense, speakers are secondary to their speech. Intertextuality diminishes the speaker’s role, considering them only as an agent that  coordinates and reformulates discourses that have already been developed and solidified elsewhere.
Speakers are not the intellectual source of what is said, rather they are the conscious or unconscious vocalizers of pre-existing content. Discourse does not originate with the speaker, rather the speaker is produced by the discourse. Compared to the classical image of the creative orator « inventing » his arguments, this view of the speaker as a machine that repeats and reformulates inherited arguments and positions is particularly humbling.

In the case of argumentation, these intertextual relations are considered through the notion of an argumentative script, S. Script.

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[1] Plato, Theaetetus (189-190). In Plato, Complete Works. Translated by M. J. Levett, rev. Myles Burnyeat. Edited, with an introduction and notes, by John M. Cooper and D. S. Hutchinson. Indianapolis/Cambridge, Hackett. 1997.

SOCRATES:  Now by ‘thinking’ do you mean the same as I do?
THEAETETUS: What do you mean by it?
SOCRATES: A talk which the soul has with itself about the objects under its consideration. Of course, I’m only telling you my idea in all ignorance; but this is the kind of picture I have of it.
It seems to me that the soul when it thinks is simply carrying on a discussion in which it asks itself questions and answers them itself, affirms and denies. And when it arrives at something definite, either by a gradual process or a sudden leap, when it affirms one thing consistently and without divided counsel, we call this its judgment.
So, in my view, to judge is to make a statement, and a judgment is a statement which is not addressed to another person or spoken aloud, but silently addressed to oneself. And what do you think?
THEAETETUS: I agree with that.

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INTENT of the author of the text

1. In Law

The argument of the legislator’s intentions interprets the law in accordance with the purpose of the legislative body. The purpose is determined by examining the legislative act itself, its social and historical context, the issues the legislator wanted to address, and the desired solution.

The intention of the legislator can also be determined by reference to the spirit of the law: this is called a psychological argument (Tarello, quoted in Perelman 1979, 58).

This form of argumentation is recognized as relevant in law, see legal logic; appeal to the letter (of the law); strict meaning (of the law).
The legislator’s intention can be determined through a historical, or genetic argument, using data from the law’s history. This history is evident in the preparatory works, the “whereas” section of the law, and parliamentary debates leading to its drafting.
When relying on the previous state of the law, the historical argument assumes that the legislator is conservative and that new legislation must be interpreted within the context of the legal tradition (the presumption of legal continuity).

This argument contrasts with arguments based strictly on the letter or on its strict literal meaning, of the text, as written in the code.

This argument is also known as the teleological argument. Teleology is a philosophical doctrine asserting that every phenomenon can be explained by its end, or  intention.
Teleology answers the questions: « What is it for? » « What is its good?”.

2. In Literature and Philosophy

The scope of this class of arguments extends beyond the legal field. They can be used with any text that an institution recognizes as valid.
For instance, in philosophy or literature, an interpretation of a text may appeal to the author’s intention. This intention can be inferred from  preliminary work, and  data, (e.g., drafts, notes, manuscripts, declared intentions); from psychological data, such as the spirit of the work and the author’s mindset at the time, as understood by the interpreter; and also from the historical context at large.
However, such arguments are considered misleading in structuralist literary analysis, which advocates an immanent approach to literary texts, see fallacy 1.

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INFERENCE

1. A Primitive Concept

The concept of inference is primitive, meaning it can only be defined based on equally complex concepts or through an example of inference from the field of logic. For instance, Brody (1967, pp. 66–67) defines inference as « the derivation of a proposition (the conclusion) from a set of other propositions (the premises). » Inference establishes new truths based on known truths.
In an extended sense, the term « inference » refers to any derivation of an accepted proposition based on the prior acceptance of other propositions.

There are two types of inference, inference strictly speaking and immediate inference.
– In immediate inference, the conclusion is derived from a single proposition, see proposition, §4.
– Strict, or direct inference is based on two propositions, its premises, see syllogism.

2. Deductive and Inductive Inferences in Traditional Logic

Traditional logic distinguishes between deductive inferences (deduction) and inductive inferences (induction). The valid conclusion from true premises in a syllogistic deduction  is necessarily true (« apodictic »),  while an inductive conclusion is only probable.
Analogical inference is accepted only as a heuristic tool, with no evidential value, see analogy.

Generalization / Restriction – Deduction and induction are considered two complementary processes.
– Induction goes from the particular to the general, or from the general to the most general, « This Syldavian is redheaded, therefore, Syldavians are redheaded. »
– Deduction, on the other hand, goes from the most general to the least general, « All men are mortal, therefore Athenians are mortal,” and then to the individual, « Socrates is mortal. »
However, syllogistic deduction can also generalize:
« All horses are mammals, all mammals are vertebrates, therefore all horses are vertebrates. »

Other forms of reasoning – According to Aristotle’s view of rhetoric, the enthymeme is the argumentative counterpart of deductive inference, and the example is the counterpart of inductive inference.
Wellman (1971) considers conduction to be a special kind of inference on a par with deduction and induction.
Since Toulmin (1958), the study of everyday reasoning has developed on the basis of an open number of reasoning schemes (argument schemes).

3. Direct Inference and Analytic Statements

An analytic proposition is a proposition that is true “by definition”, i.e., by virtue of its meaning. Good definitions are analytically true, “a single person is an adult unmarried adult.”

Direct logical inference is based on quantifiers or “empty words.”
Immediate analytical inference operates on the meaning of the “full words” of the basic proposition, « He is single, so he is not married. »

In arguments such as, “This is our duty, therefore we must do it,” the proposition “we must do it,” introduced by therefore,  is semantically contained in the argument “it is our duty.” By definition a duty is something that people must do. This conclusion, if it is a conclusion at all, is direct.
More generally, an analytic inference is one in which the conclusion is embedded in the argument, and the conclusion merely develops the argument’s semantic content. For example, If I’m told that my colleague recently “quit smoking” I can analytically infer that he or she smoked in the past, see. presupposition.

Consider the following example:

Talking about the birth of the gods implies that at one time the gods did not exist. Talking about the death of the gods is just as impious as talking about their birth. For this, your colleague was recently sentenced to death.

Birth is defined as the “beginning of life.” However, this definition does not directly imply the threatening conclusion; an additional step is required to explicitly define “beginning”, which establishes an equivalence between the time after death and the time before birth. For this reason, the conclusion does not seem as obvious as in the previous cases.

3. Pragmatic Inference

This concept explains how utterances are interpreted in discourse. In the dialogue:

S1    — Did you see anyone I know at the party?
?S2    — Oh yes, Peter, Paul, and Mary.

From S2’s answer, S1 will infer that S2 did not meet anyone else whom they both know. This inference is based on the maxim of quantity: “When asked a question, provide the most accurate information possible, both quantitatively and qualitatively”.
Therefore, if S2 met Bruno at the party–a person known to S1–then S2 can be said to have lied to S1 by omission, see cooperation.

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