METAPHOR, ANALOGY, MODEL

In Ancient Greek, ‘metaphor’ means ‘transfer. » In the Poetics (1457b), Aristotle defines metaphor as ‘the application to a thing of a name foreign to it. In the Poetics  Aristotle defines metaphor as « the application to a thing of a name foreign to it by a change from genus to species, from species to genus, from genus to species, or according to a relationship of analogy » (1457b). This definition actually encompasses the field of tropes or figures of words, see metonymy. In this sense, the metaphor is indeed the ‘queen of figures.’

Metaphors can be defined by the following features and perspectives.
(a) Metaphor is a matter of discourse.
(b) A metaphor occurs when a reality is designated by a ‘strange’ term in a discourse. The term is strange because it does not fit into the isotopy of the discourse in which it appears.
(c) The receiver is surprised and tries to make sense of the term.
(d) They find an interpretation based on analogy that makes sense and introduces a new perspective on the subject under discussion.
(e) From an argumentative point of view, the metaphor is successful if it provides  a cognitive benefit to the receiver.

From a rhetorical point of view, the metaphor is valued as a cryptic analogy, whose meaning is left to the audience to decipher. The main difference between a metaphor and an analogy is that an analogy keeps the two domains it relates to separate and distinct, while a metaphor tends to conflate them.

1. Metaphor on trial

In his Rhetoric, Aristotle considers metaphor to be the most effective instrument of persuasion in ordinary discourse. However, from the perspective of an anti-rhetorical theory of argumentation, metaphor is highly misleading. But metaphor is also a powerful cognitive tool for building representations, and better understanding complex situations. Metaphor applies the language of a model, i.e. the Resource domain (the metaphorical term) to an actual situation, the Problematic domain, to which the (sometimes missing) « metaphorized » term belongs, see structural analogy.

If metaphor is defined as a figure, and figures are defined as ornaments, then metaphor is misleading in all its dimensions, see. fallacy; ornamental fallacy. The metaphorical statement is false: “The voter is a calf” said Charles de Gaulle. but the voter (proper, literal term) is not a calf (figurative, metaphorical term) the voter is a human being. Metaphor systematically commits a category mistake. It can also be accused of creating ambiguity, because it introduces a parasitic level of meaning: the figurative meaning, which runs parallel to the proper, standard meaning.

The metaphor creates a surprise and introduces an emotion (ad passiones fallacy); it entertains the audience (ad populum fallacy), thus sacrificing docere (teaching information) to placere (pleasure). It transforms the rational arguer into an actor (ad ludicrum fallacy). Therefore metaphor is the discursive distractor par excellence, leading the audience down on a false path, and confusing the honest literalist in his search for truth, see relevance; red herring; resumption of discourse.

Therefore, metaphor is, and should be, banished from serious argumentative discourse, as well as from scientific language. It can only be helpful if it is reformulated as a comparison (Ortony 1979, p. 191). Nevertheless, it should be emphasized that metaphor is active and welcome in stimulating creativity and facilitating the transmission and popularization of science and science education.

2. Metaphor, the Ultimate Weapon of Persuasion?

Persuasion, pistis, is produced in three ways “(1) by working on the emotions of the judges themselves, (2) by giving them the right impression of the character of the speaker, or (3) by proving the truth of the statements made” (Aristotle, Rhet., 1403b10; RR p. 397), in the latter case, persuasion arises “from the facts themselves” (ibid).

Ideally, the issue should be discussed based on facts and evidence: “we ought in fairness to fight our case with no help beyond the bare facts: nothing, therefore should matter except the proof of those facts” (ibid 1404a1; RR p. 399). But ordinary people are not that perfect. “Owing to the defects of our hearers”, and of our “political institutions”, “the arts of language cannot help having a small but real importance” in public discourse and education-but not in science: “Nobody uses fine language when teaching geometry” (1404a1-10, RR. p. 399).

Fine language is therefore the most effective tool of persuasion. Persuasion by emotion (pathos) and image (ethos) is produced, orally, by the “oratorical action”, and in writing, by the stylistic arrangement of facts, “because speeches of the written or literary kind owe more to their diction than to their thought” (1404a15; p. 401). Metaphor is the supreme tool of written discourse “both in poetry and in prose”. It “gives style clearness, charm and distinction as nothing else can” (1405a1-10; RR, p. 405). The conclusion is clear: Metaphor is the ultimate weapon of persuasion. It is the art of “[hiding one’s] purpose successfully” (1404b20; RR, p. 403), and charming the audience, see, logos, ethos, pathos.

Contemporary approaches to metaphor agree consider that metaphor derives this power from its intrinsic element of surprise, which results from perceiving an anomaly in the discourse, a rupture, an inconsistency, an incongruity, or a logical contradiction–in short, a discursive coup, that delights the audience. Since pleasure cannot be refuted, metaphor is considered virtually inaccessible to refutation. In reality, it is: see below, §4

3. Metaphor and Interpretive Cooperation

By using a metaphor, the speaker openly seeks the audience’s interpretive cooperation. By doing so, the speaker reinforces the importance of prior agreements. Note that the same functional explanation is given for the derivation of enthymemes from underlying syllogisms.In both cases, the enthymematic or metaphorical condensation’s argumentative function (i.e., its effectiveness and persuasiveness) is to activate the audience, see enthymeme §5.n

This analysis assumes that the nonargumentative metaphorical language, or the nonelliptical syllogism would be transparent, or less complex than the metaphorical language, and that their direct interpretation would not require the same degree of cooperation from the audience. This assumption is not self-evident.

4. Metaphor as Analogy

Metaphor provides clever solutions to the riddle of metaphor.

Metaphor is the dreamwork of language and, like all dreamwork, its interpretation reflects as much on the interpreter as on the originator. The interpretation of dreams requires collaboration between a dreamer and a waker, even if they be the same person; and the act of interpretation is itself a work of the imagination. So too, understanding a metaphor is as much a creative endeavor as making a metaphor, and as little guided by rules.
(Davidson 1978, p. 29)

In The Interpretation of Dreams (1900) Freud defines dreamwork as the process by which the latent content of a dream is covered by its manifest content, through displacement, distortion, condensation and symbolism. The metaphor “metaphor / dreamwork” is difficult to reject, even though it commits the fallacy of trying to go ad obscurum per obscurius, that is, of trying to illuminate the dark (metaphor) by the darker (dreamwork).

Metaphor is a model, (Black 1962), and an imperialist one at that, that urging one to identify the « metaphorized » reality within the metaphorical world.

L1 — We should do something about the economy.
L2 — The “economy-casino” you mean?
L1 — Oh yes! All these addicted traders should be banned from the market!

The reconstructed analogy is “as addicted gamblers are banned from casinos.”

Saying that “the voter is a calf” means saying that “the voter is hesitant, weak and can be manipulated like a calf”, where calves are the stereotypical animal that combines these characteristics. This metaphor opens up new perspectives, and legitimizes a new set of inferences about voters. If voters are categorized as calves, then they can be made to behave in ways that are contrary to their interests. For example, they can be led to a more or less metaphorical slaughterhouse.

A metaphor draws its argumentative power from an analogy that is pushed to identification. A structural analogy explicitly brings two domains together, while respecting their specificities. The domains are confronted, not assimilated. A metaphor makes the comparison implicit, negates the metaphorized domain, and assimilates  it to the metaphorical one. This is why reconstructing of the analogy underlying a metaphorical expression betrays the metaphor: it splits apart what the metaphor has united. For example, in Peter is a lion, the language referring to human beings is replaced by the language referring to lions. We are not far from the hyper-unified coherent Renaissance world where everything reflects in everything else, see analogical thinking.

5. Jumping from analogy to identity?

Analogy can be defined as a partial identity. The question of deep underlying identity, despite immediately recognizable differences plays an essential role here.

Snowdrifts are like corrugated iron.
Snowdrifts are like dunes.

The syntactic structures of these two statements are identical, both propose the image of “waves” to the interlocutor, and both share the key semantic feature of « waving. » But the second comparison is deeper and opens the way to a theory. It introduces a proportional analogy:

snow : snowdrift :: sand : dune

This analogy suggests that the wind acts similarly on snow particles and sand grains. This analogy help students construct a physical-mathematical model covering both phenomena (taking into account the differences between sand grains and snowflakes, and their respective laws of agglomeration). Starting with two seemingly different phenomena–one can know what a dune is without knowing what a snowdrift is, and vice versa–we arrive at the problem of a unifying abstract representation. Can the same physical model account for both phenomena.
Establishing an analogy is the first step toward affirming a deep identity. This shift, from explanatory analogy to identity is central to a class of arguments about analogy that considers metaphor, not only as a model but also as the essence of the metaphorized phenomenon.

6. Mole Rats “Societies”, Human Society: Metaphor or Identity?

The thesis – The following texts and information are taken from S. Braude and E. Lacey, “A Revolutionary Monarchy: The Society of Mole Rats”[2]. Mole rats are mammals, specifically hairless rats, that live in “groups” or “communities” (the difference is significant). They exhibit behaviors similar to those observed in social insects, such as ants or bees. However, this behavior has never been observed in mammals. Hairless mole rats are thus the first mammals with this kind of “social behavior.”
When we speak of « social behavior » or « community », are we using a simple analogical-metaphorical lexicon, for a pedagogical presentation, or an explanatory metaphor? Are we engaged in describing these newly identified animal behaviors in terms of existing human societal structures? As in the case of the dunes and snowdrifts, are we suggesting, that these social phenomena may well have the same foundations, in this case biological? Do human societies obey the same biological laws as the “societies” of mole rats? Are we on the way to a sociobiological theory of human societies? Have we stealthily moved from metaphorical language to identification?
This is a strategy of “slippery metaphor.” Note that this strategy reverses the Target / Resource relationship. Being closer to nature, mole rats, formerly the Target, are now a model for studying of human society, formerly the Resource.

A criticism: the words used betray a deep assimilation – To reject this assimilation, the opponent first lists the terms coming from the Resource field, the human social lexicon:

The phrase “division of labor” appears four times; as do the word “task” and “responsible”. The phrase “they take care of” appears once, as do the term “cooperation” and “subordinate.” The term “sexual status” is used three times to refer to the animal’s reproductive status. (G. Lepape, [Research], 1992)

A reply – In response to this criticism, the authors of the article limit the identification of human societies with animal groups.

G. Lepape also claims that our language makes unfair comparisons by attributing common behavioral traits to mole rats and social insects. This claim surprises us, especially when he writes, “The similarities [between hairless mole rats and social insects] are treated as true homologies.” Our paper is clear on this point: we believe that the behavior of hairless mole rats and eusocial[3] insects shows striking similarities. However, we do not see how the language used to describe these similarities suggests that a common origin of these animals constitutes the evolutionary basis of these similarities.
Braude & Lacey, ibid..

The danger here is that we might be tempted to forget that we are dealing with an analogy, which is “never more compelling than when it is abolished and ceases to be perceived as an analogy. Becoming invisible, it merges with the order of things.” (Gadoffre 1980, p. 6)

7. Against metaphors

Politicians [are] catering to a public that doesn’t understand the rationale for deficit spending, that tends to think of the government budget via analogies with family finances.
When John Boehner, the Republican leader, opposed US stimulus plans on the grounds that “American families are tightening their belt, but they don’t see the government tightening its belt”, economists cringed at the stupidity. But within a few months the very same line was showing up in Barack Obama’s speeches […]. Similarly, the Labour Party […]
(The Guardian 04-29-2015)[3]

The “stupidity » lies in the inference that « families are tightening their belts, SO the state must tighten its belt.” We can reconstruct the justification principle of this argument as a metaphor:

A state, a nation, a country is a family.

You could also think of it as a kind of composition:

The state is made up of families, families tighten their belts, the state must tighten its belt.

In any case, the “state, family” metaphor has deep roots. It is based on the etymology of the word economy, which comes from the Greek oikonomia, meaning “household management.” This metaphor is evident in the praise of leaders as “father of the nation,” and “founding father.”

Krugman considers that politicians « cater » to a public « that doesn’t understand, » by providing what they want, desire, or find amusing. Thus politicians must use metaphors, however stupid they may be, to adapt to their audience. This is indeed what Aristotle said, see above.

Happy metaphors serve to charm the audience, but the existence of unhappy metaphors must also be acknowledged. Upon hearing such a metaphor, the audience does not feel “charmed”; rather they show no pleasure, but “cringe at the stupidity”, displaying their disgust and embarrassment through their faces and bodies” (after MW, Cringe). This is exactly how metaphors can be refuted as metaphors.

Then, in a second step, one can address the substantive content, i.e., the de-metaphorized claim that « in times of economic crisis, the state must turn to austerity. » Krugman conducts this substantive refutation in the semi-technical language of economics, combining a priori refutation (theoretical unfoundedness), falsification (contradicted predictions) and pragmatic refutation (failed policies).
However, a second metaphor remains: Words such as restriction and austerity, have a clearly negative orientation. The expression “tightening one’s belt”, associated with successful dieting, weight loss and slimness, has a strong positive visual, orientation, that is inaccessible to refutation.

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[2] Braude, S. & Lacey E. (1989). Une monarchie révolutionnaire: la société des rats-taupes. La Recherche [Research], a journal of general scientific information] July-August 1989. Comments by G. Le Pape, and reply by the authors in the same magazine, Oct. 1992.

[3] “Living in a cooperative group in which usually one female and several males are reproductively active and the non-breeding individuals care for the young or protect and provide for the group eusocial termites, ants, and naked mole rats” (MW, Eusocial)

[4] www.theguardian.com/business/ng-interactive/2015/apr/29/the-austerity-delusion (15-08-16)

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Argument TO THE MATTER

The argument to the matter is on point. It addresses the relevant facts and the central issue under discussion–the substance of the controversy, the merits of the case, the heart of the matter. 

For example, a discussion of the matter is avoided, when someone accused of corruption and embezzlement of public funds responds to the charge with a countercharge of misogyny. This classic argument substitutes a private and potentially shameful ulterior motive for a public and honorable good reason.
In this sense, an argument to the matter is quite different from an argument drawn from the subject matter of the law.

Like the ad judicium and ad rem arguments, arguments to the matter under discussion are not argumentative schemes— that is, they are not recognizable forms of reasoning that lead to a conclusion, such as the argument by analogy or by opposites. Each argument scheme may or may not be used to discuss what is the substance of an issue.

The three labels ad rem, ad judicium and to the matter could be taken absolutely, in the Lockian style, to refer to arguments that produce knowledge of natural objects by the scientific method, see ad judicium.
For the global opposition ad judicium – to the matter – ad rem  / to the letter, see ad judicium.

1. Argument to the matter and validity

Saying that an argument is to the matter means that it is relevant to the debate, and that it makes a substantial contribution to the discussion.
From the immanent evaluative perspective of the third parties, such arguments are the only ones whose strength and value are worth discussing and they should be mentioned in the argument map of the discussion.
However, this does not mean that they are automatically validated. For example, a party may cite a legitimate and relevant precedent. Nevertheless, this alleged precedent could be criticized and rejected, by an argument showing that it is not close enough to the actual facts. Even if this argument on the matter is ultimately declared irrelevant to the issue, it can still be noted as an interesting objection.

2. Form and substance (matter) of the discussion

Arguments concerning the substance of the discussion complement arguments concerning the form of the discussion,  which refer to the conditions under which the discussion takes place. These arguments concern the framework, procedures and rules by which the issue is addressed. For example, participants may object that they did not receive the necessary documents in time; or that there is no quorum.

3. Logos-based arguments and arguments to the matter

Misleading associations might lead one to think that arguments related to logos are « logical » and therefore objective, related to the matter and substance of things. As objective arguments, then, logos-based arguments could be contrasted with subjective ethotic and pathemic arguments.
However, in everyday argumentation, however, ethotic and pathemic arguments, like logos-based arguments, exploit logos, that is language and discourse. Most importantly, « object » can mean, first, any material or immaterial being, and second, the issue to be decided, as presented in an  argumentative question.
Arguments that refer to people, their values and their emotions are to the matter (ad rem and ad judicium) to the extent that they are relevant to the question. at hand. Recalling a person’s past condemnations is not always irrelevant. Describing the state of emotional shock in which the victim was found, is relevant in court. The challenge lies in distinguishing between aspects of a person that are and are not relevant to the discussion and which are not. This process is particularly complicated when the people involved are parties to the dispute.

4. Indirect Arguments, Peripheral Arguments,
Arguments to the Matter

Indirect arguments such as arguments from the absurd, or from ignorance, may or may not be to the matter, on point.
The same is true of peripheral arguments, which exploit indices incidentally connected with the dmain action. For example, a peripheral argument about the person is on point if it is relevant to the discussion: a witness saw him near the scene of the crime; or not really so: a witness says the suspect is a good friend of his, see circumstances.

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[1] http://carm.org/dictionary-argumentum-ad-judicium (20-09-13).

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“MANY QUESTIONS”: A Semantic Fallacy?

1. « Many questions » as a dialectical fallacy

Many questions, or multiple questions, is also known as loaded questions. A question contains many questions when it « [makes] two questions into one » (id. 167b35; p. 22). The issue is examined by Aristotle in the context of a dialectical exchange, and in this context, it is considered a fallacious discursive maneuver, see fallacies.
Dialectic is the prototypical ortho-language. An ortho-language is a language game derived from ordinary language and interaction supplemented by a system of conventional rules that control linguistic production. These rules are proposed in order to preserve and expand the truth and guarantee the rationality of the dialogue, see  logic for dialogue.

Badly phrased dialectical questions

Consider a set consisting of bad things and good things (id., §5). The misleading question is: “Is the set good or bad?”. The answer “good” will be rejected by the presence of bad things, and the answer “bad” by the presence of good things (ibid.). The clever sophist will refute the answer yes by alleging the second component, and vice-versa. Hence, the importance of this case for the sophists, who hope in thus defeating the dialectical method of seeking truth.

The case of the half white and half black picture may be more convincing. The sophistical question is: “Is it (=the picture) black (resp. white)?” Since the dialectal convention imposes to answer « yes » or « no », they are each refuted respectively by focusing on the white (resp. black) part of the picture (id., §5).
In ordinary interactions, the sensible response to this question will probably be to observe that the question is awkwardy phrased, and to quickly clarify the issue by saying « some elements are white, and some are black« ; or  “this part is white and the other part is black”, ,or « some part are white, some ar black an some are light gray. »
One can imagine that the question “Is anger a good thing?” exhibits that kind of problem. The yes answer is refuted by any negative aspects of anger such as violence or lack of self-control, while the no answer is undermined by any instance of “righteous anger”.

For Aristotle, this situation shows that in « truth-seeking dialogue », ordinary exchanges need to be supplemented by specific rules, and that the question as it is violates these two rules (Aristotle’s Sophistical Refutation (RS), see Fallacies). [1] The first rule for that kind of dialectical game authorizes only yes/no answers. According to the second rule  the logical dialectical game requires the use of propositions, a proposition being defined as “a single statement about a single thing” (Aristotle, RS, 169a6; Tricot, p. 30). This guarantees the separate examination of every single elementary statement.
The fallacy of many questions is thus a clear example of fallacy defined as a breach of dialectical rules, S. Fallacies (2).

Questions in Everyday Speech

In ordinary language, sentences can have several layers of meaning. In dialectical truth- seeking dialogue, this linguistic resource cannot be exploited in dialectical truth-seeking dialogue. There is no need to import the dialectical rule as such in the analysis of ordinary argumentation. For example, rhetorical argumentation has no problem to treat confusing questions; they can be answered with clarifying answer, for example, with a conceptual dissociation or a distinguo.

Natural language questions can contain statements that can contain implicit statements that the speaker assumes to be true for the exchange and its participants. In most cases, this presupposed information serves as a reminder of relevant details related to the topic of the conversation. This information has the status of a thematic information (ancient, background information, while the sentence has the status of a topical information (new, foreground information), or, in the case of a question, the status of a contribution to producing new knowledge).
If the speaker erroneously assumes such background information, their conversation partner simply corrects them:

S1     – How was your weekend by the sea?
S2     – Oh, we had to postpone it to next week!

S1 is a loaded question since it implies that S2 had a week end by the see, but it is not a fallacy.

The so-called fallacy of many questions occur in polemical context. For example, consider the following exchange:

S1: — You should think about why your policy has failed
S2: — But my policy has not failed!

S2 rejects the presupposition of S1 “Your policy has failed« , see presupposition.

Claiming that the S1 question is fallacious, requires that the S2 policy has not failed, and to be an ally of S2. Claiming that the S1 question is legitimate, then, one has to assume that S2‘s policy has failed, that is, one has to be an ally to S2.

Aristotle’s solution is to forbid the use of such presupposition-loaded sentences in dialectic.

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MANIPULATION

1. Words and domains

The transitive verb to manipulate, as in « No manipulates N1″ works within two structures:

Manipulate₁: N1 refers to a non-human, inanimate object, such as acontainer or a body part, such as spinal manipulation.

Manipulate₂: N1 refers to a person as a synthesis of representations and capable of self-determination. Manipulating₂ is exploitative; manipulating people is using them as objects or instruments.

To manipulate is the head of a rich and homogeneous family of derivative words including manipulation, manipulator, (non-)manipulative, outmanipulate₂, “to outdo or surpass in manipulating₂” (MW, Outmanipulate).

Manipulation₂ can affect all areas of human activity:

— Political, ideological and religious spheres.
— Everyday psychology: a manipulator, manipulative behavior.
— The military domain: White propaganda has a domestic source and targets domestic public opinion; it can be misleading the public. Black propaganda has a hidden source and purpose. It appears to come from a well-meaning and harmless source, but actually it comes from an evil or hostile one.
— Commercial action and marketing techniques are used to encourage or manipulate people to buy one product over another or nothing at all. These techniques are used to « bait and hook » customers, see gradualism.

In these different areas, manipulative influence may overlap, combine or contradict argumentative persuasion.

2. Acting Together: From Cooperation to Manipulation

Manipulation is a resource that can be activated when a person M is pursuing a goal φ. To achieve this goal, M and needs a contribution from another person, N, to achieve this goal.

2.1 Overt Goal Negotiation

(i) M believes that φ is in the interest of N’s interest, and N agrees

N has a positive representation of φ. He considers φ to be important, pleasant and in his interest; N pursues φ spontaneously and independently. Thus, M and N need each other, and they cooperate to achieve φ.

If N’s commitment is less immediate, M will take a more open approach and try to persuade N to work with her in order to achieve φ. N knows that M intends to make N do φ, and they will talk about it.

(ii) Doing φ is not really in N’s interest

N doesn’t care about φ. He will not spontaneously cooperate with M in order to achieve φ. M can then act on N‘s will or mental representations.

(a) Acting on the will to do

In this situation, M can try to persuade N to do φ. M can threatens N (ad baculum), try to blackmail or bribe N (ad crumenam), tru to move N to pity (ad misericordiam), try to charm or seduce N (ad amicitiam), see threat; emotion.

N still has a negative view of φ, but M’s arguments, if they are arguments at all, have changed N’s willingness to act, and she will eventually agree to act in favor of φ even if she does not like it. N reluctantly performs φ as a favor to M, raising the question whether N has been manipulated.

(b) Action on representations of the action to be taken

M can reframe φ so that it appears to be pleasant or favorable to N and in her best interest. As in case (i), N agrees to do φ because it seems beneficial., 

In case (a), N will do a dangerous job, because it pays well. In case (b), N will do a dangerous job, or one that he thinks is dangerous, s. M can combine the two strategies. “You can do it for me, it’s not that dangerous”. These two situations are not necessarily manipulative. M has openly presented the goal φ to N; N has been persuaded to do φ for arguably good reasons; the work may not actually be all that dangerous, and it pays well.

M acts manipulatively only if she knows that the work is dangerous, but knowingly misrepresents it, by concealing the danger from N; lying is the basis of manipulation.

(iii) Doing φ goes against N’s interests and values

Now, φ is clearly against the interests of N. Under normal circumstances, N would automatically oppose M in her attitude toward φ. Nevertheless, M can still persuade N to do φ deliberately.

— To persuade N to deliberately do something contrary to his interests or values. For example, in an extreme case N could be persuaded to commit suicide or to sacrifice herself, even though she does not want to die, in the name of a higher interest or value,:“God, the Party, the Nation, ask you to…”; “You must sacrifice your children to make our cause prevail.”

— To convince N that the action he is being asked to take is in his best interest. For example, M might urge N to sacrifice herself even if N is doesn’t want to die, saying, “You will go to Heaven”. The discourse and arguments used by M to persuade N to agree to φ are manipulative because they do not respect a hierarchy of values that is considered natural. On the basis of highly questionable arguments, N has been induced to do something that no human being would reasonably commit. This is a case of brainwashing.

2.2 Covert Purpose

In the above cases, N is more or less aware of what she is committing to do. Deep manipulation, on the other hand, is characterized by M hiding her true intentions or the true nature of the goal φ, which is in fact unacceptable to N. M will use a secondary goal, as a decoy (φ_d):

(i) φ_d is positive for N: N is made to believe that it is in his best interest to perform φ_d
(ii) φ_d fatally leads to φ
(iii) N ignores (2)
(iv) N achieves φ_d and M pockets the bet.

There is not necessarily any verbal exchange, or even contact between M and N during this process. N may be harmed, and may or may not realize that she has been manipulated. N may lose the game without knowing that he was playing a game.
An example could be that of a salesman  who sells a large encyclopedia to consumers who are hardly aware that they have bought anything, who can hardly read, who have no use for that kind of book, and who, in any case, cannot afford to pay the bill. The salesman succeeded in framing the sales interaction, φ, as an ordinary, friendly conversation, φ_decoy with no financial implications.

3. “Pious lies”

In the past, children refused to take the cod liver oil they needed for their health because it tasted awful. Parents tried to mask the taste by adding sweeteners. Their’ intentions were good, but they had to hide the fact that it was always the same disgusting cod liver oil. « He who wills the end will have the means »

Calvin attributes to monks who wanted to save people by any means necessary, because the end justifies the means. The following excerpt deals with the multiplication of the relics of the True Cross:

What other conclusion can be drawn from these considerations but that all these were inventions for deceiving silly folks? Some monks and priests, who call them pious frauds–that is honest deceits for exciting the devotion of the people, have even confessed as much.
John Calvin, A Treatise on Relics, [1543][1]

The concept and practice of “patriotic fraud” in elections could be seen as a modern version of the practices that Calvin attributes to medieval monks.

4. Manipulation and power practices

The status accorded to manipulation is based on notions of power and action. Should power be exercised through reason and valid argument, or, in a Machiavellian perspective, does it necessarily require the use of violence and lies, as seen from a Machiavellian perspective?

I must confess that the so-called cultured circles of Western Europe and America are incapable of understanding the real balance of power. These people must be considered deaf and dumb.
Telling the truth is a petty-bourgeois prejudice, while lying is often justified by the intended outcome. (Lenin, quoted in V. Volkoff, [Disinformation, A Weapon of War], 1986[2]

Discussing the vital need to keep secret the place and time of the Normandy landings, Churchill said:

“In wartime”, I said, “truth is so precious that it should always be attended by a bodyguard of lies”.
Churchill was discussing of Operation Overlord with Stalin at the Tehran Conference, November 30, 1943 [3]

The answer to the previous question could be:

[The] truth is incontrovertible. Panic may resent it, ignorance may deride it, and malice may distort it, but there it is.
Winston Churchill, Speech in the House of Commons, May 17, 1916[4]

5. Argumentation and manipulation

5.1 Argumentation and Propaganda

The study of discursive schematization is the study of the processes by which the speaker arranges a synthetic, coherent and stable meaning. This constructed meaning is neither a manipulation₂, not reality itself, nor an illusion of reality, but rather a significant view of reality. In order to communicate, the speaker must necessarily manipulate₁ the discursive material, but this process is not necessarily intended to manipulate₂ the interlocutor. Manipulation₂ presupposes deliberate falsehood. Assuming that all speech is manipulative would over-dramatize the process of signification.

A very thin thread separates the study of argumentation as defined by the Treatise on Argumentation from that of political propaganda, as defined by Domenach. For Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, “the object of the study of argumentation is the study of the discursive techniques allowing us to induce or to increase the mind’s adherence to the theses presented for its assent.” ([1958]/1969, p. 4; italics in the original). Domenach defines the object of propaganda as “the creation, transformation or confirmation of opinions” through multisemiotic processes, such as images, music, demonstrations and mass mobilization) » (Domenach 1950, p. 8).
This difference may be that between ratio-propaganda and senso-propaganda as defined by Tchakhotine (1939, p. 152). The former is effective “by persuasion, by reasoning”, and the latter by “suggestion” (ibid.), that is, indirectly, by manipulation₂.

5.2 Manipulation and lying

Lies and hidden intentions decisively contrast argumentation with manipulation; a lie can be an active lie, asserting a known falsehood, or a passive lie, failing to tell the whole truth, or relevant parts of it. Manipulative discourse relies on lies, which may be presented as “alternative facts.” Confusing hints, false cues and misleading perspectives are presented as truths. Spin doctors know how to mix some true information with false information to make the whole believable.
Denouncing manipulative discourse means denouncing lies. However, there is no formal way revealing errors and lies. Exposing lies requires a substantial knowledge of the subject. For this reason, as Hamblin says, “[the logician] is not a judge or court of appeal: and there is no such judge or court” (1970, p. 244). However, as a responsible citizen, she must denounce manipulation and act in favor of a better-informed picture of reality, see Evaluation.

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[1] John Calvin, A Treatise on Relics. Trans. and intro. by Valerian Krasinski. 2^nd ed. Edimburg: Johnstone, Hunter & Co, 1870. Quoted from http://www.gutenberg.org/files/32136/32136-pdf.pdf (08-17-2017)
[2] Vladimir Volkoff, La désinformation, arme de guerre. [Disinformation, a weapon of war]. Lausanne: L’Âge d’Homme, 1986, p. 35.
[3] In The Second World War, Volume V: Closing the Ring (1952), Chapter 21 (Tehran: The Crux), p. 338.
[4] Quoted from https://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Winston_Churchill

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LOGOS -ETHOS – PATHOS

Knowledge-oriented theories of argumentation focus on phenomena related to the objects of debate in order to construct an accurate shared representation of the world. These phenomena include such as  categorizations and placement in causal and analogical networks. These theories are based on restoring and reinforcing language’s representational capacities. For example they recommend well-constructed definitions, and univocal use of words and sentences.
Strategically constructing and managing people and their emotions is essential to orienting rhetorical discourse toward persuasion and action. The goals is to make people think, feel and act. Accomplished action is the only criterion of successful persuasion. Otherwise, persuasion would be unduly reduced to creating or strengthening intellectual adherence to a thesis, see argumentation 1, definitions. A rhetorical judge is not persuaded unless he rules in favor of the persuader.

The connections between beliefs and actions are unclear, see motives and reasons. For example, is said that a congressman once replied to someone trying to persuade him to change his mind, « You can certainly change my mind, but you won’t change my vote. » This joke highlights the crucial difference between the determinants of mental representation and those of action.

Rhetorical technique enumerates three instruments of persuasion (pistis), which are derived repectively from logos, ethos and pathos. These instruments, sometimes called « proofs », are used by the speaker to create belief and guide the will to determine action. The first instrument, logos,  is based on the proofs, real or apparent, given by the text of the speech itself. The second instrument, ethos, depends on the speaker’s talent and character. The third instrument, pathos, depends on the speaker’s ability to evoke an emotional response from the audience. (Rhet., I, 2, 1356a1; RR, p. 105).

All three forms depend on discourse. « Logo-ic » evidence is purely discursive, while ethotic and pathemic evidence are both discursive and para-discursive. These three types of evidence are assimilated by the trinity of « logos ethos, pathos, » , leading to the definition of rhetorical evidence as any sign, whether verbal or nonverbal, that can induce belief.

Cicero and later rhetorical catechisms assign three goals to the speaker engaged in the persuasion process:  The speaker must prove (probare), please (conciliare), and move (movere) (De Or., II, XXVII, p. 114).
— First teach the audience. This is the « logo-ic » way to persuade: the speech must inform, narrate and argue. This approach takes an intellectual stance on persuasion, focusing on evidence and deduction.
— However, information and argumentation can be undermined by the audience’s boredom and incomprehension. Therefore, the audience must be given a substitute for intellectual mastery, of the case: trust. Ethos plays a key role in building trust between the speaker and audience–“Maybe you don’t quite understand what I say, but you can trust me”.
— Neither logos nor ethos have the power to trigger “acting out”, hence the recourse to pathos. Seeing the good is not enough; wanting it is also necessary. The physical emotional tension produced by a speech, is considered the most powerful determinant of the will and action.

Evidence based on logos is considered to be « logical” and objective. It is the only type of evidence that can serve as evidence in the proper sense of the word. First, it satisfies the propositional condition for argumentation to some extent. This condition states that evidence must be expressed in an identifiable statement, that can be evaluated independently of the conclusion is supports.  Thus, it is open to refutation. In contrast, pathemic and ethotic evidence are expressed indirectly, through subtle channels, and are not easily accessible to explicit, verbal refutation.
Classical texts emphasize the practical superiority of the ethotic and pathemic evidence over logo-ic evidence. Aristotle asserts the primacy of ethos, « the character of the speaker may almost be called the most effective means of persuasion » (Rhet., I, 2, 1356a10; RR, p. 106), while also warning against the overly effective use of the pathos. Cicero and Quintilian virtually assimilate ethos to pathos, in order to affirm the ultimate supremacy of emotion, and subjectivty.

LOGICS FOR DIALOG

In the second half of the 20th century, various systems of logic were constructed to provide  formal representations of argumentative dialogue.

— In addition to his historical account, discussion and critique of the “standard treatment of fallacies” Charles L. Hamblin (1970 proposed a “formal dialectic.”

— Paul Lorenzen and Kuno Lorenz developed a dialogical logic (Lorenzen, Lorenz, 1978).

— Else Barth and Jan L. Martens constructed a formal dialectic for analyzing arguments (Barth, Martens, 1977).

— Jaakko Hintikka  (1981) studied the semantics of questions, and the logic of information-seeking dialogues.

— Building on Hamblin’s work, Douglas Walton and John Woods developed logical approaches to fallacies (Woods and Walton 1989) and to argumentative dialogues (Walton 1989).

— Lorenzen and the Erlangen School developed dialogical logic (Dialogische Logik) as a contribution to formal logic. This model was extended to include the definition of rational dialogue, and is a precursor of the pragma-dialectic approach to argumentation.

1. Logical dialogical game

The logical contribution is a method of defining logical connectives not by the traditional method of truth tables, but by means of allowed or forbidden moves in a “dialogical game.” Consider, for example, the conjunction “&”, read “and”. It can be defined using the truth table method, see logical connectives. In dialogical games, “&” is defined by the following moves:

(a) First round:

Proponent: P & Q
Opponent: Attacks P
Proponent: Defends P.

If the proponent successfully defends P, he wins round (a). If the defense fails, the game is over, and the proponent has lost. In the language of truth tables, this corresponds to the truth table line « If P is false, then the conjunction ‘P & Q’ is false ». In other words, the line “if P is false, then the conjunction ‘P & Q’ is false” is excluded.

If the proponent wins round (a), with respect to P, the game continues.

(b) Second round, the opponent attacks Q.

Proponent: P & Q
Opponent: Attacks Q
Proponent: Defends Q.

If the proponent successfully defends Q, he wins round (b). Since he already won round (a), he wins the game. If the defense fails, the game ends, and the opponent wins it.

In the language of truth tables, this means that “P & Q” is true when the proponent wins; and “P & Q” is false when the opponent wins.

2. Dialogical Logic Rules and Pragma-Dialectical Rules

Dialogical logic uses three types of rules (van Eemeren et al. 1996, p. 258).

— Starting rule: the proponent begins by asserting a thesis.
— General rules about legal and illegal moves in dialogue (see above).
— Closing rule, or winning rule, which determines who has won the game.

Similar rules apply in Pragma-Dialectics, see Rules

— The starting rule corresponds to “Rule 1. Freedom — The parties must not interfere with the free expression or questioning of points of view” »(van Eemeren, Grootendorst, Snoeck Henkemans 2002, pp. 182–183).
— The closing rule, or the winning rule corresponds to « Rule 9. Closing — ­If a point of view has not been conclusively defended, the advancing party must withdraw it. If a point of view has been conclusively defended, the other party must withdraw the doubts it has expressed with respect to that point of view” (ibid.).

The other rules are intended to ensure the smooth progression of an argumentative dialogue in ordinary language aimed at resolving differences of opinion.

3. A contribution to the theory of rationality

In a work entitled Logical Propaedeutic: Pre-School of Reasonable Discourse ([1967] / 1984), Kamlah and Lorenzen aim to provide “the building blocks and rules for all rational discourse” (quoted in van Eemeren et al. 1996, p. 248). Their basic assumption is that,

in order to prevent them from speaking at cross-purposes in interminable monologues, the interlocutors’ linguistic usage in a discussion or conversation must comply with certain norms and rules. Only when they share a number of fixed postulates with respect to linguistic usage can they conduct a meaningful discussion” (van Eemeren et al. 1996, p. 253).

The goal of the endeavor is to construct of an “ortholanguage” (Lorenzen & Schwemmer, 1975, p. 24; quoted in van Eemeren & al. 1996, p. 253), that defines rational dialogical behavior capable of resolving interindividual contradictions.

This approach  differs significantly from the interactional approaches to speech in interaction that began developing around the same time.

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LOGIC:
Art of Thinking, Branch of Mathematics

1. Traditional Logic

1.1 The Aristotelian Framework

Aristotle does not use the word “logic” in his logical and ontological writings collected in the Prior and Posterior Analytics. In his own words, he is concerned with “demonstrative analytical behavior (reasoning, discourse),” which corresponds “to the current meaning of the term logic.” (Kotarbinski [1964], p. 5; Woods 2014). The Posterior Analytics define scientific knowledge as follows:

We attain knowledge through demonstration. […] I call demonstration a scientific syllogism (Post. An., I, 2; Owen, p. 247).

It follows that “it is necessary that demonstrative science should be from things true, first, immediate, more known than, prior to, and the causes of the conclusion” (ibid).

In a note added to this passage, Tricot points out that « syllogism is the genre (“producer of science”) common to demonstrative, dialectical and rhetorical syllogisms; scientific is the specific difference that distinguishes demonstration from dialectical and rhetorical syllogisms » (In Aristotle, SA, I, 2, 15–25; Note 3 p. 8). A scientific syllogism produces categorical knowledge, a dialectical syllogism produces probable, i.e. criticized, knowledge, when categorical knowledge is unavailable, and a rhetorical syllogism produces persuasive representations. The role of persuasion in Aristotle’s rhetoric should be understood within this framework.

Traditional logical theory is based on 1) an analysis of propositions as subject-predicate constructions,  2) a definition of the relations between the four forms of a general proposition and 3) a theory of syllogism.

1.2 Neo-Thomistic logic

In the Middle Ages, Thomas Aquinas took up the Aristotelian definition of logic and defined it in relation to the reflexivity of the act of reasoning, or “its ability to reflect upon itself.”

An art is needed to direct the act of reasoning, so that by it a man when performing the act of reasoning might proceed in an orderly and easy manner and without error. And this art is logic, that is, the science of reason. (Com. Post. An., “Foreword”)

This definition is taken up by The Neo-Thomist tradition, especially by Maritain, who defines logic as:

The art THAT DIRECT THE VERY ACT OF REASON. (Maritain 1923, p. 1; capitals in the original)

This definition is adopted for example by Chenique in his Elements of Classical Logic (1975).

The following definition emphasizes the normative value of “formal logic”, which is defined as:

A science that determines the correct (or valid) forms of reasoning” (Dopp 1967, p. 11, italics in the original)

1.3 Logic and inference

In mathematics, logic is defined as:

The discipline that deals with correct inference (Vax 1982, Logic).

Logic is concerned with the principles of valid inference (Kneale and Kneale, [1962], p. 1).

See inference. Logic is the study of the valid forms of deduction:

Logic has the important function of saying what follows from what (Kleene, 1967, Ch. 1, §1).

1.4 Logic is a science

Logic, like any science, has as its business the pursuit of truth. (Quine, 1959, p. xi)

The Stoics were the first to define logic not in Aristotelian terms as an organon, an instrument (in the service of the sciences), but as a science.

1.5 Classical logic

Classical logic (or traditional logic, according to Prior, 1967) is by nature a formal logic. One of Aristotle’s revolutionary contributions is the introduction of a systematic use of variables. Classical logic includes a set of theses and techniques that synthesize proposals of Aristotelian, Stoic or medieval origin. It consists of two parts:

— The logic of analyzed propositions also known as predicate calculus, and the theory of the syllogism.

—The logic of unanalyzed propositions or propositional calculus, deals with 1) constructing complex propositions from simple or complex propositions, using logical connectives, and 2) determining of valid formulas (logical laws or tautologies).

Classical logic is based on a set of principles, that are considered to be laws of thought and rational discourse.

— Principle of non-contradiction, “non-(P and non-P)”; a proposition cannot be both true and false, that is « non-(P and non-P) ».

— Excluded middle (excluded third) principle, “Either (P or non-P)”; a proposition must be either true or false.

— Identity, “a = a”, and its practical consequences, such as the principles of indiscernibility and intersubstitutability of the identicals, and the unicity and stability of the meaning of the logical symbols in the same universe of discourse (same reasoning).

Contemporary logic no longer considers these principles to be laws of thought, but rather as possible axioms, among others.

The contemporary era has seen the multiplication of “unconventional” logical formalisms, some of which draw from phenomena of ordinary language that were not considered by classical logic, such as time or modality.

2. Logic: An Art of Thinking, a Branch of Mathematics

2.1 The Three Operations of the Mind

From Aristotle until the end of the nineteenth century, classical logic was regarded as the art of correct thinking. In other words, it was the art of combining propositions in a way that convey the truth of the premises to the conclusion, within a universe of common and stable symbols and meanings. Logic provides the theory of rational discourse and of scientific argumentation by defining and determining the valid reasoning schemes.

The theory of the three operations of the mind originates with Maritain (1937, §2–3). This approach had long been abandoned by logicians, who were legitimately motivated by the fantastic potential for expansion and discovery offered by mathematical models. Nevertheless, this approach certainly has its place in relation to ordinary thinking, anchored in ordinary language. It illuminates the need to consider the progressive and multidimensional construction of an argument, the articulation of words and concepts into judgments, and of propositions into arguments and reasoning. Such a model is quite compatible with Grize’s (1996) definition of schematization as defined in Natural Logic.

(i) Argumentation as a mental process

As a mental process, argumentation is defined as the third « operation of the mind », proceeding from apprehension, to judgment and reasoning.

— Apprehension: The mind grasps a concept, such as“man”, and then limits its scope: “some men”, “all men”.

— Judgment: The mind constructs a proposition, that affirms or denies something about this quantified concept, “some men are wise”. This judgment is categorical, it is either true or false. 

— Reasoning: The mind links the judgments without losing any truth, in order to develop new truths based of known truths.

(ii) Argumentation as a discursive process

In the discursive process, argumentation is defined as the third of the three basic linguistic operations: naming the concept; predicating something of that concept in a statement; and arguing.

— Naming: Speaking of something clearly delimited. The concept is anchored in language by a term according to its quantity, see proposition.

— Predicating: Saying something about this clearly delimited concept, that is constructing a proposition (a linguistic statement) by imposing a predicate on the term.

— Arguing: Arranging the propositions in an orderly discourse, so as to produce a new proposition, the conclusion, developed exclusively from the premises already known. Thus, argumentation on the discursive level corresponds to reasoning at the cognitive level.

In Aristotelian logic, the rules of correct argumentation are provided by the theory of syllogism, which distinguishes valid syllogisms from paralogisms (vicious arguments, fallacies or sophisms).

2.2 Logic as the Art of Reasoning and the Emergence of the Scientific Method

In modern times, the view of logic as a theory of discursive reasoning as well as the assimilation of discursive reasoning to scientific reasoning has been destabilized by the emergence of the natural sciences and experimental reasoning. Experimental reasoning  is based on observation, measurement, prediction and experimentation, all of which are regulated by mathematical calculation. This development has been complemented in contemporary times by the integration of logic into mathematics. The rules of the scientific method include logic and extend beyond it.

From the point of view of argumentation, this development began in the Renaissance, and can be traced back to Ramus (Ong 1958). According to Ramus, judgment, logic and method are independent operations that we would call epistemic or cognitive, and they are independent of rhetoric and language. This mutation becomes clear when comparing the Port-Royal Logic, in its full title: Logic, or, the Art of Thinking: Containing, Besides Common Rules, Several New Observations Appropriate for Forming Judgment of Arnauld and Nicole ([1662]) and Condillac’s Treatise on the Art of Reasoning ([1796]). In the latter work, the language of the “art of reasoning” is not that of syllogism, but rather of geometry. Rhetorical argumentation is never considered; for example, analogy is reduced to mathematical proportion.

2.3 The Mathematization of Logic

Logic is  formal by nature, it is not interested in the content of argumentation its substance, its the particular objects, but rather in its form. In contemporary times, logic has been axiomatized and mathematized. Frege’s publication of Begriffsschrift, “Concept Writing” in 1879 marked the point at which logic could no longer be regarded as an “art of thinking”, but rather as an “art of calculating”, that is, as a branch of mathematics. At the beginning of the 20th century, classical logic was overwhelmed by the “twilight of self-evidences” (Blanché 1970, p. 70).

We move from Logic to logics that can be constructed at will. This plurality of logics removes classical logic’s privileges, reducing it to one system among others. Like them, logic is a simple formal architecture whose validity depends only on its internal coherence. (Id., pp. 71-72)

To become an axiomatic exercise, logic had to relinquish its reflexive and critical function with respect to common thought and discourse. It could no longer serve as a model for rationally argued discourse or dialectical exchange. Logic is now a mathematical discipline, that was challenged, in the 1950s and 1970s, by natural, non-formal and substantial logics. Classical logic should open this list.

2.4 Neo-Thomism: Resistance to the Formalization Tendency

In 1879, the year when Frege published the Begriffsschrift, Pope Leo XIII established Thomas Aquinas’s interpretation of Aristotelianism as the quasi-official philosophy of the Catholic Church in the encyclical Aeterni Patris. This decision was unfortunate, because it promoted an outdated view of logic. Nevertheless, it has produced a substantial research and teaching on classical logic as a method of reasoning and as an analytical framework for natural language cognition. Substantial developments in classical logic as well as interesting reflections on argumentation schemes and sophisms can be found in textbooks for the higher philosophical curriculum of neo-Thomism.

In France, Maritain’s Logic (1923), Tricot (1928), and Chenique (1975)–each with a different focus–reflect this ongoing interest in classical logic. This trend can be compared to the so-called revivals of rhetoric that have emerged since the 1950s.

3. Pragmatic Logic and Argumentative Reasoning

In a quite different tradition, that of the philosophy of ordinary language, Toulmin was the first to suggest that the formalization movement in logic required a counterpart capable of addressing « logical practices », ([1958], p. 6), and mobilizing « substantial » and « field-dependent » argumentation (id., pp. 125; p. 15). Toulmin saw logic as a “generalized jurisprudence” (p. 7), whose primary purpose was “justificatory” (p. 6).

The logico-pragmatic movement which includes non-formal, substantial, natural, and generally dialogical logics, distances itself from axiomatized formalisms in order to consider the ecological conditions of argumentation. People argue in natural language, and in a given context. Classical logic does not satisfy the second condition, but it does satisfy the first, at least for the limited aspects of language it can deal with.

Unlike other theories of argumentation, and perhaps in contrast to the New Rhetoric’s total rejection of logic, Informal Logic and Natural Logic have retained the word logic in their names. This may be to emphasize the fact that, despite their specific differences, they do belong to a common genre, see argumentation studies; demonstration; proof.

These pragmatic logics must combine with ordinary language and subjectivity. Classical logic has its roots in highly regimented ordinary language, whereas speakers of natural language are virtuosic in their use of contextualization, implicitness and polysemy. These characteristics are constitutive of the efficiency, dynamism and adaptability of natural language in everyday circumstances, as well as the resources for strategically managing  worlds of action and interaction.
However, these observations do not imply a rejection of logic. The practice of ordinary discourse requires logical skills, just as it requires some arithmetic skills.

It will take about two hours to reach the shelter. In about one hour, it will be night. We will arrive at the shelter in the dark, which is risky.
Some mushrooms are edible, but not all. You can’t cook and eat just any mushroom, that’s risky.

4. Entries concerning classical logic

— Predicate logic: see proposition; syllogism.
— Propositional logic: see connective.

LINKED or COORDINATE argumentation

Linked (or coordinated) argumentation is defined in terms of two different issues:

(i) A linked argumentation is an argumentation whose conclusion is based on a set of interrelated statements that combine to form an argument.
The issue here is the connection between statements, that, taken together, constitute a single argument supporting a conclusion. The notion of connection is constitutive of the notion of argument.

(ii) A linked argumentation is an argumentation whose arguments are sufficient for the conclusion only when considered together.
The issue here is how arguments are combined to produce a conclusive argumentation. The notion of connection is constitutive of that of conclusive argumentation.
See convergent, linked, serial argument.

1. Statements that are combined to form an argument

Linked argumentation is defined as an argumentation based on linked premises.
In logic, a premise is defined as « a proposition supporting or helping to support a conclusion » (Dictionary.com, Premise). In natural language, a proposition corresponds to a statement. Therefore, the expression “linked premises” may seem redundant, since speaking of a « premise » presupposes a relation to a conclusion.
In natural language, a linked argumentation is an argumentation based on linked statements–that is, on statements that combine together in order to build an argument supporting the conclusion  

Syllogistic reasoning has a linked structure. For example, the statement “all members of this society are over 30 years old”, only support the conclusion “Peter is over 30 years old” when combined with the proposition “Peter is a member of this society”.

Representation:

Similarly, in Toulmin’s model, the assertive component has a linked structure. The statement “data” becomes an argument only when it is combined with the propositions that function as « warrant » and « backing », see layout.

Representation:

Arguments are based on a single statement:
– In immediate inference, such as « all A are M, so some A are M. »
– In analytical deductions, such as « If he is single, then he is unmarried. »

All other argumentations are either linked, or have one or more missing premises.

2. Convergent and linked argumentation

The concepts of linking and convergence do not describe same-level phenomena.
– Several statements are linked together to form an argument for a given conclusion.
– Several arguments converge to point to the same conclusion.

Convergent arguments consist of two or more co-oriented arguments, each of which by definition has a linked structure, as shown in the previous paragraph. The complete scheme of convergent argumentation is as follows:

2.1 Arguments Linked to Produce a Compelling Conclusion

The linking effect also affects convergent argumentation, the strength of which is greater than the sum of the individual strengths of the added arguments.
For example, several arguments from necessary signs may combine to form a necessary and sufficient bundle.
When exhaustive, case-by-case arguments benefit from a binding effect giving the whole a conclusive value that cannot be achieved by simply adding each confirmed case.

2.2 Convergent or Linked Argumentation?

To answer this question, consider a conclusion supported by a set of statements. Then, consider a particular statement, and see what happens if it is false or suppressed (after Bassham 2003):

— If what remains is still an argumentation, then it is a convergent argumentation:

Peter is smart and likable, he will be a great negotiator.
Peter is smart, he will be a great negotiator.
Peter is likable, he will be a great negotiator.

All of these argumentations are admissible; “Peter is smart” and “Peter is personable” are two convergent, co-oriented arguments that lead to the same conclusion: “ Peter will be a great negotiator”.

— If what remains is not an argumentation, we are dealing with a linked argumentation:

(1) It rained and the temperature is below 0°C, so there should be black ice on the road.
(2) It rained, there should be black ice on the road: false, unless you add the premise, « in this season, temperatures frequently drop below 0°C. »
(3) The temperature is below 0°C, so there should be black ice on the road: false, unless you add the premise, “in this country, low temperatures are generally associated with wet roads.”

Discourse (1) is an explicit, valid and sound argumentation. Discourses (2) and (3) are still argumentations, but they are valid only if missing premises are contextually supplied.

The usefulness and practicality of the convergent / linked distinction has been questioned (Goddu, 2007). Walton argues that the distinction’s merit lies in its ability to capture the different conditions of refutation for the two constructions. To refute a linked argumentation, one must show that one of the premises is false or inadmissible. To refute the conclusion of a convergent argumentation, each converging argument must be tested separately (Walton 1996, p. 175). In the case of convergent argumentation the arguer can concede one of the arguments.  In the case of linked argumentation, she cannot concede a premise.

Essentially, one must decide whether the argumentation involves one or more good reasons. In other words, one must first structure the verbal flow by proposing coherent semantic blocks that support the conclusion.

 

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« THE LAYOUT OF ARGUMENT »

In The Uses of Argument, Stephen Toulmin presents a general description of the structure of argumentative passages, “the layout of argument” (1958, Chap. III, pp. 94-145). This highly influential representation is also known as the Toulmin Scheme, the Toulmin Model of Argument or the Toulmin Argument Pattern (TAP)

1. The Structure of the Prototypical Argumentative and Monologue and Dialogue

1.1 Argumentation as a Polyphonic Monologue

The following passage is an elementary argumentative cell, that brings together the basic components of argumentative discourse according to Toulmin.

— Harry was born in Bermuda, so, presumably, Harry is a British subject
— Since a man born in Bermuda will generally be a British subject,
on account of the following statutes and other legal provisions…
— Unless both his parents were aliens or he has become a naturalized American citizen
(id., p. 103).

This layout of argument combines two main components.

— A central, affirmative component.
— A negative component, staging a challenging voice, that details the “circumstances in which the general authority of the warrant would have to be set aside.” (Id., p. 101)

1.2 Argumentation as Dialogue

This discourse can be reenacted as a prototypical argumentative dialogue, beginning with a question, posed by an investigating third party, and evolving under pressure from a challenger.

(i) A Question

Question:  — What is Harry’s nationality?

(ii) A Claim — The arguer responds:

Arguer: — “Harry is a British subject” (ibid., p. 99).

By making this assertion, the arguer “[is thereby committed] to the claim which any assertion necessarily involves.” As a Claim (C), it can be “challenged”:

Challenger: — “What have you got to go on?” (ibid. p. 98)

(iii) Data — In the defense, the arguer “must be able to establish [the Claim] — that is, make it good and show that it was justifiable. How is this to be done?” (Id., p. 97). “we shall normally have some facts to which we can point in its support” (ibid.). Here, the arguer presents a fact, or Data (D) to support his answer.

Arguer: — Harry was born in Bermuda.

Toulmin’s layout is clearly built on a dissensus background. A Claim is “a demand for something rightfully or allegedly due” (WCD, Claim). A claim is made in the context of a dispute “to lay claim to, to assert one’s right or title to” (ibid.).
Data are “things known or assumed; facts or figures from which conclusions can be inferred” (WCD, Data). The search for data is undertaken with a claim in mind, see justification.
Data and Claim are correlative words: Claims require Data, and Data is sought and selected based on Claims. They are explicitly linked by a Warrant.

(iv) Warrant — The challenger may still consider the answer unsatisfactory, and “[require]” the speaker to explain “the bearing of the data already produced on his conclusion” (id., p. 98):

Challenger: — “How do you get there?” (Ibid.)

The arguer must now provide a Warrant (W), i.e., “some rule, principle or inference license” (Ibid.):

Arguer: — “A man born in Bermuda will be a British subject.” (id., p. 99)

The inquisitive challenger may now be “dubious” of “whether the warrant is acceptable at all” (ibid., p. 103):

Challenger: — “You presume that a man born in Bermuda can be taken to be a British subject; […] why do you think that?” (Ibid.).

A warrant is an “authorization or sanction, as by a superior or the law” (WCD, Warrant). The gap between the argument and conclusion is fillen by some authority. It can also be “a justification or reasonable grounds for some act, course, statement or belief” (ibid.). In this case, the warrant itself would correspond to a good reason added to the data. It is generally a law that orients the fact as a data for this claim.
Another warrant would provide a different orientation to the same data. For instance, the warrant “In Bermuda the climate can be uncomfortably hot from late May to October, with especially high humidity” would orient the same fact toward the claim “Harry certainly knows how to behave in a humid subtropical climate.”

(v) Backing — The arguer must now provide a Backing (B) to make the Warrant acceptable

Arguer: — I say that “on account of the following statutes and other legal provisions: …” (id., p. 105).

 (vi) Qualifier – Rebuttal — In previous moves, the challenger requested formal clarifications. Now, he turns to substantive objections, such as:

Challenger: — But “special facts may make this case an exception to the rule, or one in which the law can be applied only subject to certain qualifications” (id., p. 101).

Finally, the claimant acknowledges these caveats. Her claim is a “presumption”, which is only “presumably” true, not “necessarily” so. This must be made clear by a Qualifier (Q), “indicating the exceptional conditions which might be capable of defeating or refuting the warranted conclusion (R).”

Arguer: — My claim (C) is probably true, insofar as we don’t know if “both his parents were aliens [or] he has become a naturalized American” (id. p. 102-103).

The Rebuttal articulates the conditions that would defeat the inference if met. By incorporating the challenger’s contributions into his argument, the speaker introduces co-operation into the inquiry process.
The Qualifier should not be seen as the expression of some vague mental limitation, just in case things do not turn out as expected. Rather, it is the trace of substantial Rebuttals, not just any face-saving softener or mitigator. These terms would not express the link with the substantial rebutting counter-discourse.

2. Representation

Toulmin articulates these six basic elements in the following diagram

 

— The chain “Data — Warrant — Backing — Claim” represents the positive component of the model.
— The combination “Qualifier + Rebuttal” represents the negative, or default component of the model.

3. Corollaries

3.1. A legal syllogism

Toulmin refers to his approach to argumentation as “generalized jurisprudence” ([1958], p. 7). An instance of reasoning that illustrates the structure of an argument corresponds to a legal syllogism, in which a law is applied to a fact.

Positive component
Law: Any driver who crosses the yellow line is breaking the law, and will be fined.
Recorded fact: X crossed the yellow line.
Conclusion: This is a violation of the law and the driver will be fined.

Default Component
Unless X was driving a fire engine, or ambulance on a call,  participating in a formal parade, orroadworks were in progress.

This positive component articulates a premise with a general subject (a law) and a premise with a concrete subject (or singular proposition, the argument) in order to deduce a proposition with a concrete subject (the conclusion). This process corresponds to a categorization, which includes an individual in a class, and thus allows the attribution of the properties and stereotypes that characterize the class to the individual. Toulmin’s basic example highlight the importance of categorization and intracategorical deduction in everyday reasoning. However, warrants are not restricted to categorizing. In fact, a Warrant is an instance of an argument scheme.

3.2 The “Rediscovery of the Topoi”

The warrant corresponds to the traditional argumentative notion of topos (Bird 1961), or argument scheme. A topos is a general statement that “warrants” the acceptability of the argument and can generate an infinite number of particular arguments or enthymemes of the same form.
Ehninger and Brockriede have shown how the concept of a warrant could cover the main forms of argument schemes. For example “authoritative arguments” ([1960], p. 293):

— (D) Klaus Knorr states “Soviet leaders calculate that a minor build-up of nuclear power in the NATO countries of Western Europe will add only marginally to the danger of American striking power.”

— Therefore (C) Soviet leaders calculate that a minor build-up of nuclear power in the NATO countries of Western Europe will add only marginally (to the danger of American striking power).

— Since (W) what Knorr says about the power of nuclear weapons is reliable.

— Because (B) Knorr is a professor at Princeton’s Center of International Studies, he is unbiased and has made reliable statements on similar matters in the past.

— Unless (R) Other authorities more qualified than Knorr say otherwise or special circumstances negate or reduce Knorr’s usual reliability as a witness.

Accordingly, the specific objections and rebuttals associated with a given argument scheme fall under the qualifier – rebuttal subsystem.

3.3 Open Foundations

Let us assume that Harris was not born not Bermuda but in the Falkland Islands (English name) also called Islas Malvinas (Argentine name) and not in Bermuda. In that case, the backing mentioning the British nationality statutes, would possibly be supplemented by an appeal  to the right of occupation, conquest and survival of the fittest, considering the islands’complex history.

Basing the Warrant on a Backing opens a potential regression to infinity, since the guarantee needs itself to be guaranteed. The same regression could be observed in the argument, which coud also be challenged.

3.4 Scientific Calculation and the Deletion of the Rebuttal Component

Toulmin’s layout is popular among scientists interested in argumentation. The following example, less frequently cited than the previous one, expresses the expression of a scientific prediction based on a calculation involving laws derived from experience and observation (1958, p. 184):

The general premise is replaced by a calculation based on physical laws. The disappearance of the counter-discourse (modal + rebuttal) characterizes the transition to a mathematical calculus based on stable scientific content.

LAUGHTER – SERIOUSNESS

Laughter and seriousness are the manifestations of opposing mental states. Laughter is a manifestation of positive emotions, such as joy. It is the opposite of tears and grief, which are manifestations of negative emotions. It is also the opposite of seriousness, i.e., calm, see pathos.
Laughter is a major instrument of discourse disorientation and destruction, see irony. Laughter and entertainment are associated with rhetoric, while seriousness and severity are associated with argumentation.
In a debate, laughter and seriousness correspond to two positioning strategies. if your opponent is joking and laughing, your response should be stern and to the point. If your opponent is delivering an austere technical discourse, your response should be a smile and a pun that everyone can understand about what he has just said.

Hamblin (1970, p 41) identifies three standard ad fallacies of entertainment, that occur in two different discursive and interactional organizations.

1. The Arguer as an Entertainer

Ad ludicrum: Latin ludicrum, « game; show », which Hamblin translates as « dramatics ».
Ad captandum vulgus: Latin. vulgus, « the populace »; captare, « to seek to seize. »

Rational criticism rejects discursive theatricality, which spares no form of public speech, including conference communication. A speech becomes a performance. Such shows were first staged by the ancient sophists, as in Plato’s Euthydemus, see sophism. The arguer becomes an actor, who « plays to the gallery » or « to the crowd », referring to an actor whose demagogic performance appeals to easy popular tastes, see ad populum.

2. The arguer makes fun of the opponent

Ad ridiculum: Latin. ridiculum « ridiculous ».

This second type of talk is quite different from the former. Hamblin uses the terms « appeal to ridicule » and « appeal to mockery » (ibid.). Strictly speaking, it is a type of refutation by the absurd, where the advanced proposition is rejected by pointing out its unacceptable, counterintuitive, immoral and ridiculous consequences, see absurd. Ridicule is not necessarily comic, and laughter may be sarcastic rather than joyful.

Hedge’s seventh rule explicitly prohibits laughing at one’s opponent: « Any attempt to lessen the force of his reasoning, by wit, caviling, or ridicule, is a violation of the rules of honorable controversy » (1838, p. 162), see rules. This is a special case of the prohibition against substituting the destruction of discourse for the refutation of arguments, see destruction.

Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca’s book, The Comic of Discourse (1974), is devoted to the comical use of argumentative mechanisms in jokes.