Ancient rhetorical theory is not particularly concerned with the connecting words structuring the argumentative passages. In contemporary times, Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca ([1958]) do not mention connectives, nor does Lausberg (1960) in his monumental re-creation of the classical system.
Toulmin’s “layout of argument” emphasizes the role of linguistic connectives in the articulation of the element of the argumentative cell (1958) whereby the Warrant is introduced by since; the backing by on account of; the claim (conclusion) by so; the rebuttal (counter-discourse) by unless. Toulmin does not however discuss the connectives in any further detail.
Connecting words are a central issue for the linguistic theory of argumentation (Ducrot & al. 1980).

1. Indicators

Indicators are relevant to argumentative analysis on three levels

(1) Boundary indicators, helping to delineate the argumentative sequence.
(2) Internal indicators, helping to identify and articulate the argument and the conclusion within the argumentative sequence.
(3) Argument scheme indicators, helping to identify the argument scheme embodied in a specific argumentation.

All linguistic phenomena that can be exploited for any of these operations can be considered to be argumentative indicators, not only discourse particles and full semantic words. The label most often refers to the intermediate level, that of the argument-conclusion structure, where connectives play a prominent role.

1.1 Multifunctionality of connective particles

The terminology used for connectives and markers of discursive or argumentative structure is overabundant. Schematically, the framework for the discussion is as detailed below.

— Logical connectives build complex propositions from simple or complex propositions.
— Connective words belong to the category of discursive particles. From a grammatical point of view, discursive particles are conjunctions, prepositions, adverbs, interjections… Some discourse particles are particularly attached to conversational speech: well, hm, right…
— Natural language connectives are multi-functional. Some connectives have essentially non-argumentative functions, even in argumentative contexts. For example, enumerative and ordering connectives, “firstly, secondly, and finally” can be used to list a series of agenda items as well as a successions of arguments. In an argumentative context, the “list effect” can itself be argumentative.

Other connectives such as since, because, so, therefore… are particularly helpful for tagging a segment of discourse as an argument or as a conclusion. However, it must be born in mind that their argumentative function although prevalent, is not exclusive.

To sum up, connectives are multi-functional particles that can signal an argument-conclusion relation.

1.2 Connective verbs

The argument-conclusion structure, “A so B” can also be articulated by a full verbal construction:

[A]; which leads me to conclude that [B]

1.3 Connectives articulating the semantic contents
of whole discourses.

Logical connectives articulate precise sets of well-defined logical propositions, whereas natural language connectives articulate not only propositions but also discourse of undetermined length:

 [A]. From this, we can conclude that [B].

In reality, connectives articulate meanings inferred from such indeterminate spans of discourse. A statement like “and so [Fr. ainsi] Commissioner Valentin jailed the whole gang” may close a novel. The left scope of so sums up all the events since the beginning of the investigation of Commissioner Valentin. The same is true for the connector but, which does not articulate propositions but semantic-pragmatic contents (example infra, §3.1); S. Orientation.

1.4 Multifunctionality of argument indicators

Argument indicators are not unifunctional words; not all their occurrences are argumentative. The discourse following so or thus is not necessarily a conclusion, and the discourse following because is not necessarily an argument pointing to a conclusion. There are non-argumentative cases of thus and because, and there are excellent arguments which feature neither therefore nor because. This means, on the one hand, that peppering a speech with because and therefore will not necessarily turn it into an argumentation. Aristotle had already spotted this strategy and rightly considered it as vain, S. Expression. On the other hand, if the interpreter waits for a so or a because to realize that he or she is involved in an argumentative situation, he or she can be said to be seriously lacking in argumentative, interpretative and interactional competence. The connective particles restrict the possibilities of interpretation by evoking a possible argumentative structure, but they are not summons addressed to a sleepy recipient to awake him from his or her interpretive torpor.
The discussion of the argumentative value of a particle must be related to the argumentative sequence itself. It must be independently defined, that is, insofar as it is organized by an argumentative question articulating discourse and counter-discourse. The argumentative character of a particle is context dependent. The fact of occurring in argumentative contexts activates its argumentative function. This general condition does not preclude the practice of the ars subtilior of reconstructing implicit arguments and conclusions.

In practice, the analysis of the connecting phenomenon should first give full consideration to the complexity of the grammar of connecting words and connected discourses:

— Their grammatical category, full words as well as discursive particles.
— Their syntactic characteristics.
— Their idiosyncratic semantic and syntactic properties.
— Their multifunctionality as argumentative particles: a particle like but can mark an argument, a conclusion, a contradiction or an argumentative dissociation.

Therefore, but, because are prime examples of particles with an argumentative function.

2. Thus, therefore, so… since, because…

So can be a conclusion marker, and many other things. It may for example, mark the resumption of a topic already introduced and forming the ratified topic of the text or of the interaction, but momentarily left aside. To make matters worse, this non-argumentative resumption can be found everywhere, and in particular in argumentative contexts. The following example is taken from a lively debate about the attribution of French nationality to immigrants living in France[1]:

I think that:: all these people— and then also the people who came thus, so [Fr. donc “therefore”] during the post-war boom years, we still owe them a certain form of respect.

No participant ever doubted that “these people” came “during the glorious thirties”. The reasoning here is that since they came during the “during the post-war bloom years”, as workers, they are therefore entitled to respect. Actually, so [Fr. donc, “therefore”], resumes a statement that is, functionally, not a conclusion but an argument. The structure is {[we owe respect to all these people, Conclusion] [they came to work (during the post-war bloom years), Argument]}, and certainly not:

* we owe respect to all these people, so [Fr. donc] they came during the post-war boom years.

The following intervention is made by a property manager, M, during a conciliation session with his tenant, T. The manager recapitulates his position: he requests a 80F (14 $) monthly increase of the rent[2].

[I asked/ Mrs. T certainly remembers\ I asked if you want uh, so uh: eighty francs if you want to get to a thousand thirty a month=]_claim [that seemed very reasonable, very reasonable]_modal considering the apartment/ and considering its location/ (..) you know a three room apartment let’s say all the same on the second floor’ (..) relatively comfortable\]_argument
Corpus Negotiation on rents (conciliation commission), Clapi Data Base of Spoken French. Our parenthesis, italics and tagging.

T.’s claim is articulated to the context by so [Fr. donc, “so, therefore”], which sounds quite standard. But this claim is not inferred from what comes before, which has already been expressed and repeated. The so [donc] is in its classical recall, resumptive function; it just happens that the repeated segment is a claim. Thus, this is the case of a non-argumentative so, in a strongly argumentative context.

So, then… because… can be used to extract and thematize the implicit content of a sentence:

— An encyclopedic content:

All this happened in Greenland, so far in the North

— A semantically presupposed content:

S1    — Peter stopped smoking
S2    — then you know he used to smoke (in the past)?

— An implication of the act of saying such and such thing:

S1    — this dress suits you very well!
S2    — because the others don’t?

3. But

But reverses the argumentative orientation of the propositions it introduces. Nonetheless, no more than so, but is not an inherently argumentative particle, and the argumentative framework and vocabulary cannot account for all its occurrences. In particular but reverses not only argumentative orientations but also narrative and descriptive orientations.

3.1 But, reverser of narrative and descriptive orientations

Generally speaking, but serves to reverse the orientation, regardless of the kind of orientation: narrative, argumentative, or descriptive.

But is used to introduce a new narrative development:

August 27: On Friday, I remembered that the annual tax on my car was due to expire. Since I am not one of those who wait until the last minute to renew it, I went to the tax office. An employee was there, waiting for me, or almost. In just a few minutes, via the Internet, everything was done. I’m set until next year. But in the meantime…
He walked, and while he walked, tirelessly, with his head held high, rocked by his regular rhythm, he dreamed of next year […] ([3])

Such non-argumentative occurrences of but are quite common. The following passage contains perhaps the most famous but in all of French literature. Emma is the heroine of Gustave Flaubert’s novel, Madame Bovary. The whole passage is narrative-descriptive. First, it develops a semantic isotopy, “travel, love, beauty, exotic life, hammocks and gondolas”. But articulates this first isotopy to a second one, “husband snoring, children coughing, irritating screeching noises and provincial life”. It would not make sense to impose an argumentative analysis upon such a but.

Emma was not asleep; she pretended to be; and while he dozed off by her side she awakened to other dreams.
To the gallop of four horses she was carried away for a week towards a new land, whence they would return no more. They went on and on, their arms entwined, without a word. Often from the top of a mountain they suddenly glimpsed some splendid city with domes, and bridges, and ships, forests of citron trees, and cathedrals of white marble, on whose pointed steeples were storks’ nests. They went at a walking-pace because of the great flag-stones, and on the ground there were bouquets of flowers, offered you by women dressed in red bodices. They heard the chiming of bells, the neighing of mules, together with the murmur of guitars and the noise of fountains, whose rising spray refreshed heaps of fruit arranged like a pyramid at the foot of pale statues that smiled beneath playing waters. And then, one night they came to a fishing village, where brown nets were drying in the wind along the cliffs and in front of the huts. It was there that they would stay; they would live in a low, flat-roofed house, shaded by a palm-tree, in the heart of a gulf, by the sea. They would row in gondolas, swing in hammocks, and their existence would be easy and large as their silk gowns, warm and star-spangled as the nights they would contemplate. However, in the immensity of this future that she conjured up, nothing special stood forth; the days, all magnificent, resembled each other like waves; and it swayed in the horizon, infinite, harmonized, azure, and bathed in sunshine. But the child began to cough in her cot or Bovary snored more loudly, and Emma did not fall asleep till morning, when the dawn whitened the windows, and when little Justin was already in the square taking down the shutters of the chemist’s shop.
Gustave Flaubert, Madame Bovary, [1856][4]

In these two examples, but is not argumentative, it marks an isotopic shift.

3.2 But, indicator of an unresolved contradiction

While in the standard case of an argumentative but, the inferred contradiction E1 but E2 is resolved, the coordinated construction being cooriented with E2, in other cases but articulates two anti-oriented arguments without argumentative resolution:

S1    — What shall they do today?
S2    — Some want to go to the woods, but others to the beach.

Discourse (a) sounds strange, (b) more standard:

*(a) so we’ll go to the beach.
(b) so we do not know what to do, we’ll have to talk about that

3.3 But, indicator of argumentative dissociation

S1    — I thought you wanted reform?
S2    — We do want reform, but real reform.

The concept of argumentative dissociation was introduced by Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, who define it as the splitting of an elementary notion, operated by the arguer to escape a contradiction ([1958], 550-609), S. Dissociation

3.4 Other functions

— Rectification: with reference to “Beautiful blue Danube”

In Vienna, the Danube is not blue but dirty gray

— Preface to a second turn at speech, aligned with the first turn:

S1    — Once again, Peter failed to get his degree
S2    — But that’s exactly like me!                                             

4. Other constructions articulating an argument to a conclusion

An argumentative thus can be paraphrased by a set of verbal constructions connecting an argument to a conclusion:

[Left Context]      therefore, from where, hence, that is why,      [Conclusion]                                  this means, proves, shows clearly that,
                                 one can (then) conclude that

The conclusion appears as the completion of a “connective predicate”. Markers of argumentative structure would thus be unduly restricted to “small connectives words”; other constructions, combining anaphoric terms, verbs, or substantives can play this role.

4.1 Connective predicates

Some verbs predicate a conclusion upon an argument or an argument upon a conclusion. In reality, these connective predicates are the only indisputable and univocal argumentative indicators. We must distinguish between two cases (argument is taken in the sense that it has in theory of argumentation, not as “argument of a mathematical function”, S. Argument)

(1) Conclusion Predicate: the conclusion is predicated upon the argument.
Subject (Argument) + Pred (Conclusion)

— from [Argument] I conclude (that) [Conclusion]:

V = to conclude, infer, deduce…

— [Argument] allows to deduce (that) [Conclusion]:

V = to induce, show, demonstrate…

— [Argument] proves [Conclusion]

V = to prove, demonstrate, support, corroborate, suggest, go in the direction of, motivate, legitimate, justify, entitle to believe (say, think…)

(2) Argument predicate: the argument is predicated upon the conclusion.
Subject (Conclusion) + Pred (Argument)

[Conclusion] ensues from [Argument]:

V = to ensuing, result, follow, derive…

To argue is not a conclusion predicate, but a simple verb of speech activity. In “X argues for such a conclusion”, the subject X must be [+ Human]; it cannot be an argument, a description of a state of affairs. This construction contrasts with the construction “X suggests such a conclusion” where X can be a discourse or a human, S. (To) argue.

Overlooking this set of constructions is particularly damaging in the teaching of argument.

4.2 Constructions framing an argumentation

All the words used to talk about arguments and argumentation can serve as markers of argumentative structuration and argumentative function. This class of nominal indicators includes all the ordinary lexicon of argumentation: (counter-)argument, (counter-)conclusion, point of view…, premise, objection, refutation…

this is my conclusion, a consequence, a serious objection, an argument to be taken into consideration…

[D1, argument] is given as a good reason to admit, to do… is stated, said for, with a view to, to make acceptable, to make, to say, to feel… [D2, conclusion]

the conclusion, the premise, the objection that…; against this point of view…

We can be certain that “building the school here, the land is cheaper” is an argumentation, because it can be satisfactorily paraphrased as follows:

A good reason to build the school here is that the land is less expensive.
The fact that the land is cheaper legitimizes the decision to build the school there.

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[1] Corpus Debate on Immigration, Clapi Data Base of Spoken French
http://clapi.univ-lyon2.fr/V3_Feuilleter.php? Num_corpus = 35]. (09-30-2013)
[2] Corpus Negotiation on Rents – Conciliation Commission), Clapi Data Base of Spoken French. Our parenthesis, italics and tagging.
http://clapi.univ-lyon2.fr/V3_Feuilleter.php?num_corpus=13]. (09-30-2013)
[3] http://impassesud.joueb.com/news/mali-pendant-ce-temps-la-il-il-marchait]. 07-28-2010. Our emphasis.
[4] Quoted after Gustave Flaubert, Madame Bovary. Trans. by Eleanor Marx-Aveling. Ebook, 2006. http://www.gutenberg.org/files/2413/2413-0.txt

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1. Paragons

When it comes to political thinking, some events act as paragons: Munich and the diplomatic defeat of democracies facing Nazi expansionism, the genocide of Jews, Gypsies and homosexuals, are all great analogues that function as an anti-model for all current conflicts. For the United States before the Iraq war, Vietnam was the great analogue called to the rescue when it came to opposing military intervention abroad. Paragons serve as “models” for understanding the new events; they work on the principle of precedent, S. Analogy (II); Precedent; Example.

The paragon, person or event, creates a class by analogy, S. Categorization; Analogy (I).

A “great analogue” can stage characters that are a source of antonomasia. The antonomasia is the figure of speech by which a member of a category is designated by the name of the paragon of this category: a Daladier or a Chamberlain is a politician who capitulates to a dictator instead of fighting him. This references the behavior of the European politicians Edouard Daladier and Neville Chamberlain in Munich in 1938, as they dealt with Hitler.

Anti-models like Chamberlain or Daladier represent everything one should not do (Perelman, Olbrechts-Tyteca [1958], p. 362).

Anti-models typify negative authority; the “Model of the Anti-Models” is Hitler, S. Authority §6: Refutative uses of authority.

2. Model

The model is the single most valued member of a hierarchical category.

— It functions as the root of the class, generating the other members of the class.
— It is the most representative element of the category.
— As such, it is the criterion for the evaluation of the other class members and for integrating new individuals into the category.
— It is considered to be the ideal form, towards which all members of the class tend.

The argument by the model supports the conclusions of the type “this is (not) a good (real, true) X” by comparing the item to evaluate and reference.

In classical culture, the doctrine of imitation is based on the authority of a model. Literary genres are defined by the relationship of their members to a founding model, a founding “father”: Thucydides for history; Aesop and La Fontaine for fables; Aristotle and Cicero for argumentation, etc.

3. Setting an example

When chosen as a model by an individual, the model is not necessarily conscious to be a model, and the situation is not clearly argumentative, S. Example

To get an individual to do something, one can proceed argumentatively, that is to say, expose discursively, every reason to do so, and particularly argue by the model, giving as an example important people, either real or fictional, who have committed the same deed. This “argument from exemplarity” can be seen as variant of the verbal argument of authority, a metonymic exemplum.

In addition, one might set an example in order to demonstrate to the other what is wanted. One might stop smoking for example, to encourage a friend to stop smoking. Metaphorically speaking, this is an “argument by example”, as one speaks of an “argument by strength” (appeal to force) when one tries to open a recalcitrant can with a screwdriver.

The example strategy can be applied to all forms of behavior we wish to change; how to eat properly, talk properly, lead a dignified life worthy of reward in the afterlife. During this process, there may be some kind of persuasion, that is transformation of belief correlated with the transformation of behavior, but not all persuasion comes from argument, S. ‘You too’.

Setting an example, the person hopes to set in motion alignment mechanisms. The argument by the example given, plays on non-verbal mechanisms of social imitation, ripple effect, identification, empathy, charisma. Seduction and repulsion are forces distinct from argumentation that push individuals to align or to distance themselves from another person.

The ethotic argument combines with the argumentation by example, thereby pushing the audience to fully identify with the orator as a model, committing themselves to full belief in what he or she says and doing what he or she does, S. Ethos; Consensus; Ad populum.

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Ad ignorantiam argument, Lat. ignorantia, “ignorance”

1. Argumentation from ignorance and legitimacy of doubt

Argumentation from ignorance is defined by Locke as one of the four fundamental forms of argumentation, S. Collections (II):

Secondly, another way that men ordinarily use to drive others, and force them to submit to their judgment, and receive the opinion in debate, is to require the adversary to admit what they allege as a proof or to assign a better. And this I call argumentum ad ignorantiam. ([1690]; Vol. II, p. 410-411)

This argument is considered to be fallacious:

It proves not another man to be in the right way, nor that I ought to take the same way, because I know not a better. (Id., p. 411)

The following dialogue schematizes the situation where S1‘s conclusion relies on the ignorance of S2:

S1_1:   — C, since A.
S2_1:   — This is a bad argument. I do not admit that A proves C.
S1_2:   — Do you have any reason to conclude anything different from C? Do you know a better argument for C?
S2_2:   — Well, no
S1_3:   — Then you have to accept my own proof and my conclusion.

(i) First turn: S1_1 proposes a justified claim C.

(ii) Second turn: S2_1 refuses to ratify the claim C.

(iii) Third turn: S1_2 asks S2 to explain the reasons for his or her doubt. According to the conversational principle which requires justification for non-preferred second turns, S1 is perfectly justified in doing this. S2 could answer:

(a) by presenting objections against the alleged argument, A, or by utterly refuting A;
(b) by constructing a counter-discourse by providing what Locke terms “a better proof”. The text does not tell for what conclusion; so we can therefore assume the following two cases:

(b1) Concluding something different from C;
(b2) Providing “better evidence” for C.

(iv) Fourth turn: S2_2 admits that he or she cannot elaborate anything along the (a), (b1) or (b2) lines.

(v) Fifth turn: S1 may accordingly:

(a) Admit S2’s reluctances, while maintaining his argumentation: “Okay, this is not a very good argument, but it is still interesting, it is even the only one we have”;
(b) Summon S2 to accept his (A, C) argumentation, considering that his partner’s incapacity is a kind of second order proof to add to his former substantial one, A, and so committing an ad ignorantiam fallacy (even if his former argument is, after all, not so bad).

A pure ad ignorantiam fallacy would be based only on the partner’s failure “to assign a better [proof]”. Under conversational circumstances, S2_1 does not ratify S1_1’s turn; normally, this should urge S1 to clarify and elaborate upon his proposal. The crude reaction seems rare: “as you cannot articulate anything against my argumentation, you have to accept it wholesale”.

Seen from S2’s perspective, this situation also seems a little bizarre, a kind of borderline case where S2 has only his or her inner conviction to oppose to an argumentation. Under standard conditions, a conversationalist and a fortiori a dialectician, knows how to elaborate upon a strong inner conviction. In essence, Locke seems to attribute to S2 a kind of radical clause of conscience.

Leibniz mitigates this radical stand: “The argument ad ignorantiam is valid in cases of presumption where it is reasonable to hold to an opinion till the contrary is proved” ([1765], p. 576).
Presumption here has the meaning of burden of proof. The pretension of L1 may be excessive and misleading, but his argument nevertheless creates a preference in the field concerned, and in practice we can stick to it until something else has been proven.
This “for lack of anything better” reasoning seems to be the standard case in practical argumentation when a decision has to be made and a possibly urgent action has to be taken:

S1_1:     — Upon such and such basis, I propose 1) that we take such and such a disposition; 2) that we explore such and such a hypothesis. Now, the floor is yours

S2:        [Long silence]

S1_2:     — Nothing to say? Silence meaning consent,
1) In the absence of contradiction, my proposal is adopted.
2) In the absence of any other hypothesis, mine will serve as a working hypothesis.

It is difficult to object to S1_2’s conclusions. He or she does not claim that his proposition is the only viable one, nor that his hypothesis should be held to be true.

2. Ignorance and principle of the excluded middle

The argument from ignorance is also defined, without consideration of the quality of the argumentation, as an illegitimate application of the principle of the excluded middle:

P is true, since you are unable to prove that it is false.

The argument is not conclusive. If we consider that “not-P is not proven” is equivalent to “not-(not-P)” we conclude that P, by application of the principle of the excluded middle. But the two nots are not of the same nature: “not-P is not proved” does not mean “not-P is false”, which would be a confusion between what is true (alethic) and what is knowable (epistemic), S. Absurd.

3. Ignorance, burden of proof, precautionary principle

I am innocent, since you are incapable of proving that I am guilty.
You are guilty because you are incapable of proving your innocence.

Admitting that P is true, or acting “as if” it was true in the absence of proof of not-P is a decision that falls to the institution empowered to discuss and rule on such matter in the field concerned. In the judicial field, presumption of innocence places the burden of proof on the prosecution and gives the benefit of doubt to the defendant.

Precautionary principle
In the debate on the safety or toxicity of new products, a decision has to be made in a situation of insufficient knowledge. The presumption of safety would be:

Possibly the product has toxic effects, but this is not proven. So it has no toxic effects.

The precautionary principle is easiest to rebut when maximized:

Every new product is assumed toxic and will remain forbidden until its safety has been proved.

Under its common form, it simply reverses the burden of proof:

The precautionary principle (or precautionary approach) to risk management states that if an action or policy has a suspected risk of causing harm to the public, or to the environment, in the absence of scientific consensus (that the action or policy is not harmful), the burden of proof that it is not harmful falls on those taking an action that may or may not be a risk.
Wikipedia, Precautionary Principle

Situation: no scientific consensus on the inocuity of a given product
Decision: the burden of proof is upon those which use it

4. Argument from ignorance and argument from silence

S. Silence

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The argument of direction, or slippery slope argument, is based on the device of stages and is used to counter the gradualist strategy. It is classified as an argument “based on the structure of reality” by Perelman Olbrechts-Tyteca.

1. The device of stages as a general action strategy

Generally speaking, the process of stages is implemented when the overall goal is judged as being directly unattainable; it is then divided into smaller, more easily achievable goals.
This process of division corresponds to a common action strategy, which is not necessarily manipulative. Experienced explorers explain that when lost in the desert, dying of thirst, and trying to reach a desperately distant town (final goal) one must set oneself a manageable goal, say the next dune, and then the next cactus, and so, step-by-step finally reach the distant town.

More relevant to everyday life perhaps is the solution to trying to carry a heavy weight. If I cannot carry this one hundred pound object, I dismantle it and carry each of its parts separately.
Such small but achievable goals might be ordered, as is the case in every learning process: one first learns to drive on a normal road for example, before learning to drive on an icy road. In these different cases, the actor keeps the ultimate goal in mind, in relation to which the partial goals are determined and organized.

2. The gradualist strategy

To get something from another person, an actor can apply the process of stages. In that case, the gradualist process should not be considered to be an argument but an intentionally opaque, manipulative strategy, S. Manipulation.

It is often found to be better not to confront the interlocutor with the whole interval separating the existing situation from the ultimate end, but to divide this interval into sections, with stopping points along the way indicating partial ends, whose realization does not provoke such a strong opposition. (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca [1958], p. 282).

Step-by-step strategy, in this second sense, is commonly referred to in sales as a priming strategy:

The newlywed Joneses want to buy a flat; the real estate agent proposes a modest, fully sufficient two room flat, and they agree to buy it. Now the agent has got a foot in the door, and observes that very soon a baby will come; so they really need a three-room flat, and they change their mind and agree to buy one. But the agent observes that Mrs. Jones is developing a promising start-up, she needs an individual office; so they need a four-room flat, etc.

Arguing with the Lord to convince him to hold his wrath toward Sodom, Abraham uses such a priming strategy and step-by-step process — somewhat manipulative, but nonetheless laudable. The argument goes not from the few to the many but from just some to a very little few:

[…] Abraham remained standing before the Lord. Then Abraham approached him and said: “Will you sweep away the righteous with the wicked? What if there are fifty righteous people in the city? Will you really sweep it away and not spare the place for the sake of the fifty righteous people in it? Far be it from you to do such a thing—to kill the righteous with the wicked, treating the righteous and the wicked alike. Far be it from you! Will not the Judge of all the earth do right?”
The Lord said, “If I find fifty righteous people in the city of Sodom, I will spare the whole place for their sake.”
Then Abraham spoke up again: “Now that I have been so bold as to speak to the Lord, though I am nothing but dust and ashes, what if the number of the righteous is five less than fifty? Will you destroy the whole city for lack of five people?” “If I find forty-five there,” he said, “I will not destroy it.”
Once again he spoke to him, “What if only forty are found there?” He said, “For the sake of forty, I will not do it.”
Then he said, “May the Lord not be angry, but let me speak. What if only thirty can be found there?”He answered, “I will not do it if I find thirty there.”
Abraham said, “Now that I have been so bold as to speak to the Lord, what if only twenty can be found there?” He said, “For the sake of twenty, I will not destroy it.”
Then he said, “May the Lord not be angry, but let me speak just once more. What if only ten can be found there?” He answered, “For the sake of ten, I will not destroy it.”
When the Lord had finished speaking with Abraham, he left, and Abraham returned home.
Genesis 18:22-33 New International Version.[1]

Unfortunately, the Lord will not find ten righteous people in Sodom.

3. Argument of direction, or slippery slope argument

The term argument of direction is an alternative name for the slippery slope argument. It is used to prevent the application of a gradualist strategy:

“[it] consists, essentially, in guarding against the use of the device of stages. If you give in this time, you will have to give in a little more next time, and heaven knows where you will stop” (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca [1958], p. 282).

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[1] Quoted after www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=Genesis%2018:16-33

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Lat. ejusdem generis argument. Lat. idem, “identical”; genus, “genus”.

1. Argument from genus

The argument from the genus is based on essential definition. It transfers to the species, and ultimately to the individuals, the properties, duties, representations, any and all characteristic attached to the genus they belong to, S. Classification; Categorization; Definition.

2. Extending to the genus: the generic clause “… and the like”

Generic clauses are phrases such as “… and the things of the same kind”, “… and the like”. The text has the form:

This provision concerns a, b, c, and things of the same kind.

Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 2[1].
Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. (My italics)

If an object x is not included in the enumeration “a, b, c…” but if it is possible to consider that it belongs to the category defined by the enumeration, then the generalizing clause “and all beings of the same kind” applies the provision concerning a, b and c to x.

This shows that the individuals enumerated are mentioned not only for their own sake, but also as prototypes from which a new category must be derived, S. Analogy (II).

This provision concerns cars, motorcycles, and all private means of transportation.

Cars and motorcycles are considered to be prototypical members of the category “private means of transportation” to which the provision applies. Note that the particle etc. would also open the list to new categories of individuals, but would not give any indication about the relevant common feature constituting them into a specific genus, as the provision “all private means of transportation” does quite clearly. The generic provision may either create a new category out of the enumeration of specific individuals, or explicitly mention an existing genus:

One must pay the tax on chickens, geese, and other poultry.
Conclusion: therefore on ducks and turkeys.

Chickens and geese are mentioned only as prototypical examples of the category “poultry”. One can discuss borderline cases, for example whether a peacock is really a backyard animal or a pet. In any case, there is no levy on rabbits, which don’t qualify as poultry.

On the other hand, the absence of a generic provision limits the application of the measure to the categories that are explicitly mentioned:

You have to pay the tax on chickens and geese.
Conclusion: So not on ducks.

Unless the legislator’s intention is invoked.

The use of the extensive clause is not limited to the legal field:

Fixed concrete barbecue
Warning! Do not use alcohol, gasoline or similar liquids to light or reactivate the fire.

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[1] Quoted after www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/ (01-07-2017)

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Lat. a generali sensu; Lat. generalis “general”, sensus “thought, idea”.

In law, the argument of the generality of the law posits that the law must be applied in all its extension, “we must not introduce distinctions where the law does not”. General terms should not be given a particular meaning. In other words, law is non-negotiable. Possible exceptions must be explicitly laid down in the relevant regulation, for example, while generally prohibited, the consumption of canna­bis may be tolerated in some specific places complying with the existing regulation.

In public places, people’s behavior must comply with law plus specific rules of the place. Rules are by nature more flexible than laws, but, when strictly enforced, these rules also obey the principle of generality. If the rule of the school states in general terms that “the use of mobile phones is prohibited during the course”, then its application is general, and admits no exception or distinction. One cannot argue that the regulation is especially valid for “the lower grades”, or that an exception must be made for students “urgently managing their bank account”, or for “students who have a good academic standing”.

S. Strict meaning

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Some argumentative questions can be quickly and privately solved (“who is going to take out the trash?”); others cannot be solved so easily and are brought before specialist, established social institutions. An argumentative forum is a more or less institutionalized physical social space dedicated to the treatment of argued issues. Such a space may or may not have a decision-making capacity. Interventions are ruled by the norms and customs that characterize the forum, in the first place the specific codification of the turns at speech as defined by the rights to the floor, S. Rules. Such rules give meaning and consistency to the expression “local rationality”.

The concept of a forum, with its institutional accompaniment and its concrete regulations, must be taken into account for the analysis of the social exercise of argument. This approach enables us to go beyond an idealized view of argumentation as an exercise subject only to the law of dialectical reason, regulating verbal exchanges between two artificially de-socialized actors, S. Roles.
The crucial question of the burden of proof relates not only to the state of opinion (doxa) at the time of the discussion, but also to the forum where the discussion takes place, S. Burden of proof.

 

Tribunals and political assemblies can be seen as typical forums. There are many others “argument marketplaces”, where viewpoints are calculated, expressed and traded to inform practical decisions, are part of the fabric of democratic societies. Consider the dispute over the legalization of drugs in Syldavia, a true participatory democracy. The issue will be discussed in a huge range of forum, from the subway carriage, to the family table, at the pub on the corner, in the city conference room, by the commissions drawing up the political parties’ official positions, by the National Congress, the Law Commission, etc. Some of these forums are intended for the expression of disputes and have the power to voice a decision or opinion on the matter, others serve simply to amplify and popularize the debate rather than close it.

The following passage is taken from a 2002 speech given by Alfredo Cristiani, President of El Salvador from 1989 to 1994. In 1992, under his presidency, the Chapultepec Peace Agreements were signed, ending a twelve-year civil war between the extreme right and Marxist guerrillas. His 2002 speech was delivered on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of these agreements[1].

We cannot understand the importance of what happened in El Salvador if we limit ourselves to the recent past. The crisis that swept the Salvadorian nation over the last decade did not come out of nothing, nor has it been the fruit of isolated wills. This crisis, so painful and tragic, has ancient and profound social, political, economic and cultural roots. In the past, one of the pernicious flaws in our national form of life was the lack or insufficiency of the spaces and mechanisms [de los espacios y mecanismos] necessary to allow the free play of ideas, the natural development of the various political projects which stem from freedom of thought and to act; in short, the lack of a real democratic living environment.

According to Plato, sophistic discourse reigns over public forums and institutional places, in particular, over the court and the assembly, dominated by professional sophists. That is why Socratic dialectic interaction, oriented solely by the search for truth, takes place in a very special, de-socialized argumentative place, in the natural setting of a locus amœnus: a hot day, a stream, a tree, a light breeze and grass to lie down on:

Phaedrus:    — […] All right, where do you want to sit while we read?[[2]]
Socrates:     — Let’s leave the path here and walk along the Ilisus; then we can sit quietly wherever we find the right spot.
Phaedrus:    — How lucky, then, that I am barefoot today—you, of course, are always so. The easiest thing to do is to walk right in the stream; this way, we’ll also get our feet wet, which is very pleasant, especially at this hour and season.
Socrates:     — Lead the way, then, and find us a place to sit.
Phaedrus:    — Do you see that very tall plane tree?
Socrates:     — Of course.
Phaedrus:    — It’s shady, with a light breeze; we can sit or, if we prefer, lie down on the grass there.
Socrates:     — Lead on, then.
Phaedrus:    — Tell me, Socrates, isn’t it from somewhere near this stretch of the Ilisus that people say Boreas carried Orithuia away?
Socrates:     — So they say.
Phaedrus:    — Couldn’t this be the very spot? The stream is lovely, pure and clear: just right for girls to be playing nearby.

Plato, Phaedrus, I229a-c. CW, p. 509.

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[1] archivo.elsalvador.com/noticias/especiales/acuerdosdepaz2002/nota18.html (09-20-2013)

[2] The speech of Lysias, that Phaedrus “[holds] in [his] left hand under [his] cloak”.

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The word force is used with three distinct meanings:

1. 1. Argument from or by force, S. Threat -Promise
   2. Force of things, S. Weight of Circumstances
   3. Force of an argument, this entry

The graduated concept of force of an argument exists in opposition to the binary notion of valid or invalid argumentation. An argument is strong (or weak) either in itself or relative to another argument. This force is evaluated according to different criteria.

1. Inherent strength of an argument scheme

In scientific fields, to be strong an argument must first of all be valid. That is to say that it must develop according to a method which is accepted in the given scientific field. Yet, an argument can be valid and not so strong, that is to say, really relevant and interesting for the discussion of such and such hypothesis.

From a philosophical point of view, one might consider that some argument schemes are by nature stronger than others. The strength of an argument is thus determined on the basis of ontology. An adept of moral realism will consider that an argument based on the nature of things and their definition is stronger than a pragmatic argument; a practical mind will think the opposite.

2. Strength and effectiveness

In relation to a goal such as persuasion, the strongest argument will be the most efficient, the argument that most quickly achieves the arguer’s goal, whether it be selling a product or electing a president. A degree of strength can be attributed to the argument on the basis of an impact study carried out on the relevant target population, S. Persuasion.

3. Strength of an argument and acceptability by an audience

The New Rhetoric defines the strength of the argument according to the extent and quality of the audiences that accept it, S. Persuade, Convince.

4. Strength and linguistic reinforcement of arguments

Two arguments oriented towards the same conclusion belong to the same argumentative class, S. Orientation. Both bring some support to this conclusion. Within the same argumentative class, the strength of an argument can be determined by reference to an objective gradation, such as the scale of temperature, or it may simply be allocated to the argument by the speaker, who value such argument over another. The hierarchization is marked by the means of argumentative morphemes (for example, even) and realizing or de-realizing modifiers. The arrangements of the arguments on argument scales are governed by the laws of discourse.

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The term figure is used in syllogistic, in fallacy theory and in rhetoric with different meaning

1. Figures of the syllogism

The figures of the syllogism correspond to the different forms of the syllogism, according to the position of the middle term in the premises.

2. Fallacy of “figure of speech”

The fallacy of misleading expression is sometimes referred to as the fallacy of figure of speech.

3. Figures of Rhetoric

The figures of rhetoric are variations in the manner of signifying “which give to the discourse more grace and vivacity, luster and energy” (Littré, Figure). Dictionaries of rhetoric include entries in the field of argumentation, even though they are primarily concerned with literary rhetoric. For example, the dictionary “Gradus. The literary processes ­— Dictionary (Dupriez, 1984), includes the entries argument, argumentation, argument, deduction, enthymeme, epicheirema, example, induction, refutation, paralogism, premise, reasoning, sophism… These basic concepts within the field of argumentation do not belong specifically to the literary domain.

The word figure is used to cover tropes and figures of speech. Metaphor, irony metonymy and synecdoche are considered to be the “four master tropes”. The metaphor as a model has a clear argumentative function. There is correspondence between the mechanisms of metonymy and synecdoche and those that legitimize the passage from an argument to a conclusion. Moreover, irony argues from a self-evident situation.

The expression figure of speech can actually refer to any salient and recurrent form of discursive organization. This is why the enthymeme can be considered as a figure, the enthymemism, along with refutation or prolepsis. Other figures of rhetoric, from antanaclasis (S. Orientation) to analogy and interpretation correspond to well-identified argument schemes.

Other figures play a role in the construction of argumentative structures. For example, a figure of syntactic disposition, such as parallelism, can act as an analogy or antithesis indicator, S. Analogy; Antithesis.

The figures of opposition are all directly interpretable as argumentative, insofar as they correspond to various modes of presentation of the discourse vs. counter-discourse confrontation.

Without reducing each and every figure to a feature of the argumentative situation, it can be observed that the classical definition of argumentation is based on the idea that arguing constitutes an attempt to gain acceptance for a discourse (conclusion) on the basis of good reasons (argument). A clear index of such acceptance is the resumption, repetition, and development of the convincing discourse, particularly as fragments or slogans. Since to have things repeated, it is necessary to facilitate their memorization, figures of sounds and every kind of rhetorical pun can be used to that effect, and must be viewed as a feature of argumentation.

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When taking sides truth and rationality, fallacy theory calls for a criticism of language and speech as vectors of error and deceit, S. Evaluation; Norms. Other cultures gave other foundations to the criticism of speech. Reconstructing the history of the “sins of language” in the Middle Ages, Casagrande & Vecchio (1991) have demonstrated the link between speech and sin. The issue then was not to build a rational discourse, but a sinless, “impeccable” discourse, if not a holy one. The nature of the misconduct has shifted: what was declared sinful in the name of religion is now considered to be fallacious or sophistical in the name of rationality. Whether sin or fallacies, salvation of the soul or rational guidance of the mind, it is always a matter of regimenting verbal behavior, disciplining one’s speech and pen.

Casagrande and Vecchio synthesize data from various medieval treatises into a list of fourteen sins. This list can be widely interpreted in terms of misleading interactional argumentative behaviors. These sins-fallacies intend to rule the interaction in a religious context where hierarchy and valorization of authority occupy a central position, S. Politeness.

Making a connection between fallacy theory and “sins of the tongue” is not indulging in any kind of derisio, neither to one nor to the other party. This connection, on the contrary, is intended to show how deep the anthropological roots of discourse criticism are.

1. Sins against truth

1.1 Lying

Telling the truth, all the truth and nothing but the truth is certainly a basic commitment for a non-fallacious debate. Lying, as saying something false to someone who has no access to truth, is a sin in the system of theological norms, and a fundamental violation of Grice’s cooperative^@ principle S. Manipulation

1.2 Aggravated lying: perjury and false testimony

In judicial rhetoric, oath and testimony, two major instruments to establish the truth, are considered to be non-technical proofs, S. “Technical’ and “Non-technical” evidence. Their violation corresponds to two aggravated lies, the sins of perjury, perjurium, and false testimony, falsum testimonium.

2. Six sins of interaction

2.1 Against disputes

Rivalry, conflict, fight (contentio), and discussion (disputatio) are names denoting the very activity of disputing. It can thus be said that arguing is potentially considered sinful at its very core. It is the sin of the intellectual monks, and no doubt, that of Abelard. The passage from the peccaminous to the fallacious is explicit in the Port-Royal Logic, in which the excessive love of dispute, the spirit of contradiction, is condemned as a sophism of self-esteem (n°6 and 7), a fundamental feature of the character of “those who contradict” (Arnauld and Nicole [1662], p. 272); S. Fallacies (IV). The debate is subject to a moral imperative: the contradiction must be genuine, not “malignant and envious” (ibid.) – or, to move on to judicial pathology, querulous. Such a debate might be legitimately declined.

We then discern two families of sins of interactional positioning, on the one hand, the sins “towards the other”, the partner with whom we argue (§ 2.2), and, on the other hand, the sins committed “towards oneself” as a speaker (§2.3). In both cases, it is a question of banishing illegitimate treatments of the partners of the interaction, S. Politeness.

2.2 Three kinds of sins towards the partner

Undue negative treatment: offensive remarks (contumelia) or slander (detractio). These two sins are a form of personal attacks, or ad personam fallacies. The derisio, as a contemptuous mockery, could be associated with this fallacy, S. Ad hominem; Dismissal.

Negative treatment under the cover of the positive: this is the mechanism of refutation by self-evidence as implemented through irony, ironia. This intention to hurt the other is dealt with only laterally in contemporary theories of irony.

Undue positive treatment: flattery (adulatio), and even simple praise (laudatio). These two sins involve the same interactional mechanisms as found in the fallacy of modesty^@, ad verecundiam, where the speaker humiliates himself unduly before his partner. Adulatio and laudatio encourage pride, and pride is a sin. Logic, religion, and politeness speak with one voice, S. Modesty; Politeness.

2.3 Two kinds of sins against oneself

Undue positive treatment, in other words, boasting, iactantia. This ethotic sin stigmatizes the projection in the discussion of an overly positive self-image, S. Ethos. According to politeness theory, the iactantia sins against modesty.

Undue negative treatment is the symmetrical sin of the sin of undue positive treatment of the partner, S. Modesty. The taciturnitas, sin of the person who keeps silent when he should speak, can be related to the ad verecundiam fallacy in which “human respect” inhibits criticism.

4. Murmuring: a sophism of insubordination

A person who complains against authority commits the sin of murmur (murmur), S. A fortiori. A person who refuses to yield to the force of the best argument having little to oppose to it, save an intimate conviction or sense of justice, is guilty of the same kind of fallaciousness, S. Dissensus; Rules. Insubordination is irrational, illegal, peccaminous.

5. The sin of eloquence

Eloquence, seen as an abundance of words, amplification, repetition, magnification, is the source of all fallacies, S. Verbiage. The same evaluation should apply to idle speech (vaniloquium), as well as to chatter (multiloquium).

6. Flaring into a passion: ad passiones

Some remaining sins are difficult to connect to the problematic of fallacies, perhaps because they directly involve the relation to the sacred: the prohibition of obscene words (turpiloquium), blasphemy (blasphemia) and the curse (maledictum). Nonetheless, these sins can have an ad personam function. Above all, they have an emotional import, so they certainly relate to the ad passiones group. Blasphemy is anger against god, and cursing, anger against the other; obscene words can be used to support many passions, including insulting.

 

To sum up, the theory of the sins of language is a critical theory of discourse taking into account:

— The “non-technical” problems of lying or attesting the truth.
— The spirit of the discussion.
— The relative interactional positions of the participants.

7. The “rules of the devil”

This list of fallacies-sins does not mention violations of logical rules, such as the assertion of the consequent (confusion of necessary and sufficient conditions, S. Deduction. One would think that it is because the logical domain, by nature escapes the religious norm. In the Muslim tradition, however, one can find the vocabulary of sin applied to paralogisms, which Al-Ghazali considers as “rules of the devil” (Bal., p. 171; Deg.). A medieval exemplum also puts the logician into hell, assimilated to the sophist, S. Exemplum.

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