Antoine Arnauld and Pierre Nicole conclude the third part of their Logic, or the Art of Thinking (1662) with two chapters devoted to sophisms and bad reasoning. Chapter XIX, “Of the different ways of reasoning which are called Sophisms”, takes up the Aristotelian fallacies; Chap. XX, “Of the bad reasonings which are common in Civil Life and in Ordinary Discourse” repositions the concept of fallacious reasoning an anthropological and moral issue about fallacious discourse and discussion.

1. The Aristotelian fallacies

The list of “ways of evil reasoning that we call sophisms” merges the Aristotelian linguistic and non-linguistic fallacies, S. Fallacies (3).

The linguistic fallacies are grouped under two headings. The list does not mention the fallacy of many questions, and adds two new types of fallacies independent of language, “incomplete enumeration”, and “defective induction”.

2. On the bad reasonings in civil life

Chapter XX “Of the bad reasonings which are common in Civil Life and in Ordinary discourse” is much more original. Its consists of two parts:

Of the sophisms of self-love, of interest, and of passion.
Of the false reasonings which arise from objects themselves.

These sophisms and bad reasoning no longer reflect logical or scientific concerns, and have no connection with dialectics. On the basis of a thorough and hypercritical description of the discussant’s concrete behavior, they emphasize the difficulties in bringing a debate to a successful completion and show how deceitful and useless dispute can be when truth is at stake. More than an appeal to follow rules for discussion, the conclusion is an ascetic appeal to moral reformation of the disputants. It should be kept in mind that the religious and philosophical disputes over Jansenism and Cartesianism form the background of the disillusioned discussions mentioned in this chapter.

In the following, the various sophisms and bad reasoning are designated by an expression extracted from their definition.

2.1 “Of the sophisms of self-love, of interest, and of passion”

(1) “To take our interest as the motive for believing a thing” — The first of the causes which determine belief is the spirit of belonging to “some nation, or profession, or institution” (Id., p. 268). Beliefs are not determined by truth and reality, but by the social position of the believer. The disputant borrows his beliefs from the group in which he finds “his interest” and his identity.

(2) “[The] delusions of the heart” (Id., p. 269) — This sophism expresses the ad passiones fallacies of love and hate (ad amicitiam, ad amorem, ad odium), it is a variant of pathetic argumentation:

 ‘I love him, therefore, he is the cleverest man in the world; I hate him; therefore, he is nobody’. (Ibid.)

(3) Those “who never distinguish their authority from reason”, and

decide everything by a very general and convenient principle, which is, that they are right, that they know the truth; from which it is not difficult to infer that those who are of their opinion are deceived, — in fact, the conclusion is necessary. (Ibid.)

The claim to the truth of the self-centered person comes from immediate certainty (in the profane as in the sacred domain), whereas it would require an argument, S. Authority; Modesty. This can be read as a criticism of the Cartesian’s criterion of truth, as clear and distinct ideas. Interest and self-love better determine clarity and distinctness than truth does.

(4) “The clever man[‘s]” sophism is related to the preceding one:

‘If this were so, I should not be a clever man; now, I am a clever man; therefore, it is not so.’ (Id., p. 270)

Enthymemes:

‘What,’ said they, ‘if the blood circulates, […] if nature does not abhor a vacuum […] — I have been ignorant of many important things in anatomy and in physics. These things, therefore, cannot be’.  (Ibid).

This is another fallacy ad passiones, the fallacy of pride, ad superbiam.

These first four “sophisms” are not precisely sophisms insofar as they are self-deceiving as well as other-deceiving. Nor are they correctly called fallacies insofar as they are not public reasoning, propositionally expressed. Their premises remain unsaid, perhaps unconscious:

I’m a Syldavian, Syldavians are always right, therefore, I’m right.
I’m right, therefore my opponent is wrong.
I hate him; therefore, he is a nobody.
I know everything, thus what I don’t know is false.
Interests, inflated egos and passions, are epistemological obstacles ingrained in human nature.

Chapter XIX reiterates the classical belief that education about argument requires thorough knowledge of language and a good training in logic. Chapter XX adds that first of all, the arguer has to work on himself (sophisms (1)-(4) and avoid the pitfalls of argumentative interactions (sophisms (5)-(9)): This is the substantial content of the following subset, which complements the first moral and psychological subset with factual observation of the interactional behavior of seasoned arguers.

(5) “Those who are in the right, and those who are in the wrong, with almost the same language make the same complaints and attribute to each other the same vices” (Id., p. 271). From this empirical observation follows a recommendation to the wise and thoughtful, about how to properly advocate truth in a controversy.

First Recommendation to the arguers: don’t start a debate before having “[thoroughly establish] the truth and justice of the cause which they maintain”.

Only when these rules have been correctly applied can one shift to a meta-discussion about the bad argumentative manners of the opponent. This of course presupposes that one can decide that the rules have been correctly applied.

(6)“The spirit of contradiction”, is a “malignant and envious disposition”:

“Someone else said such a thing; it is therefore false. I did not write that book; it is, therefore, a bad one”. This is the source of the spirit of contradiction so common amongst men, and which leads them, when they hear or read anything of another, to pay but little attention to the reasons which might have persuaded them, and to think only of those which they think may be offered against it. (p. 272)

(7) “The spirit of debate”

Thus, unless at least we have been accustomed by long discipline to retain the perfect mastery over ourselves, it is very difficult not to lose sight of truth in debates, since there are scarcely any exercises which so much arouse our passions. (p. 277),
Observations (6) and (7) have a clear link with the sin of contentio, S. Fallacies as Sins of the Tongue.
From the observation that “speaking of ourselves, and the things which concern us” can “excite envy and jealousy” comes a new recommendation: when advocating truth, self-exposure should be minimized, and the arguers should rather “seek, by hiding in the crowd, to escape observation, in order that the truth which they propose may be seen alone in their discourse” (p. 273).

(8) “The Complaisant”

For as the controversial hold as true the contrary of what is said to them, the complaisant appear to take as true everything which is said to them. (p. 278)

This sophism of acceptance without examination, at least of refusal to take a position, corresponds exactly to the ad verecundiam fallacy of Locke, S. Modesty. This is different but nonetheless related with the blamed character alluded to in (7), who “in the midst of [the discussion] become obstinate and are silent, affecting a proud contempt, or a stupid modesty of avoiding contention” (p. 277). S. Modesty; Contempt.

(9) “The determination to defend our opinion” leads us to

no longer to consider whether the reasons we employ are true or false, but whether they will avail to defend that which we maintain. We employ all sorts of reasons, good or bad, in order that there may be some to suit everyone. (p. 279).

The whole section closes with a kind of final recommendation:

To have no end but truth, and to examine reasonings with so much care, that even prejudice shall not be able to mislead us. (p. 276)

As observed in (5), each discussant will say that is precisely what he or she does. The attempt to expose the sophism seems to be doomed from the start, as if, in a conflictual dialogue, we were condemned never to know who speaks the truth.

2.2 “Of the false reasoning which arise from objects themselves”

This section focuses on the following points:

— There is only a small margin between truth and error; cf. supra (5):

In the majority of cases, there is a mixture of truth and error, of virtue and vice, of perfection and imperfection (p. 277)

— Rash induction also applies to human affairs; cf. supra §1, “incomplete enumeration”, and “defective induction”:

[Men] judge rashly of the truth of things from some authority insufficient to assure them of it, or by deciding the inward essence by the outward manner. (p. 284)

Decisions are made on the basis of “exterior and foreign marks.” (ibid.), that is peripheral arguments.

— “We rarely avoid judging purposes by the event”, a very relevant point:

If somebody succeeds, he had carefully planned his deeds; if he fails, he miscalculated. (p. 283)

No distinction is made between “the fortunate and the wise.” (Ibid)

— About “pompous eloquence”, S. Verbiage.

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1. Francis Bacon, Novum Organum, 1620

Hamblin considers Francis Bacon’s New Organon as a psychological turning point in the conception of fallacies (Hamblin 1970, p. 146; Walton, 1999). Bacon presents his concept of “idol” as the scientific counterpart of logical or dialectical fallacies. An idol is an obstacle to the (inductive) edification of scientific knowledge.

The word idol comes from a Greek term meaning “simulacrum, phantom” (Bailly, [eidolon]). According to Bacon, a fallacy is a simulacrum, a phantom of argument, produced under the influence of towering idols, defined as false Gods altering human reasoning:

XXXIX. Four species of idols beset the human mind, to which (for distinction’s sake) we have assigned names, calling the first Idols of the Tribe, the second Idols of the Den, the third Idols of the Market, the fourth Idols of the Theater. ([1620], p. 20)

— The Idols of the Tribe, that is of the whole of humanity. These idols are the deformations imposed upon reality by the innate structure of the human mind, which is not a tabula rasa but an “uneven mirror” (id.). Its a priori categories distort reality.

— The Idols of the Den are the product of the education and history of each individual, that is to say, prejudices or other evidences, exerting their powers through “Authority” (id., p. 21).

— The Idols of the Market place are the words themselves, which “still manifestly force understanding, throw everything into confusion, and lead mankind into vain and innumerable controversies and fallacies” (id., p. 21).

— The Idols of the Theater correspond to “the various dogmas of peculiar systems of philosophy, and also from the perverted rules of demonstration” (id., p. 22).

These Idols include fallacious inferences as well as substantial fallacies.

2. John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 1690

In a brief section of his Essay, Locke reflects “on four sorts of arguments, that men in their reasonings with others, do ordinarily make use of to prevail on their assent or at least so to awe them as to silence their opposition” ([1690], p. 410). This definition of an argument perfectly suits what is a rhetorical argument as pressure exerted on the audience, S. Logos – Ethos – Pathos. These four sorts of arguments are (id., p. 410-412):

“The argumentum ad verecundiam”, S. Modesty
“The argumentum ad ignorantiam”, S. Ignorance
“The argumentum ad hominem”, S. Ad hominem
“The argumentum ad judicium”, S. Matter.

Locke rejects the first three arguments on the ground that, at best, they “may dispose me, perhaps, for the reception of truth, but help me not to it”:

For, 1. It [ad verecundiam] argues not another man’s opinion to be right because I, out of respect, or any other consideration but that of conviction, will not contradict him. 2. It [ad ignorantiam] proves not another man to be in the right way, nor that I ought to take the same way, because I know not a better. 3. Nor does it follow that another man is in the right way because he has shown me that I am in the wrong. I may be modest, and therefore not oppose another man’s persuasion; I may be ignorant, and not be able to produce a better; I may be in error, and another may show me that I am so. This may dispose me, perhaps, for the reception of truth, but helps me not to it (id., 411).

The concept of fallacy is redefined independently of any Aristotelian consideration. The only valid arguments are arguments ad judicium, that is to say “proofs drawn from any of the foundations of knowledge or probability” (ibid.); truth “must come from proofs and arguments and light arising from the nature of things themselves” (id., 412). Note that whilst the fallacious arguments correspond to argument schemes, the argument ad judicium does not correspond to just one argument scheme but to any kind of argument recognized as scientifically valid.

Leibniz ([1765]) nuanced this strict vision of fallacious arguments (see the above mentioned entries).

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Argumentation studies are related to two Aristotelian sources, on the one hand, the rhetorical and dialectical theories of the Rhetoric and the Topics, and on the other hand, the critical analysis of fallacious sequences (fallacies, apparent enthymemes) in the Prior Analytics, the Rhetoric and mainly in the Sophistical Refutations (Woods 2014). This last line is the basis of the “standard treatment of the fallacies” as reconstructed by Hamblin (Fallacies, 1970).

The definitions from the Sophistical Refutations are taken up in all works dealing with fallacious arguments. The title, Sophistical Refutations, is ambiguous. Firstly, according to the classic joke, it is not ‘an adequate description of the contents of the book’, that is to say, a set of refutations (concerning well defined theses) which would be sophistical, but a refutation of the Sophists’ arguments. The book analyses and rejects the refutations as practiced by the sophists, or “how the sophists refute”.

Aristotle draws a broad distinction between two sets of paralogisms. He defines, on the one hand, paralogisms that “depend on the language used”, and on the other, paralogisms which are “independent of language” (SR, 4). The “language” referred to is the language used in a dialogue, as practiced by the dialecticians or the sophists.

The Rhetoric lists ten “lines of argument that form the spurious enthymemes” (Rhet, ii, 24, 1400b35-01a5, RR 379), clearly related to language. Note that this parallelism enthymeme / spurious enthymeme may lead us to believe that the preceding enthymemes, as enumerated in Rhet., II, 23 are valid, which is not the case. S. Collections (2); S. Expression.

1. The fallacies in the Sophistical Refutations

The six Aristotelian linguistic fallacies are listed in the first column of the following table:

Six fallacies “dependent on language” or “verbal fallacies” (lat. in dictione ) (RS 4 (=165b-167a)
1. Homonymy	Lat. æquivocatio; ambiguity, equivocation — S. Ambiguity
2. Amphiboly	Gr. [amphibolia] — S..Ambiguity
3. Combination	lat. fallacia compositionis, composition of words — S. Composition and Division
4. Division of words	lat. fallacia divisionis, S. Composition and Division
5. Accent	lat. fallacia accentis ; wrong accent — S. Ambiguity
6. Form of expression	lat. fallacia figuræ dictionis, misleading expression — S. Expression

This terminology may seem obscure, but its purpose is perfectly clear; it serves to establish, through a critique of language and discourse, the basic principles of a “logical grammar for argumentation”, supporting the production of reasoned texts and speeches anticipating their criticism.

The seven fallacies considered “independent from language”, are listed in the first column of the following table

Seven fallacies “independent of language”, RS 4 (=166b-168b) (Lat. extra dictionem )
1. “Accident”	Lat. fallacia accidentis — S. Accident; Definition; Categorization.
2.  “The use of an expression absolutely or not absolutely but with some qualification of respect or place, or time, or relation”	Lat. a dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter — S. Circumstances; Distinguo.
3. “That which depends upon ignorance of what ‘refutation’ is”	Lat. ignoratio elenchi; misconception of refutation; evading the question — S. Question; Relevance; Resumption of speech
4. “That which depends upon the consequent”	Lat. fallacia consequentis — — S. Implication; Causality.
5. “That which depends upon assuming the original conclusion”	Lat. petitio principii ; assumption of the original point; begging the question — S. Vicious Circle
6. “Stating as cause what is not the cause”	Lat. non causa pro causa, non cause as cause — S. Cause – Effect
7. “The making of more than one question into one”	Lat. fallacia quæstionis multiplicis, many questions; complex question — S. Many questions

These fallacies are actually methodological mistakes.

2. Fallacies, inferences and dialectical games

In contemporary terminology, an invalid inference is often referred to as a fallacy. According to Hintikka, the Aristotelian concept of fallacy refers to something invalid, but not to an invalid inference:

The error in thinking that the traditional fallacies are faulty inferences is what I propose to dub “the fallacy of fallacies”. It is the fallacy whose recognition will, I hope, put a stop to the traditional literature on so-called fallacies. (1987, p. 211)

In other words, a fallacy cannot be simply defined as, “a fallacious argument”; just some, but not all fallacies can be “thought of as mistaken logical or conceptual inferences” (ibid.). Hintikka considers that a fallacy is essentially a move which transgresses a rule in a dialectical game, dialectical games being defined as “information-seeking questioning processes (interrogative games)” (ibid.). It is in this sense that the concept of fallacy has been taken up in the pragma-dialectical theory.

Linguistic fallacies examine the conditions a proposition must fulfill in order to qualify as a premise in a correct syllogistic inference. The fallacy of accident is the consequence of an error in the methodology of definition. Misconception of refutation reflects a poor understanding of the issues involved in the discussion and the problem. Many questions is also a forbidden move in dialectical games, where problems must be serialized to avoid implicit agreements. These different cases clearly demonstrate the non-inferential nature of fallacies, and, for the latter two, their links to rules-based dialogue games.

1. Fallacy: The word

1.1 The Latin word fallacia

Etymologically, the noun fallacy and the adjective fallacious come from the Latin fallacia, which means “deceit”, referring to a “trick”, or even a “spell”. This deceit can be defined as a verbal deceit, as expressed by the adjective fallaciloquus, “[he] who deceives by words, astute” (Gaffiot [1934], Fallaciloquus). The corresponding verb fallo, fallere means “to deceive someone”, and according to the contexts, “to disappoint the expectations of someone, to betray the word given to the enemy, to break his promises” (id., Fallo). These meanings show that etymologically the word fallacy does not refer to a logical or dialectical mistake but to an interactional manipulation.

1.2 Paralogism, sophism, fallacy

Fallacy — The word fallacy has at least two meanings. On the one hand, the very general meaning of “erroneous belief, false idea” (Webster, Art. Fallacy). On the other hand, it refers to an “invalid” argumentation or reasoning, the conclusion of which does not follow from the premises, and which may therefore be misleading or deceptive (ibid.).

Being an ordinary word, there is no guarantee that fallacy refers to a unique stable, highly connected domain of reality that can be systematized. It is not a priori obvious that fallacies can be theorized more coherently than, for example, errors, deceptions, blunders or carelessness, just to mention some relatively close terms.

Paralogism has a precise and restricted technical use, in which it refers to a formally invalid syllogism. This term is of little use outside this specialized field.

Sophism refers to a deliberately misleading discourse, using paralogism or any other maneuver. This imputation of bad intention is not necessarily present when one speaks of paralogism or fallacious discourse.

2. Hamblin, Fallacies, 1970

Hamblin revived the theory of fallacies in his book, Fallacies (1970). As Perelman revived ancient rhetoric, or rhetorical argumentation, from Aristotle’s Rhetoric, Hamblin reactivated the other Aristotelian source of argumentation as a critical theory from the Topics and the Sophistical Refutations. Following Hamblin, the study of argumentation developed as a critique of bad reasoning, fallacious and specious arguments.

The Argumentation within Language or the Natural Logic theories do not approach the critical question. The New Rhetoric proposes an ideal critical instance, the universal audience, in a different perspective from that generally implemented in fallacy theories.

Hamblin gives the following definitions of fallacy. It should be noted that this conceptual definitions is parallel to the lexicographical definition given above.

Fallacy₁ — The ordinary meaning of “erroneous belief” has been dismissed by Hamblin: “a fallacy is a fallacious argument. […] In one of its ordinary uses, of course, the word ‘fallacy’ means little more than ‘false belief’; but this use does not concern us.” (1970, p. 224; italics in the text).

Hamblin adds that, “there are several varieties of fallacies, or particular fallacies which have received special names, but which are not really logical fallacies at all, but merely false beliefs” (id., p. 48; capital in the text). In this sense, the word corresponds to a “false concept”, which may clearly be itself deceitful, S. Expression.

Fallacy₂ — In this second sense, the word fallacy designates the counterfeit of argument[1]:

A fallacious argument, as almost every account from Aristotle onwards tells you, is one that seems to be valid but is not so. (Id.., p. 12)

This definition brings up some questions, the first one being:

What it is for an argument to seem valid? The term ‘seems’ looks like a psychological one, and has often been passed over by logicians, confirmed in the belief that the study of fallacies does not concern them. (Id.., p. 253)

Following Frege, mathematicians have de-psychologized logic. Axiomatized logic is no longer a theory of thought. From this point of view, truth is one, and if error is multiple, it is precisely because it is related to psychology. There is no logical theory of error. In short, a fallacious argument is an argument or argument that seems valid to a negligent or untrained reader; it is the reader who has a problem.

In the definition of a “fallacious argument” given above, Hamblin refers to a fallacious argumentation, since he speaks of validity. In English however, the word argument can also denote an argumentation. A fallacy₁ is an “erroneous belief” which can obviously serve as a premise for an argumentation. Since ordinary argumentation demands the truth of the arguments, an argumentation based on a false premise is legitimately deemed to be fallacious; this is an authentic fallacy₂. In other words, from this fallacious argument (erroneous belief), derives a fallacious₂ argumentation, a fallacy₂. “To appear to be true or valid”, “to look honest, solid, admissible, credible” is a property common to arguments and argumentations. There is no difference between the first former and the latter which would enable us to reject one without forcibly rejecting the other. Like argumentation, fallacy is a unitary phenomenon, both substantial and formal.

The lexical / conceptual distinction between substantial fallacies (fallacy₁) and formal fallacies (fallacies₂) is generally taken up in the theory of argumentation, as in the following text:

Assumptions, principles, and ways of looking at things are sometimes called fallacies. Philosophers have spoken of the naturalistic fallacy, the genetic fallacy, the pathetic fallacy, the fallacy of misplaced concreteness, the descriptive fallacy, the intentional fallacy, the affective fallacy, and many more. And outside of philosophy, we also hear sophisticated people using the term ‘fallacy’ to characterize things which are neither arguments nor substitutes for arguments. For example, the China expert Philip Kuhn speaks of the hardware fallacy. This, according to him, is the mistaken assumption common among Chinese intellectuals that China can import Western science and technology without importing with it Western (i.e., decadent) values as well. (Fogelin, Duggan 1987, p. 255-256)

The distinction between form and substance is not easy to maintain. For example, the genetic fallacy, given here as an example of “a way of looking at things”, that is, a substantial fallacy (fallacy₁) can be seen as referring to an argumentation (fallacy₂) which evaluates beings and things according to their origin, and which Hamblin admits in his list of authentic formal fallacies.

3. Lists of fallacies

In the chapter entitled “Standard Treatment”, Hamblin proposes four lists of fallacies.

— The list of Aristotle in the Sophistical Refutations, S. Fallacy (2).
— The fallacies or arguments ad —, a list of modern fallacies, designated by Latin labels of this form, S. Ad — Arguments.
— The syllogistic paralogisms.
— The fallacies of scientific method.

Under this last heading Hamblin proposes the following six cases:

— Fallacy of simplism or pseudo-simplicity, (id., p. 45), according to which the simplest explanation is necessarily the best.
— The fallacy of exclusive linearity (ibid.), assumes that a series of factors is ordered according to a strictly linear progression. The fallacy of linearity neglects the existence of thresholds and ruptures in the development of phenomena. This is an extrapolation fallacy: for example, the conductivity of a metal or a solution decreases steadily and then drops abruptly when approaching absolute zero temperature.
— The genetic fallacy (ibid.), ostracizes an idea or a practice on the basis of their source or origin: “This is exactly what the Bad Guys Group says”, S. Authority.
— Fallacy of invalid induction (id., p. 46), S. Induction; Example.
— Fallacy of insufficient statistics (ibid.).
— Hasty generalization (ibid.), which may correspond to the fallacy of accident or induction, S. Accident; Induction.
— The naturalistic fallacy (id., p. 48). Moore defines this fallacy of valuing the “natural” as follows:

To argue that a thing is good because it is “natural,” or bad because it is “unnatural,” in these common senses of the term, is therefore certainly fallacious; and yet such arguments are very frequently used. (Moore, 1903, §29; italics in the original)

This amounts to saying that the word natural has a generally positive argumentative orientation, but not for the author’s group. The naturalistic fallacy goes hand in hand with a range of reciprocal fallacies, named after the antonyms of “natural”: culturalist fallacy, etc. S. Orientation.

Fogelin (see above) adds:

— The descriptive fallacy, a form of fallacy of expression, S. Expression.
— The fallacy of misplaced concreteness. Whitehead introduced this expression in the field of the philosophy of science, to denote the error of forgetting the distinction between the model and reality, and more generally between words and things.
— The intentional fallacy, is invoked in literary analysis, to condemn the interpretation of a work based on intentions attributed to the author. It should be noted that, conversely, in the field of law, the argument based on the intentions of the legislator is recognized as being entirely valid.
— The emotional and pathemic fallacies, S. Emotion; Pathos; Pathetic fallacy

Many of these so-called fallacies view scientific language as the norm of ordinary language, and represent ordinary arguments as unsatisfactory scientific arguments.

4. Informal Logic and Pragma-Dialectic

From the 1970s onwards, following Hamblin, the literature on fallacies underwent considerable developments, particularly within the theoretical frameworks of Informal Logic and Pragma-Dialectic. These works have clearly highlighted the necessity of systematically taking the pragmatic conditions under which ordinary language reasoning operates into account.

In the Informal Logic framework, Woods and Walton represent the first generation to follow on from Hamblin. They questioned the logical and pragmatic conditions of validity ordinary arguments (Woods and Walton 1989, 1992). Woods (2013) focuses on “errors of reasoning”, insisting on the necessity of formalism (Woods 2004). Walton has in particular developed and systematized a new vision of argument schemes including their “rebuttal factors” (Walton & al., 2008). Argumentation is consequently defined as a default reasoning process, which is both consistent with, and goes beyond Toulmin’s approach, S. Layout.

This development of a counter-discourse based criticism of argument is different from the rule-based criticism of argument developed by the pragma-dialectical school. The Pragma-Dialectic orientation can be read as follows, “if you want your discussion to progress towards a decent resolution, you had better follow such and such a procedure and avoid such and such counter-productive, that is, fallacious, maneuvers”. The felicity conditions of the argumentative exchange are dependent upon the observation of ten rules.

In principle, each of these ten discussion rules constitutes a separate and different standard or norm for critical discussion. Any infringement of one or more of the rules, whichever party commits it and at whatever stage in the discussion, is a possible threat to the resolution of a difference of opinion and must therefore be regarded as an incorrect discussion move. In the pragma-dialectic approach, fallacies are analyzed as such incorrect discussion moves in which a discussion rule has been violated. A fallacy is then defined as a speech act that prejudices or frustrates efforts to resolve a difference of opinion and the use of the term “fallacy” is thus systematically connected with the rules for critical discussion. (van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 1995, no pag.)

5. Methodological remarks

Natural argumentation develops in contexts where the question of truth is suspended. It might also arise when a decision has to be taken as a matter of urgency, even when all necessary information is not available.

Wanting to solve a dispute rationally is the manifestation of a specific and legitimate desire, which is obviously not a prerequisite for arguing. One can also argue to solve the dispute to one’s own advantage, at all cost, to end this affair; or to uphold the truth, or to protect one’s interests; to spread one’s emotions, to satisfy one’s ego, to fill time, for enjoyment… One might also be interested not in solving but rather in deepening the difference of opinion. If a new issue has just arisen, for example, it may be more productive and more rational, to properly articulate the problem, rather than to prematurely seek to eliminate it.

One might also be interested not in solving, but rather in increasing the difference of opinion. If a new issue has just arisen, for example, it may be more productive, even more rational, to properly articulate the problem and the dispute, rather than seeking to eradicate any discussion.

There are interesting arguments, which contain a portion of truth, the whole truth being unknown and not entirely in a single camp. On the other hand, a speaker can put forward a weak or even doubtful argument, in an exploratory way, while explicitly emphasizing its uncertain character. It is therefore impossible to introduce a definition of fallacies based on truth and validity as a single regulatory ideal in all argumentative situations.

5.1 Discursive atomism

To criticize an argument, the analyst must first delineate the discursive passage in which this argument is intuitively seen. This basic operation must itself be technically justified, S. Tagging; Indicators. On the other hand, the quality of the argument must be assessed in relation to the argumentative question on which it depends, including the replicas introduced by opponents, S. Stasis; Question; Relevance.

2. The arbitrator is also a player

The diagnosis of fallacy is supposedly made by the logician who has the role of fulfilling the evaluator’s “meta” function in a neutral and objective way. That is to say that he or she must fulfill this role as if he or she had no interest in the controverted issue, but only an interest in the correction of discourse evaluated according to a priori rules and principles. As Hamblin points out, this position is untenable in the case of “actual practical argument’, (1970, p. 244), S. Norms; Rules; Evaluation. The evaluators of social arguments are by no means excluded from the argument; they are also participants like any others.

3. Natural language cannot be eliminated

These elements — an atomistic approach, an unbiased arbitrator, augmented by a strong reductionist tendency —, all feature in the practical advice by which the Encyclopedia of Philosophy concludes the entry on fallacies:

As Richard Whately remarked “…a very long discussion is one of the most effective veils of Fallacy: … a Fallacy which when stated barely… would not deceive a child, may deceive half the world if diluted in a quarto volume.” (Elements of Logic, p. 151). Consequently, an important weapon against fallacy is condensation, extracting the substance of the argument from a mass of verbiage. But this device too has its dangers; it may produce oversimplification, that is, the fallacy a dicto secundum quid, of dropping relevant qualification. When we suspect a fallacy, our aim must be to discover exactly what the argument is; and, in general the way to do this is first to pick out its main outlines, and then to take into account any relevant subtleties or qualifications. (Mackie 1967, p. 179; italics in the original).

Even if one were to agree with the method, the problem of implementing the proposed solution would remain unsolved, nothing being said about how to deal with natural language and speech, seen somewhat contradictorily as an insubstantial and vicious medium.

Natural language, the common vehicle of argument, is accused of dissolving logic in an insignificant verbiage which serves to mask unsavory human interests. Thus, a sustained war against language would be the price to pay for a correct determination of sound arguments, that is, for eliminating fallacies. Nonetheless, it may be noted that natural language is to natural argument what air resistance is to the flight of the “light dove”:

The light dove, in free flight cutting through the air the resistance of which it feels, could get the idea that it could do even better in airless space. Likewise, Plato abandoned the world of the senses because it posed so many hindrances for understanding, and dared to go beyond it on the wings of ideas, in the empty space of pure understanding. (Kant, [1781], p. 129).

Natural language is not an obstacle, but the condition of ordinary argumentation.

4. The diagnosis of fallacy is an argumentative issue

Criticism of argument does not escape argumentation. First, it has to be justified. This justified diagnosis is just a move in a longer game, not the final one, not the terminal charge. This justified diagnosis is just one move in a longer game, it is by no means a final, conclusive or terminal act. In a subsequent move, the so-called “fallacious arguer” can exercise his or her right of reply, and try to rebut the accusation of fallacy. This reply can itself be challenged, and there is no rule as to who closes the game.

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[1] To use a title of W. Ward Fearnside & William B. Holther (1959). Fallacy: The Counterfeit of Argument, quoted in Hamblin 1970. P. 11.

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Lat. ad fidem argument, fides, “faith”.

Revealed truth can be used either as arguments, or disputed as claims.

1. Revealed truths as arguments

Revealed truths can be used as arguments justifying some conduct; we follow the Law because our God has given it to us; because He will reward His Followers, the Good, and punish the Wicked. Appeals to religious beliefs may be dismissed as appeals to superstition, S. Threat.

2. Revealed truths as claims

Faith and religious mysteries can be opposed to reason and argument. Thomas Aquinas discusses “whether sacred doctrine is a matter of argument?” and quotes St. Ambrose’s categorically negative response: “Put arguments aside where faith is sought” (ST, Part 1, Quest.1, Art. 8)[1].

For a believer, revealed truths have precedence over all other forms of truth; trying to demonstrate a revealed truth would degrade it. It should be emphasized that, for a believer, renouncing to argue does not imply submitting to the argument from authority, since he or she considers that authority has a human origin, while faith has a divine origin. Whether religious tradition is of human or divine origin is a controversial issue among theologians.

But the precedence of faith does not invalidate the necessity of argument. Thomas Aquinas distinguishes three kinds of situations, depending on whether one addresses Christians, heretics or unbelievers.
— Where a speaker is addressing a Christian audience, argumentation will have two significant uses. The first use is to connect two articles of faith, to show that one can be logically deduced from the other. For example, if somebody believes in the resurrection of Christ, then he or she must believe in the resurrection of the dead. In addition, arguments may be used to extend the domain of faith to deeper truths, derived from the elementary ones.

— When arguing with heretics who agree on some point of the dogma, an argument will be built upon this point to show that they must also accept the validity of other connected points. The technique is basically the same as in the previous case.
In both cases, argumentation about matters of faith is based on arguments postulated as true because they are taken from the corpus of revealed truths.

— Where confronting unbelievers, the argument will essentially be ad hominem, showing that their beliefs are contradictory (after Trottman 1999, p. 148-151).

As can be seen, the Angelic Doctor does not exclude situations of deep disagreement from the field of argumentation, S. Disagreement.

3. Superstition

S. Threat and Promises

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[1] Quoted after Thomas Aquinas, The Summa Theologica. Benziger Bros, 1947. Translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province. http://dhspriory.org/thomas/summa/FP/FP001.html#FPQ1OUTP1 (11-08-2017)

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The term expression is used in Aristotelian rhetorical theory and critical theory with three quite distinct meanings.

1. A language-related paralogism

In the Sophistical Refutations, the label “paralogisms of expression” covers the six paralogisms “related to language”:

Homonymy          Composition          Accent
Amphiboly           Division                   Expression.          S. Fallacy (2): Aristotle foundational list.

This label can also be used to specifically refer to the paralogism of homonymy.

2. Pseudo-deduction

A speech is said to be fallacious by expression when although expressed formally as a demonstration, it has no demonstrative content. The speech may take the form of a demonstration, if, for example the speaker introduces a high number of argumentative indicators. When there is no semantic connection between the connected propositions A and B, the argument “A, therefore B” is said to be fallacious due to the “form of the expression”. The conclusion is drawn “although there has been no syllogistic process” (Rhet., II, 24, 1401a1; Freese, p. 325), that is without any real argumentation.

Such examples can sometimes be found in academic essays overloaded with argument indicators, hoping that they will end up producing an argument. The discourse of Pangloss, railed at by Voltaire in Candide, is of that kind:

[After the earthquake that ravaged Lisbon]
Some [citizens] whom they had succored, gave them as good a dinner as they could in such disastrous circumstances; true, the repast was mournful, and the company moistened their bread with tears; but Pangloss consoled them, assuring them that things could not be otherwise. “For,” said he, “all that is for the best. If there is a volcano in Lisbon it cannot be elsewhere. It is impossible that things should be other than they are; for everything is right.
Voltaire, Candide, or The Optimism. [1759].[1]

3. Misleading expressions

In Aristotle Sophistical Refutations, the fallacy of “form of expression” is also called the fallacy of “form of discourse”, as well as a “figure of discourse”, a label likely to introduce formidable confusions. The fallacy of form of expression corresponds exactly to the phenomenon that analytic philosophers discuss under the heading of misleading expressions.

For example, according to Ryle, a statement such as “Jones hates the thought of ​​going to hospital” (1932, p. 161) suggests that the phrase “the thought of going to hospital” refers to some existing object, its reference; this expression induces a belief in the existence of “‘ideas’, ‘conceptions’, ‘thoughts’ or ‘judgments’” (ibid.). Ryle considers that to eliminate such non-existing entities, the statement must be rewritten in the form corresponding to its semantic-ontological reality: “Jones feels distressed when he thinks of what he will undergo if he goes to hospital” (ibid.). This new formulation is not supposed to contain any reference to deceptive entities such as “the idea of ​​going to hospital” (ibid.).

Analytical philosophy has devoted substantial efforts to the study of misleading expressions as expressions that generate non-existent problems, as seen in the previous case, or expressions which are superficially similar but whose semantic structure is very different, as shown by the following examples.

— According to Austin’s analysis ([1962]), descriptive statements and performative statements have the same superficial grammatical structure, whilst their meanings and references are very different. The former refer to states of the world, whereas the latter produce the reality they formulate.

— The words “the path is stony and steep” and “the flag is red and black” are syntactically analogous, yet one can infer from the first that “the path is stony” and that “the path is steep” whilst it cannot be inferred from the second that “the flag is red” and that “the flag is black”. Fallacies of composition and division can be considered as a particular case of fallacious expression by the form of the expression.

— The similarity of superficial linguistic forms, can lead us to attribute to a word an erroneous semantic characterization. For example, suffering and running are syntactically, intransitive verbs, and, from this analogy, one might think that, like running, suffering expresses an action.

— The arguments drawn from derivative words might also be criticized as cases of fallacies of expression, S. Derived Words.

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[1] Quoted after Voltaire, Candide, Chap. V. New York, Boni and Liveright, 1918. No pag. https://archive.org/stream/candide19942gut/19942.txt (11-08-2017)

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In common language, the words explain and explanation refer to different scenarios, discourse genres and interactions. Ethnomethodology proposes to grasp the ongoing intelligibility of ordinary actions and interactions through the concept of “accounts” (justifications, explanations). Text linguistics considers the explanatory sequence as one of the basic sequence types (Adam 1996, p. 33), along with narration, description and argumentation. The relations between text types are complex: a justificatory (vs. deliberative) argument explains, or accounts for a decision by enumerating the good reasons having motivated the decision made in the past.

1. Structure of explanatory discourse

From the conceptual point of view, explanatory discourse connects a less well-known, local phenomenon, something to be explained (explanandum) to a better known and complex explanatory domain (explanans). Explanation promotes understanding. An explanation is an abduction^@. One can distinguish between different kinds of explanation according to the kind of field-related principles invoked to connect the explanandum to the explanans:

— Causal explanations, allowing prediction and action, as in the following explanatory definition, S. Causality:

Rainbow: A luminous meteorological phenomenon […] produced by the refraction, reflection and dispersion of the colored radiations composing the white light (of the sun) by drops of water. (PR, Art. Rainbow).

— Functional explanations:

Why does the heart beat? — To circulate the blood
Why religion? — To strengthen social cohesion
Why do oranges have slices and chocolate bars have squares? — So they can be more easily divided among children.

— Analogical explanations, S. Analogy I; Analogy II:

The atom is like the solar system

— Intentional explanations, S. Motives: “He killed to steal”.

— Interpretive explanation; when it comes to an obscure text, the explanation provided is an interpretation^@ of the text.

The specific conceptual structure of explanatory discourse in science depends on the definitions and operations governing the field considered: one can explain in history, in linguistics, in physics, in mathematics. As it relies upon a less known / better known differential, explanation also depends on the previous knowledge of the person to whom it is addressed. A good explanation must “reach home”; the explanation provided to someone having no knowledge of the given field, will not be the same as that given in a research paper in that same field.

2. Ordinary explanations

1.1 Explain: The word and its usages

The actors of the verb to explain are human (S1, S2 …). Explanatory discourse connects the explanandum to a possible explanans.

— Explanation typically bears upon an external phenomenon which one wishes to better understand:

In “S1 explains M to S2” the explanation is ​​a conceptual interactional sequence.
In “E explains M”, the explanation is phrased as an objective conceptual monologue, containing no reference to an interactive event.

— S1 can summon another person S2 to explain his or her (= S2‘s) behavior. Then, S1 wants to clarify an interpersonal misunderstanding, or something that could be taken as an offense O, committed by S2 against S1:

You owe me an explanation! (1)

The so-called “explanation” required is actually a justification. (1) constitutes a rather threatening opening, said in an angry tone, and anticipating an animated, even violent discussion. The “explanatory” interaction to follow will probably be an argument₂ (S. Argument – Conclusion), made with the aim of either restoring the relationship between the two individuals, or redefining it.

In everyday usage, the word explanation refers to segments of speech or to interactive sequences opened by a speaker who:

— does not understand:

“(Explain to me) what does ‘zoon politikon’ mean?”: Arequest for a definition, a paraphrase, a translation or an interpretation.

“(Explain to me) what really happened?”: A request for a convincing narrative.

“(Explain to me) why does the shape of the moon change?”: A request for a theory, diagrams and images.

— does not know how to do something:

“(Explain to me) how does it works?”: A request for directions for use, a leaflet, a manual, a practical demonstration.

The structure of the explanation provided will be as diverse as the kind of activity involved.

The question of the unicity of the concept of explanation thus arises, as well as that of the varieties of interactional explanatory discourses. At the most general level, the need for explanation comes from the feeling of surprise (novelty, anomaly) before something astonishing. Any answer that can satisfy this astonishment and rid the speaker of any sense of surprise may be considered to be a satisfactory explanation.

1.2 In ethnomethodology

Ethnomethodology (Garfinkel 1967) attaches central importance to accounts in everyday interactions, that is to ordinary explanations, justifications or good reasons given by the participant in regard to the meaning of what they are doing and expecting. Accounts are given at two levels; firstly, as explicit explanations “in which social actors give an explanation for what they are doing in terms of reasons, motives or causes” (Heritage 1987, p. 26). Secondly, implicit accounts are provided as explanations inscribed in the ongoing flow of actions and social interactions (ibid.). Such implicit accounts are intended to ensure the mutual intelligibility of “what is going on”, on the basis of action scripts, social expectations or practical moral standards. These explanations are said to be situated, i.e., context bound.

When it comes to conversation, explicit explanations often manifest themselves as repairs, when an initial turn is followed by a non-preferred sequence, for example if an invitation is rejected, the refusal will often be accompanied by a justification: “I’m afraid I can’t come with you, I have to work”. This kind of explanation or reason is required in view of a social norm, as can be seen in the conflictive turn taken by the interaction when explanations are not provided (Pomerantz 1984).

1.3 Explanatory sequences

Beyond the question “why are things so?”, the quest for an explanation is defined as a cognitive, linguistic, interactional activity, triggered by the feeling or expression of doubt, ignorance, by a disturbance in the normal course of action, or a mere “mental discomfort” (Wittgenstein 1974, p. 26). Explanations seek to satisfy such a cognitive need, to appease doubt and so produce a sense of understanding and (inter)comprehension.

The explanatory interaction between an “explainer” and an “explainee” can be schematized as a succession of stages. The first stage is a demand for an explanation addressed to an explainer by an explainee, and the last one a ratification of the explanation by the explainee:

Ee has a curiosity, a doubt, concern, a mental block … about M.
Ee looks for an explanation from Er
Er provides an explanation
Ee ratifies this explanation, or not.

According to this scheme, the explanation is an answer to a request. As an epistemic-interactional act, an explanation is satisfactory if it appeases Ee’s “mental discomfort”. This means that, if not based upon Ee’s interrogations, the most sophisticated and true explanation, will be satisfactory, at best, for the explainer Er.

3. Explanation and argumentation

3.1 Explanation and justificatory argumentation

Explanations are on the side of the justificatory arguments, S. Justification:

— Explanation and argumentation both originate in a state of doubt about a statement which does not fit with the individual’s stock of beliefs and knowledge.
— Explanation and argumentation develop from an interrogation.
— Both are connecting processes which develop a given stock of beliefs. Explanation integrates an unquestionable fact, the explanandum into the explanans system. Deliberative argumentation develops arguments taken in this stock of beliefs towards a conclusion, which will be integrated in this same stock of beliefs. Justificatory argumentation integrates a challenged known fact into an established coherent system of representation.

In deliberative argumentation, the argument is given as assured, doubt is attached to the consequent, the conclusion. In justificatory argumentation, the search for argument goes the opposite way:

My client is entirely innocent, how can I prove / explain this to the jury?

as in explanation, where the explanandum is an established fact, and the explanans must be identified:

No doubt, the face of the moon change; how can I make sense of that?

The same laws of passage can make the connection; causal links, for example, are exploited both in explanation and in argumentation, S. Pragmatic; Motives.

3.2 Explanation as argumentative move

The opposition between argumentation and explanation may have an argumentative import. Explanation projects unequal interaction roles: the explainee is the ignorant profane in a low position, whilst the explainer is the expert in a high position. In argumentative situations, the roles of proponent and opponent are more equal; one “explains something to somebody” vs. “argues with or against somebody about something”.

The question “why?”, which typically introduces a request for explanation, may also be used to call into question an opinion or a behavior. In the latter case, it opens an argumentative, egalitarian, discussion. But the recipient of this question may re-frame the argumentative situation as an explanatory situation, “Wait, let me explain!”, whereby the relations becomes asymmetric, the explainer trying to have the upper hand over the explainee.

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1. The predicative rhetorical genre

The classical rhetorical genres, the deliberative, the judicial, the epidictic, all relate to civil life. Christian religious rhetoric has developed a new genre, preaching, where persuasion is put to the service of religious faith. Predication is the action name associated with the verb to preach, and the noun preacher. It has not been affected by the derogatory orientations sometimes associated with these two words in contemporary usage. It is homonymous with the word predication as used in grammar and logic to designate the operation by which a predicate (a verbal group) is associated with a subject in a sentence; and with the word to predicate something upon, that is to base an action or a saying upon:

I predicated my argument on the facts. (tfd, Predicate)

Preaching as an argumentative genre fully complies with the definition of argumentation provided by Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca as a discursive effort “to induce or to increase the mind’s adherence to the theses presented for its assent” ([1958]/1969, p. 4). The theses referred to in this case are religious beliefs, that are articles of faith from the point of view of the preacher. Assuming that the audience is composed of believers, by preaching to them, the pastor assures their ongoing training and increases their degree of belief, in other words, “the soul’s adherence” to their creed (after Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, [1958], p. 4).

If the audience is composed of unbelievers, the missionary might preach to them in order to instigate these same beliefs. If the audience is composed of heretics in a position of strength, rhetoric must give way to dialectic.

The tenants of the Catholic faith are given in the Holy Scriptures, and are commented on by the authorities, the Fathers of the Church. These contents are articulated and applied in sermons by means of various speech techniques, which have established themselves in a sometimes polemical tension between dialectical appeals to reason and rhetorical enthusiasm for faith, S. Faith.

2. The exemplum

The exemplum (plural exempla) is an instrument of preaching which has been particularly developed by the Dominican and Franciscan mendicant orders, from the beginning of the thirteenth century. Structurally, the exemplum is a narrative, exploiting the resources of the fable. The genus is legitimated by the very example of Christ who preached by parables. The exempla present models of action to be followed or avoided.

The exemplum is “a brief narrative given as truthful and intended to be inserted into a discourse (usually a sermon) to convince an audience by a salutary lesson” (Brémond & al. 1982, pp. 37-38). Brémond distinguishes metaphorical and metonymic exempla.

2.1 Metonymic exemplum

In such exempla, the fact is presented as being likely. There is then a certain identity of status between the heroes of the anecdote and the recipients of the exhortation. The parable of the evil rich is told to the rich, and the logicians are told the tale of one of their colleagues, who is tormented in hell for his sins, that is to say, his sophisms.

The following exemplum deals with the fate of souls after death, and especially with purgatory. The lesson it contains is a “Christian denunciation of vain pagan erudition” (Boureau, p. 94), and a call to the logicians to convert to a religious life.

For our edification, it may be useful to know that a harsh sentence is inflicted upon sinners at the end of their lives.
This is what happened in Paris, according to the Parisian Cantor (= Peter the Chanter, Petrus Cantor). Master Silo urged one of his colleagues, who was very ill, to come and visit him after his death and to inform him of his fate. The man appeared before him a few days later, wearing a cloak of parchment covered with sophistic inscriptions and full of flames. The master asked him who he was. He replied, “I am the one who promised you that he would visit.” When asked what his fate was, he said, “This cloak weighs me down and oppresses me more than a tower. They make me bear it for the vainglory which I have derived from the sophisms. The flames with which it is filled represent the delicious and varied furs I wore, and this flame tortures me and burns me”. And as the master found this slight penalty, the deceased told him to stretch out his hand to test the lightness of punishment. On his outstretched hand, the man dropped a bead of sweat, which drilled the hand of the master as fast as an arrow. The Master experienced an extraordinary agony, and the man said to him, “so it is with all my being”. Afraid of the harshness of this chastisement, the master decided to leave the world and enter religion. And in the morning, facing his gathered students, he composed these verses:

To the frogs, I give up croaking /To the ravens, cawing, / To the vain, vanity.
I attach my fate /To a logic that does not fear the conclusive ‘therefore’ of death.

And, abandoning the world, he took refuge in religion.
Jacobus da Varagine, The Golden Legend, written around 1260[1]

The practice of exemplum goes beyond the strictly religious domain. Fontenelle’s “Golden Tooth” is actually a lay metonymic exemplum illustrating the fallacy of finding the cause of a fact that does not exist, S. Cause – Effect.

2.2 Metaphorical exemplum

In such exempla, “the narrative no longer quotes a sample of the rule, but a fact that resembles it” (ibid.):

The hedgehog, it is said, when he enters a garden, takes on a load of apples which he fixes on his prickles. When the gardener arrives, the hedgehog wants to run away, but his load prevents him doing so, and thus he is caught with his apples. […] This is what happens to the unfortunate sinner who is taken, when he dies, with the burden of his sins.
Humbert from Romans, [The Gift of Fear or the Abundance of the Examples], written between 1263 and 1277.[2]

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[1] Quoted after Jacques de Voragine, La Légende Dorée. Text presented by A. Boureau. In J.-C. Schmitt (ed.), Prêcher d’exemples [Preaching Exempla]. Paris: Stock, 1985. P. 7.
[2] Humbert from Romans, Le Don de Crainte ou l’Abondance des Exemples. Trans. from Lat. to French by Chr. Boyer. Lyon: PUL. 2003. P. 116.

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The word example has two main meanings:

1. Way of being or doing worthy of imitation: setting an example, leading by example, being an example for the community.
2. Any item in a series of equivalent elements, one case among others. If the series is composed of different elements, a typical example is the most characteristic individual, central to the series.

Besides the specific forms of argumentation described below, the following forms of argumentation are related with the example: S. Exemplum; Imitation; Ab exemplo.

1. The example in the Aristotelian rhetorical system

In a version of the Aristotelian rhetorical system, the induction and the syllogism are the instruments of scientific discourse, whereas the example and the enthymeme are their counterparts in rhetorical discourse (Rhet, II, 20, 1393a20-25, RR p. 335). There are different kinds of examples:

[Argument by example] has two varieties; one consisting in the mention of actual past facts, the other in the invention of facts by the speaker. Of the latter, again, there are two varieties, the illustrative parallel and the fable. (Id., 1393a25-30; RR p. 357-358)

A table of rhetorical instruments:

An argument drawn from an example based on past, real facts is illustrated by a form of induction leading to the conclusion, “we must prepare for war against the King of Persia and not let Egypt be subdued”, in view of two past experiences which were detrimental to the Greeks:

For Darius of old did not cross the Aegean until he had seized Egypt; but once he had seized it, he did cross. And Xerxes again did not attack us until he had seized Egypt. but once he had seized it, he did cross. (Rhet., II, 20, 1393a30-b5, RR p. 335)

The reasoning can be seen as an induction, aimed at establishing as a law that “the conquerors who seize Egypt then cross the sea to Europe”, or as a direct stimulation to wake up bad memories. In that case, the argument by example would function as a kind of two-term reasoning.

Comparison — Aristotle gives as an example of a “parable”, an analogy drawn from the speeches of Socrates. This parable condemns the practice of drawing lots for magistrates, since one does not “use the lot to select a steersman from among a ship’s crew” (Rhet., II, 20, 1393b5, RR, p. 335); S. Metaphor.

Fable — Aristotle gives as an example of a fable of the horse that wanted revenge on the stag, and in so doing becomes a slave to man, with an application to the saviors of the fatherland who quickly became tyrants (Rhet, II, 20, 1393a5-25, RR p. 337). As portraits (S. Ethos), fables are a fully argumentative and literary genre, from Aesop (620 – 564 BCE) to modern times, S. Exemplum.

2. Argument by example

As a generalization (induction) based on a single specific case, the argument from example draws on an observation made on one individual, and categorically generalizes it to all individuals of the same class or of the same name:

This butterfly is blue, so (all) butterflies are blue.

In reality it is only possible to conclude “some Bs are P” from “this B is P”. The generalization on the basis of one single specific case corresponds to the converse of the instantiation of a universal proposition, which is valid; if “all Is are P” then “this I is P”.

This swan is white, it’s okay, since (all) swans are black.

Argument by example is a kind of hasty generalization or induction on the basis of a single case, or a relatively small number of cases. It may also be a case of two-term reasoning.

The inductive narrative proceeds from an anecdote: “the owners of iPhones are unbearable. Recently I was camping…” and the anecdote develops, highlighting the terrible behavior of one iPhone user and generalizes this case to all iPhone users. In Aristotelian terms, the process is an inductive generalization, based on a real past fact, which is then elaborated as a truth revealing fable.

3. Argumentation from a generic example, or ecthesis

A generic example is a being in which all the properties of the genus to which it belongs are clearly manifested. It is a prototype of the class, its best incarnation, S. Category; Intra-categorical Analogy. The argument from the generic example is based on such a specimen and results in conclusions being made about a given genus (about all the individuals belonging to that genus):

The generic example consists in explaining the reasons for the validity of an assertion by performing operations or transformations on a given concrete object, considered not for itself but as a characteristic representative of a class. (Balacheff 1999, p. 207).

The process is also known as ecthesis, defined as “[a] technique of demonstration used especially in Euclidean geometry: to establish a theorem, you reason on a singular figure. Your inference is correct if it does not mention the characteristics peculiar to the drawn figure but only those which it shares with all the figures of its species.” (Vax 1982, Ecthèse)

4. Exemplification of a generic or accidental feature?

The argument by example is a legitimate extrapolation if it is founded on a generic feature. If one asks for example how many wings birds may have, observation of any bird will lead the observer to discover the correct answer. On the other hand, if one asks about the average weight of a pigeon, the same procedure is absurd: “this pigeon taken at random weighs 322 g. So the average weight of a pigeon is 322 g.”

As in many cases, it is not previously known whether the investigated feature is essential or accidental, this distinction is exploited as an argumentative resource. The proponent considers that generalization is valid because it is based on an essential trait, and the opponent argues that it is accidental and cannot be generalized. S. Classification; Accident.

The remains of a single animal belonging to an unknown disappeared species provides a wealth of knowledge about this species, but its specific conditions must be duly acknowledged, as shown by the case of the Neanderthal man.

1. The views the scientists hold about the Neanderthals have changed over time. (after G. Burenhult, “[Towards Homo Sapiens]”, 1994[1])
More precisely: Is the Neanderthal man our ancestor or a species different from our own?

2. First answer: The Neanderthal man belongs to our species. “It has long seemed obvious that the physical appearance of the Neanderthal man — and especially those living in Europe — was very different from ours”. However, “in spite of these physical differences, Neanderthals have long been regarded as direct ancestors of the present man” (id., p. 66).

Second answer: The Neanderthal man belongs to a different species. “Following the work of the French paleontologist Marcellin Boule these differences were judged too great” (id., p. 67), and the Neanderthal man was considered to belong to a different species.
The Neanderthal of Marcellin Boule: “From 1911, the paleoanthropologist Marcellin Boule published a detailed study of the skeleton. He built an image that has conditioned the popular perception of Neanderthal man for more than thirty years. His interpretations are strongly influenced by the ideas of his time concerning this extinct hominid. He describes him as a kind of savage and brutal caveman, dragging his feet and not able to walk upright.”
“Marcellin Boule describes a Neanderthal with a flattened skull, a curved vertebral column (much like gorilla), semi-flexed lower limbs and large divergent big toes. This description is in keeping with the ideas of the time on human evolution” (Wikipedia, Marcellin Boule).

4. But this Neanderthal was seriously handicapped: “In 1913, Marcellin Boule exaggerated the differences with us, not realizing that the skeleton he was studying — the “Old Man of the Chapelle aux Saints” (Corrèze, France) — was deformed by arthritis, as demonstrated by W. Strauss and A. J. Cave in 1952.” (id., p. 67)
“J.-L. Heim describes the subject as badly disabled; he suffered a deformity of the left hip (epiphysiolysis or rather trauma), a crushing of the finger of the foot, severe arthritis in the cervical vertebrae, a broken rib, and a narrowing of the channels of the spinal nerves.” (Wikipedia, id.)

5. Conclusion: Our cousin, the Neanderthals: “Today Neanderthal men are seen as our cousins ​​rather than as our ancestors, although they look like us in many respects” (ibid.).

5. Exemplification as illustration and test case example

The generic example functions as a basis for an abductive generalization, resulting in a rule or regularity about a class of cases or individuals. Specific cases can be introduced in relation with such a general discourse.

— The illustrative example facilitates the understanding of a concept or a law, by introducing a (typical) instantiation of the concept or the law:

A migratory bird is a bird that … So the swallow…

Moreover, if the example chosen is (presented as) typical of the phenomenon, it renders the time-consuming and precarious work of checking a large number of cases unnecessary. In this sense, to give an argument in defense of a general statement is simply to find a case to which it applies correctly. If the general statement is the result of an a priori argumentation or illumination, the illustrative example will at least show that the conclusion is not undermined by the first example that comes to mind (see infra, § 6).
The illustrative example can also be used as an epideictic amplification technique:

Whereas an example is designed to establish a rule, the role of illustration is to strengthen adherence to a known and accepted rule, by providing particular instances which clarify the general statement, show the import of this statement by calling attention to its various possible applications, and increase its presence to the consciousness. (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca [1958], p. 357)

— The test case example is different. It may be introduced as an objection to the theory, and the speaker must show that the general principle he or she favors can be successfully applied to this case, that it accounts for this case.

6. Refutation by the counter-example (arg. in contrarium)

An example does not establish a law, but is sufficient to refute a generalization. Argument by the counterexample is the standard method of refutation of general propositions “all A are B”: this assertion is refuted by showing an A which is not B. This strategy is perfectly operative in ordinary argument, S. Opposites.

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[1] G. Burenhult, Vers Homo Sapiens. In Le Premier homme. Preface by Y. Coppens, Paris, Bordas, 1994, p. 67.

Rhetorical argumentation focuses on persuasion, adherence, communion, consensus, co-construction… These terms sound much like moral incitements, “don’t be different, be the same”; and it’s difficult to disagree with the principle of agreement. The emphasis on persuasion and consensus suggests that unanimity would be the normal, healthy state of society, as opposed to the pathological state of controversy, or dissensus.

1. The passion for dissensus as sin and fallacy

The passion for dissensus characterizes polemical exchanges; verbal violence is not associated with controversies as it is with polemics. Emotional dramatization and personal involvement are expressed in the speech acts opening the debate: to rise up against, to be outraged, to protest… When it comes to emotional repercussions, controversy and polemic might hurt the feelings of the parties.
The polemicist refuses to close the debate, and allow the other party’s argument to prevail, even if it is the stronger argument. This refusal to defer to the arguments of the other is a paralogism of obstinacy, stigmatized by Rule 9 of the critical discussion, that asks the proponent to bow before a conclusive argument (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 2004, p. 195; S. Rules). But who says that the point of view has been conclusively defended? The polemicist refuses to admit that the point of view of his or her opponent has been defended conclusively, and posits that the veracity of his or her viewpoint is beyond reasonable doubt. As a last resort, he or she might appeal to intimate conviction, as a way of preserving a jeopardized identity.

The condemnation of argumentativeness and polemic has deep historical roots. The Middle Ages considered contentio, that is contentiousness, as a sin of the tongue, S. Fallacies as Sins.

Contentio is a war of words. It may be a defensive war waged by the stubborn individual, who refuses without reason alter his position. But contentio is most often manifested as a display of aggression in one of many forms. This might be an unnecessary verbal attack against one’s neighbor, an aim not to seek the truth, but to simply manifest aggression (Aymon); a quarrel which, abandoning any quest for truth, gives rise to dispute and goes as far as blasphemy (Isidore); a refined and malevolent argumentation that opposes the truth to satisfy an irresistible desire for victory (Glossa ordinaria); a wicked, contentious and violent altercation (Vincent of Beauvais); an attack against the truth led by the strength of the clamor [“public outcry”, CP] (Glossa ordinaria, Peter Lombard). Often, however, the contentio appears in texts without ever being defined, as if the connotation of violent verbal antagonism attached to the term is sufficient to indicate that it should be avoided and condemned as a sin. (Casagrande & Vecchio ([1987], p. 213-214)

Contentio is a second level sin, derived from first level sins such as envy, vainglory and pride. There is one reservation to be mentioned here, namely that such definitions restrict the sin of contentio to violent attacks against religious truth. It is not, however, a sin to violently and continuously attack error and sin; anger becomes a holy anger.

2. Polemics and “deep disagreement”

The concept of deep disagreement was introduced by Fogelin (1985). Deep disagreement involves incompatible values or metaphysical principles, rather than empirically testable epistemic issues. The solution of scientific conflicts, including in mathematics and logic, call for technical treatment (Woods 2003), while deep disagreement is more akin to polemics, involving intense personal commitment on the part of the participants. Nonetheless, polemics seems to prefer (face-to-face) confrontation, while deeply disagreeing position can be developed in parallel and in mutual ignorance, thus appearing beyond the field of argued dialogue.

In human affairs, the existence of such intractable divergences may be considered as a “radically shocking” challenge (Turner & Campolo 2005, p. 1) to the argumentative enterprise itself. “if [Fogelin] was right, what would become of the field? Even more important, arguably, what could be done about deep disagreements themselves? The field and all of the good it meant to accomplish seemed to be threatened all at once” (ibid.).

3. The post-persuasion era and the normality of dissensus

Any serious argumentative debate contains an element of radicalism, which calls for a de-demonization of dissensus, and, as a consequence, for a re-evaluation of the role of the ratified third parties, who have the power to make a decision. As Willard, who has written extensively on this subject, states:

To prize dissensus goes against an older tradition in argumentation, that values ​​opposition less than the rules that constrain it. (Willard 1989, p. 149)

The preference for consensus does not exclude the reality of dissensus. Argumentation studies must confront situations in which differences of opinion are produced, managed, solved, amplified or transformed through their discursive confrontation. Determining which differences of opinion should be reduced and how, and which ones should rather be encouraged and deepened is a major social and scientific issue, having critical educational implications.

Argumentation can be used to divide opinion; this is what the discourse of Christ achieves in the Christian vision of the world:

Do not suppose that I have come to bring peace to the earth. I did not come to bring peace, but a sword. ³⁵ For I have come to turn a man against his father, a daughter against her mother, a daughter-in-law against her mother-in-law, a man’s enemies will be the members of his own household. Matthew 10: 34-36[1]

The first virtue of argumentation is not that it solves the conflicts, but that it is able to give words to conflicts; it is a precious method of managing differences, sometimes reducing them, sometimes increasing them and causing them to multiply. In an over-consensual context, it may be the noble task of argumentation to bring about relevant dissensual discourses, and to value and stimulate the emergence of differences of opinion.

The majority rule does not imply that the majority is the holder of the truth, and is entitled to enforce its rule over a disgraced minority who spuriously resist the persuasive power of the orator, or refuse to acknowledge the defeat inflicted upon them by the dialectician. One can hypothesize that, in our terrestrial world, the coexistence of contradictory opinions represents the normal state, neither pathological nor transitory, of the socio-political ideological field; deep disagreement is the routine and rule. Hegelians would add that contradiction is the dialectical engine of history.

In any case, democracy does not eliminate differences, and voting does not eliminate minorities and their opinions. In such conditions “it is not about convincing, but about living together” [2], the objective is not to convince others, but to enable groups to coexist. Argument is a way of managing these differences, sometimes eliminating them, sometimes promoting them for the common good.

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[1] Matthew 10:34-36. Quoted after The Bible, New International Version (NIV), www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=Matthew%2010:34-36 (11-08-2017)

[2] “No se trata de convencer sino de convivir”. A. Ortega, “La razón razonable”, El País, 25-09-2006.

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