Ad ignorantiam argument, Lat. ignorantia, “ignorance”

1. Argumentation from ignorance and legitimacy of doubt

Argumentation from ignorance is defined by Locke as one of the four fundamental forms of argumentation, S. Collections (II):

Secondly, another way that men ordinarily use to drive others, and force them to submit to their judgment, and receive the opinion in debate, is to require the adversary to admit what they allege as a proof or to assign a better. And this I call argumentum ad ignorantiam. ([1690]; Vol. II, p. 410-411)

This argument is considered to be fallacious:

It proves not another man to be in the right way, nor that I ought to take the same way, because I know not a better. (Id., p. 411)

The following dialogue schematizes the situation where S1‘s conclusion relies on the ignorance of S2:

S1_1:   — C, since A.
S2_1:   — This is a bad argument. I do not admit that A proves C.
S1_2:   — Do you have any reason to conclude anything different from C? Do you know a better argument for C?
S2_2:   — Well, no
S1_3:   — Then you have to accept my own proof and my conclusion.

(i) First turn: S1_1 proposes a justified claim C.

(ii) Second turn: S2_1 refuses to ratify the claim C.

(iii) Third turn: S1_2 asks S2 to explain the reasons for his or her doubt. According to the conversational principle which requires justification for non-preferred second turns, S1 is perfectly justified in doing this. S2 could answer:

(a) by presenting objections against the alleged argument, A, or by utterly refuting A;
(b) by constructing a counter-discourse by providing what Locke terms “a better proof”. The text does not tell for what conclusion; so we can therefore assume the following two cases:

(b1) Concluding something different from C;
(b2) Providing “better evidence” for C.

(iv) Fourth turn: S2_2 admits that he or she cannot elaborate anything along the (a), (b1) or (b2) lines.

(v) Fifth turn: S1 may accordingly:

(a) Admit S2’s reluctances, while maintaining his argumentation: “Okay, this is not a very good argument, but it is still interesting, it is even the only one we have”;
(b) Summon S2 to accept his (A, C) argumentation, considering that his partner’s incapacity is a kind of second order proof to add to his former substantial one, A, and so committing an ad ignorantiam fallacy (even if his former argument is, after all, not so bad).

A pure ad ignorantiam fallacy would be based only on the partner’s failure “to assign a better [proof]”. Under conversational circumstances, S2_1 does not ratify S1_1’s turn; normally, this should urge S1 to clarify and elaborate upon his proposal. The crude reaction seems rare: “as you cannot articulate anything against my argumentation, you have to accept it wholesale”.

Seen from S2’s perspective, this situation also seems a little bizarre, a kind of borderline case where S2 has only his or her inner conviction to oppose to an argumentation. Under standard conditions, a conversationalist and a fortiori a dialectician, knows how to elaborate upon a strong inner conviction. In essence, Locke seems to attribute to S2 a kind of radical clause of conscience.

Leibniz mitigates this radical stand: “The argument ad ignorantiam is valid in cases of presumption where it is reasonable to hold to an opinion till the contrary is proved” ([1765], p. 576).
Presumption here has the meaning of burden of proof. The pretension of L1 may be excessive and misleading, but his argument nevertheless creates a preference in the field concerned, and in practice we can stick to it until something else has been proven.
This “for lack of anything better” reasoning seems to be the standard case in practical argumentation when a decision has to be made and a possibly urgent action has to be taken:

S1_1:     — Upon such and such basis, I propose 1) that we take such and such a disposition; 2) that we explore such and such a hypothesis. Now, the floor is yours

S2:        [Long silence]

S1_2:     — Nothing to say? Silence meaning consent,
1) In the absence of contradiction, my proposal is adopted.
2) In the absence of any other hypothesis, mine will serve as a working hypothesis.

It is difficult to object to S1_2’s conclusions. He or she does not claim that his proposition is the only viable one, nor that his hypothesis should be held to be true.

2. Ignorance and principle of the excluded middle

The argument from ignorance is also defined, without consideration of the quality of the argumentation, as an illegitimate application of the principle of the excluded middle:

P is true, since you are unable to prove that it is false.

The argument is not conclusive. If we consider that “not-P is not proven” is equivalent to “not-(not-P)” we conclude that P, by application of the principle of the excluded middle. But the two nots are not of the same nature: “not-P is not proved” does not mean “not-P is false”, which would be a confusion between what is true (alethic) and what is knowable (epistemic), S. Absurd.

3. Ignorance, burden of proof, precautionary principle

I am innocent, since you are incapable of proving that I am guilty.
You are guilty because you are incapable of proving your innocence.

Admitting that P is true, or acting “as if” it was true in the absence of proof of not-P is a decision that falls to the institution empowered to discuss and rule on such matter in the field concerned. In the judicial field, presumption of innocence places the burden of proof on the prosecution and gives the benefit of doubt to the defendant.

Precautionary principle
In the debate on the safety or toxicity of new products, a decision has to be made in a situation of insufficient knowledge. The presumption of safety would be:

Possibly the product has toxic effects, but this is not proven. So it has no toxic effects.

The precautionary principle is easiest to rebut when maximized:

Every new product is assumed toxic and will remain forbidden until its safety has been proved.

Under its common form, it simply reverses the burden of proof:

The precautionary principle (or precautionary approach) to risk management states that if an action or policy has a suspected risk of causing harm to the public, or to the environment, in the absence of scientific consensus (that the action or policy is not harmful), the burden of proof that it is not harmful falls on those taking an action that may or may not be a risk.
Wikipedia, Precautionary Principle

Situation: no scientific consensus on the inocuity of a given product
Decision: the burden of proof is upon those which use it

4. Argument from ignorance and argument from silence

S. Silence

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The argument of direction, or slippery slope argument, is based on the device of stages and is used to counter the gradualist strategy. It is classified as an argument “based on the structure of reality” by Perelman Olbrechts-Tyteca.

1. The device of stages as a general action strategy

Generally speaking, the process of stages is implemented when the overall goal is judged as being directly unattainable; it is then divided into smaller, more easily achievable goals.
This process of division corresponds to a common action strategy, which is not necessarily manipulative. Experienced explorers explain that when lost in the desert, dying of thirst, and trying to reach a desperately distant town (final goal) one must set oneself a manageable goal, say the next dune, and then the next cactus, and so, step-by-step finally reach the distant town.

More relevant to everyday life perhaps is the solution to trying to carry a heavy weight. If I cannot carry this one hundred pound object, I dismantle it and carry each of its parts separately.
Such small but achievable goals might be ordered, as is the case in every learning process: one first learns to drive on a normal road for example, before learning to drive on an icy road. In these different cases, the actor keeps the ultimate goal in mind, in relation to which the partial goals are determined and organized.

2. The gradualist strategy

To get something from another person, an actor can apply the process of stages. In that case, the gradualist process should not be considered to be an argument but an intentionally opaque, manipulative strategy, S. Manipulation.

It is often found to be better not to confront the interlocutor with the whole interval separating the existing situation from the ultimate end, but to divide this interval into sections, with stopping points along the way indicating partial ends, whose realization does not provoke such a strong opposition. (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca [1958], p. 282).

Step-by-step strategy, in this second sense, is commonly referred to in sales as a priming strategy:

The newlywed Joneses want to buy a flat; the real estate agent proposes a modest, fully sufficient two room flat, and they agree to buy it. Now the agent has got a foot in the door, and observes that very soon a baby will come; so they really need a three-room flat, and they change their mind and agree to buy one. But the agent observes that Mrs. Jones is developing a promising start-up, she needs an individual office; so they need a four-room flat, etc.

Arguing with the Lord to convince him to hold his wrath toward Sodom, Abraham uses such a priming strategy and step-by-step process — somewhat manipulative, but nonetheless laudable. The argument goes not from the few to the many but from just some to a very little few:

[…] Abraham remained standing before the Lord. Then Abraham approached him and said: “Will you sweep away the righteous with the wicked? What if there are fifty righteous people in the city? Will you really sweep it away and not spare the place for the sake of the fifty righteous people in it? Far be it from you to do such a thing—to kill the righteous with the wicked, treating the righteous and the wicked alike. Far be it from you! Will not the Judge of all the earth do right?”
The Lord said, “If I find fifty righteous people in the city of Sodom, I will spare the whole place for their sake.”
Then Abraham spoke up again: “Now that I have been so bold as to speak to the Lord, though I am nothing but dust and ashes, what if the number of the righteous is five less than fifty? Will you destroy the whole city for lack of five people?” “If I find forty-five there,” he said, “I will not destroy it.”
Once again he spoke to him, “What if only forty are found there?” He said, “For the sake of forty, I will not do it.”
Then he said, “May the Lord not be angry, but let me speak. What if only thirty can be found there?”He answered, “I will not do it if I find thirty there.”
Abraham said, “Now that I have been so bold as to speak to the Lord, what if only twenty can be found there?” He said, “For the sake of twenty, I will not destroy it.”
Then he said, “May the Lord not be angry, but let me speak just once more. What if only ten can be found there?” He answered, “For the sake of ten, I will not destroy it.”
When the Lord had finished speaking with Abraham, he left, and Abraham returned home.
Genesis 18:22-33 New International Version.[1]

Unfortunately, the Lord will not find ten righteous people in Sodom.

3. Argument of direction, or slippery slope argument

The term argument of direction is an alternative name for the slippery slope argument. It is used to prevent the application of a gradualist strategy:

“[it] consists, essentially, in guarding against the use of the device of stages. If you give in this time, you will have to give in a little more next time, and heaven knows where you will stop” (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca [1958], p. 282).

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[1] Quoted after www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=Genesis%2018:16-33

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Lat. ejusdem generis argument. Lat. idem, “identical”; genus, “genus”.

1. Argument from genus

The argument from the genus is based on essential definition. It transfers to the species, and ultimately to the individuals, the properties, duties, representations, any and all characteristic attached to the genus they belong to, S. Classification; Categorization; Definition.

2. Extending to the genus: the generic clause “… and the like”

Generic clauses are phrases such as “… and the things of the same kind”, “… and the like”. The text has the form:

This provision concerns a, b, c, and things of the same kind.

Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 2[1].
Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. (My italics)

If an object x is not included in the enumeration “a, b, c…” but if it is possible to consider that it belongs to the category defined by the enumeration, then the generalizing clause “and all beings of the same kind” applies the provision concerning a, b and c to x.

This shows that the individuals enumerated are mentioned not only for their own sake, but also as prototypes from which a new category must be derived, S. Analogy (II).

This provision concerns cars, motorcycles, and all private means of transportation.

Cars and motorcycles are considered to be prototypical members of the category “private means of transportation” to which the provision applies. Note that the particle etc. would also open the list to new categories of individuals, but would not give any indication about the relevant common feature constituting them into a specific genus, as the provision “all private means of transportation” does quite clearly. The generic provision may either create a new category out of the enumeration of specific individuals, or explicitly mention an existing genus:

One must pay the tax on chickens, geese, and other poultry.
Conclusion: therefore on ducks and turkeys.

Chickens and geese are mentioned only as prototypical examples of the category “poultry”. One can discuss borderline cases, for example whether a peacock is really a backyard animal or a pet. In any case, there is no levy on rabbits, which don’t qualify as poultry.

On the other hand, the absence of a generic provision limits the application of the measure to the categories that are explicitly mentioned:

You have to pay the tax on chickens and geese.
Conclusion: So not on ducks.

Unless the legislator’s intention is invoked.

The use of the extensive clause is not limited to the legal field:

Fixed concrete barbecue
Warning! Do not use alcohol, gasoline or similar liquids to light or reactivate the fire.

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[1] Quoted after www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/ (01-07-2017)

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Lat. a generali sensu; Lat. generalis “general”, sensus “thought, idea”.

In law, the argument of the generality of the law posits that the law must be applied in all its extension, “we must not introduce distinctions where the law does not”. General terms should not be given a particular meaning. In other words, law is non-negotiable. Possible exceptions must be explicitly laid down in the relevant regulation, for example, while generally prohibited, the consumption of canna­bis may be tolerated in some specific places complying with the existing regulation.

In public places, people’s behavior must comply with law plus specific rules of the place. Rules are by nature more flexible than laws, but, when strictly enforced, these rules also obey the principle of generality. If the rule of the school states in general terms that “the use of mobile phones is prohibited during the course”, then its application is general, and admits no exception or distinction. One cannot argue that the regulation is especially valid for “the lower grades”, or that an exception must be made for students “urgently managing their bank account”, or for “students who have a good academic standing”.

S. Strict meaning

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Some argumentative questions can be quickly and privately solved (“who is going to take out the trash?”); others cannot be solved so easily and are brought before specialist, established social institutions. An argumentative forum is a more or less institutionalized physical social space dedicated to the treatment of argued issues. Such a space may or may not have a decision-making capacity. Interventions are ruled by the norms and customs that characterize the forum, in the first place the specific codification of the turns at speech as defined by the rights to the floor, S. Rules. Such rules give meaning and consistency to the expression “local rationality”.

The concept of a forum, with its institutional accompaniment and its concrete regulations, must be taken into account for the analysis of the social exercise of argument. This approach enables us to go beyond an idealized view of argumentation as an exercise subject only to the law of dialectical reason, regulating verbal exchanges between two artificially de-socialized actors, S. Roles.
The crucial question of the burden of proof relates not only to the state of opinion (doxa) at the time of the discussion, but also to the forum where the discussion takes place, S. Burden of proof.

 

Tribunals and political assemblies can be seen as typical forums. There are many others “argument marketplaces”, where viewpoints are calculated, expressed and traded to inform practical decisions, are part of the fabric of democratic societies. Consider the dispute over the legalization of drugs in Syldavia, a true participatory democracy. The issue will be discussed in a huge range of forum, from the subway carriage, to the family table, at the pub on the corner, in the city conference room, by the commissions drawing up the political parties’ official positions, by the National Congress, the Law Commission, etc. Some of these forums are intended for the expression of disputes and have the power to voice a decision or opinion on the matter, others serve simply to amplify and popularize the debate rather than close it.

The following passage is taken from a 2002 speech given by Alfredo Cristiani, President of El Salvador from 1989 to 1994. In 1992, under his presidency, the Chapultepec Peace Agreements were signed, ending a twelve-year civil war between the extreme right and Marxist guerrillas. His 2002 speech was delivered on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of these agreements[1].

We cannot understand the importance of what happened in El Salvador if we limit ourselves to the recent past. The crisis that swept the Salvadorian nation over the last decade did not come out of nothing, nor has it been the fruit of isolated wills. This crisis, so painful and tragic, has ancient and profound social, political, economic and cultural roots. In the past, one of the pernicious flaws in our national form of life was the lack or insufficiency of the spaces and mechanisms [de los espacios y mecanismos] necessary to allow the free play of ideas, the natural development of the various political projects which stem from freedom of thought and to act; in short, the lack of a real democratic living environment.

According to Plato, sophistic discourse reigns over public forums and institutional places, in particular, over the court and the assembly, dominated by professional sophists. That is why Socratic dialectic interaction, oriented solely by the search for truth, takes place in a very special, de-socialized argumentative place, in the natural setting of a locus amœnus: a hot day, a stream, a tree, a light breeze and grass to lie down on:

Phaedrus:    — […] All right, where do you want to sit while we read?[[2]]
Socrates:     — Let’s leave the path here and walk along the Ilisus; then we can sit quietly wherever we find the right spot.
Phaedrus:    — How lucky, then, that I am barefoot today—you, of course, are always so. The easiest thing to do is to walk right in the stream; this way, we’ll also get our feet wet, which is very pleasant, especially at this hour and season.
Socrates:     — Lead the way, then, and find us a place to sit.
Phaedrus:    — Do you see that very tall plane tree?
Socrates:     — Of course.
Phaedrus:    — It’s shady, with a light breeze; we can sit or, if we prefer, lie down on the grass there.
Socrates:     — Lead on, then.
Phaedrus:    — Tell me, Socrates, isn’t it from somewhere near this stretch of the Ilisus that people say Boreas carried Orithuia away?
Socrates:     — So they say.
Phaedrus:    — Couldn’t this be the very spot? The stream is lovely, pure and clear: just right for girls to be playing nearby.

Plato, Phaedrus, I229a-c. CW, p. 509.

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[1] archivo.elsalvador.com/noticias/especiales/acuerdosdepaz2002/nota18.html (09-20-2013)

[2] The speech of Lysias, that Phaedrus “[holds] in [his] left hand under [his] cloak”.

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The word force is used with three distinct meanings:

1. 1. Argument from or by force, S. Threat -Promise
   2. Force of things, S. Weight of Circumstances
   3. Force of an argument, this entry

The graduated concept of force of an argument exists in opposition to the binary notion of valid or invalid argumentation. An argument is strong (or weak) either in itself or relative to another argument. This force is evaluated according to different criteria.

1. Inherent strength of an argument scheme

In scientific fields, to be strong an argument must first of all be valid. That is to say that it must develop according to a method which is accepted in the given scientific field. Yet, an argument can be valid and not so strong, that is to say, really relevant and interesting for the discussion of such and such hypothesis.

From a philosophical point of view, one might consider that some argument schemes are by nature stronger than others. The strength of an argument is thus determined on the basis of ontology. An adept of moral realism will consider that an argument based on the nature of things and their definition is stronger than a pragmatic argument; a practical mind will think the opposite.

2. Strength and effectiveness

In relation to a goal such as persuasion, the strongest argument will be the most efficient, the argument that most quickly achieves the arguer’s goal, whether it be selling a product or electing a president. A degree of strength can be attributed to the argument on the basis of an impact study carried out on the relevant target population, S. Persuasion.

3. Strength of an argument and acceptability by an audience

The New Rhetoric defines the strength of the argument according to the extent and quality of the audiences that accept it, S. Persuade, Convince.

4. Strength and linguistic reinforcement of arguments

Two arguments oriented towards the same conclusion belong to the same argumentative class, S. Orientation. Both bring some support to this conclusion. Within the same argumentative class, the strength of an argument can be determined by reference to an objective gradation, such as the scale of temperature, or it may simply be allocated to the argument by the speaker, who value such argument over another. The hierarchization is marked by the means of argumentative morphemes (for example, even) and realizing or de-realizing modifiers. The arrangements of the arguments on argument scales are governed by the laws of discourse.

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The term figure is used in syllogistic, in fallacy theory and in rhetoric with different meaning

1. Figures of the syllogism

The figures of the syllogism correspond to the different forms of the syllogism, according to the position of the middle term in the premises.

2. Fallacy of “figure of speech”

The fallacy of misleading expression is sometimes referred to as the fallacy of figure of speech.

3. Figures of Rhetoric

The figures of rhetoric are variations in the manner of signifying “which give to the discourse more grace and vivacity, luster and energy” (Littré, Figure). Dictionaries of rhetoric include entries in the field of argumentation, even though they are primarily concerned with literary rhetoric. For example, the dictionary “Gradus. The literary processes ­— Dictionary (Dupriez, 1984), includes the entries argument, argumentation, argument, deduction, enthymeme, epicheirema, example, induction, refutation, paralogism, premise, reasoning, sophism… These basic concepts within the field of argumentation do not belong specifically to the literary domain.

The word figure is used to cover tropes and figures of speech. Metaphor, irony metonymy and synecdoche are considered to be the “four master tropes”. The metaphor as a model has a clear argumentative function. There is correspondence between the mechanisms of metonymy and synecdoche and those that legitimize the passage from an argument to a conclusion. Moreover, irony argues from a self-evident situation.

The expression figure of speech can actually refer to any salient and recurrent form of discursive organization. This is why the enthymeme can be considered as a figure, the enthymemism, along with refutation or prolepsis. Other figures of rhetoric, from antanaclasis (S. Orientation) to analogy and interpretation correspond to well-identified argument schemes.

Other figures play a role in the construction of argumentative structures. For example, a figure of syntactic disposition, such as parallelism, can act as an analogy or antithesis indicator, S. Analogy; Antithesis.

The figures of opposition are all directly interpretable as argumentative, insofar as they correspond to various modes of presentation of the discourse vs. counter-discourse confrontation.

Without reducing each and every figure to a feature of the argumentative situation, it can be observed that the classical definition of argumentation is based on the idea that arguing constitutes an attempt to gain acceptance for a discourse (conclusion) on the basis of good reasons (argument). A clear index of such acceptance is the resumption, repetition, and development of the convincing discourse, particularly as fragments or slogans. Since to have things repeated, it is necessary to facilitate their memorization, figures of sounds and every kind of rhetorical pun can be used to that effect, and must be viewed as a feature of argumentation.

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When taking sides truth and rationality, fallacy theory calls for a criticism of language and speech as vectors of error and deceit, S. Evaluation; Norms. Other cultures gave other foundations to the criticism of speech. Reconstructing the history of the “sins of language” in the Middle Ages, Casagrande & Vecchio (1991) have demonstrated the link between speech and sin. The issue then was not to build a rational discourse, but a sinless, “impeccable” discourse, if not a holy one. The nature of the misconduct has shifted: what was declared sinful in the name of religion is now considered to be fallacious or sophistical in the name of rationality. Whether sin or fallacies, salvation of the soul or rational guidance of the mind, it is always a matter of regimenting verbal behavior, disciplining one’s speech and pen.

Casagrande and Vecchio synthesize data from various medieval treatises into a list of fourteen sins. This list can be widely interpreted in terms of misleading interactional argumentative behaviors. These sins-fallacies intend to rule the interaction in a religious context where hierarchy and valorization of authority occupy a central position, S. Politeness.

Making a connection between fallacy theory and “sins of the tongue” is not indulging in any kind of derisio, neither to one nor to the other party. This connection, on the contrary, is intended to show how deep the anthropological roots of discourse criticism are.

1. Sins against truth

1.1 Lying

Telling the truth, all the truth and nothing but the truth is certainly a basic commitment for a non-fallacious debate. Lying, as saying something false to someone who has no access to truth, is a sin in the system of theological norms, and a fundamental violation of Grice’s cooperative^@ principle S. Manipulation

1.2 Aggravated lying: perjury and false testimony

In judicial rhetoric, oath and testimony, two major instruments to establish the truth, are considered to be non-technical proofs, S. “Technical’ and “Non-technical” evidence. Their violation corresponds to two aggravated lies, the sins of perjury, perjurium, and false testimony, falsum testimonium.

2. Six sins of interaction

2.1 Against disputes

Rivalry, conflict, fight (contentio), and discussion (disputatio) are names denoting the very activity of disputing. It can thus be said that arguing is potentially considered sinful at its very core. It is the sin of the intellectual monks, and no doubt, that of Abelard. The passage from the peccaminous to the fallacious is explicit in the Port-Royal Logic, in which the excessive love of dispute, the spirit of contradiction, is condemned as a sophism of self-esteem (n°6 and 7), a fundamental feature of the character of “those who contradict” (Arnauld and Nicole [1662], p. 272); S. Fallacies (IV). The debate is subject to a moral imperative: the contradiction must be genuine, not “malignant and envious” (ibid.) – or, to move on to judicial pathology, querulous. Such a debate might be legitimately declined.

We then discern two families of sins of interactional positioning, on the one hand, the sins “towards the other”, the partner with whom we argue (§ 2.2), and, on the other hand, the sins committed “towards oneself” as a speaker (§2.3). In both cases, it is a question of banishing illegitimate treatments of the partners of the interaction, S. Politeness.

2.2 Three kinds of sins towards the partner

Undue negative treatment: offensive remarks (contumelia) or slander (detractio). These two sins are a form of personal attacks, or ad personam fallacies. The derisio, as a contemptuous mockery, could be associated with this fallacy, S. Ad hominem; Dismissal.

Negative treatment under the cover of the positive: this is the mechanism of refutation by self-evidence as implemented through irony, ironia. This intention to hurt the other is dealt with only laterally in contemporary theories of irony.

Undue positive treatment: flattery (adulatio), and even simple praise (laudatio). These two sins involve the same interactional mechanisms as found in the fallacy of modesty^@, ad verecundiam, where the speaker humiliates himself unduly before his partner. Adulatio and laudatio encourage pride, and pride is a sin. Logic, religion, and politeness speak with one voice, S. Modesty; Politeness.

2.3 Two kinds of sins against oneself

Undue positive treatment, in other words, boasting, iactantia. This ethotic sin stigmatizes the projection in the discussion of an overly positive self-image, S. Ethos. According to politeness theory, the iactantia sins against modesty.

Undue negative treatment is the symmetrical sin of the sin of undue positive treatment of the partner, S. Modesty. The taciturnitas, sin of the person who keeps silent when he should speak, can be related to the ad verecundiam fallacy in which “human respect” inhibits criticism.

4. Murmuring: a sophism of insubordination

A person who complains against authority commits the sin of murmur (murmur), S. A fortiori. A person who refuses to yield to the force of the best argument having little to oppose to it, save an intimate conviction or sense of justice, is guilty of the same kind of fallaciousness, S. Dissensus; Rules. Insubordination is irrational, illegal, peccaminous.

5. The sin of eloquence

Eloquence, seen as an abundance of words, amplification, repetition, magnification, is the source of all fallacies, S. Verbiage. The same evaluation should apply to idle speech (vaniloquium), as well as to chatter (multiloquium).

6. Flaring into a passion: ad passiones

Some remaining sins are difficult to connect to the problematic of fallacies, perhaps because they directly involve the relation to the sacred: the prohibition of obscene words (turpiloquium), blasphemy (blasphemia) and the curse (maledictum). Nonetheless, these sins can have an ad personam function. Above all, they have an emotional import, so they certainly relate to the ad passiones group. Blasphemy is anger against god, and cursing, anger against the other; obscene words can be used to support many passions, including insulting.

 

To sum up, the theory of the sins of language is a critical theory of discourse taking into account:

— The “non-technical” problems of lying or attesting the truth.
— The spirit of the discussion.
— The relative interactional positions of the participants.

7. The “rules of the devil”

This list of fallacies-sins does not mention violations of logical rules, such as the assertion of the consequent (confusion of necessary and sufficient conditions, S. Deduction. One would think that it is because the logical domain, by nature escapes the religious norm. In the Muslim tradition, however, one can find the vocabulary of sin applied to paralogisms, which Al-Ghazali considers as “rules of the devil” (Bal., p. 171; Deg.). A medieval exemplum also puts the logician into hell, assimilated to the sophist, S. Exemplum.

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Antoine Arnauld and Pierre Nicole conclude the third part of their Logic, or the Art of Thinking (1662) with two chapters devoted to sophisms and bad reasoning. Chapter XIX, “Of the different ways of reasoning which are called Sophisms”, takes up the Aristotelian fallacies; Chap. XX, “Of the bad reasonings which are common in Civil Life and in Ordinary Discourse” repositions the concept of fallacious reasoning an anthropological and moral issue about fallacious discourse and discussion.

1. The Aristotelian fallacies

The list of “ways of evil reasoning that we call sophisms” merges the Aristotelian linguistic and non-linguistic fallacies, S. Fallacies (3).

The linguistic fallacies are grouped under two headings. The list does not mention the fallacy of many questions, and adds two new types of fallacies independent of language, “incomplete enumeration”, and “defective induction”.

2. On the bad reasonings in civil life

Chapter XX “Of the bad reasonings which are common in Civil Life and in Ordinary discourse” is much more original. Its consists of two parts:

Of the sophisms of self-love, of interest, and of passion.
Of the false reasonings which arise from objects themselves.

These sophisms and bad reasoning no longer reflect logical or scientific concerns, and have no connection with dialectics. On the basis of a thorough and hypercritical description of the discussant’s concrete behavior, they emphasize the difficulties in bringing a debate to a successful completion and show how deceitful and useless dispute can be when truth is at stake. More than an appeal to follow rules for discussion, the conclusion is an ascetic appeal to moral reformation of the disputants. It should be kept in mind that the religious and philosophical disputes over Jansenism and Cartesianism form the background of the disillusioned discussions mentioned in this chapter.

In the following, the various sophisms and bad reasoning are designated by an expression extracted from their definition.

2.1 “Of the sophisms of self-love, of interest, and of passion”

(1) “To take our interest as the motive for believing a thing” — The first of the causes which determine belief is the spirit of belonging to “some nation, or profession, or institution” (Id., p. 268). Beliefs are not determined by truth and reality, but by the social position of the believer. The disputant borrows his beliefs from the group in which he finds “his interest” and his identity.

(2) “[The] delusions of the heart” (Id., p. 269) — This sophism expresses the ad passiones fallacies of love and hate (ad amicitiam, ad amorem, ad odium), it is a variant of pathetic argumentation:

 ‘I love him, therefore, he is the cleverest man in the world; I hate him; therefore, he is nobody’. (Ibid.)

(3) Those “who never distinguish their authority from reason”, and

decide everything by a very general and convenient principle, which is, that they are right, that they know the truth; from which it is not difficult to infer that those who are of their opinion are deceived, — in fact, the conclusion is necessary. (Ibid.)

The claim to the truth of the self-centered person comes from immediate certainty (in the profane as in the sacred domain), whereas it would require an argument, S. Authority; Modesty. This can be read as a criticism of the Cartesian’s criterion of truth, as clear and distinct ideas. Interest and self-love better determine clarity and distinctness than truth does.

(4) “The clever man[‘s]” sophism is related to the preceding one:

‘If this were so, I should not be a clever man; now, I am a clever man; therefore, it is not so.’ (Id., p. 270)

Enthymemes:

‘What,’ said they, ‘if the blood circulates, […] if nature does not abhor a vacuum […] — I have been ignorant of many important things in anatomy and in physics. These things, therefore, cannot be’.  (Ibid).

This is another fallacy ad passiones, the fallacy of pride, ad superbiam.

These first four “sophisms” are not precisely sophisms insofar as they are self-deceiving as well as other-deceiving. Nor are they correctly called fallacies insofar as they are not public reasoning, propositionally expressed. Their premises remain unsaid, perhaps unconscious:

I’m a Syldavian, Syldavians are always right, therefore, I’m right.
I’m right, therefore my opponent is wrong.
I hate him; therefore, he is a nobody.
I know everything, thus what I don’t know is false.
Interests, inflated egos and passions, are epistemological obstacles ingrained in human nature.

Chapter XIX reiterates the classical belief that education about argument requires thorough knowledge of language and a good training in logic. Chapter XX adds that first of all, the arguer has to work on himself (sophisms (1)-(4) and avoid the pitfalls of argumentative interactions (sophisms (5)-(9)): This is the substantial content of the following subset, which complements the first moral and psychological subset with factual observation of the interactional behavior of seasoned arguers.

(5) “Those who are in the right, and those who are in the wrong, with almost the same language make the same complaints and attribute to each other the same vices” (Id., p. 271). From this empirical observation follows a recommendation to the wise and thoughtful, about how to properly advocate truth in a controversy.

First Recommendation to the arguers: don’t start a debate before having “[thoroughly establish] the truth and justice of the cause which they maintain”.

Only when these rules have been correctly applied can one shift to a meta-discussion about the bad argumentative manners of the opponent. This of course presupposes that one can decide that the rules have been correctly applied.

(6)“The spirit of contradiction”, is a “malignant and envious disposition”:

“Someone else said such a thing; it is therefore false. I did not write that book; it is, therefore, a bad one”. This is the source of the spirit of contradiction so common amongst men, and which leads them, when they hear or read anything of another, to pay but little attention to the reasons which might have persuaded them, and to think only of those which they think may be offered against it. (p. 272)

(7) “The spirit of debate”

Thus, unless at least we have been accustomed by long discipline to retain the perfect mastery over ourselves, it is very difficult not to lose sight of truth in debates, since there are scarcely any exercises which so much arouse our passions. (p. 277),
Observations (6) and (7) have a clear link with the sin of contentio, S. Fallacies as Sins of the Tongue.
From the observation that “speaking of ourselves, and the things which concern us” can “excite envy and jealousy” comes a new recommendation: when advocating truth, self-exposure should be minimized, and the arguers should rather “seek, by hiding in the crowd, to escape observation, in order that the truth which they propose may be seen alone in their discourse” (p. 273).

(8) “The Complaisant”

For as the controversial hold as true the contrary of what is said to them, the complaisant appear to take as true everything which is said to them. (p. 278)

This sophism of acceptance without examination, at least of refusal to take a position, corresponds exactly to the ad verecundiam fallacy of Locke, S. Modesty. This is different but nonetheless related with the blamed character alluded to in (7), who “in the midst of [the discussion] become obstinate and are silent, affecting a proud contempt, or a stupid modesty of avoiding contention” (p. 277). S. Modesty; Contempt.

(9) “The determination to defend our opinion” leads us to

no longer to consider whether the reasons we employ are true or false, but whether they will avail to defend that which we maintain. We employ all sorts of reasons, good or bad, in order that there may be some to suit everyone. (p. 279).

The whole section closes with a kind of final recommendation:

To have no end but truth, and to examine reasonings with so much care, that even prejudice shall not be able to mislead us. (p. 276)

As observed in (5), each discussant will say that is precisely what he or she does. The attempt to expose the sophism seems to be doomed from the start, as if, in a conflictual dialogue, we were condemned never to know who speaks the truth.

2.2 “Of the false reasoning which arise from objects themselves”

This section focuses on the following points:

— There is only a small margin between truth and error; cf. supra (5):

In the majority of cases, there is a mixture of truth and error, of virtue and vice, of perfection and imperfection (p. 277)

— Rash induction also applies to human affairs; cf. supra §1, “incomplete enumeration”, and “defective induction”:

[Men] judge rashly of the truth of things from some authority insufficient to assure them of it, or by deciding the inward essence by the outward manner. (p. 284)

Decisions are made on the basis of “exterior and foreign marks.” (ibid.), that is peripheral arguments.

— “We rarely avoid judging purposes by the event”, a very relevant point:

If somebody succeeds, he had carefully planned his deeds; if he fails, he miscalculated. (p. 283)

No distinction is made between “the fortunate and the wise.” (Ibid)

— About “pompous eloquence”, S. Verbiage.

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1. Francis Bacon, Novum Organum, 1620

Hamblin considers Francis Bacon’s New Organon as a psychological turning point in the conception of fallacies (Hamblin 1970, p. 146; Walton, 1999). Bacon presents his concept of “idol” as the scientific counterpart of logical or dialectical fallacies. An idol is an obstacle to the (inductive) edification of scientific knowledge.

The word idol comes from a Greek term meaning “simulacrum, phantom” (Bailly, [eidolon]). According to Bacon, a fallacy is a simulacrum, a phantom of argument, produced under the influence of towering idols, defined as false Gods altering human reasoning:

XXXIX. Four species of idols beset the human mind, to which (for distinction’s sake) we have assigned names, calling the first Idols of the Tribe, the second Idols of the Den, the third Idols of the Market, the fourth Idols of the Theater. ([1620], p. 20)

— The Idols of the Tribe, that is of the whole of humanity. These idols are the deformations imposed upon reality by the innate structure of the human mind, which is not a tabula rasa but an “uneven mirror” (id.). Its a priori categories distort reality.

— The Idols of the Den are the product of the education and history of each individual, that is to say, prejudices or other evidences, exerting their powers through “Authority” (id., p. 21).

— The Idols of the Market place are the words themselves, which “still manifestly force understanding, throw everything into confusion, and lead mankind into vain and innumerable controversies and fallacies” (id., p. 21).

— The Idols of the Theater correspond to “the various dogmas of peculiar systems of philosophy, and also from the perverted rules of demonstration” (id., p. 22).

These Idols include fallacious inferences as well as substantial fallacies.

2. John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 1690

In a brief section of his Essay, Locke reflects “on four sorts of arguments, that men in their reasonings with others, do ordinarily make use of to prevail on their assent or at least so to awe them as to silence their opposition” ([1690], p. 410). This definition of an argument perfectly suits what is a rhetorical argument as pressure exerted on the audience, S. Logos – Ethos – Pathos. These four sorts of arguments are (id., p. 410-412):

“The argumentum ad verecundiam”, S. Modesty
“The argumentum ad ignorantiam”, S. Ignorance
“The argumentum ad hominem”, S. Ad hominem
“The argumentum ad judicium”, S. Matter.

Locke rejects the first three arguments on the ground that, at best, they “may dispose me, perhaps, for the reception of truth, but help me not to it”:

For, 1. It [ad verecundiam] argues not another man’s opinion to be right because I, out of respect, or any other consideration but that of conviction, will not contradict him. 2. It [ad ignorantiam] proves not another man to be in the right way, nor that I ought to take the same way, because I know not a better. 3. Nor does it follow that another man is in the right way because he has shown me that I am in the wrong. I may be modest, and therefore not oppose another man’s persuasion; I may be ignorant, and not be able to produce a better; I may be in error, and another may show me that I am so. This may dispose me, perhaps, for the reception of truth, but helps me not to it (id., 411).

The concept of fallacy is redefined independently of any Aristotelian consideration. The only valid arguments are arguments ad judicium, that is to say “proofs drawn from any of the foundations of knowledge or probability” (ibid.); truth “must come from proofs and arguments and light arising from the nature of things themselves” (id., 412). Note that whilst the fallacious arguments correspond to argument schemes, the argument ad judicium does not correspond to just one argument scheme but to any kind of argument recognized as scientifically valid.

Leibniz ([1765]) nuanced this strict vision of fallacious arguments (see the above mentioned entries).

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