FALLACIES as “SINS OF THE TONGUE”

From the perspectives of  truth and rationality, fallacy theory criticizes language and speech as vectors of error and deception, see evaluation; norms. Other cultures have established different foundations for critiquing language and speech. In their reconstruction of the history of the “sins of the tongue” in the Middle Ages, Casagrande & Vecchio (1991) demonstrated the connection between speech and sin. The focus then was not on constructing a rational discourse, but rather on achieving sinless, “impeccable,” discourse, or holy discourse. The nature of wrongdoing has shifted: what was once considered sinful in the name of religion is now considered fallacious or sophistical in the name of rationality. Whether the concern is sin or fallacies, the salvation of the soul or the rational guidance of the mind, the matter always concerns the regulation of verbal behavior and the discipline of speech.

Casagrande and Vecchio synthesized data from various medieval treatises into a list of fourteen sins. These sins, or religious fallacies were intended to criticize interactions within a religious context in which hierarchy and the valorization of authority played central roles, see politeness.

Establishing a connection between the theory of fallacies and the « sins of the tongue » does not disparage either party. On the contrary, this connection, is intended to demonstrate the deep anthropological roots of discourse criticism.

1. Seven Interactional Sins

1.1 Lying

Telling the truth–the whole truth and nothing but the truth–is certainly a fundamental obligation for a non-fallacious debate. Lying is basically defined as telling someone something that is false when they have no independent access to the full truth. In theological systems, lying is a sin, as it is in the contemporary lay world, a fundamental violation of Grice’s cooperative principle, see manipulation.

Aggravated lying: Perjury and false testimony

In legal rhetoric, oaths and testimonies are two important instruments for establishing the truth, and are considered as “non-technical” evidence. Violating these oaths and testimonies corresponds to the sins of perjury, perjurium, and false testimony, falsum testimonium. These are serious interactional sins because they involve lying about the sacred foundations of social order.

1.2 Against quarreling

Rivalry, conflict, fighting (contentio), and discussion (disputatio) are terms that can refer to the very activity of arguing. Therefore,  it can be said that arguing is potentially considered sinful at its very core. It is the sin of the intellectual monks, and was undoubtedly Abelard’s. The transition from the sinful to the fallacious is explicit in the Port-Royal Logic, which condemns an excessive love of dispute, and a spirit of contradiction are condemned as sophisms of self-esteem (#6 and #7). These are fundamental features of the characters of “those who contradict” (Arnauld and Nicole [1662], p. 272). Debate is subject to a moral imperative: contradiction must be genuine, and not “malicious and envious” (ibid.)-or, in the terms of legal pathology, querulous. Such a debate can legitimately be rejected.

In the following paragraphs, we distinguish two categories of sins of interactional positioning: sins committed “against the other”, or the person with whom one argues (§ 2.2), and, on the other hand, the sins committed “against oneself” as a speaker (§2.3). In both cases, In both cases, the issue is the illegitimate treatment of interaction partners, see politeness.

2.2 Three Kinds of Sins Against the Partner

Undue negative treatment includes insulting remarks (contumelia) and slander (detractio). These two sins are personal attacks, and examples of the ad personam fallacy. Derisio, or contemptuous mockery, may be related to this fallacy, see ad hominem; dismissal.

Negative treatment under the guise of the positivity is the mechanism of refutation by self-evidence is implemented through irony, ironia. Contemporary theories of irony usually only marginally address the intention to hurt the other person..

Undue positive treatment includes flattery (adulatio), and even simple praise (laudatio). These two sins involve the same interactive mechanisms found in the fallacy of modesty, ad verecundiam, where the speaker unduly humiliates himself in front of his partner. Adulatio and laudatio, flattery and praise, encourage pride, and pride is a sin. Logic, religion, and courtesy converge on politeness.

2.3 Two types of Sins Against Oneself

Undue positive treatment,that is, boasting, iactantia. This ethotic sin stigmatizes the projection in the discussion of an overly positive self-image, in the discussion, see ethos.  Politeness theory also notes that  partners in ordinary interactions avoid immoderate self-praise..

Undue negative treatment is the symmetrical sin of the sin of unduly positive treatment of one’s partner, see modesty. Taciturnitas is the sin of remaining silent when one should speak. It may be related to the ad verecundiam fallacy in which “human respect” inhibits criticism.

4. Murmuring: A Sophism of Disobedience

A person who complains against authority commits the sin of murmuring (murmur), see a fortiori. A person who refuses to yield to the force of the best argument, having little to oppose to it except an hypothetical intimate conviction or sense of justice, can be guilty of the same kind of fallacy, see  dissensus; rules. Disobedience is irrational, illegal and sinful.

5. The Sin of Eloquence

Eloquence, seen as an abundance of words, amplification, repetition and magnification, is the source of all fallacies, see verbiage. The same judgment should apply to idle talk (vaniloquium), and to chatter (multiloquium).

6. Flaring Up into a Passion: Ad Passiones

Some of the remaining sins are difficult to relate to the problem of fallacies, perhaps because they are directly related to the sacred. Examples include the prohibition of obscene words (turpiloquium), blasphemy (blasphemia) and cursing (maledictum). Nevertheless, these sins have emotional significance, and certainly belong to the ad passiones group. Blasphemy is anger against God, and cursing, is anger against others. Obscene words can be used to support many passions, including insult.

In sum, the theory of sins of language is a critical theory of discourse that considers:
— The “non-technical” problems of lying or bearing witness to the truth.
— The spirit of the discussion.
— The relative interactional positions of the participants.

7. The “Rules of the Devil”

This list of fallacies-sins does not mention violations of logical rules, such as asserting the consequent (confusing necessary and sufficient conditions, see deduction). One might think that this is because the logical domain, by its very nature escapes the religious norm. However, the Muslim tradition, however, the vocabulary of sin can be applied to paralogisms, which Al-Ghazali regards as “rules of the devil” (Bal., p. 171; Deg.). A medieval exemplum also sends the logician to hell, equating him with the sophist, see exemplum.

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FALLACY 4:
A MORAL AND ANTHROPOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE

Antoine Arnauld and Pierre Nicole conclude the third part of their Logic, or the Art of Thinking (1662) with two chapters devoted to sophisms and bad reasoning. Chapter XIX, “Of the different ways of reasoning which are called Sophisms”,addresses the Aristotelian fallacies. Chap. XX, “Of the bad reasonings which are common in Civil Life and in Ordinary Discourse” redefines the concept of fallacious reasoning as a moral and anthropological issue concerning fallacious discourse and discussion.

1. The Aristotelian Fallacies

The list of “ways of evil reasoning that we call sophisms” combines Aristotelian linguistic and nonlinguistic fallacies, see fallacies 3.

The linguistic fallacies are grouped under two headings. The list does not mention the fallacy of many questions, and adds two new types of fallacies independent of language: “incomplete enumeration”, and “defective induction.”

2. On Bad Reasonings in Civil Life

Chapter XX “Of the bad reasonings which are common in Civil Life and in Ordinary discourse” is much more original. It consists of two parts:

1) Of the sophisms of self-love, of interest, and of passion.
2) Of the false reasonings which arise from objects themselves.

These sophisms and bad reasoning no longer reflect logical or scientific concerns, and are not related to dialectics. Based on a thorough and hypercritical description of the of the discussants’ concrete behavior, the chapter emphasizes the difficulty of reaching a successful conclusion in a debate and demonstrates how deceptive and fruitless disputes can be when the truth is at stake. Rather than appealing to follow the rules of debate, the conclusion makes an ascetic appeal for the moral reformation of the disputants.
Note that the religious and philosophical disputes over Jansenism and Cartesianism form the backdrop of the disillusioned discussions mentioned in this chapter.

The various sophisms and bad reasoning will be designated by an expression taken from their definition below.

2.1 “Of the sophisms of self-love, of interest, and of passion”

(1) “To take our interest as the motive for believing a thing.” The first of the causes that determine belief is the spirit of belonging to “some nation, or profession, or institution” (Ibid., p. 268). Beliefs are not determined by truth and reality, but by the social position of the believer. The disputant borrows his beliefs from the group in which he finds “his interest” and his identity.

(2) “[The] delusions of the heart” (Id., p. 269). This sophism expresses the ad passiones fallacies of love and hate (ad amicitiam, ad amorem and ad odium). It is a variant of the pathetic argument:

 ‘I love him, therefore, he is the cleverest man in the world; I hate him; therefore, he is nobody.’ (Ibid.)

(3) Those “who never distinguish their authority from reason”

They decide everything by a very general and convenient principle, which is, that they are right, that they know the truth; from which it is not difficult to infer that those who are of their opinion are deceived, — in fact, the conclusion is necessary. (Ibid.)

The self-centered person claims to know the truth with immediate certainty, in both the profane and sacred realms, whereas it would require a demonstration, see authority; modesty.
This can be read as a criticism of the Cartesian criterion of truth, as clear and distinct ideas. Interest and self-love determine clarity and distinctness better than truth does.

(4) “The clever man[‘s]” sophism is related to the preceding one:

‘If this were so, I should not be a clever man; now, I am a clever man; therefore, it is not so.’ (Id., p. 270)

Enthymemes:

‘What,’ said they, ‘if the blood circulates, […] if nature does not abhor a vacuum […] — I have been ignorant of many important things in anatomy and in physics. These things, therefore, cannot be’.  (Ibid).

This is another fallacy ad passiones, the fallacy of pride, ad superbiam.

These first four “sophisms” are not really sophisms since as they deceive both themselves and others. Nor are they properly called fallacies since as they are neither public reasoning nor propositional arguments. Their premises remain unspoken and perhaps even unconscious:

I’m a Syldavian, Syldavians are always right, therefore, I’m right.
I’m right, therefore my opponent is wrong.
I hate him; therefore, he is a nobody.
I know everything, therefore what I don’t know must be wrong.
Interests, inflated egos and passions, are epistemological obstacles ingrained in human nature.

Chapter XIX reiterates the classical belief that training in argumentation requires a thorough knowledge of language and logic.
Chapter XX adds that the arguer must first work on himself in order to avoid sophisms (1)-(4).
They must also avoid the pitfalls of argumentative interactions, corresponding to sophisms (5) through (9). The following subset complements the first moral and psychological subset with factual observations of experienced arguers’ interactional behavior.

(5) “Those who are in the right, and those who are in the wrong, with almost the same language make the same complaints and attribute to each other the same vices” (Id., p. 271). This empirical observation leads to a recommendation for the wise and thoughtful, about how to properly advocate the truth in a controversy.

First recommendation, to the debaters: Do not begin a debate until you have “[thoroughly established] the truth and justice of the cause you are asserting.”

Only after these rules have been applied can one move on to a meta-discussion of the opponent’s poor argumentative tactics. Of course, this presupposes  that one can decide whether the rules have been correctly applied.

(6)“The spirit of contradiction”, is a « malignant and envious disposition »:

“Someone else said such a thing; it is therefore false. I did not write that book; it is, therefore, a bad one”. This is the source of the spirit of contradiction so common amongst men, and which leads them, when they hear or read anything of another, to pay but little attention to the reasons which might have persuaded them, and to think only of those which they think may be offered against it. (p. 272)

(7) “The spirit of debate”

Thus, unless at least we have been accustomed by long discipline to retain the perfect mastery over ourselves, it is very difficult not to lose sight of truth in debates, since there are scarcely any exercises which so much arouse our passions. (p. 277),

Observations (6) and (7) have a clear connection with the sin of contentio, see fallacies as sins of the tongue.
From the observation that “speaking of ourselves, and the things that concern us” can “excite envy and jealousy”, comes a new recommendation: When defending the truth, one should minimize self-exposure. The arguer should “seek, by hiding in the crowd, to escape observation, in order that the truth which they propose may be seen alone in their discourse” (p. 273).

(8) “The Complaisant”

For as the controversial hold as true the contrary of what is said to them, the complaisant appear to take as true everything which is said to them. (p. 278)

This sophism of accepting without examining, or at least of refusing to take a position, corresponds exactly to Locke’s ad verecundiam fallacy, see modesty. It is different from yet related to the guilty character alluded to in (7): those who “in the midst of [the discussion] become obstinate and are silent, affecting a proud contempt, or a stupid modesty to avoid contention” (p. 277), see modesty; contempt.

(9) “The determination to defend our opinion” leads us to

no longer to consider whether the reasons we employ are true or false, but whether they will avail to defend that which we maintain. We employ all sorts of reasons, good or bad, in order that there may be some to suit everyone. (p. 279).

The section concludes with a  final recommendation:

To have no end but truth, and to examine reasonings with so much care, that even prejudice shall not be able to mislead us. (p. 276)

As noted in (5), each discussant will claim to be doing exactly that. The attempt to expose the sophism seems to be doomed from the start, as if we are condemned in a conflictual dialogue in which we will never know who is telling the truth.

2.2 “Of the false reasoning which arise from objects themselves”

This section focuses on the following points:

— There is only a small margin between truth and error; see above, (5):

In the majority of cases, there is a mixture of truth and error, of virtue and vice, of perfection and imperfection (p. 277)

— Rash induction also applies to human affairs; see above §1, “incomplete enumeration”, and “defective induction”:

[Men] judge rashly of the truth of things from some authority insufficient to assure them of it, or by deciding the inward essence by the outward manner. (p. 284)

Decisions are made on the basis of “exterior and foreign marks” (ibid.), i.e., peripheral arguments.

— “We rarely avoid judging purposes by the event”, a very pertinent point.

If somebody succeeds, he had carefully planned his deeds; if he fails, he miscalculated. (p. 283)

No distinction is made between “the fortunate and the wise” (Ibid).

— For “pompous eloquence”, see verbiage.

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FALLACIES 3:
FROM LOGIC AND DIALECTIC TO SCIENCE

1. Francis Bacon, Novum Organum, 1620.

Hamblin considers Francis Bacon’s New Organon as a psychological turning point in the conception of fallacies (Hamblin 1970, p. 146; Walton, 1999). Bacon presents his concept of « idol » as the scientific counterpart to logical or dialectical fallacies. An idol is an obstacle to the (inductive) edification of scientific knowledge.

The word idol comes from a Greek term meaning “simulacrum, phantom” (Bailly, [eidolon]). According to Bacon, a fallacy is a simulacrum, or phantom of an argument, produced under the influence of exalted idols, defined as false gods that alter human reasoning:

XXXIX. Four species of idols beset the human mind, to which (for distinction’s sake) we have assigned names, calling the first Idols of the Tribe, the second Idols of the Den, the third Idols of the Market, the fourth Idols of the Theater. ([1620], p. 20)

— The idols of the tribe, are the idols of all mankind. These idols are the distortions imposed on reality by the innate structure of the human mind, which is not a tabula rasa but rather an “uneven mirror” (ibid.). Its a priori categories distort reality.

— The idols of the den are the product of each individual’s upbringing and history–i.e., prejudices or other evidence, that exercise their powers through “authority” (ibid., p. 21).

— The idols of the marketplace are words in general, that “manifestly force understanding, throw everything into confusion, and lead mankind into vain and innumerable controversies and fallacies” (ibid., p. 21).

— The idols of the theater correspond to “the various dogmas of peculiar systems of philosophy, and also to the perverted rules of demonstration” (ibd., p. 22).i

These idols include fallacious inferences as well as substantial fallacies.

2. John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 1690.

In a brief section of his Essay, Locke reflects “on four sorts of arguments, that men in their reasonings with others, do ordinarily make use of to prevail on their assent or at least so to awe them as to silence their opposition” ([1690], p. 410). This definition of an argument aligns with the concept of a rhetorical argument: a pressure exerted on the audience, see logos – ethos – pathos. These four types of arguments are (id., pp. 410-412):

“The argumentum ad verecundiam”, see modesty
“The argumentum ad ignorantiam”, see Ignorance
“The argumentum ad hominem”, see ad hominem
“The argumentum ad judicium”, see matter.

Locke rejects the first three arguments because, at best, they “may dispose me, perhaps, for the reception of truth, but help me not to it”:

For, 1. It [ad verecundiam] argues not another man’s opinion to be right because I, out of respect, or any other consideration but that of conviction, will not contradict him. 2. It [ad ignorantiam] proves not another man to be in the right way, nor that I ought to take the same way, because I know not a better. 3. Nor does it follow that another man is in the right way because he has shown me that I am in the wrong. I may be modest, and therefore not oppose another man’s persuasion; I may be ignorant, and not be able to produce a better; I may be in error, and another may show me that I am so. This may dispose me, perhaps, for the reception of truth, but helps me not to it (id., 411).

The concept of fallacy is redefined independently of any Aristotelian consideration. The only valid arguments are arguments ad judicium, that is to say “proofs drawn from any of the foundations of knowledge or probability” (ibid.). Truth “must come from proofs and arguments and light arising from the nature of things themselves” (ibid., 412).

Note that while the first three fallacious arguments correspond to argument schemes, the argument ad judicium does not correspond to an argument scheme but to any kind of argument recognized as scientifically valid.

Leibniz ([1765]) nuanced this strict view of fallacious arguments (see the entries above).

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FALLACIES 2: ARISTOTLE’S FOUNDATIONAL LIST

Argumentation studies are related to two Aristotelian sources, on the one hand, the rhetorical and dialectical theories in Rhetoric and Topics, and on the other hand, the critical analysis of fallacious sequences (fallacies, apparent enthymemes) in Prior Analytics, Rhetoric and primarily  Sophistical Refutations (Woods 2014). The latter forms the basis of the “standard treatment of the fallacies” as reconstructed by Hamblin (Fallacies, 1970).

Definitions from the Sophistical Refutations are used in all works dealing with fallacious arguments. The title, Sophistical Refutations, is ambiguous. First, according to the classic joke, it is not ‘an adequate description of the contents of the book’,i.e., a set of refutations that would be sophistical. The book analyzes and rejects the refutations as practiced by the Sophists.

Aristotle distinguishes between two types of paralogisms. He defines first paralogisms that “depend on the language used”, and second, paralogisms that are “independent of language” (SR, 4). The “language” referred to is the language used in a dialogue, as practiced by dialecticians or sophists.

The Rhetoric lists ten “lines of argument that form the spurious enthymemes” (Rhet, ii, 24, 1400b35-01a5, RR 379), which are clearly related to language. Note that the parallelism between enthymeme and false enthymeme may lead us to believe that the preceding enthymemes, as listed in Rhet., II, 23 are valid, but this is not the case, see collections 2; expression.

1. The Fallacies in the Sophistical Refutations

The six linguistic fallacies of Aristotle are listed in the first column of the following table.

Six fallacies “dependent on language” or “verbal fallacies” (lat. in dictione ) RS 4 (=165b-167a)
1. Homonymy	Lat. æquivocatio; ambiguity, equivocation — see ambiguity
2. Amphiboly	Gr. [amphibolia] — see ambiguity
3. Composition	Lat. fallacia compositionis, composition of words — see composition and division
4. Division of words	Lat. fallacia divisionis, see composition and division
5. Accent	Lat. fallacia accentis ; wrong accent — see ambiguity
6. Form of expression	Lat. fallacia figuræ dictionis, misleading expression — see. expression

This terminology may seem obscure, but its purpose is perfectly clear. It establishes the basic principles of a « logical grammar for argumentation » by critiquing of language and discourse. This grammar supports the production of reasoned texts and speeches that anticipate their criticism.

The seven fallacies considered “independent from language”, are listed in the first column of the following table.

Seven fallacies “independent of language”, RS 4 (=166b-168b) (Lat. extra dictionem )
1. “Accident”	Lat. fallacia accidentis — see accident; definition; categorization.
2.  “The use of an expression absolutely or not absolutely but with some qualification of respect or place, or time, or relation.”	Lat. a dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter — see circumstances; distinguo.
3. “That which depends upon ignorance of what ‘refutation’ is.”	Lat. ignoratio elenchi; misconception of refutation; evasion of the question — see question; relevance; resumption of speech
4. “That which depends upon the consequent”	Lat. fallacia consequentis — see implication; causality.
5. “That which depends upon assuming the original conclusion.”	Lat. petitio principii ; assumption of the original point; begging the question — see vicious circle
6. “Stating as cause what is not the cause.”	Lat. non causa pro causa, non cause as cause — see cause-effect
7. “The making of more than one question into one.”	Lat. fallacia quæstionis multiplicis, many questions; complex question — see many questions

These fallacies are actually methodological mistakes.

2. Fallacies, Inferences and Dialectical Games

In contemporary terminology, an invalid inference is commonly  called a fallacy. According to Hintikka, the Aristotelian concept of fallacy refers to something invalid, but not to an invalid inference:

The error in thinking that the traditional fallacies are faulty inferences is what I propose to dub “the fallacy of fallacies”. It is the fallacy whose recognition will, I hope, put a stop to the traditional literature on so-called fallacies. (1987, p. 211)

In other words, a fallacy cannot be defined simply as, “a fallacious argument.” Only some, but not all fallacies can be “thought of as mistaken logical or conceptual inferences” (ibid.). Hintikka considers a fallacy to be essentially a move that violates a rule in a dialectical game. He defines dialectical games as “information-seeking questioning processes (interrogative games)” (ibid.). In this sense, the concept of fallacy has been adopted in the pragma-dialectical theory.

Linguistic fallacies examine the conditions that a proposition must satisfy in order to qualify as a premise in a correct syllogistic inference. The fallacy of accident is the consequence of an error in the methodology of definition. The fallacy of misconception of refutation reflects a poor understanding of the issues involved in the discussion. Asking many questions is also a forbidden move in dialectical games, where problems must be serialized to avoid implicit agreements. These different cases clearly demonstrate the non-inferential nature of the fallacies, and their links to rule-based dialogical games, in the latter two cases.

FALLACY 1: CONTEMPORARY APPROACHES

1. Fallacy: The word

1.1 The Latin word fallacia

Etymologically, the noun fallacy and the adjective fallacious come from the Latin fallacia, meaning “deception, » « trick”, or even “spell.” This deception can be defined as a verbal deception, as expressed by the adjective fallaciloquus, meaning “[he] who deceives by words, cunning” (Gaffiot [1934], Fallaciloquus). The corresponding verb fallo, fallere means “to deceive someone”, and according to context, “to disappoint someone’s expectations, to betray the word given to the enemy, to break one’s promise » (id., Fallo).
These meanings show that etymologically the word fallacy does not refer to a logical or dialectical error, but rather to an interactive manipulation.

1.2 Paralogism, Sophism, Fallacy

The word fallacy has at least two meanings. First, it has the very general meaning of “erroneous belief, false idea” (MW, Fallacy). Second, it refers to an « invalid » argument or reasoning, whose conclusion does not follow from the premises, and which may therefore be misleading or deceptive (ibid.).
As an ordinary word, there is no guarantee that fallacy refers to a unique stable and highly interconnected domain of reality that can be systematized. It is not obvious a priori that fallacies can be theorized more coherently than deceptions, blunders or carelessness, which are relatively similar terms.

Paralogism has a precise and limited technical use referring to a formally invalid syllogism. The term is of little use outside this specialized field.

Sophism refers to deliberately misleading discourse, that usies paralogisms or other maneuvers. However, the implication of bad intent is not necessarily present when speaking of paralogisms or fallacious discourse.

2. Hamblin, Fallacies, 1970

In his book, Fallacies (1970), Hamblin revives the Aristotelian theory of fallacies, much like Perelman revived rhetorical argumentation. While both refer to the Topics, Hamblin focuses on the Sophistical refutations.
Theories of Argumentation within Language or Natural Logic do not address this critical issue. The New Rhetoric proposes an ideal critical instance, the universal audience, in a different perspective from that generally implemented in fallacy theories.

Hamblin offers the following definition of fallacy. Note that this conceptual definition is parallel to the lexicographical definition given above.

Fallacy₁ — Hamblin rejects the common meaning of “erroneous belief”: “A fallacy is a fallacious argument. […] In one of its ordinary uses, of course, the word ‘fallacy’ means little more than ‘false belief’; but that use does not concern us” (1970, p. 224; italics in the text).
He adds that “there are several kinds of fallacies, or certain fallacies which have been given special names, but which are not really logical fallacies at all, but merely false beliefs” (id., p. 48; italics in the text). In this sense, the word corresponds to a “false concept”, which can be deceptive, see expression.

Fallacy₂ — In this second sense, the word fallacy denotes a counterfeit argument [1]:

A fallacious argument, as almost every account from Aristotle onward tells you, is one that seems to be valid but is not so. (Id.., p. 12)

This definition raises several questions, the first of which is:

What it is for an argument to seem valid? The term ‘seems’ looks like a psychological one, and has often been passed over by logicians, confirmed in the belief that the study of fallacies does not concern them. (Id.., p. 253)

Following Frege, mathematicians have de-psychologized logic. Axiomatized logic is no longer a theory of thought. From this point of view, truth is one, and if error is multiple, it is precisely because it is related to psychology. There is no logical theory of error. In short, a fallacious argument is one that seems valid to a careless or untrained reader. The problem lies with the reader.

In his definition of a “fallacious argument”, Hamblin uses the word « argument », to refer to a fallacious argumentation (argument + conclusion) since he speaks of validity. The term argument refers to an argumentation by metonymy part / whole.
A fallacy₁ is an “erroneous belief” that can obviously serve as a premise for an argumentation. Since ordinary argumentation requires the truth of the arguments, an argumentation based on a false premise (argument) is legitimately considered fallacious; this is an authentic fallacy₂. In other words, from this fallacious argument due to a false belief, derives a fallacious₂ argumentation, a fallacy₂. “To appear true or valid”, “to look honest, solid, admissible, credible” is a property common to arguments (premises) and argumentations. There is no difference between the two that would enable us to reject one without necessarily rejecting the other. Like argumentation, fallacious argumentation is a unitary phenomenon, both substantively and formally.

The lexical / conceptual distinction between substantive fallacies (fallacy₁) and formal fallacies (fallacies₂) is generally addressed in the theory of argumentation, as in the following text:

Assumptions, principles, and ways of looking at things are sometimes called fallacies. Philosophers have spoken of the naturalistic fallacy, the genetic fallacy, the pathetic fallacy, the fallacy of misplaced concreteness, the descriptive fallacy, the intentional fallacy, the affective fallacy, and many more. And outside of philosophy, we also hear sophisticated people using the term ‘fallacy’ to characterize things which are neither arguments nor substitutes for arguments. For example, the China expert Philip Kuhn speaks of the hardware fallacy. This, according to him, is the mistaken assumption common among Chinese intellectuals that China can import Western science and technology without importing with it Western (i.e., decadent) values as well. (Fogelin, Duggan 1987, pp. 255-256)

The distinction between form and substance is difficult to maintain. For example, the genetic fallacy, which evaluates beings and things according to their origin, is given here as an example of “a way of looking at things”, i.e., a substantive fallacy (fallacy₁). However, it can be seen as an argumentation (fallacy₂) , that Hamblin acknowledge in in his list of authentic formal fallacies.

3. Lists of fallacies

In the chapter entitled “Standard Treatment”, Hamblin presents four lists of fallacies.

— Aristotle’s list in the Sophistical Refutations, see fallacy 2.
— The fallacies or arguments ad —, a list of modern fallacies, designated by Latin labels of this form, see ad — arguments.
— The syllogistic paralogisms.
— The fallacies of the scientific method.

Under the last heading Hamblin suggests the following six cases:

— The fallacy of simplism or pseudo-simplicity, (ibid., p. 45), which assumes that the simplest explanation is necessarily the best.
— The fallacy of exclusive linearity which assumes that a set of factors is ordered according to a strictly linear progression (ibid.). This fallacy neglects the existence of thresholds and breaks in the development of phenomena. It is an extrapolation fallacy: for example, the conductivity of a metal or a solution decreases steadily and then drops abruptly as the temperature approaches absolute zero.
— The genetic fallacy (ibid.) ostracizes an idea or practice on the basis of its source or origin: “This is exactly what the Bad Guys Group says”, see authority.
— The fallacy of invalid induction (ibid., p. 46), see Induction; Example.
— The fallacy of insufficient statistics (ibid.).
— The fallacy of hasty generalization (ibid.) may correspond to the fallacy of accident or induction.
— The naturalistic fallacy (ibid., p. 48). Moore defines this fallacy as valuing the “natural” as follows:

To argue that a thing is good because it is “natural,” or bad because it is “unnatural,” in these common senses of the term, is therefore certainly fallacious; and yet such arguments are very frequently used. (Moore, 1903, §29; italics in the original).

This suggests that the word natural generally has a positive argumentative orientation, except among the author’s group. The naturalistic fallacy is associated with a variety of reciprocal fallacies, named after the antonyms of “natural”: such as culturalist fallacy, etc. see orientation.

Fogelin (see above) adds:

— The descriptive fallacy, a form of the fallacy of expression, see expression.
— The fallacy of misplaced concreteness. Whitehead introduced this term in the field of the philosophy of science, to denote the error of forgetting the distinction between models and reality, and more generally between words and things.
— The intentional fallacy, is invoked in literary analysis, to condemn interpretations of  works based on the intentions attributed to the authors-whereas in law, arguments based on the intentions of legislators are recognized as valid.
— The emotional and pathemic fallacies, see emotion; pathos; pathetic fallacy

Many of these so-called fallacies treat scientific language as the norm of ordinary language, and present ordinary arguments as unsatisfactory scientific ones.

4. Informal Logic and Pragma-Dialectic

Since the 1970s, following Hamblin, the literature on fallacies has grown considerably especially within the theoretical frameworks of Informal Logic and pragma-dialectic. These works have clearly emphasized the importance of systematically considering the pragmatic conditions under which ordinary language reasoning occurs.

Within the Informal Logic framework, Woods and Walton are the first generation to build on Hamblin’s work. They questioned the logical and pragmatic conditions for the validity of ordinary arguments (Woods and Walton 1989, 1992). Woods (2013) focuses on “errors of reasoning”, and emphasizes the importance of formalism (Woods 2004). In particular, Walton has developed and systematized a new vision of argument schemes including their “rebuttal factors” (Walton & al., 2008). Argumentation is thus defined as a default reasoning process, that is consistent with yet goes beyond Toulmin’s approach, see layout of argument.

This counter-discourse-based critique of argumentation differs from the rule-based critique developed by the pragma-dialectical school. The pragma-dialectical orientation can be summarized as follows, “If you want your discussion to progress toward a decent solution, you should follow this procedure and avoid  these counterproductive, i.e., fallacious, maneuvers”. The felicity conditions of the argumentative exchange depend on observing ten rules.
Each rules of discussion constitutes a distinct standard or norm for critical discussion. Any violation of one or more of these rules, no matter which party commits it or at what stage of the discussion, threatens to the resolution of the disagreement, and is therefore an improper discussion move. In the pragma-dialectical approach, fallacies are analyzed as such improper discussion moves in which a discussion rule has been violated. A fallacy is defined as a speech act that prejudices or frustrates efforts to resolve a difference of opinion; thus, the term “fallacy” is thus systematically linked with the rules of critical discussion (van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 1995, no pag.)

5. Methodological Remarks

Natural argumentation develops in contexts where the question of truth is suspended. It can also arise when a quick decision must be made, even when not all the necessary information is  available.
The desire to resolve a dispute rationally is a legitimate desire, though it is not a prerequisite for argumentation. One may argue in order to resolve a dispute for one’s own benefit, at any cost, to put an end to the matter; or to uphold the truth, to protect one’s interests; to express emotions, to satisfy one’s ego, to pass the time, or for pleasure.
One may also be interested in deepening deepening the disagreement rather than resolving it. For example, when a new problem arises, it may be more productive and more rational to articulate the problem properly than to prematurely try to eliminate it.

Some interesting arguments contain a part of the truth, when the whole truth is unknown and not entirely in one camp. Conversely, a speaker may present a weak or even doubtful argument, in an exploratory manner, while explicitly emphasizing its uncertain nature. It is impossible to introduce a definition of fallacies based on truth and validity as a single regulatory ideal for all argumentative situations.

5.1 Discursive Atomism

To critique an argument, an analyst must first delineate the discursive passage in which the argument is intuitively seen. This basic operation must itself be technically justified, see tagging; indicators. Conversely, the quality of the argument must be assessed based on its larger context, and, more precisely on the argumentative question to which it pertains. This includes the responses introduced by opponents, see stasis; question; relevance.

2. The Arbiter is Also a Player

Logicians are supposed to diagnose fallacies in a neutral and objective way. In other words, they must perform this role as if they had no interest in the controversial issue, only in correcting the evaluated discourse according to a priori rules and principles. However, as Hamblin points out  this position is untenable in the case of “actual practical argument,’ (1970, p. 244), see norms; rules; evaluation. Evaluators of social arguments are not excluded from the argument; they are also participants as well.

3. Natural Language Cannot be Eliminated

These elements–an atomistic approach, an arbiter above the fray and a strong reductionist tendency–are all present in the practical advice with which the Encyclopedia of Philosophy concludes its entry on fallacies:

As Richard Whately remarked “…a very long discussion is one of the most effective veils of Fallacy: … a Fallacy which when stated barely… would not deceive a child, may deceive half the world if diluted in a quarto volume.” (Elements of Logic, p. 151). Consequently, an important weapon against fallacy is condensation, extracting the substance of the argument from a mass of verbiage. But this device too has its dangers; it may produce oversimplification, that is, the fallacy a dicto secundum quid, of dropping relevant qualification. When we suspect a fallacy, our aim must be to discover exactly what the argument is; and, in general the way to do this is first to pick out its main outlines, and then to take into account any relevant subtleties or qualifications. (Mackie 1967, p. 179; italics in the original).

Even if one were to agree with the method, the problem of implementing the proposed solution would remain unresolved, since it doesn’t address how to deal with natural language and speech: these are contradictorily regarded as an insubstantial and malignant media.

Natural language, the common vehicle of argument, is accused of dissolving logic into meaningless verbiage that conceals unsavory human interests. Thus, a sustained war against language would be the price to pay for correctly determining sound arguments–for eliminating fallacies. In other words, replacing ordinary language in all its ordinary functions with an as-yet-undiscovered formal language, would be required.
Moreover, it may be noted that natural language is to natural reasoning what air resistance is to the flight of the “light dove”:

The light dove, in free flight cutting through the air the resistance of which it feels, could get the idea that it could do even better in airless space. Likewise, Plato abandoned the world of the senses because it posed so many hindrances for understanding, and dared to go beyond it on the wings of ideas, in the empty space of pure understanding. (Kant, [1781], p. 129).

Natural language is not an obstacle, but the condition of ordinary argumentation.

4. Diagnosing Fallacy as an Argumentative Issue

Criticizing arguments is an argument in itself. First, the diagnosis of a fallacy  must be justified. This justified diagnosis is only one step in a larger process, not the final step or  charge. Next, the so-called “fallacious arguer” may respond, and attempt to refute the accusation.
This reply may then be challenged, and there are no rules as to who ends the discussion.

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[1] To use a title from W. Ward Fearnside & William B. Holther (1959). Fallacy: The Counterfeit of Argument, cited in Hamblin 1970, p. 11.

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FAITH and PROMISE

According to the Church, revealed truth is the unchanging, unchangeable truth given by God to humanity.  This truth constitutes the dogma as expressed in the scripture and handed down by the Church. Dogma contains mysteries, and acceptance of these mysteries defines faith [1] and characterizes believers. Faith is beyond the reach of human reason alone, and, therefore, beyond the reach of critics of reason.

Revealed truth can either be used as an argument, or disputed as a claim.

1. Revealed Truths as Arguments

Revealed truths as found in scripture and in dogmatic writings are fundamental resources for believers when justifying their worldview, a way of life or course of action.

These arguments are grounded in other creeds belonging to the same corpus of revealed beliefs. For example, we adhere to the Divine Law because our God gave it to us promising to reward those who obey His rule, and do good while punishing the wicked.

However, appeals to religious belief can be dismissed as appeals to superstition, see threat and promise.

2. Revealed Truths as Claims

The possible conflict between revealed and demonstrated truth can lead to the complete rejection of reason and argument. Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274) discusses “whether sacred doctrine is a matter of argument?” and quotes St. Ambrose’s (circa 340 – 397) categorically negative answer: “Put aside argument where faith is sought” (ST, Part 1, Question 1, Article 8) [2].
For a believer, revealed truths take precedence over all other forms of truth. Atttempting to prove a revealed truth would degrade it. It should be emphasized that for believers, renouncing argument does not mean submitting to an argument from authority, since they consider authority to be of human origin, and faith to be of divine origin. The origin of religious tradition—whether human or divine—is a controversial topic among theologians.

However, the primacy of faith does not negate the need for argumentation to strengthen the believer’s faith or persuade the nonbeliever. Thomas Aquinas distinguishes three types of situations, depending on whether one is addressing Christians, heretics, or nonbelievers.

— When a religious speaker addresses a Christian audience, argument has two important uses. First it connects two articles of faith, to show that one can be logically deduced from the other. For example, if one believes in the resurrection of Christ, then one must also believe in the resurrection of the dead. Second, arguments can be used to expand the realm of faith to include deeper truths, derived from elementary ones.

— When arguing with heretics who agree on some point of the dogma, an argument is built on that point to show that they must also accept the validity of related points.
The technique is basically the same as in the previous case. In both cases, the deductions are based on a systemic argument, that assumes the sacred text has all the characteristics of a code.

— When confronting unbelievers, the argument is essentially ad hominem, showing that their beliefs are contradictory (after Trottman 1999, pp. 148–151). [3]

As can be seen, the Angelic Doctor does not exclude situations of deep disagreement from the field of argumentation.

3. Superstition

See Threat and promise.

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[1] Latin ad fidem argument, fides, “faith”.

[2] Quoted from Thomas Aquinas, The Summa Theologica. Benziger Brothers, 1947. Translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province: http://dhspriory.org/thomas/summa/FP/FP001.html#FPQ1OUTP1 (11-08-2017)

 [3] This was the situation in the 13th century. In the 16th century, the evangelization of the American Indians, after the Spanish conquest, was quite different. See Fray Bernardino de Sahagún, Los diálogos de 1524.Edición facsimilar, introducción, paleografía. Versión del nahuatl y notas de Miguel León-Portilla. Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México. 1986.

 

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EXPRESSION

In Aristotelian rhetorical and critical theory, the term expression has three distinct meanings.

1. A linguistic paralogism

In the Sophistical Refutations, the term “paralogisms of expression” refers to the six “language-related” paralogisms.

Homonymy          Composition          Accent
Amphiboly           Division                   Expression.          see fallacy (2): Aristotle basic list.

This label can also be used to refer specifically to the paralogism of homonymy.

2. Pseudo-Deduction

A passage is said to be fallacious by expression when although it is formally expressed as a demonstration, it has no demonstrative content. For example, speech may take the form of a demonstration, if the speaker introduces a large number of argumentative indicators. If there is no semantic connection between the connected propositions A and B, the argument “A, therefore B” is fallacious due to the “form of the expression”. This is because no syllogistic process can occurr, or in other words, no real argumentation has taken place (Rhet., II, 24, 1401a1; Freese, p. 325).

Such examples can sometimes be found in academic essays that overload the text with argument indicators, in the hope that an argument will eventually emerge. Pangloss’s discourse, railed against by Voltaire in Candide, is of that kind.

[After the earthquake that devastated Lisbon]
Some [citizens] whom they had succored, gave them as good a dinner as they could in such disastrous circumstances; true, the repast was mournful, and the company moistened their bread with tears; but Pangloss consoled them, assuring them that things could not be otherwise. “For,” said he, “all that is for the best. If there is a volcano in Lisbon it cannot be elsewhere. It is impossible that things should be other than they are; for everything is right.
Voltaire, Candide, or The Optimism. [1759].[1]

3. Misleading Expressions

In Aristotle’s Sophistical Refutations, the fallacy of “form of expression” is also called the fallacy of “form of discourse”, as well as a “figure of discourse”, a label that is likely to cause considerable confusion. The fallacy of form of expression corresponds exactly to the phenomenon that analytic philosophers discuss under the heading of misleading expressions.

According to Ryle, for example, a statement such as “Jones hates the thought of ​​going to the hospital” (1932, p. 161) suggests that the phrase “the thought of going to the hospital” refers to some existing object. This expression induces a belief in the existence of “‘ideas,’ ‘conceptions,’ ‘thoughts’ or ‘judgments’” (ibid.). To eliminate such non-existent entities, Ryles believes that the statement must be rewritten to correspond to its semantic-ontological reality: “Jones feels distressed ,when he thinks of what he will undergo if he goes to the hospital” (ibid.). This new formulation should contain no reference to deceptive entities such as “the idea of ​​going to the hospital” (ibid.).

Analytic philosophy has devoted considerable effort to studying misleading expressions as expressions that create non-existent problems, as seen in the previous case, or as expressions that are superficially similar but have a very different semantic structure is, as in the following examples.

— According to Austin’s analysis (1962), descriptive and performative statements have the same superficial grammatical structure but different meanings and references. The former refer to states of the world, while the latter produce the reality they describe.

— The statements “the path is stony and steep” and “the flag is red and black” are syntactically analogous. However, one can infer from the first  statement that “the path is stony” and that “the path is steep”, but not from the second statement that “the flag is red” and “the flag is black”. The fallacies of composition and division can be seen as a special cases of the fallacy of the form of expression.

— The similarity of superficial linguistic forms, can lead us to incorrectly characterize a word’s meaning. For example, suffering and running are syntactically, intransitive verbs. From this analogy, one might incorrectly assume that, suffering, like running, expresses an action.

— The arguments drawn from derived words might also be criticized as cases of fallacies of expression.

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[1] Quoted from Voltaire, Candide, Chapter V. New York, Boni and Liveright, 1918. No pag. https://archive.org/stream/candide19942gut/19942.txt. Accessed August 11, 2017).

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EXPLANATION

In everyday language, the words explain and explanation refer to different scenarios, discourse genres and interactions. Ethnomethodology uses the concept of “accounts” (justifications, explanations) to capture the ongoing intelligibility of ordinary actions and interactions. Text linguistics considers explanatory sequences to be one of the basic sequence types, alongside narration, description and argumentation (Adam 1996, p. 33). The relationships between text types are complex. A justificatory argument (as opposed to a deliberative argument) explains, or accounts for a decision by listing the reasons that motivated that decision, see justification and deliberation.

1. Structure of Explanatory Discourse

Conceptually, explanatory discourse connects a lesser-known local phenomenon–something to be explained (the explanandum)–with a more well-known, complex explanatory domain (the explanans). Explanation promotes understanding. An explanation is an abduction. Different kinds of explanations can be distinguished by the kinds of field-related principles used to connect the explanandum to the explanans.

— Causal explanations, which allow prediction and action as in the following explanatory definition, see causality:

Rainbow: A luminous meteorological phenomenon […] produced by the refraction, reflection and scattering of the colored rays that make up the white sunlight by waterdroplets. (PR, Art. Rainbow).

— Functional explanations:

Why does the heart beat? — To circulate blood.
Why religion? — To strengthen social cohesion.
Why are oranges sliced and chocolate bars square? — To make them easier for children to share.

— Analogical explanations, see analogy 1; analogy 2:

The atom is like the solar system.

— Intentional explanations, see Motives: “He killed to steal.”

— Interpretive explanations are given when an obscure text is involved. An explanation is an interpretation of the text.

The specific conceptual structure of explanatory discourse in science depends on the definitions and operations that govern the field under consideration. One can explain phenomena in history, in linguistics, in physics, in mathematics. Since explanations rely on differential knowledge, they also depend on the prior knowledge of the audience. A good explanation must “get home.” The explanation given to someone with no knowledge of the field, will not be the same as that given in a research paper on the same topic.

2. Ordinary Explanations

2.1 Explain: The Word and Its Uses

The agents of the verb to explain are human (S1, S2, etc.)

— The explanation usually refers to an external phenomenon that one wants to understand better:

In “S1 explains M to S2” the explanation is ​​a conceptual interactive sequence.
In “E explains M”, the explanation is formulated as an objective conceptual monologue, that does not contain any reference to an interactive event.

— S1 may ask another person S2 to explain his (= S2‘s) behavior. In this case, S1 wants to clarify an interpersonal misunderstanding, or something that could be seen as an offense O, committed by S2 against S1.

You owe me an explanation! (1)

The so-called “explanation” demanded is actually a justification. This is a rather threatening opening, uttered in an angry tone, and anticipating a lively–even violent–discussion. The “explanatory” interaction that follows is likely to be an argument₂  (see  to argue, argument: the words) made with the aim of either restoring or redefining the relationship between the two individuals.

In everyday use, the word explanation refers to segments of speech or to interactive sequences initiated by a speaker who:

— Does not understand:

“(Explain to me) what ‘zoon politikon’ means?”: A request for a definition, a paraphrase, a translation or an interpretation.

« (Explain to me) what really happened? »: A request for a convincing narrative.

“(Explain to me) why the shape of the moon is changing?”: A request for a theory, diagrams and pictures.

— Does not know how to do something:

“(Explain to me) how it works?”. This is a request for instructions, a brochure, a manual, or a practical demonstration.

The structure of the explanation varies depending on the nature of the activity.

This raises the question of the unity of the concept of explanation, as well as that of the variety of explanatory discourses in interaction. At the most general level, the need for an explanation arises from the feeling of surprise (novelty, anomaly) when faced with something astonishing. Any answer that satisfies this astonishment and frees the speaker from any sense of surprise can be considered to be a satisfactory explanation.

2.2 In Ethnomethodology

Ethnomethodology (Garfinkel 1967) places great importance on accounts in everyday interactions, i.e., to ordinary explanations, justifications or good reasons given by the participants regarding the meaning of their current actions and  expectations. Such accounts are given at two levels. First, there are explicit explanations “in which social actors give an explanation for what they are doing in terms of reasons, motives or causes” (Heritage 1987, p. 26). Second, implicit accounts are provided as explanations inscribed in the ongoing flow of actions and social interactions (ibid.). These implicit accounts aim to ensure mutual intelligibility of “what is going on”, based on action scripts, social expectations, or practical moral standards. These explanations are said to be situated, i.e., contextual.

In conversation, explicit explanations can occur as repairs, when an initial turn is followed by a non-preferred sequence. For example when an invitation is declined, the refusal will often be accompanied by an explanation-justification: “I’m afraid I can’t go with you, I have to work.” This kind of explanation or justification is required in the face of a social norm. This can be seen from the conflictual turn the interaction takes when no explanations are given (Pomerantz 1984).

2.3 Explanatory Sequences

Beyond the question “Why are things so?”, the search for an explanation is defined as a cognitive, linguistic and interactional activity, triggered by the feeling or expression of doubt, ignorance, by a disturbance in the normal course of action, or mere “mental discomfort” (Wittgenstein 1974, p. 26). Explanations seek to satisfy this cognitive need, assuage doubt, and produce a comfortable sense of understanding and (inter)comprehension.

The explanatory interaction between an “explainer” and an “explainee” can be schematized as a sequence of stages. The first stage is the explainee’s request for explanation to an explainer. The final stage is the explainee‘s ratification of the explanation:

Ee has a curiosity, a doubt, concern or a mental block about M.
Ee seeks an explanation from Er.
Er provides an explanation.
Ee ratifies or does not ratify the explanation

According to this scheme, an explanation is a response to a request. As an epistemic-interactional act, an explanation is satisfactory if it alleviates Ee’s “mental discomfort.” Therefore, the most objective, sophisticated and accurate explanation, that it is not based on Ee‘s question and state of knowledge, will at best be satisfactory to the explainer Er, leaving Ee  out.

3. Explanation and Argumentation 

3.1 Explanation and Justificatory Argumentation

Explanations are on the side of the justificatory argumentation, see justification:

— Both explanation and argumentation originate from a state of doubt about a statement that does not align with an individual’s beliefs and knowledge.
— Both explanation and argumentation develop out of an interrogation.
— Both are linking processes that develop a given set of beliefs. An explanation incorporates an undeniable fact, the explanandum into an explanatory system. Deliberative argumentation takes arguments from a set of beliefs and develops them into a conclusion, that is integrated into the same set of beliefs. Justificatory argumentation integrates a challenged known fact into an established coherent system of representation.
In deliberative argumentation, the argument is presented as certain, and doubt is cast on the corollary, the conclusion is questioned.
In justificatory argumentation, the search for an argument goes in the opposite direction.

My client is completely innocent. How can I prove / explain this to the jury?

As in an explanation, where the explanandum is an established fact, and the explanans must be identified.

Undoubtedly, the face of the moon is changing. How can I make sense of that?

The same argumentative laws of passage can establish explanatory connection. For example, causal links are used both in both explanation and in argumentation, see pragmatic; motives.

3.2 Explanation as an Argumentative Move

The contrast between argumentation and explanation can have argumentative significance. Explanations project unequal interaction roles: the explainee is an ignorant profane in a low position, while the explainer is an expert in a high position. In argumentative situations, the roles of proponent and opponent are more equal. It’s one thing to « explain something to someone » and another to « argue with or against someone about something. »

The question “Why?”, which typically introduces a request for an explanation, can also be used to question a behavior or opinion. In the latter case, it opens an argumentative, egalitarian, discussion. However, the recipient of this question may reframe the argumentative situation as an explanatory situation, saying, “Wait, let me explain!”. In this case, the relationship becomes asymmetrical, with the explainer / proponent trying to gain the upper hand over the explainee / opponent.

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EXEMPLUM

1. Preaching as a Rhetorical Genre

Christian monotheism developed the rhetorical genre of the sermon, in which persuasion is serves religious faith.
Predication is the action name associated with the verb to preach, and the noun preacher. However, predication has not been affected by the pejorative connotations sometimes associated with the words to preach and preacher in contemporary usage.
Predication is homonymous with the word predication which is used in grammar and logic to denote the process by which a predicate (a verbal group) is associated with a subject in a sentence.
Predication is also homonymous with the verb to predicate something upon, meaning to base an action or statement on something: “I predicated my argument upon the facts.” (tfd, Predicate)

As an argumentative genre, preaching fully corresponds to Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s definition of argumentation provided by as a discursive effort « to induce or to increase the mind’s adherence to the theses presented for its assent” ([1958]/1969, p. 4).  In this case, the theses are religious beliefs, that are articles of faith from the preacher’s point of view.
If the audience consists of believers, the pastor, then, by preaching to them, the pastor ensures their ongoing training and increases their faith–that is, “their soul’s adherence” to their creed (adapted from Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, [1958], p. 4).n
If the audience consists of nonbelievers, the preacher might preach to inspire the same faith in them. If the audience consists of heretics in a position of strength, rhetoric must give way to dialectic.

Catholic faith doctrines are found in Sacred Scripture, and are commented on by theologians and traditional authorities–the Fathers of the Church. These doctrines are articulated and applied in sermons through various rhetorical techniques, that exist in a sometimes polemical tension between dialectical appeals to reason and enthusiasm for the faith.

2. The exemplum

The exemplum (plural exempla) is a preaching technique developed especially by the Dominican and Franciscan mendicant orders, at the beginning of the thirteenth century. Structurally, the exemplum is a narrative that uses the resources of the fable. This genre is legitimized by the example of Christ himself who preached in parables. The exemplum presents models of behavior to be followed or avoided.

According to Brémond et al., the exemplum is “a short narrative presented as truth and intended to be incorporated into a discourse, usually a sermon, to convey a salutary lesson to an audience” (1982, pp. 37-38)  Brémond distinguishes between metaphorical and metonymical exempla.

2.1 Metonymical Exempla

In such exempla, the story is presented as probable, and there is a certain similarity in status between the characters in the story, and the recipients of the admonition. For instance, the parable of the wicked rich is told to the wealthy, and logicians are told of a colleagues, who is tormented in hell for his sins–that is, his sophisms.

The following exemplum deals with the fate of souls after death, and in particular, purgatory. It contains a “Christian denunciation of vain pagan learning” (Boureau, p. 94), and encourages logicians to convert to  the religious life.

Knowing that sinners are severely punished at the end of their lives can edify us.
According to the Parisian Cantor (= Peter the Chanter, Petrus Cantor), this is what happened in Paris. Master Silo urged one of his colleagues, who was very ill, to come and visit him after his death and to inform him of his fate. A few days later, the man appeared before Master Silo, wearing a parchment cloak covered with sophistic inscriptions and engulfed in flames. The Master asked him who he was. He replied, “I am the one who promised to visit you.” When asked about his destiny, he said, “This cloak weighs me down and oppresses me more than a tower. They force me to wear it because of the vanity I have derived from the sophistry. The flames with which it is filled represent the delicious and varied furs I have worn, and they torment and burn me.” When the Master found this light punishment, the deceased told him to stretch out his hand to test its lightness. As soon as the Master dis so, the man dropped a bead of sweat onto his hand. It pierced the Master’s hand as quickly as an arrow. The Master experienced an extraordinary agony, and the man said to him, “So it is with all my being.”
Fearing the severity of this punishment, the Master decided to leave the world and become a religious man. The next morning, before his assembled disciples, he composed these verses:

To the frogs, I surrender croaking / To the ravens, cawing / To the vain, vanity.
I entrust my fate /To a logic that does not fear the conclusive ‘‘therefore’ of death.

And, abandoning the world, he took refuge in religion.
Jacobus da Varagine, The Golden Legend, written around 1260[1]

The practice of exemplum extends beyond the strictly religious realm. Fontenelle’s « Golden Tooth » is a lay metonymic exemplum that illustrates the fallacy of attributing a cause to a nonexistenf fact, see cause – effect.

2.2 Metaphorical exempla

In the metaphorical exemplum, “the narrative no longer quotes an example of the rule, but a fact that resembles it” (Brémond, ibid.).

It is said that when a hedgehog enters a garden, he takes on a load of apples which it fastens to its spine. When the gardener arrives, the hedgehog tries to escape, but he cannot because of his load, and he is caught with his apples. […] This is what happens to the unfortunate sinner who, when he dies, is carried away with the burden of his sins.
Humbert of Romans, [The Gift of Fear or the Abundance of the Examples], written between 1263 and 1277.[2]

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[1] Quoted from Jacques de Voragine, La Légende Dorée. Text presented by A. Boureau. In J.-C. Schmitt (ed.), Prêcher d’exemples [Preaching exempla, Preaching by example]. Paris: Stock, 1985. P. 7.
Jacobus de Voragine, Legenda aurea, The Golden Legend]. Written between 1261 and 1266 (Wikipedia).
[2] Humbert de Romans, Le Don de Crainte ou l’Abondance des Exemples. [The Gift of Fear or the Abundance of Examples.]
Translated from Latin into French by Chr. Boyer. Lyon: PUL. 2003. P. 116.

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EXAMPLE

The word example has two main meanings:

1) Example-1: An element of a category of cases or events that are grouped under the same definition, law or principle. Such an item can help to identify new members of the category, and serve to establish, clarify and explain the definition, law or principle it embodies.

2) Example-2:  A way of being or doing that is worthy of imitation, such as setting an example, leading by example, being an example or being a role model for the community.
An exemplary person perfectly synthesizes and embodies the highest moral and professional norms and practices, with whom one can identify.

In addition to the specific forms of argumentation described below, the following forms of argumentation are related to the example: see exemplum; imitation; ab exemplo.

1. The Example in the Aristotelian Rhetorical System

In one version of the Aristotelian rhetorical system, induction and syllogisms are the instruments of scientific discourse, while example and the enthymemes are their counterparts in rhetorical discourse (Rhet, II, 20, 1393a20-25, RR p. 335). There are different kinds of examples:

[Argument by example] has two varieties; one consisting in the mention of actual past facts, the other in the invention of facts by the speaker. Of the latter there are again two varieties, the illustrative parallel and the fable. (Id., 1393a25-30; RR p. 357-358)

The place of examples in a table of rhetorical devices is as follows:

Comparison

Aristotle gives as an example of a “parable”, an analogy drawn from the teachings of Socrates. This parable condemns the practice of drawing lots for magistrates, since one would not “use the lot to select a helmsman from the crew of a ship” (Rhet., II, 20, 1393b5, RR, p. 335); see metaphor.

Fable

Aristotle gives as an example the fable of the horse that wanted revenge on the stag, and thus became a slave to man. This fable applies to the saviors of the fatherland who quickly became tyrants (Rhet, II, 20, 1393a5-25, RR p. 337). as a genre of rhetoric and literature,
Fables, like portraits (see ethos) are genres of rhetoric and literature that have existed since the time of Aesop (620–564 BCE) and continue to this day.

A modern version of the fables could be anecdotes. « iPhone owners are obnoxious. Recently I went camping… » The anecdote then develops, highlighting the terrible behavior of one iPhone user and generalizing it to all iPhone users. In Aristotelian terms, this is an argument based on a real past fact, elaborated as a truth-telling narrative, see precedent.
Other characteristics of anecdotes such as their educational function and conversational entertainment value, and the roles of storyteller and audience bring them closer to tales or fables.
On a strictly argumentative level, anecdotes are difficult to contradict and nearly impossible to refute directly, except with another decisive anecdote, tale or fable, and the quasi impossibility of refuting them directly, except with another decisive anecdote, tale, or fable.

These characteristics suggest that anecdotes have inherited some of the forms and functions  of tales and fables.

Actual past facts

The argument from an example based on real past facts is illustrated by two historical events, that lead to the conclusion that “we must prepare for war against the king of Persia and not allow Egypt to be subjugated, » given two past experiences that were unfavorable to the Greeks:

For Darius of old did not cross the Aegean until he had seized Egypt; but once he had seized it, he did cross. And Xerxes again did not attack us until he had seized Egypt, but once he had seized it, he did cross.
(Rhet., II, 20, 1393a30-b5, RR p. 335) – Darius, 522-486 BCE; Xerxes, 486 à 465 BCE.

This is an example of strategic observation closely linked to a specific geographical situation. It can be considered as an historical precedent, that functions like a judicial one. Specialists in the field must rule on a case:
What should we do when the Persian army enters Egypt? or: now that they are in Egypt?
What does the presence of the Persian army in Egypt mean? What will they do next?

To answer these questions, specialists first look for similar cases in the past. In this case, they found two similar cases. While this is not enough to establish a mechanical law, it is sufficient to suggest a strategic response, « they will cross the sea to Europe”, and the correlative decision of action: « let’s prepare for war« .

2. Generalizing from an Example

2.1 Example-Based Law-Like Generalizations

A generalization can be made from a random item (lambda-example), whether idiosyncratic or generic.

2.1.1 Generalization from a random idiosyncratic example

The argument from example is a generalization (induction) based on a single specific case. It takes an observation made about an individual, and generalizes it to all individuals of the same class (or bearing the same name):

This butterfly is blue, so (all) butterflies are blue.

In logic, from « this B is P« , one can only infer “some B are P”. The generalization on the basis of a single specific case, i.e., « from particular this to universal all« , corresponds to the converse of the instantiation of a universal proposiiculartion, « from universal all to particular this » which is valid; if “all I are P » then “this I is P”.

This swan is white, that’s okay, since (all) swans are white.

An argument by example is generally considered as a type of hasty generalization or induction based on a single case. It can also be a case of two-term reasoning.

2.1.2 Scientific Generalization on a Generic Example or Ecthesis

A generic example is a being that clearly manifes all the properties of its genus. It is a prototype of the class, and its best embodiment, see category; intra-categorical analogy. The argument from the generic example is based on such a specimen and leads to conclusions about a given genus (i.e., all the individuals belonging to that genus):

A generic example demonstrates the reasons for the validity of a proposition by performing operations or transformations on a given concrete object, that is considered not in and of itself, but as a characteristic representative of a class. (Balacheff 1999, p. 207).

This process is also known as ecthesis, which is defined as

A technique of demonstration used especially in Euclidean geometry, in which a theorem is proven, by reasoning on a singular figure. Your inference is correct if it does not mention the characteristics peculiar to the drawn figure, but only those characteristics that it shares with all the figures of its kind (Vax 1982, Ecthèse)

2.1.3 Generic example or idiosyncratic individual?

The argument by example is a legitimate extrapolation when it is based on a generic feature. For instance, if you ask how many wings a bird can have, observing any bird will lead you to the correct answer. However, asking what the average weight of a pigeon is, and then observing any pigeon to find the answer is absurd: « This λ-pigeon weighs 322 g, so the average weight of a pigeon is 322 g. »

Since in many cases, it is not known beforehand whether the studied characteristic is essential or random, this distinction is used as an argumentative resource. The proponent argues that the generalization is valid because it is based on an essential property. The opponent argues that the property is accidental and cannot be generalized see classification; accident.

The remains of a single animal belonging to an unknown extinct species can provide a great deal of knowledge about that species;  however, the specific conditions of the individual animal considered must be duly recognized. The case of the Neanderthal man is an example of this.

1. Scientists’ views of Neanderthals have changed over time. (From G. Burenhult, « [Towards Homo Sapiens] », 1994 [1])
More specifically: Are the Neanderthals our ancestors or are they a different species?

2. First answer: The Neanderthal man belongs to our species. « It has long seemed obvious that the physical appearance of Neanderthals — and especially those living in Europe — was very different from ours.” However, “despite these physical differences, Neanderthals have long been regarded as direct ancestors of modern humans » (id., p. 66).

Second answer: Neanderthals are a different species. « According to the work of the French paleontologist Marcellin Boule these differences were considered too great; » (id., p. 67), and the Neanderthal man was considered a different species.
The Neanderthal of Marcellin Boule: « Starting in 1911, the paleoanthropologist Marcellin Boule published a detailed study of the Neanderthal skeleton. He created an image that has conditioned the popular perception of Neanderthals for more than thirty years. His interpretations were strongly influenced by ideas of his time about these extinct hominids. Boule described them as a kind of savage and brutal cave men, who dragged their feet and were unable to walk upright. »
“Marcellin Boule described a Neanderthal with a flattened skull, a curved spine (similar to that of a gorilla), semi-flexible lower limbs and large divergent big toes. This description aligns with the ideas of the time about human evolution” (Wikipedia, Marcellin Boule).

4. However, this Neanderthal was severely handicapped. « In 1913, Marcellin Boule exaggerated the differences between Neanderthals and modern humans.  He did not realize that the skeleton he studied — the “Old Man of the Chapelle aux Saints” (in Corrèze, France) — was deformed by arthritis, as demonstrated by W. Strauss and A. J. Cave in 1952” (id., p. 67).
“J.-L. Heim describes the subject as severely disabled. The individual suffered from a left hip deformity (epiphysiolysis or rather trauma), a crushed toe, severe arthritis in the cervical vertebrae, a broken rib, and narrowed spinal nerve channels. (Wikipedia, id.)

5. Conclusion: Our Cousins, the Neanderthals: “Today Neanderthals are now considered our cousins ​​rather than as our ancestors, even though they resemble us in many ways” (ibid.).

In short, a generic example can serve as the basis for an abductive generalization, that leads to a rule or regularity concerning a class of cases or individuals. The specificity of individual cases must be specified.

2.2 Argument from the Example

An illustrative example is an example chosen to help understand a concept or law, by providing an instance of it:

A migratory bird is a bird that  … For example, the swallow …

Furthermore, if the chosen example is (presented as) typical of the phenomenon, the time-consuming and precarious work of examining a large number of cases becomes unnecessary. In this sense, providing an argument in defense of a general statement simply means finding a clear case to which it applies correctly.
At the very least, the illustrative example shows that the conclusion is not undermined by the first example that comes to mind (see infra, § 6).
When a school essay proposes a maxim for commentary and criticism, the basic argument is to provide an example that clarifies the meaning of the maxim and justifies the maxim’s meaning. This is why the argument from example is considered as the basic form of argument from a pedagogical point of view.

The illustrative example can also be used as an epideictic amplification and persuasion technique.

Whereas an example is designed to establish a rule, the role of illustration is to strengthen adherence to a known and accepted rule, by providing particular instances which clarify the general statement, show the import of this statement by calling attention to its various possible applications, and increase its presence to the consciousness. (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca [1958], p. 357)

2.3 Test Case Example and Refutation by the Counter-Example (arg. in contrarium)

An example does not establish a law, but is theoretically sufficient to refute a generalization. The test case example (or counterexample) is functionnaly different from the illustrative example. It is introduced as an objection to a theory. Then, the proponent must demonstrate that the general principle he is advocating can successfully apply to the case in question.
The argument by counterexample is the standard method of refuting universal propositions “all As are Bs”. This law is refuted by showing an A that is not a B, a strategy is perfectly operative in ordinary argument.
However, the counterexample attack can be neutralized by appealing to exceptional cases, as opposed to default ones. The proponent acknowledges that the law admits exceptions.
Nonetheless, theories as mental constructions are not directly refuted by facts, see refutation by facts.

3. Example 2: “Exemplary Examples »

3.1 Paragons, Model/Antimodel

An unspecified example (λ-example) is one element that makes up a category and is defined by its characteristic features. From a linguistic perspective, it is an element currently called by the name of the category.

Categories are also structured around their prototypical elements, see Categorization; Analogy (I) ; Analogy (II); Precedent.
In the social domain at large, a model is an « exemplary example », or a role model for a particular kind of behavior. The members of the category are judged by him. He is worthy of imitation and attracts identification.

Anti-models typify negative authority; (Perelman, Olbrechts-Tyteca [1958], p. 362).

Etymologically, a paragon is a touchstone for gold or silver. Metaphorically speaking, a paragon of virtue is a touchstone of virtue, that is, his behavior is the sole criterion for recognizing and ranking virtuous people. A paragon is  the most excellent prototypical element.

The following example is taken from a television program in which contestants are asked questions and the winner is the one who answers the fastest. The question, read slowly, begins with:

Question: Who is the poe/t
Answer:                              /Victor Hugo

The slash / marks the moment when the candidate answers, “Victor Hugo”, without waiting for the question to finish, i.e. the clue that would make it possible to identify the poet: « Who is the poet who wrote of the famous verse “Tomorrow, at dawn, at the hour when the countryside turns white »?  And “Victor Hugo” was indeed the correct answer.
The conclusion is that Victor Hugo is the paragon of poets in France. This suggests that “who / what is the (name of a category) » could be used as a test to determine the paragon of the category: « What is the animal? – The lion.

The “paragon of anti-models” is Hitler, see authority §6: Refutative uses of authority.

3.2 Imitation

When an individual uses another person as a model, they are imitating that person, see ethos. The choice of a model is not necessarily conscious, whether for a hairstyle or voice intonation. The model is usually unaware of being imitated. This process usually neither expressed linguistically nor clearly argued. Rather, it is based on nonverbal mechanisms of social imitation, the ripple effect, identification, empathy and charisma.

To persuade someone to do something, one can argue by example, citing important people, real or fictional, who have done the same thing. This « argument of exemplary behavior » is a metonymic exemplum, a type of the verbal argument of authority.
More importantly, one can set an example voluntarily in order to show and demonstrate to the other what is desired, hoping  to set alignment mechanisms in motion. For instance, one might stop smoking in order to encourage a friend to do the same, without giving grand speeches. As parents are reminded, actions speak louder than words, and they are their children’s primary role models.
This strategy of example can be applied to any form of behavior we wish to instill in another person, such as how to eat, speak, or live a dignified life worthy of reward in the afterlife.
Rather than being a type of argumentation, nonverbal models and examples appear as an alternative to argumentation.
Seduction and repulsion push a person to conform themselves with a model or distance  themselves from an antimodel, see authority. They operate differently than verbal arguments. Some kind of persuasion may be involved—a change in belief that correlates with a change in behavior—but not all persuasion comes from argumentation. See « you too! », consensus; ad populum.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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[1] G. Burenhult, « Vers Homo Sapiens » [Towards Homo Sapiens]. In Le Premier homme. Preface by Y. Coppens, Paris, Bordas, 1994, p. 67.