Lat. ex concesso, pl. ex concessis; concessus, “concession, consent”.
Lat. ex concessu gentium: gentium, from gens “race, nation, people” translated as “argument from the consensus of nations”.

The Latin label ex concessis refers to two kinds of argumentation.

— Argumentation based upon the (alleged) universal consensus (ex concessu gentium), that is to say, from general agreement, S. Consensus; Authority.

— Argumentation based upon a local consensus, limited to the beliefs of the audience. The orator may or may not share these beliefs. With this meaning, the argument ex concessis is also called ex datis.

Some argument schemes are designated by Latin labels, S. Ab —; Ad —; Ex —. This entry lists the labels using the Latin preposition ex (rarely e, and never e before a vowel).

E/ex means “taken from”; in the construction “arguments e/ex N” the Latin noun N refers to the substance, from which the argument is drawn.

A list of “ex + N” Arguments

Latin name of the argument	• Meaning of the Latin word(s)Latin • (When necessary a word-for-word translation) • English equivalent(s) • Reference to the corresponding entry/ies
ex concessis (sg. ex concesso) e concessu gentium	Lat. concedere, “admit; agree with sb” — arg. from the consensus of nations ; from traditional wisdom; from what is admitted by the audience or the opponent — S. Consensus; Authority; Ex concessis; Ex datis; Beliefs of the Audience; Concession; Ad hominem.
e contrario [generally a contrario]	Lat. contrarius, “contrary; opposite” — S. Opposites
ex datis	Lat. datum, “gift” — arg. from the facts as such; from what is accepted by the audience — S. Ex datis
ex notatione	Lat. notatio, from notare “stamp with a mark” — arg. from “what the word (truly) says”; argument from the meaning or of a word. S. True Meaning of the Word; Derived Words
ex silentio	Lat. silentium, “silence” — S. Silence

As the ab and ad arguments, the ex arguments do not refer to a unified category of arguments, or to a common semantic family, nor to a formal type.

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Evidentiality is a set of grammatical or linguistic phenomena indicating how the information conveyed in a statement has been obtained by the speaker. Evidential systems commonly signal that the information 1) comes from sensory experience (auditory, visual); 2) that is has been inferred from something else; 3) that it reproduces a hearsay. Other evidential systems are much more complex. In evidential languages, the speaker must explicitly mention the basis on which he or she says what he or she says, that is, the kind of argument supporting the utterance.

In some languages, evidentiality is grammaticalized, that is, it corresponds to a specific grammatical category. In English, for example, the reported event is necessarily referred to by its temporal-aspectual coordinates. In evidential languages, the speaker is obliged to stipulate how the information he relays has been obtained (via the senses, hearsay, inference, etc.). The sub-system of the grammatical marks of evidentiality is distinct from the modal system as well as from the temporal-aspectual system.

Evidentiality can be considered as a linguistically embedded argumentation, as an “argumentation within grammar”. It leads to the conception of the argumentation as a continuum, sometimes related to the grammar and semantics of the language and at other times, to the grammar and semantics of discourse.

In English, where evidentiality is not grammaticalized, evidential markers or phrases remain optional. The evidential sources can be discursively expressed as coordinated sentences or as the head of the sentence:

Peter is at home;

one can hear him             I hear that Peter is at home
one can see him               I see that —
they told me                   They told me that —
I read it                          I read that —
I guess                          I guess that —

Evidentiality may be expressed by modals. So, for example, in the statement “Peter is at home”, the information about that Peter’s whereabouts is given in the categorical mode, and is endorsed by the highest degree of speaker certainty on an epistemic scale ranging from doubt to certitude. From an evidential perspective, the statement implies that the speaker has some direct evidence to back the speech, for example “I just left him”, etc.

“Peter should be at home now”: this sentence communicates the same information on a lower position on the epistemic scale. From an evidential perspective, the statement implies, for example, “I have no direct and categorical evidence of what I say, but on the basis of Peter’s usual habits, I infer that he is at home”.

The following example is taken from Ducrot (1975). In “Pierre doit avoir reçu ma lettre” (“Peter must/should have received my letter”), , the information is backed only by common knowledge of the usual delivery deadlines. The following case is different:

Eh bien, je crois que Pierre a reçu ma lettre!
Well, I believe that Peter has received my letter!

There is now an implication that the same information has been inferred from a quite different source, that is, some natural sign taken in Peter’s behavior which can be explained only by referring to the letter’s content; for example, the letter informed Peter of a disciplinary warning, and Peter clearly changed his behavior.

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In general, to evaluate an argumentative discourse is to pass upon this discourse a justified positive or negative “value judgment”, S. Value. The assessment activity is one argumentative activity among others, which may be misleading or well founded, regardless of the quality of the discourse it approves or condemns. In order to avoid arbitrariness, the evaluation must specify its method, criteria and reference assessment scale, and remain open to criticism — as is the case for any other argumentation.

1. Dimensions of evaluation

1.1 Assessment scales

Arguments may be evaluated on the basis of different kinds of scales, such as:

An efficiency scale — The best argument is the one that best orients its target towards the thesis it defends, or the action it advocates.

A scale of logical-scientific validity — Good arguments are valid deductions, starting from true premises and conveying their truth to their conclusion according to valid rules and methods.

Invalid arguments are misleading, and effective argumentation may be so; in fact, effective arguments are systematically suspected of being misleading. Conversely, a valid argument may be totally ineffective: for example, “P, so P” is a valid deductive inference but it has no persuasive power. It could be argued that ordinary arguments often simply just camouflage this kind of truism by using two distinct formulations of the same proposition P “P, therefore (paraphrase of P)”. Since trains never leave before the scheduled time, the following account is not a real justification:

Due to the delay, the train will not start on time.

1.2 Binary and gradual evaluation

— Binary evaluation classifies arguments as valid (good, accepted) and invalid (bad, rejected). This evaluation follows the rules and criteria of formal logic. It requires the translation of the argumentation produced in ordinary language into a logical language. The evaluation bears on this logical characterization, taken as expressing the essence of the argumentation, and this logical evaluation is then transferred to the original discourse, S. Connectives.

— Gradual evaluation positions the argument on a gradual scale, as more or less good or bad. In practice, the evaluation criteria depend on the argument scheme considered, and on the availability of a relevant set of critical questions, which can be rather heterogeneous. The argument under consideration is then checked for each condition, and its global evaluation may be only a precarious synthesis of the results of these different operations.

2. The diagnosis of fallacy

The imputation of fallacy is an adversarial procedure condemning, rejecting, or disqualifying a discourse. The accused arguer has the right to defend his or her argument, in view of the principle of “no execution without representation”. Discussions about the fallacious nature of argumentation are, in principle, open-ended and their conclusions are defeasible and adjustable. They are arguments like any others, possibly themselves fallacious. At any rate, meta-argumentative disputes about argument evaluation provide interesting data for argumentative analysis.

Evaluators

Hamblin gives a clear answer to this question: the logician is not the arbiter of the argument or dispute (Hamblin 1970, p. 244-245):

Consider, now, the position of the onlooker and, particularly, that of the logician, who is interested in analyzing and, perhaps, passing judgment on what transpires. If he says “Smith’s premises are true” or “Jones argument is invalid”, he is taking part in the dialogue exactly as if he were a participant in it ; but, unless he is in fact engaged in a second-order dialogue with other onlookers, his formulation says no more than the formulation “I accept Smith’s premises” or “I disapprove of Jones’s argument”. Logicians are, of course, allowed to express their sentiments but there is something repugnant about the idea that Logic is a vehicle for the expression of the logician’s own judgments of acceptance and rejection of statements and arguments. The logician does not stand above and outside practical argumentation or, necessarily, pass judgment on it. He is not a judge or a court of appeal, and there is no such judge or court: he is, at best, a trained advocate. It follows that it is not the logician’s particular job to declare the truth of any statement or the validity of any argument.
While we are using a legal metaphor it might be worthwhile to draw an analogy from legal precedent. If a complaint is made by a member of some civil association such as a club or a public company, that the officials or management have failed to observe some of the association’s rules or some part of its constitution, the courts will, in general, refuse to handle it. In effect the plaintiff will be told: “Take your complaint back to the association itself. You have all the powers you need to call public meetings, move rescission motions, vote the managers out of office. We shall intervene on your behalf only if there is an offence such as a fraud.” The logician’s attitude to actual argument should be something like this.

The diagnosis of fallacious speech operates on a meta-argumentative level, but this second level does not transcend the dialogue under scrutiny, it remains an integral part of the argumentative game. In other words, the judgment “this argument is fallacious” works in the same way as any other ordinary refutation, whether carried by a participant (ordinary use of the word fallacy) or by an analyst, who then behaves as a participant. One must then speak of an ad fallaciam argument.

In a letter to Scherer, the economist Leon Walras refers to a controversy between Scherer himself and Guéroult:

I take […] your [= Scherer’s] study of December 30 to the point where you […] clearly and plainly address the more general considerations about the divergence between his [Guéroult’s] opinions and yours.

“Perfectibility, you say is a modern idea, one of those that best indicate the distance between the old world and the new world. It bears within itself its own self-evidence, so that its adversaries are only a few sophists or some misanthropes. It has passed into the common law of intelligence. Yet, as M. Guéroult seems sometimes to do, perfectibility should not be confused with the possibility of perfection. This confusion is not merely a matter of words; for those who understand the scope of the questions, it marks the dividing point between two systems, liberalism and socialism. Socialism, reduced to its principle, is nothing other than the belief in the possible perfection of society and the effort to realize this state.”

This is clear and precise. M. Guéroult and you agree up to a point: for both of you, humanity advances and does not retreat; the law of the development and organization of society is a law of progress and not of decadence. Beyond these limits, you separate, you think that society is only perfectible, while M. Guéroult, on his part, thinks that society, sooner or later, will be perfect; you are a liberal, M. Guéroult is a socialist. Perfectibility or perfection, liberalism or socialism, such is the alternative and the question that is raised. (Léon Walras, [“Socialism and liberalism”], [1863][1])

Schérer argues that Guéroult concludes from the possibility of the perfectible (point upon which they agree) the possibility of the perfect (point upon which they disagree). This is a typical argument built upon derived words. Schérer does not consider this inference to be a sophism (he does not attribute to Guéroult the intention to mislead his readers) not even to be a mistake, a fallacy of “confusion”, simply a criticism. The analysis is not made from an external logical point of view; it comes from a political opponent, making this point as a sub-issue of a greater debate “Liberalism or Socialism?”.

3. For a laissez-faire in argumentation

Ordinary argumentation is carried out in specific fields by speech communities corresponding to what Hamblin calls “civil association[s]”, having their, interests, programs, ways of thinking and rules for deliberation and action. In these fields, the logician does not, as such, have the substantial specialist skills required. This remark is at the heart of “critical liberalism”, advocating a laissez-faire attitude with argumentation.

From such a viewpoint, what becomes of evaluation? Hamblin’s objection is taken into account, and the evaluation of the arguments is entrusted to the “civil association” with which the arguing party, interested in the outcome of the issue, is affiliated. The data to be considered for the evaluation is not limited to the one isolated argument under scrutiny, but consists in a well-defined selection of contradictory discourses developed around the same issue.

As a result, the evaluation process may be empirically documented and criticized on three levels:

— Non-thematized criticism: description of the practices of evaluation in action, such as concessions, objections, refutations and counter-discourses in general.
— Emergence of a specific ordinary critical metalanguage: charges of fallacy, misplaced authority, irrelevance, emotionality, amalgam and impugned motives, etc. (Doury 2000).
— Evaluations carried out by the specialists of the field. This level, which includes scientific expertise, is the ultimate level of evaluation. Scientists routinely evaluate the discourses and fallacies of their colleagues; historians and social scientists evaluate the fallacies of historians (Fisher 1970), and the teachers and pupils evaluate the pupils’ and teachers’ arguments.

All these activities are “[meta-argumentative]”, as opposed to “ground level argumentations” (Finocchiaro, 2013, p. 1). Provided that the intervention is useful and desired, the specialist in argument analysis can intervene at all levels. As Hamblin has explained, his or her function and deontological position are those of a “well-trained advocate”. As such, the specialist can evaluate all the arguments of the world, the posture being that of the participant analyst and evaluator, working under a double constraint of externality / internality well known in ethnomethodology. He or she may meaningfully intervene in court as a jurilogician or a jurilinguist, that is as a counsel, not a substitute for the judge.

Argumentative discourse is in itself evaluative and critical; scholarly evaluation is a process of argumentative expansion and deepening of the issue itself. There is no super-evaluator capable of putting an end to the critical process by providing a final, conclusive evaluation to silence all other participants.

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[1] Quoted after Léon Walras L. (1896). “Socialisme et libéralisme”. In Études d’économie sociale – Théorie de la répartition de la richesse sociale Lausanne: Rouge & Paris: Pichon. P. 4.

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1. The word ethos

The word ethos is borrowed from the ancient Greek word ἦθος (ēthos), having two meanings:

I. In pl. Usual stay, familiar places, dwelling. Speaking of animals: cowshed, stable, den, nest. […]
II. Usual character, hence custom, usage; the manner of being or habit of a person, his character; […] by extension, mores. (Bailly, [ethos])

In rhetoric, ethos refers to “the moral impression (produced by an orator)” (ibid.).

In Latin rhetoric, ethos is translated as mores, “manners”, or sensus “common sense”. Quintilian considers that ethos “manners” and pathos “passions” are subcategories of feeling [adfectus]:

Of feelings [adfectus] as we are taught by the old writers, there are two kinds, the first of which the Greeks included under the term πάθος (pathos), which we translate rightly and literally by the word “passion” [adfectus]. The other, to which they give the appellation ἦθος (ēthos), for which, as I consider, the Roman language has no equivalent term, is rendered however, by mores, “manners”; whence that part of philosophy, which the Greeks call ἠθική (ēthikē), is called moralis. (IO, VI, 2, 8)

The same opposition ethos / pathos can also be translated in Latin as sensus / dolor:

Sensus is one of those vague terms by which Latin tries to express what Greek rhetoric designates by [ethos]. […] It is distinct from dolor, which responds to [pathos] (Cicero, De Or. III, 25, 96). (Courbaud, note 2 to Cicero, De Or., II, XLIII, 184; p. 80)

The noun sensus basically refers to physical perception, also to “an intellectual way of seeing things”, and a moral perception of the situation in terms of right and wrong, a “moral sense” (after Gaffiot, Sensus). To display sensus is therefore to jointly display good perceptual, analytic and moral skills.

Sensus also points toward sensus communis, “common sense”, as a synthesis capacity in agreement with what people consider to be “[soundness and prudence]” (MW, Common sense). The good orator is a man of common sense with the ability to achieve synthesis.

The English nouns ethos, ethics, ethopoeia, ethology are borrowed and adapted from the Greek.

— The noun ethos is used in rhetoric, up to the present time. Mores is borrowed from the Latin mores, which itself translates the Greek ethos.
— Ethology is the science of the behavior of animal species in their natural environment, cf. supra, meaning (I).
— The noun ethopoeia is used in rhetoric, and literary theory, referring to a “moral and psychological portrait”.
— Ethics is the part of philosophy dealing with morality and values.

The rhetorical notion of ethos refers to the fact that the speaker is projected into discourse and holds part control over this projection. The ethics of discourse refers to an inner moral authority controlling discourse. The ethotic dimension of rhetorical discourse can be seen as a discursive projection of ego ideals, whereas its ethical dimension would be a discursive projection of the superego imperatives.

Such moral control is central to the rhetorical definition of an orator as a vir bonus dicendi peritus “a good man having public speaking skills”. In contemporary argumentative theory, the criticism of discourse is referred to a rational control, whereas classical rhetoric refers discourse to moral control as well.

2. The arguer’s ethos

Ethotic strategies deal with the social “presentation of self” (Goffman [1956]). The ethos of the orator is a professional ethos. All professions have their ethos, for example, beyond its strictly professional capacities, the traditional waiter embodies a set of peripheral professional virtues: may be finding the cocktail best adapted to the customer’s mood, having the art to deftly drop into and out of the conversation, etc.

Aristotle deals with ethos in two passages of Rhetoric. It describes on the one hand ethos proper, the auto-fiction that constitutes the construction of the face that the orator intends to present to the public; and, on the other, the ethos of the audience, the synthesis of information which enables him or her to adequately orient his or her argument.

2.1 Aristotle: The combined effect of discourse and reputation

In the Aristotelian system, ethos is one of the main leverages for persuasion, the other two being logos and pathos. The Rhetoric poses the primacy of ethos over logo-ic proofs, “[the speaker’s] character may almost be called the most effective means of persuasion” (Rhet., I, 2, 1356a10; RR, p. 106). The concept of ethos is introduced as follows:

Persuasion is achieved by the speaker’s personal character when the speech is so spoken as to make us think him to be credible. We believe good men more fully and more readily than others: this is true generally whatever the question is, and absolutely true where exact certainty is impossible and opinions are divided. This kind of persuasion, like the others, should be achieved by what the speaker says, not by what people think of his character before he begins to speak. It is not true, as some writers assume in their treatises on rhetoric, that the personal goodness revealed by the speakers contributes nothing to his power of persuasion; on the contrary his character may almost be called the most effective means of persuasion he possesses. (Rhet., I, 2, 1356a1-15; RR, p. 107)

The speaker’s ethos is the product of a discursive strategy that builds a complex authority based on three components:

There are three things which inspire confidence in the orator’s own character — the three namely, that induce us to believe a thing, apart from any proof of it: good sense, good moral character, and goodwill. (Rhet., II, 1, 1378a; RR, p. 245).

Good sense is phronesis, that is to say, “prudence”; good moral character, arete, “virtue”; and good will is eunoia, or “goodwill”. The arguer has persuasive authority because he or she is (or appears to be) clever, honest, and on our side. To no lesser extent than pathos, ethos has a pathemic structure; ethotic authority combines expertise, morality and benevolence into a unique feeling of trust, the perfect persuasive cocktail:

These qualities are all that is necessary, so that the speaker who appears to possess all three will necessarily convince his hearers. (Rhet., II, 1, 1378a15; Freese, p. 171)

The verb to appear (and not to be), will seem suspicious. Rhetoric is always suspected to give to the incompetents, vicious and crooks, the means to deceive their partners. As Groucho Marx says or repeats, “sincerity — If you can fake that, you’ve got it made”. But the ablest and truest arguer remains subject to the “paradox of the actor”, that is to say, he or she can be suspected of feigning the skills, virtues, and intentions he claims and shows, and therefore must not only be but appear sincere and true. The arts of appearance are no less necessary to honest people than to scoundrels.

Under this definition, the Aristotelian ethos attracts identification on the basis of a shared community feeling. Disruptive rhetoric implements another ethotic positioning, as an influential minority group: “we are different from all of you … I bring a new world … yes your wise men call it madness.”

The text of the Rhetoric is somewhat puzzling. On the one side, ethotic persuasion “should be achieved by what the speaker says, not by what people think of his or her character before he or she begins to speak”. In line with the classical doctrine of technical and non-technical proofs, this amounts to an outright rejection of non-technical ethos (not the speaker’s character before the speech) in favor of technical ethos (what the speaker says). Nonetheless, the following sentence seems to prioritize the former over the latter, probably because both play their part in actual discourse, as suggested in Ruelle’s translation: “It is necessary, moreover, that this result should be obtained by the force of discourse and not merely by a preference favorable to the speaker.” (Aristotle, Rhet. Ruelle, emphasis added).

2.2 Challenging the ethos

Ethos can be seen as a public exhibition of one’s best possible self, in view of influencing the recipient. Critical theories of argumentation focus on the subject matter of the debate, protect the participants by keeping at least some part of their personalities distanced from the dispute, when they have nothing to do with it. They make a crucial distinction between the charisma of the speaker, which is rejected by principle as exerting an irrational influence, and the exercise of the authority legitimately attached to his or her specific competences.

Ethos and personal attacks on the opponent are the obverse and reverse of the same discursive coin, as theoretically shown by politeness theory. Exhibiting ethos, the speaker exploits his own person as a resource to accredit his point of view, whilst when attacking personally the opponent, the speaker exploits the person of the opponent to refute or discredit his point of view. In both cases, the discourse eludes the substance of the issue and turns to a discussion about the participants, either to discredit or to accredit their positions.

From a critical perspective which postulates that only explicit arguments about the matter itself are relevant, and potentially valid, there cannot be something like an ethotic argument simply because the propositional requirement is not met. Due to its implicit and global positioning, ethotic authority cannot be challenged by any refutation on the matter; accordingly, the opponent will be tempted by an ad personam counter-attack.

In a face-to-face situation, the ethotic grip seeks to establish an asymmetrical relationship framing the interactional relation on a high / low opposition, humbling the opponent into the low position, in order to inhibit free criticism. S. Modesty. So, from a critical point of view, the ethotic yoke must be shaken off, as a preliminary of any constructive discussion. The charismatic facets of ethos are first rejected outright, as irrelevant and fallacious. Second, an explicit component is extracted from a synthetic form of ethos, the argument from authority, which satisfies the propositionality condition and is accessible to criticism. This authority is integrated as peripheral evidence, to be dealt with within the appropriate critical framework.

3. Ethos and discursive identities

Contemporary and ancient discussions about ethos deal with a broadly recognized fact, language splits the speaker into several discursive roles. Ethos is a hub concept, connecting argumentation studies with linguistic studies on subjectivity in language (Benveniste 1958) and with literary studies in narratology, confronting author and narrator, real and implicit readers.

Argumentative discourse, as any discourse, articulates three identity-building elements, ethos strictly speaking, reputation, self-portraying. The ethotic impact of discourse is the result of these three forces:

Ethos Itself — Ducrot integrates the notion of ethos into the general theory of polyphonic discourse: “Ethos is attached to the speaker as such: the character attributed to him or her as the source of the utterance, make this utterance acceptable or not” (Ducrot 1984, p. 200). In Goffman’s terminology, ethos is attributed to the Figure, S. Roles.

Explicit Self-Portrayal — Ducrot introduces as a second, intra-discursive element “what the orator could explicitly say about himself” (1984, p. 201). The arguer can be the author of her own portrait: “I raised my three children myself” but these self-accounts are quite distinct from what can be indirectly revealed through the discourse. Having an accent is not the same thing as saying “Yes, I have an accent and I am proud of it”. In an argumentative situation, participants systematically value their persons and actions in order to legitimize themselves. The requirements of this situation prevail over the principles of linguistic politeness.

Fame, Reputation — Some social actors are well-known people, that is, they have a reputation, prestige, and perhaps even charisma, positive or negative. This established image is called the “prior”, or the “preliminary” ethos by Amossy:

We shall therefore call preliminary ethos or preliminary image, the image that the audience can have of the speaker before the speech, as opposed to ethos (or oratory ethos, which is fully discursive). […] Preliminary ethos is developed on the basis of the role played by the speaker in society (its institutional functions, status and power) but also on the basis of the collective representation or stereotype of this person […]. Indeed, the image projected by the speaker integrates prior social and individual data, which necessarily plays a role in interaction and contributes significantly to the power of his speech. (Amossy 1999b, p. 70; Maingueneau 1999)

“Pre-discursive” does not mean “language-free”. Reputations are based on discourse as well as upon actions. Ethos can be said to be pre-discursive only in the sense of “preceding a particular speech act”.

Public relations agencies can construct, manage and repair the image of human beings and commercial products (Benoit 1995, etc.).

The operating and control systems of these different identity layers are very different, and each layer can conflict with the two others.
Reputation is a socio-historical construct, which can be socially managed and controlled. Reputation can be inconsistent; the self-representation that the arguer has of his reputation can be different from the representation his audience has of him.

Self-portrayal is an explicit, declarative, controlled activity, an “argumentation of the self” as it is properly termed.

Ethos building is an on-going speech activity. All speech, spontaneous or elaborated, contains subjective features. This fact is transparent for the participants. The speaker knows that his or her conversation partners know (that he or she knows, etc.) that at least some of these subjective features will be elaborated and interpreted as clues to the speaker’s identity, through standard argumentations from natural signs. The arguer might therefore intentionally arrange these subjective features in order to channel these interpretations according to his or her intended aims and perspectives.

The concept of ethos can be used as a descriptive category, relevant to the analysis of any form of ordinary discourse (Kallmeyer 1996). This trend towards generalization, coming with the naturalization of ethos, is typical of modern theories of argumentation such as that of Argumentation within Language or Natural Logic. Argumentative ethos is specifically a category of rhetorical action, a strategic resource available to the arguer, a functional element, intentionally elaborated or distorted.

Generally speaking, inferences to the speaker’s (deep) identity(ies) are based on inferences from linguistic and encyclopedic clues. Like all interpretation processes, such inferences are open-ended, the only restrictions are those of the imagination of the interpreting party: the identity of the speaker is in the eye and ear of the receiver. When it comes to the specificity of ethos, argumentative analysis focuses on the strategic dimension of the presentation of self in argumentation. Its reconstruction program, distinct from the psychoanalytic approach, dovetails with the semiotic and stylistics program.

4. Ethos as a stylistic category

“Style is the man”, and ethos is the style. When looking for a systematic method to study ethos, we come across the stylistic tradition. For example, Quintilian thus emphasizes the effectiveness of a style linked to the choice of vocabulary having a “majestic” ethotic effect:

Words derived from antiquity have not only illustrious patrons, but also confer on style a certain majesty [not without charm], for they have the authority of age and, as they have been disused for a time, bring with them a charm similar to that of novelty. (Quintilian, IO, I, 6, 39, slightly modified)

The authority of the uttered word is constitutive of the ethos of the speaker. The ethos is constructed from features belonging to any linguistic level, beginning with the voice — a powerful vector of attraction or repulsion — the art of hesitating, repeating, faltering, and so on. Ethotic inferences can be drawn from any feature of the argument. He or she who:

— makes concessions is moderate / weak.
— does not make concessions is straight / sectarian.
— appeals to the authorities is conservative / dogmatic.
— uses pragmatic arguments upon causes and consequences is sensible and realistic, pragmatic / opportunist.
— refers his arguments to the nature of things and their definition is a man of conviction / conservative.

Other argumentation lines (by absurdity, by analogy…) do not have such clearly associated ethos.

The link of ethos with style is explicitly made in the Rhetorical Art of Hermogenes of Tarsus (160-ca. 225 CE). Hermogenes considers that discourse can be evaluated along seven stylistic categories:

Clarity, grandeur, beauty, vivacity, ethos, sincerity and skill (Hermogene, AR, 217, 20 – 218, 05; Patillon, 1988, p. 213).

Ethos is one of these categories of discourse; in any given speech, there may be a little or a lot of ethos.
Ethos has four components, simplicity; moderation; sincerity; severity. These qualities compare with the qualities of wisdom, expertise and benevolence that make up Aristotelian ethos. Each of these components is characterized by specific thoughts, methods, words, figures of speech, and rhythms.

As strange as this might sound, sincerity, the key ethotic element is a style. Sincerity is a linguistic condition attached to:

— Emotions, and particularly a feeling, indignation.
— Severity in the accusation of others or oneself is shown by using harsh and vehement words.
— A method of discourse management, in particular the balance achieved between what is openly discussed and what is left suggested.
— The use of derogatory demonstrative pronouns; of figures: apostrophe, and particularly figures of embarrassment (reticence, doubt, hesitation, corrections, interrogations).
— Personal comments suspending the speech (after Patillon 1988, pp. 259; p. 261 et seq.)

Thus, a sincere character is not an extra-linguistic supplement that would be introduced into the discourse from outside, by a moral exhortation. It is the product of a discursive strategy. Any ethics of discourse should take this into account. In particular, figures of speech serve the construction of ethos, and they therefore are instrumental in argumentation in general. We are very far from post-Ramusian rhetoric where invention is divorced from elocution.

5. Character of the audience

After having defined the ethos of the orator in a brief passage of the Rhetoric, Aristotle takes a very different perspective to deal with the characters of the audiences:

Let us now consider the various types of human character, in relation to the emotions and moral qualities, showing how they correspond to our various age and fortune. (Rhet, II, 12, 1388b31, RR p. 311).

This section describes a set of “ideal-types”, that is, human characters classified and characterized according to their social condition, wealth and power (noble, rich, powerful, and lucky) and age (youthful, mature, old). These “elements of sociology for the rhetoricians” conclude with a practical remark:

Such are the characters of Young men and Elderly Men. People always think well of speeches adapted to, and reflecting, their own character: and we can now see how to compose our speeches so as to adapt both them and ourselves to our audience. (RT, II, 13, 1390a20-29, RR p. 319)

Such a passage clearly shows that the adaptation-identification to the audience is the key to persuasion. It will be regarded as fallacious by the normative theories of argumentation requiring that one speaks the truth, not upon the basis of the specific beliefs of a particular audience (ex datis).

Compared to the three statuses distinguished for the ethos of the speaker (ethos strictly speaking, self-portraying, reputation), we see that the character of the audience is entirely of the latter kind, that is reputation, not that of a person but of a group: “young people are like that”. Strictly speaking, however, any audience is able to express its rhetorical ethos by means of its spontaneous reactions to speech.

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An epitrope is defined as, “a figure of rhetoric, consisting in granting something that one can dispute, in order to give more authority to what one wants to persuade” (Littré, Epitrope), S. Concession.

Under ordinary conditions, as described by Grice’s principles, the arguer refutes everything possible, and concedes anything else. So, “Peter concedes P” pragmatically implies that Peter is not able to refute P. If the arguer concedes a doubtful proposition, he or she will be considered a bad arguer; if he or she concedes something that could obviously be refuted, the speech will be interpreted as being ironic:

P is obviously wrong:
L: — P, okay, but / yet Q

Embedding P in a concessive structure, assigns P to the opponent, whether or not he or she wishes to endorse it:

About a writer whose qualities of style have just been discussed in a rather negative way:
I am ready to consider him a good stylist, but he doesn’t know what a plot is.

Irony may also arise from the exaggeration given to the granted position:

I may have visions, but I also have some hard evidence.

S. Irony; Exaggeration.

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The word epicheirema comes from the Greek “epicheirein, to endeavor, attempt to prove” (Webster, epicheirema). It translates into Latin as ratiocinatio (Cicero), “reasoning”, or as argumentatio (Ad. Her.)

The term epicheirema is used in ancient argumentation theory with three distinct definitions.

1. Epicheirema as dialectical reasoning

The Aristotelian theory of syllogistic reasoning opposes philosopheme to epicheirema. Philosopheme is another name for the analytical or scientific syllogism, where the premises are true and the rule of deduction is valid (Top., VIII, 11; p. 156). In contrast “epicheirema is a dialectical inference” (ibid.), that is, a syllogism founded on premises taken from the doxa, hence only probable; this inference concludes to a probability.

2. Epicheirema as an argumentation
whose premises are themselves argued

In rhetorical argumentation, the word epicheirema is a synonym of probable (rhetorical) syllogism, enthymeme and argumentation. A well-built, convincing, rhetorical proof is defined as an argumentation (ratiocinatio) whose premises are only probable, and, consequently, should be explicitly backed by their proofs (Cicero, Inv. I, 34; Hubbell, p. 98-99). In short, a probable premise accompanied by its proof becomes certain. Cicero discusses the following rhetorical syllogism (id., 101-103)

— Premise 1 + Proof of Premise 1:

Premise 1: “Things that are governed by design are managed better than those that are governed without design”
Proof of Premise 1: “The house that is managed in accordance with a reasoned plan is better managed that those that are governed without design. The army […] The ship […]”

— Premise 2 + Proof of Premise 2:

Premise 2: “Of all things, nothing is better governed than the universe”
Proof of Premise 2 (our numbering and presentation)
(a) “the rising and the setting of the constellations keep a fixed order”
(b) “and the changes of the seasons not only (b1) proceed in the same way by a fixed law but (b2) are also adapted to the advantage of all nature,
(c) “and the alternation of night and day has never through any variation done any harm.”

— Conclusion: “Therefore, the universe is governed by design.”

Premise 1 is the conclusion of an induction, that is an enumeration of examples, sharing the same structure and orientation. In premise 2, case (b), the element (b2) argues not only for a design but also for a benevolent design, as does case (c).

Structure of an epicheirema

The question as to whether an epicheirema includes five or three components is disputed (Solmsen 1941, p. 170). On the surface level, an epicheirema is indeed a sequence consisting of five components:

Premise 1 + Proof of Premise 1 + Premise 2 + Proof of Premise 2 + Conclusion

This corresponds to a three-element deep structure:

(Premise 1 and its Proof) — (Premise 2 and its Proof) — Conclusion

This is Quintilian’s position: “To me, as well as to the greater number of authors, there appears to be not more than three [parts]” (IO, V, 14, 6).

The epicheirema corresponds to a linked argumentation, represented as follows:

3. Epicheirema, as a communicated argument

The Rhetoric to Herennius defines “the most complete and perfect argument [argumentatio]” as “that which consists of five parts: the Proposition, the Reason, the Proof of the Reason, the Embellishment and the Résumé” (Ad Her., II, 28).

This perfect rhetorical argument is described as a sequence consisting of five components, like a logical epicheirema, but with a quite different organization. The first three elements correspond to the logical component, establishing the Proposition:

Reason 1 + Proof of the Reason + Proposition

The proof of the Reason, “corroborates by means of additional arguments, the briefly presented Reason” (Id., p. 107). The argumentation must now be seen as serial:

[Argument₁   =>       {(Conclusion] = Argument₂)    =>  Conclusion}
Proof of the Reason                    Reason                                Claim

The Embellishment is a reformulation that “adorn[s] and enrich[s] the argument (argumentatio)”. The Résumé is not the conclusion; its “[brevity]” contrasts with the preceding amplification episode, creating a kind of hot / cold contrast. This second component of the argumentation articulates two elements that clearly have a communicative function.

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1. The Greek word

The Greek word corresponding to the English word enthymeme (adjective enthymematic) means (after Bailly, [enthymema]):

1. 1. Thought, reflection.
   2. Invention, particularly war stratagem.
   3. Reasoning, counseling, warning.
   4. A reason, a motive.

The general meaning of “thought, reflection” is present in all ancient rhetoric: “Any expression of thought is properly called an [enthymema]. (Cicero, Top., XIII, 55; p. 423). Quintilian also alludes the meaning “everything that is conceived in the mind”, to put it aside (IO, V, 10, 1).

2. An instance of an argument scheme

In rhetorical argumentation, an enthymeme is essentially an instance of a topic^, an argument scheme^@. An argument scheme is a general formula having an inferential (associative) form; an enthymeme is the application of such a formula to a specific case. This general definition combines with the following orientations.

(i) In relation to logic, the enthymeme is:

— A form of syllogism:

• • • • • • A syllogism based on plausibility or on sign
          • A truncated syllogism.

— The counterpart of the syllogism.

(iii) Functionally, the enthymeme is seen as a manifestation of cooperation with the audience.

(iv) Marginally, the enthymeme has also been defined as a concluding formula.

3. A special kind of syllogism

3.1 The enthymeme, a syllogism based on “a probability” or “a sign”

In the Prior Analytics, Aristotle defines the enthymeme as “a syllogism starting from probabilities or signs.” (P. A., II, 27)

An enthymeme is a probable reasoning such as:

Peter is tired, he must have worked hard.

The arguer can be charged with mistaking necessary and sufficient conditions, or trusted as knowing for sure that Peter did not spend the whole night celebrating, according to the context span taken into consideration by the analyst.

A natural sign is a proposition expressing a natural connection between two states of things. The connection can be probable (to be red is a sign or a symptom of fever) or necessary (as smoke to fire).

A probability is a proposition expressing either a probable natural relation or a social agreement:

A probability is a generally approved proposition: what men know to happen or not to happen, to be or not to be, for the most part thus and thus, is a probability, e.g. “the envious hate”, “the beloved show affection”. (Aristotle, PA, II, 27)

These are excellent examples of associative semantic inferences (+ envious, + hate); (+ love, + show love), S. Orientation; Topos in Semantic. Such substantial probabilities are based on common sense views of basic human tendencies. The corresponding topics underlie the current production of arguments; S. Common place.

The big strong man will prevail over the small weak one, and mothers love their children. Sometimes, however, this is not the case. A characteristic of reasoning from social probabilities is that it can be reversed, as expressed in the key Aristotelian topic n°21, “incredible things do happen” (Rhet, n°22, 1400a5; RR p. 373).

Consistency is generally a source of probabilities. Humans are rational and intentional beings; they make plans and are expected to act according to these plans, to remain true to their words and intentions. Their behavior is assumed to be probably consistent. Inconsistency is the sign of a defective personality, or of a basic mistake, S. Consistency; Ad hominem. Showing that the opponent is incoherent is a key tool for claims or narratives to be rejected. But consistency is only a probability, as noted in topic n°21, and probabilities cannot hold against hard evidence; they are default qualifications. Other topics are based on inconsistent behavior, people change their minds and criminal actions might be badly planned, S. Motives.

3.2 The enthymeme as a truncated syllogism

The enthymeme is also defined as a categorical syllogism where a premise is omitted:

Men are fallible, you are fallible.
You are a man, you are fallible.

Or the conclusion:

Human are fallible, after all you are a human!

The Logic of Port-Royal defines the enthymeme as:

A syllogism perfect in the mind, but imperfect in the expression, since one of the propositions is suppressed as too clear and too well known, and as being easily supplied by the mind of those to whom we speak. (Arnauld, Nicole, [1662], p. 224)

No enthymeme is conclusive, save in virtue of a proposition understood, which, consequently, has to be in the mind though it be not expressed. (Id., p. 207)

The example in the preceding paragraph can therefore be called an enthymeme for two reasons: on the one hand because it is based on probable indices and on the other hand because it is an incomplete syllogism. The definition of an enthymeme as a truncated syllogism is often not considered to be Aristotelian: “It is not of the essence of the enthymeme to be incomplete” (Tricot’s Note to Aristotle, PA, II, 27, 10, p. 323). Moreover, according to Conley, this conception of the enthymeme as a truncated syllogism is not widely used in ancient rhetoric. He finds it only in a passage by Quintilian (Conley 1984, p.174). However, the First Analytics does consider the case of the truncated syllogism, “Men do not say the latter [Pittacus is wise] because they know it” (PA, II, 27, 10). On the other hand, we read in the Rhetoric that:

If any of these propositions is a familiar fact, there is no need even to mention it; the hearer adds it himself. Thus, to show that Dorieus has been victor in a contest for which the price is a crown, it is enough to say ‘For he has been victor in the Olympic games’, without adding ‘And in the Olympic games the prize is a crown’, a fact which everybody knows. (Rhet., I, 2, 1357a15; RR, p. 113).

Under this definition, the enthymeme can be considered as a figure of speech by ellipsis, precisely a figure of thought.

4. The rhetorical counterpart of the syllogism

In the Aristotelian systematic, the proof is obtained by inference, whether scientific (logical), dialectical, or rhetorical. Aristotle considers that there are two kinds of scientific inferences, syllogistic deduction and induction. In rhetoric, scientific inference is replaced by “rhetorical inference” or enthymeme, the requirements of rhetorical discourse not being compatible with the exercise of scientific inference:

I call the enthymeme a rhetorical syllogism, and the example the rhetorical induction. (Rhet., I, 2, 1356b5, RR, p. 109)

The syllogism (scientific inference) and the enthymeme (rhetorical inference) are defined in a strictly parallel way:

When it is shown that certain propositions being true, a further and quite distinct proposition must also be true in consequence, whether invariably or usually, this is called syllogism in dialectic, enthymeme in rhetoric. (Rhet., I, 2, 1356b15; RR, p. 109)

But, unlike the syllogism, derived from true propositions, the enthymeme is drawn from “probabilities and signs” (Rhet., I, 2, 1357a30; RR, p. 113), see supra § 3.1.

The enthymeme is “the substance of persuasion”, “a sort of demonstration” (Rhet., I, 1, 1354a10, RR p. 95; 1355a5, RR p. 99). It deals centrally with the issue, the substance of the debate, “the fact” (Rhet, I, 1, 1354a25, RR p. 97. As such, the enthymeme is opposed to the reckless use of ethos and pathos, S. Emotion; Pathos; Ethos.

The enthymeme is also called a rhetorical syllogism, considered as an imperfect syllogism. These labels refer rhetoric to syllogistic. However, the scientific / dialectical / rhetorical parallelism, however attractive it may be, is problematic. If one accepts this opposition, one enters a very uncomfortable and empirically inadequate notional grid. On the one hand, the distinction between the three types of reasoning creates a divide between categorical scientific syllogism and probable dialectic syllogism, versus persuasive rhetorical enthymeme, the socially relevant discourse being posited as inherently unable to deal with well-grounded truth. On the other hand, argumentative rhetoric is straightjacketed in the opposition between technical^@ evidence, rhetorical evidence proper, and non-technical proof, which obviously do not fit into the previous notional framework. Common judicial discourse routinely combines the two types of proof, in perfectly syllogistic forms of reasoning, S. Layout; Demonstration.

The reasons given for binding the enthymeme to syllogistic discourse are somewhat paradoxical. The enthymeme as a truncated syllogism is supposed to suit rhetoric because it would be less pedantic than the complete syllogism; this assumes that the missing premise is easy to retrieve. Another reason put forward is that one would use an enthymeme because the ordinary audience is composed of people of a mediocre intelligence, unable to follow a rigorous syllogistic chain. This second justification supposes that the missing premise is too difficult to recover: these two justifications are not immediately compatible.

5. Enthymeme and interpretative cooperation

From the point of view of argumentative communication, the enthymeme exploits what is implicit to achieve persuasion:

Everyone who effects persuasion through proof does in fact use either enthymeme or examples; there is no other way. (Rhet., I, 2, 1356b5, RR p. 109)

As Bitzer notes (1959, p. 408), the enthymematic form is a way of connecting speaker and audience in a process of co-construction of the meaning of discourse, “the enthymeme is satisfied if merely what is stated in it be understood”, (Quintilian, IO, V, 14, 24). Building a common speech space, implicitness produces intersubjectivity. The orator frames the audience as good listeners, and thus creates a “good intelligence” and an atmosphere of complicity. Communicative fusion thus contributes to the formation of an ethos: “you understand me; you can read my mind, I am like you, we are together”.

In Jakobson’s words, the enthymematic formulation of reasoning has a phatic function, that is to say, it keeps the communicative channel open. The effect of surprise associated with the ellipsis is supposed to wake up somnolent audiences: “Something missing!” (see supra § 3.2).

6. The enthymeme as a conclusive formula

The ancient rhetorical practice accorded a superior efficiency to the enthymeme founded on opposites. As the paragon, this specific enthymeme has appropriated the name of the class:

Although every expression of thought may be called enthymeme, the one which is based on contraries has, for it seems the most pointed form of argument, appropriated the common name for its sole possession. (Cicero, Top., XIII, 55; 423)
What you know is of no use; is what you do not know hindrance? (Cicero, Top., XIII, 55: 425).

The second sentence can be understood as a rhetorical question “so, what you do not know should be useful”.

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1. Emotion

1.1 Psychology

From a psychological point of view, emotion is a syndrome, a temporary synthesis of different states:

— A psychic state of consciousness.
— A neurophysiological state, perceptible or not to the subject, such as goose bumps associated with emotions such as fear or pleasure; or the adrenaline rush accompanying rage.
— An altered self-presentation: transformation of facial expression; of body posture; specific attitudes and emergence of actions, such as the flight reaction, characteristic of fear.
— A cognitive state, including a structured representation of reality.

The direction of causality between these components is discussed: common sense considers that the psychic state determines the neurophysiological and attitudinal changes, “he cries because he is sad”, but it can be shown that, if one puts a subject in the physical state corresponding to a particular emotion, he or she experiences this emotion, so, literally “he is sad because he cries” (James, 1884).

1.2 Basic emotions

The emotions listed by Aristotle in the Rhetoric and taken up by the Latin rhetoricians can be considered as the very first set of basic social emotions in the Western world S. Pathos.

Modern philosophers propose their own lists of emotions; for example, Descartes holds that there are only six “simple and primitive” passions, “wonder, love, hatred, desire, joy, and sadness. […] all the others are composed of some of these six or are species of them” ([1649], §69).

Psychologists define basic emotions as universal, independent of languages ​​and cultures. The lists are variable and more or less developed; they generally include fear, anger, disgust, sadness, joy, surprise. Ekman (1999) counts fifteen basic emotions: amusement, anger, contempt, satisfaction, disgust, embarrassment, excitement, fear, guilt, pride in success, relief, sadness – distress, satisfaction, sensory pleasure, and shame.

In theology, the capital sins — pride, envy, anger, sadness (acedia: sloth, depression), avarice, gluttony, lust, can be seen as emotional leakages, considered as sins insofar as they are left uncontrolled.

1.2 Emotions and mood: phasic and thymic

Moods are defined as stable or thymic affective states, whereas emotions are phasic, that is developing in an event structure, according to a bell-shaped curve pattern, S. Calm.

1.3 Emotion and situation

An emotion is related to a situation. Causal theories of emotion analyze the situation as a stimulus mechanically inducing a response, which is the corresponding emotion. This view does not, however, explain the possibility of emotional injunctions and disagreements about emotion (see below). In fact, emotion is linked not to a kind of objective situation, but to a subjective perception of the situation; the stimulus is a situation under a certain description. In other words, the situation perceived as emotional is part of the emotion.

A distinction can be made between experienced emotion and spoken emotion. The relation between these two modes of emotion is analogous to that between time as an extra-linguistic reality, and tense, the shape language gives to time. Rhetorical-argumentative emotions concern emotion-tense, whereas psychology is interested in emotion-time.

2. Arguing emotions

Serious argumentative situations are intrinsically emotional. Contradiction, conflictive or not, disrupts routine beliefs and action plans. So, for example, having to decide what to do introduces tension on the social, cognitive, and emotional levels. The arguer must confront an uncomfortable situation; relations with the other, as well as social statuses are potentially threatened; representations of the world are destabilized, as are the personal identities based on these representations.

2.1 Emotions as issues in argumentative discourse

The situation related to emotion is not a causal source of emotion; when it rains there is no argument as to whether or not one will get wet. This negotiability of emotions is evidenced by the existence of emotional injunctions, such as,

“Time for Outrage!”(Stéphane Hessel)
“A Call to Outrage” (Ignacio Ramonet)
“Indignant? We should be” (Simon Kuper).[1]

In one given situation, there can be huge discrepancies between the emotional states of different people:

S1 — Let us cry, the father of the Nation is dead!
S2 — Let’s rejoice, the tyrant is dead!

S1 -— I’m not afraid!
S2 — You should be.

In the second example, by refusing to align with S1, S2 opens a debate, and must explain why he or she does not agree. S2 must reveal his or her reasons for being afraid, and argue his or her emotion. Reciprocally, S1 is now at risk of being refuted by S2, and left with an inadequate emotion. An emotion is a point of view.

As for argumentation in general, we can distinguish cases where emotion is explicitly argued, and those where the argument is left implicit, and where we are dealing with an orientation towards a particular, unnamed, emotion. In both cases, the point of departure of the emotion is in the participants’ perception of the situation. Ultimately, formatted situation and experienced emotion form a compact whole. Therefore, in order to justify an emotion, one has to give a detailed account of the situation including objective specifications about what happenned and subjective emotional appraisal of the latter. This formatting obeys a relatively simple system of “emotional parameters”, which determine the nature and intensity of the emotion, depending on the more or less predictable and pleasant character of the situation, its origin, its distance, control, norms and values ​​of the experiencer, etc. (Scherer [1984a], p. 107; 1984b).

Aristotle’s Rhetoric presents an excellent description of the thematic structure of speech constructing specific emotions, that is, of the topics of emotion. The book is not about the psychology of emotion but rather a treatise on what discourse can do with emotions and how an emotional social thrust can be monitored, constructed or refuted. The question is not what anger or calm are, but how discourses which are likely to prompt or to calm anger are constructed. That is why, from an argumentative perspective, action predicates should be preferred to substantives where we refer to emotions:

— To anger vs. to cool down the anger;
— To inspire friendship vs. to break the bonds of friendship fueling anger and hatred;
— To frighten vs. to buoy up;
— To shame vs. to despise other’s opinion;
— To be grateful vs. to feel no obligation;
— To pity vs. to be indifferent;
— To kindle rivalry, jealousy, envy vs. to instigate a spirit of competition.

Emotions belong in the field of discursive action. In the Rhetoric, they are defined on the basis of typical scenarios, activated and developed by the speaker. This description of discursive strategies which generate emotion is one of the major achievements of rhetorical argumentative theory.

Anti-oriented discourses construct anti-oriented emotions. Speech alters representations, thus arousing or appeasing, counterbalancing emotions, just as any viewpoint can be fought, turned back, or circumvented. The examples of pity and anger can give an idea of these basic argumentative techniques.

2.2 Pitying and pitiless

Moving to pity — A pities B if he considers that B is the victim of an evil that is not deserved; and if A is well aware that one day he or she may suffer from the same evil (id., 1385b10-15, RR, p. 291). For A to pity B, the distance between A and B must have been calibrated correctly; one feels pity towards people who are similar and close to us. Generally speaking, the “distance” dimension plays an essential role in the construction of emotion, not as an objective metric, but as a cultural, language-built notion. It follows from this description that pity should not be considered an automatic feeling. In particular, those who have nothing to fear for themselves would be insensitive to pity. According to the theory of the moral characters (mores) of the audience, the locally relevant construction of an emotion depends on a good analysis of the audience, S. Ethos. It follows that to directly induce pity, B must show that he or she is suffering, and that he or she does not deserve to be, that the same thing could happen to you, his or her interlocutor, etc., and then, of course, amplify these substantial common places. If pity is constructed according to such parameters, it is justified and judged to be decent and reasonable.

Refuting misplaced pity — Walton has shown along which lines the target can resist pity, in other words, he has shown how to build a discourse against pity, which allows the target to remain calm, insensitive, not to yield to a movement of pity. This discourse is constructed first along a specific “information line”, about the situation. It is then subjected to a relevance condition, pity can only be appealed to if the domain admits of personal involvement. For example, scientific discourse, excluding ordinary subjectivity, does not allow appeals to pity, which will then be deemed “irrelevant” (Walton 1992, p. 27)

When relevant, the appeal to pity routinely functions in the general conflict of pro and contra arguments, concerning personal involvement. In the case of dismissed workers, for example, the appeal to pity (ad misericordiam) confronts the need to preserve the interests of shareholders (ad pecuniam vs. ad misericordiam), to place the company in a good position in the market (ad rivalitatem vs. ad misericordiam), or to preserve the jobs of other employees of the company (ad misericordiam vs. ad misericordiam).

2.3 Anger: getting angry and calming down

Argumentation theory has glorified appeal to pity with a Latin name, ad misericordiam. Actually, from an argumentative point of view, there is no reason to set pity apart from other emotions. All should be given the same lexical consideration, particularly the appeal to anger, ad iram, a highly argued and argumentative emotion.

Causing anger — Anger is a basic rhetorical emotion. When willing to cause the public anger, the speaker will develop his or her righteous indignation or holy anger, and will adopt a virtuous ethos. From the same virtuous posture, the opponent will denounce rage, fury and hatred, S. Pathos.

Discursive representations play an essential role in these oppositions. To make A angry with B, the speaker has to show to his or her interlocutor A that:

— B baffles, offends, mocks A; B makes an obstacle to A‘s plans, wishes, and takes pleasure in it.
— A suffers and seeks revenge by harming B.
— A fantasizes a vengeance, and enjoys it.

These are the basic lines of inflammatory speeches. It should be noted that anger is not an atomic emotion, a crude response to the bite of a stimulus, but the complex result of an aggregate of emotions such as humiliation, contempt and even pleasure. The rationality or morality of anger depends on the proper construction of this feeling of injustice. Anger can be fully virtuous, rational and emotional, if these distinctions have any meaning here.

Anger triggers the mechanisms of revenge. In a typical serial episode, anger constructed and justified in the first sequence, is turned, into an argument for subsequent action.

Anger is not hatred; anger can be rationally justified, hatred cannot; there is no acceptable reason for hate. From a religious point of view, hate speech is a sin “love, at least patiently bear one another!”. The status of hate speech serves as an example of how social evaluation is achieved. Any citizen can legitimately comment on and take stock of anger speech, outrage speech and hate speech. Politicians and judges have the authority to make judgments about such issues. They may of course also draw on the assistance of other parties that they consider helpful, anthropologists, moralists, and, of course, linguists and logicians.

From anger back to serenity — In order to calm down an enraged A, B‘s advocate will develop a soothing discourse concluding that A‘s expression of anger is poorly worded and badly constructed, and that this anger is unreasonable. He or she will argue that B’s behavior was not contemptuous, mocking, abusive, or outrageous. It rather the case that B has been misunderstood; he or she was joking; the intention was not hostile; B behaves like this with people that he or she loves; B repents, and offers excuses, compensations; B has already been punished, etc. — and the soothing discourse will conclude that all that happened a long time ago, and that the situation has changed, S. Kettle

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[1] — Stéphane Hessel (2011). Time for Outrage! London: Charles Glass Books.
— Ignacio Ramonet (2011). Quoted after http://www.ipsnews.net/2011/02/a-call-to-outrage/(11-08-2017)
— Simon Kuper (2011). Quoted after https://www.ft.com/content/280c9816-192c-11e0-9311-00144feab49a?mhq5j=e1 (11-08-2017)

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Dialectics and dialogue have the same Greek etymology dia- + legein, dia- “through”, legein “say”. The prefix dia- is different from the prefix di– meaning “two”. Etymologically, a dialogue is not a two-person conversation (which could be referred to as a dilogue). The condition is not on the number of participants, but on discourse circulation. However, the historical notion of dialectic does refer to a two-partner dialogue.

1. The ancient dialectical method

Aristotelian dialectic is a dialogical method used to solve questions of the form “P or not P?”, such as “is being rich a good thing or not?”, by eliminating one of the options, in a standardized question-answer interaction using dialectical syllogisms.

Dialectic is a philosophical instrument used in the a priori search for the definition of fundamental concepts. In this function of clarification of the first principles, it has been replaced by axiomatization.

1.1 Dialectical reasoning

As “mathematical science” and “rhetorical argument”, “dialectical reasoning” proceeds by syllogism and induction (Aristotle, Post. An., I, 1). While scientific syllogistic deduction proceeds from “true and primary” premises, dialectic uses generally accepted premises (Top. I, 1), or simple “opinions”, endoxon:

Our treatise proposes to find a line of inquiry whereby we shall
be able to reason from opinions that are generally accepted about
every problem propounded to us, and also shall ourselves, when standing up to an argument, avoid saying anything that will obstruct us. (Ibid.)

The word endoxa translates as “probable premises” or as “accepted ideas”. The strict deduction rules of the syllogism are replaced by argument schemes.

1.2 Dialectical game

The dialectical game is played by two partners, the Respondent and the Questioner (Brunschwig 1967, p. 29). It is a bounded interaction governed by strict rules, proceeding by questions and answers, with a winner and a loser. The Respondent first chooses to assert either P or not P. The Questioner must refute the proposition that the Respondent has chosen to support, by means of total questions (yes or no questions). On the basis of these answers, the Questioner attempts to make the Respondent admit a statement which contradicts the original assertion. If the Questioner succeeds, then he or she will win the dialectical game; if he or she fails, the Respondent will win.

The terms Proponent and Opponent used to refer to the core partners of an argumentative situation, are borrowed from this dialectical theory. Unlike the Proponent of a substantial proposition in an argumentative situation, the Respondent in the dialectical game does not have to build a positive proof of the proposition put forward, but must simply avoid being led into a self-contradiction.

1.3 Dialectical authority

To be worthy of a dialectical debate, the proposition must be an endoxon, that is to say, it must be endorsed by some social or intellectual authority:

Now a dialectical proposition consists in asking something that is held by all men or by most men or by philosophers, i.e., either by all, or by most, or by the most notable of these. (Top., 10)

The Aristotelian continuum values different orders of endoxa. We are far from the vision of the doxa as cliché or stereotype as “ready-to-think”, or, just as mechanically, “ready-to-denounce”.

Endoxa are opinions worthy of discussion. They define a contrario what a thesis as “a supposition of some eminent philosopher that conflicts with the general opinion”; the philosopher must be eminent, “for to take notice when any ordinary person expresses views contrary to men’s usual opinions would be silly” (Aristotle, Top., I, 11). In other words, “if it were the first comer who emitted paradoxes, it would be absurd to pay attention to it” (Aristotle, Top., Brunschwig, I, 1, 100b20, p.17). The authority entering the debate is clearly socially referenced as such.

It is remarkable to see that it is the plurality and competition between authorities — rather than the call to authority — which is placed at the core of intellectual debate. Authority is not invoked in order to close the discussion but rather to open it. To say that a proposal is supported by an authority is not to say that it is true, but to say that it deserves discussion.

2. The scholastic dispute

The scholastic dispute (disputatio) corresponds to the medieval practice of a dialectical game. It is an instrument of research and teaching, based upon a specific substantial question, as proposed by a master. At the end of the discussion, the master proposes a solution and refutes the arguments against it (Weijers 1999).

3. The revival of dialectic

The ancient dialectical method, which had been declining since the Renaissance (Ong 1958), was reconstructed in the second half of the twentieth century within the framework of logical dialogue games. It has been put at the forefront of argumentation studies by the Pragma-Dialectic and by the Informal Logic programs. The Pragma-Dialectic program of Frans van Eemeren and Rob Grootendorst (1996, etc.) is a “New Dialectic”, a counterpart of Perelman’s “New Rhetoric” (van Eemeren, Grootendorst, 1996 “La Nouvelle Dialectique” [“The New Dialectic”]). In the Informal Logic framework, the study of “logical dialogue games” has been developed by Douglas Walton (Walton 1984; Walton 1998, The New Dialectic).

In a continuation of a general definition of dialectic as, “the practice of reasoned dialogue, [the art] of arguing by questions and answers” (Brunschwig 1967, p. 10), one can consider that the conversational process is “dialectized” insofar as 1) it relates to a specific and mutually agreed problem; 2) it is played out between equal partners, 3) driven by the search for the truth, the just or the common good; 4) between which the speech circulates freely, but nonetheless 5) respects explicitly established rules.

4. Aristotelian dialectic and Hegelian dialectic

Unlike Aristotelian dialectic, Hegelian dialectic does not proceed by the elimination of the false, but by synthesis of the antagonistic positions. The original opposition is not resolved but abolished and transcended. Aristotelian dialectic is founded on the principle of non-contradiction, whereas Hegelian dialectic tends towards something “beyond” contradiction.

Nonetheless, going beyond contradiction should not imply that a speaker may hold an inconsistent discourse:

[HL] claims that “since the world is torn by contradictions, only dialectic (which admits the contradiction) makes it possible to consider it as a whole and to find out its meaning and direction”. In other words, since the world is contradiction, the idea of ​​the world must be contradictory. The idea of ​​a thing must be of the same nature as this thing: The idea of ​​blue must be blue.
Julien Benda, The Betrayal of the Intellectuals, [1927][1]

Conversational dialectic, made up of negotiations and adjustments, enables the opponents to save face, whereas Aristotelian dialectic does not take into account the questions of faces and politeness.

5. Rhetoric and dialectic

According to their ancient definitions, dialectic and rhetoric are the two arts of discourse. Argumentative rhetoric is “the counterpart of dialectic” (Aristotle, Rhet, I). Rhetoric is to public speech what dialectic is to private, conversational speech. Rhetoric concerns long and continuous discourse, whilst dialectic is a technique of discussion between two partners, proceeding by (brief) questions and answers. Fundamentally, dChristianityestions and answers. t, “ews contrary to men’s usual opinins would be sillly most, or by the most notable of thes, pialectic is legislative, it serves the discussion of the a priori foundations which will serve as premises for scientific deduction. Rhetoric has an executive function: it deals with current, public, legal and political affairs, and, with the development of Christianity, religious belief; it strengthens the principles that govern these practices, via epideictic means.

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[1] Quoted after Julien Benda, La Trahison des Clercs. Excerpt from the Preface to the 1946 edition. Paris: Grasset, 1975. P. 63.

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