1. Emotion

1.1 Psychology

From a psychological point of view, emotion is a syndrome, a temporary synthesis of different states:

— A psychic state of consciousness.
— A neurophysiological state, perceptible or not to the subject, such as goose bumps associated with emotions such as fear or pleasure; or the adrenaline rush accompanying rage.
— An altered self-presentation: transformation of facial expression; of body posture; specific attitudes and emergence of actions, such as the flight reaction, characteristic of fear.
— A cognitive state, including a structured representation of reality.

The direction of causality between these components is discussed: common sense considers that the psychic state determines the neurophysiological and attitudinal changes, “he cries because he is sad”, but it can be shown that, if one puts a subject in the physical state corresponding to a particular emotion, he or she experiences this emotion, so, literally “he is sad because he cries” (James, 1884).

1.2 Basic emotions

The emotions listed by Aristotle in the Rhetoric and taken up by the Latin rhetoricians can be considered as the very first set of basic social emotions in the Western world S. Pathos.

Modern philosophers propose their own lists of emotions; for example, Descartes holds that there are only six “simple and primitive” passions, “wonder, love, hatred, desire, joy, and sadness. […] all the others are composed of some of these six or are species of them” ([1649], §69).

Psychologists define basic emotions as universal, independent of languages ​​and cultures. The lists are variable and more or less developed; they generally include fear, anger, disgust, sadness, joy, surprise. Ekman (1999) counts fifteen basic emotions: amusement, anger, contempt, satisfaction, disgust, embarrassment, excitement, fear, guilt, pride in success, relief, sadness – distress, satisfaction, sensory pleasure, and shame.

In theology, the capital sins — pride, envy, anger, sadness (acedia: sloth, depression), avarice, gluttony, lust, can be seen as emotional leakages, considered as sins insofar as they are left uncontrolled.

1.2 Emotions and mood: phasic and thymic

Moods are defined as stable or thymic affective states, whereas emotions are phasic, that is developing in an event structure, according to a bell-shaped curve pattern, S. Calm.

1.3 Emotion and situation

An emotion is related to a situation. Causal theories of emotion analyze the situation as a stimulus mechanically inducing a response, which is the corresponding emotion. This view does not, however, explain the possibility of emotional injunctions and disagreements about emotion (see below). In fact, emotion is linked not to a kind of objective situation, but to a subjective perception of the situation; the stimulus is a situation under a certain description. In other words, the situation perceived as emotional is part of the emotion.

A distinction can be made between experienced emotion and spoken emotion. The relation between these two modes of emotion is analogous to that between time as an extra-linguistic reality, and tense, the shape language gives to time. Rhetorical-argumentative emotions concern emotion-tense, whereas psychology is interested in emotion-time.

2. Arguing emotions

Serious argumentative situations are intrinsically emotional. Contradiction, conflictive or not, disrupts routine beliefs and action plans. So, for example, having to decide what to do introduces tension on the social, cognitive, and emotional levels. The arguer must confront an uncomfortable situation; relations with the other, as well as social statuses are potentially threatened; representations of the world are destabilized, as are the personal identities based on these representations.

2.1 Emotions as issues in argumentative discourse

The situation related to emotion is not a causal source of emotion; when it rains there is no argument as to whether or not one will get wet. This negotiability of emotions is evidenced by the existence of emotional injunctions, such as,

“Time for Outrage!”(Stéphane Hessel)
“A Call to Outrage” (Ignacio Ramonet)
“Indignant? We should be” (Simon Kuper).[1]

In one given situation, there can be huge discrepancies between the emotional states of different people:

S1 — Let us cry, the father of the Nation is dead!
S2 — Let’s rejoice, the tyrant is dead!

S1 -— I’m not afraid!
S2 — You should be.

In the second example, by refusing to align with S1, S2 opens a debate, and must explain why he or she does not agree. S2 must reveal his or her reasons for being afraid, and argue his or her emotion. Reciprocally, S1 is now at risk of being refuted by S2, and left with an inadequate emotion. An emotion is a point of view.

As for argumentation in general, we can distinguish cases where emotion is explicitly argued, and those where the argument is left implicit, and where we are dealing with an orientation towards a particular, unnamed, emotion. In both cases, the point of departure of the emotion is in the participants’ perception of the situation. Ultimately, formatted situation and experienced emotion form a compact whole. Therefore, in order to justify an emotion, one has to give a detailed account of the situation including objective specifications about what happenned and subjective emotional appraisal of the latter. This formatting obeys a relatively simple system of “emotional parameters”, which determine the nature and intensity of the emotion, depending on the more or less predictable and pleasant character of the situation, its origin, its distance, control, norms and values ​​of the experiencer, etc. (Scherer [1984a], p. 107; 1984b).

Aristotle’s Rhetoric presents an excellent description of the thematic structure of speech constructing specific emotions, that is, of the topics of emotion. The book is not about the psychology of emotion but rather a treatise on what discourse can do with emotions and how an emotional social thrust can be monitored, constructed or refuted. The question is not what anger or calm are, but how discourses which are likely to prompt or to calm anger are constructed. That is why, from an argumentative perspective, action predicates should be preferred to substantives where we refer to emotions:

— To anger vs. to cool down the anger;
— To inspire friendship vs. to break the bonds of friendship fueling anger and hatred;
— To frighten vs. to buoy up;
— To shame vs. to despise other’s opinion;
— To be grateful vs. to feel no obligation;
— To pity vs. to be indifferent;
— To kindle rivalry, jealousy, envy vs. to instigate a spirit of competition.

Emotions belong in the field of discursive action. In the Rhetoric, they are defined on the basis of typical scenarios, activated and developed by the speaker. This description of discursive strategies which generate emotion is one of the major achievements of rhetorical argumentative theory.

Anti-oriented discourses construct anti-oriented emotions. Speech alters representations, thus arousing or appeasing, counterbalancing emotions, just as any viewpoint can be fought, turned back, or circumvented. The examples of pity and anger can give an idea of these basic argumentative techniques.

2.2 Pitying and pitiless

Moving to pity — A pities B if he considers that B is the victim of an evil that is not deserved; and if A is well aware that one day he or she may suffer from the same evil (id., 1385b10-15, RR, p. 291). For A to pity B, the distance between A and B must have been calibrated correctly; one feels pity towards people who are similar and close to us. Generally speaking, the “distance” dimension plays an essential role in the construction of emotion, not as an objective metric, but as a cultural, language-built notion. It follows from this description that pity should not be considered an automatic feeling. In particular, those who have nothing to fear for themselves would be insensitive to pity. According to the theory of the moral characters (mores) of the audience, the locally relevant construction of an emotion depends on a good analysis of the audience, S. Ethos. It follows that to directly induce pity, B must show that he or she is suffering, and that he or she does not deserve to be, that the same thing could happen to you, his or her interlocutor, etc., and then, of course, amplify these substantial common places. If pity is constructed according to such parameters, it is justified and judged to be decent and reasonable.

Refuting misplaced pity — Walton has shown along which lines the target can resist pity, in other words, he has shown how to build a discourse against pity, which allows the target to remain calm, insensitive, not to yield to a movement of pity. This discourse is constructed first along a specific “information line”, about the situation. It is then subjected to a relevance condition, pity can only be appealed to if the domain admits of personal involvement. For example, scientific discourse, excluding ordinary subjectivity, does not allow appeals to pity, which will then be deemed “irrelevant” (Walton 1992, p. 27)

When relevant, the appeal to pity routinely functions in the general conflict of pro and contra arguments, concerning personal involvement. In the case of dismissed workers, for example, the appeal to pity (ad misericordiam) confronts the need to preserve the interests of shareholders (ad pecuniam vs. ad misericordiam), to place the company in a good position in the market (ad rivalitatem vs. ad misericordiam), or to preserve the jobs of other employees of the company (ad misericordiam vs. ad misericordiam).

2.3 Anger: getting angry and calming down

Argumentation theory has glorified appeal to pity with a Latin name, ad misericordiam. Actually, from an argumentative point of view, there is no reason to set pity apart from other emotions. All should be given the same lexical consideration, particularly the appeal to anger, ad iram, a highly argued and argumentative emotion.

Causing anger — Anger is a basic rhetorical emotion. When willing to cause the public anger, the speaker will develop his or her righteous indignation or holy anger, and will adopt a virtuous ethos. From the same virtuous posture, the opponent will denounce rage, fury and hatred, S. Pathos.

Discursive representations play an essential role in these oppositions. To make A angry with B, the speaker has to show to his or her interlocutor A that:

— B baffles, offends, mocks A; B makes an obstacle to A‘s plans, wishes, and takes pleasure in it.
— A suffers and seeks revenge by harming B.
— A fantasizes a vengeance, and enjoys it.

These are the basic lines of inflammatory speeches. It should be noted that anger is not an atomic emotion, a crude response to the bite of a stimulus, but the complex result of an aggregate of emotions such as humiliation, contempt and even pleasure. The rationality or morality of anger depends on the proper construction of this feeling of injustice. Anger can be fully virtuous, rational and emotional, if these distinctions have any meaning here.

Anger triggers the mechanisms of revenge. In a typical serial episode, anger constructed and justified in the first sequence, is turned, into an argument for subsequent action.

Anger is not hatred; anger can be rationally justified, hatred cannot; there is no acceptable reason for hate. From a religious point of view, hate speech is a sin “love, at least patiently bear one another!”. The status of hate speech serves as an example of how social evaluation is achieved. Any citizen can legitimately comment on and take stock of anger speech, outrage speech and hate speech. Politicians and judges have the authority to make judgments about such issues. They may of course also draw on the assistance of other parties that they consider helpful, anthropologists, moralists, and, of course, linguists and logicians.

From anger back to serenity — In order to calm down an enraged A, B‘s advocate will develop a soothing discourse concluding that A‘s expression of anger is poorly worded and badly constructed, and that this anger is unreasonable. He or she will argue that B’s behavior was not contemptuous, mocking, abusive, or outrageous. It rather the case that B has been misunderstood; he or she was joking; the intention was not hostile; B behaves like this with people that he or she loves; B repents, and offers excuses, compensations; B has already been punished, etc. — and the soothing discourse will conclude that all that happened a long time ago, and that the situation has changed, S. Kettle

[1] — Stéphane Hessel (2011). Time for Outrage! London: Charles Glass Books.
— Ignacio Ramonet (2011). Quoted after http://www.ipsnews.net/2011/02/a-call-to-outrage/(11-08-2017)
— Simon Kuper (2011). Quoted after https://www.ft.com/content/280c9816-192c-11e0-9311-00144feab49a?mhq5j=e1 (11-08-2017)

Dialectics and dialogue have the same Greek etymology dia- + legein, dia- “through”, legein “say”. The prefix dia- is different from the prefix di– meaning “two”. Etymologically, a dialogue is not a two-person conversation (which could be referred to as a dilogue). The condition is not on the number of participants, but on discourse circulation. However, the historical notion of dialectic does refer to a two-partner dialogue.

1. The ancient dialectical method

Aristotelian dialectic is a dialogical method used to solve questions of the form “P or not P?”, such as “is being rich a good thing or not?”, by eliminating one of the options, in a standardized question-answer interaction using dialectical syllogisms.

Dialectic is a philosophical instrument used in the a priori search for the definition of fundamental concepts. In this function of clarification of the first principles, it has been replaced by axiomatization.

1.1 Dialectical reasoning

As “mathematical science” and “rhetorical argument”, “dialectical reasoning” proceeds by syllogism and induction (Aristotle, Post. An., I, 1). While scientific syllogistic deduction proceeds from “true and primary” premises, dialectic uses generally accepted premises (Top. I, 1), or simple “opinions”, endoxon:

Our treatise proposes to find a line of inquiry whereby we shall
be able to reason from opinions that are generally accepted about
every problem propounded to us, and also shall ourselves, when standing up to an argument, avoid saying anything that will obstruct us. (Ibid.)

The word endoxa translates as “probable premises” or as “accepted ideas”. The strict deduction rules of the syllogism are replaced by argument schemes.

1.2 Dialectical game

The dialectical game is played by two partners, the Respondent and the Questioner (Brunschwig 1967, p. 29). It is a bounded interaction governed by strict rules, proceeding by questions and answers, with a winner and a loser. The Respondent first chooses to assert either P or not P. The Questioner must refute the proposition that the Respondent has chosen to support, by means of total questions (yes or no questions). On the basis of these answers, the Questioner attempts to make the Respondent admit a statement which contradicts the original assertion. If the Questioner succeeds, then he or she will win the dialectical game; if he or she fails, the Respondent will win.

The terms Proponent and Opponent used to refer to the core partners of an argumentative situation, are borrowed from this dialectical theory. Unlike the Proponent of a substantial proposition in an argumentative situation, the Respondent in the dialectical game does not have to build a positive proof of the proposition put forward, but must simply avoid being led into a self-contradiction.

1.3 Dialectical authority

To be worthy of a dialectical debate, the proposition must be an endoxon, that is to say, it must be endorsed by some social or intellectual authority:

Now a dialectical proposition consists in asking something that is held by all men or by most men or by philosophers, i.e., either by all, or by most, or by the most notable of these. (Top., 10)

The Aristotelian continuum values different orders of endoxa. We are far from the vision of the doxa as cliché or stereotype as “ready-to-think”, or, just as mechanically, “ready-to-denounce”.

Endoxa are opinions worthy of discussion. They define a contrario what a thesis as “a supposition of some eminent philosopher that conflicts with the general opinion”; the philosopher must be eminent, “for to take notice when any ordinary person expresses views contrary to men’s usual opinions would be silly” (Aristotle, Top., I, 11). In other words, “if it were the first comer who emitted paradoxes, it would be absurd to pay attention to it” (Aristotle, Top., Brunschwig, I, 1, 100b20, p.17). The authority entering the debate is clearly socially referenced as such.

It is remarkable to see that it is the plurality and competition between authorities — rather than the call to authority — which is placed at the core of intellectual debate. Authority is not invoked in order to close the discussion but rather to open it. To say that a proposal is supported by an authority is not to say that it is true, but to say that it deserves discussion.

2. The scholastic dispute

The scholastic dispute (disputatio) corresponds to the medieval practice of a dialectical game. It is an instrument of research and teaching, based upon a specific substantial question, as proposed by a master. At the end of the discussion, the master proposes a solution and refutes the arguments against it (Weijers 1999).

3. The revival of dialectic

The ancient dialectical method, which had been declining since the Renaissance (Ong 1958), was reconstructed in the second half of the twentieth century within the framework of logical dialogue games. It has been put at the forefront of argumentation studies by the Pragma-Dialectic and by the Informal Logic programs. The Pragma-Dialectic program of Frans van Eemeren and Rob Grootendorst (1996, etc.) is a “New Dialectic”, a counterpart of Perelman’s “New Rhetoric” (van Eemeren, Grootendorst, 1996 “La Nouvelle Dialectique” [“The New Dialectic”]). In the Informal Logic framework, the study of “logical dialogue games” has been developed by Douglas Walton (Walton 1984; Walton 1998, The New Dialectic).

In a continuation of a general definition of dialectic as, “the practice of reasoned dialogue, [the art] of arguing by questions and answers” (Brunschwig 1967, p. 10), one can consider that the conversational process is “dialectized” insofar as 1) it relates to a specific and mutually agreed problem; 2) it is played out between equal partners, 3) driven by the search for the truth, the just or the common good; 4) between which the speech circulates freely, but nonetheless 5) respects explicitly established rules.

4. Aristotelian dialectic and Hegelian dialectic

Unlike Aristotelian dialectic, Hegelian dialectic does not proceed by the elimination of the false, but by synthesis of the antagonistic positions. The original opposition is not resolved but abolished and transcended. Aristotelian dialectic is founded on the principle of non-contradiction, whereas Hegelian dialectic tends towards something “beyond” contradiction.

Nonetheless, going beyond contradiction should not imply that a speaker may hold an inconsistent discourse:

[HL] claims that “since the world is torn by contradictions, only dialectic (which admits the contradiction) makes it possible to consider it as a whole and to find out its meaning and direction”. In other words, since the world is contradiction, the idea of ​​the world must be contradictory. The idea of ​​a thing must be of the same nature as this thing: The idea of ​​blue must be blue.
Julien Benda, The Betrayal of the Intellectuals, [1927][1]

Conversational dialectic, made up of negotiations and adjustments, enables the opponents to save face, whereas Aristotelian dialectic does not take into account the questions of faces and politeness.

5. Rhetoric and dialectic

According to their ancient definitions, dialectic and rhetoric are the two arts of discourse. Argumentative rhetoric is “the counterpart of dialectic” (Aristotle, Rhet, I). Rhetoric is to public speech what dialectic is to private, conversational speech. Rhetoric concerns long and continuous discourse, whilst dialectic is a technique of discussion between two partners, proceeding by (brief) questions and answers. Fundamentally, dChristianityestions and answers. t, “ews contrary to men’s usual opinins would be sillly most, or by the most notable of thes, pialectic is legislative, it serves the discussion of the a priori foundations which will serve as premises for scientific deduction. Rhetoric has an executive function: it deals with current, public, legal and political affairs, and, with the development of Christianity, religious belief; it strengthens the principles that govern these practices, via epideictic means.

[1] Quoted after Julien Benda, La Trahison des Clercs. Excerpt from the Preface to the 1946 edition. Paris: Grasset, 1975. P. 63.

The word doxa is modeled on an ancient Greek word, meaning “opinion, reputation, what is said of things or people”. The doxa corresponds to a set of socially predominant, fuzzy, sometimes contradictory, representations, considered in their current linguistic formulation. The word shares the deprecating meaning of cliché or commonplace; it may be given the meaning of “ideology” or “dogma”, particularly when it is called into question (Amossy 1991, Nicolas 2007). Its derived adjective is doxic (or doxical).

Aristotle defines the endoxa (sg. endoxon) as the common opinions of a community, used in dialectical and rhetorical reasoning:

Those opinions are ‘generally accepted’ which are accepted by everyone or by the majority or by the philosophers, i.e., by all, or by the majority, or by the most notable and illustrious of them. (Aristotle, Top., I, 1)

An endoxic idea is therefore an idea based on a form of social authority, ranging from the authority of common people as a group, to that of the wise (S. Dialectic), according to a gradation ranging from the purely quantitative to the qualitative, from the opinion of the human (the universal consensus) to the authority of the enlightened opinion.

Thus, endoxic is an antonym of paradoxic, paradoxical. Latin translates the adjective derived endoxos “endoxic” by probabilis, “probable”.

The endoxa is the target of philosophical criticism addressed to common sense and common opinion. This criticism extends to conclusions based on the endoxon – inferential topic system, used in dialectic and rhetoric. Yet, to say of a proposition that it is endoxic, is not pejorative:

It is well known that Aristotle confides, under conditions of scrutiny, in the collective representations and the natural vocation of mankind toward truth. (Brunschwig, Preface to Aristotle, Top., p. xxv)

Rhetoric and dialectic are based on endoxa: dialectical arguments test the endoxa, and rhetorical argument exploits them, pro and contra, in the context of a particular conflict.

In a judicial situation, the salient doxic elements, without being taken as true, may determine who bears the burden of proof, in other words, it determines who is at first sight, the object of suspicion, who is accused by the rumor, S. Common place.

Argument schemes relying on the authority of the doxa:

— Appeal to common belief, S. Authority.
— Appeal to the feeling of the crowd, S. Ad populum.

Doubt is a mental state and a behavior typically attached to an argumentative situation.

— As a psychological state, doubt means discomfort and apprehension, S. Emotion. Argumentation is a costly and time-consuming activity, from the cognitive, emotional and interactional points of view. Non-argumentative individuals are reluctant to engage in an argumentative situation, where they will have to face the resistance of the other party.

— At the cognitive level, to doubt is to be in a state of suspended assent of a proposition, or a state of indecision about what to do.

— From a linguistic point of view, doubtful propositions are worded by the speaker, without these being asserted or rejected. In Goffman’s words, the speaker is, at most, the “Author” of the proposition, not its “Principal”; he or she is not committed to the statement, S. Roles.

— From an interactional point of view, doubt is cast upon a turn of speech when this turn is not ratified or overtly rejected by the interlocutor, S. Disagreement; Question. Such rejection cannot remain unfounded and reservations must be justified, either in the addition of arguments supporting another point of view, or by refuting the reasons given in support of the original proposal.

— In a full-blown argumentative situation, one or the other party does not necessarily assume doubt. A party may be absolutely and entirely confident of the truth of his or her argument, and argue that P is the case or the right thing to do in perfectly good faith, whilst the other party will have no doubt that it is not the case. Doubt is systematically taken in charge by the third party.

The dialogue outsources these different operations by giving them specific linguistic shapes and micro-social configurations.

Argumentative doubt, Cartesian doubt, skeptical doubt

Argumentative doubt is opposed to Cartesian doubt. Descartes rejects “all such merely probable knowledge and makes it a rule to trust only what is completely known and incapable of being doubted” ([1628], Rule II; Geach). He reconstructs a system of certain beliefs on the basis of the only absolute certainty, that of the cogito: “I think, therefore I am”. This kind of doubt is opposed to skeptical doubt:

Cartesian doubt does not consist in floating, uncertain, between affirmation and negation. On the contrary, it clearly demonstrates that what is in doubt is false, or insufficiently self-evident, and so cannot be asserted to be true. Skeptic doubt considers uncertainty to be the normal state of thought, whereas Descartes regards it as a disease he wants to cure. Even when he takes up the Skeptics’ arguments, it is in a spirit quite opposite to theirs. (Gilson, Note 1, p. 85. to Descartes [1637])

Argumentative doubt is opposed to skeptical doubt in that it does not privilege the indefinite suspension of assent over resolution of dispute.

The concept of dissociation was introduced by Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca. According to the Treatise, the techniques of argumentation are of two kinds “association and dissociation” ([1958], p. 190). The former of these concerns two or more propositions, making up an argumentation, while the latter operates on a single concept. The dissociation technique is thus placed on a par with association techniques as a whole, that is, the large set of argument schemes.

Dissociation is defined as the splitting of the meaning of a word or a concept, to avoid a contradiction. The meaning of the problematic term T is re-framed as containing an internal contradiction, “an incompatibility”, “an antinomy”, and dissociation is the mechanism by which it can be solved ([1958], 550-609). T is split into a term T₁ and a term T₂, this operation coming with a negative evaluation of T₁ and a positive evaluation of T₂. Dissociation appears as a kind of “semantic cleansing”, through which an unwanted content or connotation, T₁, can be disposed of. The word reality can thus be divided, “dissociated”, into the pair T₁ = appearance vs. T₂= reality, the latter being “the true reality”.

While the primitive status of what is given as the starting point of dissociation is undecided and indeterminate, the dissociation in terms I and II will value the aspects corresponding to term II and will devalue the aspects that oppose it. Term I, the appearance, in the narrow sense of this word, is only illusion and error. (Perelman 1977, p. 141)

Dissociation can operate in a monologue or a dialogue:

X: — Well old chap, that’s democracy!
Y: — There is democracy and democracy.

According to Perelman, the dissociation technique is, “hardly mentioned by traditional rhetoric, for it is especially important for the analysis of systematic philosophical thought as systematic” (1977, p. 139). An example is taken from Kant, for whom natural sciences postulate a universal determinism while morality postulates the liberty of the individual; hence the necessity of dissociating the Term reality, a confused notion, into a phenomenal reality, in which determinism reigns, and a noumenal reality where the individual can freely choose and act upon his or her decision. In that case, dissociation is equivalent to a conceptual distinguo, but without a preferred term.

It seems to follow from the examples given above that the same notion can be dissociated according to the arguer’s objectives, dissociation being the key operation to derive a concept from the ordinary meaning of a word.

1. Linguistic aspects of dissociation

Reasoning through dissociation is characterized first of all by the opposition between appearance and reality. This can be applied to any notion, as soon as one makes use of the adjectives such as apparent, illusory on the one hand, real, true on the other. To use an expression such as apparent peace or genuine democracy is to indicate the absence of genuine peace, or the presence of an apparent democracy: one of these adjectives refers to the other. (Id., p. 147)
The linguistic markers of dissociations are very diverse:

A prefix such as pseudo- (pseudo-atheist), quasi– not– the adjective alleged, the use of quotes indicate that we are dealing with the term I, while the capital letter (Being), the definite article (the solution), the adjective unique or true denote a term II. (Id., p. 148)

Other dissociations are stabilized as pairs of antithetical terms or “philosophical pairs” such as “opinion / science; sense knowledge / rational knowledge; body / soul; just / legal, etc.” (Perelman [1958], 563). Some of these dissociated pairs are traditional and constitute the oppositions generating foundational ideological discourses. As for all antonymic pairs, one term is linguistically preferred to the other, and this preference can be reversed. The T₁ vs. T₂ opposition “superficial vs. deep” can be reversed through a praise of the superficial — “the skin is the deepest thing there is” (Paul Valéry). The dissociated pair, “rhetoric vs. argumentation” is engaged in a permanently revolving evaluation.

2. Dissociation as a shielding operation

Dissociation has a concessive facet. For example, one might assume that some intellectuals would make good businessmen, while conceding that they are only a tiny minority. Dissociation does the same, but via an outright exclusion of this sub-category from the general category, “intellectuals”:

(1)    S1    — When it comes to business, intellectuals are hopeless
         S2    — Or they are not true intellectuals.

(2)    S1_1     — Germans drink beer.
        S2        — Not Hans!
        S1_2     — Normal, Hans is not a true German.

In (2) S2 refutes S1₁ by the production of a contrary case. S1₂ recognizes that Hans is German and does not drink beer, and maintains his original claim by splitting the category “German” into “true Germans vs. not true Germans”. This amendment to the argument may or may not be substantiated; S1 might have replied:

S1_3      — But Hans is not a real German, he was brought up in the United States

— Assuming that Americans drink less beer than Germans do. S1_3 introduces a justificatory line showing that Hans departs from the stereotype of the true German; the category created by S1_3 is based upon an explicit criterion, independent of the current discussion. In the original dialogue, the only criterion contextually available is “beer-drinking”. The word Germans in S1 refers to all German people; if Germans are re-defined as true Germans on the basis of the criterion, “Germans who drink beer”, the statement S1₁ is indeed compelling, since “Germans who drink beer” do drink beer.

The category rectification serves to exclude individuals from the category under re-analysis. In politics, this strategy opposes the, “true Syldavian” as good citizens to exclude other citizens as, “bad citizens”. In practice, dissociation transforms a formerly necessary and sufficient condition (to be a Syldavian one must be a Syldavian citizen) into a necessary one, ​​“to be a true Syldavian, one must have Syldavian nationality and share our ideology”.

The following case opposes “La Réunion”[1], that is “the people living in La Réunion”, to “the true Réunion”, an ad hoc subcategory of this group.

Roland Sicard (RS) is the host of the TV program. Marine Le Pen is the candidate for the National Front (“Front National”, a far right party) in the 2012 French presidential election. Gilbert Collard (GC) is a lawyer, chairman of her Supporting Committee.
RS   — good morning Gibert Collard […] er- a word about Marine Le Pen’s trip to La Réunion\ she has been heckled, one feels that the candidates of the National Front is still in a lot of trouble overseas/
GC   — listen I know La Réunion very well since I went there as a lawyer very often and then in particularly sensitive cases and— there are: er two Réunions eh there is a Réunion which is instrumentalized which organizes the usual reception committee for Marine Le Pen they are quite unsignificant eh\ well and then there is the true Réunion made of men with divergent views of— women with opi— but that is no more difficult in the overseas departements than in metropolitan France anyway\ no I do not think what makes it difficult is the instrumentalization of the media hmm […]
TV program [Home Truths] France 2, 08 Feb., 2012.[2]

S. Opposite words; Categorization; Orientation

[1] The Réunion Island is an overseas French department, East of Madagascar.
[2] TV program Les Quatre Vérités France 2. Feb. 8, 2012.

When applied to discourse, dismissal is a method of processing out the opponent’s discourse, on the brink of refutation and destruction.

1. Dismissal as the concluding stage of refutation

An argument can be dismissed after due consideration. In that case, dismissal is the last step of a conclusive refutation.
The standard forms of refutation are based on a substantial examination of the content of the rejected speech, or on more or less relevant considerations about the person holding it. Even in the latter case, the rejection is, however badly argued, at least backed by some justificatory discourse.

2. Dismissal without consideration of the dismissed argument
(ad lapidem)

The opponent can dismiss a discourse simply by declaring that the bad quality of the proposed argument is self-evident and self-denouncing:

No comment.
Your arguments are shabby, insufficient, miserable, distressing
I will not give your statement the honor of a refutation.
What you say is not even false.

Uncle Toby’s reaction, “whistling half a dozen bars of Lillabullero”, is a case of such reaction “when any thing, which he deem’d very absurd, was offerd”,  S. Ab –, ad –, ex –.

In ancient rhetoric, this move declaring the argument to be “childish” or “obviously absurd or practically null”, is called apodioxis, (Dupriez 1984, Apodioxis; Molinié 1992, Apodioxis), S. Pathetic argument.

The opponent can dismiss an argument as self-refuting in perfectly good faith, which can lead to paradoxical situations. If the discourse of Big Jones is really self-denouncing, then:

One should give Big Jones a greater say, the more he speaks, the more foolish he appears, the fewer votes he will get.

But this is a perilous strategy, inspired more by the arguer’s self-confidence than by any self-evidence about the discourse.

To top it all off, the opponent may adopt a strategy of irony, and contribute to the dissemination of the opponent’s speech. This is the extraordinary case reported by Wayne Booth about events taking place in his university, where students were clashing with their University administration:

At one point, things got so bad that each side found itself reduplicating broadsides produced by the other side, and distributing them, in thousands of copies, without comment; to each side it seemed as if the other side’s rhetoric was self-damning, so absurd had it become. (Booth 1974, p. 8-9)

S. also Dismissal (Companion

Obviously, the other side cannot even hear such a disqualification, which targets third parties. Used in particularly contentious argumentative situations, such a maneuver makes any deal between the discussants impossible, S. Conditions of discussion.

From the ethotic perspective, such a (non-) arguer displays a kind of moral indignation, whereas the opponent can accuse her of arrogance and contempt.

Ad lapidem argument (Lat. lapis, “stone”)

The name of this argument is derived from a famous incident in which Dr. Samuel Johnson claimed to disprove Bishop Berkeley’s immaterialist philosophy (that there are no material objects, only minds and ideas in those minds) by kicking a large stone and asserting ‘I refute it thus’ (after Wikipedia, Ad lapidem).

This clear contempt of verbal argument is akin to “the proof of the pudding is in the eating”, a practical proof by facts and action.

1. Preference for agreement

Argument is a means of deriving a new consensus from an established consensus, S. Agreement; Persuasion. Such a construction can be seen as the “macro” expression of a trend observable at the “micro” level of the interactional sequence, preference for agreement. This concept is fundamental for the organization of turns of speech in interaction.

In an adjacency pair, the first turn “prefers”, i.e., is oriented towards a specific kind of second turn. The preferred response to an invitation is acceptance, rather than refusal; proposals are made to be accepted and not rejected; affirmations are put forward to be ratified, not to be rejected, etc.
The preferred sequence is unmarked; the second speaker aligns with the first; agreement is a given, a minimal linguistic mark may suffice: (yes, OK, let’s go…), or a quasi-verbal ratification (mm hm) or a minimal bodily action (nodding).
The preference for agreement is also reflected in practices such as the avoidance of frontal opposition, the absence of ratification of emerging disagreements and the preference for micro-adjustments to reach an agreement without explicitly bringing up the disagreement for an overt discussion.

The dispreferred sequence is marked, that is to say, it contains specific features such as hesitation, presence of pre-turns (underlined in S2_2) and justifications (bold characters in S2_2):

S1_1 — What are you doing tonight?
S2_1 — Well I don’t know …
S1_2 — Come for a drink!
S2_2 — (silence) hmm, well, you know, I’d prefer not to, I have got a little work to do.

Giving reasons for accepting an invitation is almost an offense:

S1 — Come to dinner tomorrow night!
S2 — With pleasure, it’ll mean I won’t have to cook, and I will take down the trash.

This preference for agreement is not a psychological fact, but an observational conversational regularity. It can be compared with Grice’s principle of co-operation, or with Ducrot’s observations on the polemical effect produced by second turns which do not accept the presuppositions of the first turn, S. Presupposition.

2. Conversational divergences and overt arguments

Face to face disagreement is expressed by a series of specific coordinated behaviors, either verbal “I don’t agree”, or paraverbal: fights for the floor; interruptions; non collaborative overlappings; accelerated speech flows; raised voices; negative regulators, heads shaking, sighs, agitation — or ironic excesses of signs of approval; non-addressed partner behavior, etc.

Sequences of conversational divergence appear randomly; they follow unforeseen patterns; they have a potentially negative impact on the goals of the overall interaction; they introduce a delicate balance between somehow sacrificing one specific vision of things to maintain good relations with the other party; or taking the risk of damaging the relationship to maintain and sharpen extreme difference of opinion. In the majority of cases, conversational disagreements are resolved immediately, through step-by-step micro-adjustments and negotiation, to be forgotten.

At other times, conversational divergences serves to deepen differences. When conversational divergences are explained and disagreement ratified, each position backed by arguments and counter-arguments, the interaction becomes strongly argumentative. Such interactions can be momentous, kept in mind, ruminated upon and elaborated. They may generate new interactions, referring to the root disagreement, where the parties will develop planned interventions. The treatment of what has become an issue is now the rationale of these interactions.

3. Enantiosis: emerging argumentation

The argumentative role of an opponent may develop from his or her interactional role as a listener, ratifying the existence of an argumentative situation, where two discourses concerning the same topic are in explicit competition.

During a friendly conversation at a party, between people who barely know each other:
S1 — if we watch the TV candidates debate together tonight, maybe we should know something about each other, personally I vote for candidate Smith.
S2 — oh, well, for me it’s not quite so…

Before this exchange, S2 is simply the interlocutor of S1. During the exchange, a political divergence emerges, which initiates a restructuring of the interaction, that can lead to a re-framing of the interlocutors as political antagonists. A full-blown argumentative situation can develop from that point, depending on whether or not the subsequent turns will thematize the emerging opposition.

The figure of rhetoric called enantiosis seems particularly well suited to designate this transitional moment, where opposition is looming large without yet being ratified by the participants. The Greek adjective [enantios] can mean:

1. 1. Being in front of, such as shores that face each other; things that are offered to the gaze of somebody.
   2. With an orientation towards ​​hostility, which stands in front of: “those in front of us”, that is the enemy; in general, the opposing party, the adversary.
   3. Opposed, contrary to: the opposite party, the opponent (after Bailly, [enantios]).

According to this development of meaning, in a dialogue, the adjective enantios refers first to the person standing here, in front of you, for example, in the interlocutor’s position. The idea of ​​hostility appears in a second instance, and then the interlocutor becomes the opponent (the “adversarius” in a rhetorical encounter, Lausberg [1960], §274).

The word enantiosis is also used as a synonym of “antithesis”, and can refer to oppositions such as “good vs. bad; even vs. odd”; one vs. multiple” (Dupriez 1984, Énantiose). This kind of binary opposition is characteristic of the sometimes Manichaean diptych corresponding to antagonistic argumentation. The semantic palette of enantiosis covers the dynamics of this emergence and the initial stabilization of the argumentative situation:

4. “Deep disagreement”

S. Dissensus

A dilemma is a schematization of a situation as an alternative whose terms are equally undesirable. Used as an argumentative strategy, the dilemma corresponds to a case-by-case refutation, consisting in cornering one’s opponent by showing that all his or her lines of defense lead to the same negative conclusion:

Either you were aware of what was going on in your services, and you are an accomplice, at least passively, of what has happened, and you must resign. Or you were not aware, then you do not control your services, and you must resign. Either way, you will have to resign.

A dilemma can be rejected as poorly built, as a false dilemma, an artificial radicalization of a more complex opposition, which can be reconstructed in order to show that there is a third way out of the dilemma, S. Case-by-case.

If I have clear and strong support from the citizens to remain in office, the future of the new Republic will be secured. If not, there can be no doubt that it [the new Republic] will immediately collapse and that France will have to endure, this time without remedy, a confusion of the State even more disastrous than that which it once knew.
Charles de Gaulle, 4 Nov. 1965 Speech, announcing his candidacy for the December 1965 presidential election[1]

This relatively common practice of framing the political situation can be rephrased as the slogan “it’s either me or chaos”. A supporter of the speaker will take this statement as offering a realistic clear-cut choice between good and evil. An opponent will reject it as an arrogant and inadequate means of pressure. Undecided citizens may see it as the expression of a real dilemma, a choice to make between two equally undesirable options.

[1] http://fresques.ina.fr/jalons/fiche-media/InaEdu00101/de-gaulle-Fact-de-candidature-en-1965.html] (11-08-2017). The last phrase alludes to the June 1940 military rout.

The argumentative forms of rebuttal are based upon what is said, that is to say upon a critical examination of the content of the rejected speech, of its relevance to the current issue, or upon considerations related to the person who holds it. Good or bad, the refutations are explicitly argued.
Argumentative discourse, as any discourse, can be put under attack, either by such an argued refutative discourse or through more radical, linguistic or non-linguistic coups. Speech destruction tries to impair, cancel, exclude, the targeted speech; to make nonsense of what it says, leaving it devoid of substance and import; to make it unbearable, untenable, repulsive — and, first of all, to make it innocuous, to ensure that it will have no practical impact upon the group.

1. Discourse destruction and freedom of expression

In view of their material exclusion from the public sphere, argued beliefs and proposals can be neutralized by the legal prohibition of their expression, and the imprisonment of the opponents. This can be seen as attacks on freedom of expression; nonetheless, many democratic countries agree to prohibit by law hate speech as an incitement to crime.
Free expression can also be hindered by popular demonstrations, thus making public expression inaudible, by means of shouting, blowing horns, etc.

2. Destruction through interactional behavior

In ordinary face-to-face situations, discourse can be destroyed by non-verbal interactional maneuvers, the most radical being the refusal to listen, and let the others listen, the discourse of the other. Agreement is manifested by various phenomena of ratification, and, conversely, a simple lack of ratification, the inertia of the partner, may induce the speaker to withdraw the speech, S. Disagreement.

The following interaction takes place in a high school physics lab. The lesson is on the notion of force, and exploits a small device, a stone suspended from a gallows.[1] The two male students F and G are working in pair. The question asked by the teacher is:

What are the objects that act on the stone?

Puzzled, the two students look at the teacher. Then, still addressing the class, she adds:

Well, I took an object in the most general sense that is to say, all that can act on the stone er: visibly or invisibly if— well\

Then, student F immediately answers the teacher’s question, addressing his partner:

Well the air/ the air/ … the air it acts the air when you do that the air\

After an interruption, F resumes his argumentation, waving vigorously his arm up – down – up, intensely addressing his partner (simplified transcription):

When you do that there will be air afterwards since y’know when you make a fast movement like that\ it is the same there is the air\ I’m sure\ but here for now we do not answer that yet but/

Then student G, playing with the stone, says:

There is the attraction\

F‘s argument is perfectly in line with Toulmin’s model of argument. The claim is “the air [acts upon the stone]”. It is supported by an appeal to analogy, “it’s the same”, referring to an arguing ad hoc gestures, mimicking and emphasizing some self-evident fact. The conclusion is duly emphatically modalized, “I’m sure” — and immediately withdrawn: “but for now we do not answer that yet”. In view of this strongly asserted argument, this withdrawal is quite unexpected. It is understandable only in view of the interactional behavior of the conversation partner G, who stares at the stone and gives no sign of ratification throughout, not even signaling that he is listening to F‘s argument (with whom he gets on very well, as shown by their following fully collaborative exchanges).

3. Rejecting the expression

An embarrassing discourse can be destroyed through a criticism focusing upon the style and expression of the opponent without taking into consideration the argument itself. The reply “I don’t agree” actually demonstrates a high level of cooperation.
Ancient rhetoric enumerates a trio of major linguistic qualities of discourse, quality of language, clarity and vivacity of expression (respectively latinitas, perspicuitas and ornatus). Destruction strategies can develop out of any of these points.

3.1 Quality of the language

“You are hardly understandable, you don’t even know the language you pretend to speak, you use dialect expressions you should try to speak classical Syldavian”. In a polemical situation, the opponent can reject a priori a discourse arguing from its grammatical defects. It would be wrong to think that these strategies are marginal or ineffective:

In an uncertain spelling, Mrs. X challenges the evaluation of her language skills by the jury of the competition.

Mrs. X failed her exam about her language skills. Now, she disputes the jury’s decision, and the jury answers mentioning the “uncertain spelling” of her complaint letter. Stricto sensu, these misspellings do not prove that her exam paper was also misspelled, but can certainly be used as a suggestion to that effect. In any case it justifies a charge for neglect, showing a disregard for the jury, which is enough to devaluate the significance of her complaint.

3.2 Clarity and vivacity of the expression

Similar devastating strategies appeal to the lack of clarity of expression: “the presentation was unclear and confusing”, or vivacity “so boring!”.

It is of course better for an argumentative speech to be grammatically correct, clear and interesting. On the other hand, it is human nature to consider correct, clear, and interesting the speeches with which one agrees. This is not just a psychological or bad faith issue; it has a cognitive relevance. The discourse with which one agrees is better known; its deep principles being well accepted, it is easier to recover the ellipsed contents and the missing links; its variations are better tolerated; it is better memorized, etc. When it comes to an opponent’s discourse, it is relatively natural to translate as speech defects the corresponding difficulties, and to conclude by denying that the minimum conditions of mutual comprehension are satisfied.

Making fun and puns out of the opponent’s discourse, is a popular way to get rid of the problems and arguments defended S. Laughter and Seriousness; Orientation Reversal

4. Leaving aside the argumentative details

A class of refutative maneuvers refers to the opponent’s discourse without considering its argumentative details, for example:

— Declaring the discourse sub-argumentative, unworthy of a refutation, S. Dismissal.
— Misrepresenting the argument, S. Resumption of speech.

5. Disqualifying the arguer

Personal attacks against the speaker set aside the argument and try to disqualify the arguer.

For other forms on the verge of destruction and propositional refutation, S. Refutation

[1] Example taken from the VISA database: https://visa-video.ens-lyon.fr/visa-web/ (09-20-2017).

1. Argumentations based on word derivation

A derived word is a word formed on a base or a stem word combined with a prefix or a suffix. A derivational family is made up of all the words derived from the same root or base word.

The argument based on derivatives uses this mechanism of morphological derivation. As the signifier of the root word is found in the derived word, one may think that the meaning of the root word is also transferred to the derivative, which is not necessarily the case. The president of a rather powerless commission of conciliation addressed his fellow members of this commission as commissioners; this clever label gives him and his colleagues the authority associated with the word (police) commissioner and some superiority over the people who appeal to the commission.

The argumentation by derivative exploits a sense of semantic obviousness arising from the morphological similarity between words belonging to the same derivational family, which produces a statement apparently impossible to deny, because true by virtue of its seeming analytical form, “A is A”:

I am human, nothing human is foreign to me

This famous speech made by General de Gaulle uses such self-argued statements, S. Self-argued Claim

As for the legislative elections, they will take place within the period established by the Constitution, unless the whole French people are to be gagged, preventing them from speaking as they are prevented from living, by the same means that prevent students from studying, teachers from teaching and workers from working. (Charles de Gaulle, Speech on May 30, 1968[1])

In a well-made world, “students study, teachers teach and workers work” if not, the semantic disorder argues the abnormality of beings who don’t act according to their essential principle.

These self-evident arguments are based on a license to infer according to which the derivational families are semantically consistent. The morphological similarity may obscure deep semantic differences between the root word and the derived word, which meaning may range from the conservation of the root meaning, to opposition between their connotations or argumentative orientations, to the complete independence of meanings in synchrony. By a kind of antanaclasis S. Orientation Reversal, §1, the following exchange plays on the opposite argumentative orientations of words belonging to the same lexical family, politic:

S1 — By signing this compromise at a convenient moment, the president made a highly political decision.
S2 — We are just witnessing a new example of the President’s usual politicking

The French present participle-adjective aliénant, “alienating”, and the past participle-adjective aliéné, “alienated”, derive morphologically from the verb aliéner, “alienate”, but have two different meanings. Aliénant refers to socio-political conditions whilst aliéné refers to severe mental conditions. In the following case, the speaker rebuts a social claim by aligning the former on the latter:

If you find your work alienating [Fr. aliénant], then we will direct you to an asylum [Fr. asile d’aliénés].

Arguments based on word derivations are strictly dependent on the linguistic structure of the specific language considered.

Rebuttal — The argument by derivation can be rejected as a fallacy of form of expression. The identity of the visible forms of the derivative word with its base word suggests that their meanings are the same; but this supposition is misleading, S. Expression. They are therefore refuted as “plays on words” by highlighting the differences in meaning between root word and derived word. In turn, this rebuttal will be rejected as “semantic nitpicking”.

2. Other designations and related forms

Topic of related words

Cicero considers the same argumentative device under the label topic of related terms (coniugata), that is “arguments based on words of the same family”; related terms are terms such as “wise, wisely, wisdom” (Top., III, 12, p. 391):

If a field is “common” (compascuus), it is legal to use it as a common pasture (compascere). (Ibid.)

Since it is a common field, the sheep can graze there in common. But does that mean that all herds can graze there simultaneously or successively?

Topic of the derivative

Topic n° 2 of Aristotle defines the “topic of derivative” as follows:

Another topic is derived from similar inflexions, for in like manner the derivative must either be predicable of the subject or not; for instance, that the just is not entirely good, for in that case good would be predicable of anything that happens justly; but to be justly put to death is not desirable. (Rhet., II, 23, 2; Freese, p. 297)

This is a dialectical exercise. Problem: “Is the just desirable?”, that is to say, is the predicate “— is good, desirable” part of the essential definition of the word just? The answer is no, because “If you find that the just is desirable, then you find that being justly put to death just is desirable”, which is rarely the case.

Etymology, notatio nominis, conjugata

For Bossuet there are two kinds of topics drawn from the noun.

— On the one side, the topic “drawn from etymology, in Latin notatio nominis, that is from the root the words originate from, like ‘to be a master, you have to master the masters’.” (after Reverso; Fr. “if you are king [roi], then reign! [régnez]”. The example corresponds to Cicero conjugata.

— On the other side, the scheme “taken from words that have all the same origin, called conjugata”, giving as an example of this relationship the pair homo / hominis, two inflected forms of the same word.

The terminology might seem a little confusing, but the bottom line is clear, whenever two terms are linked by morphology, lexicon or etymology, the conclusions established for one of the two can be transferred to the other.

[1] Quoted after http://archives.charles-de-gaulle.org/pages/espace-pedagogique/le-point-sur/les-textes-a-connaitre/discours-du-30-mai-1968.php (11-08-2017)