AUTHORITY

1. Auctoritas, authority, authoritarian, authoritative

1.1 Latin Auctoritas

The word authority, and, with it, elements of the problematic of authority, comes from Latin and Roman law and custom. According to Benveniste, the words auctor, “author”, and auctoritas, “authority” are related to the primary meaning of the verb augere, “to bring forth, to promote” ([1969], no pag.):

In its most ancient uses, augeo (1) does not denote the increase of something that already exists, but the act of producing out of itself; a creative act which causes something to emerge from a nutrient medium and which is the privilege of the gods or the great forces of nature, but not of men (ibid.).
(1) Augeo is the first person singular of the present indicative of augere (CP)

The speech given with auctoritas is creative:

The primary sense of augeo is discovered in auctoritas with the help of the basic term auctor. Every word spoken with authority determines a change in the world; it creates something. This mysterious quality is what augeo expresses, the power that makes plants grow and a law come into being. This is the auctor who promotes, who alone is endowed with the quality […]. In this auctoritas, this gift that is reserved for a handful of people there are hidden and powerful values that can cause something to come into being and can literally bring into existence (ibid.)

Obscure and potent values reside in this auctoritas, this gift which is reserved to a handful of people who can cause something to come into being

This has nothing to do with what we now call an “argument from authority” that supports a belief about a given reality. Ellul describes the institutional exercise of the auctoritas as follows:

The auctoritas is the quality of the auctor. He gives his support, his approval to the act done by another person. In the beginning, it was probably an act of sacred law: one individual performs the legal act, and another validates this act by an intervention that manifests the approval of the gods. (Ellul [1961], pp. 248-249)

The auctoritas is held by the father, the priest, the judge; its use is fundamental to family life, as well as to religious and legal life:

The auctoritas appears as the authority of a person that serves as the basis for a legal act. This act has value and effectiveness only through the auctoritas. […] The pater [« father »] gives his auctoritas for the marriage of his son. In religious life, the priest’s auctoritas delimits the domain of the sacred, and draws the boundaries of the profane. In juridical life, the auctoritas delimits the domain of the legitimate and separates it from the illegitimate (ibid).

1.2 Authority, authoritarian, authoritative

The author-authority relationship is now broken, an author may not have so much authority, and the person with authority is not necessarily an author.
Authoritarian and authoritarianism develop along a lexical line that stigmatizes authority.
In contrast, authoritative as “possessing recognized or evident authority” (MW, Authority) refers to a positively oriented lexical line associated with authority.

2. Authority as a social issue

The concept of authority is being redefined and discussed in all the fields of the human sciences, in relation to submission and in opposition to freedom or freedoms. Major studies on authority, power and totalitarianism have marked the last century: in psychology, especially since Stanley Milgram’s shocking experiences on « Obedience to Authority » (1974); in philosophy, with Theodor Adorno’s the study on the “The Authoritarian Personality” of  (1950); in history with Hannah Arendt’s « The Origin of Totalitarianism » (1951); in sociology with Max Weber (1922), whose distinctions between traditional, charismatic, and rational-legal authority are now a part of common knowledge.

In our society, basic authority is expressed through various explicit rules and norms, enforced by law, backed by the police and the legal institutions, in relation with the current political authorities.
Organizations must define a mode of authority to be exercised within their sphere of competence, and to which their members must subscribe.
Like the definition and exercise of authority, resistance to illegitimate authority is a never-ending enterprise.

3. Authority in Argumentation Studies

3.1 Position

Along with the question of authority, the study of discourse engages in a multidisciplinary reflection on the epistemic level (non-truth-conditional conditions of the acceptability of a statement); on social influence (management of the powers of discourse); on interpersonal relations (interactional manifestations and effects of the relative authority positions of the participants).
In the specific field of argumentative rhetoric, the notion of authority is considered in relation to speech: In what identifiable ways, from implicit evocation to explicit invocation, can authority invest a statement? What is an appeal to authority? What are the kinds of critical responses to authoritarian and authoritative speech?

Insofar as it invokes reason and free inquiry, argumentation is antithetical to authority and violence, even when they claim legal and even moral legitimacy. Argumentative speech, however, operates on a razor’s edge. As a critical discourse, it denounces the discourse of authority; as powerful affirmative discourse, it affects the minds of others and seeks to change the representations of the audience in the name of rationality. Argumentation must find a way to be authoritative, without being authoritarian.
Claiming to be the instrument of reason, argumentation studies develop develop a reflection on how this argumentative reason interacts with legitimate social authority, a fundamental element of social life, see Agreement; Role; Persuasion; Evaluation. The ideal of rational persuasion and consensus served by argumentation is invoked, but, on the other hand, the decision rests with the legal-legitimate authority, and the best argument may or may not be reflected in the voter’s decision.

3.2 Forms of argumentation appealing to authority

— Basically, the argument from authority explicitly cites a hetero-attributed authority. It is sometimes specified according to the nature of the source of authority: consensus, ad antiquitatem, ad numerum… (see beow).
— Authority, or lack of authority, can be self-attributed, embodied and manifested in the speaker’s speech and attitudes, see Ethos; Modesty.
— The authority of the testimony is supported by the character and reputation of the witness, and is thus rellated to ethos. The criticism of the testimony is to be compared with that of the expertise.
— The authority of the precedent is based on a previous judgment (in every sense of the word judgment). The case may also have been decided in the fable or parable; see Example; Exemplum.
— Dialectic problematizes discourses supported by various kinds of social authority, see Doxa.

The following sections develop various forms and argumentative uses of authority.

4. The speaker’s Inherent Authority

4.1 Performative auctoritas

The speaker possesses a unique form of authority, the auctoritas which is related to the performativity of different classes of utterances. According to Austin [1962], the performative utterance produces the reality that it states: by saying, “I promise”, I promise. The speaker is the auctor of the reality created, her promise.

4.2 Taking people at their word

When someone says, “Hello! », even if his friendliness is actually fake, the default belief is that this is genuine friendly behavior. Normally, no argument is needed to make someone believe something, it just has to be said; the speaker’s words are be taken at face value; what she says is believed and acted upon without hesitation. When someone is asked “What time is it? », the answer is accepted, without checking the person’s watch.
Statements about inner states, “I feel in good shape today », are regularly accepted by default without question, as are statements made by people with special access to the facts under discussion (witnesses). If having authority means having the power to successfully transmit one’s representations to listeners, this is the most common form of linguistic authority, based on the preference for agreement.

This basic linguistic authority is combined with other types of social authority, that are attributed to the speaker according to the different social identities and roles she plays. These identities and roles cumulate in the displayed authority of the authoritative speaker, precisely as defined by the theory of ethos.

Nevertheless, the preference for agreement is not automatic; recipients routinely disagree, and if they do not, they may be to blame.

5. The Argument of Legal Authority

Authority, in the most common sense of the term, is defined by its claim to compliance and obedience; commands can be obeyed by virtue of their source, without being systematically supported by a lengthy justification.

Context: L has the power and means of coercion in domain D
L tells O to do F (F is in domain  D)
O does F.

The ideal of authoritarian authority is to exert a direct, causal influence on the behavior of others. If the tyrant’s subjects do not submit to his good reasons or charisma, he can still choose for a harsh punishment or a sweet reward.
Radical authority demands that the person who receives the command obey “like a corpse” (perinde ac cadaver), according to the metaphor used by Ignatius of Loyola uses to illustrate the perfection of the virtue of obedience. For the person who is not a member of the organization, to obey in this way is to reduce oneself to the state of an instrument by renouncing free examination and free will. For a member of the organization, it is simply adherence to the purposeful rationality of the institution as such.

Conversely, orders are invoked as a sufficient justification for action: “I was only following orders”. Such an appeal to authority is diametrically opposed to the philosophy of argumentation, which universalizes the imperative of justification and individual responsibility. It can be challenged by appealing to international human rights conventions on Human Rights and the Geneva Convention.

Everyday democratic authority is the authority of legal and regulatory norms, backed by the monopoly of legal force, enforced by those in power, and implemented by those legally responsible. In such a context, the basic expression of a socially valid legal and democratic argument from authority can be schematized as follows, in the case of judicial authority

Context: There is a system of norms N. One of these norms empowers a judge to enforce this system and gives her the means of coercion necessary for its application.
Person P has done action A, and somebody complains.
The judge assesses, in a procedure that conforms to the requirements of N, whether or not A constitutes a violation of a norm.
If it does, the judge sentences P to F, taking into account that R (justification of the decision).
Willingly or not, P obeys with F.

Judicial sentences are about « making do », not « making believe », that is, convincing the condemned. The recipients of the judge’s good reasons are much more likely to be the judge’s colleagues, or P‘s lawyer, than P herself. P may be convinced of the legitimacy of the punishment by the good reasons given by the judge, but this psychological condition is not necessary. P only has to obey with the judge’s decision, willingly or not. One cannot ask everyone to share the theory of redemptive punishment, and to willingly submit to a sentence, even a democratic one.
Authority cannot force anyone to believe anything. But, since belief manifests itself in words and behavior, “make do” may be indistinguishable from “make believe”: “Kneel down, pray, and you will believe.”

6. The Classical Argument of Authority

6.1 Displayed authority and Cited authority

Critical studies of argumentation make a distinction within ethotic authority, rejecting its seductive charismatic component (shown authority) as fallacious, in order to discuss only its expert component (cited authority), see Ethos.
In the case of ethotic authority, the speaker is the source of authority. Authority is « self-authorized » or self-founded. What is said is believed or obeyed because such and such a person says so.
In the case of the classical argument from authority, the speaker legitimates her argument by referring to a pre-existing, external authoritative, source: authority is hetero-founded. The technical study of this hetero-founded authority lies within the more general framework of discourse repetition, reformulation, reinterpretation, see Resumption of speech.

6.1 Rhetorical argumentation of authority and the authority store

Authority is at the foundation of topos # 11 of Aristotle’s Rhetoric:

Another line of argument is based on some decision already pronounced, whether on the same subject, or on one similar to it, or one contrary to it. Such a proof is most efficacious when everyone has always so decided; but if not everyone, then at any rate, most people; or when all, or most of the wise or good men have so decided, or the actual judges of the present question, or those whose authority they accept, or people whose decision they cannot gainsay because they have complete control over them, or those whom it is not proper to gainsay, such as the gods, or one’s father, or one’s teachers.
(Rhet., II, 23, 1398b15-30, RR, p. 365)

The “decisions” to be made may be intellectual or judicial.
On this basis, later rhetoricians list the authorities that can be used to strengthen a party’s position. In the legal field, the Rhetoric to Herennius proposes ten « formulae » [loci comunes, « commonplaces », see Topos) « to strengthen an accusation »:

The first commonplace is taken from authority, when we recall how great a concern the matter under discussion has been to the immortal gods, to our ancestors, or to kings, states, barbarian nations, wise men, the senate; and again, especially how sanction in these matters has been provided by laws. (Ad Her., II, 48)

These authorities are distinct from the judicial precedent, and can support any form of speech. Quintilian considers them authoritative for the same legal situation,

Whatever can be adduced as expressing the opinion of nations or people, or of wise men, eminent political figures, or illustrious poets. 37. Nor will common sayings, established by popular belief, be without their use in this way. (IO, V, 11, 36-37)

This store of authority will be used extensively, with some adjustments; gods should read God:

— Authority of Books, tradition, ancestors (ad antiquitatem). The argument of progress is opposed to this form of authority.
— The famous verses, proverbs, fables, parables…
— The Chinese, the Americans…
— The authority of the media, professionals, scientists, professors…
— Truths from the mouths of children, the rich, the poor…
— The authority of large numbers, prestige of the majority consensus, of a particular group…

These forms of authority are cumulative: the scientific authority of the master is sometimes mitigated by the charismatic authority of the guru.

All these varieties of authority can be invoked; some can be embodied by the speaker as a Chinese, an expert, a poor person, a member of a distinguished community.

6.2 Invoked authority: the classical argument from authority

The classical argument of authority exploits an authority taken from the authority store. It is based on a quotation, and can be schematized as follows (see Hamblin 1970: 224 et seq.):

S:   — A is an authority, A says that P; therefore, P is true and indisputable.

Or, put simply, “A says that P”, when the context clearly establishes that A is an authority, and that S is itself defending P, or a position co-oriented with P.
The prototypical example in this category is that of Pythagoras quoted by his disciples, « he said it himself«  (« ipse dixit »). Pythagoras, of course, has nothing to do with the matter; it is the speaker who quotes him as an authority.

Authority can justify actions, beliefs, or a combination of both:

S:     — That’s how they hold their fork and knife in New York.
S:     — The Master said that compassion is wrong
S:     — I never give money to homeless people, I read in a book that it’s just encouraging laziness.

6.3 Evoked Authority

When analyzing discourse based on an external authority, one must consider the fact that the quotation is not always direct and open. The speaker may also use an allusion to refer indirectly to a discourse, that is considered authoritative because it is dominant, prestigious or associated with an expert. Through the subtle use of terms such as “discursive formation”, “ideological state apparatuses”; “the great other” … I suggest my knowledge of and complicity  with respectively with the thought of Foucault, Althusser, Lacan, etc.

Citing an authority in support of a proposition has repercussions on the ethos of the speaker. When the Greek messenger Orestes says to Pyrrhus, “All the Greeks speak to you through my voice” [1], he does more than quote the Greeks, he embodies the authority he quotes. Self-quotation does not add much authority to what is said, but quoting a respected authority enhances the personal authority of the speaker. The master’s voice comes from the speaker’s mouth, the speaker identifies with him, reframes the exchange accordingly, and hopes that the audience will follow.

The philosophy of argument invokes an ideal of exposure to refutation, according to which it is perfectly legitimate to argue with authority, if the argument is explicit, if one knows exactly who said what and when. This rational demand for explicitness is opposed to burying authority in the depths of discourse in order to protect it from possible refutation.

7. Expert authority

From a logical-scientific point of view, a discourse is sound if it collects and articulates true propositions, in order to deduce a new true proposition, according to procedures accepted in the relevant community. In argumentation, the acceptance of a proposition or a global vision is based on authority when it is not based on an examination of the good reasons that support it, or on a direct examination of the correspondence of the proposition with things themselves, but relies on the source and the channel through which the information was transmitted.
The argument from authority substitutes peripheral, indirect evidence for direct evidence or examination, which is considered inaccessible, too costly, or too tedious. Such everyday practice is justified by a principle of economy, division of labor, or simply because someone else was more qualified, or in a better position to tell how events unfolded. It works quite well and rationally, as a default argument, that can be edited as more information becomes available. From this perspective, authority removes nothing and no one  from dispute, it simply shifts the burden of proof to the person challenging it, S. Dialectic.

The argument of authority is therefore a form of argumentation when it exposes the authority which it claims. One could oppose the authoritarian support of a statement, as supported by the socio-discursive position of the speaker, to the argument of authority, hetero-founded, whose source is clearly exposed. In other words, the argument of authority is neither authoritarian nor fallacious when it is invoked to open the debate, , but it is when it claims to close the discussion, S. Modesty.

The method of counter-discourse provides a principle for evaluating and criticizing arguments from authority. Referring to the structure of the argument of authority, discourses against authority are directed as follows.

7.1 Against the Citation itself

S: — A says that Qo

The refutation questions the citation as such or the relevance of the citation to the present discussion. This move preserves the status of A‘s status as an authority.

— A did not say Q; Q does not correspond to the letter of what A actually said.
— Q is quoted out of context.
— Q is a misquote of A; it contains elements of rewording and mischievous redirection.
— As meant by A, Q is not relevant to the present issue (Q is misinterpreted)

7.2 Against the Authority Cited

— A has changed her mind, as evidenced by her recent statements.

— A has no direct evidence, so A is not a real authority on point Q.

— There is no consensus among experts; “A⁺, a greater expert, rejects Q”.

— Applying the ad hominem argument to the source A: Q is incompatible, contradictory, with other statements (or prescriptions) of A.

— A has spoken outside of her area of ​​expertise; she is not an expert in the precise area referred to by Q-type assertions.

— A is not an expert, his or her views are outdated;

— A is wrong, and has been wrong many times in the past.

— A is biased, manipulated, paid to say what she says.

— A can be dismissed with a personal attack (ad personam): “A is not an expert but a fool”.

7.3 Arguments for Establishing Expert Authority

One can distinguish between two different strategies in dealing with authority: arguments that establish an authority as such, and arguments that exploit an established authority. This distinction is of general value, see Causality, Definition, Analogy. Discourses (7.1) against authority attack the use made of authority, whereas discourse (7.2) attacks the authority itself.
It follows that discourse (7.2) against authority reflects a discourse defining a legitimate expert:

A is speaking in his field of expertise, and is aware of the state of the matter; A‘s system is coherent; A has direct evidence, reputable experts agree with what A says; A‘s previous predictions have been proven correct.

7.3 Against the Person who Submits to Authority

The focus on interaction shifts the focus from the claim of authority itself to the relationship of authority. The criticism is now directed at the pusillanimity of the interlocutor.

7.4 Counterargument ad rem

Finally, the opponent can argue that Q can be countered with direct arguments i.e. arguments that deal with the issue at hand, and are not based on authority but on scientific reason, or historical knowledge, which are considered superior to lazy appeals to authority.

8. Refutative Uses of Authority

8.1 Refutative Uses of Positive Authority

The preceding paragraphs deal with authority in the sense that it serves to support a claim. Such an authoritative assertion can be used to rebut a claim:

S1:      — P!
S2:      — X says the opposite, and she knows what she is talking about!

If X and S1 share the same affiliation, the refutation combines authority and ad hominem.
Positive authority can also be used to destroy not the content of what is said, but the claim to authority and thus the competence of the speaker:

S1:     — P!
S2:      — That’s exactly what Perelman is saying!
           — We’ve known that since Aristotle!

Thinking is an inner dialog? We’ve known that since Plato! [2]

8.2 Negative authority: “Reductio ad Hitlerum”

Negative authority is used to refute a claim in the following case:

S1:     — P!
S2:      — H says exactly the same thing!

H is a person, a party rejected by the community of speech to which S2 belongs, or by the third parties arbitrating the discussion, or possibly by S1 herself; H is an anti-authority, an anti-model, see Imitation.
In the case of a positive authority, the proponent associates the statement with an authority. Here, the opponent makes the connection between the disputed statement and the negative authority.

Hitler is the paragon of the negative authorities, whose words cannot be repeated. The reductio ad Hitlerum ends any argument.

Last year, you may recall, a number of financial-industry barons went wild over very mild criticism from President Obama. They denounced Mr. Obama as being almost a socialist for endorsing the so-called Volker rule, which would simply prohibit banks backed by federal guarantees from engaging in risky speculation. And as for their reaction to proposals to close a loophole that lets some of them pay remarkably low taxes — well, Stephen Schwarzman, chairman of the Blackstone Group, compared it to Hitler’s invasion of Poland.
Paul Krugman, “Panic of the Plutocrats”, 2011.[2]

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[1] Racine, Andromache, 1667. I, 2. Quoted from: http://www.poetryintranslation.com/PITBR/French/AndromacheActI.htm#anchor_Toc169494154 (11-08-2017)

[2] SOCRATES: Very good. Now by ‘thinking’ do you mean the same as I do?
THEAETETUS: What do you mean by that?
SOCRATES: A conversation that the soul has with itself about the objects it contemplates. Of course, I’m only telling you my idea in all ignorance; but this is the kind of picture I have of it. It seems to me that when the soul thinks, is simply carries on a discussion in which it asks itself questions and answers them itself, affirming and denying. And when it arrives at something definite, either by a gradual process or by a sudden leap, when it affirms one thing consistently and without divided counsel, we call that its judgment. So, in my opinion, judge is to make a statement, and a judgment is a statement that is not addressed to another person or spoken aloud, but silently addressed to oneself. And what do you think?
THEAETETUS: I agree with that.

Plato, Theaetetus, 189e-190d. Translated by M. J. Levett, Rev. Myles Burnyeat. In Plato, Complete Works. Edited, with introduction and notes by John M. Cooper; associate editor D. S. Hutchinson. Hackett, Indianapolis/Cambridge, 1997.

[2] www.nytimes.com/2011/10/10/opinion/panic-of-the-plutocrats.html? _r = 1&ref=global-home (11-08-2017)

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ASSENT

Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca discuss the effects of argumentation on the basis of an opposition between to persuade and to convince, the former being a local achievement involving a particular audience, while the latter is a global achievement involving the universal audience. The functional definition of argumentation given at the beginning of the Treatise, however, does not use these terms but speaks of “adherence of minds” and “assent”. In this passage, argumentation is seen as an activity aimed at “inducing or increasing the adherence of the mind” to “theses” that are “presented for its assent” (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1958, p. 4).

The concept of assent refers to Newman’s Grammar of Assent (1870).

The Stoic theory of knowledge defines assent as a voluntary act of the soul that occurs when the soul receives a true impression; this process implies a pre-established harmony between the will and the mind. “The soul wants truth”, and truth is index sui, its own mark. The mark of the true impression is the assent given to it. The skeptics reject this harmony between true representation and assent; truth is not capable of self-certification, i.e. one can give its assent to false representations.

Suspension or abstention from assent, is the basis of the skeptical method of attaining tranquility (ataraxia):

The skeptical way is called […] aporetic either, as some say, from its being puzzled and questioning about everything or from its being at a loss as to whether to assent or dissent. (Sextus Empiricus, Outlines, I, iii)

Assent may be given or withheld by an act of the will:

I think it a very great feat to resist one’s perceptions, to withstand one’s vague opinions, to control one’s inclination to give assent to propositions; […] Carneades performed a Herculean work when, as it had been a wild and formidable monster, he extracted assent, that is to say, vague opinion and rashness from our minds. (Cicero, Ac. II, 34; trans. Yonge, p. 74)

Skepticism characterizes the argumentative situation as a standoff between two equal (isosthenic) and opposing discursive forces, which imposes a suspension of assent, see Force; Stasis.

Common language regards assent as an action. Assent can be given or withheld, just as agreement or authorization can be given or withheld. Rhetorically, the problem of assent complicates the concept of persuasion, by giving the recipient an active role in the process. While people are passively persuaded, they are actively giving their assent. This maintains a balance between the speaker and the audience, as the speaker’s efforts to persuade the audience correspond to the audience’s ability to grant or withhold assent. Withheld assent plays a role in all varieties of rational exchange because it creates a state of doubt that characterizes the third party position, S. Roles.

Assent to a proposition is characterized by varying degrees, as one moves from opinion to belief to knowledge:

— The lowest degree corresponds to opinion, defined as a belief accompanied by an awareness that there are other equally valid opinions.
— The middle degree is that of belief. There are other beliefs, that are not considered false, but less valid than one’s own.
— The strongest degree is that of conviction. The convinced person considers that the proposition to which he or she adheres is true and that opposing arguments are fallacious, perverse or insane.

According to Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, persuasion produces belief, while conviction produces a generalized belief, that defines socially legitimized knowledge.

ARGUMENTATION STUDIES:
SOME CONTEMPORARY DEVELOPMENTS

The long history of argumentation studies spans the history of rhetoric, dialectics and logic. Argumentation studies emerged as an autonomous field only after the Second World War; but it is possible to identify inflections during this short history.

1. The Long History: Dialectics, Logic, Rhetoric

Greek and Latin antiquity ­— From the perspective of classical disciplines, argumentation studies is related to logic, “the art of thinking correctly”; to rhetoric, “the art of speaking well and addressing a group”; and to dialectics, “the art of interacting well, articulating one’s interventions and thoughts with those of others”.
This triad is the basis of the system in which argumentation has been conceptualized, from the time of Aristotle until the late nineteenth century. Argumentation is seen as a theory of convincing reasoning in ordinary language. The central issues are the theory of argument schemes theory, and the theory of validity and soundness, depending on the quality of the premises and the reliability of the principles used to derive conclusions from these premises. see Dialectic; Logic; Rhetoric.

Modern Times — Walter Ong has commented on the decline of dialectical practices (1958) since the Renaissance, the reduction of rhetoric to figures of speech and considerations of literary style, and the critique and rejection of the Aristotelian logic as the exclusive or essential tool of scientific thought. New scientific methods based on observation and experimentation, with increasing use of mathematics, were thought.

Late nineteenth century, early twentieth century — At the end of the nineteenth century rhetorical argument is delegitimized as a source of knowledge. Logic is formalized and becomes a branch of mathematics. The tradition of argumentation studies remains active in law and theology.

2. A symptom: the titles

In French, until the publication of Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca’s Treatise on Argumentation, the books entitled Argumentation were pamphlets containing arguments on specific topics, not theoretical books about argumentation in general, as shown by their full titles:

1857 – Discussion of Etherization Considered from the Standpoint of Medical Responsibility – Argumentation. By Marie Guillaume Alphonse Devergie.
1860 – Arguments on the administrative law of the municipal administration. By Adolphe Chauveau.
1882 – The question of water before the Medical Society of Lyon. Argumentation in reply to Mr. Ferrand. By Mr. Chassagny. BY P.-M. Perrellon.
1922 – Argumentation of the Polish proposal about the border in the industrial part of Upper Silesia.

The content and field of the argument are specified by an additional subtitle: argumentation on, about … The title Argumentation corresponds to modern titles such as “An Essay on —” or “Thesis”; it refers to a textual genre. Thus, it seems that the emergence of the genre “[Theoretical work on] Argumentation” coincided with the disappearance of the genre « Argumentation [on —]« .

In English – Toulmin’s book « The Uses of Argument » apparently” (1958) seems to come in a traditional line of books titled “Argument”. Some of these books offer “an argumentation” in support of a position, such as the following:

Yale C., Some Rules for the Investigation of Religious Truth; and Some Specimens of Argumentation in its Support, 1826.

Others are textbooks for teaching composition and debate:

Brewer E. C., A Guide to English Composition: And the Writings of Celebrated Ancient and Modern Authors, to Teach the Art of Argumentation and the Development of Thought, 1852
Foster, W. T., Argumentation and Debating, 1917.
Baird A. C., Argumentation, Discussion and Debate, 1950.
Lever R., The Arte of Reason, Rightly Termed Witcraft; Teaching a Perfect Way to Argue and Dispute, 1573.

The best known may be:

Whately R., Elements of Rhetoric Comprising an Analysis of the Laws of Moral Evidence and of Persuasion, with Rules for Argumentative Composition and Elocution, 1828.

In the first half of the twentieth century, many such books were published,  mixing didactic purposes were mixed with more theoretical considerations. Toulmin’s work, however, does not fit into this tradition, tied to education, to the practices of Speech Communication Departments or English Departments in the United States. No such book is listed in his bibliography, and he cites no work from the field of rhetoric.

In fact, both Toulmin and Perelman both break with a modern tradition and establish a new foundation in the treatment of the concept of argument.

3. 1958 and After: The Constitution of the Field of Argumentation Studies

3.1 A Key Date, 1958 

Chaïm Perelman, Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1958, Traité de l’Argumentation. La Nouvelle Rhétorique = 1969, The New Rhetoric — A Treatise on Argumentation.
Stephen E. Toulmin, 1958, The Uses of Argument.

These two titles are the best known in an impressive constellation of works that all help to define, positively or negatively, the new field of argumentation studies.

— On “Public Relations”: a non-rhetorical and non-argumentative perspective on persuasion:

Vance Packard, 1957, The Hidden Persuaders.

— On the language of propaganda:

Sergei Chakhotine, 1939, Le Viol des foules par la Propagande Politique.
= 1940, The Rape of the Masses – The Psychology of Totalitarian Political Propaganda.
Jean-Marie Domenach 1950. La Propagande Politique [Political Propaganda]

— In law:

Theodor Viehweg, 1953, Topik und Jurisprudenz. Ein Beitrag zur rechtswissenschaftlichen Grundlagenforschung = 1993, Topics and Law. A Contribution to Basic Research in Law.

— On the rhetorical foundations of literature and Western culture:

Ernst Robert Curtius, 1948, Europäische Litteratur und Lateinisches. Mittelalter.
= 1953, European Literature and the Latin Middle Ages.

— An historical and systematic reconstruction of the field of rhetoric

Heinrich Lausberg, 1960, Handbuch der literarischen Rhetorik.
= 1998, Handbook of Literary Rhetorik. Foundation for Literary Study.

— A history of the adventures of dialectic and rhetoric at the time of the Renaissance

Walter J. Ong, 1958, Ramus. Method and the Decay of Dialogue.

3.2 Extended theories of argumentation

These theories have been developed since the 1970s, mainly in French:

— In a linguistic perspective:

Oswald Ducrot, 1972, Dire et ne pas Dire [To Say and Not To Say] — 1973, La Preuve et le Dire [Proving and Saying] — & al. 1980, Les Mots du Discours [The Words of Discourse] Jean-Claude Anscombre et Oswald Ducrot, 1983, L’Argumentation dans la Langue [Argumentation within Language]

— From a discursive and cognitive point of view:

Jean-Blaise Grize, 1982, De la Logique à l’Argumentation [From Logic to Argumentation]

3.3 The Dialectical and Critical approaches

The work of Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca work is seen as a revival of rhetorical argumentation, which has its origins in Aristotle’s Rhetoric. In the same vein, Hamblin’s seminal work revived argumentation as a dialectical and critical thinking, based on the concept of fallacies, which originated in Aristotle’s On Sophistical Refutations:

Charles L. Hamblin, 1970, Fallacies

3.4. The Pragma-Dialectical Trend

Since the 1980s, Frans van Eemeren and Rob Grootendorst have developed the “Pragma-dialectical” approach. They reformulated the study of argumentation in terms of speech acts, linguistic pragmatics and a new conception of dialectics. They developed a powerful system of guidelines for evaluating  arguments as a system of rules for the rational resolution of differences of opinion, S. Norms; Rules; Evaluation.

Frans H. van Eemeren & Rob Grootendorst, 1984, Speech Acts in Argumentative Discussions A Theoretical Model for the Analysis of Discussions Directed Towards Solving Conflicts of Opinion.
Frans H. van Eemeren & Rob Grootendorst, 1992, Argumentation, Communication, and Fallacies.
Frans H. van Eemeren & Rob Grootendorst, 2004, A Systematic Theory of Argumentation – The Pragma-Dialectical Approach.

Since 1986, a reference conference on argumentation is organized has been held in Amsterdam every four years. The series of proceedings proposes an up-to-date vision of the discipline (van Eemeren & al. (1987, 1991, 1995, 1999, 2003, 2006, 2010).

3.5 The Informal Logic Trend

The “Informal Logic” of Anthony Blair, Ralph Johnson, Douglas Walton and John Woods combines argumentation studies with a logic and a philosophy that take into account the ordinary dimensions of speech and reasoning. The focus is on the evaluation of the arguments and their educational applications in the development of critical thinking. The concept of argument scheme is defined to include their corresponding counterarguments, and, on this basis, a new approach to argument criticism is developed.

Howard Kahane, 1971, Logic and Contemporary Rhetoric The Use of Reason in Everyday Life.
Ralph H. Johnson & J. Anthony Blair, 1977, Logical Self-Defense.
Ralph H. Johnson, 1996, The Rise of Informal Logic.
Anthony Blair & Ralph H. Johnson, 1980, Informal Logic – The First International Symposium.
John Woods & Douglas Walton, 1989, Fallacies. Selected Papers 1972-1982.
Douglas Walton, Chris Reed & Fabrizio Macagno, 2008, Argumentation Schemes.
Anthony Blair, 2012, Groundwork in the Theory of Argumentation.

3.6 Argumentation and ordinary interactions

The Pragma-Dialectic and the Informal Logic schools of argumentation place particular emphasis on dialogue. The first works to integrate the perspectives of conversation and interaction analysis are found in:

Robert Cox & Charles A. Willard (eds), 1982, Advances in Argumentation Theory and Research.
Jacques Moeschler (1985). Argumentation et Conversation. [Argumentation and Conversation] Frans H. van Eemeren & others (eds), 1987, Proceedings of the [ISSA] Conference on Argumentation 1986.

4. Relations with Other Disciplines

The leading research programs maintain various relationships with the rhetorical, dialectical and logical heritage, as well as with language studies, philosophy and education. The table below attempts to give an idea of these relationships.

0: no significant link

+: the number of stars indicates the importance of the link

 

	New Rhetoric	Arg. within Language	Natural Logic	Fallacies (Hamblin)	Pragma- dialectics	Informal Logic
Rhetoric	+++	+	+	0	++	+
Dialectic	+	0	0	+++	+++	+++
Classical Logic	0	0	+++	+++	++	+++
Grammar, Linguistics	0	+++	++	0	++	+
Philosophy	+++	+	+	++	+	+++
Teaching, Education	++	0	0	0	+	+++

5. Dialogues between the main trend theories

The arrows represent commonalities, solidarities or affiliations between different schools

6. Argumentation studies, argumentation scholars:
How to name the field and its specialists?

The talk about of the “revival of the field of argumentation” in the fifties should be taken with a grain of salt. First, the phrase is ambiguous: it does not refer to the field of argumentative practices; but to the theory of argumentation, the meta-language used to study this practice. Second, it is also a bit simplistic: although discontinuous, reflections on argumentation have been going on for more than two millennia, not half a century. The point is that, since the fifties, a learning community has formed around a large and diverse corpus of studies that take as their object a set of practices that are directly characterized as argumentative.

How do we identify a field of study, its object and its specialists? The situation is clear when each of these different realities is designated by a specific term. This is the case for example with the economists, specialists of economics, whose object is the study of the economy (production and consumption of goods and services). But the term argumentation refers both to the object of study, as in “everyday argumentation”, and to the study itself, when, especially in the titles of books, “argumentation” shortens “theory of argumentation”.

The spectacular appearance of papers and books entitled “… Argumentation …” hides a deeper reality, the change in the disciplinary status of logic. All the ancient books entitled Logic, dealing with the logic of terms, quantifiers, connectors, analyzed and non-analyzed propositions, etc., are actually theories, logic-based treatises on argumentation, such as, for example the Port-Royal Logic, or The Art of Thinking ([1662]). Basically, we now use the word argumentation to refer to a field of study or to a theoretical book because, since the mathematization of logic in the late nineteenth century, the title Logic can only be used in the domain of formal logic, and is no longer available as a reference to natural language argumentation. Exceptions are rare. In French, one can think of works such as the Elements of classical logic (François Chenique 1975, vol. I: The art of thinking and judging; t II. The art of reasoning), or especially Jacques Maritain’s Introduction to Logic ([1923]), which is perhaps one of the last books to offer, under the heading of Logic, a traditional “art of thinking”, inspired by neo-Thomistic philosophy. This logic is, in this respect, the first in the series of “non-formal”, “substantial”, “natural” logics… that flourished at the end of the last century; it is a treatise on argumentation as a theory of logical reasoning within natural language.

So, we are left with the problem of naming the field by a single unambiguous term. Following the example of polemology, the study of war, it could be called argumentology. following the same line, the corresponding professionals would be called argumentologists, a figure clearly distinct from that of the arguers. But the word sounds jargon-laden and slightly ridiculous. In any case, usage will have the last word, and, at present, no one seems to feel an urgent need for such words. Argumentology does not appear in the monumental and foundational Proceedings on the Fourth International Conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation of 1999; one instance in 2003, one in 2007; and no occurrence of argumentologist or any derived name of that kind (van Eemeren & al. (eds.), 1999, 2003, 2007).

ARGUMENTATION 2: KEY FEATURES AND ISSUES

The domain of argumentation studies can be characterized   according to an underlying system of key features, questions and orientations.

1. Key questions about the role of language

The following table proposes a possible organization of the field according to the role of language and the type of speech situation that is given theoretical prominence. This hypothesis makes it possible to represent the various concepts of argumentation as a tree structure, in which the nodes correspond to the research questions, or crossroads questions, that articulate the field.
Such a representation illustrates that what might at first glance to be an arbitrary dispersion of options, actually reflects the need to consider  the complex range of argumentative situations.

A vision of argumentation might be characterized as a structured choice among the various options opened up by the following questions.
Other possible starting points will be suggested in §2.

Table : Key features and questions about the role of language in argumentation

Same table:

(1) Argumentation

(2) AS A THINKING ACTIVITY:
             The study of argumentation as a psycho-cognitive process

(3) AS A LINGUISTIC-COGNITIVE ACTIVITY

(5) Extended                                              

(7)  as a form of language:  “ARGUMENTATION WITHIN LANGUAGE” 

(8) as the eneral form of discourse: “NATURAL LOGIC”

(6) Situated

(9) monologue 

not polyphonic: LOGIC AS AN ART OF THINKING   

polyphonic: « BENE DICENDI” RHETORIC

 

(10) dialog

without  turn-taking:  RHETORIC OF PERSUASION

with turn-taking:   DIALOGUE LOGIC

INTERACTION                      

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(2) vs. (3) vs. (4): The Cognitive, Linguistic and Multimodal Dimensions of Argumentation

Different general questions could be taken as starting points, and each question would produce a different map of the field. This map arises from the general question: is argumentation fundamentally a linguistic activity or a cognitive activity — or both?

If argumentation were defined as a pure activity of thinking, expressed in a perfectly transparent language, the study of argumentation would correspond to a psychology of thinking without language.

But mathematical thinking and scientific reasoning require language, as does everyday argumentation. Language-based approaches to argumentation deal with the cognitive component within the linguistic component. Such approaches are compatible with different positions on the question of thinking and reasoning. Classical Logic, Natural Logic, Informal Logic and cognitive approaches stress the articulation of thought and language in the argumentative activity.

Argumentation is unanimously understood as a discursive practice. The consideration of still and moving images raises the question of how argumentative meanings are able to invest non-verbal semiotic supports. The study of argumentation in work situations also requires us to consider the signifying intention that guides both the action and the argument into account. In both cases, it is necessary to rethink what exactly constitutes a well-constructed corpus within the field of argumentation.

(5) vs. (6) — Argumentation as a linguistic-cognitive activity: Extended or situated?

Should argumentation, as a linguistic cognitive process, be considered a local or a general phenomenon? (a special kind of passage / the general form of discourse?)

 

(7) vs. (8) — Extended argumentation: Saussurian langue or discourse?

(7) Argumentation, as a condition for well-formed linguistic chain {E1, E2}:
see Orientation
(8) Argumentation as a schematization of the situation, see Objects of discourse

Two different theories have extended the concept of argumentation to all linguistic activities, the theory of Argumentation within Language (Anscombre, Ducrot 1983) and the theory of argumentation as a Natural Logic (Grize 1982).

The former generalizes the concept of argumentation at the level of language (of Saussurian langue), while the latter enacts the same generalization at the level of speech (parole). 

(9) vs. (10) — Situated argumentation: Monologue or Dialogue?

If argumentation is restricted to some characteristic forms of discourse, then in which type of discourse is it best exemplified, in monologic discourse, or in dialogue?

 

(11) vs. (12) — Monologue: Logic or Rhetoric?

(11) Logic

(12) Bene dicendi rhetoric, see Rhetoric

(13) vs. (14) — Dialogue: With or without turn taking?

According to the externalization principle (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1992, p. 10), dialogical theories either assume that dialogue is the basic form of argumentative activity, or that it is in the form of a dialogue that the argumentative mechanisms of argumentation, can be most clearly seen.

Within this set of dialogical approaches, there are distinctions. Does the dialogue have an exchange structure or not? Does the dialogue admit turns of speech? Do all the participants have equal possibility of taking the floor in the same conditions?

(13) Argumentation, a dialogue without an exchange structure: The Rhetorical Address

The rhetorical address is a special kind of dialogue, with a polyphonic structure; the voices of the others, especially the opponent’s voice, are rincorporated into the discourse of the speaker who has the floor. The audience intervenes only later and indirectly, as a verdict on the case or a decision on the policy.

(15) vs. (16) — A turn-taking dialog: Dialogue logic or natural interaction?

In the case of a dialogue in which there is a possibility of exchange, one of the following two poles will provide the appropriate basis, 1) a logical approach to formal dialogues, or 2) an empirical approach to natural interactions.

(15) Argumentation, a formalized critical dialogue

Since the 1970s the Informal Logic and the Pragma-Dialectic theories have reoriented argumentation studies by giving the priority to the study of argumentation as a kind of dialogue.

Dialectical-critical theories of argumentation reinforce the constraints of dialogue either through a system of rules designed to embody a rational standard, as in Pragma-Dialectic, or through of a system of critical questions, as in Informal Logic. see Norms.

 (16) Argumentation, a type of ordinary interaction

Proto-argumentative activity is triggered by a lack of ratification by the addressee. Depending on the reaction of the interaction partners, the conversation disruption may pass quickly, being absorbed into the flow of the ongoing task they are engaged in. Otherwise, the interaction might develop into a fully-fledged argumentative situation. In either cases, the argumentative situation is fundamentally governed by interactional principles.

This view is compatible with the ancient theory of “argumentative questions” (or stasis, or point to adjudicate).

For each of these points, the question is not which to adopt and which to exorcise, but to clearly articulate the contrast between the approaches they define.

2. Other points of departure

The above table develops from the question of language. Other questions might give rise to alternative maps of the field.

2.1 Kind of rationality?

Truth and rationality can be considered:

• As an attribute of a well-thought monological discourse, best exemplified in logic, as an art of thinking;
• As the consensus of the properly defined universal audience, within the prospect of a rhetoric of persuasion;
• As a social production, the result of a well-organized critical dialog to reach the best possible true and rational answer in the course of a dialectical process;
• As a progressive construct, through a closer contact with scientific results, thought and method.

In complete opposition to these guidelines, generalized theories of argumentation maintain an agnostic perspective on rationality, and question the very possibility of reaching it through ordinary discourse.

2.2 Form or function?

Is argumentation (first, better) defined by its function or by its form? This question opposes two theoretical families, one focusing on persuasion, and the other focusing on the structural description and formal representation of argumentative episodes. These two starting points themselves give rise to symmetrical questioning: how to deal with functional aspects in the latter case? What are the structural criteria that ensure the descriptive adequacy of the in the former case?

2.3 Argumentativity, a binary or gradual concept?

For extended theories of argumentation, language (Ducrot) or discourse (Grize) are basically argumentative, S. Orientation; Schematization.

In the case of restricted theories of argumentation, however, some discursive genres (deliberative, epideictic, judicial) or, more broadly, certain kinds of discursive sequences are argumentative and opposed to other non-argumentative genres or other types of sequences. These definitions tend to consider that argumentativity is a binary concept: a sequence is or is not argumentative.

In reference to the language exchanged between partners defending contrasting positions, the argumentativity of a situation is not an all or nothing concept; various forms and degrees of argumentativity can be distinguished.

— A given linguistic situation begins to become argumentative when opposition emerges between two lines of speech, quite possibly without reference to each other, as in an argumentative diptych. This is most probably the basic argumentative structure, each partner repeats and restates his position. S. Disagreement. We can thus go beyond the opposition between narrative, descriptive or argumentative sequences. When a description or a narration is developed in support of an answer to an argumentative question, this narration or description should be considered as fully argumentative and evaluated as such.

— Communication is fully argumentative when the difference is problematized as an argumentative question, with the participants taking roles as proponent, opponent, or third party, S. Roles.

2.4 Central objects?

The various approaches to argumentation are characterized by the nature of their internal assumptions and external assumptions. The former corresponds to the organization of the concepts postulated in the system, and the latter, to the kinds of objects taken into consideration. Both types of hypotheses are bound.

The extremities of the branches in any of the preceding “decision trees” represent a pole articulating theoretical views with specific “preferred” objects. To satisfy the requirement of descriptive adequacy each theory must combine its central objects with what it posits as peripheral objects. Decisions as to what is to be considered as central and as peripheral (derived or secondary) data, fall within the domain of external assumptions. Such choices are never self-evident and require justification. So, for example, the decision to give priority to dialogue or to take as reference monologal syllogistic discourse, correspond to two distinct external assumptions regarding the structure of the argumentation field, and clearly put to the fore quite different kinds of data.

This does not imply that second level (often annoying) facts and data are excluded, rather that all phenomena cannot be put on the same level; data must be ordered, and prioritized. In practice, the problem is to determine how the results established on the basis of central facts can be expanded to peripheral data.

Some major types of coupling of internal and external assumptions:

— Rhetorical argumentation, and planned monological speech.
— Dialectical argumentation, and conventionalized dialogues.
— Argumentation as orientation, and pairs of statements.
— Argumentation as schematization, and texts, etc.

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ARGUMENTATION 1: DEFINITIONS

The analysis of argumentation has been intensively and specifically studied since the post-World War II period (references infra) :

The bi-millennial framework of logic as an “art of thinking” in natural language has been taken up and reworked in the new intellectual framework of the post-Fregean mathematical logic as a Substantial Logic, an Informal Logic, or a Natural Logic.

A new vision of argumentation as discourse orientation has been developed in the semantic theory of Argumentation within Language.

Ancient rhetoric has been recast as New Rhetoric. Dialectics has been revisited in relation to pragmatics and speech act theories, and expanded into a powerful critical tool within the framework of Pragma-dialectic.

The perspectives of rhetoric and dialectics are now ubiquitous in contemporary studies and teaching programs on argumentation. The connections between rhetoric, textual linguistics and discourse analysis have been recognized and rearticulated.

The spectacular results of interactions analysis have opened up the immense field of everyday conversational interactions as a specific domain of investigation, where argument as “dispute” intertwines with argument as “good reason”.

The various theories of argumentation developed in the late twentieth century are based on different visions and definitions of their objects, methods and goals. Given this diversity, and the apparent and real discrepancies between definitions, there is a real temptation of synthesize, that is, to look for a definition that, while not trivial, will restore order, unity, simplicity and consensus.
Experience shows, however, that many new definitions intended to replace older ones, simply add to the existing lists, thereby exacerbating the problem that they were intended to solve.

Another solution could be to start with things as they are, that is, to admit that the field of argumentation studies does not develop in the hypothetical-deductive style of starting from an overwhelming “master definition” and deriving its consequences, but rather in a more empirical, data-driven, manner.
In practice, this suggests that one can very well start with a corpus of definitions of the concept of argumentation in order to identify the points of consensus and divergence, while emphasizing the points of view that have proven to be the most fruitful

1. Rhetorical argumentation, an instrument of persuasion

Socrates views and rejects rhetoric as an enterprise in social persuasion through speech. He shares this definition with his opponents, especially Gorgias:

Gorgias — I’m referring to the ability to persuade by speeches judges in a law court, councilors in a council meeting, and assemblymen in an assembly or in any political gathering that might take place. (Plato, Gorgias, 452e; p. 798)

Socrates — Well, then isn’t the rhetorical art, taken as a whole, a way of directing the souls by means of speech, not only in the law courts and on other public occasions, but also in private? (Plato, Phaedrus, 261a ; CW, p. 537)

This defines the common use of the word rhetoric in ancient Greece, what people call rhetoric.
Now what rhetoric is, in its substance, or lack of substance, is another story:

By my reasoning, oratory is an image of a part of politics. (Plato, Gorgias, 463d; CW, p. 807)

Politics is defined as the craft of addressing “the soul » (ibid, 464b, p. 808), and rhetoric is discarded as an insubstantial “image”, an eidolon, a counterfeit of politics. Socrates unreservedly condemns rhetorical discourse aimed at persuasion, as a lie, an illusion, a manipulative enterprise, antagonistic to truth-seeking philosophical discourse.
This unqualified and irrevocable condemnation of rhetoric as counterfeit is at the root of the popular negative meaning of the word, and this obviously includes argumentative rhetoric as well. The criticism of rhetoric is part of the field of rhetoric, and the same is true of the field of argument.

Aristotle positions rhetoric not as a counterfeit but as “the counterpart of dialectic” (Rhet, I, 1, 1354a1; RR p. 95) and defines it as an empirical techne, a craft, oriented toward the study of specific cases:

Rhetoric may be defined as the faculty of observing in any given case the available means of persuasion (Rhet, I, 2, 1355b25; RR, p. 105).

Cicero follows this functional definition:

Cicero Junior: — What is an argument?
Cicero Father — A plausible device [probabile] to obtain belief.
Cicero, Part., II, 5; p. 315

Crassus — As becomes a man well born and liberally educated, I learned those trite and common precepts of teachers in general; first, that it is the business of an orator to speak in a manner adapted to persuade. (Cicero, De Or., I, XXXI; p. 40)

Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca’s “New Rhetoric”  also focuses on persuasion:

The object of the study of argumentation is the study of the discursive techniques allowing us to induce or to increase the mind’s adherence to the theses presented for its assent. ([1958], p. 4; italics in the original)

By focusing on “discursive techniques” and on “the mind’s adherence”, this definition re-builds argumentation studies on the same basis as those of the Aristotelian argumentative rhetoric, persuasive speech. It reconnects the contemporary understanding of argumentation with the experience gained throughout two millennia.

Thesis, mind, presented, assent, discursive techniques: this definition articulates the core concepts of what could be called “the argumentation movement” as a vision of man and discourse in modern democratic societies.

— The claims are theses. This is a philosophical term; the issues addressed by argumentative interventions are complex and high level, “the most rational” (id., p. 7). The Treatise keeps its distance from everyday arguments and minds: it does not address the ignorant, and more: “there are beings with whom any contact may seem superfluous or undesirable…” (id., p. 15).

— These theses are presented to the audience, imposed on

— Moreover, they are presented to the minds of the audience, that is, to men and women wo are endowed with the capacity for choice and decision; and who live under social conditions that allow them to exercise this capacity to the full.
This action on the minds can be contrasted with the manipulation of souls and bodies: souls with their capacities of emotion and sensibility / sensitivity to romantic or mystical appeals; bodies which can be forced to march or vibrate in unison under a musical mantra or image.

— Consent assent results from an explicit judgment of a free and conscious mind. Assent can be given or withdrawn. Expressing one’s assent is in contrast to producing a response under the causal pressure of a stimulus.

— Finally, argumentation is a discursive technique, that is, a form of speech in which speakers can practice and improve.

— The Treatise does not deal with fallacies, but the evaluation of arguments is a central theme of the book. The sound criticism and evaluation of arguments is not a matter for the orator, but for the partner audiences, both particular and universal.

2. Argumentation as a way of dealing with stasis situations

The Rhetoric to Herennius by an unknown author of the first century BC (formerly attributed to Cicero) articulates argumentative rhetoric with the key concept of stasis. In a court of law, the contradiction between the two parties determines the “point to adjudicate” and produces a stasis, which defines an argumentative situation:

The point to adjudicate is established from the accusation and the denial, as follows: Accusation: ‘You killed Ajax.’ Denial: ‘I did not.’ The point to adjudicate: Did he kill him?
(To Her., I, 17; p 53)

Argumentation can thus be generally defined as an institutionally developed instrument for dealing with and resolving stasis situations, see. Argumentative Question.

3. Argumentation as “substantial logic” and default reasoning

According to Toulmin’s “layout of argument”, the argumentative passage is defined by its structure. The capitalized concepts originate from Toulmin.

— A speaker presents a Claim, based on Data that is oriented by general rules or principles, the Backing, and the Warrant. This defines the monologic assertive component of the argument.

— The Claim is defeasible under certain Rebuttal conditions, expressed by a Modal affecting the Claim. This reservation component refers to a dialogic and critical approach of argumentation.

The combination of an assertive and a refutative component in an “argumentative cell”, both linguistically and cognitively, defines reasonable-rational discourse.

This Toulminian complex is often reduced to the main parts of its assertive component “Data, Claim”,

Slavery has been abolished, why not prostitution? I do believe in the progress of civilization.
When snakes come out, it’s going to rain. We know that from experience.

Toulmin makes no reference to rhetoric. But as Bird has pointed out (1961), with his Warrant and Backing, Toulmin has “rediscovered” the more than two-thousand-year-old concept of topic, fundamental to the rhetorical theory of argument.
This approach is fully compatible with a class of classical definitions of rhetorical argument, such as the following,

Cicero senior — I take it that what you desire to hear about is ratiocination, which is the process of developing the arguments. […]
Cicero Junior — Of course, that is exactly what I require.
Cicero Senior — Well then, ratiocination, as I have just said, is the process of developing the argument; but this process is achieved when you have taken certain or probable premises from which you draw a conclusion which appears in itself either doubtful or less probable.
Cicero, Part., XIII, 46; p. 345-347; my italics

How does one make the doubtful a little less doubtful? Like Toulmin, Cicero sees argumentation (“ratiocination”) as a technique to reduce uncertainty.

4. Argumentation as Schematization

According to Jean-Blaise Grize,

As I understand it, argumentation considers the interlocutor not as an object to be manipulated but as an alter ego with whom a vision must be shared. To work on him means to try to change the various representations attributed to him, by highlighting certain aspects of things, hiding others, proposing him new perspectives, and all this with the help of an appropriate schematization. (Grize 1990, p. 40)

Arguing consists in schematizing, or framing the situation for the interlocutor.
Such a generalization extends the concept of argumentation over the whole act of saying something to someone:

Arguing amounts to making some claims that we choose to compose in a discourse. Conversely, asserting (saying) amounts to arguing, simply because we choose to say and put forward some meanings rather than others. (Vignaux 1981, p. 91)

This vision of saying as essentially a rhetorical argumentative activity has deep roots in the rhetorical tradition.

It can be compared to what Quintilian presents as the essence of rhetorical argumentation:

The art of speaking well. (IO, II, 15, 37)

This famous formula is often quoted in Latin, rhetoric is the « ars bene dicendi »; the definition is supplemented by the definition of the orator as “a good man who speaks well”.
Argumentative rhetoric becomes the legislative technique of persuasive speech, guaranteed by the quality of the speaker, see. Ethos.
This vision of rhetoric is the backbone of the classical humanities.

Compared to Grize — who, as far as I know, never quotes Quintilian, no more than Toulmin referred to the classical science of topoi — the only difference is that Quintilian emphasizes the educational dimension of rhetoric, while Grize simply analyzes argumentation as it is found in natural discourse.

This line of thought generalizes rhetoric to all forms of controlled expression, thus founding a Rhetorik der Sprache (Kallmeyer 1996), a “rhetoric of speech”.

5. Argumentation as orientation

Anscombre and Ducrot’s theory of argumentation within language is based on the fact that, in natural language, the argument as a statement is linguistically linked to the conclusion, which is defined as the next statement:

A speaker argues when he presents a statement S1 (or a set of statements) as intended to make a new statement (or a set of new statements), S2, acceptable. Our thesis is that there are linguistic constraints on this construction. For a statement S1 to be given as an argument supporting a statement S2, it is not sufficient that S1 gives reason to admit S2. The linguistic structure of S1 must also satisfy certain conditions in order to constitute an argument for S2 in a speech. (Anscombre & Ducrot 1983, p. 8)

This approach leads to a redefinition of the concept of topos, as a semantic link between two predicates, see Topos in Semantics.

By redefining the argumentative constraint as a linguistic constraint between constraints, Anscombre and Ducrot generalize the concept of argumentation as a property of the linguistic system (langue and not parole “speech”, as defined by de Saussure).

S. Orientation; Argumentative scale.

6. Argumentation between Monologue and Dialogue

Argument seems to be a mode of discourse which is neither purely monologic nor dialogic. (Schiffrin 1987, p. 17)
[I have defined argument as] a discourse through which speakers support disputable positions. (Id., p. 18)

Schiffrin’s work is not primarily concerned to argument. However, this succinct definition, however, perfectly expresses the mixed character of argumentative activity.

7. Argumentation, a discourse submitted to a rational judge

Argumentation is a verbal and social activity, aiming to strengthen or weaken the acceptability of a controversial point of view from a listener or reader, advancing a constellation of proposals to justify (or disprove) that view before a rational judge. (van Eemeren & al. 1996, p. 5)

This definition combines the rhetorical and dialectical positions. It redefines the position of the third party, the judge, not as an empirical, institutional figure, arguing on the basis of the legal corpus of law and jurisprudence shaped by history and sociology, but instead as a normative rational figure, arguing on the basis of a set of independently defined rational principles, S. Norms; Evaluation and Evaluators.

8. Guidelines adopted in this dictionary

(i) An argumentative situation is defined in the Ad Herennium style: a complex dialogic situation opened by an argumentative question.

(ii) An argumentative question is a question to which the arguers (the debaters) give argued answers, possibly both sensible and reasonable, but incompatible, organized in pro- and a contra-discourse.

(iii) These answers express the conclusions (points of view) of the arguers about the issue. The elements of pro- and counter-discourse which support these conclusions have the status of argument for their respective conclusions.

(iv) Argumentative situations come in a variety of degrees and types of argumentativity, according to the kinds of relationship established between the pro- and counter- discourses and to the interactional and institutional parameters framing the exchanges.

Points (i) to (iv) define the external argumentative relevance, as the relevance of a conclusion for a question.

(v) An argumentation, in the monologic sense is defined as the “argumentative cell”, as represented in Toulmin’s layout.
In the broad sense, the word argumentation covers all the verbal and semiotic activities produced in an argumentative situation.

(vi) An argument is an implicit or explicit combination of statements supporting a conclusion.

(vii) The internal argumentative relevance, as the relevance of an argument for a claim is defined in relation to an argument scheme.

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ARGUMENT – CONCLUSION

1. Argument

The word argument is used in various fields, in grammar, logic, literature, and argumentation, with quite different meanings.

— In logic and mathematics, the arguments of a function f are the empty places x, y, z… that characterize the function; the independent entities (variables) organized by the function.

— By analogy, in grammar, the verb plus its subject and object(s) can be considered the counterpart of a function. For example,
to give, corresponds to the three-argument predicate “x gives y to z”;
to love corresponds to a two-argument predicate, “x loves y”.

By replacing each of these variables with an appropriate phrase (i.e., respecting the semantic relation that characterizes the verb), we form a proposition: “Adam gives Eve an apple”, see Proposition.

— In literature, the central argument of a play or a novel corresponds to the plan, the summary, or the guiding principle of the plot. In this sense, the word argument is morphologically and semantically isolated; argument as « a summary » has no relation to conclusion, nor to arguing₁, argumentation.

2. Argument and argumentation

The words argument and proof are used to translate the Greek word pistis and the Latin word argumentum.

2.1 Argument ~ argumentation

By synecdoche, argument often means argumentation: “let the best argument win!”

2.2 Premise, Data, Argument 

— In logic, the premises of the syllogism lead to a conclusion. The premises are propositions that express true or false judgments. The conclusion is a proposition that is different from the premises and that is derived solely from their combination, without the surreptitious introduction of implicit background information into the argument, see syllogism. A premise is not an argument but a component of an argument; the argument is constructed by combining the two premises.

— In argumentation, the conclusion is derived from a piece of information combined with an inferential topic. The situation is the same in Toulmin’s layout of argument, where the data becomes an argument when combined with an often implicit system justification/support « warrant / backing », see Toulmin’s model. The word argument is routinely used to refer to the data element as the head of such combinations.

— In analytic and direct inferences, the conclusion is derived directly from a single statement that is an argument in itself. The conclusion is derived from the form or the semantic content of the statement argument, S. Proposition.

Argument and conclusion are correlative terms. The relation « argument — conclusion » is expressed, more or less precisely by expressions like those listed below. If necessary, “is” can be replaced by « is presented as such by the speaker » (as in line 1, etc.).

The argument	The conclusion
— is a consensual statement, or is presented as such by the arguer)	— is a dissensual, contested, disputed statement
— is more probable than the conclusion	— is less probable than the argument
— is the cognitive starting point in deliberative argumentation — is the end point in justificatory argumentation	— is the end point of deliberative argumentation — is the starting point in justificatory argumentation
— expresses a reason	— searches for a reason
— does not bear the burden of proof	— bears the burden of proof
— is oriented towards the conclusion	— is a projection of the argument
— (in a functional perspective, from the point of view of the speaker determines, legitimates the conclusion	— — determined, legitimated by the argument
— (in a dialogical perspective) accompanies the answer given to the argumentative question	— — is the correct answer to the argumentative question

2.3 Argument: true, probable, plausible, accepted, conceded…

A statement is taken (or presented) as sufficiently true to be used as an argument on very different bases.

— The argument conveys a known fact, an intellectual self-evidence, see Self-Evidence.

The heat of the wax dilates the pores, making the pulling up less painful (Linguee)

— The partners have explicitly agreed on the statement, e.g.as part of   (quasi-) dialectical agreement:

We agree that Syldavia cannot leave the Eurozone now, so we can make further demands on them.

— The speaker has chosen his argument from those that are considered to be true by the audience, even if he or she has personal doubts about its validity, see Ex datis:

You think that Syldavia will never leave the Eurozone, so…

— A simple fact: the statement is challenged, either by the opponent or the audience.

The audience’s acceptance of stable statements, which that may serve to support the conclusion, is always precarious. The opponent’s belief in the truth of a given statement is even less stable. The choice of what will be considered a valid argument is therefore a strategic choice that will change depending on the circumstances, see Strategy.

Challenging the argument — If the argument is to be challenged, it must itself be legitimized. As part of this operation, the argument assumes the status of a claim made by the proponent and supported by a series of arguments. These new arguments serve as sub-arguments in support the overarching claim, see Linked argument; Epicheirema. If no agreement can be reached on any claim, things can, theoretically, go backwards indefinitely and the debate can continue indefinitely. The risks associated with such “deep disagreement” should not be seen as invalidating argumentation as a useful social tool for dealing with social incompatibilities, provided that third parties play their role in well-regulated settings.

3. Claim, Thesis, Conclusion, Viewpoint, Point of view, Standpoint

In argumentation, the conclusion is also called the claim, or standpoint.
A philosophical conclusion is often called a thesis, S. Dialectic.
The set of conclusions drawn from complex data at the end of an abduction process can be a full-blown theory, S. Abduction.

3.1 Point of view, viewpoint, standpoint

In the socio-political domain, a standpoint is an « opinion », possibly justified by arguments. The pragma-dialectical program aims at reducing, resolving, or eliminating differences of opinion. The corresponding expressions « resolving… differences of conclusions, claims, thesis… » are not used.
An argument as a point of view, an opinion, a perspective… expressed in a single sentence is a very special case. Points of view and opinions are usually expressed in complex discourses, supported by equally complex argumentative sub-discourses. The expression point of view can be used to refer to an entire discourse, including the point of view and the good reasons that support it.
In ordinary language, the concept of point of view organizes the speaker’s perceptual reference system:

On the other side of the hedge was a gardener.
On the other side of the hedge was a street.

In one case, the speaker is outside the garden, in the other inside the garden. The concept of point of view used in argumentation is highly metaphorical. It frames the argumentative situation according to the visual metaphor of a spectator within a landscape, which would be the reality, inaccessible as such, if not represented on a map.
The spectator’s vision provides a section of reality that is restructured according to the laws of perspective. The reality referred to by the point of view is only so with respect to a focus, that is, by definition, unstable. In this sense, a point of view is either questionable because it acts as a blinker; or valuable, because it protects one from the objectivist illusion produced by consensus, and from the paranoia of absolute knowledge.

An affirmation corresponds to a point of view if it is traceable to one subjective source, whereas absolute truth, or vision, is independent of any source, or has a universal, absolute source.
The point of view is an inescapable starting point. Points of view are comparable and evaluable. We cannot be without a point of view, but we can define a better point of view; change our point of view, and multiply our points of view. To eliminate differences in viewpoints, one would have to eliminate subjectivity, or the plurality of voices, and decontextualize the discourse.
Scientific discourses routinely do this, but, insofar as argumentative discourse seeks to deal with human affairs, involving (legitimate) interests, values, and their affective correlates, argumentation analysis cannot align itself with scientific language without changing the nature of its objects and goals. The radical elimination of points of view would require the resurrection of Hegel’s absolute subject, or of the objective and omniscient narrator of nineteenth-century novels.

3.2 Conclusion

The opening section of a discourse is its introduction, the closing section its conclusion. The argumentative conclusion is different from the material conclusion that ends an intervention. The argumentative conclusion can be stated, or repeated, in any part of speech, at the beginning or at the end, or both.

The argumentative conclusion is defined in relation to the argument (see table above). In an argumentative monolog, the conclusion is the claim by which the discourse is organized; to which it converges; in which its orientation is materialized; the intention that gives the discourse its meaning, and the ultimate core of the text obtained by condensing it.

The conclusion is more or less separable from the arguments that support it. Once we have reached the conclusion that « Harry is probably a British citizen », we can, by default, act on that belief. But, insofar as the modal probably expresses clear reservations about the whole inferential process, the claim remains open to revision (i.e. is revisable) as the available information changes. The “fire and forget” principle [1] does not work well in argumentation. The conclusion is never completely divorced from the language used in its construction.

A statement S becomes a claim in the following dialogical configuration

(1) — S is asserted by a speaker (as something essential to him, or merely anecdotal)
(2) — S is not ratified by the addressee: non-preferred second turn
(3) — S is reasserted, possibly reformulated by the speaker
(4) — S is explicitly rejected by the interlocutor (reassertion not ratified, i.e.  disagreement ratified)
(5) — Pro- and contra-arguments emerge

At stage (3), the disagreement emerges. At stage (4) the disagreement is ratified as such, a stasis is formed, and S is now a Claim made by the first speaker. At stage (5), the stasis begins to develop

Stage (1) is not a dialectical “opening stage”. The speaker does not necessarily intend to open a dispute. Non-ratification can occur at any time in an interaction, and can involve any foreground or background statement, see Denying; Disagreement. In other words, being a claim is not a property of a statement, but is attached to the treatment of a statement in an interactive configuration.

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[1] “(Of a missile) capable of guiding itself to its target after being fired.” (EOD, fire-and-forget) (11-08-2017)

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To ARGUE, Argument, Argumentation, Argumentative:
THE WORDS

1. The Words

1.1 To argue ­

The verb to argue has two different meanings which will be referred to, respectively, as to argue₁ and to argue₂:

— To argue₁: “to give reasons for or against; to debate”
— To argue₂: « to engage in a quarrel; to dispute: We must stop arguing and engage in constructive dialogue (tfd, Argue).

The morphological, syntactic, and semantic differences between these meanings are crucial and clear.

Morphology

The word argumentation is derived from to argue₁ via argument₁; it refers only to speech in which a conclusion is supported by good reasons.

Syntax

— To argue_1 is followed by a that clause: “A argues that P”; P is the claim.
— To argue_2 is followed by a double indirect complement: “A argues with B about Q”. Q is neither A‘s nor B‘s claim, but refers to the subject of the dispute.

Semantics

— To argue_₁ means “to give reasons” (MW, Argue) and refers to a semiotic activity (verbal and co-verbal).

— To argue_₂ means “to have a disagreement a quarrel, a dispute” (ibid.), and refers to the wide range of interactions from a lively discussion to outright pugilism, as shown in the following passage, in which the detective Ned Beaumont questions an informant, Sloss:

Ned Beaumont nodded. ‘Just what did you see?’
‘We saw Paul and the kid standing there under the trees, arguing’
‘You could see that as you rode past?’
Sloss nodded vigorously again.
‘It was a dark spot’, Ned Beaumont reminded him. ‘I don’t see how you could’ve made out their faces riding past like that, unless you slowed up or stopped.’
‘No, we didn’t, but I’d know Paul anywhere,’ Sloss insisted.
‘Maybe, but how’d you know it was the kid with him?’
‘It was. Sure it was. We could see enough of him to know that’
‘And you could see they were arguing? What do you mean by that? Fighting?’
‘No, but standing like they were having an argument. You know how you can tell when people are arguing sometimes by the way they stand’
Ned Beaumont smiled mirthlessly. ‘Yes, if one of them’s standing on the other’s face.’ His smile vanished.
Dashiell Hammett, The Glass Key, [1931][1].

1.2 Argument ­

The noun an argument inherits the two meanings of to argue; an argument₁ is a “good reason”, an argument₂ is a “dispute”, possibly including argument₁.
Grimshaw’s book, Conflict Talk. Sociolinguistic Investigations of Arguments in Conversation (1990), deals exclusively deals with arguments₂ “disputes”, and not at all with arguments_1, “good reasons”.

Argument can have two other meanings
Argument₃, as “the abstract, the theme, the subject matter” (of a literary work, etc.).
Argument₄, in mathematics, the variable associated to a function

“Argument is War” — Lakoff and Johnson have discussed the famous equivalence “argument is war”:

Let us start with the concept argument and the conceptual metaphor argument is war. This metaphor is reflected in our everyday language by a wide variety of expressions:

Your claims are indefensible.
He attacked every weak point in my argument.
His criticisms were right on target.
I demolished his argument. […]

“We can actually win or lose arguments” (1980, p. 4)

Lakoff and Johnson call this “the concept argument”. If the preceding conclusion is correct, then, there are not one but two, or even four, concepts of argument. To argue₂ and argument₂ may be associated with some kind of war; but what about argument₁ and to argue₁?

If interlinguistic comparisons can tell anything about words used as concepts, note that, in French, the first set of metaphors is easily translated word for word; but the expression “we can actually win or lose arguments” is not.

The words to argue, argument, and argumentation have clearly recognizable counterparts in French or Spanish, or in the Romance languages in general:

French argumenter, argument, argumentation
Spanish argumentar, argumento, argumentación

This graphic illustration of the proximity of these words certainly favors the internationalization of the concept. However, there are deep differences between their respective meanings, which can be roughly represented as follows:

English

dispute

good reason

topic

 

French

good reason

topic

 

Spanish

good reason

topic

The French word argument and the Spanish word argumento never refer to a dispute. The field of argumentation studies develops from the common meaning of argument₁, “good reason”.

This suggests that the meaning of to argue₂, argument₂ in a language is independent of the concept referred to by the family to argue₁, argument₁, argumentation.

1.3 Argumentative

According to the Merriam-Webster Dictionary, the adjective argumentative shares the two meanings of its morphological base, argument: « controversial » and « disputatious » (MW, Argumentative). The Merriam-Webster Learner’s Dictionary, however, is more categorical (MWLD, Argumentative):

Argumentative: tending to argue; having or showing a tendency to disagree or argue with other people in an angry way: quarrelsome.

An argumentative person
He became more argumentative during the debate.
An argumentative essay.

By default, in this dictionary, argumentative will be attached to the family “argumentation” (argumentative₁), that is, a semantically derived of argument₁ “good reason”, unless contextually clear or otherwise specified. An argumentative essay is taken to be “an essay that develops an argumentation”; when referring to “a polemical essay” (argumentative₂), its quarrelsome character will be explicitly mentioned.

2. Divergent orientations: the words argumenter, argument  vs arguer, argutie in French

In French, from a morphological point of view, the verb arguer is the basic verb from which all the argu- words are derived:

arguer   → un argument      → argumenter       → une argumentation, etc
« an argument »     « to argue »          « an argumentation », etc.

But arguer_F must be distinguished; to argue does not match argumenter_F, nor does arguer_F. There is a semantic discontinuity between arguer_F and argumenter_F. When S1 says:

S:   — Pierre argumente en faveur de P, “Peter argues that P”

S considers that Peter does give arguments_F. If he or she says:

S:   — Pierre argue que… “Peter argues_F that so-and-so”

S is simply quoting the argumentative discourse of Peter without taking a position on the validity of the arguments offered by Peter, and even suggesting that they might be fallacious. In a newspaper the construction:

The extreme right argues_F that…

introduces an argumentation_F presented as weak or invalid.
That is, the verbs arguer_F and argumenter_F have opposite orientations. The former values discourse content as arguments, while the latter suggests that it only presents pseudo-arguments.

Quibble can be translated in French as argutie_F, a word derived from arguer_F:

These people are the manipulated agents of subversion, carrying out instructions and rehashing quibbles [« répétant des arguties »].

Arguer_F and argutie_F are used only occasionally. Arguer_F can be replaced by argument_F between quotes. Thus, a pro-wind farm group quotes the arguments of its opponents, the anti-wind farm group, as follows:

Let’s look at some of the anti-wind farms ‘arguments’
(Complete example, see Convergent argumentation)

The concept of argument, and argumentation studies, benefit from the strong positive orientation that the words argument and argumentation have in ordinary language.
The same is true for the word and the concept of dialogue, see Interaction, Dialogue, Polyphony.

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[1] Quoted after Dashiell Hammett, The Four Great Novels. Picador, 1982. P. 725-726.

APAGOGICAL argument

« Apagogical » or « apagogic » argument is the name given in law to the argument by the absurd.
According to this argument, unreasonable interpretations of the law must be rejected:

The apagogic argument assumes that the legislator is reasonable and could not have admitted an interpretation of the law that would lead to illogical or unjust consequences. (Perelman 1979, p. 58)

It parallels the psychological argument, which assumes that the legislator is rational and benevolent,see Absurd; Juridical arguments.

According to Alexy, the apagogic argument is one of the four types of arguments that prevail in law, the others being the arguments by analogy, a contrario (opposites) and a fortiori, (1989, cited in Kloosterhuis 1995, p. 140).

ANTITHESIS

The rhetoric of figures defines the antithesis as an opposition between two terms (words or phrases) of opposite meanings, that enter into parallel syntactic constructions.
The argument scheme of opposites is discursively materialized as antithesis.

1. Antithesis as Argumentative Diptych

An argumentative situation emerges with the appearance of a point of confrontation ratified as such, a stasis. It develops into a diptych, characterized by the confrontation of two schematizations, that is to say two sets of descriptions, narratives and arguments that support two opposing conclusions. At this stage, the two discourses develop in opposition to each other, without explicitly taking this opposition into account, S. Stasis. This elementary argumentative situation corresponds to a discursive antithesis.

Such a confrontation could be taken up in a structured monologue that juxtaposes the two sides of the question. Such a monologic diptych features an “antiphony”, that is two voices making incompatible arguments (antioriented arguments) about the same issue. This is typically seen when an individual with a vested interest in an issue engages in internal deliberation, and oscillates between two points of view, acting effectively as a third party. This situation is elaborated as a dilemma whose opposing (anti-oriented) horns are articulated by an and:

I admire your courage and I pity your youth.
Corneille, Le Cid 2, 2, verse 43. Quoted by Lausberg [1960], §796

When the speaker clearly identifies with one of the two voices, the balance of the two voices is broken in favor of one of the positions. The and-dilemma transforms into a but-opposition, which overcomes the antithesis:

… but I pity your youth; so, I won’t accept your challenge to a duel.

2. Antithesis, Figure of Speech and Argument

The following argument is structured by the scheme of the opposite:

(D1) He is submissive to the privileged; I do not want to confront him in a weak position.

Exactly like the self-argued description:

(D2) He is submissive to the privileged and powerful, and tough with the weak.

While in (D1), the second member of the scheme “he must be tough with the weak”, remains implicit, (D2) corresponds to a complete expression of the topos. But the two discourses are based on the same mechanisms, the argumentation is “valid” or acceptable insofar as the portrait sounds “true”; both are “convincing”. Description and argument are rooted in the same figure of speech or argument scheme, the antithesis.

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Analogy 2: STRUCTURAL ANALOGY

1. Terminology

Structural analogy connects two complex domains, each of which articulates an indefinite and unlimited number of objects and relations between these objects. It combines intra-categorical analogy (a property of objects) with proportional analogy (a property of relations). One could also speak of formal analogy (the domains have the same shape) or borrow the mathematical term “isomorphism”, see Intra-categorical analogy; Proportion.

The term “material analogy” refers to the relationship between two objects when one is a replica of the other. The concept covers various phenomena, such as the relationship between a model and its original, or the relationship between a prototype and the object to be produced. The reasoning based on the model or prototype is then applied to the original.

Structural analogy is used in the following two situations.

(i) A, B, C are similar ­— To determine whether the complex objects or domains A, B, C are similar, one must compare their components and the relationships between them. The result of this investigation will be a claim such as « A, B, C are similar »; « A, B, are indeed similar, but C is something different”, and so on.

One might ask whether the Great Depression of 1929, the Lost Decade of Japan in the 1990s, and the Argentine crisis of 2001 share some significant characteristics. The whole purpose of the study may be to establish a typology of economic crises, without relying — as much as possible — relying on preconceived notions of how people will use the conclusions of this study.

The areas are symmetrical from the point of view of the study, which does not favor any of the areas over the others, but only focuses only on their relationships.

(ii) A is similar to B — A contrario, the importance of the previous situation appears when the series includes the 2008 crisis. Given the topicality of this last crisis, it will certainly be tempting to see if we can « learn lessons » from the previous crises and to apply them to the case of 2008, with the intention of making provisions for the current situation. If the proponent uses the analogy 1929 ~ 2008 to predict a third world war, her opponent can refute the inference by showing that the domains are not similar, and therefore it is impossible to rely on the first instance, in 1929, to infer anything about what will happen in 20** and beyond (see below).

The difference in status between the two domains is expressed in different ways. In his analysis of the metaphor, Richards contrasts tenor and vehicle (1936); Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca speak of theme and phore ([1958], p. 501). A simple way of naming these domains might be comparing domain / compared domain; or, in terms of argument analysis, Resource domain / Target domain.
The argument by analogy works on the asymmetry of the compared domains. Therefore, these two domains are denoted, if necessary by the letter R, the resource field, and Π (Greek capital letter “pi”),   the Problematic domain, targeted by the investigation. The field R is the source or Resource on which the arguer relies to explore the target domain Π, or to derive certain consequences about Π from R. In other words, the resource field R is the argument domain and the target field Π is the inference domain.

The two domains are distinguished from epistemic, psychological, linguistic and argumentative perspectives.

— Epistemically, the resource domain is the best-known domain; the target domain is the domain under investigation.
— Psychologically, the intuitions and values that operate in the resource domain are brought to bear in the target domain.
— Linguistically, the resource domain is well covered by a stabilized, familiar and easily spoken language; the target domain is not.
—Practically, we know what to do in the resource domain but we do not know what to do in the target domain.

2. Explanatory Analogy

In Ernest Rutherford well-known analogy between the atom and the solar system, the resource field is the solar system, the goal domain is the atom:

The atom is like the solar system.

This is a didactic analogy, intended to provide a first intuitive understanding of the atomic structure, taking advantage of a (supposed) better understanding of the solar system. The asymmetry of the fields is obvious: the resource field, the solar system, has been known and understood for a long time. The targeted field, the atom, was new, then poorly understood, inaccessible to direct perception, mysterious.

The explanatory analogy retains some pedagogical merit, however partial. Comparison is not identification, and two systems can be compared only in order to identify the limits of the comparison, that is, the irreducible specificities of each field, cf. infra, §6.

The analogy has explanatory value in the following situation:

In the world Π, the proposition π is badly understood. In a world R, there is no debate about r. Π is isomorphic to R (structural, systemic analogy). The position of π in Π is the same as that of r in R. So, the knowledge, images, commitments associated with r are now transferred to π; π is now a little better understood; we know how to deal with π.

The analogical relation allows the unknown to be integrated on the basis of the known. As causal explanations, analogical explanations break the insularity of the domains.

The analogy is an invitation to see and treat the problem through the resource. The resource domain is viewed as a model of the target domain. The relationship of the domain under study to the resource domain is treated as of the relationship of the domain under study to an abstract representation of that domain. Otto Neurath uses a maritime metaphorical analogy to explain his vision of epistemology:

There is no tabula rasa. We are like sailors at sea, who must rebuild their ship without ever taking it to a dock to be dismantled and rebuilt it with better materials. (Otto Neurath, [Protocol Statement],1932/3.[1])

The analogy can be translated literally: “There is no ultimate foundation of knowledge from which we could rebuild all of our present knowledge without any presuppositions.” This resource is extremely powerful; the image could also be applied to social life: “There is no ‘good explanation’ (meaning « good discussion of our disagreements ») that would allow us to reconstruct a damaged relationship and start from scratch.”

3. Arguments Based on Structural Analogy

In ordinary situations, analogy is used argumentatively, as in the following case:

— In the world Π, we are in a difficult situation; what should we do? Should we accept or reject the perspective π?
— But we know for sure what happens in a world R.
— Fortunately, Π is isomorphic to R (structural, systemic analogy); if necessary we can argue for this.
— The position of π in Π is the same as the position of r in R.
— So, we can act, in the world Π, on the basis of the knowledge, images, obligations associated with r (in R) — That is, we can now decide about π.

This argumentative operation implies that “if the domains are analogous, so are their corresponding elements and the relations between them”, which may turn out to be true or false upon further investigation. The analogy gives us something to think about, but proves nothing; the conclusion projected onto Π may be false or ineffective.

4. From Analogy to Metaphor and Back

A language is associated with the resource domain. For example, ​​the human body is referred to in a language that may be incomplete and rather incoherent, but is generally understood, the language of the flow of organic matter, of popular physiology, of good health and illness, of life and death. This language synthetizes and builds a common intuition of the body. Other unfamiliar domains are not equipped with such a dense, effective and functional language. The analogy projects the language of the resource field, the human body, onto the problem field, society. As a result, the target can be problematized in a familiar, non-controversial language; so that social convulsions can be discussed and a cure found. The analogy is an invitation to see the problem through the lens of the resource; full metaphorization allows us to forget the glasses.

The following apologue is based on the analogy « society is like a body », as expressed in the metaphorical phrase “social body”. Note the explicitness of the vocabulary of analogy in the last section of the commentary.

The senate therefore decided to send as their spokesman Menenius Agrippa, an eloquent man, who was also accepted by the plebs because he himself was of plebeian origin. He was received into the camp, and it is reported that he told them, in a primitive and uncouth manner, the following fable. ‘In the days when all the parts of the human body did not work together as they do now, but each went its own way and spoke its own language, the other members, indignant at seeing that all that was acquired by their care and labor and service went to the belly, while the belly, undisturbed in the midst of them all, did nothing but enjoy the pleasures provided for it, entered into a conspiracy; the hands were not to bring food to the mouth, the mouth was not to receive it when offered, the teeth were not to chew it. While they, in their resentment, were trying to force the belly by starving it, the members themselves were wasting away, and the whole body was reduced to the last stage of exhaustion. Then it was found that the belly did no idle service, and that the nourishment it received was no greater than that which it gave by returning to all the parts of the body that blood by which we live and are strong, evenly distributed in the veins, after being ripened by the digestion of the food.’ By using this comparison, and showing how the internal discontent between the parts of the body resembled the animosity of the plebeians against the patricians, he succeeded in winning over his audience.
Titus Livius, The History of Rome, Volume 1, Book 2; between 27 and 9 BC [2]

The resource does not necessarily exist before it is used in an analogy. An analogy can create a self-evident resource ex nihilo, as in the following analogy, proposed by Heisenberg in 1955. The danger mentioned in the first line refers to the Cold War era, and the resource concept is “a ship built with such a large amount of steel and iron that its compass, instead of pointing North points toward the iron mass of the ship.” Note again that there is no clear line between structural analogy and metaphor. Heisenberg calls the situation he envisions a metaphor; and in the next line, he uses a construction that expresses an analogy: “Mankind is in the position of a captain”.

Another metaphor might make such a danger even clearer. Through the seemingly un­limited growth of its material power, humanity could be likened to a captain whose ship has been built from such a large amount of steel and iron that its compass, instead of pointing north, is pointing toward the huge iron mass of the ship. Such a ship would get nowhere. It would be blown off course and go around in circles.

But to return to the situation of modern physics, we must admit that the danger exists only if the captain does not know that his compass no longer responds to the magnetic force of the Earth. Once he understands this, the danger is already halved. Because the captain who does not want to turn back, but wants to reach a known or unknown destination, will find a way to steer the boat, either by using new modern compass that does not react to the iron mass of the boat, or by steering in relation to the stars as sailors used to do. It is true that the visibility of the stars does not depend on us, and perhaps we rarely see them today. Nevertheless, our awareness of the limits of our hope for progress presupposes the desire not to go round in circles, but to reach a goal. Once recognized, this limit becomes the first fixed point that allows a new orientation.
Werner Heisenberg, [Nature in Modern Physics], [1955] [3]

5. Structural Analogy as an Epistemological Barrier

Analogy is fruitful in stimulating discovery and invention, useful in teaching and popularizing knowledge. But it becomes an epistemological barrier when the proposed explanation by analogy seems so clear and satisfying that it discourages further inquiry:

For example, blood flows like water. Canalized water irrigates the soil, so blood should also irrigate the body. Aristotle was the first to associate the distribution of blood from the heart to the body with the irrigation of a garden by canals (De Partes Animalium, III, v, 668 a 13 and 34). Galen did not think otherwise. But to irrigate the soil, it is ultimately to get lost in the soil. And this is the main obstacle to a correct understanding of the blood circulation.
Georges Canguilhem, [The Knowledge of Life], 1951.[4]

The systematic rejection of analogy as a tool of knowledge is based on such observations.

6. Refuting Structural Analogies

6.1 Vain Analogy

In an explanation, the explanation (explanans) must be clearer than the thing to be explained (explanandum). An analogical explanation must also satisfy this condition, and if the resource area is even less well known than the area under investigation the analogy will not help to understand of things.

The analogy is also useless if it is used to impress the audience and to show off the speaker’s familiarity with the resource domain. Gödel’s theorem is often used for this purpose (Bouveresse [1999]).

6.2 False Analogy

An argument by analogy can be rejected by showing that there are critical differences between the resource domain and the target domain, that prohibit the projection of the former onto the latter so that no lesson can be learned from the supposed resource domain. For example, the following passage argues that the comparison of the 2008 and 1929 crises is marred by the fact that the current situation in Germany has nothing to do with its situation after 1918 and in the years to come. It is also argued that there is nothing comparable to Hitler and Nazism in the European landscape of 2009:

Jean-François Mondot — Is the economic crisis weakening our civilization? We sometimes hear intellectuals and columnists draw analogies with the 1929 crisis that led to the Second World War.

Pascal Boniface — We often make the mistake of thinking that history repeats itself, and so we make very risky comparisons. Russia bangs its fist on the table, and everyone immediately talks about the Cold War. There is an economic and financial crisis erupts on Wall Street, and immediately an analogy is drawn to 1929, suggesting that Hitler could come to power as a result of these difficulties. But the political circumstances are obviously very different, for no great country is now being humiliated as Germany was after 1918, and so is seeking revenge. This comparison is easy to make, but it has no basis, neither strategic nor intellectual.
Pascal Boniface, [The Clash of Civilizations is Not Inevitable], 2009.[5]

6.3 Partial analogy

Partial analogy (« misanalogy », Shelley, 2002, 2004) is an analogy that has been criticized and recognized as limited. The two domains cannot be equated. Nevertheless, partial analogy still has a pedagogical use, as seen in the case of the analogy between the solar system and the atom (see §2 above):

A central body: the sun, the nucleus of the atom.
Peripheral elements: the planets, the electrons.
A central mass much greater than the peripheral masses: the mass of the sun is greater than that of the planets; the mass of the nucleus is greater than that of the electrons. —etc.

Differences (analogy breaks):

The nature of the attraction: electric for the atom, gravitational for the solar system.
There are identical atoms, each solar system is unique.
There can be several electrons in the same orbit, whereas there is only one planet in the same orbit, etc.

The fact that the limits of analogy are well known prohibits any automatic transfer of knowledge gained in one field to the other.

6.4 Reverse Analogy

A conclusion C1 has been reached about a target resource on the basis of an analogy drawn from the resource domain R. The opponent argues that the same analogy drawn from the same domain R leads to another conclusion C2 about the same target domain, that is incompatible with C1 (« disanalogy » Shelley, ibid.). These two contradictory conclusions prohibit the use of the resource domain to argue in the target domain.

This is particularly effective because the opponent is conceding to play on her opponent’s home turf. The opponent accepts the proponent’s analogy and examines it more closely in order to neutralize the proponent’s conclusions. This strategy is used in the refuting argumentative metaphors.

Argument: ­— This is the heart of our discipline.
Refutation: — That’s true. But disciplines also need eyes to see clearly, legs to move, hands to act, and even a brain to think.
Other refutation — That’s true, but the heart can keep beating very well preserved in a jar.

An advocate of hereditary monarchy speaks against universal suffrage:

Argument: — An elected president, that’s absurd, we don’t elect the  ship’s pilot.
Rebuttal: — There are no natural-born ship’s pilot either.

Both sides are staging the same metaphorical field. This form of rebuttal has the force of an ad hominem refutation, based on the speaker’s own beliefs about the speaker: “You are your own refuter”.

Counter-analogy — As with any argument, an argument by analogy can be countered with a counter-argument (an argument whose conclusion is incompatible with the original conclusion). This rebuttal can be of any kind, including another argument by analogy, taken from a different resource domain; one analogy balances another analogy:

Argument:   — The university is (like) a business, so …
Rebuttal:     — No, it is (like) a day-care center, an abbey …

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[1] Otto Neurath, “Protokollsätze”. Erkenntnis 3 (1932/3), p. 206. Quoted in A. Beckermann “Zur Inkohärenz und Irrelevanz of Wissensbegriffs”. Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 55, 2001. P. 585. [« On the incoherence and irrelevance of concepts of knowledge ». Journal for Philosophical Research, etc.] [2] Translated by Rev. Canon Roberts, edited. by Ernest Rhys. J. M. Dent & Sons, Ltd., London, 1905. Quoted from; http://mcadams.posc.mu.edu/txt/ah/Livy/Livy02.html. No pag. (11-08-2017)
[3] Quoted from Werner Heisenberg (1962) La Nature dans la Physique Contemporaine. Paris: Gallimard, 1962. P. 35-36. [Nature in Contemporary Physics] [4] Quoted after Georges Canguilhem, La Connaissance de la Vie. Paris: Vrin, 1965. P. 26-27. [The Knowledge of Life.
[5] Pascal Boniface, “Le clash des civilisations n’est pas inévitable”. Interview by J.-F. Mondot, Les Cahiers de Science et Vie, 2009. www.iris-france.org / Op-2009-03-04.php3] (09-20-2013) [“A clash of civilizations is not inevitable”.]