Conductive arguments are defined by Wellman as third kind of argument, parallel to deduction and induction. In view of examples such as those below (my numbering, CP), he notes that, “it is tempting, therefore, to define a conductive argument as any argument that is neither deductive nor inductive” (1971, p. 51):

(1) You have to take your son to the circus because you promised.
(2) This is a good book because it is interesting and thought provoking.
(3) Although he is tactless and nonconformist, he is still a morally good man because of his underlying kindness and real integrity. (Ibid.)

Wellman distinguishes between three types of conductive arguments

(i) “A single reason is given for the conclusion” (id. p. 55), as in

(4) You ought to help him because he has been very kind to you.
(5) That was a good play because the characters were so well drawn. (Ibid.)

(ii) “In the second pattern of conduction, several reasons are given for the conclusion” (id., p. 56), as in:

(6) You ought to take your son to the movie, because you promised to do so, it is a good movie, and you have nothing better to do this afternoon.
(7) This is not a good book, because it fails to hold one’s interest, is full of vague description, and has a very implausible plot. (Ibid.)

(iii) “The third pattern of conduction is that form of argument in which some conclusion is drawn from both positive and negative considerations. In this pattern, reasons against the conclusion are included as well as reasons for it” (id., p. 57), as in

(8) In spite of a certain dissonance, that piece of music is beautiful because of its dynamic quality and its final conclusion.
(9) Although your lawn needs cutting, you ought to take your son to the movie because the picture is ideal for children and will be gone by tomorrow. (Ibid.)

The key characteristic of conductive reasoning appears to be condition (3), where, depending on the speakers, and with the same reasons, the pros can outweigh the cons or vice versa (Blair 2011). From the same data, another speaker might draw the opposite conclusion.

(8.1) In spite of a certain dynamic quality and its final conclusion, that piece of music is ugly because of its dissonance.

The adjective certain seems to be attached to the connective in spite of, indicating that the speaker will not argue on the basis of this argument (will not identify with this voice), S. Interaction, Dialogue, Polyphony.

A conductive argument does not seem amenable to default reasoning. Their conditions of refutation are different. Default reasoning might be updated or changed when new information is accessed, while conductive reasoning does not depend on information as such. A conductive argument typically deals with values, either moral or aesthetic. The specific issue of conduction is the hierarchization, or balance, of values. Whilst some pairs of values will be very difficult, if not impossible, to balance, others will be quite plausibly balanced. So, sentence (8) for example can be plausibly converted as (8.1), because the three implied values cannot, in my view, be hierarchized, whilst (9) invokes values which seem easier to balance:

(9.1) I know, the movie is ideal for children and won’t be showing in the cinema after tomorrow, but you ought to cut your lawn.

Cutting the lawn seems to be a task which is easy to postpone, in view of the children’s education and their legitimate satisfaction, which might be prioritized. So, in the case of (9), the consensus would be that pros clearly outweigh the cons.

In any case, more complex interactional data could provide some clue as to how dissenting speakers fare when dealing with competing values.

The Treatise on Argumentation insists on the necessity and variety of “prior agreements” between participants to develop an argumentation — that is, an argument₁; no previous agreements are necessary to engage in an argument₂:

For argumentation to exist, an effective community of minds must be realized at a given moment. There must first of all be agreement, in principle, on the formation of this intellectual community, and, after that, on the fact of debating a specific question together: now, this does not come about automatically. (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca [1958], p. 14)

Two different kinds of agreements are mentioned here, and, as the text points out, neither of them can be taken for granted.

1. Formation of speech communities

This first kind of agreement deals with the realization of an “effective community of minds”, constituted upon the free decision taken by the participants. It may be considered as an ideal form of argumentative communication. Its nearest approximation may be philosophical or scientific friendly encounters.

Not all argumentative practices depend on the production of such a community. The court is a prototypical argumentative place, and no prior voluntary agreement must be made with criminals to assure their timely appearance; when necessary, legal coercion may be used. Institutions defining specific forums, problems and rules of interaction determine the social and legal conventions ruling argumentative communities. The existence of these social infrastructures makes it possible to avoid previous cumbersome negotiations among speech communities.

2. Agreement about the issue

To discuss an issue, must we first “agree to discuss this issue together”? As was the case for the kind of agreements described immediately above, the different legal systems establish who has the legal right to determine the charges leading to the appearance of a given party; the defendant does not necessarily agree to discuss the matter, but is summoned by the judge.

Prior discussions may be useful in institutionally structured communities in order to establish the points that will be discussed at a particular meeting. But the agenda is not necessarily decided upon by mutual agreement among the future participants in the discussion; it may be the prerogative of an individual in charge of the organization. On the other hand, the issue itself, may be re-framed during the encounter.

Intellectual communities are also social communities, even when they address questions concerning the human condition in general. The disputability of an issue is itself an argumentative exercise, in the same way as the process of discussing the issue itself. Two quite distinct subquestions must be envisioned, first, a central one, the conditions on the “disputability” of the issue properly said, and second, if all the potential partners agree to discuss such and such issue, a practical issue must be settled, the material conditions on the discussion itself – where, when, who will chair the discussion, etc. — not to mention the shape of the table.

The dispute about the maximization vs. minimization of the right to discuss define what may be called the stasis of stasis.

2.1 Maximizing the right to discuss

Concerning the substantial issue, one can either stress the principle of radical free expression according to which any point of view can be affirmed and challenged, or emphasize the pragmatic conditions of such discussion. The first of the “Ten Commandments for Reasonable Discussants” posits that:

Commandment 1, Freedom rule: Discussants may not prevent each other from advancing standpoints or calling standpoints into question. (van Eemeren, Grootendorst, 2004, p. 190)
S. Rules.

This is also the position taken by Stuart Mill:

If all mankind minus one, were of one opinion, and only one person were of the contrary opinion, mankind would be no more justified in silencing that one person, than he, if he had the power, would be justified in silencing mankind. (Mill, [1859], p. 76)

2.2 Conditioning the rights to discussion

Absolute liberty of expression would give free rein to racist speech, hate speech, collective verbal and non-verbal persecution of the individual chosen as a scapegoat a group, types of speech which many would find unacceptable. If individuals are free to privately discuss anything, provided they can find a partner willing to do so, actual speech communities put conditions on social discussions. For example, the res judicata principle prevents the reopening of an issue which has already been judged, unless a new fact is to be considered.

Moreover, the proper functioning of a speech community must take into consideration the fact that it is not possible to discuss anything (condition on the subject, on the agenda), with anyone (condition on the participants), anywhere and anytime (material conditions on place and time), no matter how (according to what procedure), S. Manipulation:

Some Truths Are Not for Common Ears. It is lawful to speak the truth; it is not expedient to speak the truth to everybody at every time and in every way.
Erasmus, [1524], On the Freedom of the Will. (no pag.)[1]

The Treatise is very sensitive to the “anyone” condition:

There are beings with whom any contact may seem superfluous or undesirable. There are some one cannot be bothered to talk to. There are also others with whom one does not wish to discuss things, but to whom one merely gives orders.
(Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca [1958], p. 15)

Aristotle limits topics of legitimate discussion to the endoxa, and rejects debates questioning “anything”, that is to say, affirmations which in practice nobody doubts:

Not every problem, nor every thesis, should be examined, but only
one which might puzzle one of those who need argument, not punishment or perception. For people who are puzzled to know whether one ought
to honor the gods and love one’s parents or not need punishment, while those who are puzzled to know whether snow is white or not need perception. (Top., 11)

The undisputable refers to three kinds of evidence: sense data evidence, “snow is white”; religious evidence, “we must honor the gods”; and the social evidence “we must love our parents”; these statements are uncontroversial because it is unconceivable that anyone would argue otherwise — in Aristotle’s Athenian society of course. In order for an opinion to be worthy of doubt, it must, on the one hand, fall within the scope of the doxa. That is, it must be part of the defining beliefs of the community, or seriously claimed by some of its honorable members or a subgroup, S. Doxa.

On the other hand, the doubt must be serious, that is motivated. Arguing being a costly activity, one must have a good reason to doubt. In other words, the person who wants to challenge an accepted statement bears the burden of proof.

In the same spirit, the theory of stasis categorizes as uncontroversial (a-stasic) misplaced, badly worded or intractable questions, or, conversely, questions whose answer is obvious, S. Dialectic; Self evidence; Stasis; Argumentative question.

On the legitimizing effects of debate, S. Paradoxes.

3. Agreement on what counts as an argument

Agreements on the community of speech and on the issue must be supplemented by agreements on beings, facts, rules and values ​​(Perelman, Olbrechts-Tyteca [1958], II, 1). Agreements here should establish what counts as an argument: condition of truth; of relevance of the true statement for the defended conclusion; of relevance of the conclusion (defended by a true and relevant statement) for the debate itself, S. Relevance.

When it is impossible to determine whether a statement is true, relevant to a conclusion itself relevant to a debate, a general system of acceptance or tacit agreement is invoked. In serious global disagreements, sub-agreements are difficult to reach; the disputants anticipate their opponent’s conclusion, and know very well that once the argument is accepted, the conclusion will quickly follow, hence the tendency to postulate disagreement as a ruling principle, including upon what should be considered as facts, S. Politeness; Dissensus; Disagreement.

This “appeal to agreement” is actually grounded on an argument by perverse effects, considering that the absence of agreement would condemn the debate to an undesired state of deepening disagreement, that can indeed lead to a collapse of the discussion (Doury 1997). In practice, two facts must be taken into account. Firstly, points of agreement and disagreement can be negotiated on the spot, during the discussion. Secondly, the lack of agreement does not preclude argumentation, it suffices that third parties take the reins of the discussion. The decision of the judge, and more generally that of the third party, is commonly made on the basis of an argument rejected or ignored by one party, or by both, S. Roles. Judicial organizations intervene precisely when no agreement can be passed between the parties; as representing the ruling power, they dispense with agreements — not with arguments.

In general, if one agrees on the data and rules, the conclusion automatically follows; argumentation becomes demonstrative. But argumentation is a linguistic way of dealing with the different in a system of generalized disagreement and uncertainty. There is a decisive incompatibility between the material interests at stake: one can indeed divide the pie, but what is eaten by any one person cannot be shared with the other. Serious, deep, intractable… disagreement between the parties, proponent and opponent, should be considered to be the basic condition of argumentation; that is why third parties have a key role to play in argumentative devices.

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[1] Quoted after Desiderius Erasmus, On the Freedom of the Will. Trans. by E. Gordon Rupp (no pag., no date). www.sjsu.edu/people/james.lindahl/courses/Hum1B/s3/Erasmus-and-Luther-on-Free-Will-and-Salvation.pdf (05-23-17).

Concessions may be negotiated in an organized discussion, or presented as such in a monological discourse.

1. Negotiated concession

Through negotiated concessions, the arguer modifies his or her original position by decreasing the original demand or by granting to the adversary a controversial sub-point. From a strategic point of view, this move may amount to an orderly retreat, possibly for future benefit, hoping that the opponent will do the same when it comes to another point.

Aristotelian logical-dialectical games ignore concessions, as a violation of the principle of excluded middle, things being either entirely true, or entirely false; conclusively defended or not, S. Dialectic. In contrast, conceding is a key moment in the negotiation process of human affairs, understood as a discussion leading to a reasonable agreement (Kerbrat-Orecchioni, 2000).

By making concessions, the arguer recognizes that the opponent’s point of view is to some extent valid, whilst continuing to uphold the value of his or her own positions and conclusions. The arguing party may believe that his or her remaining arguments are:

— More compelling, or of a different type than those of the opponent.
— Not strong arguments, but nonetheless arguments grounded on personal values and deep convictions (identity-based arguments).

The original position should thus be maintained against all odds, according to the formula “I do know, but still…”.

In everyday discussions, concessions are valued as manifestations of openness to the others, and as constitutive of a positive ethos. Nonetheless, concessions may be ironic, S. Epitrope.

2. Concession as a speech act

In grammar, concessive constructions “A(claim) + C(concession)” co-ordinate two statements having opposite argumentative orientations, while retaining the overarching orientation determined by the first proposition A:

“Although C, A”; “certainly C, but A”
“I admit, I understand C but I stick to A”.

C takes up or reformulates the speech of the opponent, or evokes the speech of a fictitious opponent; A reaffirms the speaker’s claim.

Social relations are indeed extremely tense these days, but we must nonetheless go on restructuring the company.

Unlike negotiated concession, linguistic concession is structural. The speaker sets out:

— first, a virtual character or voice developing the argument “social relations are extremely tense”, oriented towards conclusions such as “stop the restructuring of the company”,

—followed by a second argument, putting forward the opposite position “we must go on restructuring the company”, and identifies with this second character. In Goffman’s words, the speaker is the animator of A, and the animator and principal of C. In other words, the speaker recognizes the existence of arguments supporting an opposing conclusion, but at the same time refuses to conclude on this basis. The concession here is a simple acknowledgment of the fact that somebody, somewhere, says, or may say something opposite to that claimed by the speaker. This amounts to a de-activation of the argumentative strength of the aforementioned argument. This kind of concession is by no means the expression of the goodwill of a reasonable negotiator, but a mere phagocytosis and castration of the opponent’s arguments.

The two forms of concession may be superimposed, by rationalizing the linguistic concession. One considers that linguistic concession occurs when the speaker has taken the opponent’s arguments into consideration and confronted them with his or her own (even if this examination often leaves no discursive trace), and that, finally, in the grand scheme of things, he or she thinks that her or his arguments are better. But since language gives for real and true that which it signifies, a purely linguistic concession automatically produces a negotiated concession effect, whether or not it is really the case. This does not mean that linguistic concession is always mere lip service, but that negotiated concession can only be studied on corpora built to that effect.

Aristotle considers composition or “combination of words” and division as verbal fallacies, that is fallacies of words, as opposed to fallacies of things or method, S. Fallacies 2. They are discussed in the Sophistical Refutations (RS 4) and in the Rhetoric (II, 24, 1401a20 – 1402b5; RR p. 128).

The label argumentation by division is sometimes used to refer to case-by-case argumentation, S. Case-by-Case.

1. Grammar of composition and division

Composition and division involve the conjunction and that can coordinate:

— Phrases:

(1) Peter and Paul came.                   (No and N1) + Verb
(2) Peter smoked and prayed.            No + (V1 and V2)

— Statements:

(3) Peter came and Paul came.            (N + V1) and (N1 + V2)
(4) Peter smoked and Peter prayed.     (N + V1) and (N1 + V2)

In Aristotelian logical-grammatical terminology:

(3) and (4) are obtained by division respectively from (1) and (2).
(1) and (2) are obtained by composition respectively from (3) and (4).

The compound and divided statements are sometimes semantically equivalent and sometimes not.

(i) Equivalent — (1) and (3) on the one hand, (2) and (4) on the other hand are roughly equivalent, although it seems that (1), not (3), implies that Peter and Paul came together. In this case, composition and division are possible, and the coordination is used simply to avoid repetition.

(ii) Not equivalent — sometimes phrase coordination (composed statement) is not equivalent to sentence coordination (divided statement). The semantic phenomena involved are of very different types.

Peter got married and Mary got married.
≠ Peter and Mary married.

If Peter and Mary are brother and sister, the custom being what it is, the composition is unambiguous. Without such information, the composition introduces an ambiguity.

The operation of division can produce a meaningless discourse:

The flag is red and black.
* The flag is red and the flag is black.

B is between A and C.
* B is between A and B is between C.

Sometimes a syntactic operation applied to a statement produces a paraphrase of this statement. At other time, the same operation applied to another statement having apparently the same structure as the first one produces a statement that has no meaning, or whose meaning and truth conditions entirely differ from those of the original statement.

2. Aristotelian logic of composition and division

The study of paraphrastic systems is a classical object of syntactic theory. Aristotelian logic considers composition and division as a problem in logic. As Hintikka (1987) has repeatedly pointed out, the Aristotelian notion of fallacy is dialogical, S. Fallacy (I). The fallacious maneuver throws the interlocutor into confusion, and this is precisely what happens with composition and division. The following case is one of the oldest and most famous illustrations of the fallacy of composition:

This dog is your dog (is yours); and this dog is a father (of several puppies).
So this dog is your father and you are the brother of the puppies.

The interlocutor is disoriented, and everyone finds that very funny (Plato, Euth., XXIV, 298a-299d, pp. 141-142). S. Sophism.

Aristotle analyzes this kind of sophistical and sophisticated problem in the Sophistical Refutations and in the Rhetoric under the heading of “paralogism of composition and division”. He shows that the issue extends to a variety of discursive phenomena, under what conditions can judgments made on the basis of isolated statements be “composed” into a discourse of connected statements? The discussion is illustrated by several examples showing the full scope of the interpretation issues that are raised, even if their wording may seem contrived.

(i) Consider the statement: “it is possible to write while not writing” (RS, 4); it can be interpreted in two ways:

— Interpretation 1 composes the meaning: “one can at the same time write and not write” (ibid.), in the sense of: “one can (write and not write)”. The composition is misleading and absurd.
— Interpretation 2 divides the meaning; when one does not write one still retains the capacity to write, meaning: “one can know how to write, while not writing”, which is correct. Under certain circumstances, a person who can write cannot physically do so, for example if one’s hands are tied. The modal power is ambiguous between “having the capacity to” and “having the possibility to exercise that capacity”.

 (ii) The following example also uses the modal can, this time in its relation to time. Consider the statement “if you can carry one thing, you can carry several” (RS, 4, 166a30: 11):

(1) (I can carry the table) and (I can carry the cabinet)

Therefore, by composition of the two statements into one:

(2) I can carry (the table along with the cabinet)

Which is not necessarily the case.

(iii) The fallacy of division is illustrated by the example “five is equal to three and two” (after RS, 4, 166a30, p.12):

— Interpretation (1) divides meaning, that is, it decomposes the utterance into two coordinated propositions, which is both absurd and fallacious:

(Five is equal to three) and (five is equal to two)

— Interpretation (2) composes the meaning, which is correct:

Five is equal to (three and two)

In the Rhetoric, the notion of composition is discussed with several examples that clearly show the relevance of the issue for argumentation. The argument by composition and division “[asserts] of the whole what is true of the parts, or of the parts what is true of the whole” (Rhet, II, 24, 1401a20-30; RR, pp. 381), which makes it possible to present things from quite different angles. This technique of argumentation involves statements constructed around appreciative and modal predicates such as:

— is good; — is just; — is able to —; — can —;
— knows —; — said.

The following example is taken from Sophocles play, Electra. Clytemnestra killed her husband, Agamemnon. Then their son Orestes kills his mother to avenge his father. Was Orestes morally and legally entitled to do this?

“‘T’is right that she who slays her lord should die’; ‘it is right too, that the son should avenge his father’. Very good: these two things are what Orestes has done.” Still, perhaps the two things, once they are put together, do not form a right act. (Rhet., II. 24, 1401a35-b5, RR, 383).

Orestes justifies what he did, arguing that his two actions can be composed. His accuser rejects the composition.

This technique of decomposing a doubtful action into a series of commendable, or at least innocent, acts is arguably very productive. Stealing is just taking the bag that is there, taking it somewhere else, and failing to put it back in the same place. The division blocks the overall assessment.

A second example clearly shows that fallacy and argument are two sides of the same coin:

If a double portion of a certain thing is harmful to health, then a single portion must not be called wholesome, since it is absurd that two good things should make one bad thing. Put thus, the enthymeme is refutative; put as follows, demonstrative “for one good thing cannot be made up of two bad things”. The whole line of argument is fallacious. (Rhet., Ii. 24, 1401a30, RR p.381-383)

Abstainers start from an agreement upon the fact that “having a lot of drinks makes you sick”, and divide: “so having a drink makes you sick”. Permissive people follow the other line: “having a drink is good for health”, and proceed by composition. Abstainers argue by division, and this is considered to be fallacious by permissive individuals. Permissive individuals argue by composition, and this is considered to be fallacious by abstainers.

3. Whole and parts argument

The two labels “composition and division” and “part and whole” are in practice considered equivalent (van Eemeren & Garssen, 2009).

3.1 Whole to parts and division

The argument based on the whole assigns to each of its parts a property evidenced on the whole:

If the whole is P, then each of its parts must be P.

If the country is rich, each of its regions (inhabitants…) must be rich.
Americans are rich, so he is rich; let’s ransom him!

The problem faced by whole to parts arguments mirrors that of the argument by division: can the property evidenced on the whole be transferred to each of its parts?

3.2 Parts to whole and composition

The argument based on the parts assigns to the whole they make up the properties evidenced on each of its parts:

If every part of a whole is P, then the whole is P.
If every player is good, then the team is good (?).

The problem faced by parts to whole arguments mirrors that of the argument by composition: is the property evidenced by each part also evidenced by the whole?

4. Complex wholes and emerging properties

Accidental or Mechanical wholes are composed of a set of disconnected objects in a relation of neighborhood. Essential or complex wholes are made up of the conjunction of the parts plus some emerging extra properties, which distinguishes them from an inert juxtaposition of components. The degree of complexity of the whole is superior to the simple arithmetical addition of its parts. This process is referred to as a composition effect. The case of the superiority of the group over the individual alleged by Aristotle is an example of such an effect, S. Ad populum.

This issue is also found in rhetoric, where a distinction is made between metonymy and synecdoche, the first focusing upon neighborhood relations and the second on relations between a complex whole and its parts.

Argument a completudine; Lat. completudo, “completeness”.

The evolution of society can be manifested by the emergence of legal cases that do not find clear solutions in the existing system of laws, whether in national, international or human rights legislations (Tarello 1972, quoted in Perelman 1977, p. 55).
Nonetheless, the judge is under an obligation to judge, that is, he or she must pass a sentence upon all the cases before him or her, S.. Silence. That is to say, he or she cannot refuse to make a decision upon a case by arguing that there is no law applicable to that case, or that no interpretation of an existing law can settle it.
In other words, the principle of completeness assumes that the existing system of law, duly interpreted, can qualify all and any human act as permitted, tolerated, or prohibited.

Meta-principles such as the following complement the system of laws:

In civil matters, in the absence of specific law, the judge is obliged to proceed in accordance with equity. To decide according to equity, he must call on natural law and on reason, or on the usages received, when the primitive law is silent.
Fortuné Anthoine de Saint Joseph, [Concordance between the Foreign Civil Code and the Napoléon Code], 1856.[1]

The argument of completeness is parallel to the topos of the impotent legislator, the nature of things rendering the application of the law impossible, S. Weight of Circumstances.

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[1] Fortuné Anthoine de Saint Joseph, Concordance entre les codes civils étrangers et le Code Napoléon, 2^nd ed. t. II. Paris: Cotillon, 1856. P. 460.

Comparison is the process of establishing whether or not two individuals, two situations, two systems… present or not some similarities or analogies. A process of comparison is involved in many argumentative activities, such that the label argument by comparison (a comparatione) is used with different meanings.
These meanings primarily correspond with the argument a fortiori, the arguments a pari, by analogy, by example or exemplum.

Comparison and categorization — Comparison is the basis for the categorization-nomination process; the individual to categorize is compared either with a known individual belonging to the category, or with the prototypical member defining the category. S. Justice

Intra-categorical comparison — Two beings belonging to the same category are identical from the point of view of this category. Despite this, they can still be compared in terms of:

— their non-categorical properties; S. Intra-categorical analogy.

— their position relative to a prototypical subcategory of this category. A rat and a whale, for example, are identical insofar as both are mammals; considering that the cow is a prototypical mammal, we can say that a rat, being nearer to a cow than to a whale, is “more” a mammal than a whale.

— Hierarchized categories contain by definition built-in comparisons: Bachelor, Master, and Doctorate are three kinds of academic degrees, listed by ascending order. They can enter in an a fortiori argument.

Comparison and structural analogy — A process of comparison is also involved in establishing a structural analogy.

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The expression commonplace corresponds to the Latin locus communis, which translates the Greek topos.

— Often reduced to place (locus, pl. loci), an inferential common place is an inferential topic, or argumentation scheme.

— A substantial common place is an endoxon, a formulary expression of a common thought. Traditional rhetorical invention specialized in the argumentative use of substantial common places.

1. Topical questions: An ontology for doxa-based argumentation

Everyday argumentation is based on an ontology organizing the world of events according to the following broad parameters:

Person, Action, Time, Place, Manner, Cause or Reason.

These dimensions mirror the system of sentence complementation:

Yesterday,     in Philadelphia,      with great difficulty
Time              Place                        Manner

Peter                     met Paul     to settle their business
Focus person      Action        Cause, Reason

The corresponding interrogative words guide the methodical procedure to follow in order to gather and organize information about an event:

Who? What? When? Where? How? Why?

[Interrogative words] have already been recognized in various languages ​​for different purposes: for speculative purposes, in the Latin of the scholastics: cur?, quomodo?, quando? [why? how? when?]; or for military purposes in German, where the tetralogy Wer? Wo? Wann? Wie? is taught to all military recruits as an information framework that any scout on a reconnaissance mission must be capable of providing and reporting back to his superiors. (Tesnière 1959, p. 194)

These common basic dimensions of reality are rubric or “heads of chapters”, generating more or less general ideas and formulas. Their application is extremely general. They might be used to frame a description or narration of any kind, a scout report, a newspaper article, or an event-based essay. Such questions also guide moral evaluation, for example an action such as “having carnal intercourse” will be evaluated as shameful if that if was “with forbidden persons” (With Whom?), or “at wrong times” (When?) or “in wrong place” (When?) (Aristotle, 1383b 15-20; RR p. 279).

When attached to a particular field, these ontological parameters are expressed using words which have a full lexical meaning. For example, the classical guide to political decisions includes questions such as: “Honorable? Will the proposed measure turn out honorable, or embarrassing for us? S. Political Arguments: Two collections

These questions governing the quest for information about a given issue or event, form the very foundation of rhetorical argumentation. They might be answered a posteriori, that is after a full documented inquiry into the specificities of the case. They can also be answered a priori, on the basis of endoxa, that is pre-conceived ideas. The undue prominence given to stereotyped ideas in the construction of arguments, leads to the strong and indignant criticism of rhetoric as a fallacious verbiage, S. Ornamental fallacy?

2. The method: stereotyped portrait-based argumentation

Consider the argumentative question “Has Mr. So and So committed this hideous murder?”

— The question Who? is applied to the defendant: “Who is this Mr. So-and-So?”. The sub-topos Which nation? provides the categorizing information: “Mr. So-and-so is Syldavian”, and likewise for all questions parameterizing the topical person.

— Endoxon on the Syldavians: to the category Syldavian is attached a set of defining endoxical predicates such as “the Syldavians are like that”, each having a specific argumentative orientation:

the Syldavians are peaceful / bloodthirsty people.

These predicates provide an endoxic encyclopedic-semantic definition of the Syldavian.

— The instantiation of the endoxic definition backs the conclusion:

the guilt of Mr. So-and-So is likely / unlikely.

Other topical questions regarding the same Mr. So-and-So will provide other, possibly contradictory, orientations. Such questions thereby play a role in the creation or dismissal of inculpations or exculpations, shifting the burden of proof on the whim of pre-established judgments, regardless of the outcome of any detailed investigation of the matter.

3. Common place based portrayal in literature and argumentation

Each and every one of these questions can itself become the source of sub-questions, and these can be developed considerably, to produce a detailed grid of investigation. The results yielded via this technique depend entirely on the method of investigation used to answer the question; an armchair argument for which the ‘research’ is based on common sense and common places will deliver commonplace conclusions.

The richest set of detailed questions concerns the key element of these rhetorical scenarios, that being the person (Who?). Their application produces a portrait of this person, which can be taken as a literary feat (if successful), and a base for argumentative categorizing inferences.

These commonplaces serve as ready-made arguments, from which the investigating party may select the most appropriate, depending on his or her aims.

Quintilian identified the following doxically relevant facets of a person in order to compound the a priori rhetorical representation of a person, independently of any concrete information about the action under discussion.

— “Birth, for people are mostly thought similar in character to their fathers and forefathers, and sometimes derive from their origin motives for living an honorable or dishonorable life” (IO, V, 10, 24 ).

To answer the sub-question “Birth?” the inquiry about the family collects information such as “he is from a well-known honorable family”, or “his father was sentenced”. The first information provides arguments allowing for example the application of the rule “like father, like son”, “he is a chip of the old block”, which serves inferences like:

He made a mistake, but his family affords all the necessary guarantees; good blood cannot lie, he deserves a second chance.

The second information leads to different conclusions:

The father was sentenced, so the son has a heavy inheritance. Bring me more information about him!

The commonplace “the miser’s son is a spendthrift” opposes the preceding one. If the father has a vice, the doxa now credits the son not of the corresponding virtue, but either of the same vice or an opposite vice.

—  “Nation?” (ibid.) and “Country?” (id., 25). The answers will introduce national stereotypes: “if he is a Spanish, he is proud, if he is British, he is phlegmatic”. These conclusions, “he is proud, he is phlegmatic”, may prove useful for the discussion to come “he is Spanish, so he is proud, so he certainly strongly reacted to this personal attack”.

— “Sex, for you would more readily believe a charge of robbery with regard to a man, and poisoning with regard to a woman” (ibid.) The prejudiced investigator will follow the commonplace suggestion: in case of poisoning, he will tend to look for a woman. A French book, “The Famous Poisoners” [Les Empoisonneuses Célèbres] is exclusively dedicated to famous female poisoners.

—  “Age?”, “Education?”, “Bodily constitution, for beauty is often drawn into an argument for libertinism, and strength for insolence, and the contrary qualities for contrary conduct” (id., 25-26). In other words, “he is handsome, he must be a debauchee” is more probable than “he is handsome, therefore he must live an austere life”. If A is stronger than B, then “A is more aggressive than B” is likely, and therefore, if A and B had a row, “certainly, A attacked B”, in other words, A bears the burden of proof. These inferences can be turned around by application of the paradox of plausibility: “actually, B must have attacked A, because he knew that the appearances were against A”.

— “Fortune, for the same charge is not equally credible in reference to a rich and a poor man, in reference to one who is surrounded with relations, friends and clients, and one who is destitute of all such support” (id., 26). The commonplaces associated with social roles and positions come under this heading. An elderly man from the countryside, sitting on a bench in the setting sun, will certainly deliver some deep and true thought about the current state of affairs, S. Rich and Poor.

— “Natural disposition, for avarice, passionateness, sensibility, cruelty, austerity, and other similar affections of the mind, frequently either cause credit to be given to an accusation or to be withheld from it” (id., 27): “the assassination was committed in a particularly cruel manner, Peter is cruel, therefore he is the murderer’, S. Circumstances.

— “Manner of living, for it is often a matter of inquiry whether a person is luxurious, or parsimonious, or mean” (ibid.).

The following questions refer to arguments based on desires and motives_ (ibid.):

— “What a person affects, whether he would wish to appear rich or eloquent, just or powerful” (id., 28).

— “Previous doings and sayings” (ibid.), used to find motives and precedents.

— “Commotion of the mind, […] a temporary excitement of the feelings, as anger, or fear” (ibid.), S. Emotions.

— “Designs” (id., 29)

This set of commonplaces underlies portraits such as:

A man in his thirties, Canadian, West Coast, sporty, from a well-known and respected family, has never completed his law education, very kind with his neighbors, living a conventional life, works in a pharmacy, with limited prospect for the future…

This portrait can be read as an (unsuccessful) literary attempt, a police form, etc. In all cases, it is a stock of premises. Doxa-based argumentation is based on pieces of information like “the man is X”, draws on the stereotyped categories attached to Xs, “the X are like that”, and concludes that “the man is like that”, S. Categorization; Definition.

4. The literature of characters

This topology has a derived argumentative function and a direct aesthetic-cognitive function. It is linked to the question of the socio-linguistic or doxical beliefs, that is to the prejudiced identity of the person. It is antagonistic with a problematic of identity as deep being, the psychological nucleus of the person. Providing a technique for the construction of the portrait, it thus establishes a bridge between argumentation and literature through the genre of “Characters”, as those of the Greek Theophrastus, and, more generally, the classical literature of portraits and mores.

We are no longer in the realm of ethos as an autofiction, but in the pure world of the ethopoeia, that is to say, of the fictional representation of a “character”, such as “the Miser” or “the Garrulous person” via his or her typical manners, discourse and actions. Such de-contextualized portraits can be used as authorized and respectable sources about the character which they are used to depict, as prolegomena to the exercise of the argumentation in situation, where they will be applied to a particular person.

Historically, this is part of a coherent educative, esthetic and cognitive process of controlled, systematic writing and thinking, the very antithesis of any uncontrolled automatic writing.

5. “This noxious fertility of common thoughts” (Port-Royal)

When based exclusively on common knowledge, that is language associations and doxa-based knowledge, this technique makes it possible to quickly compose fairly convincing, true-to-life pictures of things and events. Critically, these are justifiably very difficult to rebut, as they are the mere expression of shared preconstructed knowledge. The vicious circle between persuader and persuadee is an example of such a situation, S. Persuasion. Such compositions are not scientific characterizations of the individual, as can be developed in psychology or philosophy, but the perfect stronghold for all positive or negative social prejudices. Port-Royal has severely condemned this “noxious fertility of common thoughts”:

Now, so far is it from being useful to obtain this sort of abundance, that there is nothing which more depraves the judgment, nothing which more chokes up good seed, than a crowd of noxious weeds; nothing renders a mind more barren of just and weighty thoughts than this noxious fertility of common thoughts. The mind is accustomed to this facility, and no longer makes any effort to find appropriate, special and natural reasons, which can only be discovered by an attentive consideration of the subject. (Arnauld, Nicole, [1662], III, XVII; p. 235)

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1. Chaïm Perelman & Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca, A Treatise on Argumentation — The New Rhetoric, 1958

In the New Rhetoric — A Treatise on Argumentation (1958), Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca propose a sophisticated typology of arguments. Some twenty years later, in The Rhetorical Empire [L’Empire Rhétorique, 1977], Perelman takes up the essential elements of the 1958 typology, making some significant simplifications. In Juridical Logic [Logique Juridique, 1979] he presents a specific set of juridical arguments.

1.1 The typology of the Treatise

According to Conley, the Treatise contains “more than eighty different forms of argumentation, and illuminating remarks on more than sixty-five figures” (1984, p. 180-181), and contrasts these achievements with “Toulmin’s renegade logic” (ibid.).

The “forms of argumentation” are described in the third part of the Treatise, entitled “Techniques of argumentation”. They are presented as a set of “association techniques”, (Chap. 1 to 3), along with two other kinds of technique, the “dissociation technique” (Chap. 4), and the “Interaction of arguments” (Chap. 5). This latter Chapter exposes a set of disposition techniques, and discusses the relative persuasive effects of the various arrangements of arguments in a speech, that is, issues in classical “dispositio”.

1.2 The association techniques

The association techniques correspond to the classical argument schemes. They are classified under three categories:

Chap. 1. Quasi-logical arguments
Chap. 2. Arguments based on the structure of reality
Chap. 3. The relations establishing the structure of reality

“Quasi-logical arguments” (§46-59)

This category lists arguments which “lay claim to a certain power of conviction in the degree that they claim to be similar to the formal reasoning of logic or mathematics” (p. 192); this definition should be brought closer to the definition of a fallacious argument as “one that seems to be valid but is not so.” (Hamblin 1970, p. 12), S. Fallacies (1). The category covers the following argument schemes:

• • • 46-49 Contradiction and incompatibility
    • 50 Identity and definition
    • 51 Analyticity, analysis and tautology
    • 52 The rule of justice
    • 53 Arguments of reciprocity
    • 54 Arguments by transitivity
    • 55 Inclusions of the part in the whole
    • 56 Division of the whole into its parts
    • 57 Arguments by comparison
    • 58 Argumentation by sacrifice
    • 59 Probabilities

In The Rhetorical Empire, the Chapter on “Quasi-Logical Arguments” essentially recapitulates the class as presented in the Treatise.

“Arguments based on the structure of reality” (§60-77)

From a linguistic point of view, he broad label “argument based on the structure of reality” may be interpreted as referring to arguments which exploit syntagmatic, or metonymic relations. This category in fact lists arguments “alleged to be in agreement with the very nature of things” (p. 191); these arguments “make use of [the structure of reality] to establish a solidarity between accepted judgments and others which one wishes to promote” (p. 261). The “causal link” and the “relation of succession” are fundamental to this category.

Arguments within this category include:

• • • 61-63 “Causal link”, “Pragmatic argument”
    • 63-73 discuss arguments where the person is considered to be a causal agent, such as:
      • • 64-68 “Ends and means”, among which:
        • 65 “Argument of waste”
        • 66 “The Argument of direction”
        • 68-73 “The Person and his acts”, among which:
        • 70 “Argument from authority”
        • 73 “The Group and its members”
    • 74-75 extend the notion of “relation of coexistence” to:
    • 74 “Act and essence”
    • 75 “The symbolic relation”
    • 76-77 present “more complex”, second level arguments:
    • 74 “Double hierarchy”
    • 75 “Differences of degree and of order”

The Rhetorical Empire, Chapter VIII, recapitulates the same class of arguments based on the structure of reality under different groupings:

— Relations of succession
— Relations of coexistence
— The Symbolic relation, the double hierarchy argument, argument about the differences of order.

“Relations establishing the structure of reality” §78-88

The inclusive label “Relations establishing the structure of reality” might be interpreted as referring to a set of arguments exploiting paradigmatic or metaphoric relations. This category of relations is defined on the basis of two of its prototypical members, arguments from “the particular case”, and “arguments by analogy”. The following argument schemes come under this category:

• • 78 “Argumentation by example”
  • 79 “Illustration”
  • 80-81 “Model and anti-model”
  • 82-87, On analogy
  • 87-88, On metaphor.

In the Rhetorical Empire, the title “establishing the structure of reality” is not retained; its contents are grouped under two distinct chapters:

Chap. IX, Arguments by example, illustration and model
Chap. X, Analogy and metaphor

This can be construed as a waiver of the distinction between arguments “establishing” the structure of reality, and those “based on” the structure of reality.

It might, however, also be argued that this couple of concepts does not characterize causal arguments in opposition to analogical ones, but indeed applies to both argument schemes. The successful use of an argument “based on” authority, for example, presupposes that the invoked authority has been previously “established”. This distinction is especially helpful in the case of arguments from authority, definition, causality and analogy.

1.3 The dissociation techniques

The basic difference between association and dissociation techniques is that the former operate on judgments; they “establish a solidarity between accepted judgments and others which one wishes to promote” (p. 261); they correspond to argument schemes. In contrast, dissociation techniques operate on “concepts” (p. 411; my emphasis): “[they] are mainly characterized by the modifications which they introduce into notions, since they aim less at using the accepted language than at moving towards a new formulation” (p. 191-192), S. Dissociation, Distinguo; Persuasive Definition.

The two terms of the opposition association / dissociation are thus of a very different nature.

2. Toulmin, Rieke, Janik, An introduction to reasoning (1984)


Toulmin, Rieke, Janik consider nine «forms of reasoning» «most frequently to be met with in practical situations «   (1984, p. 147-155 ; p. 155).

1. analogy 2. generalization 3. sign 4. cause

5. authority 6. dilemma 7 classification 8. opposites 9. degree

In the argument from degree, « the different properties of a given thing are presumed to vary in step with one another » (id., p. 155)

Like the following one, this restricted group of argumentative schemes has a family resemblance with the classical lists derived from Cicero, S. Collections 2.

3. Kienpointner, Alltagslogik [Everyday Logic] 1992.

Kienpointner (1992, p. 231-402) synthetizes six contemporary typologies (Perelman, Olbrechts-Tyteca [1958] ; Toulmin, Rieke, Janik 1984 ; Govier 1987; Schellens 1987; van Eemeren, Kruiger 1987; Benoit, Lindsey 1987), summarized in the following table (1992, p. 246):

3.1 Rule-using argument schemes

Classificatory Schemes

Definition
Genus – Species
Part – Whole

Comparison Schemes

Equivalence
Resemblance
Difference
A fortiori

Opposition Schemes

Contradictories
Contraries
Relative terms
Incompatibility

Causal Schemes

Cause – Effect
Consequences
Reason
Means – End

3.2 Rule-establishing argument schemes

Argumentation by example
Inductive argumentation

3.3 Other schemes

Argument by example, illustrative argumentation
Arg. by analogy
Arg. by authority

4. Douglas Walton, Chris Reed, Fabrizio Macagno, Argumentation schemes, 2008.

Walton, Reed and Macagno present an extensive and exhaustive investigation including “a user’s compendium of argumentation schemes” (2008, p. 308-346).

The schemes are consistently designated as argument schemes, with the exception of (19), (20), (21), referred to as argumentation from values, from sacrifice, from the group and its members.

The following list mentions only the main schemes; they may include subtypes.

(1) Authorities: position, expertise, testimony, number (p. 309-314)

1. 1. 1. Argument from position to know
      2. Arg. from expert opinion
      3. Arg. from witness testimony
      4. Arg. from popular opinion, ad populum
      5. Arg. from popular practice.

Arguments (4) are drawn from what people generally believe, whereas arguments (5) refer to what people generally do.

(2) Example, analogy (p. 315-316)

1. 1. 6. Argument from example
      7. Arg. from analogy
      8. Practical reasoning from analogy

Arguments (7) concern beliefs; arguments (8) concern ways to do things.

(3) Composition and division (p. 316-317)

1. 1. 9. Argument from composition
      10. Arg. from division

(4 )Negation, opposition (p. 317-318)

1. 1. 11. Arg. from opposition (contradictory, contrary, converse, incompatible)
      12. Rhetorical argument from opposition

Negation-based argumentation schemes can be logically valid or not; they are frequently not well defined.

(5) Alternative (p. 318-319)

1. 1. 13. Arg. from alternatives

This scheme concludes with the elimination of a member of an alternative due to the requirement of the other member. It corresponds to a case-by-case argument between two cases.

4.6 Classification (p. 319-320)

1. 1. 14. Arg. from verbal classification

“for all x, if x has property F, then x can be classified as having property G.”

Set F is included in set G.

1. 1. 15. Arg. from definition to verbal classification

If an individual a is defined (categorized) as a D, and if Ds generally have property P, then a has property P.

1. 1. 16. Arg. from vagueness of a verbal classification
      17. Arg. from arbitrariness of a verbal classification

Schemes 16. and 17. conclude with the rejection of an argument as “too vague” or “too arbitrarily defined” in some aspects. These cases can also be seen as an application of Grice’s Cooperation Principle.

(7) Persons, values, actions and sacrifice (p. 321-327)

1. 1. 18. Argument from interaction of act and person
      19. Arg. from values
      20. Arg. from sacrifice
      21. Arg. from the group and its members

These schemes consider a group whose members are supposed to share quality Q, and attribute this quality to any member of the group. A member of a racist association can legitimately be supposed to be racist.

Not all characteristics of its members can be composed and attributed to the group as such; a large set is not necessarily composed of large elements.

1. 1. 22. Practical reasoning
      23. Two-person practical reasoning

If one pursues an end, then one must accept the means and steps necessary to attain it.

1. 1. 24. Argument from waste
      25. Arg. from sunk costs

Pages 10-11 (id.) consider as synonyms the labels argument from waste, (with reference to Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca), and argument from sunk costs. Nonetheless, they are discussed here as two separate entries.

(8) Ignorance (p. 327-328)

1. 1. 26. Arg. from ignorance
      27. Epistemic argument from ignorance

This argument covers the case “if it were true, the newspapers would certainly speak of it” (id., p. 99)

(9) Cause, effect; abduction; consequence (p. 328-333)

1. 1. 28. Argument from cause to effect
      29. Arg. from correlation to cause
      30. Argument from sign
      31. Abductive argumentation scheme
      32. Argument from evidence to a hypothesis
      33. Arg. from consequences
      34. Pragmatic argument from alternatives

Scheme (34) is a special case of (33), the choice is between doing/not doing something and suffering/not suffering negative consequences.

(10) Arguments from threat, fear, danger (p. 333-335)

1. 1. 35. Argument from threat
      36. Arg. from fear appeal
      37. Arg. from danger appeal

Schemes (35), (36), (37) schematize different strategies of fear.

1. 1. 38. Arg. from need for help
      39. Arg. from distress

(11) Commitments, ethos, ad hominem (p. 335-339)

40. Arg. from commitment
41. Ethotic argument
42. Generic ad hominem
43. Pragmatic inconsistency
44. Argument from inconsistent commitment
45. Circumstantial ad hominem

Scheme (44) draws a distinction between committed and not really so.

Schemes (43) and (45) express forms of contradictions between personal commitments and actions.

1. 1. 46. Argument from bias
      47. Bias ad hominem

Schemes (46) and (47) are closely related. According to (46), argument from bias: “L is biased, so the conclusions are suspect”. According to (47), “bias ad hominem”: “L is biased, so I do not trust him”. Biases are relative to a domain, but it is convenient to consider that the whole personality is biased; L has a “false mind”.

(12) Gradualism; slippery slope (p. 339-341)

1. 1. 48. Argument from gradualism

The comments (id. p. 114-115), show that this scheme can be likened to the slippery slope forms, (49) to (53). It expresses the sorite paradox, also mentioned in (52): “If you remove a grain from a pile of grains, you always have a heap; if you remove another grain, you still have a heap … up to what extent?”

1. 1. 49. Slippery slope argument
      50. Precedent slippery slope argument

The slippery slope argument is used to reject an exceptional treatment, on the ground that this exception would open a line of precedents leading to something unacceptable.

1. 1. 51. Sorites slippery slope argument
      52. Verbal slippery slope argument

The slippery slope principle is used to reject the assignment of a property to an object because this property is transmitted by contiguity up to an object that obviously does not or should not possess it. This is a variety of argument to the absurd, based on a demonstration by recurrence.

1. 1. 53. Full slippery slope argument

(13) Rules, exceptions, precedent (p. 342-345)

1. 1. 54. Argument for constitutive-rule claim

Scheme (54) relates to rules of language (synonymy) and to principles of categorization in institutionally codified languages (“D counts as W”).

1. 1. 55. Arg. from rules
      56. Arg. for an exceptional case
      57. Arg. from precedent
      58. Arg. from plea for excuse

Confronted with an exceptional case, one can waive the usual rule (56) or change it (57). Excuses and extenuating circumstances can suspend the rule.

(14) Perception, memory (345-346)

1. 1. 59. Arg. from perception
      60. Arg. from memory

Scheme (59), (60) argue that one can reasonably believe in a given fact on the basis of the perception or memory of this fact.

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1. Scipion Dupleix,
Logic, or the art of speaking and Thinking (1607)
Jacques-Bénigne Bossuet, Logic for the Dauphin (1677)

These works most probably have no particular historical importance, yet they certainly provide an idea of seventeenth century terminology, clearly akin to the Ciceronian system, S. Collections (2).

As the title suggests, Bossuet’s Logic functions as a pedagogical guide to everyday argumentation: ‘Dauphin’ was the title given to the heir of the French Kingdom.

Table:
— First column, Bossuet, 1677
— Second column, Dupleix, 1607

The order of the lines is that of Bossuet. To facilitate reading, the order of Dupleix was changed, so that the same types of arguments are on the same line; the numbering corresponds to the order in Dupleix’s typology.

Bossuet, 1677	Dupleix, 1607
1. Etymology	3. Etymology
2. Conjugates	4. Conjugata
3. Definition	1. Definition
4. Division
5. Genus	5. Genus and Species
6. Species
7. Property
8. Accident
9. Resemblance 10. Dissemblance	6. Similitude, 7. Dissimilitude
11. Cause	13. Cause
12. Effects	14. Effects
13. What comes before1	10. Antecedents1
14. What accompanies1	9. Adjuncts or conjuncts1
15. What follows1	11. Consequents1
16. Contraries	8. Contraries
17. A repugnantibus3
	12. Repugnants
18. All and parts2	2. Enumeration of the parts2
19. Comparison	15. Comparison with things bigger, equal and smaller
20. Example, or Induction

(¹) S. Circumstances

(²) Bossuet’s topic n°18, “enumeration of the parts” is akin to the topic of definition. For example, what is a “good captain” is defined by enumeration of his relevant qualities: brave, wise, etc. Dupleix’s topic n°2, “all and parts” relates more to composition and division

(³) Dupleix’s topic n°12, from “repugnants” refers to predication: “stone” and “man” are repugnant because “ — be a stone” cannot be said of man — Whereas Bossuet’s topic n°17, “a repugnantibus”, refers to a kind of ad hominem.

Both typologies prioritize arguments exploiting the resources contributing to the definition of a word or a concept, in view of their exploitation in syllogistic reasoning. This enumeration of the core set of arguments is followed by the usual enumeration of arguments schemes drawing on causality, analogy, comparison, peripheral circumstances, opposites and induction. This set will reemerge under a new re-organization in the New Rhetoric.

2. John Locke,
An Essay concerning Human Understanding (1690)
Wilhelm Leibniz,
New Essays Concerning Human Understanding (1765)

In An Essay concerning Human Understanding John Locke briefly mentions “four sorts of arguments, that men, in their reasoning with others, do ordinarily make use of to prevail on their assent; or at least so to awe them as to silence their opposition” (IV, 17, “Of Reason”, § 19-22; p. 410). These four arguments are:

— ad verecundiam, S. Ethos; 
Modesty; Authority.
— ad ignorantiam, S. Ignorance.
— ad hominem, S. Ad hominem.
— ad judicium, S. Matter

In his New Essays Concerning Human Understanding, Leibniz comments on this list, and qualifies Locke’s abrupt and general condemnation by taking into consideration the circumstances; see the above mentioned entries. In addition, Leibniz adds a new kind of argument, the argument ad vertiginem, S. Vertigo.

This brief list has nothing to do with the previous Ciceronian ones; its aim is to oppose the first three fallacious arguments to the last one, the only one to “bring true instruction with it, and advance us in our way to knowledge” (op. cit., p. 411). Reasoning and the methods used in mathematics and experimental sciences are introduced under the heading ad judicium. Contrary to the classical typologies, these arguments are not associated to a logic itself backed by a natural ontology, but rather to the requirements of scientific method, S. Fallacy. We are thus entering a new argumentative world.

3. Jeremy Bentham, The Book of fallacies (1824)

S. Political Arguments.

1. Aristotle, Rhetoric (between 329 & 323 b.c)

1.1 The catalog and its position in the system of Aristotelian proofs

The catalog of the Rhetoric must be viewed within the framework of the Aristotelian typology of the different types of reasoning carried by different types of discourses. In this typology of proofs, rhetorical discourse is opposed to dialectical dialogue and to scientific (syllogistic) discourse. Tricot points out that “syllogism is the genre, scientific (producer of science) [is] the specific difference that separates the scientific demonstration from the dialectical and rhetorical syllogisms” (S. A., I, 2, 15-25; p. 8, note 3). The concept of persuasion in the Rhetoric must be seen in this context: scientific discourse produces apodictic knowledge, dialectical interaction produces probable truth and rhetorical syllogism or enthymeme is an element of persuasive discourse. Thus, by its very definition, rhetorical discourse cannot be probative; in short, the phrase “rhetorical evidence persuades” is a pleonasm.

The catalog of arguments is situated as follows in the sub-typology organizing the rhetorical proofs (proof = pistis, “means of pressure”).

 

1.2 Wavering distinctions

Aristotle establishes the following distinctions between the various kinds of rhetorical proof:

	Non-technical
Proof
	Technical	Ethos
		Pathos
		Logos	Enthymeme
			Example
			Sign

 

The proofs attached to the logos are enthymemes, which correspond to deduction; examples^@, which corresponds to induction; and arguments based on natural signs, that are probable or certain. Enthymeme and example are said to be common to the three ancient rhetorical genres (epideictic, deliberative, judicial, S. Rhetoric.) But the articulation of these different kinds of proofs, and the consistency of the text of the Rhetoric such as we read it now, is problematic (McAdon 2003, 2004). The classification of proofs attached to logos has important variants:

(a) “I call an enthymeme a rhetorical syllogism, and an example rhetorical induction. Now all orators produce belief by employing as proofs either examples or enthymemes, and nothing else.” (Rhet., I, 2, 8; Fr., p. 19)

(b) “the materials from which the enthymemes are derived […] being probabilities and signs […].” (Ibid I, 2, 14; p. 25)

(c) “Now the material of enthymemes is derived from four sources — probabilities, examples, necessary signs and signs.” (Ibid II, 15, 8; p. 337)

The example is placed on the same level as the enthymeme in (a), but is considered a form of enthymeme in (c); enthymemes have four sources in (c), and two in (b). Thus, it would be risky to look for a rigorous system in these presentations of rhetorical proof, and the above table must be considered as a simple reminder.

1.3 The topoi of the Rhetoric

The Rhetoric enumerates twenty-eight topoi (topics) or “lines of argument” (Rhet, II, 23), as listed in the following table. An enthymeme is a discursive instance of a topos.

They are designated by their English label, when available, or by a short description, both quoted from Freese (F) or Rhys Roberts (RR).

1. 1. 1. “From opposites” (F). S. Opposites
      2. “From similar inflexions” (F). S. Derived Words
      3. “From relative terms” (F);“upon correlative ideas” (R). S. Correlative Terms
      4. “From the more or less” (F); a fortiori (R). S. A fortiori
      5. “The consideration of time” (F). S. Consistency
      6. “Turning upon the opponent what has been said against ourselves” (F). S. Ethos; A fortiori.
      7. “From definition” (F). S. Definition
      8. “Topic from the different significations of a word” (F). Aristotle explicitly refers to this topos in his Topics. S. Ambiguity.
      9. “From division” (F). S. Case-by-case
      10. “From induction” (F). S. Induction
      11. “From a previous judgment in regard to the same or a similar or contrary matter”, this judgment having been given by one of “those whose judgment it is not possible to contradict” (F). S. Precedent; Ab exemplo; Authority; Modesty; Politeness
      12. “From enumerating the parts” (F). S. Case-by-case
      13. “Since in most human affairs the same thing is accompanied by some bad or good result, […] employing the consequences to exhort or dissuade, accuse or defend, praise or blame” (F). S. Pragmatic argument; Dilemma
      14. [id. 13], “but there is this difference that in the former case [i.e., 13] things of any kind whatever, in the latter [i.e., 13] opposites” (F). S. Pragmatic; Dilemma
      15. “Men do not praise the same thing in public and in secret” (F). S. Motives
      16. “From analogy in things” (F). S. Analogy; Opposites.
      17. “Concluding the identity of precedents from the identity of results” Instance: “There is as much impiety in asserting that the gods are born as in saying that they die; for either way the result is that at some time or other they did not exist” (F). S. Consequence; Implication.
      18. “The same men do not always choose the same thing before and after but the contrary” (F).  S. Consistency.
      19. “Maintaining that the cause of something which is or has been is something which would generally, or possibly might be the cause of it; for example, if one were to make a present of something to another, in order to cause him pain by depriving him of it” (F). S. Motives
      20. “Examining what is hortatory and dissuasive, and the reasons which make men act or not” (F). S. Motives
      21. “Things which are thought to happen but are incredible” (F). S. Probable.
      22. “Another line of argument is to refute your opponent’s case by noting any contrast or contradiction of dates, acts or words that it anywhere displays” (RR). S. Contradiction;  Consistency; Ad hominem.
      23. “Another topic, when men or things have been attacked by slander […] consists in stating the reason for the false opinion” (F). S. Motives; Interpretation
      24. “Another topic is derived from the cause. If the cause exists, the effect exists; if the cause does not exist, the effect does not exist” (F). S. Motives
      25. “Whether there was or is another better course than that which is advised, or is being, or has been carried out” (F). S. Consistency; Motives
      26. “Another topic, when something contrary to what has already been done is on the point of being done, consists in examining them together” (F). S. Consistency
          
      27. “Another topic consists in making use of errors committed for purposes of accusation or defense” (F). S. Contradiction; Consistency
          
      28. “From the meaning of a name” (F). S. Proper Name

Even if no clear order emerges from this enumeration, it can be noted that an important subset of topics deal basically with the world of human action and its determination, where motives have been substituted for causes, and behavioral stereotypes on human nature and human motivations have replaced strict scientific causality and taxonomies.

 

2. Cicero, Topica, “Topics” (44 b. c.)   

Cicero proposes a typology of arguments in an early work, De Inventione, “On Invention” and in his latest book on argument, Topica, “Topics”. Unlike the Topics of Aristotle, which exposes a method of finding and criticizing arguments in the context of a dialectical philosophical exchange, Cicero’s observations and examples constantly refer to rhetoric as a judicial practice. In this context, Cicero proposes the following distinction:

• Intrinsic arguments, either “inherent in the very nature of the subject which is under discussion” or “closely connected with the subject which is investigated” (, I, 8; p. 387-389).
• Arguments taken “from external circumstances”, or “extrinsic arguments” (, II, 8; p. 388; IV, 24, p. 397), corresponding to the so-called non-technical^@ arguments, mainly testimonies and their conditions of validity, and including authority (Top., IV, 24; p. 397).

Objects and facts are built and discussed on the basis of arguments drawn from five main sources.

 

From definition. Arguments:

— by genus and species of the genus (a genere; a forma generis).
— by enumeration of the parts (partium enumeratio)
— from “etymology” (ex notatione)
— from words of the same family (a conjugata)
— “based on difference” (a differentia).

S. Categorization and Nomination; Definition; Genus; Case-by-case; True meaning of the word; Derived Words

 

From causal relations S. Causality. Arguments: ­

— from efficient causes (ab efficientibus causis)
— from effects (ab effectis).

 

From analogy (a similitudine).

S. A pari; Intra-categorical analogy; Structural analogy

 

From opposites (ex contrario).

S. Opposites

 

From circumstances. Arguments: ­

— from antecedents, ab antecedentibus,
— from consequents, a consequentibus

S. Circumstances

 

This brief and articulated list of arguments is all important in the Western tradition of argumentation studies. They were transmitted in the Middle Ages by Boethius (around 480-524) On Topical Differences (Top., c. 522), and were taken up by medieval logic, dialectic and philosophy. They remained in use until well into the modern era, S. Collections (3).

3. Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria, “The Orator’s Education” (c. 95)

In Book V, Chap. 10 of the Institutes of Oratory, dealing with arguments, Quintilian summarizes a list of 24 argumentative lines (IO, V, 10, 94). A first series deals with common places.

A second series is a catalog of argument schemes: the French translator, J. Cousin, notes that

“this list-summary, which seems to be a loan, recalls previous classifications, with their elements arranged in a different order: […] Later rhetoricians condense or develop without apparent reason” (1976, p. 240).