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Persuasion

1. Persuasion as the essence of rhetoric

Since Isocrates and Aristotle, argumentative rhetorical speech is commonly defined by its function, that being persuasion:

Rhetoric may be defined as the faculty of observing in any given case the available means of persuasion. (Rhet, I, 2, 1355b26, RR, p. 105).

According to Crassus as staged by Cicero, persuasion is the “first duty” of the orator (Cicero, De Or., I, XXXI; p. 40). Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, focus their definition of argumentation on how “to induce or to increase the mind’s adherence to the theses presented for its assent” ([1958]/1969, p. 4; italics in the original) before elaborating on the notion of “adherence of minds” by means of an opposition between persuading and convincing speech, S. Assent; Persuading and convincing.

According to these standard definitions, argumentative rhetoric is fundamentally concerned with the discourse structured by the illocutionary (overtly expressed in the discourse) intention of persuading, that is to communicate, explain, legitimate, and make the listeners share the speaker’s point of view and the words that express it. Persuasion, as a perlocutory state obtained through discourse, results from the realization of these intentions.

The rhetorical tradition binds the discourse of persuasion to the production of a plausible representation in the audience’s minds. This rhetorical representation of reality is considered to be antagonistic towards truth by essentialist philosophers such as Plato, S. Probable.

2. A rhetoric without persuasion: the ars bene dicendi

Chapter 15 of Book II of Quintilian’s Institutes of Oratory is devoted to challenging the definition of rhetoric in relation to persuasion, “the most common definition therefore is that [rhetoric] is the power of persuading” (IO, II, 15, 3), this definition being attributed to Isocrates. Quintilian rejects all the definitions linking rhetoric to persuasion:
— As the power to persuade:

But money, likewise, has the power of persuasion, as do interest, and the authority and dignity of a speaker, and even his very look, unaccompanied by language, when either the remembrance of the services of any individual, or a pitiable appearance, or beauty of person, draws forth an opinion. (Id., 6)

— Or as an instrument of persuasion, even with the restriction “power of persuading by speaking”:

Not only the orator, but also others, such as harlots, flatterers, and seducers, persuade or lead to that which they wish, by speaking. (Ibid.)

Finally, Quintilian takes up the definition of rhetoric attributed to the Stoics and Chrysippus, “rhetoricen esse bene dicendi scientiam” (id., p. 841), that is to say, “the art to speak well and say the Good”:

The definition that [rhetoric] is the science of speaking well […] embraces all the virtues of [rhetoric] at once and includes also the character of the true orator, as he cannot speak well unless he be a good man. (Id., 34)

Its purpose is, “to think and speak rightly” (id., 36).

The rhetoric of persuasive communication and the rhetoric focusing on the quality of expression have been opposed as primary vs. secondary rhetoric (Kennedy 1999), or extrinsic vs. intrinsic rhetoric (Kienpointner 2003). We can also speak of an introverted rhetoric, focusing on the quality of an expression based on intellectual rigor and depth of feeling. Extroverted, communicative rhetoric strives to be eloquent, while introverted rhetoric requires an alternative concept of style.

Note that this distinction does not correspond to the distinction forwarded in the 1960s, between a restricted rhetoric opposed to a general rhetoric. Likewise, it has nothing to do with the distinction between rhetoric of arguments and rhetoric of figures. S. Rhetoric.

Introverted rhetoric is a rhetoric whose communicative and interactional dimensions, hence persuasiveness, are weakened, but which nevertheless remains an argumentative rhetoric. La Bruyère expresses as follows the concept of such a rhetoric having abdicated eloquence and persuasion:

We must only endeavor to think and speak justly ourselves, without aiming to bring others over to our Taste and Sentiments; that would be too great an enterprise. (La Bruyère, [Of Works of Genius], [1688])2

3. From persuasion to action

In an essential but often neglected complement to the basic definition of argumentation, the Treatise on Argumentation extends the scope of persuasion through argumentation to action. Argumentation would actually produce the “disposition to action”:

The goal of argumentation, as we have said before, is to create or increase the adherence of minds to the theses presented for their assent. An efficacious argument is one which succeeds in increasing this intensity of adherence among those who hear it in such a way as to set in motion the intended action (a positive action or an abstention from action) or at least in creating in the hearers a willingness to act which will appear at the right moment. (Perelman, Olbrechts-Tyteca, [1958], p. 45)

This vision is restated a little later:

Argumentation alone […] allows us to understand our decisions. (Id, p. 37)

The end point of the argumentative process, then, is not persuasion seen as a mere mental state, an “adherence of the mind”. The ultimate criterion of complete persuasion is an action accomplished in the sense suggested by discourse, and emotion plays an essential role where this is acted out. Adherence beyond a certain degree would trigger action. This is a crucial point where argument, emotions, and values are combined in order to give a response to the philosophical problem of action.

4. Persuasion, identification, self-persuasion?

Burke stressed that persuasion presupposes identification:

When you are with Athenians, it is easy to praise Athenians, but not when you are with the Lacedaemonians.
Here is perhaps the simplest case of persuasion. You persuade a man only insofar as you can talk his language by speech, gesture, tonality, order, image, attitude, idea, identifying your ways with his. (1950, p. 55).

According to the rhetorical doxa, the preliminary to a successful persuasive performance is based on agreements between the speaker and the audience S. Conditions of discussion. This negotiation of agreements could take place through a preliminary argumentative dialogue, running the risk of an infinite regression. So the orator resolves not to explicitly agree with his audience, but to adapt to it. For this reason, he or she makes a preliminary inquiry about the audience, in order to be able to correctly adapt to, or mimic, the audience. This is precisely what the theory of the ethos of audiences foresees, S. Ethos, §5: through ethotic suggestion, the speaker presents himself or herself as “one of you, the people”. Secondly, by logical proofs, the speaker gives prominence to the values and judgments accepted by his or her audience (he or she argues ex concessis). Thirdly, appealing to pathemic communion with the audience, empathy is shown.

Accordingly, in order that the audience identifies with the speaker, he or she must first identify with this audience. At the end of this process of adaptation, one might ask who exactly is being persuaded by whom? The extroverted rhetoric of persuasion is threatened by the solipsism of identification. It expresses only group introversion. The notion of “communion” proposed by the Treatise, may characterize the culmination of this process. This rhetorical concept of identification is totally foreign to the concept of identification defined in the framework of polyphony theory.

5. Who studies persuasion?

The characteristic difference of rhetorical argumentation cannot be defined by persuasion, for the simple reason that persuasion is an object claimed by many other disciplines, including the sciences and philosophy of cognition; neuropsychology as well as “neuro-linguistic programming”.

One year before the Treatise on Argumentation, Vance Packard published The Hidden Persuaders (1957), in which he developed a criticism of rational persuasion as socially ineffective. This criticism was first elaborated in the twenties by Walter Lippman (1922) and later by Edward L. Bernays (1928). In the wake of these books, but with quite different methods, neuromarketing came to focus on the issue of persuasion. To take a less controversial discipline, the analysis of persuasion also belongs to social psychology. This discipline counts among its fundamental objects the theoretical and experimental study of social influences: persuasion, convictions, suggestion, grip/influence, incitement… the formation and manifestations of attitudes, representations, and correlative transformations in the ways individuals or groups behave. The whole movement of the world, the material events, including scientific discoveries and technical innovations, along with the correlative flows of language, produce and rectify the representations, thoughts, words and actions of individuals and groups. The great classical studies of social psychology of persuasion published in the last century hardly mention rhetoric or argumentation. For example, neither the word rhetoric nor the words argument or argumentation appear in a collection of texts on the psychology of persuasion, entitled Persuasion (Yzerbit and Corneille 1994). The problem of persuasion can be legitimately invoked in relation to discourse, but the study of the process of persuasion, even in term of its linguistic aspects, may in no circumstances be carried out in the sole framework of rhetorical studies (Chabrol and Radu, 2008).

6. Persuasion as a general function of language

Just as rhetorical argumentation cannot be characterized by its persuasive function, it cannot be defined as the study of the persuasive language genres, insofar as the persuasive function is not linked to a genre but is coextensive with language use, S. Schematization.

From the general point of view of language functions, persuasion may be considered representative of the function of action on the recipient (call function, German Appell Funktion, Bühler [1933], or conative function, Jakobson [1960]). More specifically, Benveniste contrasts history (narrative) with discourse, and considers that the intention to influence is a characteristic of the latter category, discourse:

By contrast, we have in advance situated the plane of discourse. Discourse is to be understood in its broadest extension: every utterance supposes a speaker and a listener, and in the first the intention of influencing the other in some way. It is first of all the diversity of the oral discourses of every nature and of every level … but it is also the mass of the writings that reproduce the oral discourses or borrow their turns and ends. (Benveniste [1959], p. 242, my emphasis)

Nietzsche, in his lectures on rhetoric, generalizes rhetorical force to make it “the essence of language”:

There is obviously no unrhetorical “naturalness” of language of which one could appeal; language itself is the result of purely rhetorical arts. The power to discover and to make operative that which works and impresses, with respect to each thing, a power which Aristotle calls rhetoric, is at the same time the essence of language; the latter is based just as little as rhetoric is upon that which is true, upon the essence of things. Language does not desire to instruct, but to convey to others a subjective impulse and its acceptance. (In S. L. Gilman & al. C. 1989, p. 21)

This trend towards the extension of rhetoric as persuasion to any kind of talk is, moreover, compatible with all the classical definitions of rhetoric as a technique capable of developing the natural capacities of individuals.

7. Persuasion and the “colonization of minds”

The concept of rhetorical persuasion is built on the key idea that persuasion is intrinsically good, even if men and women have an unfortunate tendency to misuse the best things. The orator is placed in the elevated position of being a “good man, speaking well” and aspiring to universalize his visions and aspirations, an aristocrat of speech, while his audience is framed in the lower, insubstantial position of the undecided, because of poor reasoning and decision- making abilities, S. Enthymeme; Metaphor. The audience is considered barely capable of reaching an independent decision, needing guidance and easy prey to manipulators.

On the political and religious level, persuasion is the strictly correct term to use for propaganda. Propagandists and converters also introduce themselves as good persons eager to persuade, and might also count dictators and fundamentalists amongst the deeply self-convinced persuaders. S. Dissensus. In the early fifties, Domenach defined propaganda as the activities systematically organized “to create, transform or confirm opinions” ([1950], p. 8), while Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca focus on “the adherence of minds”; and to adhere is also the first step to becoming a member. A key difference between argumentation and propaganda is the means they use: argumentation uses “discursive techniques” (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca [1958], p. 5), that is an overt, technique, while propaganda uses all the available means, both overt and covert, to achieve its goal, using not only discourse, but also images and all spectacular manifestations demanding a ritual collective action.

To persuade is to convert or, in Margaret Mead’s words, to “colonize minds” (Dascal 2009), to save the audience from some evil and direct them to some good, of which they were formerly neither persuaded nor convinced.

8. Arguing in an exchange structure

The theory of rhetorical persuasion is discussed in the context of an interaction without exchange (an addressed monologue, that is to say a one-turn interaction), which gives the public a largely passive role.
Pragma-Dialectic starts not from an opinion to be conveyed to a public but from a difference of opinion between two individuals, giving each opinion an equal value and chance to prevail. This theory “takes as its object the resolution of divergences of opinion by means of argumentative discourse” (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1992, 18). Rule 1 opens up the space for debate and controversy:

Freedom – The parties must not obstruct the free expression of points of view or their questioning. (van Eemeren, Grootendorst, Snoeck Henkemans 2002, p. 182-183),

The debate reaches its rational goal if it can effectively eliminate either the doubt or the “inconclusively defended point of view”:

Closing – If a point of view has not been conclusively defended, the advancing party must withdraw it. If a point of view has been conclusively defended, the other party must withdraw the doubts it has expressed with respect to that point of view.” (Ibid.)

This leads to a consensus either on the opinion, or on its “withdrawal” (from the current interaction, from the other’s mind, etc.).
Interactional and cooperative approaches to argumentation consider that the viewpoint that one partner brings into the discussion and lays out for the appreciation of the other participants arguing their own perspective can be profoundly transformed by the encounter. Consensus can be achieved by merging primitive views or by co-constructing a third opinion, participants behaving like Hegelian evolutionary dialecticians progressing by synthesis of actual positions, and not as Aristotelian dialecticians, progressing by eliminating the competing position, S. Rhetoric; Dialectic.

9. Externalized persuasion

Persuading, that is to say changing the audiences’ minds, means changing the audience’s language. The persuasion experience leaves an inflection point in the discourse of the persuadee. The new discourse produced by a persuaded audience is characterized by its argumentative co-orientation with the persuader’s discourse. The persuadees ratify the persuader’s interventions; they adopt the speaker’s presuppositions, repeat his or her arguments, adopt his or her personal style, and, in the cases of “deep persuasion”, his or her tone of voice.

That is, persuasion can be externalized, to be analyzed, on the basis of linguistic evidence obtained by comparing the persuading and the persuaded discourses.

1 Quoted after Quintilien, I. O. = Institution oratoire, Trans. by J. Cousin. Paris: Les Belles Lettres,
2 Jean de La Bruyère, The Characters, or Manners of the Age. London: D. Browne, etc. p. 7. [Des ouvrages de l’esprit. In Les Caractères ou les mœurs de ce siècle, 1688] https://books.google.fr/books?id=6y9QiTEK1JAC&printsec=frontcover&dq=La+Bruyere+Characters&hl=en&sa=X&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=think&f=false (03-19-2017)

 

Persuade, Convince

The opposition, or progression, from to persuade to to convince, along with the development of audiences from particular to universal, is a major focus of the Treatise on Argumentation (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca [1958]), S. Persuasion

1. To persuade a particular audience,
to convince the universal audience

Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca significantly restructure the concept of audience. First, the notion is broadened to encompass written communication, “every speech is addressed to an audience, and it is frequently forgotten that this applies to everything written as well” ([1958] p. 6-7). The focus put on this en- larged concept of audience explains the fact that the Treatise does not engage in the analysis of delivery (pronunciatio), the oral, face-to-faces, dimension of classi- cal rhetoric, S. Rhetoric.

The Treatise goes beyond actual audiences to consider the particular audiences and the universal audience. The former is the sole object of classical rhetoric; the latter is a philosophical projection of the essential characters of the former. The concept of audience is then extended to cover self-deliberation (exploiting the resource of polyphony:

Thus, the nature of the audience to which arguments can be successfully pre- sented will determine to a great extent the direction the arguments will take and the character, the significance that will be attributed to them. What formulation can we make of audiences, which have come to play a normative role, enabling us to judge on the convincing character of an argument? Three kinds of audiences are apparently regarded as enjoying special prerogatives as regards this function, both in current practice and in the view of philosophers. The first such audience consists of the whole of mankind, or at least, of all normal adult person; we shall refer to it as the universal audience. The second consists of the single interlocutor whom a speaker addresses in a dialogue. The third is the subject himself, when he deliberates or gives himself reasons for his actions. (Id., p. 30)

2. A normative opposition

While the translators of classical rhetorical texts use the verbs to persuade or to convince interchangeably, Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca differentiate between these two verbs on the basis of the quality of the audiences:

We are going to apply the term persuasive to argumentation that only claims validity for a particular audience, and the term convincing to argumentation that presumes to gain the adherence of every rational being. ([1958], p. 28)

This is a stipulative definition, based on a normative perspective. For the New Rhetoric, the norm of argumentation is constituted by the hierarchy of audiences who accept it. This position strongly distinguishes the new rhetoric from the standard theories of fallacies, for which the norm is given by logical laws, or by a system of rules defining rationality. S. Norms; Rules; Evaluation.

3. To persuade, to convince: The words

3.1 History

The Greek word used to refer to rhetorical evidence is pistis. Unlike the scientific and logical word proof, pistis belongs to a family of terms expressing the idea of “trust in others; which can be relied upon” and “proof” (Bailly, [Pistis]). The family of Greek terms translated as “persuasion” refers to “obeying”, as well as to “persuading, seducing, deceiving” (id., [Peitho]). The name of the goddess Peitho, the companion of Aphrodite, sometimes Aphrodite herself, goddess of beauty, seduction and persuasion, also belongs to this family. From this perspective, the word pistis is syncretic; it covers what is for us the field of influ- ence, proof, seduction, submission and persuasion. By definition, “rhetorical evidence is persuasive”.

The Latin verb suadere means “to advise”; the corresponding adjective, suadus, means “inviting, insinuating, persuasive” (Gaffiot [1934], Suadeo; Suadus). Persuadere is composed of suadere and the aspectual prefix per-, which indicates the completion of the process, meaning “I. Decide to do something […] II. Persuade, convince” (id., Persuadeo).

Convincere is composed of con- (cum-) “totally” + vincere “conquer”: “utterly conquer” (id., Convinco); its primary meaning is “to confound an adversary” (ibid.). Just like per- in persuadere, the prefix cum- refers to a completed action. The same meaning is expressed in to convict, coming from the Latin convictus, past participle of convincere meaning “to refute, convict” (MW , Convict, Etymology):

1: to find or prove to be guilty. The jury convicted them of fraud.
2: to convince of error or sinfulness

Both persuadere and convincere mark the completion of the action. According to the grammatical normative tradition, to convince is should be used in  situations in which beliefs are changed without action, whilst to persuade is should be used for situations in which action is undertaken; the rule is based on the etymology of the words. In practice, both terms are used as synonyms. The traditional rule may be based on the principle of superfluity, whereby there cannot be two words with the same meaning, as there cannot be two laws to the same effect. Yet two words can have the same meaning until everyday usage differentiates them.

3.2 Lexical opposition persuasion vs. conviction

The verbs to persuade and to convince belong to a lexical-semantic field including:

advising

brainwashing

bringing around

catechizing

converting

counseling

inciting

 

 inducing

insinuating

inspiring

instilling

inviting

preaching

prevailing on

 

 prompting

propagandizing

seducing

suggesting

talking s.o. into / out of doing sth.

winning somebody over to a point of view.

This lexical basis is a rich source of semantic orientations and oppositions whose exploitation could contribute to the reflection on the diversity of the expected effects of discourse.

To persuade and to convince are equivalent in many contexts.

A tries to persuade / convince B of something
A addresses a persuasive / convincing argument to B
=> then B adopts new persuasions / convictions

Nonetheless, in other contexts, they are non-equivalent:

A letter of persuasion — not *conviction
A considers that B is persuadable (-ible) — not *convince-able

The pair persuader / persuadee is not marched by a pair *convincer / *convincee. Convictive and convict are, at least etymologically, linked to convince. To persuade has not produced corresponding words.

The present participle convincing can be used as an autonomous adjective, meaning “cogent”; a conviction is “a strong belief”. “Very convincing” seems more common than “very persuasive”; nonetheless, both can be used to qualify not only an argumentative discourse but also many other kinds of discourse:

very convincing accounts, reports…
— — novels, tales, narratives…
— — portraits

as well as non-verbal activities:

a very convincing experience
— —scar (stage make-up).

“Ad —” Arguments

Some argument schemes are designated by Latin labels, S. A/Ab —; Ad —; Ex —. This entry lists the labels using the Latin preposition ad. In classical Latin, the preposition ad is constructed with the accusative and introduces a goal complement. The phrase “argument ad hominem” reads “argument addressing the person”.

According to Hamblin, the oldest scheme in this grouping is ad hominem, which appears in the Latin translations of Aristotle; this naming method was popularized by Locke ([1690]) and by Bentham ([1824]), and most of these terms seem to be nineteenth or twentieth century creations (Hamblin 1970, p. 41; p. 161- 162).

1. A list of “ad + N” arguments

Latin name of the Argument

Meaning of the Latin word(s)
• (When necessary a word-for-word translation)
• (English equivalent(s))
• Reference to the corresponding entry/ies

(reductio) ad absurdum (also: ab absurdo):  Lat. absurdus, “false, unpleasant, absurd” — reduction to the absurd — S. Absurd
ad amicitiam Lat. amicitia, “friendship” — appeal to friendship
— S. Emotion
ad antiquitatem Lat. antiquitas, “antiquity, tradition” — appeal to antiquity, to tradition — S. Authority
ad auditorem (pl. ad auditores) Lat. auditor, “hearer, audience”
— S. Beliefs of the audience.
ad baculum Lat. baculus, “stick” — S. Threat — Promise
ad captandum vulgus Lat. captare, “try to seize … by insinuation, by guile”; vulgus “crowd, ordinary people” — playing to the gallery ; playing to the crowd
— S. Emotion; Ad populum ; Laughter and Seriousness.
ad consequentiam  Lat. consequentia, “following, consequence”
— S. Ad consequentiam; Consequence — Effect
ad crumenam Lat. crumena, “purse” — argument to the purse
— S. Emotion ; Threat — Promise
(reductio) ad falsum
 Lat. falsum, “false” — reduction to a falsehood
— S. Absurd
ad fidem Lat. fides, “faith” — S. Faith
ad fulmen Lat. fulmen, “thunderbolt” — argument from thunderbolt
— S.  Threat — Promise
ad hominem Lat. homo, “human being” — S. Ad hominem
ad ignorantiam
 Lat. ignorantia, “ignorance” — S. Ignorance
ad imaginationem
 Lat. imaginatio, “picture, vision” — appeal to imagination
— S. Subjectivity
(reductio) ad impossibile
 Lat. impossibile “impossible” — reduction to the impossible
— S. Absurd
(deducendo, reductio) ad incommodum:  Lat. incommodum “unfortunate, disadvantageous” — reduction to the uncomfortable — S. Ad incommodum
ad invidiam:  Lat. invidia, “hate, envy” — appeal to envy — S. Emotion
ad iudicium:
 Lat. iudicium, “sentence, judgment, opinion” — arg. appealing to the judgment ; to common sense — S. Matter
ad lapidem:  Lat. lapis, “stone; (symbol of stupidity, insensibility)” — S. Dismissal
ad Lazarum Lat. Lazarus, character of the Bible, paragon of the destitute — arg. ad Lazarum — S. Rich and Poor
ad litteram:  Lat. littera, “letter” — S. Strict Meaning
ad ludicrum:  Lat. ludicrum, “public game (theater, circus…)” — appeal to the gallery —
S. Emotion; Ad populum ; Laughter and Seriousness
ad metum Lat. metus, “fear, apprehension” — appeal to fear — S. Threat — Promise
ad misericordiam:  Lat. misericordia, “compassion, pity” — appeal to pity — S. Emotion
ad modum:  Lat. modus “measure, just measure, moderation” — arg. of gradualism
— S. Proportion
ad naturam:  Lat. natura, “nature” — appeal to nature ; naturalistic fallacy
— S. Weight of circumstances
ad nauseam:  Lat. nausea, “nausea, seasickness” — proof by assertion — S. Repetition
ad novitatem:  Lat. novitas, “novelty, innovation; unexpected thing” — appeal to novelty
— S. Progress
ad numerum:  Lat. numerus, “number, great number” — arg. from number — S. Authority
ad odium:  Lat. odium, “hate” — appeal to hatred, to spite — S. Emotion
ad orationem Lat. oratio, “language, comments, speech, discourse” — S. Matter
ad passionem
(pl. ad passiones)		 Lat. passio, “passivity; passion, emotion” ; appeal to passion, to emotion
— S. Pathos ; Emotion
ad personam Lat. persona, “mask; role; person” — abusive ad hominem
— S. Personal Attack; Ad hominem
ad populum Lat. populus “people” — appeal to people, arg. from popularity
— S. Ad populum
ad quietem Lat. quies “rest; political neutrality; calm; peace”, tranquili- ty” — appeal for calm, conservatism — S. Calm
ad rem Lat. res, “thing, being, reality ; judicial matter, issue” — arg. addressed to the thing, to the point, dealing with the matter at hand — S. Matter
ad reverentiam Lat. reverentia, “respectful fear; deference” —S. Respect
ad ridiculum Lat. ridiculus, “funny; ridicule” — appeal to ridicule, appeal to mockery
— S. Absurd ; Laughter and seriousness
ad socordiam Lat. socordia, “stupidity; indolence” — appeal to weak-mindedness
— S. Subjectivity
ad superbiam Lat. superbia, “pride” — appeal to pride; arg. of popular corruption
— S. Emotion; Ad populum
ad superstitionem Lat. superstitio, “superstition”— S. Subjectivity
ad temperantiam Lat. temperantia, “moderation, restraint” — S. Proportion
ad verecundiam Lat. verecundia, “respect, modesty, discretion ; fear of shame” — arg. from modesty ; arg. from authority — S. Subjectivity ; Modesty ; Authority
ad vertiginem Lat. vertigo, “rotation, dizziness” — S. Vertigo

1.Characteristics of the “ad + N” family

2.1 A productive pattern

There are many more “ad +N” arguments than there are “a / ab + N” arguments. Only the “ad +N” construction is still productive; the pattern is popular and mocked (ad bananum argument).

2.2 Origin of the labels

Some of these names have been defined and used by Locke and Bentham, S. Collections (III).

Locke has defined the arguments:

ad hominem ad judicium
ad ignorantiam  ad verecundiam

Bentham has defined the arguments:

ad amicitiam

ad ignorantiam

ad imaginationem

ad invidiam

 ad judicium ad metum ad odium ad quietem ad socordiam
ad superbiam
ad superstitionem ad verecundiam

2.3 Semantic subsets of “a d + N” arguments

These arguments refer to very different strategies. Nonetheless, some group- ings can be proposed according to their semantic content.

 

(i) Arguments bound to affects, emotions, often via positive interest (rewards) or negative results (threats):

ad amicitiam

ad captandum vulgus

ad invidiam

ad ludicrum

ad metum (ad carcerem, ad baculum, ad fulmen, ad crumenam)

 ad misericordiam

ad novitatem

ad numerum

ad passionem

ad odium

ad quietem

 ad personam

ad populum

ad superbiam

ad verecundiam

 

(ii) Arguments involving a limited, subjective system of beliefs, not universal, questionable:

ad consequentiam

ad fidem

ad hominem

 ad ignorantiam

ad imaginationem

ad incommodum

 ad socordiam

ad superstitionem

ad vertiginem

 

Categories (i) and (ii) list arguments often considered as misleading, insofar as they express the subjectivity of the speaker. In other words, they are related to the ethotic and pathemic components, S. Subjectivity; Ethos; Pathos; Emotion.

 

(iii) Arguments opposed to the subjective series (i) and (ii) and dealing with the substance of the issue:

ad iudicium ad rem

 

Absurd

1. The scheme

The argumentation from the absurd is a form of indirect evidence based on contradiction. This label includes a family of arguments concluding that an assertion or a proposal should be rejected on the basis of the indefensible consequences which would result from its adoption.

The general operation of reduction to the absurd corresponds to the following mechanism:

1. A claim, a proposal is put forward, as a working hypothesis, a possibility…
2. Consequences are drawn from this proposition, whatever they may be, causal, logical…
3. One of these consequences is deemed to be “absurd” in relation to some criteria, cf. infra
4. The initial proposal or hypothesis is rejected.

Argumentation to the absurd is not an argument from ignorance. An argument from ignorance concludes that P is true because we have failed to prove not-P, whilst an argument to the absurd concludes that P is true because it has been shown that the proposition not-P is false, and that between P and not-P, only one can hold true. This corresponds to a case-by-case argument in a situation where the number of cases is reduced to two: P is true or not-P is true; but not-P is false, so P is true. S. Apagogic argument; Contradiction.

2. Varieties of absurdities

There are as many kinds of reduction to absurdity as modes of deduction and reasons to evaluate a consequence as inadmissible. The qualification as absurd may thus apply to:
— Mathematical consequences. One clearly sees the variety and the diversity of what is called the “absurd” in argumentation by contrasting these forms with the demonstration from the absurd, where absurd means “contradictory”, cf. infra.

— Logical or semantical consequences. The consequences analytically derived, from the very meaning of the expression lead to a semantic difficulty, S. Dialectic; Opposites; Consequence.

— Causal consequences. In the physical domain and natural experience, the effects predicted by the hypothesis are not attested, S. Refutation by the opposite. The refutation by an attested fact, different from the theoretically expected fact, is a kind of refutation from the absurd.

— Practical consequences. As soon as one turns from the scientifically established causal link to the “causal story” as constructed in a pragmatic argument, however, the speaker intervenes through his or her positive or negative valuation of the consequences. The consequence is then:

— Contrary to the intended goals, the effects of the proposed action are perverse; the measure is counterproductive, contrary to various interests.

— Inadmissible from the point of view of common sense, law, or morality, S. Apagogic; Ad Incommodum.

Pragmatic refutation by negative consequences is opposed to a measure by showing that it will have negative consequences unforeseen by the individual who proposes the measure, and that these drawbacks will prevail over any possible advantage.
The argument is strengthened  if the opponend can show that these  alledged negative consequences are not just  collateral effects, but are in fact  diametrically opposed to the expected positive effects:  the measure proposed to cure the patient will in fact strengthen her disease.

3. Demonstration by reduction to the absurd

Proof by the absurd, or by contradiction, is based on the principle of the excluded middle, according to which “A or not-A” is necessarily true. The rea- soning is based not on the proposition A that we want to prove, but on its negation, not-A.

The negation, not-A, is provisionally admitted and its consequences are de- duced; these consequences lead to statement A. But the conjunction “A and not-A” contravenes the principle of contradiction; thus, not-A is false, and A is necessarily true.

In the language of implication, we are in a situation where “A → non-A’. According to the principle of “one can deduce anything from the false”, this implication is true only if A is false.

 

It can be shown by reduction to the absurd that “the square root of 2 (the number whose square is 2, noted by the symbol √2) is not a rational number” (proposition A).

(1) Suppose that “the number corresponding to √2 is a rational number” (proposition not-A).
(2) By definition, a rational number can be written in the form of a fraction “p / q”, where p and q are prime numbers (a prime number can be divided only by itself and 1).

From this hypothesis, it can be deduced that both p and q are even; Therefore, they have 2 as a common divisor, which is contradictory to the initial hypothesis.

(8) Conclusion: hypothesis (1) is false, and √2 is not a rational number.

The demonstration by the absurd is an indirect method of demonstration. It has not been proved that A is true, but only that not-A is false. This reasoning is by no means permitted by all specialists, “if the classical mathematicians consider the proof by the absurd as valid, the intuitionists reject it: in order to prove a, they say, it is not enough to establish that not-(not-a)” (Vax 1982, Absurd). We see that the demonstrative character of a demonstration can be discussed.

  • Lat. absurdus, “absurd”. Argument ad absurdum, ab absurdo, ex absurdo; or reductio ad absurdum, “reduction to absurdity”, under different forms: reductio ad impossibile, “reduction to the impossible”; r. ad falsum, “r. to the false”; r. ad ridiculum, “r. to the ridicule”; r. ad incommodum; “r. to the undesirable”.


Ab —, Ad —, Ex —: Latin Labels

Latin labels are used to name arguments and fallacies. This practice, although not systematic, is common in modern texts, not exceptional in law, and some traces remain in contemporary usage.

A few of these labels belong to the usual vocabulary of argumentation theory:

argument ad hominem, a fortiori, a contrario, a pari…

The English counterpart of the Latin word is often transparent:

argument e silentio, argument from silence.

Nonetheless, some labels remain opaque when one is not familiar with Latin:

argument ad crumenam, argument to the purse.

The current translation of these Latin labels may be questionable. The label argument ad verecundiam is often translated as “argument from authority”, while the Latin word verecundia means “modesty, humility”. For Locke, who introduced this label, the ad verecundiam argument is not precisely a sophism of authority but of submission to authority, S. Modesty.

This terminology is no longer spontaneously understood. In many cases, this piecemeal Latin appears gibberish and even ridiculous, particularly when well established, or more readily understood English terms can be used to refer to the same argument scheme.

This continued use of Latin labels, however, is due to the power of Latin as the language of law, theology, philosophy and traditional logic. This designation system for argumentation parallels the one which is well established and currently used for the designation of rhetorical figures. Latin has provided a common technical language for everyday reasoning, whilst giving the theoretical discourse some fragrance of Ciceronian authority. This use of Latin is altogether comparable to the contemporary use of English in countries where English is not the native language.

Three main types of Latin phrases can be distinguished.

1. Prepositional labels using the prepositions ab /a — ad — ex

Some arguments or fallacies are designated, in contemporary texts, by prepositional phrases having the following structure:

Latin Preposition + Latin Noun + argument

Sometimes, the Latin word “argumentum” replaces argument.

Latin is an inflected language; in prepositional phrases, the preposition imposes a specific grammatical case on the following noun, marked by a morphological variation at its end.

The three most used prepositions are ab, ex, and ad.

— The preposition ab (or a before consonant) means “from, pulled of, drawn from”:

a contrario argument, argument from the contrary.

—The preposition ad, means “to, towards, for »:

ad personam argument, argument to the person.

— The preposition ex means “from, out of”, indicating the origin:

Argument ex datis: argument drawn from what is admitted by the audience.

Ex labels are less common.

Occasionally, other prepositions can be found:

per: per analogiam argument, argument by analogy;
in: argument in contrarium, argument from the opposites;
pro: argument pro subjecta materia, argument relative to the subject matter. S. Subject matter.

From a semantic point of view, there is a directional contrast, origin vs. purpose, between the prepositions ab and ex on the one hand, and ad on the other hand:

ab, ex + Latin noun + argument = argument based on —, using —
— ad + Latin noun + argument = argument targeting —.

Ab, ad and ex compete in the designation of some arguments, with the same meaning:

ab auctoritate or ad auctoritatem argument;
ab absurdo or ad absurdum or ex absurdo argument.

The argument schemes designated by each of these labels have no common semantic basis. Many ad tags have been introduced in the modern period. Sometimes, they  refer to very specific contents, in particular, to appeals to emotion or to a subjective position, whilst the labels ab and ex are never used in this sense.

 

The following entries list the Latin labels according to the preposition head of the noun phrase, give some equivalent of the Latin terms, and refer to the corresponding entry or entries:

Ab — Arguments (A Contrario, etc.)
Ad — Arguments (Ad Ignorantiam, etc.)
Ex — Arguments (Ex Concessis, etc.)

These lists are taken from Bossuet ([1677]), Locke ([1690]), Bentham ([1824]), Hamblin (1970); Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca ([1958]), and from the Internet. They do not claim to be exhaustive.
Modern Latin labels are presented along with ancient ones, as they were used by Cicero, Quintilian and Boethius, and sometimes incorporated unchanged by modern authors. Examples of this original terminology may be found under the entry Typologies (II): Ancient.

2. Other Latin phrases

Less frequently, various Latin phrases are used to refer to classical Aristotelian fallacies:
— Fallacy of omission of relevant qualification or circumstances; undue generalization of a limited claim:

Fallacy a dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter: a reasoning concluding from a qualified statement (limited in scope) to a generalizing statement (absolute).

Lat. dictum “word; maxim; sentence” here: “assertion”; Lat. secundum quid “according to something”; Lat. simpliciter, from simplex, “simple”.

This formula is abbreviated as “secundum quid fallacy”, S. Circumstances.

 

— Fallacies of false cause, that is to say, of poor construction of the causal relation, S. Causation; Cause-Effect: The causal link:

Non causa pro causa: “a non-cause is taken for a cause”. E1 is said to be the cause of E2, although this is not the case.
Cum hoc, ergo propter hoc: “At the same time as, thus because of ”.
From the fact that E1 and E2 are concomitant, one wrongly infers that they are causally linked.
Post hoc, propter hoc ergo: “later, thus because of”: from the fact that E1 always occurs before E2, one wrongly infers that E2 is due to E1.

— Fallacy of vicious circle:

Petitio principii, Lat. petitio, “demand”; principium “principle”: “request to grant (something equivalent to) the claim which is actually disputed”

The language of law uses Latin phrases and expressions to refer to argumentative principles, for example:

eiusdem generi: lat. idem, “the same”; genus, “genus”. Argument from the identity of genus; S. Genus; Juridical arguments.

3. A mocked pattern

In Tristram Shandy, Sterne mentions the arguments ad verecundiam, ex absurdo, ex fortiori, ad crumenam and the argumentum baculinum (ad baculum) and asks to add to this list the argumentum fistulatorium, which he claims to have invented.

— There lies your mistake, my father would reply; — for in Foro Scientiae there is no such thing as MURDER, —’tis only DEATH, brother.
My uncle Toby would never offer to answer this by any other kind of argument, than that of whistling half a dozen bars of Lillabullero.—–You must know it was the usual channel thro’ which his passions got vent, when anything shocked or surprised him; — but especially when any thing, which he deem’d very absurd, was offerd.

As not one of our logical writers, nor any of the commentators upon them, that I remember, have thought proper to give a name to this particular species of argument, — I here take the liberty to do it myself for two reasons. First, That in order to prevent all confusion in disputes, it may stand as much distinguished for ever from every other species of argument — as the Argumentum ad Verecundiam, ex Absurdo, ex Fortiori, or any other argument whatsoever: — And, secondly, That it may be said by my children’s children, when my head is laid to rest, — that their learn’d grandfather’s head has been busied to as much purpose once, as other people’s; — That he had invented a name, — and generously thrown it into the TREASURY of the Ars Logica, for one of the most unanswerable arguments in the whole science. And, if the end of disputation is more to silence than convince, — they may add, if they please, to one of the best arguments too.

I do therefore, by these presents, strictly order and command, That it be known and distinguished by the name and title of the Argumentum Fistulatorium, and no other; — that it rank hereafter with the Argumentum Baculinum and the Argumentum ad Crumenam, and for ever hereafter be treated of in the same chapter.

As for the Argumentum tripodium […] Laurence Sterne The Life and Opinions of Tristram Shandy, Gentleman [1760]1

Lillibullero is a famous Irish march; the fistula is a panpipe (Gaffiot, Fistula). Uncle Toby’s maneuver is an excellent, although rude, strategy to annihilate a discourse, S. Destruction of discourse; Dismissal.

1 In The Complete Work ofLaurence Sterne. Delphi Classics, 2013. P. LV

 

A Simili

A simili argument, Lat. similis, “similar, looking like, identical”.
Per analogiam argument, Lat. analogia, “resemblance, analogy”.

Perelman defines the argument a simili or “by analogy” as follows:

A legal proposition being given, which affirms a legal obligation relative to a subject or a class of subjects, this same obligation exists with regard to any other subject or class of subjects having with the first subject (or class of subjects) sufficient analogy so that the reason which determined the rule with respect to the first subject (or class of subjects) is valid with respect to the second subject (or class of subjects). Thus, the fact of having forbidden a traveler to climb on the steps accompanied by a dog leads us to the rule that it is also necessary to forbid it to a traveler accompanied by an equally inconvenient animal. (1979, p. 56)

By application of the a fortiori rule, travelers may be accompanied by a “less inconvenient” animal than a dog (maybe a cat?)” but not by a more inconvenient animal (a goat?)

As the extension clause “an equally inconvenient animal” shows, the a simili argument is based on categorization mechanisms. It covers the same kind of reasoning as a pari, and the rule of justice.
The terminology seems somehow redundant, S. Analogy; Genus.

 

A Priori, A Posteriori

Lat. prior, “superior, anterior, older, better, first”; posterior, “coming after, behind, later; second ».

In ordinary language, the modifier a priori is equivalent to “at first sight, before any thorough examination”; the expression is sometimes used to refer to biased thought. A posteriori currently refers to “on second thoughts; after the event”

1. A priori / a posteriori

The a priori / a posteriori distinction expresses an epistemological issue. A posteriori knowledge is concrete knowledge, built from sense data extracted from the world through observation and practice. In contrast, a priori intellectual knowledge is based only on knowledge of language (natural or formal), perhaps coupled with an intuition of essences.
In philosophy, the distinction a priori / a posteriori is linked to the necessary / contingent, and the analytic / synthetic oppositions.

1.1 A posteriori

A posteriori argument starts from an element of experience and reconstructs its material causes or origin. Alternatively, it functions via an abduction process, attaching this experience to a general explanation or a law accounting for the existence of the fact. Arguments from consequences to causes or principles; inductive arguments; arguments based on a natural sign or a concrete example, are cases of a posteriori argumentation.

When investigating the “origin and foundation of inequality among men”, Rousseau highlights the difference between what would be a historical, a posteri- ori, approach to this topic and his own philosophical, a priori inquiry:

Let us begin therefore by laying aside Facts, for they do not affect the Question. The Researches, in which we may engage on this occasion, are not to be taken for Historical Truths, but merely as hypothetical and conditional Rea- sonings, fitter to illustrate the Nature of Things, than to show their true Origin, like those systems, which our Naturalists daily make of the Formation of the World.
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, A Discourse upon the Origin and Foundation of Inequality Among Mankind. [1755]1.[1]

1.2 A priori

Unlike a posteriori argumentation, a priori argumentation is carried out without any explicit consideration of what exists. It starts from what is considered to be deep, first, essential, superior in an intellectual, religious or metaphysical order, and develops its consequences in order to account for apparent, second order, derived, subordinated phenomena.

A priori argumentation may be based on foundations of various kinds.
— Causal a priori argumentation. Causes are considered as primary, as conditioning, with respect to the effect, which are secondary, that is to say, conditioned. A priori argumentation then corresponds to the cause to effect argumentation (or argumentation propter quid).

— Essentialist a priori argumentation is the fruit of pure contemplation and intellectual activity. It assumes that the human mind has the capacity to come into contact with (to apprehend) the essence; that is to say, the hidden and true reality of things, and to adequately express their concept in substantial definitions. Basic concepts are considered as primary in relation to their mundane incarnations. Practically, such argumentation starts with the definition of a concept corresponding to an object of investigation. The deduction then progresses analytically from one intellectual evidence to the other, all the while remaining in the domain of the a priori.

A priori argumentation corresponds to various kinds of deductions which start from principles, from language definitions or from axioms, in order to identify their consequences.
In a Platonic ontology, the ordered contemplation of essences defines supreme knowledge, and an a priori argument, which bears on the being of things, is the most valued form of argumentation.

2. Propter quid and quia argumentations

Lat. propter quid, “on account of which”; quia, “that’”.

The distinction propter quid / quia / proposed by Thomas Aquinas (ST 1st Part, Q. 2, 2; Com. NE, 4, § 51) is close to the a priori / a posteriori relation, and covers the same kind of argumentation respectively.
The proof quia is primary in relation to us, starts from what is better known to us, whereas the proof propter quid is primary in the absolute.

This distinction expresses the difference between a cause to effect, that is a “propter quid” because:

The lawn is wet because it is raining
Why is the lawn wet? — Because it is raining

and an effect to cause, that is, a “quia” because: It is raining, because the lawn is wet

*Why is it raining? — Because the lawn is wet
Why do you say it’s raining? — Because the lawn is wet

In theology, the a priori – propter quid proof corresponds to the ontological argument for the existence of God, whose existence is deduced from the a priori perfection attributed to him. The ontological proof of the existence of God consists in defining God as an infinitely perfect being, in order to deduce thathe necessarily exists, this conclusion being reached, as St. Anselm says “by arguing silently with [one]self” (Pros., Preface).

The proof quia of the existence of God corresponds to the argument from the world itself (effect) to a creator (cause), as in the Voltairian metaphor:

The universe embarrasses me, and I cannot imagine
That such a clock should exist without a clockmaker.
Voltaire, [The Cabals], 1772. [2].

[1] Quoted after John James Rousseau, A Discourse upon the Origin and Foundation of Inequality among Mankind. London: R. and J. Dodsley, 1761. P. 10.
[2] Quoted in Pierre Hadot, The Veil of Isis. Cambridge, MAS & London, England: Harvard UP, 2008. P. 127.

A pari “for the same reason”

Lat. a pari, or a pari ratione, “for the same reason”: par, “equal, same” ratio, “reason”.

A distinction must be drawn between two kinds of a pari arguments, depending on whether they deal with individuals or classes of individuals.

1. When the argument concerns individuals, the a pari argument includes an individual x in a cate­gory C. The individual becomes (is identified as) a member of the category, in logical symbols < x ∈ C >, S. Categorization.

2. When the argument concerns classes of individuals, the a pari argument reorganizes the cate­gory system (classification@, taxonomy). It reduces two formerly distinct categories (class, species) to one, on the basis that they belong to the same super category (genus). This entry deals with this second definition.

The vocabulary of analogy and the label “argument a comparatione” are sometimes used to refer to the argument a pari, in both of its forms, S. Taxonomies and categories.

The a pari argument “[applies] to another species of the same genus what can be asserted about some particular species.” (Perelman, Olbrechts-Tyteca [1958], p. 241);

A pari reasons by equality of the cases if a parricide deserves death, the same ap­plies to matricide. (Chenique 1975, p. 358)

The a pari argument transfers a property (a quality, a right, a duty…) (here “— deserves death”) originally attached to a species A (here: “— is a parricide”) to an­other species B (here: “— is a matricide”), arguing that they belong to the same genus (here: “— is a murderer of a parent”). The reasoning is as follows:

The trend is towards severity
The penalty for matricide is life imprisonment.
Let’s strengthen the punishment of matricide!

The penalty for parricide is death.
Parricide and matricide are crimes of the same genus (type, genre, kind…).
The penalty for matricide should be death!

Two different situations should be distinguished for the discussion of a pari.

— Situations of complete knowledge, where the truth is fully known and can be fully contemplated; then, syllogistic reasoning applies.
— Situations where the truth is debatable and a concrete decision has to be made, i.e., argumentative situations.

1. Syllogistic a pari

From the point of view of absolute knowledge, the a pari argument is either a truism or a paralogism, depending on whether or not the property considered is generic, S. Taxonomies and categories.

If the property is generic, then it is true of all species attached to the genus, and particularly true of the two species involved in the a pari argument. The syllogism runs as follows:

Having a constant body temperature is a generic property of mammals.
Whales, humans… are mammals
So Whales, humans… have a constant body temperature.

The corresponding a pari argument is:

Both men and whales are mammals (“belong to the same genus”, here mammals)
Men have a constant body temperature (“what is true of a species”, here humans)
So whales (must) have a constant body temperature (“is applied to another spe­cies”, here whales).

If the property is not generic, then, the inference is a paralogism:

Labradors, poodles… are dogs
Labradors are gun dogs
So, poodles are / must be gun dogs.

The corresponding a pari argument is:

Both labradors and poodles are dogs (“belong to the same genus” here dogs)
Labradors are gun dogs (“what is true of a species”, here labradors)
So poodles are gun dogs (“is applied to another species”, here gun dogs).

But poodles are not gun dogs. The property “— is a gun dog” is not a generic property, it is attached to labrador as a species, not to the genus “dogs”. It follows that this property cannot be safely transferred to poodles.

In short, a property can be transferred from a species to another species belonging to a same genus only if the said property is generic. The validity of the argument depends on the quality of the taxonomy it exploits, and the argument will be considered convincing only if people agree on the classification.

2. The seeming deadlocks a pari vs. a contrario
and a pari vs. a pari

Two paradoxes are attributed to a pari argument. In the same situation:

  • a contrario and a pari cancel each other out;
  • a pari can destroy a pari.

2.1 A contrario against a pari

(i) A pari extends to the As the treatment given to the Bs, arguing that both are attached to a common super-category:

(1) the As are like the Bs! they should be treated as Bs!

(ii) A contrario, the argument from the opposite, justifies the difference in treatment of the As and Bs, arguing that they are indeed opposites:

(2) The As and Bs are different, so they are rightly treated as such!

In both cases, the question is whether a difference between A and B should be preserved: a contrario answers “yes!”, a pari answers “no!”.

2.2 A pari against a pari

A pari argument extends to B a characteristic of A, or to A a characteristic of B. It can be objected to (i):

(3) If the As are like the Bs, then the Bs are like the As; the Bs are the ones which should be treated like As!

Here, proponent and opponent refer to the same data and use the same rule to support contrary claims. They agree on the necessity to re-categorize As and Bs into just one category, but disagree about which should prevail.

Hence the conclusion may be reached that all this maneuvering is useless (in the following quotation “analogy” means a pari):

That the argumentum a contrario and analogy as means of interpretation are entirely worthless can be seen from the fact that both lead to opposite results, and that no criterion exists to decide when the one and when the other should be applied. (Kelsen 1967, p. 352).

This is the case for an abstract, syllogistic situation, where:

— A contrario is actually logically invalid, S. Opposites – A contrario.
— A contrario can be systematically opposed to a pari.
— As a “bidirectional” argument scheme, a pari can always be opposed to a pari.

3. Argumentative a pari and the situated condition of argument

Let us schematize a situation in which Gs and Bs are treated differently. A pari can be used to support the claims “All Gs!” or “All Bs!” and a contrario, to rebut both.

Present situation Revendication
all Gs!
G ≠ B and G and B are treated differently
all Bs!

— A contrario is the status quo argument, which may be set up against both a pari alignments. Those arguing for a status quo do not support the burden of proof, they can simply reformulate and amplify the current “doxical” discourse, to maximize the opposition between As and Bs, and so to justify a contrario the difference in treatment:

It is not by chance that As and Bs are called A and B, precisely because they are A and B, and not something else!

— The proponent of either a pari alignments of categories must undermine this discourse, showing that the difference formerly considered as essential should now be considered a mere accident. These minimizing strategies accompanying a pari depend on the characteristics of the specific situations.

In a slightly more complicated move, the individual forwarding an a pari argument may attempt to show that it is possible to construct a super category, including both A and B. This solution implies that the former definitions of both categories needs to be amended.

The problem with the syllogistic approach of a priori is that it does not take the argumentative situation into account, whereas there are preferences and impossibilities enshrined in any such situation. These contextual conditions systematically eliminate one or the other application of a pari. A pari is logically bi-directional and contextually mono-directional, as can be seen in the following cases.

3.1 Military service: girls / boys

Context: a country where boys, but not girls, complete compulsory military service. Applying a pari to the boys, that is, claiming that they should not do their military service, amounts to requesting the dissolution of the army, its professionalization, or similar. This would be the real issue, and not that of equal treatment of boys and girls.

So, the a pari argument can only be advanced by the girls, or by the military administration willing to incorporate girls. The relevant argumentative question can only be “should the girls do military service too?”, and a pari backs a positive answer very well.

3.2 Murders: patricide / matricide

Context: a social situation in which a “civilizing process” is taking place; there is a clear effort being made to eliminate all forms of violence. In such a situation, an a pari generalization of the death penalty is “out of the question”. The only relevant issue can be “should we reduce the penalty for patricide?”, with a pari being used to back a positive answer.

If the social climate is oriented towards the strengthening of penalties, the situation is the same, with a pari serving as justification for the positive answer to the question “should we increase the penalty for matricide?”.

3.3 Employment: fixed-term / permanent contract

Context: Some employees receive a Permanent Contracts (PC), while others have a Fixed Term Contracts (FTC), the former kind of contracts being considered better than the latter from the point of view of the workers. In a period of prosperity and full employment, PCs are the golden standard, the a pari alignment of FTCs with PCs is on the agenda. The issue of a possible alignment of PCs with FTCs is irrelevant. The difference will be denied through argumentations such as:

People with FTCs are exploited, we are all workers, everyone should be able to get a PC!

In less favorable economic conditions, FTCs become the norm, and their alignment with PCs is not on the agenda. The difference will be denied by argumentations such as:

People with PCs are privileged, privileges should be ended, everyone should be put on an FTC!

3.4 Going out at night: girls / boys

Let us consider a family of consisting of both teenage boys and teeenage girls, two species of the same genus. The boys are authorized to go out in the evening, the girls however are not. Let us suppose that this prohibition annoys the girls. They can argue their point in many ways. They might, for example draw on the positive outcomes that going out at night will have on their social awareness, S. Pragmatic argument; they might also point out that their brothers go out at night, in an elliptic a pari:

G — But the boys do go out at night!

Unsurprisingly, the parents argue a contrario:

P — Yes but you are a girl…

To strengthen their case and eliminate the difference, girls might stress the common features characterizing the new catchall category “as the boys”:

Boys and girls receive the same education; they have access to the same media; they practice judo; they follow the same courses with the same requirements; they share the same tasks at home …

and minimize the gender gap:

We are mature, we know how to avoid trouble.

 

A fortiori, “for a stronger reason”

Lat. a fortiori ratione, “for a stronger reason”.
Ratio, “reason”; fortis, “strong”, fortior “stronger”.

The argument a fortiori applies in two directions:

(1) “From bigger to smaller” (Lat. a maiori ad minus). This formula allows infer­ences from more to less:

The hook can hold a load of up to 20kg, so it can support 10kg.
If he is capable of killing someone, he is capable of striking someone.

Other expressions to the same effect: “for stronger reason”, “all the more reason to/for”, “those who can do hard things can readily do easy ones”, etc.

(2) “From smaller to bigger” (Lat. a minori ad maius). This formula rejects inferences from less to more:

The hook cannot hold a load of more than 20kg, so it certainly cannot support a 30 kg burden.
If one has no right to strike, one has no right to kill.

Other expression to the same effect: “still / much / even less”, etc.

This scheme can be specified in a discursive domain, for example as a consolation discourse:

The idea that “death should spare young people” is more acceptable (more normal) than “death should spare the elderly”. And you know that around you many younger people have died. Therefore, accept death.

This form underlies the statement “others died much younger”, said to comfort the living for the death of an elderly relative.

1. A fortiori, a transcultural topos

The a fortiori argument scheme is a clear example of a cross-cultural interpretative – argumentative rule.

1.1 Greco-Latin tradition

In the Greco-Latin tradition all collections of argument schemes throughout the history of Western argumentation mention the a fortiori rule. Aristotle illustrates this rule via the following examples:

If even the gods are not omniscient, human beings are certainly not. (Rhet, II, 23, 1397b15, RR, p. 359)
A man who strikes his father also strikes his neighbors […] for a man is less likely to strike his father than to strike his neighbors (ibid.).

The second argument can be used in the following situation. Somebody was assaulted. Who is guilty? We know that someone in the victim’s neighborhood committed violence against his own father. The a fortiori line casts suspicion upon he who has already committed more strongly prohibited forms of violence. The conclusion is that the police should question him.

1.1 Muslim legal argumentation

In Muslim legal argumentation, the bi-l-awla argument corresponds exactly to the a fortiori argument. The problem is discussed in the Koran (Surah 17, verse 24), dealing with the respect that a child owes to his parents:

Do not make “pffft!” to them!

The prohibition refers to a minimal impolite retort of a child shrugging off the words of his parents, or obeying them reluctantly, puffing out a sigh of exaspera­tion. The a fortiori principle extends the prohibition to all disrespectful behavior: “since it is forbidden even to say “pff!” to one’s parents, it is all the more forbid­den to say harsh words to them, to bully or to hit them”.
The prohibition takes its support on the lowest point on the scale, the epsilon of disrespect. Commentators have noticed that a fortiori argument can be a case of semantic deduction (Khallâf [1942], p. 216).

1.3 Talmudic exegesis

The rules of Talmudic exegesis have been established by various authors since Hillel (1st century CE). The entry “Hermeneutics” of the Encyclopædia Judaïca, enumerates the thirteen interpretation rules of Rabbi Ishmael.
The first one is the rule qal va-homer, “how much more”, going a fortiori from the “minor” (qal) to the “major” (homer). (Jacobs & Derovan 2007, p. 25).

This rule helps to determine what is lawful and what is not, for example the conditions under which the Easter sacrifice, Pesach, should be offered. The Bible asks that Pesach be offered at Easter. Some actions are forbidden on the Sabbath, so what is one to do when Pesach coincides with the Sabbath? The calculation a fortiori gives the answer: the sacrifice Olat Tamid (“daily burnt-offering”[1]) is offered every day, including Shabbat. Pesach is more important than Tamid (proof: if one does not respect Tamid, one does not incur penalties; if one does not respect Pesach, the sanctions are severe). Since not to celebrate Pesach is more serious than not to cele­brate Tamid, and Tamid is lawful when Easter falls on the day of Shabbat, it is therefore a fortiori lawful to proceed to sacrifice Pesach when Easter falls on the day of Sabbath.
The reasoning can be expressed as a rhetorical syllogism:

Problem: the Pesach sacrifice must be offered on Passover.
Some actions are forbidden on Shabbat
Question: What should we do when Passover coincides with Shabbat?

Data: We know that 1) Tamid must be celebrated on Shabbat 2) Not celebrating Pesach is worse than not celebrating Tamid
Argumentation: Topos of the opposites on (2):
Celebrating Pesach is more important than celebrating Tamid.
This, combined with (1), leads to the conclusion:

Conclusion: Pesach can be celebrated when Easter coincides with Shabbat.

1.4 Chinese tradition

Confucius, The Analects. Bk 11, §12. Trans. Robert Eno [3]

Ji Lu asked about serving the spirits. The Master said, “While you are yet not able to serve men, how could you be able to serve the spirits?”
“May I ask about death?”
“When you do not yet understand life, how could you understand death?”

Han Fei Tzu, “Precautions within the palace”.  Trans. Burton Watson [4]

Thus, the actor Shih aided Lady Li to bring about the death of Shen-sheng and to set Hsi-ch’i on the throne.1 Now, if someone as close to the ruler as his own consort, and as dear to him as his own son, still cannot be trusted, then obviously no one else is to be trusted either.
1 Lady Li and Hsi-ch’i “forced Shen-sheng to commit suicide in 656 BC”. “Hsi-ch’i (…) succeeded to the throne in 651 BC” (Burton Watson’s note to the text)

A fortiori can therefore be considered a good candidate for universality.

2. Nature of gradation

The application of the a fortiori rule presupposes both that the facts put in relation fall within a certain category and that they are hierarchically positioned within this category. This gradation may follow very different principles:

— Objective gradation: “he can hardly go from his bed to the window, and you would like to take him shopping downtown?”
— Socio-semantic gradation: “even grandparents sometimes make big mistakes, so their grandchildren…”
— Gradation based on the authority of the sacred book: “the Pesach sacrifice is more important than the Tamid sacrifice”.

When there is a consensus on the gradation, ratified by the dictionary, the argumen­tative or interpretive deductions is purely semantic, S. Definition.

In the “Argumentation within Language” theory (Ducrot 1973) the concept of a graduated category is represented as an argumentative scale, the a fortiori rule being an argumentative operator on such scales.

3. A fortiori in paragon scales

Some of these scales are topped by an ultimate individual, the paragon, the most excellent specimen of the category. The absolute degree in the category is estab­lished in terms of comparability with the paragon: “sly as a fox”.These paragon scales are effective in rejecting a complaint: “You say that what happens to you is unjust. That’s true. But consider that Christ is the Innocent par excellence. Now, you are not Christ, and Christ accepted an unjust death. You must therefore accept this injustice.”

An episode of the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939). Paco, a somewhat turbulent villager, turns himself in after the war, upon the request of Mosén Millán, a priest. Mosén Millán as­sures him that he would be convicted but that he would have his life saved. Paco surren­ders, and now he is to be shot with his companions.
— Why do you want to kill me? What did I do? We didn’t kill anyone. Tell them I’ve done nothing wrong. You know very well that I’m innocent, that we’re all innocent.
—Yes, my son. You are all innocent. But what can I do?
— They want to kill me because I fought back at Pardinas; OK, but the other two did nothing wrong.
Pedro clung to the cassock of Mosén Millán, and repeated: “They did nothing, and they are going to kill them. They did nothing.” Moved to tears, Mosén Mil­lán said to him:
— Sometimes, my son, God allows the death of an innocent. He allowed it for his own son, who was more innocent than you three.
On hearing these words, Paco remained paralyzed and mute. The priest said noth­ing either.
Ramón J. Sender [Requiem for a Spanish Peasant] [1953][4]

[1] After https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/tamid (11-08-2017)

[2] Confucius, The Analects. An Online Teaching Translation.  R. Eno 2015 (Version 2.21) http://www.indiana.edu/~p374/Analects_of_Confucius_(Eno-2015).pdf

[3] Han Fei Tzu. Basic Writings. Section 17, “Precautions within the palace”. Translated by Burton Watson. New York, London, Columbia University Press, 1964. P. 84-85.

[4] Ramón J. Sender [1953] = (1981). Requiem por un campesino Español. Barcelona: ​​Destinolibro, 7th ed.. P. 100-101.

 

F Oxymore

Oxymore

Wuttke, Walter 1977. Zu Fragen des Zustandekommens potentieller sprachlicher Wirkingen des Oxymoron… Beiträge zur Geschischte des deutschen Sprache und Literature, 98. 83-90

Des emplois récents du mot oxymore lui-même illustrent de façon frappante cette ambivalence pragmatique de la figure. Lors de la constitution de mon corpus, j’ai en effet été frappée de constater que ce terme savant, peu usité dans les manuels de rhétorique eux-mêmes jusqu’à une date récente, s’était suffisamment répandu dans l’usage courant pour apparaître dans des commentaires métalinguistiques à forte orientation argumentative, de sorte qu’on peut parler de jugement d’oxymorisation, comme A. Krieg-Planque (2004) parle de jugement d’euphémisation.

57 Qualifier tel objet de discours d’oxymore devient alors un acte argumentatif décisif, soit pour disqualifier l’objet de discours ou le locuteur qui l’a désigné ainsi, soit au contraire pour les parer de toutes les vertus. C’est ainsi que le syntagme « TVA sociale » se voit dans des échanges récents sur la Toile (mai 2007) qualifier d’oxymore par les détracteurs de l’impôt ainsi désigné afin de montrer la fausseté du caractère social de cet impôt. Une blogueuse voit même dans l’oxymore une tare du discours politique contemporain :

58

(29) C’est ainsi que depuis une dizaine d’années on voit fleurir dans la sphère politico-économique d’aussi brillants oxymores que la « croissance zéro » pour éviter de dire la stagnation, le « développement durable » pour taire toute notion de consommation prudente, la « discrimination positive » ou encore le « libéralisme raisonné » pour faire passer la pilule, quand il ne s’agit pas tout bonnement de nous faire croire à l’impossible avec des expressions comme la « guerre propre » et ses fameuses « frappes chirurgicales ». (Article publié sur Agoravox dans l’édition du 04/12/2006, http:// wwww. agoravox. fr/ article. php3 ? id_article= 16263) [29][29]On peut noter que les exemples cités, hormis « discrimination…

 

59 Dans les débats à l’Assemblée Nationale sur le Traité Constitutionnel Européen, l’expression de « traité constitutionnel » est qualifiée d’oxymore par les défenseurs de ce traité, qui parviendrait selon eux à ménager les prérogatives des États tout en approfondissant la construction de l’unité européenne, alors que, quatre ans auparavant, l’appellation d’ « oxymore » est utilisée pour critiquer le concept de « fédération d’États-Nations » qui masquerait tout bonnement une conception fédéraliste de l’Union européenne :

60

(30) M. Léonetti. Contrairement à ce que certains prétendent en arguant du terme de Constitution, ce nouveau traité ne fait pas de l’Union européenne un super-État. C’est un traité entre États. Pascal Clément a brillamment expliqué comment l’expression de traité constitutionnel faisait coïncider deux concepts a priori contradictoires, mais synthétisés dans la notion de construction européenne. – M. Pascal Clément, président de la commission des lois constitutionnelles, de la législation et de l’administration générale de la République, rapporteur. Un oxymore ! (première séance du 26/01/2005)
(31) M. Jean-Pierre Chevènement. À rien ne sert de se réfugier, Monsieur le ministre des affaires étrangères, dans les oxymores, du type « fédération d’États-nations » ; c’est d’avance concéder à la logique du super Etat fédéral. (deuxième séance du 5/06/2001)