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Abduction

Lat. abductio, “action of taking”, by an outwardly directed movement (see infra, meaning 2).

1. Abduction as inference from facts to hypothesis

The concept of abduction was introduced in modern philosophy by the philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce. According to Peirce, there are two kinds of inferences: deductive inference and abductive inference or abduction. Abduction starts from the observation of a fact “contrary to what we should expect” Peirce ([1958], § 202), that is to say, a fact that does not fit into an available explanatory system. Abduction is a kind of inference by which one proposes a hypothesis accounting for this fact.
This hypothesis is not the product of the application of a “discovery algorithm”, but the fruit of a creative process, “abduction is, after all, nothing but guessing” (Peirce [1958], § 219).

Abduction is not an issue in logic, but rather a scientific method (id., Chap. 6). Scientific work consists in proposing, on the basis of facts, plausible hypotheses “suggested” by these facts. Abduction is the first step in this process.
The practice of abduction is not guided by logical rules but by general principles, such as the principle of exclusion of so-called metaphysical hypotheses, that is to say, hypotheses which would have no experimental consequences, or the principle according to which every fact has an explanation: an abducted hypothesis is interesting “if it seems to make the world reasonable” (id., §202).

Unlike abduction, which starts from facts in search of theory, the Peircian deduction starts from a theory in search of facts; that is, it seeks to identify the crucial experimental consequences of a hypothesis.

Much more than a form of deduction or induction, argumentation should be seen as a form of abduction: because the light is on, “I abduct”, I make the hypothesis, that there is someone in the room; but this hypothesis still needs to be checked, S. Probable, Plausible, True.

Woods redefines abductions as “responses to ignorance-problems. An agent has an ignorance-problem in relation to an epistemic target that cannot be hit by the cognitive resources presently at his command, or within easy and timely reach of it” (Woods, 2009; Gabbay & Woods, 2005). The study of argument as an abductive process has proved especially fruitful in the fields of medicine, science and law (Walton 2004).

2. Abduction as reduction of uncertainty

In its Peircian sense, abduction is a kind of inference by which one arrives at a hypothesis accounting for this fact. Aristotle defines abduction as a kind of dialectical syllogism (Aristotle, PA, II, 25), whose major premise is true, the minor just probable, and, consequently, the conclusion also probable. The conclusion alone, without the minor, is more improbable than the minor. The minor therefore strengthens the relative acceptability of the conclusion. This situation recalls the Ciceronian definition of argumentation, S. Argumentation (I).

For example, if the question is: “can virtue be taught?” we can reason as follows:

A true premise: it is clear that science can be taught.
A doubtful premise: virtue is a science.
Conclusion: virtue can be taught.

Though uncertain, the veracity of the second premise is still less in doubt than the conclusion “virtue can be taught”. This second premise may therefore serve as an argument for the conclusion. We find this montage in speeches such as:

Citizenship can be taught.
Citizenship is essentially a set of social knowledge and practices.
Knowledge is being taught and all practical skills can be improved by teaching. So, citizenship can be taught.

Argument functions “for want of better”. Reduction of uncertainty serves to modify relevantly the epistemic status of a belief. This is a logic not of elimination but of reduction of doubt and uncertainty, S. Default reasoning.

Ab exemplo argument

Lat. exemplum, “example”.

In law, the label ab exemplo refers to an argument that interprets the law according to:

  1. A previous case, S. Precedent.
  2. A traditional interpretation, “the doctrine generally accepted” (Tarello, quoted in Perelman 1979, p. 59).

The argument ab exemplo is therefore distinct from the argument from example.

Ab — Arguments (A Contrario…)

Some argument schemes are designated by Latin labels, S. Ab —; Ad —; Ex —. This entry lists the labels using the Latin preposition a / ab.

The same Latin preposition has two forms, a or ab: in general, a is used before a noun beginning with a consonant (a contrario argument), and ab before a noun beginning with a vowel (ab auctoritate argument).

1. The construction

In classical Latin, the a / ab preposition means “separation; away from” and governs the ablative case. Grammatically, ab / a introduces only a circumstantial clause of a verb, indicating the origin. This means that the Latin construction “argumentum ab + N” is to be interpreted as elliptical for “argumentum [ducetur, “drawn”] ab [“from”] N”. Latin texts regularly use expressions of this type, Cicero for example, wrote in the Topics:

cum autem a genere ducetur argumentum (my emphasis) (IX, 39; p. 411);

that is “when, however, an argument is drawn from genus”. Genere is the ablative case of the noun genus; the construction is “argumentum [ducetur] a genere”, “argument [provided by, taken] [from] the genus”. Similarly, the rhetoric Ad Herennius suggests that, in order to amplify the charge, the orator has to look first for an argument drawn from authority:

primus locus ab auctoritate sumitur (my emphasis) (Ad Her., II, 48; p. 147);

that is “the first commonplace [primus locus] is taken [sumitur] from [ab] authority [auctoritate]”. Auctoritate is the ablative case of auctoritas, “authority”. Locus means literally “place”, and is taken here metaphorically as “inferential commonplace” or “argument scheme”, S. Topos, Topic Commonplace.

2. List of the “ab (a) + N” arguments

The set of “ab / a + N” arguments belongs to the original stock of Latin argument labels; its core is drawn from the Ciceronian typology, passed on to the Middle Ages by Boethius, up to modern times S. Collections (2).

In stark contrast to the list of “ad + N” arguments (S. Ad — Arguments), the following list contains no label referring to feelings or subjective beliefs.

Table
First column: Latin name of the argument
Second column:

  • Meaning of the word(s) (based on Gaffiot).
  • (When necessary a word-for-word translation)
  • Reference for the corresponding entry
Latin name of the argument

 

 • Latin term(s) and their English equivalent(s)
• (Global translation)
• Corresponding entry/ies.
ab auctoritate Lat. auctoritas, “authority” — S. Authority; Modesty
a carcere Lat. carcer, “jail” S. Threats — Promises ; Threat; Emotion.
a coherentia Lat. cohærentia, “coherence, consistency” – S. Consistency.
a comparatione Lat. comparatio, “comparison; confrontation”
S. Comparison; A fortiori; Analogy
a completudine Lat. completus, “complete” — S. Completeness
a conjugata Lat. conjugatus “belonging to the same family”
S. Related Words
a contrario (sensu)
(or: ex contrario)		 Lat. contrarius “opposite, contrary” — S. Opposites
a consequentibus Lat. consequens “close; what logically follows”
S. Circumstances; Consequences.
a fortiori
a fortiori ratione		 Lat. a fortiori ratione, “for a stronger reason”; ratio, “reason”; fortior = fortis + higher degree comparative “stronger” — S. A fortiori
a generali sensu Lat. generalis, “general”; sensus “meaning, point of view” —
S. Generality of the law
a genere Lat. genus, “genus” — Argument from genus
S. Genus; Classification; Definition; a pari
a pari Lat. par, “equal, same” 
— S. a pari
a posteriori Lat. posterus, “which comes after” —S. A priori; A posteriori
a priori Lat. prior, “the first of two, superior” — S. A priori; A posteriori
a repugnantibus Lat. repugnans, from repugnare “contradictory; contrary; incompatible” — S. A repugnantibus; Opposites.
a rubrica Lat. rubrica, “title of the section (law)” — S. Title
a silentio Lat. silentium, “silence” — S. Silence.
a simili Lat. similis, “resembling, similar” — S. Analogy; a pari
ab absurdo
[or: ad absurdum]		 Lat. absurdus, “absurd” — S. Absurd.
ab adjunctis Lat. adjuncta, “attached to” — argumenta ex adjunctis ducta, arg. from circumstances — S. Circumstances.
ab antecedentibus Lat. antecedens, “preceding” — S. Circumstances.
ab consequentibus Lat. consequens, “following” — S. Circumstances; Consequences.
ab auctoritate
(or: 
ad auctoritatem)		 Lat. auctoritas, “authority” — S. Authority.
ab enumeratione
partium		 Lat. enumeratio “enumeration”; pars, “part”
arg. from enumeration of parts
S. Composition — Division; Case-by-case; Definition.
ab exemplo Lat. exemplum “example” S. Example; Exemplum; Precedent.
ab inutilitate Lat. inutilitas, “useless, dangerous” — S. Superfluity
ab utili Lat. utilitas, “useful, beneficial” — S. Pragmatic argument

 

The a / ab arguments constitute the original stock of arguments whose core is taken from Cicero’s typology, S. Collection (2). From Aristotle to Boethius

 

As opposed to the ad  arguments, we notice that these labels never refer to emotions or subjective beliefs.

The ad  arguments are clearly arguments and not fallacies. In other words, when using the label “ad + N” argument we take the perspective of the proponent, who produces and puts forward the argument, not from the perspective of the opponent whom the argument will impact and who will reject it.

 

A repugnantibus

A repugnantibus, lat. repugnans “contradictory; resistant, contrary, incompatible”.
Repugnant meaning “disgusting” is also derived from this source, but the argument a repugnantibus is not the “argument of disgust”, S. Emotions.
The meaning of Lat. repugnans in a repugnantibus is closer to “revolting, unacceptable”, the second meaning of Eng. repugnant.

1. In Cicero’s Topica, the a repugnantibus argument is based on logically “contradictory” things (Cicero, Top, XII, 53; p. 420).
In her translation of Boethius, Stump translates a repugnantibus as “from incompatible” (Boethius Top. p. 64), S. Contradiction; Opposites.

This logical a repugnantibus argument is based on contradiction, whereas the ad incommodum argument involves consequences subjectively unacceptable to the speaker, either from a material or a moral point of view, S. Pragmatic argument.

2. Bossuet defines the a repugnantibus argument as a contradiction between act and speech: “your conduct does not suit your speech” ([1677], p. 140), which corresponds to the third type of ad hominem argument, S. Ad hominem.

Indétermination du sens

 Ang. Uncertainty of meaning

1. Le sens dans les langages logiques et dans le langage ordinaire

Les langages logiques, formels et scientifiques se distinguent du langage naturel par leur univocité. À chaque chaîne signifiante (terme ou expression), simple ou complexe, correspond une signification (interprétation) et une seule. De telles chaînes ne connaissent ni le vide de sens (le non-sens), ni l’obscurité, ni le flou (le vague), ni l’ambiguité, ni la multiplicité des sens (ambiguïté), ni les variations de sens dans un discours comme dans domaine.

Dans le langage ordinaire, l’interprétabilité des chaînes signifiantes n’est pas garantie. Une chaîne signifiante peut être :

— Vide de sens, ou ininterprétable (non-sens).
Dans le cas le plus général, il est impossible d’attribuer au segment linguistique un sens quelconque. On ne lui trouve pas de paraphrase satisfaisante  (acceptable dans ce contexte). Le texte est totalement obscur, il pose un défi interprétatif, il est inexploitable par le récepteur.

— Obscure. Il est difficile de formuler la moindre interprétation.
Un texte énigmatique n’est pas un texte obscur, dans la mesure où l’énigme a une clé, qui peut éventuellement être trouvée au terme d’un cheminement interprétatif.
La coexistence dans un même discours d’orientations incompatibles est une cause majeure d’obscurité pragmatique.

— Floue ou vague. Il est possible d’attacher à la même chaîne signifiante  plusieurs interprétations également douteuses et discutables.
On parle de flou et de vague à propos de phénomènes limites qui apparaissent particulièrement à propos de la catégorisation et de la définition.
Le vague du discours peut être également lié aux questions de généralisation et de particularisation.

— Ambiguë. La  chaîne signifiante est ambigüe si on peut lui plusieurs interprétations nettement distinctes et incompatibles. L’interprétation hésite entre deux ou plusieurs sens possibles pour le même segment.

— Instable. Le sens d’une même chaîne peut varier ou s’obscurcir,  dans un même discours, V. Objet de discours.

Globalement, ces cinq caractéristiques — non-sens, obscurité, flou, ambiguïté, instabilité — opposent le langage scientifique, qui est le prototype du langage transparent, au langage naturel qui comporte nécessairement une part d’opacité.
Si l’on définit l’activité de raisonnement à partir du raisonnement logico-scientifique, alors l’incertitude du sens dans le discours ordinaire fait apparaître le langage naturel comme un mauvais milieu particulièrement peu favorable au développement du raisonnement.

2. Exploitation argumentative de l’incertitude sémantique

Le sens d’un discours est le produit d’une activité rhétorique d’expression et d’une activité herméneutique d’interprétation. Le sentiment d’incertitude du sens, peut avoir sa source  dans l’incertitude de l’expression ou dans celle l’interprétation.
Ce sentiment d’indétermination se matérialise par un jugement porté par le récepteur. Comme le jugement de clarté, il peut varier avec les récepteurs.
Dans le cas de discours argumentatifs, le jugement d’incertitude porté sur un discours sert à le réfuter.  Le discours cible est invalidé sur le plan logique et rejeté sur le plan interactionnel, V. Destruction du discours. On lui dénie toute pertinence pour l’échange en cours. Comme tous les jugements, le jugement d’incertitude demande donc à être justifié.
Dans certains genres de discours et d’interaction, le sentiment d’incertitude peut être vu, à juste titre, comme une richesse stimulant l’interprétation. Ils exploitent positivement ce que le discours argumentatif rejette comme fallacieux.

L’interprétation d’un discours tient compte du genre et du type d’échange dans lesquels entrent ce discours, et avant tout de son contexte immédiat, l’échange auquel il apporte une contribution. On peut réfuter une accusation d’indétermination en montrant que l’indétermination est levée par la prise en compte d’un ou plusieurs de ces éléments.

Le dialogue collaboratif joue un rôle essentiel dans la levée de l’indétermination ou de la sous-détermination, lorsque le discours n’atteint pas le niveau de pertinence requis par l’échange.

 

Political Arguments: Two Collections

1. Parameters of political debate

Political deliberation is a problem-solving activity. The following interrogative framework groups the most general questions that must be answered before deciding whether or not to adopt or reject a measure of general interest

Is this measure legal? Just? Honorable? Timely? Useful? Necessary? Safe? Possible? Easy? Pleasant? What are the foreseeable consequences? (After Nadeau 1958, p. 62).

This framework functions on different modes.
— On the interrogative-deliberative mode, it guides a practical decision process:

If you are considering such a measure, look at whether it is just, necessary, feasi- ble, glorious, profitable, and whether it will have positive consequences.

In this case, the set of questions is used as a heuristic. One can take up a re- sponsible political position on a given issue by examining each point and providing a well-argued answer to each question.

— On the prescriptive-justificatory mode, it helps to develop a global, positive or negative persuasive argumentative script about an issue:

If you want to support (or to attack) such measure, show that it is (or it is not) just, necessary, etc.

— On the analytical-critical mode, it serves to test the completeness of an argumentation

You argue that this measure is just, necessary, glorious; but you say nothing about its consequences and the practical modalities of its realization.

In practice, this simple, robust and effective topic applies to any practical public or private decision.

2. Arguments/fallacies of parliamentary debate:
Bentham’s collection

In The Book of Fallacies [1824], Bentham focuses exclusively on fallacious arguments in parliamentary debates. This collection is strongly oriented towards the refutation of conservative discourse, S. Collection (II). In the same spirit, Hirschman has analyzed The Rhetoric of Reaction (1991).
In politics, sophists are accused of indulging in obstructive or manipulative maneuvers, producing bad arguments in bad faith, rejecting legitimate discussion, and serving dishonest or anti-popular purposes.

Bentham distinguishes four main categories of fallacies: fallacies of authority, of danger; of delay, of confusion.

(i) Fallacies of authority

S. Modesty; Threat; Politeness; Personal Attack

— “The wisdom of our ancestors, or Chinese argument; ad verecundiam.” (p.69)

—“Irrevocable law; ad superstitionem”.

— “Fallacy of vows or promissory oaths; ad superstitionem”

“The object of this fallacy is the same as in the preceding; but to the absurdity involved in the notion of tying up the hands of generations yet to come is added, in this case, that which consists in the use sought to be made of supernatural power.” (p. 104)

—“No-precedent argument; ad verecundiam”

“The proposition is of a novel and unprecedented complexion: the present is surely the first time that any such thing was ever heard of in this house.” (p. 115)

— “Self-assumed authority; ad ignorantiam; ad verecundiam” (p. 116)

— “Self-trumpeter’s fallacy”

“There are certain men in office who (…) arrogate to themselves a degree of probity, which is to exclude all imputations and all in- quiry.” (p. 120)

— “Laudatory personalities; ad amicitiam”

“The object of laudatory personalities is to effect the rejection of a measure on account of the alleged good character of those who oppose it.” (p. 123)

(ii) Fallacies of danger, appealing to fear (ad metum) or hate (ad odium)
to repress discussion

S. Emotion; Threat.

— “Vituperative personalities; ad odium” (p. 128).

Attacking the person: “Imputation of bad design; of bad character; of bad motive; of inconsistency; of suspicious connections; imputation founded on identity of denomination.” (p. 127-128)

— “Hobgoblin argument or: No innovation!; ad metum” (p. 145)

Innovation leads to anarchy.

— “Fallacy of distrust

What’s at the bottom?” (p. 154)

— “Official malefactor’s screen (ad metum)

Attack us, you attack Government.” (p. 158)

— “Accusation-scarer’s device.” (p. 184)

(iii) Fallacies of delay

These fallacies play for time, with the intention “to postpone discussion, with a view of eluding it”. Some are based on stupidity and laziness (Lat. socordia):

— “The quietist, or ‘No complaint’ (ad quietem)

Nobody complains, therefore nobody suffers” (p.190); so, no need to change.

— “False consolation (ad quietem)”

“Look at the people there, and there: think how much better off you are than they are.” (p. 194)

— “Procrastinator’s argument (ad socordiam)”

Wait a little, this is not the time!” (p. 198)

— “Snail’s pace argument (ad socordiam])”:

“One thing at a time! Not too fast! Slow and sure!” (p. 201)

— “Artful diversion (ad verecundiam)”

“Why that? (meaning the measure already proposed) — Why not this? — or this?” (p. 209)

(iv) Fallacies of confusion

“[their] object is to perplex, when discussion can no longer be avoided” (p. 213), S. Personal attack; Ambiguity; Ad populum; for Ad judicium, S. Matter

— “Question-begging appellatives (ad judicium)”

The use of “eulogistic terms” and “dyslogistic or vituperative terms.” (p. 214)

— “Impostor terms (ad judicium)”

“For instance, persecutors in matters of religion have no such word as persecution in their vocabulary; zeal is the word by which they characterize all their actions.” (p. 221)

— “Vague generalities (ad judicium)”

A fallacy “resorted to by those who, in prefer- ence to the most particular and determinate terms and expression (…) employ others more general and indeterminate.” (p. 230)

— “Allegorical idols (ad imaginationem)”

“substituting for men’s official denomination the name of some fictitious entity, to whom (…) the attribute of excellence has been attached. Example: Government, for members of the governing body.” (p. 258)

— “Sweeping classifications (ad judicium)”

“ascribing to an individual (…) any prop- erties of another, only because the object in question is ranked in the class with that other” (p. 265) “Example 1: Kings; Crimes of Kings (…) criminals ought to be punished; kings are criminals, and Louis is a king: therefore Louis ought to be punished)” (p. 266)

— “Sham distinctions (ad judicium)”

“Declare your approbation of the good by its eulogistic name, and thus reserve to yourself the advantage of opposing it without reproach by its dyslogistic name (…) Example 1: Liberty and licen- tiousness of the press” (p. 271)

— “Popular corruption (ad superbiam)”

“The source of corruption is in the minds of the people; so rank and extensively seated is that corruption that no political reform can ever have any effect in removing it: This was an argument brought forward against parliamentary reform.” (p. 279)

— “Anti-rational fallacies (ad verecundiam)” — “When reason is found or supposed to be in opposition to a man’s interest, his study will naturally be to render the faculty itself and whatsoever issues from it an object of hatred and contempt” (p. 295)

— “Paradoxical assertions (ad judicium)”

“When of any measure, practice or principle the utility is too far above dispute to be capable of being impeached by rea- soning, a rhetorician (…) in a sort of fit of desperation (…) he has assailed it with some vehement note of reprobation or strain of invective” (p. 314). “Ex- ample: Good method, a bad thing.” (p. 316)

— “Non causa pro causa (ad judicium)”

“When in a system which has good points in it you have a set of abuses (…) to defend; (…) take the abuse you have to de- fend (…) and to them ascribe the credit of having given birth to the good ef- fects” (p. 328)

— “Partiality-preacher’s argument (ad judicium)

A discussion of the maxim: “From the abuse, argue not against use.” (p. 339)

— “The end justifies the means (ad judicium)” — A discussion of the maxim (p. 341).

— “Opposer-general’s justification (ad invidiam)”

“it is not right for a man to argue against his own opinion. (…) If a member of the House of Commons, and in opposition, a measure which to him seems a proper one is brought on the carpet on the ministerial side, it is not right that he should declare it to be, in his opinion, pernicious, and use his endeavours to have it thought so, and treated as such by the House” (p. 344), and reciprocally.

— “Rejection instead of amendment (ad judicium)”

“this fallacy consists in urging in the character of a bar, or conclusive objection against the proposed measure, some consideration, which, if presented in the character of an amendment, might have more or less claim to notice.” (p. 349)

Bentham does not express the fallacies under any “logical form”, but presents them in the form of statements that are condensed argumentations, sometimes in the form of a slogan. The topoi are getting closer to the discursive clichés.
Bentham condemns these maneuvers as prima facie fallacies, and discusses them further under the corresponding heading.

 

Politeness

The verbal aspects of interpersonal relationships are regulated by a set of principles defining linguistic politeness:

Politeness refers to all aspects of the discourse, 1. which are governed by rules, 2. which intervene in the interpersonal relationship, 3. and which have the function of preserving an harmonious relationship (at worst: neutralizing potential conflicts and, at best, ensuring that each participant is as open to the other as possible). (Kerbrat-Orecchioni 1992, p. 159; 163)

Ordinary conversation is governed by the principle of preference for agreement. The interactionist theory of politeness (Brown and Levinson, 1978) defines the individual by his or her faces and territories. Polite intervention respects rules of positive politeness and rules of negative politeness, both towards oneself, and to- wards the interlocutor. In argumentative situations, this preference for agree- ment is transformed into a preference for disagreement (Bilmes 1991). Differences are maximized, which has consequences for all the components of the system of linguistic politeness. The case of the ad verecundiam argument is a typical illus- tration of this transformation, S. Modesty.

1. Politeness oriented towards the addressee

Negative politeness recommends the avoidance of face-threatening acts whilst positive politeness recommends that positive acts be enacted in relation to the territories and the face of the interlocutor (Kerbrat-Orecchioni 1992, p. 184).
The argumentative situation reverses these principles. The rules of positive politeness are not applied, whilst those of negative politeness are inverted. For example, the rule “avoid encroachments on the interlocutor’s private territo- ries” (id., p. 184) corresponds to a principle of non-aggression, “do not violate the territory of the other”. In an argumentative situation, there is necessarily a form of aggression and territorial conflict, with encroachments and counter- encroachments being made.

Another general rule of politeness recommends that parties “[refrain] from making disparaging remarks, too sharp criticisms, too radical refutations, too violent reproaches” (ibid.) – to their conversational partner; whereas, in a situation of argumentation, radical refutation is sought rather than avoided and negative challenging of the opponent is a standard strategy. Praise for the interloc- utor turns out to be an attack against the position he defends in the current interaction, S. Counter-argumentation.
The ban on personal attacks is a matter of politeness aimed at protecting the interlocutor, for aspects of his person that are not at stake in the debate.

2. Politeness oriented towards oneself

The principles of defense the speaker’s territory recommend that you “protect your territory as much as you can (resist over-invasive incursions, do not let yourself be dragged through the mud, do not allow your image to be unfairly degraded, respond to criticism, attacks and insults)” (ibid., p. 182-183). In argu- mentative situations, participants vigorously apply these protecting principles. In non-argumentative situations, the speaker territories must be protected, yet not unduly extended and praised, “our societies severely judge self-satisfaction and pro domo advocacy”, except in “exceptional circumstances” (ibid.). These exceptional circumstances are precisely those of argumentative situations, where speakers do not hesitate to praise their persons as well as their territories, that is, their point of views and arguments. The principles of moderation and self-valorization are thus put on hold. In non-argumentative interactions, “if you have to praise yourself, at least let it be in the attenuated mode of the un- derstatement” (id., 184); you can even “slightly damage your own territory, and practice light self-criticism” (id., 154). This principle requires that one be prepared to compromise and concede, all things that the arguing speaker can choose to do or not do, without being impolite.

The conclusion is that argumentative situations locally suspend the application of the rules of politeness in relation to the objects and persons involved in the discussion. This can even be seen as a fundamental characteristic, a defining criteria of such situations. The protagonists use a kind of “anti-system of politeness”, mirroring the system of politeness. Speaking of “a system of impo- liteness” however, would imply that all these interventions are felt to be impolite, which is not the case, notwithstanding the fact that, in such situations, the partners can engage in polemics about the “tone” of their interventions.

The redefinition of the system of politeness applies strictly to the aspects of the person, face and territories, which are engaged in the argumentative conflict. Outside these areas, politeness rules still apply. It is thus possible for an arguer to praise his or her personality and possessions and attack the standing or val- ues of those of his or her opponent in an argumentative interaction where his or her behavior will, independently, be polite or impolite.

 

Persuasion

1. Persuasion as the essence of rhetoric

Since Isocrates and Aristotle, argumentative rhetorical speech is commonly defined by its function, that being persuasion:

Rhetoric may be defined as the faculty of observing in any given case the available means of persuasion. (Rhet, I, 2, 1355b26, RR, p. 105).

According to Crassus as staged by Cicero, persuasion is the “first duty” of the orator (Cicero, De Or., I, XXXI; p. 40). Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, focus their definition of argumentation on how “to induce or to increase the mind’s adherence to the theses presented for its assent” ([1958]/1969, p. 4; italics in the original) before elaborating on the notion of “adherence of minds” by means of an opposition between persuading and convincing speech, S. Assent; Persuading and convincing.

According to these standard definitions, argumentative rhetoric is fundamentally concerned with the discourse structured by the illocutionary (overtly expressed in the discourse) intention of persuading, that is to communicate, explain, legitimate, and make the listeners share the speaker’s point of view and the words that express it. Persuasion, as a perlocutory state obtained through discourse, results from the realization of these intentions.

The rhetorical tradition binds the discourse of persuasion to the production of a plausible representation in the audience’s minds. This rhetorical representation of reality is considered to be antagonistic towards truth by essentialist philosophers such as Plato, S. Probable.

2. A rhetoric without persuasion: the ars bene dicendi

Chapter 15 of Book II of Quintilian’s Institutes of Oratory is devoted to challenging the definition of rhetoric in relation to persuasion, “the most common definition therefore is that [rhetoric] is the power of persuading” (IO, II, 15, 3), this definition being attributed to Isocrates. Quintilian rejects all the definitions linking rhetoric to persuasion:
— As the power to persuade:

But money, likewise, has the power of persuasion, as do interest, and the authority and dignity of a speaker, and even his very look, unaccompanied by language, when either the remembrance of the services of any individual, or a pitiable appearance, or beauty of person, draws forth an opinion. (Id., 6)

— Or as an instrument of persuasion, even with the restriction “power of persuading by speaking”:

Not only the orator, but also others, such as harlots, flatterers, and seducers, persuade or lead to that which they wish, by speaking. (Ibid.)

Finally, Quintilian takes up the definition of rhetoric attributed to the Stoics and Chrysippus, “rhetoricen esse bene dicendi scientiam” (id., p. 841), that is to say, “the art to speak well and say the Good”:

The definition that [rhetoric] is the science of speaking well […] embraces all the virtues of [rhetoric] at once and includes also the character of the true orator, as he cannot speak well unless he be a good man. (Id., 34)

Its purpose is, “to think and speak rightly” (id., 36).

The rhetoric of persuasive communication and the rhetoric focusing on the quality of expression have been opposed as primary vs. secondary rhetoric (Kennedy 1999), or extrinsic vs. intrinsic rhetoric (Kienpointner 2003). We can also speak of an introverted rhetoric, focusing on the quality of an expression based on intellectual rigor and depth of feeling. Extroverted, communicative rhetoric strives to be eloquent, while introverted rhetoric requires an alternative concept of style.

Note that this distinction does not correspond to the distinction forwarded in the 1960s, between a restricted rhetoric opposed to a general rhetoric. Likewise, it has nothing to do with the distinction between rhetoric of arguments and rhetoric of figures. S. Rhetoric.

Introverted rhetoric is a rhetoric whose communicative and interactional dimensions, hence persuasiveness, are weakened, but which nevertheless remains an argumentative rhetoric. La Bruyère expresses as follows the concept of such a rhetoric having abdicated eloquence and persuasion:

We must only endeavor to think and speak justly ourselves, without aiming to bring others over to our Taste and Sentiments; that would be too great an enterprise. (La Bruyère, [Of Works of Genius], [1688])2

3. From persuasion to action

In an essential but often neglected complement to the basic definition of argumentation, the Treatise on Argumentation extends the scope of persuasion through argumentation to action. Argumentation would actually produce the “disposition to action”:

The goal of argumentation, as we have said before, is to create or increase the adherence of minds to the theses presented for their assent. An efficacious argument is one which succeeds in increasing this intensity of adherence among those who hear it in such a way as to set in motion the intended action (a positive action or an abstention from action) or at least in creating in the hearers a willingness to act which will appear at the right moment. (Perelman, Olbrechts-Tyteca, [1958], p. 45)

This vision is restated a little later:

Argumentation alone […] allows us to understand our decisions. (Id, p. 37)

The end point of the argumentative process, then, is not persuasion seen as a mere mental state, an “adherence of the mind”. The ultimate criterion of complete persuasion is an action accomplished in the sense suggested by discourse, and emotion plays an essential role where this is acted out. Adherence beyond a certain degree would trigger action. This is a crucial point where argument, emotions, and values are combined in order to give a response to the philosophical problem of action.

4. Persuasion, identification, self-persuasion?

Burke stressed that persuasion presupposes identification:

When you are with Athenians, it is easy to praise Athenians, but not when you are with the Lacedaemonians.
Here is perhaps the simplest case of persuasion. You persuade a man only insofar as you can talk his language by speech, gesture, tonality, order, image, attitude, idea, identifying your ways with his. (1950, p. 55).

According to the rhetorical doxa, the preliminary to a successful persuasive performance is based on agreements between the speaker and the audience S. Conditions of discussion. This negotiation of agreements could take place through a preliminary argumentative dialogue, running the risk of an infinite regression. So the orator resolves not to explicitly agree with his audience, but to adapt to it. For this reason, he or she makes a preliminary inquiry about the audience, in order to be able to correctly adapt to, or mimic, the audience. This is precisely what the theory of the ethos of audiences foresees, S. Ethos, §5: through ethotic suggestion, the speaker presents himself or herself as “one of you, the people”. Secondly, by logical proofs, the speaker gives prominence to the values and judgments accepted by his or her audience (he or she argues ex concessis). Thirdly, appealing to pathemic communion with the audience, empathy is shown.

Accordingly, in order that the audience identifies with the speaker, he or she must first identify with this audience. At the end of this process of adaptation, one might ask who exactly is being persuaded by whom? The extroverted rhetoric of persuasion is threatened by the solipsism of identification. It expresses only group introversion. The notion of “communion” proposed by the Treatise, may characterize the culmination of this process. This rhetorical concept of identification is totally foreign to the concept of identification defined in the framework of polyphony theory.

5. Who studies persuasion?

The characteristic difference of rhetorical argumentation cannot be defined by persuasion, for the simple reason that persuasion is an object claimed by many other disciplines, including the sciences and philosophy of cognition; neuropsychology as well as “neuro-linguistic programming”.

One year before the Treatise on Argumentation, Vance Packard published The Hidden Persuaders (1957), in which he developed a criticism of rational persuasion as socially ineffective. This criticism was first elaborated in the twenties by Walter Lippman (1922) and later by Edward L. Bernays (1928). In the wake of these books, but with quite different methods, neuromarketing came to focus on the issue of persuasion. To take a less controversial discipline, the analysis of persuasion also belongs to social psychology. This discipline counts among its fundamental objects the theoretical and experimental study of social influences: persuasion, convictions, suggestion, grip/influence, incitement… the formation and manifestations of attitudes, representations, and correlative transformations in the ways individuals or groups behave. The whole movement of the world, the material events, including scientific discoveries and technical innovations, along with the correlative flows of language, produce and rectify the representations, thoughts, words and actions of individuals and groups. The great classical studies of social psychology of persuasion published in the last century hardly mention rhetoric or argumentation. For example, neither the word rhetoric nor the words argument or argumentation appear in a collection of texts on the psychology of persuasion, entitled Persuasion (Yzerbit and Corneille 1994). The problem of persuasion can be legitimately invoked in relation to discourse, but the study of the process of persuasion, even in term of its linguistic aspects, may in no circumstances be carried out in the sole framework of rhetorical studies (Chabrol and Radu, 2008).

6. Persuasion as a general function of language

Just as rhetorical argumentation cannot be characterized by its persuasive function, it cannot be defined as the study of the persuasive language genres, insofar as the persuasive function is not linked to a genre but is coextensive with language use, S. Schematization.

From the general point of view of language functions, persuasion may be considered representative of the function of action on the recipient (call function, German Appell Funktion, Bühler [1933], or conative function, Jakobson [1960]). More specifically, Benveniste contrasts history (narrative) with discourse, and considers that the intention to influence is a characteristic of the latter category, discourse:

By contrast, we have in advance situated the plane of discourse. Discourse is to be understood in its broadest extension: every utterance supposes a speaker and a listener, and in the first the intention of influencing the other in some way. It is first of all the diversity of the oral discourses of every nature and of every level … but it is also the mass of the writings that reproduce the oral discourses or borrow their turns and ends. (Benveniste [1959], p. 242, my emphasis)

Nietzsche, in his lectures on rhetoric, generalizes rhetorical force to make it “the essence of language”:

There is obviously no unrhetorical “naturalness” of language of which one could appeal; language itself is the result of purely rhetorical arts. The power to discover and to make operative that which works and impresses, with respect to each thing, a power which Aristotle calls rhetoric, is at the same time the essence of language; the latter is based just as little as rhetoric is upon that which is true, upon the essence of things. Language does not desire to instruct, but to convey to others a subjective impulse and its acceptance. (In S. L. Gilman & al. C. 1989, p. 21)

This trend towards the extension of rhetoric as persuasion to any kind of talk is, moreover, compatible with all the classical definitions of rhetoric as a technique capable of developing the natural capacities of individuals.

7. Persuasion and the “colonization of minds”

The concept of rhetorical persuasion is built on the key idea that persuasion is intrinsically good, even if men and women have an unfortunate tendency to misuse the best things. The orator is placed in the elevated position of being a “good man, speaking well” and aspiring to universalize his visions and aspirations, an aristocrat of speech, while his audience is framed in the lower, insubstantial position of the undecided, because of poor reasoning and decision- making abilities, S. Enthymeme; Metaphor. The audience is considered barely capable of reaching an independent decision, needing guidance and easy prey to manipulators.

On the political and religious level, persuasion is the strictly correct term to use for propaganda. Propagandists and converters also introduce themselves as good persons eager to persuade, and might also count dictators and fundamentalists amongst the deeply self-convinced persuaders. S. Dissensus. In the early fifties, Domenach defined propaganda as the activities systematically organized “to create, transform or confirm opinions” ([1950], p. 8), while Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca focus on “the adherence of minds”; and to adhere is also the first step to becoming a member. A key difference between argumentation and propaganda is the means they use: argumentation uses “discursive techniques” (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca [1958], p. 5), that is an overt, technique, while propaganda uses all the available means, both overt and covert, to achieve its goal, using not only discourse, but also images and all spectacular manifestations demanding a ritual collective action.

To persuade is to convert or, in Margaret Mead’s words, to “colonize minds” (Dascal 2009), to save the audience from some evil and direct them to some good, of which they were formerly neither persuaded nor convinced.

8. Arguing in an exchange structure

The theory of rhetorical persuasion is discussed in the context of an interaction without exchange (an addressed monologue, that is to say a one-turn interaction), which gives the public a largely passive role.
Pragma-Dialectic starts not from an opinion to be conveyed to a public but from a difference of opinion between two individuals, giving each opinion an equal value and chance to prevail. This theory “takes as its object the resolution of divergences of opinion by means of argumentative discourse” (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1992, 18). Rule 1 opens up the space for debate and controversy:

Freedom – The parties must not obstruct the free expression of points of view or their questioning. (van Eemeren, Grootendorst, Snoeck Henkemans 2002, p. 182-183),

The debate reaches its rational goal if it can effectively eliminate either the doubt or the “inconclusively defended point of view”:

Closing – If a point of view has not been conclusively defended, the advancing party must withdraw it. If a point of view has been conclusively defended, the other party must withdraw the doubts it has expressed with respect to that point of view.” (Ibid.)

This leads to a consensus either on the opinion, or on its “withdrawal” (from the current interaction, from the other’s mind, etc.).
Interactional and cooperative approaches to argumentation consider that the viewpoint that one partner brings into the discussion and lays out for the appreciation of the other participants arguing their own perspective can be profoundly transformed by the encounter. Consensus can be achieved by merging primitive views or by co-constructing a third opinion, participants behaving like Hegelian evolutionary dialecticians progressing by synthesis of actual positions, and not as Aristotelian dialecticians, progressing by eliminating the competing position, S. Rhetoric; Dialectic.

9. Externalized persuasion

Persuading, that is to say changing the audiences’ minds, means changing the audience’s language. The persuasion experience leaves an inflection point in the discourse of the persuadee. The new discourse produced by a persuaded audience is characterized by its argumentative co-orientation with the persuader’s discourse. The persuadees ratify the persuader’s interventions; they adopt the speaker’s presuppositions, repeat his or her arguments, adopt his or her personal style, and, in the cases of “deep persuasion”, his or her tone of voice.

That is, persuasion can be externalized, to be analyzed, on the basis of linguistic evidence obtained by comparing the persuading and the persuaded discourses.

1 Quoted after Quintilien, I. O. = Institution oratoire, Trans. by J. Cousin. Paris: Les Belles Lettres,
2 Jean de La Bruyère, The Characters, or Manners of the Age. London: D. Browne, etc. p. 7. [Des ouvrages de l’esprit. In Les Caractères ou les mœurs de ce siècle, 1688] https://books.google.fr/books?id=6y9QiTEK1JAC&printsec=frontcover&dq=La+Bruyere+Characters&hl=en&sa=X&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=think&f=false (03-19-2017)

 

Persuade, Convince

The opposition, or progression, from to persuade to to convince, along with the development of audiences from particular to universal, is a major focus of the Treatise on Argumentation (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca [1958]), S. Persuasion

1. To persuade a particular audience,
to convince the universal audience

Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca significantly restructure the concept of audience. First, the notion is broadened to encompass written communication, “every speech is addressed to an audience, and it is frequently forgotten that this applies to everything written as well” ([1958] p. 6-7). The focus put on this en- larged concept of audience explains the fact that the Treatise does not engage in the analysis of delivery (pronunciatio), the oral, face-to-faces, dimension of classi- cal rhetoric, S. Rhetoric.

The Treatise goes beyond actual audiences to consider the particular audiences and the universal audience. The former is the sole object of classical rhetoric; the latter is a philosophical projection of the essential characters of the former. The concept of audience is then extended to cover self-deliberation (exploiting the resource of polyphony:

Thus, the nature of the audience to which arguments can be successfully pre- sented will determine to a great extent the direction the arguments will take and the character, the significance that will be attributed to them. What formulation can we make of audiences, which have come to play a normative role, enabling us to judge on the convincing character of an argument? Three kinds of audiences are apparently regarded as enjoying special prerogatives as regards this function, both in current practice and in the view of philosophers. The first such audience consists of the whole of mankind, or at least, of all normal adult person; we shall refer to it as the universal audience. The second consists of the single interlocutor whom a speaker addresses in a dialogue. The third is the subject himself, when he deliberates or gives himself reasons for his actions. (Id., p. 30)

2. A normative opposition

While the translators of classical rhetorical texts use the verbs to persuade or to convince interchangeably, Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca differentiate between these two verbs on the basis of the quality of the audiences:

We are going to apply the term persuasive to argumentation that only claims validity for a particular audience, and the term convincing to argumentation that presumes to gain the adherence of every rational being. ([1958], p. 28)

This is a stipulative definition, based on a normative perspective. For the New Rhetoric, the norm of argumentation is constituted by the hierarchy of audiences who accept it. This position strongly distinguishes the new rhetoric from the standard theories of fallacies, for which the norm is given by logical laws, or by a system of rules defining rationality. S. Norms; Rules; Evaluation.

3. To persuade, to convince: The words

3.1 History

The Greek word used to refer to rhetorical evidence is pistis. Unlike the scientific and logical word proof, pistis belongs to a family of terms expressing the idea of “trust in others; which can be relied upon” and “proof” (Bailly, [Pistis]). The family of Greek terms translated as “persuasion” refers to “obeying”, as well as to “persuading, seducing, deceiving” (id., [Peitho]). The name of the goddess Peitho, the companion of Aphrodite, sometimes Aphrodite herself, goddess of beauty, seduction and persuasion, also belongs to this family. From this perspective, the word pistis is syncretic; it covers what is for us the field of influ- ence, proof, seduction, submission and persuasion. By definition, “rhetorical evidence is persuasive”.

The Latin verb suadere means “to advise”; the corresponding adjective, suadus, means “inviting, insinuating, persuasive” (Gaffiot [1934], Suadeo; Suadus). Persuadere is composed of suadere and the aspectual prefix per-, which indicates the completion of the process, meaning “I. Decide to do something […] II. Persuade, convince” (id., Persuadeo).

Convincere is composed of con- (cum-) “totally” + vincere “conquer”: “utterly conquer” (id., Convinco); its primary meaning is “to confound an adversary” (ibid.). Just like per- in persuadere, the prefix cum- refers to a completed action. The same meaning is expressed in to convict, coming from the Latin convictus, past participle of convincere meaning “to refute, convict” (MW , Convict, Etymology):

1: to find or prove to be guilty. The jury convicted them of fraud.
2: to convince of error or sinfulness

Both persuadere and convincere mark the completion of the action. According to the grammatical normative tradition, to convince is should be used in  situations in which beliefs are changed without action, whilst to persuade is should be used for situations in which action is undertaken; the rule is based on the etymology of the words. In practice, both terms are used as synonyms. The traditional rule may be based on the principle of superfluity, whereby there cannot be two words with the same meaning, as there cannot be two laws to the same effect. Yet two words can have the same meaning until everyday usage differentiates them.

3.2 Lexical opposition persuasion vs. conviction

The verbs to persuade and to convince belong to a lexical-semantic field including:

advising

brainwashing

bringing around

catechizing

converting

counseling

inciting

 

 inducing

insinuating

inspiring

instilling

inviting

preaching

prevailing on

 

 prompting

propagandizing

seducing

suggesting

talking s.o. into / out of doing sth.

winning somebody over to a point of view.

This lexical basis is a rich source of semantic orientations and oppositions whose exploitation could contribute to the reflection on the diversity of the expected effects of discourse.

To persuade and to convince are equivalent in many contexts.

A tries to persuade / convince B of something
A addresses a persuasive / convincing argument to B
=> then B adopts new persuasions / convictions

Nonetheless, in other contexts, they are non-equivalent:

A letter of persuasion — not *conviction
A considers that B is persuadable (-ible) — not *convince-able

The pair persuader / persuadee is not marched by a pair *convincer / *convincee. Convictive and convict are, at least etymologically, linked to convince. To persuade has not produced corresponding words.

The present participle convincing can be used as an autonomous adjective, meaning “cogent”; a conviction is “a strong belief”. “Very convincing” seems more common than “very persuasive”; nonetheless, both can be used to qualify not only an argumentative discourse but also many other kinds of discourse:

very convincing accounts, reports…
— — novels, tales, narratives…
— — portraits

as well as non-verbal activities:

a very convincing experience
— —scar (stage make-up).