POLITENESS

The linguistic aspects of interpersonal relations are governed by a set of principles that define linguistic politeness:

Politeness refers to all aspects of discourse that 1. are governed by rules, 2. intervene in the interpersonal relationship, and 3. have the function of maintaining a harmonious relationship (at worst: neutralizing potential conflicts, and at best: ensuring that each participant is as open to the other as possible). (Kerbrat-Orecchioni 1992, pp. 159; 163)

Ordinary conversation is governed by the principle of preference for agreement. The interactionist theory of politeness (Brown and Levinson, 1978) defines individuals by their faces and their territories. Polite intervention respects rules of positive politeness and rules of negative politeness, both toward oneself and toward the interlocutor.

In argumentative situations, this preference for agreement is transformed into a preference for disagreement (Bilmes, 1991). Differences are maximized, with consequences for all components of the linguistic politeness system. The case of the ad verecundiam argument is a typical illustration of this transformation, see preference for agreement.

The interactionist theory of politeness (Brown and Levinson, 1978) defines individuals by their faces and their territories. Polite intervention respects rules of positive politeness and rules of negative politeness, both toward oneself and toward the interlocutor.

In argumentative situations, this preference for agreement is transformed into a preference for disagreement (Bilmes, 1991). Differences are maximized, with consequences for all components of the linguistic politeness system. The case of the ad verecundiam argument is a typical illustration of this transformation,  see modesty.

1. Politeness oriented towards the addressee

Negative politeness recommends the avoidance of face-threatening actions, while positive politeness recommends positive actions in relation with respect to the territories and the face of the interlocutor (Kerbrat-Orecchioni 1992, p. 184).

The argumentative situation reverses these principles. The rules of positive politeness are not applied, while those of negative politeness are reversed. For example, the rule « avoid encroachments on the private territories of the interlocutor » (id., p. 184) corresponds to a principle of non-aggression, « do not violate the territory of the other ». In an argumentative situation, there is necessarily a form of aggression and territorial conflict, with encroachments and counter-encroachments.

Another general rule of politeness recommends that parties « refrain from making disparaging remarks, too sharp criticisms, too radical refutations, too violent reproaches » (ibid.) – towards their interlocutor; whereas in an argumentative situation radical refutation is sought rather than avoided and negative challenging of the opponent is a standard strategy. Positive praise for the interlocutor is rare, and when it occurs, it can be an indirect attack on his current positions, see counter-argumentation.
The prohibition of personal attack is a matter of courtesy aimed at protecting the interlocutor for aspects of his person that are not at stake in the debate.

2. Politeness oriented towards oneself

The principles of defending the speaker’s territory recommend that one,

protect one’s territory as much as possible (resist overly invasive incursions, do not allow oneself to be dragged through the mud, do not allow one’s image to be unfairly degraded, respond to criticism, attacks, and insults) (ibid., pp. 182-183).

In argumentative situations, participants vigorously apply these protective principles. In non-argumentative situations, the speaker’s territory is to be protected, but not unduly extended and praised; « our societies severely judge complacency and pro domo advocacy » except in « exceptional circumstances » (ibid.). These exceptional circumstances are precisely those of argumentative situations in which the speakers do not hesitate to praise their persons as well as their territories, that is, their points of view and arguments. The principles of moderation and self-esteem are thus put on hold. In non-argumentative interactions, « if one must praise oneself, at least let it be in the muted mode of understatement » (ibid., 184); one can even « slightly damage one’s own territory and practice light self-criticism » (ibid., 154). This principle requires a willingness to compromise and concede, all of which the arguing speaker may or may not do without being impolite.

The conclusion is that argumentative situations locally suspend the application of the rules of politeness in relation to the objects and persons involved in the discussion. This can even be seen as a fundamental characteristic, a defining criterion of such situations. The protagonists use a kind of « anti-system of politeness » that reflects the system of politeness. However, to speak of a « system of impoliteness » would imply that all these interventions are perceived as rude, which is not the case, notwithstanding the fact that in such situations the partners can engage in polemics about the « tone » of their interventions.

The redefinition of the politeness system applies strictly to the aspects of the person, the face, and the territories involved in the argumentative conflict. Outside of these areas, the rules of politeness still apply. Thus, it is possible for an arguer to praise his or her personality and possessions and to attack the status or values of those of his opponent in an argumentative interaction where his behavior will independently be polite or impolite.

PERSUASION

1. Persuasion as the essence of rhetoric

Since Isocrates and Aristotle, argumentative rhetorical speech is commonly defined by its function, which is persuasion:

Rhetoric may be defined as the faculty of observing in any given case the available means of persuasion. (Rhet, I, 2, 1355b26, RR, p. 105).

According to Crassus as portrayed by Cicero, persuasion is the “first duty” of the orator (Cicero, De Or., I, XXXI; p. 40). Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, in their definition of argumentation, focus on how to “induce or increase the mind’s adherence to the theses presented for its assent” ([1958]/1969, p. 4; italics in the original) before elaborating on the notion of “adherence of the mind” by means of an opposition between persuading and convincing speech, S. Assent; Persuading and convincing.

According to these standard definitions, argumentative rhetoric is fundamentally concerned with the discourse structured by the illocutionary (overtly expressed in the discourse) intention to persuade, that is to communicate, explain, legitimize, and make the listeners share the speaker’s point of view and the words that express it. Persuasion, as a perlocutory state achieved through discourse, results from the realization of these intentions.

The rhetorical tradition binds the discourse of persuasion to the production of a plausible representation in the minds of the audience. This rhetorical representation of reality is considered to be antagonistic to truth by essentialist philosophers such as Plato, see Probable.

2. A rhetoric without persuasion: The ars bene dicendi

Chapter 15 of Book II of Quintilian’s Institutes of Oratory is devoted to questioning the definition of rhetoric in relation to persuasion, “The most common definition therefore is that [rhetoric] is the power of persuading” (IO, II, 15, 3), a definition attributed to Isocrates. Quintilian rejects all definitions that associate rhetoric to persuasion:
— As the power to persuade:

But money, likewise, has the power of persuasion, as do interest, and the authority and dignity of a speaker, and even his very look, unaccompanied by language, when either the remembrance of the services of any individual, or a pitiable appearance, or beauty of person, draws forth an opinion. (Id., 6)

— Or as an instrument of persuasion, even with the restriction “power of persuading by speaking”:

Not only the orator, but also others, such as harlots, flatterers, and seducers, persuade or lead to that which they wish, by speaking. (Ibid.)

Finally, Quintilian takes up the definition of rhetoric attributed to the Stoics and Chrysippus, “rhetoricen esse bene dicendi scientiam” (id., p. 841), that is to say, “ rhetoric is the art to speak well and say the Good”:

The definition that [rhetoric] is the science of speaking well […] embraces all the virtues of [rhetoric] at once and includes also the character of the true orator, as he cannot speak well unless he be a good man. (Id., 34)

Its purpose is, “to think and speak rightly” (id., 36).

The rhetoric of persuasive communication and the rhetoric that focuses on the quality of expression have been contrasted as primary vs. secondary rhetoric (Kennedy 1999), or extrinsic vs. intrinsic rhetoric (Kienpointner 2003). We can also speak of an introverted rhetoric, which focuses on the quality of an expression based on intellectual rigor and depth of feeling. Extroverted, communicative rhetoric strives for eloquence, while introverted rhetoric requires an alternative concept of style.

Note that this distinction does not correspond to the distinction advanced in the 1960s, between restricted rhetoric and general rhetoric. Nor does it correspond to the distinction between the rhetoric of arguments and the rhetoric of figures. see rhetoric.

Introverted rhetoric is a rhetoric whose communicative and interactional dimensions, and thus its persuasiveness, are weakened, but which nevertheless remains an argumentative rhetoric. La Bruyère expresses  the concept of such a rhetoric, which has renounced eloquence and persuasion, as follows:

We must only endeavor to think and speak justly ourselves, without aiming to bring others over to our Taste and Sentiments; that would be too great an enterprise. (La Bruyère, [Of Works of Genius], [1688])2

3. From persuasion to action

In an essential but often neglected addition to the basic definition of argumentation, the Treatise on Argumentation extends the scope of persuasion through argumentation to action. Indeed, argumentation would produce the “disposition to act”:

The goal of argumentation, as we have said before, is to create or increase the adherence of minds to the theses presented for their assent. An efficacious argument is one which succeeds in increasing this intensity of adherence among those who hear it in such a way as to set in motion the intended action (a positive action or an abstention from action) or at least in creating in the hearers a willingness to act which will appear at the right moment. (Perelman, Olbrechts-Tyteca, [1958], p. 45)

This vision is restated a little later:

Argumentation alone […] allows us to understand our decisions. (Id, p. 37)

The end point of the argumentative process, then, is not persuasion seen as a mere mental state, an “adherence of the mind”. The ultimate criterion of complete persuasion is an action accomplished in the sense suggested by the discourse, and emotion plays an essential role where in this enactment. Adherence beyond a certain degree would trigger action. This is a crucial point where argument, emotions, and values are combined to give an answer to the philosophical problem of action.

4. Persuasion, identification, self-conviction?

Burke emphasized that persuasion requires identification:

When you are with Athenians, it is easy to praise Athenians, but not when you are with the Lacedaemonians.
Here is perhaps the simplest case of persuasion. You persuade a man only insofar as you can talk his language by speech, gesture, tonality, order, image, attitude, idea, identifying your ways with his. (1950, p. 55).

According to the rhetorical doxa, the prerequisite for a successful persuasive performance is based on agreements between the speaker and the audience, see conditions of discussion. This negotiation of agreements could take place through a preliminary argumentative dialog, which would run the risk of an infinite regression. The speaker therefore chooses not to explicitly agree with his audience, but to adapt to it. For this reason, he makes a preliminary study of the audience, in order to adapt, or mimic it correctly. This is exactly what what the theory of the ethos of the audience foresees, see Ethos, §5: by ethotic suggestion, the speaker presents himself or herself as “one of us, the people”. Second, by logical proofs, the speaker gives prominence to the values and judgments accepted by his or her audience (ex concessis). Third, by appealing to a pathemic communion with the audience, empathy is demonstrated.

For the audience to identify with the speaker, the speaker must first identify with the audience. At the end of this process of accomodation, one might ask who exactly is being persuaded by whom? The extroverted rhetoric of persuasion is threatened by the solipsism of identification. It expresses only group introversion. The notion of “community” (Fr. communion)proposed by the Treatise, may characterize the culmination of this process.

Note: This rhetorical concept of identification is completely alien to the concept of identification defined in the framework of polyphony theory.

5. Who studies persuasion?

The characteristic difference of rhetorical argumentation cannot be defined in terms of persuasion, for the simple reason that persuasion is an object claimed by many other disciplines, including the science and philosophy of cognition; neuropsychology as well as “neurolinguistic programming”.

A year before the Treatise on Argumentation, Vance Packard published The Hidden Persuaders (1957), in which he developed a critique of rational persuasion as socially ineffective. This critique was first elaborated in the twenties by Walter Lippman (1922) and later by Edward L. Bernays (1928). In the wake of these books, but using very different methods, neuromarketing began to focus on the issue of persuasion. To take a less controversial discipline, the analysis of persuasion also belongs to social psychology. This discipline counts among its fundamental objects the theoretical and experimental study of social influences: persuasion, conviction, suggestion, grip/influence, incitement… the formation and manifestation of attitudes, representations, and correlative transformations in the way individuals or groups behave. The whole movement of the world, the material events, including scientific discoveries and technical innovations, together with the correlative flows of language, produce and correct the representations, thoughts, words and actions of individuals and groups. The great classical studies of the social psychology of persuasion published in the last century barely mention rhetoric or argumentation. For example, neither the word rhetoric nor the words argument or argumentation appear in a collection of texts on the psychology of persuasion, entitled Persuasion (Yzerbit and Corneille 1994). The problem of persuasion can legitimately be raised in relation to discourse, but the study of the process of persuasion, even in term of its linguistic aspects, can under no circumstances be carried out solely framework of rhetorical studies (Chabrol and Radu, 2008).

6. Persuasion as a general function of language

Just as rhetorical argumentation cannot be characterized by its persuasive function, it cannot be defined as the study of persuasive language genres, insofar as the persuasive function is not tied to a genre but is coextensive with language use, see schematization.

From the general point of view of language functions, persuasion can be seen as representative of the function of action on the recipient (call function; German Appell Funktion, Bühler [1933], or conative function, Jakobson [1960]). More specifically, Benveniste contrasts history (narrative) with discourse, and considers the intention to influence to be a characteristic of the latter category, discourse:

By contrast, we have in advance situated the plane of discourse. Discourse is to be understood in its broadest extension: every utterance supposes a speaker and a listener, and in the first the intention of influencing the other in some way. It is first of all the diversity of the oral discourses of every nature and of every level … but it is also the mass of the writings that reproduce the oral discourses or borrow their turns and ends. (Benveniste [1959], p. 242, my emphasis)

Nietzsche, in his lectures on rhetoric, generalizes rhetorical force to make it “the essence of language”:

There is obviously no unrhetorical “naturalness” of language of which one could appeal; language itself is the result of purely rhetorical arts. The power to discover and to make operative that which works and impresses, with respect to each thing, a power which Aristotle calls rhetoric, is at the same time the essence of language; the latter is based just as little as rhetoric is upon that which is true, upon the essence of things. Language does not desire to instruct, but to convey to others a subjective impulse and its acceptance. (In S. L. Gilman & al. C. 1989, p. 21)

This tendency to extend rhetoric as persuasion to any kind of talk is, moreover, compatible with all classical definitions of rhetoric as a technique capable of developing the natural capacities of individuals.

7. Persuasion and the “colonization of minds”

The concept of rhetorical persuasion is based on the key idea that persuasion is intrinsically good, even if men and women have an unfortunate tendency to misuse the best. The orator is placed in the exalted position of being a “good man, who speaks well” striving to universalize his visions and aspirations, an aristocrat of speech, while his audience is placed in the lower, insubstantial position of the undecided, because of their poor reasoning and decision-making abilities, see enthymeme; metaphor. The audience is seen as barely capable of making an independent decision, in need of guidance and easy prey for manipulators.

On the political and religious level, persuasion is the strictly correct term to use for propaganda. Propagandists and converts also present themselves as good people, eager to persuade; would-be and actual dictators and fundamentalists also have their place among the deeply convinced, see dissensus. In the early 1950, Domenach defined propaganda as the activities systematically organized “to create, change or confirm opinions” ([1950], p. 8), while Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca focus on “the adherence of minds”; and adherence is also the first step to membership.

Nevertheless, a key difference between argumentation and propaganda is the means they use: argumentation uses “discursive techniques” (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca [1958], p. 5), that is an overt, technique, while propaganda combines well with violence, and uses all the available means, both overt and covert, to achieve its goal, using not only discourse, but also images and all spectacular manifestations that require ritual collective action.

To persuade is to convert or, in the words of Margaret Mead, to “colonize minds” (Dascal 2009), to save the audience from some evil and to direct them to some good, of which they were previously neither persuaded nor convinced.

8. Arguing in an exchange structure

The theory of rhetorical persuasion is discussed in the context of an interaction without exchange (an addressed monologue, i.e., a one-way interaction), which gives the audience a largely passive role.
Pragma-dialectics does not assume an opinion to be conveyed to an audience, but rather from a difference of opinion between two individuals, giving each opinion an equal value and chance to prevail. This theory “takes as its object the resolution of divergences of opinion by means of argumentative discourse” (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1992, 18). Rule 1 opens up the space for debate and controversy:

Freedom – The parties must not obstruct the free expression of points of view or their questioning. (van Eemeren, Grootendorst, Snoeck Henkemans 2002, p. 182-183),

The debate achieves its rational goal if it can effectively eliminate either the doubt or the “inconclusively defended point of view”:

Closing – If a point of view has not been conclusively defended, the advancing party must withdraw it. If a point of view has been conclusively defended, the other party must withdraw the doubts it has expressed with respect to that point of view.” (ibid.)

This leads to a consensus either on the opinion, or on its “withdrawal” (from the current interaction, from the other’s mind, etc.).
Interactional and cooperative approaches to argumentation assume  that the point of view that one partner brings to the discussion and presents to the other participants,  who argue their own point of view can be profoundly transformed by the encounter. Consensus can be achieved by merging primitive views or by co-constructing a third opinion, with participants behaving like Hegelian evolutionary dialecticians who progress by synthesizing actual positions, rather than like Aristotelian dialecticians, who progress by eliminating the competing position, see rhetoric; dialectic.

9. Externalized persuasion

To persuade, that is, to change the minds of the audience, is to change the language of the audience. The experience of persuasion marks a turning point in the discourse of the persuadee. The new discourse produced by a persuaded audience is characterized by its argumentative co-orientation with the persuader’s discourse. The persuadees ratify the persuader’s interventions; they adopt the speaker’s presuppositions, repeat his or her arguments, adopt his or her personal style, and, in the case of “deep persuasion”, his tone of voice.

In other words persuasion can be externalized and analyzed on the basis of linguistic evidence obtained by comparing the discourses of the persuader and the persuaded.

1 Cited after Quintilien, I. O. = Institution oratoire, Trans. by J. Cousin. Paris: Les Belles Lettres,
2 Jean de La Bruyère, The Characters, or Manners of the Age. London: D. Browne, etc. p. 7. [Des ouvrages de l’esprit. In Les Caractères ou les mœurs de ce siècle, 1688] https://books.google.fr/books?id=6y9QiTEK1JAC&printsec=frontcover&dq=La+Bruyere+Characters&hl=en&sa=X&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=think&f=false (03-19-2017)

Some argument schemes are designated by Latin labels, S. A/Ab —; Ad —; Ex —. This entry lists the labels using the Latin preposition ad. In classical Latin, the preposition ad is constructed with the accusative and introduces a goal complement. The phrase “argument ad hominem” reads “argument addressing the person”.

According to Hamblin, the oldest scheme in this grouping is ad hominem, which appears in the Latin translations of Aristotle; this naming method was popularized by Locke ([1690]) and by Bentham ([1824]), and most of these terms seem to be nineteenth or twentieth century creations (Hamblin 1970, p. 41; p. 161- 162).

1. A list of “ad + N” arguments

Latin name of the Argument

Meaning of the Latin word(s)
• (When necessary a word-for-word translation)
• (English equivalent(s))
• Reference to the corresponding entry/ies

The argumentation from the absurd is a form of indirect evidence based on contradiction. This label includes a family of arguments concluding that an assertion or a proposal should be rejected on the basis of the indefensible consequences which would result from its adoption.

The general operation of reduction to the absurd corresponds to the following mechanism:

1. A claim, a proposal is put forward, as a working hypothesis, a possibility…
2. Consequences are drawn from this proposition, whatever they may be, causal, logical…
3. One of these consequences is deemed to be “absurd” in relation to some criteria, cf. infra
4. The initial proposal or hypothesis is rejected.

Argumentation to the absurd is not an argument from ignorance. An argument from ignorance concludes that P is true because we have failed to prove not-P, whilst an argument to the absurd concludes that P is true because it has been shown that the proposition not-P is false, and that between P and not-P, only one can hold true. This corresponds to a case-by-case argument in a situation where the number of cases is reduced to two: P is true or not-P is true; but not-P is false, so P is true. S. Apagogic argument; Contradiction.

2. Varieties of absurdities

There are as many kinds of reduction to absurdity as modes of deduction and reasons to evaluate a consequence as inadmissible. The qualification as absurd may thus apply to:
— Mathematical consequences. One clearly sees the variety and the diversity of what is called the “absurd” in argumentation by contrasting these forms with the demonstration from the absurd, where absurd means “contradictory”, cf. infra.

— Logical or semantical consequences. The consequences analytically derived, from the very meaning of the expression lead to a semantic difficulty, S. Dialectic; Opposites; Consequence.

— Causal consequences. In the physical domain and natural experience, the effects predicted by the hypothesis are not attested, S. Refutation by the opposite. The refutation by an attested fact, different from the theoretically expected fact, is a kind of refutation from the absurd.

— Practical consequences. As soon as one turns from the scientifically established causal link to the “causal story” as constructed in a pragmatic argument, however, the speaker intervenes through his or her positive or negative valuation of the consequences. The consequence is then:

— Contrary to the intended goals, the effects of the proposed action are perverse; the measure is counterproductive, contrary to various interests.

— Inadmissible from the point of view of common sense, law, or morality, S. Apagogic; Ad Incommodum.

Pragmatic refutation by negative consequences is opposed to a measure by showing that it will have negative consequences unforeseen by the individual who proposes the measure, and that these drawbacks will prevail over any possible advantage.
The argument is strengthened  if the opponent can show that these  alleged negative consequences are not just collateral effects, but are in fact diametrically opposed to the expected positive effects: the measure proposed to cure the patient will in fact strengthen her disease.

3. Demonstration by reduction to the absurd

Proof by the absurd, or by contradiction, is based on the principle of the excluded middle, according to which “A or not-A” is necessarily true. The rea- soning is based not on the proposition A that we want to prove, but on its negation, not-A.

The negation, not-A, is provisionally admitted and its consequences are de- duced; these consequences lead to statement A. But the conjunction “A and not-A” contravenes the principle of contradiction; thus, not-A is false, and A is necessarily true.

In the language of implication, we are in a situation where “A → non-A’. According to the principle of “one can deduce anything from the false”, this implication is true only if A is false.

It can be shown by reduction to the absurd that “the square root of 2 (the number whose square is 2, noted by the symbol √2) is not a rational number” (proposition A).

(1) Suppose that “the number corresponding to √2 is a rational number” (proposition not-A).
(2) By definition, a rational number can be written in the form of a fraction “p / q”, where p and q are prime numbers (a prime number can be divided only by itself and 1).

From this hypothesis, it can be deduced that both p and q are even; Therefore, they have 2 as a common divisor, which is contradictory to the initial hypothesis.

Conclusion: hypothesis (1) is false, and √2 is not a rational number.

The demonstration by the absurd is an indirect method of demonstration. It has not been proved that A is true, but only that not-A is false. This reasoning is by no means permitted by all specialists, “if the classical mathematicians consider the proof by the absurd as valid, the intuitionists reject it: in order to prove a, they say, it is not enough to establish that not-(not-a)” (Vax 1982, Absurd). We see that the demonstrative character of a demonstration can be discussed.

Lat. absurdus, “absurd”. Argument ad absurdum, ab absurdo, ex absurdo; or reductio ad absurdum, “reduction to absurdity”, under different forms: reductio ad impossibile, “reduction to the impossible”; r. ad falsum, “r. to the false”; r. ad ridiculum, “r. to the ridicule”; r. ad incommodum; “r. to the undesirable”.

A / Ab —; Ad —; Ex —
LATIN LABELS

Latin labels are used to name arguments and fallacies. This practice, although not systematic, is common in modern texts, not exceptional in law, and some traces remain in contemporary usage.

A few of these labels belong to the usual vocabulary of argumentation theory:

argument ad hominem, a fortiori, a contrario, a pari…

The English counterpart of the Latin word is often transparent:

argument e silentio, argument from silence.

Nonetheless, some labels remain opaque when one is not familiar with Latin:

argument ad crumenam, argument to the purse.

The current translation of these Latin labels may be questionable. The label argument ad verecundiam is often translated as “argument from authority”, while the Latin word verecundia means “modesty, humility”. For Locke, who introduced this label, the ad verecundiam argument is not precisely a sophism of authority but of submission to authority, S. Modesty.

This terminology is no longer spontaneously understood. In many cases, this piecemeal Latin appears gibberish and even ridiculous, particularly when well established, or more readily understood English terms can be used to refer to the same argument scheme.

This continued use of Latin labels, however, is due to the power of Latin as the language of law, theology, philosophy and traditional logic. This designation system for argumentation parallels the one which is well established and currently used for the designation of rhetorical figures. Latin has provided a common technical language for everyday reasoning, whilst giving the theoretical discourse some fragrance of Ciceronian authority. This use of Latin is altogether comparable to the contemporary use of English in countries where English is not the native language.

Three main types of Latin phrases can be distinguished.

1. Prepositional labels using the prepositions ab /a — ad — ex

Some arguments or fallacies are designated, in contemporary texts, by prepositional phrases having the following structure:

Latin Preposition + Latin Noun + argument

Sometimes, the Latin word “argumentum” replaces argument.

Latin is an inflected language; in prepositional phrases, the preposition imposes a specific grammatical case on the following noun, marked by a morphological variation at its end.

The three most used prepositions are ab, ex, and ad.

— The preposition ab (or a before consonant) means “from, pulled of, drawn from”:

a contrario argument, argument from the contrary.

—The preposition ad, means “to, towards, for »:

ad personam argument, argument to the person.

— The preposition ex means “from, out of”, indicating the origin:

Argument ex datis: argument drawn from what is admitted by the audience.

Ex labels are less common.

Occasionally, other prepositions can be found:

per: per analogiam argument, argument by analogy;
in: argument in contrarium, argument from the opposites;
pro: argument pro subjecta materia, argument relative to the subject matter. S. Subject matter.

From a semantic point of view, there is a directional contrast, origin vs. purpose, between the prepositions ab and ex on the one hand, and ad on the other hand:

ab, ex + Latin noun + argument = argument based on —, using —
— ad + Latin noun + argument = argument targeting —.

Ab, ad and ex compete in the designation of some arguments, with the same meaning:

ab auctoritate or ad auctoritatem argument;
ab absurdo or ad absurdum or ex absurdo argument.

The argument schemes designated by each of these labels have no common semantic basis. Many ad tags have been introduced in the modern period. Sometimes, they refer to very specific contents, in particular, to appeals to emotion or to a subjective position, whilst the labels ab and ex are never used in this sense.

The following entries list the Latin labels according to the preposition head of the noun phrase, give some equivalent of the Latin terms, and refer to the corresponding entry or entries:

Ab — Arguments (A Contrario, etc.)
Ad — Arguments (Ad Ignorantiam, etc.)
Ex — Arguments (Ex Concessis, etc.)

These lists are taken from Bossuet ([1677]), Locke ([1690]), Bentham ([1824]), Hamblin (1970); Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca ([1958]), and from the Internet. They do not claim to be exhaustive.
Modern Latin labels are presented along with ancient ones, as they were used by Cicero, Quintilian and Boethius, and sometimes incorporated unchanged by modern authors. Examples of this original terminology may be found under the entry Typologies (II): Ancient.

2. Other Latin phrases

Less frequently, various Latin phrases are used to refer to classical Aristotelian fallacies:
— Fallacy of omission of relevant qualification or circumstances; undue generalization of a limited claim:

Fallacy a dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter: a reasoning concluding from a qualified statement (limited in scope) to a generalizing statement (absolute).

Lat. dictum “word; maxim; sentence” here: “assertion”; Lat. secundum quid “according to something”; Lat. simpliciter, from simplex, “simple”.

This formula is abbreviated as “secundum quid fallacy”, S. Circumstances.

— Fallacies of false cause, that is to say, of poor construction of the causal relation, S. Causation; Cause-Effect: The causal link:

Non causa pro causa: “a non-cause is taken for a cause”. E1 is said to be the cause of E2, although this is not the case.
Cum hoc, ergo propter hoc: “At the same time as, thus because of ”.
From the fact that E1 and E2 are concomitant, one wrongly infers that they are causally linked.
Post hoc, propter hoc ergo: “later, thus because of”: from the fact that E1 always occurs before E2, one wrongly infers that E2 is due to E1.

— Fallacy of vicious circle:

Petitio principii, Lat. petitio, “demand”; principium “principle”: “request to grant (something equivalent to) the claim which is actually disputed”

The language of law uses Latin phrases and expressions to refer to argumentative principles, for example:

eiusdem generi: lat. idem, “the same”; genus, “genus”. Argument from the identity of genus; S. Genus; Juridical arguments.

3. A mocked pattern

In Tristram Shandy, Sterne mentions the arguments ad verecundiam, ex absurdo, ex fortiori, ad crumenam and the argumentum baculinum (ad baculum) and asks to add to this list the argumentum fistulatorium, which he claims to have invented.

— There lies your mistake, my father would reply; — for in Foro Scientiae there is no such thing as MURDER, —’tis only DEATH, brother.
My uncle Toby would never offer to answer this by any other kind of argument, than that of whistling half a dozen bars of Lillibullero.—–You must know it was the usual channel thro’ which his passions got vent, when anything shocked or surprised him; — but especially when any thing, which he deem’d very absurd, was offerd.

As not one of our logical writers, nor any of the commentators upon them, that I remember, have thought proper to give a name to this particular species of argument, — I here take the liberty to do it myself for two reasons. First, That in order to prevent all confusion in disputes, it may stand as much distinguished for ever from every other species of argument — as the Argumentum ad Verecundiam, ex Absurdo, ex Fortiori, or any other argument whatsoever: — And, secondly, That it may be said by my children’s children, when my head is laid to rest, — that their learn’d grandfather’s head has been busied to as much purpose once, as other people’s; — That he had invented a name, — and generously thrown it into the TREASURY of the Ars Logica, for one of the most unanswerable arguments in the whole science. And, if the end of disputation is more to silence than convince, — they may add, if they please, to one of the best arguments too.

I do therefore, by these presents, strictly order and command, That it be known and distinguished by the name and title of the Argumentum Fistulatorium, and no other; — that it rank hereafter with the Argumentum Baculinum and the Argumentum ad Crumenam, and for ever hereafter be treated of in the same chapter.

As for the Argumentum tripodium […] Laurence Sterne The Life and Opinions of Tristram Shandy, Gentleman [1760]1

Lillibullero is a famous Irish march; the fistula is a panpipe (Gaffiot, Fistula). Uncle Toby’s maneuver is an excellent, although rude, strategy to annihilate a discourse, S. Destruction of discourse; Dismissal.

1 In The Complete Work of Laurence Sterne. Delphi Classics, 2013. P. LV

A SIMILI argument

The following three Latin nouns cover the field of analogy: similis – similitudo – analogia (which came to Latin from Greek). Their global meaning covers the field(s) of « analogy, similarity, resemblance, comparison (up to identity), example, resemblance … ».
The corresponding terms, argument a simili – argument ex similitudine – argument per analogiam, may broadly cover cases corresponding to other, more specific, argument schemes.

1. Cicero’s “a similitudine”: “Argument based on resemblance or analogy”

Under this heading, Cicero cites the similarity of a case to be judged with another case in which there is no doubt about the decision to be made (where justice has already decided?): it is therefore a kind of precedent (Top. III, 14; Hubbell, p. 393) :

If a man has received by will the usufruct of a house, and the house has collapsed or is in disrepair, the heir (i.e., the remainderman) is not bound to restore or repair it, any more than he would have been bound to replace a slave of whom the usufruct had been bequeathed, if the slave had died.

The following case allows for a particularly interesting plurality of analyses, or cross-analyses (« On Similarity, » Top. X 41; Hubbell, p. 413):

If honesty is required of a guardian, a partner, a bailee, and a trustee, it is required of an agent (p. 413). This form of argument, which achieves the desired proof by citing several parallels, is called induction in Greek [epagoge].

This case can be seen as an induction as well as a categorization and / or an application of the gender clause.

With a simili, a similitudine, we remain in the large family of analogy and comparison.

2. Perelman: a simili

Perelman defines the argument a simili or “by analogy” as follows:

A legal proposition being given, which affirms a legal obligation relative to a subject or a class of subjects, this same obligation exists with regard to any other subject or class of subjects having with the first subject (or class of subjects) sufficient analogy so that the reason which determined the rule with respect to the first subject (or class of subjects) is valid with respect to the second subject (or class of subjects). Thus, the fact of having forbidden a traveler to climb on the steps accompanied by a dog leads us to the rule that it is also necessary to forbid it to a traveler accompanied by an equally inconvenient animal. (1979, p. 56)

Applying the a fortiori rule, travelers may be accompanied by an animal “less inconvenient” than a dog (perhaps a cat?)” but not by an animal more inconvenient (a goat?)
As the extension clause “an equally inconvenient animal” shows, the a simili argument relies on categorization mechanisms. It involves the same kind of reasoning as a pari, and the rule of justice.
The terminology seems somewhat overlapping, see Analogy; Genus.

A PRIORI, A POSTERIORI argument

Lat. prior, “above, before, older, better, first”.
Posterior, “coming after, behind, later; second ».

In ordinary language, the modifier a priori is equivalent to “at first sight, before any thorough examination”; the phrase is sometimes used to refer to prejudiced thinking.
A posteriori is currently used to mean “on second thought; after the fact.”

1. A Priori / A Posteriori

The distinction between a priori / a posteriori expresses an epistemological issue. A posteriori knowledge is concrete knowledge, built from sensory data extracted from the world through observation and practice. In contrast, a priori intellectual knowledge is based only on knowledge of language (natural or formal), perhaps coupled with an intuition of essences.
In philosophy, the distinction a priori / a posteriori is related to the opposition necessary / contingent, and the analytic / synthetic.

1.1 A posteriori

The a posteriori argument takes an element of experience and reconstructs its material causes or origin. Alternatively, it works by an abduction process, attaching this experience to a general explanation or a law that accounts for the existence of the fact. Arguments from consequences to causes or principles; inductive arguments; arguments based on a natural sign or a concrete example, are cases of a posteriori argumentation.

In examining the “origin and foundation of inequality among men”, Rousseau emphasizes the difference between a historical, a posteriori, approach to the subject, and his own philosophical, a priori inquiry:

Let us begin therefore by laying aside Facts, for they do not affect the Question. The Researches, in which we may engage on this occasion, are not to be taken for Historical Truths, but merely as hypothetical and conditional Reasonings, fitter to illustrate the Nature of Things, than to show their true Origin, like those systems, which our Naturalists daily make of the Formation of the World.
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, A Discourse upon the Origin and Foundation of Inequality Among Mankind. [1755]¹.[1]

1.2 A priori

In contrast to a posteriori argumentation, a priori argumentation is carried out without any explicit consideration of what exists. It starts from what is considered to be deep, first, essential, superior in an intellectual, religious or metaphysical order, and develops its consequences in order to account for apparent, second order, derived, subordinate phenomena.

A priori reasoning can be based on foundations of various kinds.
— Causal a priori reasoning. Causes are regarded as primary, as conditioning, in relation to the effect, which is secondary, i.e., conditioned. A priori argumentation then corresponds to the cause to effect argumentation (or argumentation propter quid).

— Essentialist a priori reasoning is the fruit of pure contemplation and intellectual activity. It assumes that the human mind has the capacity to come into contact with (to grasp) the essence; that is to say, the hidden and true reality of things, and to adequately express its concept in substantial definitions. Fundamental concepts are considered as primary in relation to their mundane incarnations. In practice, such reasoning begins with the definition of a concept corresponding to an object of study. Deduction then proceeds analytically from one intellectual proof to another, remaining in the realm of the a priori.

A priori argumentation corresponds to various kinds of deduction that start from principles, from linguistic definitions or axioms, in order to identify their consequences.
In a Platonic ontology, the ordered contemplation of essences defines supreme knowledge, and a priori argumentation, based on the essence of things, is the most valued form of argumentation.

2. Propter quid and quia arguments

Lat. propter quid, “on account of which”; quia, “that’”.

The distinction propter quid / quia / proposed by Thomas Aquinas (ST 1st part, Q. 2, 2; Com. NE, 4, § 51) is close to the relation a priori / a posteriori, and covers the same kind of argumentation respectively.
The proof quia is primary in relation to us, starting from what is better known to us, whereas the proof propter quid is primary in the absolute.

This distinction expresses the difference between
— a cause-to-effect « because » that is a “propter quid” « because »:

The lawn is wet because it is raining
Why is the lawn wet? — Because it is raining

—and an effect-to-cause, that is, a “quia” because: It is raining, because the lawn is wet

*Why is it raining? — Because the lawn is wet
Why do you say it’s raining? — Because  the lawn is wet

In theology, the a priori – propter quid proof corresponds to the ontological argument for the existence of God, whose existence is inferred from the a priori perfection attributed to him. The ontological proof of God’s existence consists in defining God as an infinitely perfect being, in order to deduce that he necessarily exists, this conclusion being reached, as St. Anselm says “by arguing silently with [one’s] self” (Pros., Preface).

The proof quia of the existence of God corresponds to the argument from the world itself (effect) to a Creator (cause), as in the Voltairian metaphor:

The universe embarrasses me, and I cannot imagine
That such a clock should exist without a clockmaker.
Voltaire, [The Cabals], 1772. [2].

[1] Quoted from John James Rousseau, A Discourse upon the Origin and Foundation of Inequality among Mankind. London: R. and J. Dodsley, 1761. P. 10.
[2] Quoted in Pierre Hadot, The Veil of Isis. Cambridge, MAS & London, England: Harvard UP, 2008. P. 127.