To analyze an argumentative text or interaction means to tag them according to three main levels.

1. 1. Delineating the different sequences that compose the text or the interaction under analysis. Characterizing the type and degree of argumentativity of these sequences.
   2. For each argumentative sequence, determining the different lines of argument and their structures; the argument(s), the conclusion(s); the role of the counter-discourses, that is, the kind of mutual criticism and evaluation implemented by each argumentative line.
   3. Specifying the argument schemes.

The analysis of an argumentative sequence must be based on relatively objective criteria, that is to say defined as best as possible, stable and shareable ones, even if not always decisive. The analysis of an argumentative passage is an argumentative activity, whose claims can be criticized and must be justified.

In formal language, one would have markers, that is to say, univocal and automatically identifiable material elements that would allow us to hold discourses such as,

— Presence of marker(s) S: so, this passage is an argumentative sequence.
— Presence of marker(s) A: so, this segment is an argument.
— Presence of marker(s) C: so, this segment is a conclusion.
— Presence of markers T: the underlying argumentation scheme is of such and such a type.

Natural language arguments do not have such markers. Actual linguistic markers are systematically polysemic and polyfunctional. Their strictly argumentative function must be evaluated according to the context. It is as much the context that designates a marker as argumentative as the marker that designates the context as argumentative.

1. Delineating an argumentative sequence

1.1 Sequencing the language flow

At the most general level, if we postulate that language or speech are by nature argumentative the problem of identifying specific argumentative sequences does not arise. If we postulate that, within the macro language datum (text, interaction), only some sequences are more or less argumentative, these sequences must be cut out from the language flow.
A sequence is a relevant analytical unit. The argumentative passages that are exploited in textbooks as well as in scientific presentations, are the product of this first sequencing operation. Sequencing and subsequencing the language flow is, most of the time, a routine operation. The selection of relevant argumentative passages is nonetheless the first problem the analyst must confront, and theirchoice of giving such and such frontiers to the sequence under analysis should therefore be explicit and justified. The correct implementation of this operation supposes a foray into the broader domains of case and corpora building.

In classroom interactions, for example, the sequence, “problem resolution” is distinct from the sequence, “homework and instructions”. In a meeting, the sequence, “agenda setting” is distinct from the sequence “discussion and decision about agenda item 19”. For a participant, identifying the sequence simply means “knowing what we are presently doing”.

Sequences and subsequences of any kind can be defined externally by their boundaries and internally by their own structure and foreground activity.

— Externally, the boundaries of the sequence are transition points characterized by topic changes, by specific closing and opening formulas, and by a re-design of the interaction format.

— From the internal perspective, the sequence is defined by a type of linguistic activity, by a specific interaction format, and by a semantic-thematic coherence, which globally obeys a completion principle. Exactly what a complete sequence consists in depends on the kind of sequence envisaged; the internal principle of completeness of a problem resolution sequence is not the same as that of an agenda setting sequence.

1.2 Delineating argumentative sequences

Argumentative sequences are isolated according to the same internal and external criteria, argumentativity being their specific difference.
Argumentation can be the defining activity of the sequence. It follows that the sequence, “discussion and decision about agenda item n° 19” should normally be highly argumentative. The external boundaries of such an institutionalized argumentative sequence depends upon the rules of the institution.
Argumentation can be an emerging activity in every kind of sequence; for example, somebody disagrees or makes other suggestions during the presentation of the agenda. The left boundary (opening) of an emerging argumentative sequence is characterized by the concretization of an opposition into an argumentative question. The right boundary (closing) can be of any kind, and is sometimes easier to grasp when it is considered in contrast to the following sequence; for example, the Chair looks at the clock and says “Well, I suggest that you further discuss this very interesting point during the coffee break. Thanks for your participation”.

When dealing with a local issue, an argumentative situation may develop and close on the spot, possibly leaving no trace in the memory of the participants.
When dealing with a pre-existing question, such as a socio-scientific issue, the present discussion is just one episode in the larger development of the question as discussed in various settings and crystallized in a specific script. In this case, the question has a story and the sequence is only an episode, which will not close the file.

2. Re-composing argumentative lines: coalitions; argument(s), conclusion(s); criticism and counter-discourse

The internal structure of the argumentative sequence is characterized by the type and the density of the argumentative operations it articulates. Classical analytical points include the following:

— If the text is a multi-speaker interaction or a polyphonic monologue, the analyst must attribute their own to every participant, that is the positions they hold and the roles they play in the global dispute.
Positions are identified as the segment providing, or pointing to, an answer to the argumentative question. Experience shows that this apparently elementary task may be rather challenging.

— Once the exact content of the oppositions and positions has been determined, one can observe the systems of coalition of the relevant positions, as well as their evolution in the dispute.

— The positions being thus localized, one looks at how the surrounding discourse ties with the proposed conclusion-answer, that is to say one identifies the argument(s).
The Indicators of argumentative function, when available, help to identify the passage as an argument or a conclusion.

— The analysis of critical strategies implemented by the participants bears upon the different modalities of counter-discourse management: Direct repetition of other discourses, or evocations, reformulation, of these discourses, rebuttals of the opponents’ arguments. S. Destruction; Refutation; Objection.

— A most interesting point is the observation of the interactions between the the participants, not only the opponent-proponent interactions, but also their interactions with the third parties, and the public at large.

— Observations about the relation between the arguments developed on the spot by the participants and the general script attached to the question, when available, will be always very instructive.

— Further issues involve the global characterization of the argumentative line developed by key participants, as implementing such-and-such strategy.

3. Argument schemes

The argument scheme can be explicitly formulated in the passage as a general law. In order to identify it, one might look for generic statements, which generally function as good supports for the affirmation of values, principles or laws.
To decide upon the correct argumentation scheme, one must investigate whether there is an acceptable paraphrase relationship between the generic discourse corresponding to the argument scheme, and the actual current argumentative discourse under investigation (in classical terms, between the topos and the enthymeme); for a detailed example of this mapping. The operations needed to determine whether such an argument scheme is reflected in the actual argumentation depend heavily on the schema involved. The same concrete argumentative discourse may be matched by several, non-exclusive schemes.

The word syzygy is an adaptation of the Greek word meaning “conjunction”.
In astronomy, a syzygy occurs when three celestial bodies are aligned, like the sun, the earth and the moon during an eclipse of the Moon.

In the traditional Catholic exegesis, there is a syzygy correspondence between two beings, events, actions, when 1) they are not contemporaneous; 2) they bear a strong analogy; 3) and the first prefigures, signifies, or announces the second. The first, the precursor, is called the type and the second is termed the antitype.

The Old Testament introduces the Types, the New Testament presents the Antitypes (this vocabulary is specific, it has nothing to do with the model / anti-model perspective) :

“the Antitype not only repeats but completes and perfects the Type. […] Noah, Abraham, Moses … are “Types” of Christ” (Ellrodt 1980, 38).

The syzygy principle orders history and the world, and, as such, founds the syzygy argument, used to an ever greater extent to establish significant links between the two “Type vs. Antitype” spheres. It exploits the resources of structural nalogy, proportion and proportionality and a variant of the argument of progress: what comes before is analogous to, but has less being and substance than what comes after, in a two-state world.

A variant of the syzygy principle projects the mundane world, considered to be a Type, onto the after-life, or eternal world, its Antitype, where it finds its raison d’être.

The syzygy argument retains its pedagogical function, which is to give the believer an idea of future conditions: the Monarch is the Type, of which the Almighty Father is the Antitype.

For him [Man] also he [God] hath varied the figures of combinations [syzygies], placing before him small things first, and great ones afterwards, such as the world and eternity. But the world that now is, is temporary; that which shall be is eternal.
Clementine Homilies, 3^rd Century (disputed).[1]

Syzygy-like principles can still be used, maybe ironically, to back a historical analysis.

In France, on Brumaire 18th (November 9th), 1799, Napoleon Bonaparte engaged in a coup in order to establish his dictatorship. Half a century later, his nephew, Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte also seized power by force. Karl Marx comments as follows on the relation between these two coups:

Hegel makes this remark somewhat that all the great events and historical personages are repeated, so to speak, twice. He forgot to add: the first time as a tragedy, the second time as a farce […]. And we find the same caricature in the circumstances in which the second edition of the 18th Brumaire appeared.
Karl Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Napoleon, 1851.[2]

The principle, “history repeats itself the first time as a tragedy, the second time as a farce” is an inverted syzygy.

[1] Clementine Homilies. Edimburgh: Clark, 1870, p. 38 (Homily II, Chapter XV. Quoted after www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/anf08.html.

[2] Brumaire is the second month of the French Revolutionary Calender, corresponding to October-November; the Revolutionary year began in Autumn. “The second edition” is the nephew’s coup. Quoted after: www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/download/pdf/18th-Brumaire.pdf. P. 5. (09-20-2013)

The systemic argument is an overall argument, referring to a definition of a whole as a structure in which everything fits together perfectly.
Taken literally, this principle asserts that each element of the system takes its full meaning only in light of its relation to the other elements in the system, and that it must be interpreted and applied accordingly.
This applies to specific laws in collections of laws, as well as to statements and passages in sacred texts and literary masterpieces.

This broad principle covers a set of argumentative techniques appealing to:consistency,  completeness, economy, or (non-)Superfluity

The argument from title postulate that the text is locally coherent.

The application of the a pari, opposite, a fortiori, schemes depends upon the effective realization of these systemic requirements in the considered system.

In the case of law codes, the systematic aspiration is immediately confronted with the de-stabilizing, complex forces of social and historical evolutions.

In the Aristotelian world, the theory of the syllogism covers all reasoning, in science, dialectic or rhetoric. In science, this is in logic, the syllogism is defined as

an argument in which, certain things being laid down, something other than these necessarily comes about through them (Aristotle, Top., I, 1).

The classical syllogism is a discourse composed of three propositions, the “things being laid down” are the premises of the syllogism, and “something other than these necessarily comes about through them” is the conclusion.

Syllogistic inference involves two premises, while immediate inference is based upon one premise, S. Proposition.

The logic of the analyzed propositions concerns the conditions of validity of the syllogism. A valid syllogism is a syllogism such that, if its premises are true, necessarily its conclusion is true (the conclusion of a syllogism does not have to be a necessary truth, it’s a truth that follows necessarily from the premises). The premises of the syllogism cannot be true and its conclusion false.

In Aristotle’s words, the syllogism, is a “demonstration” “when the premises from which the reasoning starts are true and primary, or are such that our knowledge of them has originally come through premises which are primary and true” (ibid.).

1. Terms of the syllogism

The syllogism articulates three terms, the major term T, the minor term t and the middle term M:

— The major term T is the predicate of the conclusion.
The premise containing the great term T is called the major premise.

— The minor term t is the subject of the conclusion.
The premise containing the small term t is called the minor premise.

— The middle term M connects the major and the minor terms, and consequently disappears in the conclusion, which is of the form < t is T >.

2. Figures of the syllogism

The form of the syllogism varies according to the subject or predicate position of the middle term in the major and minor premise. There are four (maybe only three) possibilities, which constitute the four figures of the syllogism, S. Figures. For example, a syllogism where the middle term is subject in the major premise and predicate in the minor premise is a syllogism of the first figure:

Major Premise          M – T              man-reasonable
Minor Premise         t – M                horse-man
Conclusion               t – T                 horse-reasonable

3. Modes of the syllogism

The mode of the syllogism depends on the quantity of the three propositions which constitute the syllogism. A proposition may be universal or particular, affirmative or negative, giving a total of four possibilities.

Each of these four possibilities for the major premise may combine with a minor premise, also admitting four possibilities, to give a conclusion that also admits four possibilities, totaling 4 x 4 x 4 = 64 forms.

Moreover, each of these forms admits the four figures, making all together 256 modes. Some of these modes are valid, others are not.

For example, the first figure of the syllogism corresponds to the case where, a universal conclusion derives from two universal premises. This deduction corresponds to the valid mode:

Major Premise             All human are reasonable
Minor Premise             All Greeks are human
Conclusion                   All Greeks are reasonable

This mode is known as Barbara, where the vowel a marks that the major, minor and conclusion are universal, S. Proposition.

4. Example: the conclusive modes of the first figure

Syllogistic deductions are clearly exposed in the language of set theory.

— Two (non-empty) sets are disjointed if their intersection is empty; they have no elements in common.
— The two sets intersect if they have some elements in common.
— One set is included in the other if all the elements of the first set also belong to the second set.

In what follows, M reads as “set M”, similarly for P and S. The first figure of the syllogism admits four conclusive modes.

A – A – A syllogism

A          every M is P
A          all S are M
A          hence all S are P.

A – I – I syllogism

A          every M is P
I           some S are M
I           hence some S are P

E – A – E syllogism

E          no M is P
A          all S are M
E          therefore no S is P

E – I – O syllogism

E          no M is P
I           some S is M
O          therefore some S is not P

These forms of basic reasoning used in categorization.

5. Evaluation of syllogisms

S. Paralogisms

6. Syllogisms with premise(s) having a concrete subject

The preceding definitions correspond to the traditional (Aristotelian) categorical syllogism, bearing on quantified variables. The word syllogism is also used to refer to a form of reasoning where one premise has a concrete subject. A concrete subject is a subject referring to a unique single individual, by means of various expressions such as this, this being, Peter, the N who.

Syllogisms instantiating a universal proposition are examples of such syllogisms. These assign to an individual the properties of the class to which he or she belongs:

the x are B
this is an x
this is B

The following type of reasoning is based on two concrete propositions can also be called, rather metaphorically, “syllogistic”. It refutes universal propositions such as “all swans are white”:

This is a swan      the proposition refers to a concrete individual
This is black         the proposition attach a property to the same individual
Applied to the same subject, “being black” and “being white” are opposite predicates
Therefore the claim “all the swans are white” is false

7. Syllogistic forms with more than two premises

By extension, one also calls a syllogism an argument based on several arguments either linked, convergent, or again having the form of an epicheirema.

A chain of propositions where the syntactic form and mode of linking more or less mimic those of a syllogism may also be called a syllogism, S. Expression.

The famous syllogism “everything rare is expensive, a cheap horse is a rare thing, so a cheap horse is expensive” is developed on the basis of two contradictory premises, so it is normal that its conclusion be absurd.

Argument ab inutilitate (legis); Lat. utilitas “utility, interest”, lex “law”; argument of uselessness (of the law).

The argument of the superfluity of the law is a matter of legal logic, S. Juridical Argument. As it is based on the principle of legislative economy, it is also referred to as the economy argument, or from uselessness argument.
This argument presupposes that the code is drawn as a system, so that none of its dispositions paraphrases another. The code is supposed to be laconic. So, an interpretation of a law that would make another law redundant, so superfluous, must be rejected: “Under interpretation I, passage A becomes equivalent to passage B, which then becomes redundant and useless. We must therefore favor an alternative interpretation of passage A”. This is a form of argumentation from the absurd (undesirable consequences). The new interpretation will be sought, for example, in the intention of the legislator.

By extension, the argument of the superfluity of the law applies to cases where the application of a law presupposes a state of fact. If entrance to a nightclub is denied to teenagers under 16, there is no need for a law prohibiting selling or serving alcohol to them in these places. Legislation on this would be superfluous.
But if it is forbidden to sell alcohol to people under 16, they might can freely attend these institutions; otherwise the law prohibiting the consumption of alcohol would be superfluous.

Let us assume that a regulation prohibits participants from voting on matters of direct concern to them. The question then is whether the participants can take part in discussions about these issues? Should it be specified in the regulation that their presence in the assembly is authorized?

— Argument by the superfluity of the regulation: Yes, they can participate. No, there is no need for a specific provision. Suffice it to observe that to vote one must be a member of the assembly; if you are forbidden to vote, it is precisely because you are part of the assembly. If you were not in the assembly, then it would be superfluous to forbid you to vote. No further clarification is needed.

— Argument “things which go without saying are better said”: so, let’s introduce the provision, “all those concerned do not take part in the vote but participate in the discussion sessions on the questions concerning them”. The new regulation is safer. In the first case, the price to pay is a subtle semantic inference; in the second, a slight redundancy.

Economy principle applied to sacred texts

The principle of economy applies to sacred texts. Consider the problem of the application of the scheme of the opposite to a prescription expressed as: “do not do this under such and such circumstances”. In ordinary cases, the application of the rule of the opposite leads to the conclusion that: “outside of these circumstances, you can do it”.

Sometimes the Koranic text explicitly mentions the opposite case (Khallâf,1942; Koran, 4-23), according to the scheme:

Do not do this under such and such conditions. Out of these conditions, do so.

Whereas in other cases, the contrary is not explicit:

Do not do this under such and such conditions.

The question in this second case is thus whether one can appeal to the scheme of the opposite to complete the text? If one adds “under other circumstances, do it!”, the literal precision given in the first case is rendered useless. If it is assumed that the Sacred Text is perfect, it expresses nothing useless or superfluous. In this case, nobody has the right to add to it, and to conclude anything about what to do or not to do.

The supreme legislator remaining silent, the judge’s decision will be founded on tradition, or on some other recognized source of legislation.

In the field of argumentation studies, the word value can refer to:

1. 1. The truth-value of a proposition, S. Proposition.
   2. The value of an argumentation, S. Evaluation; Force.

The question of values ​​and value judgments: this entry.

1. Values as a unified field

The philosophical tradition considers that questions about

the good, the ends, the right, obligation, virtue, moral judgment, aesthetic judgment, the beautiful, truth, and validity (Frankena 1967, p. 229)

belong to separate domains: morality, law, aesthetics, logic, economics, politics, epistemology.

Since the beginning of the twentieth century, these questions have been taken up globally, within the framework of a general theory of values, of distant Platonic ancestry. This “wide-ranging discussion in terms of ‘value’, ‘values’, and ‘valuation’ [then] spread to psychology, the social sciences, the humanities and even to ordinary speech” (ibid.).

2. The New Rhetoric on values

The concept of value was introduced into the field of argumentation by Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca’s New Rhetoric [1958], in the philosophical filiation of Dupréel (1939) (Dominicy n. d.).
It constitutes its permanent foundation, as shown by the introductory chapter of Perelman “Juridical Logic” [Logique juridique] (1979) entitled « The New Rhetoric and Values ».

The status of value and the role of values in argument is extensively discussed and exemplified in Guerrini 2019 Les Valeurs dans l’argumentation [Values in Argumentation]

2.1 Perelman’s research program on the logic of values

Perelman presents his discovery of the theory of argumentation as a step beyond a research program on the “logic of value judgments” (Perelman 1979, §50, p. 101; 1980, p. 457). This latter research led him to the following results:

— « There is no logic of value judgments » (ibid.) that would allow their rational organization. This conclusion that is said to be « unexpected » (ibid.).

— Contrary to the project of classical philosophy, it is impossible to build an ontology that would allow a “calculus of values” regulating their hierarchy.

— The treatment of values by logical positivism leads to a dead end. It maintains a gap between the values and the facts from which they cannot be derived. The consequence of this disconnection is that any recourse to values is rejected as irrational.
Perelman argues that considering that value-based actions are irrational is self-defeating, since it implies that practical reasoning and the whole field of law, both based on values, should be regarded as irrational, which is absurd because unacceptable.

Perelman’s conclusion is that, since science and logic deal with truth judgments, they cannot provide the rules of practical reason, which deals with value judgments. Such is the basic of the Perelmanian claim, that re-asserts the gap between the rational and the reasonable, between “the two cultures”, science and humanities, S. Demonstration; Proof.
Furthering his research program on values, in search of other methods capable of accounting for the rational aspect of the use of values, Perelman sought other perspectives better suited to this specific object. He found them in Aristotle’s Rhetoric and Topics, which provide techniques for an empirical study on how individuals justify their reasonable choices. Perelman was then able to redefine his theoretical objective no longer as a logic, but as a (New) Rhetoric (ibid.). The argumentative-rhetorical method ​​appears to be the solution to the failure of the logical and philosophical treatments of values. Perelman consistently opposes the project of classical philosophy to develop a calculus of values, since it is not possible to derive a hierarchy of values ​​from an ontology of values. More specifically, Perelman opposes Bentham on the possibility of a calculus of pleasures and pains.

2.2 The opposition fact / value, value judgement / reality judgement

The New Rhetoric is thus structured around two issues concerning values.  The first one has a logical origin. It concerns value judgments, made about a being or a concrete situation. second has a philosophical origin. It concerns substantial values such as the true, the beautiful and the good, which are the most general of all values.
In the TA, values are defined by the following distinctions and operations, which actually retain much of its positivist origin.

— Facts are necessary and compel the mind, whereas values ​​call for an adherence of the mind, S. Argumentation (I).

— But in practice, value judgments and reality judgments are difficult to distinguish. Contextual considerations may be necessary to characterize a judgment as a value judgment: “this is a car” can be a judgment of fact or a value judgment; “this is a real car” is only a judgment of value (see Dominicy, n. d., p. 14-17).

— In science, if two truth-judgments about a reality are contradictory, one of them is necessarily false (principle of the excluded middle), while two contradictory value judgments, “this is beautiful! vs. this is ugly!”, may both be justified by value-based arguments, developed independently from any appeal to reality.

— Values and facts live in separate worlds. Value judgments cannot be derived from nor opposed to reality judgments. Group values ​​are acquired through education and language. and they are specifically reinforced through the epidictic genre.

— Values currently conflict. Legitimate contradictions between value judgments cannot be resolved by eliminating one of the conflicting values, as one eliminates a false proposition. One can only rank the values (ibid., p. 107).

The specific treatment of values in the TA is based upon two assumptions
—A distinction is made between two kinds of substantial values, “abstract values ​​such as justice or truth, and concrete values ​​such as France or the Church” (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, [1958], p. 77).

— It follows that substantial values and value judgments are “objects of agreement that cannot make a claim to the adherence of the universal audience” (id., p. 76), but only to the adherence of particular audiences, S. To Persuade – To convince.

The so-called universal values, ​​“such things as the True, the Good, the Beautiful, and the Absolute” might be regarded “as valid for the universal audience only on condition that their content not be specified” (ibid.). They are the “empty frame[s]” suited to all audiences, and are as such pure instruments of persuasion (ibid.). Natural law theorists would object to this conclusion.

— The TA reasserts the link between values and emotions, of positivist origin.

— The Treatise, maintains the opposition between value judgments and judgments of fact only as the result of “precarious agreements” (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca [1958], p. 513) and for special debates.

—  The fact/value dichotomy is at the foundation of the Perelmanian argumentative construction. It absolutizes the gap between the two kinds of rationality, the reasonable [raisonnable] of current practices and law, and the rational [rationnel] of logic and sciences. This decision widens the gap between « the two cultures », the culture of facts (sciences) and the culture of values (humanities), V. Demonstration; Proof.

2.3 Discussions:  The opposition facts / values and agreement

 For Perelman, the functioning as an argument of value claims as well as of reality and truth claims presupposes the agreement of the participants. The whole of these « preliminary agreements » to the argumentation itself creates an atmosphere of « communion » (p. 74) allowing the harmonious development of the argumentative-rhetorical situation itself.
Still according to the Treatise, argumentation can be based on two classes of objects, an object being defined as anything on which one can agree or disagree:

We will ask ourselves which objects of agreement play a different role in the argumentative process. We think it will be useful, from this point of view, to group these objects into two categories, one relative to the real, which would include facts, truths and presumptions, the other relative to the preferable, which would contain values, hierarchies and places of the preferable (Id., p. 88; emphasis in the text).

The Treatise further states that

The notion of « fact » is characterized only by the idea that one has of a certain kind of agreement about certain data, those which refer to an objective reality. (Id. p. 89)

In other words, with the agreement of the participants, statements about values and reality can be used as arguments. In rhetorical argumentation, the speaker proceeds on the basis of values shared with the audience, or presented as such, S. Ex datis. In an adversarial debate, the speech of the proponent and the opponent may be based on radically incompatible values. In such cases, the role of third parties (judges, voters, members of a jury…) becomes essential to settle the conflict of values, rather than to solve it definitely.

Discussion: Agreement erases the difference between fact and values

The facts would be defined by an agreement on the objective data, and the values would be defined by an agreement on something which does not belong to the objective reality.

In practice, this definition erases the hard-won distinction between facts compelling the mind and values calling for an adherence of the mind (cf. supra) and replaces it with the notion of agreement.

For the purposes of argumentation and communication, agreement can be reached on both facts and values, which allows them to be used as arguments. At that point, the deal is done, whatever the ontological differences between facts and values.

Discussion: Is agreement a prerequisite for argumentation?

Argumentation works as well in a regime of disagreement as in a regime of agreement.
Participants can disagree on facts as well as on values. Like values, facts are not imposed on the minds, but must be agreed upon.
In a concrete argumentative situation, the agreement of the participants upon facts as well as upon values cannot be taken for granted, and the absence of agreement does not prevent their use as argument.

A fortiori, in an argumentative situation where a profound disagreement is developing, the discourses of both parties are based on radically incompatible values and facts contested by the other party. Facts and values must then be negotiated by the parties and composed by the mediator. It is in these adjustment processes that the argumentation takes on its full meaning.
The role of third parties (judge, voter, mediator) then becomes essential to settle conflicts of values and reality, always with reference to a particular case.

2.4 Discussion:
Has the epidictic genre a special status in relation to values?

According to the TA, values and truth are acquired via different processes, group values ​​are acquired through education and language. In this per, the epidictic genre specifically deals with values; it does not admit contradiction. Its specific social function is to strengthen the adherence of the group to its common founding values, “without which the discourses aimed at action could not find leverage to move and rouse their listeners” (1977, p. 33)
Perpetually reconstructed in epidictic encounters, where they are subject to a quasi-axiomatic treatment, values find their application in the two argumentative genres properly called, the deliberative and the judicial.
The deliberative and judicial genres are argumentative genres, aimed at collective decision making in situations of conflicting positions. According to Perelman, the epidictic genre has a very different status, it does not admit contradiction; its object is the reinforcement of adherence to group values in order to trigger action, V. Emotion:

Without [values] discourses aimed at action could not find leverage to move and stir their listeners (1977, p. 33).

Discussion:  The epidictic discourse on values is not unanimous

While insisting on the irreducible contradictions that prevail in the field of values, Perelman thus removes values from actual social contradiction by making the epidictic genre inherently unanimous.
The epidictic genre can be let exclude blame and restrict itself to praise, through literary and social conventions aligning the homage to living and dead men and women with the hagiography of saints. These conventions are not different from those that want a group to erect statues to its heroes and saints and not to its scoundrels and demons.
It is the social framework of the discourses of homage and veneration that, if anything, precludes counter discourse in the case of epidictic, not the nature of eulogy with has a perfect counterpart, blame. The devil’s advocate always has a role to play, even in canonization cases. If the eulogy of the deceased is unanimous, it is not because there are no opponents or because the opponents have nothing to say, but because, by convention of mourning, they keep silent; the new generation can be trusted to turn into villain the great men and values of older generations.
Epidictic praise of virtue ceases to be unanimous as soon as it is given a precise content

Exception being made of the specific conventional practice of mourning, the epidictic genre is defined by the two antagonistic acts of language, praise and blame. These acts define not so much a genre as a position (footing) that can be taken in both political and judicial discourse.

2.5 Discussion: Does Argument Schemes applies specifically to facts and Topics to values?

According to the Treatise, the opposition of values and facts corresponds to the opposition of the argumentative principles that govern them. Values are governed by topics (loci, topoi, places):

When it’s a question of founding values or hierarchies or reinforcing the intensity of the adhesion they arouse, we can link them to other values or other hierarchies to consolidate them, but we can also have recourse to premises of a very general order, which we’ll call loci, the [tópoi] from which the Topics, or treatises devoted to dialectical reasoning, derive (p. 112)

The Treatise is formal on this point:

We will call places [lieux] only premises of a general order allowing to found values and hierarchies, and which Aristotle studies among the places of the accident (p. 113)

Discussion:  An unnecessary distinction

Given the preceding definition, of the word “place”, we understand that the principles which found, i.e. which justify, the factual conclusions will not be called places (loci, tópoi).
This is what we actually see in the 3rd part of the Treatise. This part, which forms the main part of the work, is entitled « Argumentative techniques », techniques which are also called « argumentative schemes » (p. 251).

But we obviously notice that the schemes, the techniques of association correspond closely to what the tradition calls « argumentative commonplaces », which the Treatise ratifies incidentally:

these schemes [can also be considered] as places of argumentation (p. 255).

2.6 The so-called “loci of value”

Following the preceding decision, we therefore give up reserving the name of “place” to the rules of values only. It remains to be seen what the consequences of this terminological realignment are for the conceptual opposition fact/value. Just as agreement can be reached on facts and values, the same kind of argumentative rules apply to fact and value.

This is confirmed by the fact that the so-called “loci of value” does not specifically apply to values. The following are considered the « most common » loci (id., p. 95/):

— Quantity: “one thing is better than another for quantitative reasons” (id., 85/115): “the more, the better”.
— Quality is used to challenge Quantity, that is “the strength of numbers” (id., p. 89/119): “the rarer it is, the more precious it is”.
— Order: “the loci of order affirm the superiority of that which is earlier over that which is later” (id., p. 93/125).
— Existence: “the loci relating to the existent affirm the superiority of that which exists, of the real, over the possible, the contingent, or the impossible” (id., p. 94/126).
— Essence: “according a higher value to individuals to the extent that they embody [the] essence” (id., p. 95/126), which materializes as the topos “the closer to the origin, to life, to the prototype, the better it is.”

These so-called loci of values correspond to the topoi of the accident in Aristotle’s Topics (id., p. 113), V. Topics of the Preferable.  The accident is a kind of predication about an object. Such gradual links can be represented on correlated argumentative scales, S. Scale; Topos in semantics.

Discussion: The so-called “loci of value” are not specific to values

The places of the accident are, by definition, operative on the field of objects as well as on the field of values. So, in keeping with tradition, topic (locus, place) and (argument) scheme can be safely interchanged.

2.7 Discussion: Value and Emotions

The following passage on emotions is perhaps key to understanding the role of values in Perelman’s philosophy. By a clever dissociation, the New Rhetoric puts « passions » out of the picture in favor of values:

Note that passions, as obstacles, are not to be confused with passions that serve as support for positive argumentation, and which will usually be qualified with a less pejorative term, such as value, for example. (Ibid., p. 630; emphasis added)

See also the quotation above (§2.4): the role of values is « [t]o move » the audience. But, on the other hand, if values are opposed to facts (§2.2), and emotions being facts, values should be opposed to.  emotions

The notion of value refers to issues of subjectivity, emotion, and, semantically, the orientation and biases constitutive of ordinary speech. The words expressing values are words carrying argumentative orientations, constituted in antonymic couples. This lexicon organized by antonymy can be considered as a gigantic reservoir of « antagonistic couples », generators of argumentative situations:

« pleasure / displeasure », « knowledge / ignorance », « beauty / ugliness », « truth / lie »; « virtue / vice; « harmony / chaos, discord »; « love / hate; « justice / injustice », « freedom / oppression »…

Antonymy is also expressed by more or less fixed phrases (« self-expression / repression », « life in the open air / life in the offices »). Finally, the discourse can build long anti-oriented sequences, under the figure of the antithesis.

The relation of valorization/de-valorization can be reversed: aesthetics of the ugliness / (beauty), classical praise of the coherence and the constancy, baroque praise of the inconstancy, etc.

3. Values in argument

3.1 Value words

Basic values: The apple and the three libidos

The multiplication of values ​​does not call into question the fact that rhetorical discourse relies on substantial values, perhaps more prosaic than “the True, the Good, the Beautiful, the Absolute”, but nonetheless firmly attached to the human condition, and having highly mundane contents, namely honos, uoluptas, pecunia. That is, glory as the desire for social recognition; pleasure in all its forms; money and possessions. There is no place for knowledge in this trinity of materialistic values. By contrast, knowledge is one of the three criteria used by Eve to evaluate the fruit that put an end to the state of innocence:

So when the woman saw that the tree was good for food, and that it was a delight to the eyes, and that the tree was to be desired to make one wise, she took of its fruit and ate; and she also gave some to her husband, and he ate.
Genesis, 3, 6[1]

“Good for food”: the good, pleasure of the mouth; “a delight to the eye”: the beautiful, pleasure of the eyes; “to be desired to make one wise”: the true, pleasure of the mind, which was not included in the previous trinity of values.

Taken together, these three pleasures define the divine: “when you eat of it your eyes will be opened, and you will be like God, knowing good and evil.” (id. 3:5).
These three values can most probably be attached to the human condition; that is, they are widely available for immediate valorization in pragmatic argument, the argument used by the Devil.

Multiplication of value

All choices involve values and preferences. At the limit, the same valued word can be split in two anti-oriented value-words by a dissociation process, creating two anti-oriented homonyms.

Value words as oriented words

The concept of value refers to issues of subjectivity (Kerbrat-Orecchioni 1980) of affectivity and, to the inherent orientation of ordinary statements, S. Emotion; Orientation. Words which express values are basically antonymic pairs coupling words which have opposing argumentative orientations.

The whole lexicon can be seen as an enormous reservoir of such pairs:

pleasure vs. displeasure
knowledge vs. ignorance
beauty vs. ugliness;
truth vs. lies
virtue vs. vice
harmony vs. chaos
love vs. hate
 justice vs. injustice
 freedom vs. oppression”

Antonymic values are also expressed by more or less fixed phrases (“free expression of self vs. repression of aggressive instincts”, “life in the open air vs. life in offices”).

The ratio “valorization vs. devaluation” can be reversed:

aesthetics of ugliness vs. beauty), baroque esthetic of inconsistency (vs. consistency).

Value terms are at the root of “biased” language. Unbiased talk would amount to an elimination of value statements (i.e. of subjective, emotional, oriented statements), in favor of judgments based on facts. This requirement can only be satisfied by rejecting natural language in favor of a formal, scientific or technical language, or an alexithymical expression, S. Pathos.

3.2 Founding and exploiting value judgements

In argument, value words, emotion words function like “facts words”, that is, as word in general. Judgements of value as evaluation attach a value to a specific being, event, or state of things. They can be argued, used as argument or questioned as any other kind of judgement.

Arguments positioning an object in relation to a reference value

The word « valorization » has a positive orientation; the word implies the contribution of an additional value: or passing to a more noble use or place

We will nonetheless speak of evaluation (positive or negative) to designate the argumentative operation that situates a fact, a proposal for action, in relation to a value.

The process of valorization can be argued in a wide variety of ways:

X is (+) because:

— there are many / few
— it is round, it is heavy/light, it is mustard-colored, it has no shape
— I like it
— It is rare, it has just been published
— it is available right now

The story goes that a wealthy old dowager was once asked to sell one of her mansions that had been uninhabited and abandoned for many years. The discussion was long and arduous, and, when the buyer ran out of arguments, he pointed out that unless urgent repairs were made, the manor would fall into ruin. To which the dowager would have answered soberly: « I like ruins ».

The justification is satisfactory as soon as the interlocutor is satisfied or renounces.

From an argumentative point of view, the justification structure is not different from:

It’s flammable, it’s very dry, and they put products in it.

A value judgement about a being, an event, a situation… β is a judgement situating β on the specific valuation scale attached to the value / anti-value system Vⁱ

In other words, oppression is a negative value and freedom is positive one.

Restricting circulation rights is oriented towards oppression
Extending circulation rights is oriented towards freedom

The preference corresponds to the same structures in the comparative, which can be represented on a scale:

β can be characterized as ranking high or low in the value Vⁱ

Y is (+) than X because (even- more (+) (modern, etc.)

          The operation of dissociation is a valuation / depreciation operation, which splits the meaning of a word into two sub-meanings (a single notion into two notions), one of which will have a positive value (orientation), and the other, a negative value (orientation).

The predication of a value upon an object follows standard argumentative procedures. For example, in France, National sovereignty as a political value of reference, is consecrated as such in the Article 3 of the 1789 “Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen”:

The principle of all Sovereignty lies essentially in the Nation. Nobody, no individual can exercise any authority that does not expressly emanate from it.[2]

An evaluation question can arise, asking for example, that an international treaty be assessed in relation to that value. For this purpose, reference can be made to the preceding axiomatic definition, as enshrined in its legal implementation and by experience drawn from analogous situations in the past. The evaluation follows the general definition based categorization procedure, S. Categorization; Definition.

— National sovereignty is defined by the conditions Ci, Cj, Ck … –
— Treaty T respects / does not respect these conditions.
— We can / cannot sign this treaty without renouncing our national sovereignty.

The evaluation has to take into account that, as in any broad axiomatic definition, national sovereignty has many corollaries and ramifications, financial or military, sovereignty for example.

Arguments using an evaluation

The pragmatic argument and the argument by the absurd routinely implies a valorization operation:

Question: Should we do F?
Argumentation: F will result in C1;
Positive/negative evaluation of C1: C1 is Vi(+) (positive from the point of view of value Vi);
Therefore: Let’s do F.

The rebuttal can take two paths, for example:

(i) A counter evaluation of C1:

C1 is actually Vⁱ (–) (negative from the very point of view of Vⁱ),

— perhaps at the cost of a dissociation opposing to V_i “the true V_i”.
This rejoinder opens an evaluation stasis, an issue about the positioning of C in relation with value Vi. 

(ii) Introduction of another consequence C₂, considered to be negative from the point of view of the value V_m.

F will result in C²
C² is V_m (-)

In this case, the stasis is about the relative weights of C1 being V_i(+) vs. C2 being V_m(-).
Vm can be identical to Vi, which gives the rebuttal an ad hominem tinge:

Legalizing cannabis will certainly reduce the activity of small-scale dealers, but it will increase the activity of large-scale dealers.

In both cases, the conclusion is the same: “don’t do F!”.

This rejoinder opens a stasis about the relative weights of C¹ being Vⁱ (+) vs. C² being V^m(—).
The deadlock can be broken by a prioritization adapted to the circumstances of the moment: « But here Vⁱ is less important than V^m« .

In times of pandemic, public health imperatives allow us to restrict freedom
The Republican motto mentions freedom, not public health.

A value can also be invalidated as such by its practical consequences; this pattern of rebuttal seems to be available for all kinds of value:

In the name of freedom, anything can be said and done.
Liberty, what crimes are committed in thy name!
(Manon Roland, an historical Girondine, guillotined during the French Revolution).

[1] Quoted after www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=Genesis+3&version=RSVCE

[2] https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/Droit-francais/Constitution/Declaration-des-Droits-de-l-Homme-et-du-Citoyen-de-1789 (09-20-2017).

Guerrini Jean-Claude, 2019, Les Valeurs dans l’argumentation [Values in argumentation]. Paris, Classiques Garnier.

Argument ad vertiginem; Lat. vertigo “movement of rotation, vertigo”.

The argument of vertigo is defined by Leibniz in his New Essays Concerning Human Understanding [1795], as a follow-up to his discussion of Locke’s four kinds of argument, S. Collections (3: Modernity and tradition.

We might bring yet other arguments which are used, for example the one we might call ad vertiginem, when we reason thus: if this proof is not received we have no means of attaining certainty on the point in question, which we take as an absurdity.

This argument is valid in certain cases, as if any one wished to deny primitive and immediate truths, for example, that nothing can be and not be at the same time, or that we ourselves exist, for if he were right there would be no means of knowing anything whatever. But when certain principles are produced and we wish to maintain them because otherwise the entire system of some received doctrine would fall, the argument is not decisive; for we must distinguish between what is necessary to maintain our knowledge and what serves as a foundation for our received doctrines or practices.

Use was sometimes made among jurisconsults of probable reasoning in order to justify the condemnation or torture of pretended sorcerers upon the deposition of others accused of the same crime, for it was said: if this argument falls, how shall we convict them? And sometimes in a criminal case certain authors maintain that in the facts where conviction is more difficult, more slender proofs may pass as sufficient. But this is not a reason. It proves only that we must employ more care, and not that we must believe more thoughtlessly, except in the case of extremely dangerous crimes, as, for example, in the matter of high treason, where this consideration has weight, not to condemn a man, but to prevent him from doing harm; so that there may be a mean, not between guilty and not guilty, but between condemnation and banishment in judgment, where law and custom allow it.
Leibniz, New Essays Concerning Human Understanding [1765]. P. 437.

In substance, the argument from vertigo urges us to accept certain kinds of proof for if we don’t, we are left powerless. This is a subspecies of arguments by unacceptable consequences, S. Pragmatic argument; Absurd; Pathetic; Ignorance.

These consequences are “absurd” and dramatic, when dealing with the first principles of knowledge, such as the principle of non-contradiction, which every person must admit on pain of being unable to say anything scientific. Unlike the argument from ignorance, the argument ad vertiginem would therefore be valid insofar as the impossibility on which it is based is not a subjective impossibility, related with such and such a person or group, but an objective, rational impossibility concerning humanity as such.

However, Leibniz operates a distinguo between epistemic situations where our power to know is at stake, “what is necessary to maintain our knowledge”, and social situations dealing with human affairs and ideology, that “[serve] as a foundation for our received doctrines or practices”.
Since demonstrative reasoning cannot apply in the latter case, “probable reasoning” must be rehabilitated in this domain, for lack of a better proof. But having to make do with weaker proof in the criminal domain implies that a person can be condemned on the basis of insufficient proofs, which Leibniz finds undesirable. So, in an interesting maneuver, he proposes to re-equilibrate the weakness of the proofs motivating the condemnation by softening the condemnation itself.

Lat. a rubrica argument; the Lat. name rubrica belongs to the semantic family of rubor “red”, and means “red earth; heading”. In the collections of laws “the headings of chapters were written in red color” (Gaffiot [1934], Rubrica).

The interpretive argument based on the title of the relevant section of the code or argument of the title (a rubrica) is a matter of legal logic, S. Juridical arguments.

Codes and administrative regulations are divided into sections and subsections with titles and subtitles. These headings carry no legal weight, but they are relevant to the interpretation of the law, insofar as they define the scope of the following articles. The argument  on the title legitimates or suspends the application of an article depending on whether or not the case considered falls within this scope.

If the College regulation contains a section entitled “Rules of conduct in classrooms”, Article 1 providing that:

The use of mobile phones is forbidden,

this article cannot be invoked in order to ban mobile phones in the playground. If the prohibition is made under the heading “General provisions”, it applies to the conduct during classes, etc. The highest disposition in the hierarchy prevails.

Lat. pro subjecta materia argument, Lat. subjectus, “adjacent, near”, materia “topic”.

The interpretative argument from the subject matter of the law requires that the text of a law or of a regulation be interpreted not absolutely but depending on the matters concerned, that is to say, the specific material topic and purpose of the law,S. Juridical arguments.

In the following case, the interpretation derived from the object of the law leads to the redefinition of the expression territory entirely covered by snow as meaning “places where the snow layer is sufficient for tracking game”, since the purpose of the law is the protection of game. The same expression would be defined in a very different way if its purpose were, for example, the regulation of off-piste skiing.

What is meant by, “territory entirely covered with snow”? If this condition were interpreted literally, the prohibition of hunting in snow would hardly ever produce any result. […] The purpose of the law is to prevent the destruction of game, but this destruction is not prevented if I hunt, out of the woods, on land where I can follow the track of the game, although the neighboring grounds are stripped of snow.
It is therefore of little consequence that the snow should be melted over an area of ​​one hundred acres of rocks or marshy land, if I go hunting on the nearby land which remains covered with snow. Is it true that, in our hypothesis, the object of the prohibition would be evaded, if we admitted a contrary interpretation? — Quite obviously yes. It is therefore necessary to agree with our opinion, since the word “entirely” used here is impossible to apply literally. It is therefore necessary to attribute to it only the meaning and the scope that it contains pro subjecta materia.
Thus I think that there is an offense whenever one is found hunting, outside the woods, on snow-covered ground, as long as one can track the game.
Renaissance Joseph Bonjean, [Code of Hunting], 1816.[1]

The subject matter corresponds to the intention of the law, itself determined with reference to the intention of the legislator, here to protect game. If the subject is indicated by a title, the argument of the subject matter of the law and the argument of the title of the law (a rubrica) converge to the same conclusion.

The argument of the subject matter of the law is quite different from the argument to the to the matter. The former refers to the content of a specific law, the later to the matter at issue in an argumentative situation.

[1] Renaissance Joseph Bonjean, Code de la chasse, vol. 1, Liège: Félix Oudard, 1816, p. 68-69.

The expression argumentative structure is used in three different ways:

— The theoretical structure of an argumentation corresponds to its internal organization, that is to say to the specific form of the “argument(s) – conclusion” relation in a given text or interaction, S. Layout; Convergent, Linked, Serial.

— The empirical structure of an argumentative question materializes in an argument map, which features the second- or third-level sub questions derived from the main issue, as expressed by the root question, S. Script.

— The structure of an argumentative text corresponds to what classical rhetoric calls its disposition, the step-by-step organization of co-oriented and anti-oriented information and argumentations, S. Rhetoric. The structure of an argumentative institutionalized interaction fundamentally consists in the institutional arrangement of successive sequences dealing with the questions and sub-questions. Ordinary interactions include repetitions with variations of what was previously discussed. Argumentative texts and interactions routinely include non-argumentative sub-sequences.

These different structures can be depicted by diagrams, S. Scheme.