Lat. pro subjecta materia argument, Lat. subjectus, “adjacent, near”, materia “topic”.

The interpretative argument from the subject matter of the law requires that the text of a law or of a regulation be interpreted not absolutely but depending on the matters concerned, that is to say, the specific material topic and purpose of the law,S. Juridical arguments.

In the following case, the interpretation derived from the object of the law leads to the redefinition of the expression territory entirely covered by snow as meaning “places where the snow layer is sufficient for tracking game”, since the purpose of the law is the protection of game. The same expression would be defined in a very different way if its purpose were, for example, the regulation of off-piste skiing.

What is meant by, “territory entirely covered with snow”? If this condition were interpreted literally, the prohibition of hunting in snow would hardly ever produce any result. […] The purpose of the law is to prevent the destruction of game, but this destruction is not prevented if I hunt, out of the woods, on land where I can follow the track of the game, although the neighboring grounds are stripped of snow.
It is therefore of little consequence that the snow should be melted over an area of ​​one hundred acres of rocks or marshy land, if I go hunting on the nearby land which remains covered with snow. Is it true that, in our hypothesis, the object of the prohibition would be evaded, if we admitted a contrary interpretation? — Quite obviously yes. It is therefore necessary to agree with our opinion, since the word “entirely” used here is impossible to apply literally. It is therefore necessary to attribute to it only the meaning and the scope that it contains pro subjecta materia.
Thus I think that there is an offense whenever one is found hunting, outside the woods, on snow-covered ground, as long as one can track the game.
Renaissance Joseph Bonjean, [Code of Hunting], 1816.[1]

The subject matter corresponds to the intention of the law, itself determined with reference to the intention of the legislator, here to protect game. If the subject is indicated by a title, the argument of the subject matter of the law and the argument of the title of the law (a rubrica) converge to the same conclusion.

The argument of the subject matter of the law is quite different from the argument to the to the matter. The former refers to the content of a specific law, the later to the matter at issue in an argumentative situation.

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[1] Renaissance Joseph Bonjean, Code de la chasse, vol. 1, Liège: Félix Oudard, 1816, p. 68-69.

The expression argumentative structure is used in three different ways:

— The theoretical structure of an argumentation corresponds to its internal organization, that is to say to the specific form of the “argument(s) – conclusion” relation in a given text or interaction, S. Layout; Convergent, Linked, Serial.

— The empirical structure of an argumentative question materializes in an argument map, which features the second- or third-level sub questions derived from the main issue, as expressed by the root question, S. Script.

— The structure of an argumentative text corresponds to what classical rhetoric calls its disposition, the step-by-step organization of co-oriented and anti-oriented information and argumentations, S. Rhetoric. The structure of an argumentative institutionalized interaction fundamentally consists in the institutional arrangement of successive sequences dealing with the questions and sub-questions. Ordinary interactions include repetitions with variations of what was previously discussed. Argumentative texts and interactions routinely include non-argumentative sub-sequences.

These different structures can be depicted by diagrams, S. Scheme.

Lat. a ratione legis stricta, or stricta lege, Lat. ratio, “reason”; lex, “law”; strictus, “tight, narrow”.
Lat. stricto sensu: Lat. sensus, “thought, idea, meaning”
Lat. ad litteram, littera “letter”

The argument based on the strict meaning of a normative text, or principle of strict application of the law, prohibits restricting or extending the provisions of the law or regulation beyond what it clearly states. This can be considered to be a particular case of the principle “one does not interpret what is clear”.  S. Juridical arguments.
Regulatory provisions must be taken  to the letter (ad litteram), in their strict sense (stricto sensu)

If the legal voting age is 18 years, then one cannot forbid young people to vote on the day of their birthday because they are “barely” 18 years old, nor allow them to vote the day before their birthday because they are “almost” 18 years old. But from a linguistic point of view,

“he’s almost 18 years old” is co-oriented with “he’s 18 years old”,
“he is barely 18 years old” is co-oriented with “he is not 18 years old”.

The principle of interpretation stricto sensu cancels these co-orientations. The law establishes thresholds, and admits threshold effects whereas almost and barely blur the borders. S. Orientation; Orienting words.

The argument of the generality of the law posits that the law must be applied to all the concrete cases it covers. The principle of strict meaning posits that it must be applied according to its literal meaning to all these cases.

The strict meaning principle applies regularly when the law is clear. When it seems clear to one judge but not so clear to her colleague, a stasis emerges on the necessity of interpretation (distinct from a stasis of interpretation, where two interpretation clash).

The letter vs the spirit of an intervention

In a juridical context, the ad litteram label refers to an argumentation that complies strictly “to the letter” of the law, as opposed to its spirit. Interpretations appealing “to the spirit” of the law may invoke the intention of the legislator.
In an argumentative context, an ad litteram reply addresses the strict letter of the opponent’s discourse, as opposed to its meaning as intended by the opponent. Ad litteram is then equivalent of ad orationem, S. Matter.

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The label straw man fallacy refers to a special case of a general phenomenon, discourse and meaning resumption and representation.

The argumentative space is an interactional and textual space organized by a question^@, where co-oriented, anti-oriented and third parties’ discourses articulate and overlap. S. Orientation; Roles. In such a space, argumentative interventions constantly refer to and influence each other, under quite different modes, ranging from explicit quotation, to more or less distorted repetition and reformulation, to the most allusive expression.

1. Resumption of speech

1.1 Direct, explicit quotation

An explicit quotation is expressed in a passage between quotation marks, accompanied by its space-time coordinates, so as to construct an unequivocal object: what was said, by whom, when, where.

Explicit quotations can be rejected by showing that they are incomplete, unduly de-contextualized, or misunderstood, S. Authority; Circumstances. Accordingly, an interpretative stasis^@ can emerge about what the text really means and what the author has really said. It may be argued that a direct quotation is already an interpretation, and an indirect one certainly is. S. Interpretation.

In the case of direct quotation, the source text does exist; in the following ones, the very existence of such a text is problematic.

1.2 Indirect quotation

Indirect quotation of a position is presented by the speaker as a reformulation which paraphrases the original saying, or rephrases it in order to clarify its meaning and intention. The indirect quotation can be dismissed as tendentious or ludicrous, that is to say, presenting an unfair reinterpretation of the original position, implying something that was never said, S. Orientation; Epitrope; Prolepsis

1.3 Allusion

Allusion to another discourse is no more than a trace that makes it possible to broadly locate the source discourse, without the possibility of designating any individual author or work. Its vague character is its best guarantee against contradiction, and a veil of mystery suits some kinds of authorities well.

2. Anticipating oppositions

The discourse can also be attributed to a voice staged in a polyphonic space, as in the case of anticipated objections, S. Interaction; Prolepsis.

3. Straw man

The discrepancy between what the quoted party said or might have said and what the quotation makes him say is the basis for the fallacy known as the straw man or scarecrow fallacy.

Undisputable refutation must be about what the other really claimed, S. Relevance. This requirement has a clear meaning in the case of written and referenced statements. In ordinary discourse, no segment is totally context-free, and its meaning is always an interpretation, so it is often not clear if someone has fully said something or not. In an argumentative situation, what the other has actually said is not a prerequisite but an issue in the argument.

The straw man fallacy is an accusation of mischievous representation of the diverging discourse. The expression is a metaphor on the substantive straw man, which literally refers to:

a mass of straw formed to resemble a man. (Thes., Straw man).

As a metaphor, a straw man is:

1. a weak or imaginary opposition (such as an argument or adversary) set up only to be easily refuted.
2. a person set up to serve as a cover for a usually questionable transaction (MW, Straw man)

Given meaning (1), the straw man or scarecrow strategy corresponds to a tendentious, repulsive, even self-refuting, reformulation, of the discourse of something previously said.

Given meaning (2), the straw man strategy corresponds to a position which masks the real position of the arguing party. This position is advanced in order to set the public, or the speaker’s opponents on a false track, S. Red Herring.

A strategy is a complex set of coordinated actions, planned by an actor in order to achieve a specific goal. Strategies can be antagonistic or cooperative. Antagonistic strategies develop in non-cooperative fields of action, such as war, game of chess, or commercial competition. Such strategies serve to secure a decisive advantage over an opponent pursuing an antagonistic goal. Antagonistic strategies are covert, and discovered by the adversary as they are implemented, S. Manipulation. Co-operative strategies are developed by partners working together to achieve a common goal, from which both will benefit. The strategic intentions are transparent to all partners. A research strategy for example is an action plan to solve a problem; and teachers and students will collaborate to implement a pedagogical strategy.

In the military field, the strategy is set up before combat operations and tactics during the fight; tactics refers to the local implementation of a global strategy.

1. Argumentative strategies

An argumentative strategy is a set of speech choices planned and coordinated to support a point of view. Argumentative strategies are a subspecies of language and communicative strategies, speech and text construction strategies, interactional strategies.

An argumentative strategy is antagonistic if it is devised in order that the speaker may take the upper hand over the opponent.

There are two cases in which argumentative strategies may be cooperative:
— Firstly, if the speakers have the same argumentative role, share a common point of view and collaborate to support it.
— Secondly, they may have different roles, and without identifying themselves with these roles, they might collaborate in the construction of a shared solution.

The phrase argumentative tactics is not used, but could be useful to refer to local argumentative phenomena as part of the global argumentative action. The choice to use such argument schemes can be seen as a tactical move, an implementation of a general policy. This does not suffice, however to define an argumentative strategy which requires the application of different kinds of instruments, at all discourse levels, for example coordinating the choice of words, the choice of arguments and self-presentation (as open/closed to objections for example). An argument scheme can be identified on the basis of a brief passage, while the study of a strategy requires an extended corpus which fully represents a position.

2. Some argumentative strategies

The first strategic level is that of the choice of answer to be given to the question, S. Stasis.

— A defensive strategy merely refutes the opponent’s proposals.

— A counter-proposal strategy ignores the opponent’s proposition P and argues a proposition Q which is incompatible with P. In such a context, argumentation may take an explanatory turn, S. Explanation.

— An objectivizing strategy focuses on objects without questioning people.

— Ruining the discussion is a way to ruin the opponent’s arguments,, S. Destruction of speech.

— Bentham has identified types of arguments whose coordinated use defines a stalling strategy, a conservative strategy, aiming to postpone the debate n the hope that it will never take place: “the conditions are not yet fulfilled for you to join the European Union.”

— Conciliation vs. breakthrough strategies are characterized by the acceptance vs. refusal of concessions, the flexibility vs. radicalization of the proposals presented as compatible / incompatible. Conciliatory strategies use information accepted by the audience, present the conclusions and its recommendations as a continuation of previous beliefs and actions. Rupture strategies defy the audience, reject all its representations in order to replace them with new ones. The first strategy is reformist, the second is revolutionary.

 

These two last strategies are used by Paul, the Apostle of Christianity. In the following passages, in order to get the ear of the Athenians that he addresses for the first time, he uses a typical rhetorical captatio benevolentiae strategy, and begins his discourse with a reference to their own creeds, S. Rhetoric; Beliefs of the Audience:

21 The one amusement the Athenians and the foreigners living there seem to have is to discuss and listen to the latest ideas. 22 So Paul stood before the whole council of the Areopagus and made this speech: “Men of Athens, I have seen for myself how extremely scrupulous you are in all religious matters,
23 because, as I strolled round looking at your sacred monuments, I noticed among other things an altar inscribed: To an Unknown God. In fact, the unknown God you revere is the one I proclaim to you.
Acts of the Apostles, 17, 21-23[1]

Nonetheless, the message was met by skepticism on the part of the Athenians. In particular, they questioned the message about the resurrection of the dead. Later, in quite different circumstances, Paul claims a rupture between his message and “the wisdom of the wise”:

17 For Christ did not send me to baptize, but to preach the gospel, not in cleverness of speech, so that the cross of Christ would not be made void. 18 For the word of the cross is foolishness to those who are perishing, but to us who are being saved it is the power of God. 19 “I will destroy the wisdom of the wise, and the cleverness of the clever I will set aside.” 20 Where is the wise man? Where is the scribe? Where is the debater of this age? Has not God made foolish the wisdom of the world? 21 For since in the wisdom of God the world through its wisdom did not come to know God, God was well pleased through the foolishness of the message preached to save those who believe. 22 For indeed Jews ask for signs and Greeks search for wisdom; 23 but we preach Christ crucified, to Jews a stumbling block and to Gentiles foolishness.
First Letter of St. Paul to the Corinthians, 17-23.[2]

3. “Strategic Maneuvering”

Pragma-dialectics has introduced the concept of strategic maneuvering to reconcile dialectical and rhetorical demands. The rhetorical requirement is defined as a search for efficiency: each party wishes its point of view to triumph. The dialectical requirement is a quest for rationality. During an encounter, each party simultaneously pursues these two objectives. In practice, the dialectical dimension is appraised according to the pragma-dialectical rules for the rational resolution of a difference of opinion. The rhetorical dimension is essentially communicational and presentational. It updates the classical demand that the issue and position must be presented in the correct language or format for the target audience (van Eemeren, Houtlosser 2006).

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[1] Quoted after www.catholic.org/bible/book.php?id=51&bible_chapter=17 (05-05-2017)

[2] Quoted after www.biblescripture.net/1Corinthians.html (05-05-2017)

The word stasis is borrowed from the Greek; it translates in Latin as quaestio, and, “in modern parlance”, as issue (Nadeau 1964, p. 366).
In medicine, a stasis is defined as “a slowing or stoppage of the normal flow of a bodily fluid or semifluid” (MW, Stasis); a stasis results in congestion, that is, in “an excessive accumulation especially of blood or mucus in an organ” (MW, Congest).

As used in rhetorical argumentation, the word stasis is a medical metaphor; medicine is a valuable source of examples and an important analogical resource domain for argumentative theory S. Natural Sign. In medicine, a state of stasis occurs when the bodily humors are blocked, and medical arts have to be applied to restore the correct flow of the fluids. Similarly, in the field of human action and interaction, a situation of stasis occurs when the consensual circulation of discourse is blocked by a contradiction or a doubt, and the argumentative arts must be implemented to restore the normal, cooperative flow of dialogue. Nadeau defines the situation of stasis as “a position of balance or rest” established between two opposite discourses (id., p. 369).
In a state of stasis, the equilibrium is that of an aporia: “the Greek verb aporein describes the situation of the person who, finding himself in front of an obstacle, finds no passage”; the associated psychic state is embarrassment (Pellegrin 1997, art Aporia). In philosophical usage, an aporia is an insoluble contradiction.

2. The classical stasis theory

The first systematic formulation of a theory of stasis is found in Hermagoras of Temnos (late 2nd century BC; Benett 2005). The technique of stasis is used by rhetoricians before Hermagoras, but he was the first to formally identify and name the concept along with four basic kinds of stasis (Nadeau 1964, p. 370). This theory is best known via the treatise On Stasis of Hermogene of Tarsus, a Greek rhetorician of the 2nd half of the second century (Hermogene, AR; Patillon 1988). Hermogene distinguishes between:

(i) On the one hand, misconceived questions, upon which an argumentative debate cannot be built, either because their answer is obvious, or because they are undecidable; these questions are “incapable of stasis” (id., p. 385); in other words they cannot be rationally discussed.
(ii) On the other hand, we have well-conceived questions, which can be rationally discussed.

Hermogene organizes the different kinds of general, well-conceived questions as follows (after Patillon, p. 57 sq.).

— Stasis of conjecture: Is the fact established?
— Stasis on the definition, upon “the name of an act” (Nadeau, p. 393): Someone robs a private person in a temple; is he a temple plunderer?
— The next step is the qualification of the act; it can be rational (discussed on the basis of good reason) or judicial (discussed on the basis of an existing law).

Judicial qualification is discussed under the following lines (after Patillon, p. 59).

The defendant does not admit to the mischievousness of the fact: antilepsis (“contradiction, objection”, Bailly, [Antilepsis])

The defendant admits to the mischievousness of the fact: opposition

• He assumes responsibility: compensation
• He rejects responsibility:

— and blames the victim: counter-accusation
— and blames somebody or something else:

≠ who or which can be guilty: report of accusation
≠ who or which cannot be guilty: excuse

3. The authentic “rhetorical question”

A stasis is a question, the node of a conflict articulating a judicial action in order to solve it. The Rhetoric at Herennius defines the first stage of a judicial encounter as the determination of the issue constituting the cause (Ad Her., I, 18, 17):

The issue [constitutio] is determined by the joining of the primary plea of the defense with the charge of the plaintiff (Ad Her., I, 18, 11)

Quintilian explains that the first thing he does to disentangle an argumentative situation is to find the quæstio, the question, or the issue. The question “arises” when a statement made by a party is contradicted by the other party (note that the following text presupposes that adultery was a crime; that it was legal to kill an adulterer; and, apparently, that the executor was prosecuted for killing the man, while he also killed the woman):

5. First, then, (what is not difficult to be ascertained, but is above all to be regarded) I settled what each party wished to establish, and then by what means, in the following way. I considered what the prosecutor would state first: either an admitted or contested point. If it were admitted, the question could not lie in it. 6. I passed therefore to the answer of the defendant and considered it in the same way. Sometimes, too, what was elicited there was admitted. But as soon as there began to be any disagreement, the question arose. The process was of this nature: ‘You killed a man’ —‘I did kill him”. The fact is admitted, so I pass on. 7. The defendant ought to give a reason why he killed him. ‘It is lawful’, he may say, ‘to kill an adulterer with an adulteress’. It is admitted that there is such a law. We may then proceed to a third point, about which there may be a dispute. ‘They were not guilty of adultery’ — ‘they were’. Hence arises the question.
(IO, VII, 1, 5-7; my emphasis).

The question, that is to say, the point to be judged, is deduced from the nature of the reply given by the accused to the accuser. When the parties agree, the facts are considered to be established or “peaceful”; they are disputed when disagreement arises.

At the beginning of On Invention Cicero criticizes Hermagoras for having too general a view of argumentative questions, including philosophical as well as scientific questions, “Can the senses be trusted? What is the shape of the world? How large is the sun?” (On Inv., I, 8, VI). Cicero limits the theory of questions to those belonging to the proper domain of the orator, the epidictic, deliberative and judicial genres. Nonetheless, the concept of question has no such pre-set limit.

The concept of stasis as a question is the counterpart in the rhetorical domain of the Aristotelian concept of problem in the dialectical domain (Aristotle, Top., I, 11, 104b-105a10, pp. 25-28); a question is a rhetorical problem. The theory of stasis is the theory of “rhetorical questions” in the proper sense:

The constitutio of the auctor ad Herennium, then, is the functionally dual stasis of Greek rhetoric […] the psychical counterpart of which is the articulate question, or, as Sextus Empiricus (Against the Geometricians, III, 4) styled it, the “rhetorical question” (Dieter 1950, p. 360).

This meaning of the expression rhetorical question is quite distinct from the current meaning, which designates a question to which the speaker knows the answer, whilst also knowing that his interlocutors also knows the answer, and whose value is that of a challenge to potential opponents. To avoid confusion, we’ll use the expression argumentative question, S. Argumentative Question.

4. Example

Facing the accusation, “You have stolen my moped!”, the defendant may adopt different strategies which will determine the type of debate to follow.

(1) Denying having committed the act; the fact is not ascertained (“conjectural stasis”)

I did not even touch your moped!

(2) Recognize there has been a theft, and accuse somebody else:

It’s not me, it’s him!

Idem, accusing the author of the accusation:

It’s not me, it’s you, who accuse me, yet who destroyed your own moped to get the insurance premium.

This strategy, like the strategy of reorientation of the fact, manifests the tendency to radical refutation, by symmetrical reversal, S. Reciprocity; Causality.

 (3) Recognize the fact, deny it was a theft, and re-categorize the action under a more honorable label, S. Categorization. This can be achieved via a number of different strategies:

But this is my moped; you stole it from me last year!
But this moped belongs to me, you pretended to buy it, but have never paid me.
I didn’t steal it, I just borrowed it. I asked you for permission.

(4) Idem, but invoking various kinds of extenuating circumstances:

The gang leader forced me.
I was just taking my grandmother to the hospital

(5) Idem, and apologize:

I made a mistake, Mr. President.

(6) Recusing the judges (stasis on the procedure); disqualifying the accuser:

It is not for the victor to judge the vanquished.
But who are you to judge me?
Suits you (= the accuser) well, you the gang leader, to complain of a theft! This should be solved by a good fistfight, as usual.

 (7) Recognize the fact and claim to be proud of it:

You were drunk, I saved your life by taking your moped, and you should thank me!

Maybe because of its spectacular character, the last case is known in the rhetoric of figures as an antiparastasis, S. Orientation.
All these strategies are equally interesting, and all might deserve to be known by a specific name.

Some of these strategies are mutually exclusive, S. Kettle argumentation.

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The words sophism, sophist refer to very distinct realities in philosophy and in ordinary language.

1. The historical sophists

In Ancient Greece, the sophists were the first to implement a philosophy of language in their interactions with their fellow citizens. By means of calculated discursive interventions called “sophisms”, the sophists destabilize the peaceful current representations of the world as seen through language. They emphasize the “arbitrariness” of language (within the Saussurian meaning of “arbitrary”), and so provoke naive speakers who consider language to be transparent and unproblematic. These discourses are not intended to deceive their audience, but to highlight to them the paradoxes of their current talk.

In the Euthydemus, Plato stages Socrates deconstructing sophistical arguments, such as the following one. Dionysodorus is a sophist, Ctesippus his naive interlocutor:

[Dionysodorus:] — […] And your father turns out to be […] a dog.
— And so does yours, said Ctesippus.
— You will admit all this in a moment, Ctesippus, if you answer my questions, said Dionysodorus. Tell me, have you got a dog?
— Yes, and a brute of a one too, said Ctesippus.
— And has he got puppies?
— Yes indeed, and they are just like him.
— And so, the dog is their father?
— Yes, I saw him mounting the bitch myself, he said.
— Well then: isn’t the dog yours?
— Certainly, he said.
— Then since he is a father and is yours, the dog turns out to be your father, and you are the brother of the puppies, aren’t you?
Plato, Euthydemus, 298d-e. CW, p. 737

This argument is not intended to convince Ctesippus that he is son and brother of a dog. The sophist does not deceive his listeners, he leaves them confused and infuriated.

The sophists have devised thought-provoking paradoxes such as the following one:

Antiphon the Sophist claimed that the law, by obliging man to testify the truth before the courts, often compels us to do wrong to one who has done us no harm, that is, to contradict the first precept of justice.
Émile Bréhier, [History of Philosophy], 1928.[1]

The Sophists represent, with the Skeptics, an essential intellectual movement within argumentation theory. The Sophists established the principle of debate and irreducibly contradictory discourses, as the foundational cases presented in Antiphon’s second Tetralogy, about a prosecution for accidental homicide; the case is discussed as follows:

First Speech for the Prosecution
Reply to the Same Charge
Second Speech for the Prosecution
Second Speech for the Defense[2]

The intellectual and social contributions of the historical sophists have been stigmatized by Platonic idealism that imposed on them deformations which were suffered until Hegel in philosophy and are surviving in common language. Ancient Sophists were no more sophists in the contemporary sense of the word than Duns Scott was a dunce.

2. Contemporary usage:
the sophism, an intentional paralogism

In contemporary language, a sophism is an eristic, that is, a misleading discourse. From an interactional point of view, it is an embarrassing, false, manipulative and dangerous discourse, received as evidently false but the refutation of which is difficult. As any kind of discourse can be denounced by calling it a “sophism”, the concept is essential for the analysis of the polemical reception of argumentative discourse.

A sophism is a paralogism enveloped in malicious speech, produced to pull the rug from under the opponent’s feet. The distinction between sophism and paralogism is based on a charge of shameful intent, which may or may not be properly laid out. Paralogism is on the side of error and stupidity; sophism is a paralogism serving the interests or passions of its author. Under the principle of “who benefits from the crime?”, such an “error” is charged with malicious intent by the recipient and the potential victim. One moves from description to the accusation embedded in the negative contemporary use of sophist, sophistry, S. Fallacies: Aristotle foundational list, Paralogism.

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[1] Émile Bréhier, Histoire de la Philosophie, Vol. 1, Antiquité et Moyen Âge [Antiquity and Middle Ages] Paris: PUF, 1981, p. 74.

[2] Antiphon, Second Tetralogy. KJ. Maidment, ed. Quoted after www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0020%3Aspeech%3D3

The slippery slope argument is another name for the argument of gradualism and direction. It consists in saying that such a controversial action, A, apparently convincingly backed by such and such arguments, should not be accepted, even if it might seem reasonable, because, if it were, the same principles and reasoning could be used to argue in favor of another action of the same kind A+, which is much more controversial, and then for another action A++, that one would find quite unacceptable. In effect, accepting A removes all possible limit, “when started, you cannot stop”. The slippery slope counter-argument is based on the precautionary principle, aimed at preventing a risk of extension of the decision adopted.

In a debate about the legalization of drugs, a participant proposes to legalize hashish:

AC. — [Legalization, or rather domestication] will not eliminate the problem of drugs. But it is a more rational solution, which will eliminate the mafias, reduce delinquency, and also reduce all the fantasies that feed drug taking itself and are part of drug marketing.

The opponent counters this pragmatic argument with a slippery slope argument,

If you legalize hashish, you will have to legalize cocaine, then heroine, then crack and cocaine, and all the worst dirty things that man can find.
Le Nouvel Observateur [The New Observer][1], 12-18 Oct. 1989

For a refutation of the same position based on its perverse consequences, S. Pragmatic Argument; for a refutation based on the very wording and definition of the project, S. Related Words.

This argument is based on the following operations. The question is:

Question: — What should we do about the issue of drugs?
S1 — We should legalize hashish, for such and such reasons.

The opponent S2 is reluctant to accept this proposal, even if the reasons presented by S1 are not entirely unacceptable. S2, however, refuses to become involved in S1’s process of reasoning on the basis of the following analysis of the situation.

(i) Consider the broader graded category including the object concerned, S. Categorization; Classification:

The category “drug” covers hashish, heroin, crack cocaine and so on.
Heroin is worse than hashish, and crack cocaine is worse than heroin

So, hashish is the low point, the weak point by which one enters the graded category of drugs.

(ii) An evaluation
The decision to legalize hashish may be debatable, but the legalization of heroin would clearly be unacceptable, and the legalization of crack cocaine would be unthinkable, even outrageous. This gradation mirrors gradation (i).

(iii) A driving mechanism
The decision to legalize hashish is related to those to be made in relation to heroin and crack cocaine; the same question will inevitably arise about these harder drugs:

Should heroin be legalized? Should we legalize crack cocaine?

Legalizing hashish would set a precedent; the same arguments justifying the legalization of hashish (“eliminate the mafias, reduce delinquency, and also reduce all the fantasies about drug taking”) may well be used to legalize heroin, and even crack cocaine. Given the success of these arguments to justify the legalization of hashish, it would be near impossible to dismiss these arguments if they were to be used to justify the legalization of heroin and crack cocaine. A precedent has been set. In short, by accepting A, one has taken a decisive step toward accepting A+ and A++.

(iv) Conclusion: Let’s reject the legalization of hashish

 

The structure of the slippery slope argument parallels that of the argument from waste:

Slippery slope: Don’t get started, you won’t be able to stop!
Argument from waste: Since you started, you must go on!

The gradualist strategy and the slippery slope argument consider a hierarchized class of elements, S. Gradualism. The question is whether the status of these elements should be changed? The Gradualist is in favor of a change of status, and engages in a step-by-step, progressive modification of the existing hierarchy. The opponent considers that the status of the top elements can in no way be altered, and will use a slippery slope argument to counter the gradualist by opposing any change, however slight, in the status of the lower element.

The driving mechanisms invoked (often implicitly) on stage 4 can be very different:
— Psychological:“he who steals an egg will steal an ox”.
— Organic, causal: The slippery slope designation is metaphorical, and clearly illustrates the physical movement of an ever faster physical fall. One could also evoke a domino effect, where the first falling domino pushes the second, the significance of each falling domino becoming greater and greater.
— Strategic: The key point is the attribution of bad intentions to the proponent. The opponent may consider (as in our example) that the proponent is well intentioned, and that his or her public goal is indeed the authentic goal, and that he or she does not see the potential extreme consequence in which this might result. In this case, the proponent is portrayed as a naive or idealistic arguer, who doesn’t see the consequences of what he or she is promoting, but nevertheless maintains his or her moral integrity. This development reflects Hedge’s recommendation, not to attribute to the adversary hidden and manipulative intentions (sixth rule for honorable controversy, S. Rules). Nonetheless, maybe with a polemical intent, the proponent might be framed as a Machiavellian character with the active intention of developing a gradualist strategy, with the manipulative intention of implementing step-by-step, the most extreme measure beginning with the relatively benign one; hashish would be the bait initiating a priming strategy. So, the opponent will cast upon the proponent a suspicion of private, ugly intentions, S. Motives and Reasons.

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[1] Le Nouvel Observateur is a French weekly political and cultural newspaper.

The word sorite comes from the Greek word soros, meaning, “heap”.

A sorite is a discourse progressing by reiteration of the same syntactic form.

1. Sorite paradox

The sorite of the heap is one of the famous paradoxes proposed by Eubulide, a Greek philosopher, contemporary of Aristotle:

A grain of wheat is not enough to make a heap of wheat, nor two grains, nor three grains, etc.
In other words, if n grains do not make a heap, n + 1 do not make a heap either.
So no amount of grains of wheat can make up a pile of wheat.
Similarly, and if you take a grain out of a heap of wheat, you still have a heap of wheat, and so on, down to the last grain. So, a grain of wheat is itself a heap of wheat. [1]

This paradox can be illustrated by any collective name: cluster, crowd, flock, army, collection, bouquet, collective…

2. Rhetorical sorite

A rhetorical sorite (gradatio, climax) is a discourse progressing by the reiteration of the same cause-effect, begetter-begotten relation, or simply temporal succession of linked events, building up to a climax, as in the following poem:

 Cursed be
The father of the wife
Of the blacksmith who forged the iron of the ax
With which the woodcutter fell the oak
In which was carved the bed
Where was born the great-grandfather
Of the man who drove the car
In which your mother
Met your father!

 Robert Desnos, [The Dove of the Ark], [1923]. [2]

3. Logical sorite: a chain of syllogisms

In logic, the term sorite refers to a chain of syllogisms such that the conclusion of the first serves as a premise for the following one.
The sorite is also called polysyllogism:

A polysyllogism is a series of syllogisms chained together in such a way that the conclusion of one serves as a premise for the next. (Chenique 1975, p. 255).

Serial or subordinate argumentation are other names for polysyllogistic argument, and for this kind of sorite, S. Serial Argumentation.

The term sorite may also refer to an abbreviated polysyllogism “in which the conclusion of each syllogism is not expressed, except the last” (Chenique 1975, pp. 256-257).

The critical problem with the polysyllogism is the stability and reliability of the reiterated inference. In a formal system, the transmission of the truth is flawless, while in a default argument chain, as the reasoning progresses the cogency of the conclusions weakens. In such series, everything happens as if the weights of the rebuttals grow exponentially, up to the point where the chain will break.

Other kinds of reasoning engage in the sorite paradox, for example:
— Analogy: A is analogous to B, B to C, … and Y to Z. But is Z always analogous to A? S. Analogy.

— Causal chains, when the expected, theoretically perfect, “domino effect” is counteracted.

— Interpretive reasoning; which is why some Arabic legal schools refuse to interpret the sacred text of the Koran. They consider that only the starting point, the letter of the Sacred Text can be considered certain, and that engaging in interpretation would trigger a slippery slope process, leading to some unpredictable result, potentially contradictory with the undisputable content of the Sacred Text.

3. Chinese sorite

The expression « Chinese sorite » or « Confucian sorite » is used by Masson-Oursel ([1912], p. 17) to designate « arguments [argumentations] expressing a sequence of means implemented by human activity in view of an end » (1912, p. 20). Eno (2016, p.11) speaks of “sorite” or  “chain syllogism”[2].
The sorite posits a desirable state and considers the stages along the way to achieving it. The progressive sorite starts from the first  stage and proceeds to the ultimate goal. The spring of the progression can be considered as causal, instrumental or indeterminate, in this case the succession seems purely temporal. The regressive sorite states the goal and enumerates the stages backwards to the first, basic stage.
In the brief Confucian treatise The Great Learning (Dàxué), a regressive sorite is immediately followed by a progressive sorite on identical contents. Regressive sorite:

In ancient times, those who wished to make bright virtue brilliant in the world first ordered their states; those who wished to order their states first aligned their households; those who wished to align their households first refined their persons; those who wished to refine their persons first balanced their minds; those who wished to balance their minds first perfected the genuineness of their intentions; those who wished to perfect the genuineness of their intentions first extended their understanding; extending one’s understanding lies in aligning affairs.
The Great learning, R. Eno, p. 12

In the progressive sorite, « the first condition spreads, so to speak, into new conditions which arise from each other. Thus, in Mencius IV, 1, § 27, each term unites with the next by the expression: ‘the main fruit (chĕu) of A is B’. » (Id., p. 19). The previous regressive sorite corresponds to the following progressive sorite:

Only after affairs have been aligned may one’s understanding be fully extended. Only after one’s understanding is fully extended may one’s intentions be perfectly genuine. Only after one’s intentions are perfectly genuine may one’s mind be balanced. Only after one’s mind is balanced may one’s person be refined. Only after one’s person is refined may one’s household be aligned. Only after one’s household is aligned may one’s state be ordered. Only after one’s state is ordered may the world be set at peace.
The Great Learning. R. Eno, p. 12

The difference between progressive and regressive sorite is purely in the textual organization of the stages that compose them. These steps are listed in the form of a parallelism: « when A, then B« . This expression belongs to the « if… then… » family, used to note the logical implication, which gives the sorite an appearance of reasoning. Masson-Oursel proposes a second formulation expressing the progression (or regression) characteristic of the sorite:

Each step forward represents an anticipation that is justified afterwards, thanks to the formula: « in view of B, there is a way, a path to follow (yeou tao); A being given, then (seu) B is given. (Masson Oursel, 1912, p. 20).

The sorite proposes a path to follow, a way on which successive stages are marked. It would be more a question of method or path to follow than a logical or causal inference.

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[1] The concept of a heap is three-dimensional, typically pyramid-shaped. Two or three grains cannot constitute a heap because they do not fit, or fit badly, on top of each other, the heap is not stable.   On the other hand, it is possible to constitute a heap of four grains, from a base of three grains. We could therefore say that the heap is possible from four objects on.

[2] Robert Desnos, La Colombe de l’Arche, 1923. In Œuvres [Works]. Paris: Gallimard, Quarto, 1999, p. 536.

[3] http://hdl.handle.net/2022/234242

 

Lat argument a silentio or ex silentio, from silentium, « silence ».

1. Forms of silence

As in any interaction, in an argumentative interaction, a ratified participant may remain silent, that is to shut up. Overlapping indicate an urge-for-talking, which can be more or less controlled depending on the culture and personality of the participant. A silent participant is not a participant who does not have the floor, but a ratified participant who is expected to speak and does not speak.

1.1 Motivated silence

During an argumentative interaction, third parties are non commited participants, expected to speak as arbitrators at specific times, according to the specific rules of the interaction. The silence of a participant expected to talk as a party sometimes can be argumentatively interpreted as having an argumentative orientation.

For example, “I don’t want to participate”, as an expression of this intentionnally silent attitude can be justified by different forms of the argument of tranquillity (ad quietem argument, S. Calm:

… because we don’t have to discuss that here, now…

another reason alleged to keep silent is that

the  issue is already satisfactorily settled

either because the doxa already provides a satisfactory answer, or because the speaker has a strong stance on the issue, and do not want to question it. This is a stasic move, tending to substitute the issue “should we discuss P?” to the actual discussion of P.

 

In this cases, the question is “why did you keep silent?” and ask for a justification of silence, while in the following one the issue is “what should we infer from this silence?”, silence is now an undisputed fact which to be interpreted, that is, from which some conclusion should be drawn, S. Natural sign; Interpretation.

1.2 Silence as an argument

Such a silence can be argumentatively exploited according to the rules and the goal of the specific interaction underway:

— In the case of written text, by a classical argument from silence (§2), which applies along the same lines, to modern media (§3).

— During a police interrogation, the accused remains silent (§4)

— The law is (apparently) silent about the case before the judge (§5)

2. The classical argument from silence

The classical argument from silence argues from the fact that a text says does not mention an event that might have happened in the real universe corresponding to its textual universe, to conclude that the event did not happen.
Chroniclers record all the outstanding events of their time; if they do not mention in their Chronicles something that normally should have attracted their attention, the argument from silence concludes that such an alleged event never occurred.
This can be considered as an application of the completeness principle applied to the work of these chroniclers.

Did Syldavia face terrible flooding during a given period? If such an event had occurred, the chroniclers would have mentioned it, let alone if they regularly mention less important events. But they do not mention anything of the sort. So, there was no devastating flood during this period.

The value of the argument depends on the quality and quantity of the relevant documentation available for the relevant period. It increases considerably if we know that chroniclers regularly record atmospheric events. In the following example, the argument of the historiographers’ silence argument carries its weight:

Metz is perhaps the only city where the Crusaders did not dip their hands in the blood of the Jews. Louis the Younger, leaving for Palestine, assembled his army there, and yet it is not mentioned that they received any outrage there. The silence of history in this regard is worth a positive proof, considering that Metz then had historiographers.
Abbé Grégoire, [Essay on the physical, moral and political regeneration of the Jews], 1789. [1]

 

If a fact is not mentioned, it maybe because it is irrelevant to the intention of the text under consideration. The argument of silence is sometimes answered with the argument of the camel: there is no mention of camels in the Qur’an. So, there were no camels in 7th century Arabia, which is absurd. The rebuttal is nice, but there are several references to camels in the Qur’an. S. also Borges, Gibbon….

A better example would perhaps be:

The book [The history of Belgium for dummies]  does not mention French fries. Therefore, the Belgians never knew about fries. [2]

 

The argument of silence is used to date literary works. Marie de France wrote the Lais (poems whose theme is courtly love) towards the end of the 12th century. Can we specify the date? The editor of the Lais argues as follows (according to Rychner, 1978 [3]):

1) “To date more precisely the Lais, they should be placed in relation to other works of the time”.
2) To do that, he invokes “an argument ex silentio, to use with caution but [which] should not be overlooked”
3) First, “there is no evidence in the Lais of Marie having read Chrestien de Troie Eneas”, a courtly novel, published in 1178
4) Second, “it is difficult for me to imagine that, having read [Eneas], she would have been able to remain so completely herself and so different from him, in her style and general inspiration.”

The conclusion follows: the Lais must have been written before 1178.

 

The argument from silence is an indirect proof, which can only be used by default, in the absence of all proof or direct information.
Even if we admit, for the sake of the reasoning, that there is no camel in the Koran, it would not be a proof of “inauthenticity” of the Book, (whatever one may mean by “authenticity”), since we cannot play an indirect proof against strong direct ones. Direct proofs rebut indirect ones.

3. Argument from the silence of the media

The argument from the media silence is a variant of the classic argument of silence: Nothing happened since all the media (the main trend media, my influencer…) do not say anything about it.
The counter-argument goes along the following lines:

the media are silent because they are silenced
the media are silent because they share the same political agenda
you’ll find all the information you need on the social media

4. Argument of silence and right to silence

Applied to the case of the suspect who refuses to cooperate and to answer the questions of the police officer, the common adage  » If you do not speak up, you do not object« , leads to interpret the silence of the accused as an admission of guilt.
The right to remain silent « derives from the principle of the presumption of innocence« , according to which the prosecution must prove guilt (Dalloz, [Right to be silent]) [4])
It follows that the accused does not have to collaborate in the search for the truth, has the right to remain silent and not to contribute to one’s own incrimination (id.).

5. Argument from the silence of the law

The argument from the silence of the law is put forward by the judge to justify a refusal to judge such an action, arguing that the Code of laws does not contain any article applicable to the action in question, which cannot therefore be legally qualified.
The argument of silence is declared invalid by a meta-principle which imposes on the court the obligation to judge, under penalty of committing a denial of justice:

The judge who refuses to judge, under the pretext of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the law, may be prosecuted as guilty of denial of justice (Dalloz, [Prohibition of denial of justice] [5].

Obligation is made to the judge to interpret the law, that is, to find in the existing body of law an article applicable to the case before him.

 

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[1] Abbé [Henri Jean-Baptiste] Grégoire, Essai sur la régénération physique, morale et politique des Juifs. Preface by R. Badinter. Paris, Stock, 1989, note p. 179.

[2] I owe this example to Michel Goldberg, who pointed out to me that the Dictionary (2018) reproduced the traditional mistake about camels and the Koran.

[3] Jean Rychner, Introduction aux Lais de Marie de France, Paris, Champion, 1978, p. X-XI