Argument of RESPECT

Argument ad reverentiam, Latin reverentia “respectful fear’.

Respect is a feeling projected by authority, regardless of who or what it may be. Organizations and individuals who are legally vested with the proper authority to carry out a mission claim respect in that role, regardless of one’s private opinion about its relevance or effectiveness.

Claiming respect is different from claiming obedience. One can be compelled to obey by lawful force, but showing respect is essentially an adjunct to obedience. Interactions with common authorities are therefore governed by specific conventions of courtesy, for example, the closing formula “Yours respectfully,” conveys this conventional respect to the addressed in a formal letter.

As an internal feeling toward a person or institution, respect must be earned. Nevertheless, some behavior, whether intentional or not, may be perceived as disrespectful. If it involves a public official or police officer, it may be considered as an insult and punished as such. The argument from respect is used to justify sanctions for a lack of respect, see authority; modesty.

Any person in a position of authority who feels that their prerogatives are not being respected may invoke the argument from respect. The problem arises when this claim to authority is not recognized, or is even seen as oppressive, as may be the case with religious authorities. At a more abstract level, the right to respect is claimed for all beliefs in general, and for one’s own beliefs in particular. Disrespect is considered a provocation, scandal, or blasphemy that seriously hurts a believer’s feelings, and a complaint can be filed in court to uphold the right to respect. Consider the following case.

« Despicable Profanation of a Christ on the Cross”

A controversial situation involving an argument about respect developed around a photographic work by the American artist Andres Serrano, entitled Immersion Piss Christ. The piece features a crucifix submerged in the artist’s urine. On Sunday, April 17, 2011, it was vandalized at the Yvon Lambert Collection of Contemporary Art in Avignon, France.

The Archbishop of Avignon issued a statement protesting the exhibition of the piece, and thus justifying its destruction. The argument of (lack of) respect is invoked in the following passage:

Should the local authorities not ensure respect for the faith of believers of any religion? Nevertheless, such a work is a desecration that touches us deeply on the eve of Good Friday, when we remember Christ, who died on the cross for us.

The argument is then repeated and amplified (our emphasis):

– The despicable desecration of a Christ on the Cross (title)
– Can art be in such bad taste for no other reason than to insult?
– I must respond to this despicable image that disrespects the image of Christ on the cross–the heart of our Christian faith. Every attack on our faith hurts us, every believer is deeply affected.
– Given the gravity of such an affront
– For me, as a bishop, and for every Christian and every believer, this is a provocation, and desecration that hurts us in the heart of our faith!
– Did the Lambert Collection not realize that these images would seriously hurt all those for whom the Cross of Christ is the heart of their faith? Did they intend to provoke the faithful by disrespecting what is at the heart of their lives?
– This is a grave desecration, a scandal that affects the faith of these believers.
– [These images] seriously harm the faith of Christians.
– This behavior hurts us at the heart of our faith.
Infocatho, [Ugly Desecration of a Christ on the Cross], 2011[1]

In some countries, blasphemy laws punish what they consider to be contempt and disrespect for the state religion, and blasphemy is treated as any other crime. Campaigns against blasphemy laws develop a counter-discourse arguing that such laws are medieval, obscurantist, incompatible with the basic democratic principle of freedom of expression, and that they make all philosophical and historical inquiry into religious belief impossible.
Other countries have laws prohibiting hate speech or discriminatory speech, to guarantee equal rights for minority communities, religious or otherwise.

The argument of (a lack of) respect was at the heart of the case concerning the cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad published in a Danish satirical weekly in 2005. The case culminated in the 2015 terrorist attack on the French satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo, in which two Islamist terrorists shot dead 11 journalists and staff.

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[1] “Odieuse Profanation d’un Christ en Croix”, Infocatho. http://infocatho.cef.fr/fichiers_html/archives/deuxmil11sem/semaine15/210nx151europeb.html 09-20-2013

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REPETITION

Proof by repetition is sometimes referred to by its Latin name, « argumentum ad nauseam », meaning « to the point of nausea. »

In ordinary conversation, any meaningful or pragmatically relevant segment may be repeated for various reasons. For instance,a speaker may repeat something if it was not clearly heard or understood; a second speaker may repeat the end of the first speaker’s turn to connect it with their own.
Repetition may consist of reproducing a segment of speech word for word, as is the case in formal quotations. It may also be a slightly modified restatement of something ubiquitous, such as a familiar argument borrowed from an argumentative script. Deliberate, strategic repetition of slightly modified core content is key to traditional educational methods, and repetition of the same action is the basis of learning by doing, etc.

Persuasive repetition is characterized by the following elements.
– Invariance of the repeated formula.
– Frequency of these repetitions.
– They are produced as catchphrases by a social medium for political or commercial purposes.
– Their format excludes listener participation.
– The act of repetition can continue indefinitely.

While most repetition is unplanned and goes unnoticed, argument by repetition or proof by repeated assertion is part of a strategy used to impose a one-sided, uncritical view on people. The focus is on a single key claim, presented as a necessary truth. The specific function of repetition is to create a sense of a familiar self-evidence, beyond proof.

Although this process is called “argument (by repetition)”, it is characterized by the absence of argument. It offers no reasons, good or bad, to support the claim. Reasons are not implied or contextually retrievable, rather, they are carefully ignored.
Therefore, repetition can be considered argumentative only if an argument is defined by its persuasive effect; but persuasion is not a defining effect of argumentation
Repetition is instrumental to persuasion, which itself could be considered as a  willingness to repeat something under appropriate circumstances.
Repeating an entire complex argument results in an argument by repetition rather than any other kind of argument: “We will win because we are the strongest”.

Sociologist Gustave Le Bon emphasized the power of repetition to win people’s approval:

Pure and simple assertion [affirmation], kept free from all reasoning and all proof, is one of the surest means of getting an idea into the minds of crowds […]
Affirmation, however, has no real influence unless it is constantly repeated, and so far as possible in the same terms. It was Napoleon, I think, who said that there is only one figure in rhetoric of serious importance, and that is, repetition. By repetition, what is affirmed becomes so fixed in the mind in such a way that it is finally accepted as proven truth. […]
It is to this fact that we owe the amazing power of advertising. When we have read a hundred, or a thousand times that X’s chocolate is the best, we imagine that we have heard it said from many sides, and we finally acquire the certainty that it is a fact. (Le Bon [1895], p. 126-127)

This last remark shows that repetition can create an illusion of legitimacy through the authority of large numbers, see consensus.

From an evaluative standpoint this form of repetition is considered a fallacy, and even as the fallacy par excellence, since it imposes the acceptance of a statement not only without justification but against any justification.

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RELEVANCE
IGNORATIO ELENCHI

1. “Ignorance of refutation”, a fallacy of method

The fallacy of “ignorance of refutation” (Latin ignoratio elenchi [1]) is defined in relation to the dialectical game. In this game,
– One participant, the respondent (or proponent), is committed to a proposition P.
– His partner, the questioner (or opponent), tries to lead the respondent, into a contradiction by making him assert not-P, i.e., refute the proposition he had previously accepted.

Only contradictory propositions are considered In this game (one and only one of them is true). The opponent must follow the rules of the dialectical method to actually refute the original proposition in reality (and not just appear to do so, as the Sophists do).

In Aristotle’s catalog of fallacies the fallacy of ignorance of refutation is independent of language, it occurs “because the terms ‘proof’ or ‘refutation’ have not been defined, and because something is left out in their definition”. (Aristotle, R. S., 167a20, §5).
In other words, the misconception of refutation is a general term that covering all methodological errors that may occur in a dialectical game.

This concept can be extended to the argumentative language games: “The arguer argues and does not know how to argue; he thinks something is being proved or refuted successfully, when it is not; his practical concept of argument is flawed.”

This basically happens when an argument does not respect the principles of relevance. On the one hand, the argument must be relevant to the conclusion (internal relevance) and, on the other hand, the conclusion must be relevant as an answer to the argumentative question that organizes the debate (external relevance).

2. Relevance of the Argument to the Conclusion

In the context of a dialectical game, the respondent asserts P.  Starting from P, the questioner deductively constructs a chain of propositions admitted by the respondent that ends with the proposition not-P. Admitting  P and not-P , the respondent is apparently refuted, and the questioner has won the game.
However, the respondent claims that the chain of evidence supporting not-P is not valid because the arguments presented do not actually support that conclusion. Thus, the respondent holds that the questioner has actually failed to prove not-P.

This illustrate the general situation in which an arguer claims to have refuted an opponent ex datis, that is using only beliefs and modes of inference that the opponent admits.  The opponent can resist the refutation by breaking the chain of  inferences leading to the conclusive step that he is supposedly forced to concede. In other words, the opponent argues that the arguments are irrelevant to the conclusion.
This point actually involves the entire program of argumentation criticism.

3. Relevance of the Conclusion as an Answer to the Question

In the general case, the proponent commits himself to P, the opponent then constructs a chain of propositions from P , ending with proposition Q. The proponent claims that “Q = not-P”.
The proponent replies that proposition Q is not equivalent to not-P, and that P has therefore not been refuted.
In other words, the proponent claims that the opponent’s argument may be relevant to the conclusion Q, but that this conclusion does not disprove the original proposition to which the opponent is committed.

To argue that an intervention is externally irrelevant is to argue that it misses the point, or is off-topic. It may also be denounced as an attempt to mislead the opponent (red herring). The charge of paralogism is then reinforced by the suspicion of sophistry.

Criticisms of internal relevance and external relevance are cumulative. They invalidate an argument by saying that 1) it does not support the conclusion, and that, moreover, 2) the conclusion is irrelevant to the question.

4. The Question is Irrelevant to the “Real Debate”

The dialectical framework is binary, the proposition to be discussed is expressed as a simple, explicit statement, and the methodology of a refutative discussion is well-defined. Since the question is “P or not-P?”, claiming that the opponent’s conclusion does not logically contradict P, is  claiming that it is not relevant to the debate.

The situation can be equally clear in an ordinary debate. A student disputes, that is, wants to “disprove” the grade he has received.

If you don’t raise my grade, I’ll fail the exam; please, I desperately need just three more points!

The argument from consequences is quite valid, but the negative consequences of the bad grade are irrelevant to determining the grade (at least according to the classical scientific and educational regimes). The student’s conclusion is irrelevant, because it fails to address the real question: “What grade does my work deserve in itself?”. The student’s question is different from the teacher’s, and the teacher is the master of the question.

Things can be more complicated. When the proponent refutes the rebuttal by saying, “What you disagree with has nothing to do with what I am saying”, it can be difficult to pin down what he is actually saying. His claim can be constantly reformulated and reinterpreted see reformulation of speech.
Even when the original claim and its intended refutation have been previously written down, the connection between the two does not necessarily have the clarity of a binary contradiction. For example, does S2 refute S1, or does it merely show that the issue is complex:

S1: — Speculators buy commodities in advance just to speculate on future price fluctuations. Such operations with commodities should be prohibited by law.
S2: — However, it is essential for companies to buy the raw materials they need in advance to protect themselves against price fluctuations.

Finally, in ordinary argumentation, the issue itself may be controversial. When none of the participants is the master of the question, each key participant will be tempted to define the question, and reject the opponent’s answer as irrelevant:

S1: — That’s not the question!
S2: — That’s is my answer to the real problems. You’re not asking the right question.

The charge of fallacy of conclusion irrelevant to the question under debate can be answered by a counter-charge of a fallacious, wrongly formulated question, irrelevant to the “real” debate.

The role of the third party, be it the judge, the universal audience or the informed participants, is to construct, manage and decide upon the question. Accordingly, they have the responsability to determine what is or is not relevant to the debate.  The Aristotelian dialectical method has not third parties. This may explain why it cannot be applied directly to human-human disputes in natural language.

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[1] Latin ignoratio elenchi. The Greek word [elenkhos] means: “1. Argument to refute … 2. Proof in general” (Bailly, [elenkhos])”. The Latin title of Aristotle’s Sophistical Refutations is De Sophisticis Elenchis (Hamblin 1970, 305).

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RELATIONS

A relation is a two-place predicate R that associates two objects, a and b. This is denoted by “aRb”. Relations are characterized by three general properties, symmetry, transitivity, and reflexivity:

– Symmetry, or reciprocity: The same relationship holds between a and b and b and a.
– Reflexivity: The relationship connects an object to itself.
– Transitivity: The relationship connecting a to b and b to c also connects a to c.

1. Symmetry, or reciprocity

A relation is symmetric or reciprocal if it relates both a to b and b to a.
In other words, both “aRb” and “bRa” hold.
If a loves b, b does not necessarily love a: a love relationship is not symmetrical.
“Meeting” is a symmetric relationship. The following argument is no more or less logical than any other, but it would be a valid point in a detective novel. It can only be rejected by accusing Peter of lying.

If Peter confessed to meeting Paul at the bar, then we must assume that Paul met Peter. Paul cannot deny the obvious.

2. Reflexivity

A reflexive relation relates a being to itself. It is noted “aRa”.
“— Being contemporary of —” is a reflexive relationship: a is his own strict contemporary.
For the average person, the causal relationship is not reflexive. Only God is causa sui, his own cause.

The reflexive relation can be used ad hominem. For example, the principle “charity begins at home” for example forces the reflexivity of the relationship “a makes charity to b”. Nevertheless, the love of others can be used to encourage self-care:

If you love all humanity, then you should try to love yourself as well!

A counselor’s competence can be challenged by inviting them to make a reflexive use of their talents:

Doctor, heal thyself!

Such replies correspond to the ad hominem variety, setting up practices against words.

3. Transitivity

A relation is transitive if, when it connects a to b and b to c, then it also connects a to c.
In other words, “aRb and bRc” implies that “aRc”.

However if a loves b, and if b loves c, then a does not necessarily love c. Thus a relationship of love is not transitive.
The relation “being the father of ” is not transitive, but “being an ancestor of” is transitive. If a is an ancestor of b and if b is an ancestor of c, then a is an ancestor of c.

These inferences based on the transitivity of a predicate apply whenever at least three objects are positioned on a graduated scale.

If a is bigger, older, richer … than b
and b larger, older, richer … than c,
Then a is bigger, older, richer … than c.

These inferences are part of the unnoticed evidence exploited by everyday reasoning and argument. They are sometimes considered to be “quasi-logical”, see quasi-logic; but being sound and valid does not preclude being an argument.

4. Conversion

S. Conversion

RELATED WORDS
A CONJUGATA

Latin A conjugata argument, conjugatus, “related, of the same family”

There are three types of arguments based on the fact that two words are morphologically (materially) related, depending on the nature of their relationship:

An etymological relation see true meaning of the word.
A morphological relation, see derived words.
A phonic or graphic resemblance, see homonymy.

Synonymy and antonymy are semantic relationships.

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REFUTATION

All components of a written or spoken discourse in a given situation can be used and/or manipulated by the opponent to show that the discourse needs to be corrected or is totally intolerable.

Two main types of strategy can be distinguished refutation and destruction, or combinations thereof. Discourse destruction is an all-out global attack aimed at invalidating both the discourse and the speaker. Discourse refutation is a  reactive speech act involving an explicit and, at least partially, to the matter argued rejection of a claim, usually extended to the position which it supports. Such refutations are usually accompanied by negative evaluations and signs of tension, which may be expressed paralinguistically:

A congress of mathematicians. During the discussion session of a paper, a participant is given the floor  He goes to the blackboard, without speaking, and writes a few lines of mathematics, without saying a word. Violently, he adds a final comma to his writing, throws the chalk into its box and returns to his seat, still without saying a word.

From a scientific point of view, a proposition is refuted when it is shown to be false; the calculation from which it is derived contains an error; it affirms something that contradicts the observed facts.
From the point of view of ordinary interaction, a line of argument line is contextually refuted when, after being discussed, it is abandoned, either explicitly or implicitly. Accordingly, the question itself disappears, and the interaction moves on to another structuring topic.

As a reactive speech act, refutation can only be handled in a verbal (face-to-face) or written (text-to-text) dialogue. Monological discourse knows only the concession, there are no refutative subordinate clauses, and concessive clauses reduce the refutation to an objection.

1. Refutation Targets at a Key Structural Component of the Argument

Any component of the propositional argument model can be targeted by the act of refutation, see argumentation-3 – layout of argument

1.1 Rejecting the Argument

An argument supporting a conclusion can be rejected in several ways.

(i) The argument is declared to be false:

S1 — Peter will certainly arrive on Tuesday; he has been invited to Paul’s birthday party.
S2 — But Paul’s birthday is on Monday.

(ii) The argument is rejected as irrelevant to the conclusion:

S1 — He is very intelligent, he read all of Proust’s works in three days.
S2 — Intelligence has nothing to do with reading speed.

(iii) The argument may be accepted as such, recognized as somehow relevant to the conclusion but may be dismissed as too weak, or of poor quality:

S1 — The President has spoken, the stock market will go up.
S2 — Yes, and what he says goes! (said sarcastically).

Rejecting the argument may lead to a new argumentative question (sub-debate), about the truth, strength or relevance of the disputed argument.

Reject the argument and maintain the conclusion.

S1 — Peter will certainly arrive on Tuesday, he wants to be there for Paul’s birthday.
S2 — Paul’s birthday is on Monday, but Peter will not arrive until Tuesday, I bought his tickets.

Nevertheless, in ideological debates, only the most ascetic arguers will refute questionable or bad arguments in favor of conclusions that they consider good or virtuous.

1.2 Rejecting the support

The support invoked, implicitly or not, is declared false:

S1 — Pedro was born in the Malvinas Islands, so he is an Argentine citizen.
S2 — The Falkland Islands are British territory.

The adverbs exactly, precisely (not) can substitute one support for another (Ducrot & al., 1982), see orientation:

S1 — Noodles for dinner!
S2 — Again! We had noodles for lunch!
S1 — (Exactly!), we have to eat the leftovers, we don’t waste food.

The resulting stasis is caused by the conflict of two topoi:

Diet or taste: « you have to vary your diet« .
Economic principle « food should not be thrown away« .

2. The argument is not relevant

See relevant

— Not relevant to the conclusion:

S1 — Cannabis should be legalized; the taxes will pay off the National Health Service deficit
S2 —It will certainly increase tax revenues, but it will further increase the number of drug addicts. Prohibition must be maintained.

— Not relevant to the issue:

Discussion: Town council; about the new school
S1 — Did you know that the law requires us to offer a weekly vegetarian menu from the start of the school year?
S2 — I think this is an excellent idea!
Chair — Please, catering is not on the agenda, we have to decide about the matter of the documentation center.

3. Refutation using the resources of counter-discourse

In the previous section, the concept of refutation was approached in the general terms used to describe the « argument pattern » in general. Now, each argument pattern can also be rebutted on the basis of its specific defining structure and components. The possible rebuttal strategies correspond to the fuzzy set of critical questions attached to the specific argument pattern under consideration.

Testimony: Was the witness able to see and hear what he reported?
Authority: Was the quotation accurately reported?
Definition (lexical): Does the definition include the main uses of the word?
Structural analogy: Were the relevant elements and relationships in the resource and target domains clearly defined and connected?
Induction: Were the cases cited to support the generalization correctly tested for the characteristic in question?
Causal claim: Is the claimed effect properly constituted?

A negative answer to any of these critical questions contributes to the refutation of the argument under consideration.

In the skeptical philosophical style, these lines of criticism, can be cumulated to reject the argumentative type itself as inherently weak in a « discourse against authority, etc. which rejects all forms of argument from authority, and so on.
These discourse cumulate in a general discourse « against argumentation”.

These questions on refutation go to the heart of evaluating arguments (enthymemes), that is, weighing their weaknesses against their strengths, and this requires some expertise in the ecology of arguments, that is, the specific domain and circumstances in which they operate.
This is the overarching condition for a correct evaluation of an argument, and that is why, in the case of any somewhat complex argument, the evaluator must at least be familiar with in the field in which he or she claims to intervene, see

A question remains: is it possible to correctly delimit and characterize the discursive concrete elements of the text that correspond to the abstract entities that are supposed to characterize the basic structure of the argument, for example, what are the data considered, the correct levels of support and warrant, the condition of refutation and the precise meaning of the conclusion, in the scientific field in which it lives? Or should we prudently limit ourselves with what we call everyday discourse?

4. Paradoxical effects of refutation

See Paradoxes of Argumentation and Refutation, §2:

– The absence of rebuttal confirms the position that it attacks, even if this position is false, inconsequential, or absurd.

– A weak rebuttal strengthens the position it attacks.

–  An weak rebuttal by a recognized good debater strongly confirms the attacked position.
=> Hence the possibility of knowingly proposing a weak rebuttal to support a position when it cannot be openly supported.

 

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« RED HERRING »

Herrings turn red when smoked; red herrings were used by fugitives to lead dogs on a false trail.

The expression is used figuratively in argumentation, where the so-called “red herring” strategy is referred to as a diversionary strategy, where a distraction is used to avoid the issue, and divert the discussion to an irrelevant issue, see relevance.

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RECIPROCITY

1. Reciprocal (Symmetric) Verbs

Consider a statement linking two noun phrases: N 1 — Verb — N2.
By permuting the actants, we get the statement: N 2 — Verb —N1.
— In general, these statements have different meanings:

Big fish eat small fish: A eats B.
Small fish eat big fish: B eats A.

— In some cases, the two statements have the same meaning. The verbs that allow the permutation of the complements are called symmetrical (or reciprocal)

The weight of the apples is equal to that of the cherries
is equivalent to:
The weight of the cherries is equal to that of the apples.

<being equal to>, <being the friend of>, <being the brother or sister of>, <meeting> are reciprocal.

Peter is  Paul’s friend = Paul is Peter’s friend = Peter and Paul are friends. Peter and Paul are equal for the friendship relationship.

If a has met b, then b has a, in other words, a and b have met. The following argument would make sense in a detective novel; it can only be rejected by accusing Peter of lying:

If Peter confessed to meeting Paul at the bar,then,  we must assume that Paul met Peter. Paul cannot deny the obvious.

The distance from one point to another point is a symmetrical relationship, but the time it takes to travel that distance is not necessarily so.

Logical and Linguistic Aspects of Reciprocity
In mathematics, the relation of reciprocity is strict: if a function F is reciprocal, then F(ab) is strictly equivalent to F(ba). This is not the case in ordinary language:

Peter has met Paul:
The situation develops from Peter’s point of view.
In other words, we follow Peter and meet Paul.

Paul met Peter:
The situation develops from Paul’s point of view.
We follow Paul and meet Peter.

The difference between a mathematical function < F(a, b)> and an ordinary verb <to be friend with> is that ordinary language presents events from a particular perspective. This is a trace of subjectivity in language.

The relation of reciprocity (symmetry) is considered as “quasi-logical” by Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca. Quine would probably say that there is a a stylistic difference (see connectives) between the logical construction and the grammatical construction. Both lead to their elimination.

1. Principle of Reciprocity

In some human groups, reciprocity is a moral and social imperative.  Reciprocity is a kind of egalitarian principle, defined on the basis of the set of actions that bind two persons.
The strict principle of reciprocity says that that if A does something positive to/for B, then B must reciprocate to A, by doing the same thing to/for A.
This is the principle of returning favors. The individuals A and B are equal in this relationship.
If A has given B a gift, such as an invitation to dinner, then B concludes that he must do the same, i.e. give A some gift or invitation.

The principle of reciprocity acts as a constraint: « If you invite me to dinner, I must invite you to dinner.
If A has given B a decisive advantage, then B must do something equivalent for A when the situation arises: “a favor is never lost.

As a form of natural morality, the imperative of reciprocity is a correlative of  the principle:

Do to others as you would have them do to you. (Gospel of Luke, 6:31)
Do not do to others what you do not want done  to you.

In the latter form, “do not do to others what you do not want them to do to you,” this second principle opposes to the talion principle, « an eye for an eye ». This is a special case of the “you too!” argument.

The principle of reciprocity is a resource that can be used to regulate social interactions, for example in arguments such as « I am polite to you, so be polite to me.
The speaker defines himself and his  partner as members of the same category, who must be treated in the same way, see rule of Justice.

The principle of reciprocity can only be strictly applied only to acts for which A and B can be treated as equals. It makes no sense if there is a fundamental inequality between A and B: if A gives B alms, or if A fines B, there is no question of B mechanically applying the strict reciprocity. But in a romance novel, B may save A‘s life, and in a detective novel B may take revenge on the person who condemned him.

In modern times, we might consider nuclear deterrence, based on the certainty of mutual destruction, as a concrete application of this principle.

Reciprocity as a legal principle allows different states to assert their equal international dignity, and possibly to justify a retaliation:

if country A requires a visa for the nationals of country B, it is right for country B to require a visa for nationals of country A as well.

Reciprocity can be used for retaliation and revenge: « An eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth. If A has wronged B in some way, then B can legitimately do the same wrong to A.

If your jilted lover has disfigured you with vitriol, the court grants you the right to treat him in the same way.

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ARGUMENTATIVE QUESTION

The concept of an argumentative question derives from the notion of stasis, developed primarily by the rhetorical theory of legal interaction.

The concepts of an argumentative question and an argumentative situation are interdependent. An argumentative situation arises when two speeches on the same topic begin to diverge to some degree. It can occur during a remote or face-to-face, oral or written, interaction. Such potentially argumentative situation can develop into an actual argumentative situation when the divergence becomes topicalized and ratified by a participant. All of these necessary developments delimit an argumentative space, and definie what is argumentation, before the appearance of arguments strictly speaking (discursive segments supporting a conclusion).

The existence of a question is at the origin of the paradoxes of argumentation.

1. Proposition, Opposition, Doubt: A Question

The following example, constructed around the recurring question “Should we legalize drugs?” shows how the question assigns argumentative roles, on the basis of the three argumentative speech acts of proposing, opposing and doubting.

• The current state of the law
  

In Syldavia 2022, the production, import, export, trade, possession, and use of drugs are prohibited.

This statement corresponds to the state of Syldavian legislation, which is generally supported by the “prevailing opinion”, taken as a matter of course, and therefore does not require an argument.

• A proposition

Another discourse is oriented towards a proposition that opposes this prohibition:

P: — The use of soft drugs should be legalized, or at least tolerated.

Speaker P assumes the argumentative role of the proponent, and opens the debate. All speakers who agree with this proposal serve as allies.

• An opposition

Other speakers oppose the proposal:

O: — That’s outrageous!

Speaker O plays the argumentative role of the opponent. Speakers who are willing to engage in this kind of discourse of rejection of the proposal are allies.

• Doubt and question: the emergence of the argumentative question

Some participants refuse to align themselves with either position. They are in the position of third parties, who synthesize the relation of proposition vs. opposition into an argumentative question, and transform the discourse confrontation into a full argumentative situation:

TP: — All this is quite confusing. Should the prohibition of all these drugs that you call soft be maintained or not?

The argumentative question is thus generated by the contradiction “discourse / counter-discourse”, hence the schema:

Proposition vs. Opposition → Argumentative Question (AQ)

2. The Conclusion as an Answer to the Argumentative Question

When discourse becomes confrontational, good reasons are needed and quickly provided. The proponent bears the burden of proof and must provide arguments to meet this requirement, for example by recategorizing soft drugs in the same category as alcohol or anxiolytics:

P — Soft drugs are no more dangerous than alcohol or tranquilizers; alcohol is not subject to any general prohibition, and tranquilizers are subject to medical prescription.

This argument supports the slogan:

Yes! Let us at least be more tolerant towards soft drugs!

Produced under the general scope of the argumentative question, this conclusion gives an answer to this question.

The opponent must first show that the proponent’s argument is untenable:

O1: No! Alcohol has nothing to do with drugs. We know how to drink in this country; alcohol is part of our culture, drugs are not. And if you legalize soft drugs next you’ll have to tolerate hard drugs!

O2: In Syldavia, they tried to legalize drugs, and the experience failed. Enough with social experiments that to harm young people!

Conclusion:

Let us reject this crazy new proposal of legalization!

Second, O presents a counter-argument for of a different position. This could be the maintenance of the status quo::

Honest citizens live peacefully thanks to the prohibition; the situation is under control as it is!

Under the standard regime, the doxa is self-evident; but once the argumentative situation is opened, it requires justification.

Argumentative questions are different from informative ones. The latter allow for direct, unambiguous relevant answers:

S0: When did you arrive? What hotel are you staying in?
S1: Yesterday, and I’m staying at the Grand Brand Hotel.
S0_2: Oh, that’s wonderful! And what are you doing this evening?

The answer to the argumentative question requires an argument:

S0:      Does the fight against terrorism authorize restrictions on freedom of expression?
S1:      Yes.
S0_2   Oh, that’s wonderful. Now, let’s move to the next question.

3. Argumentative Situation: Form and Structuring Rules

3.1 Representation

In a stabilized argumentative situation, proponents and opponents are also called upon to present positive arguments and to refute the antagonistic position. This situation can be roughly represented as follows:

Argumentation is seen as a way of constructing answers to a question to which incompatible answers have been given.

Under the assumption of coherence, all the semiotic acts produced in this situation are oriented towards the consolidation of the answer-conclusion.

The argumentative question is essentially open; the legitimacy (interest, respectability) of the pro and contra interventions is recognized, at least factually. Sometimes the participants agree on a mutually satisfactory answer-conclusion, sometimes they don’t.

In many cases, an element of doubt remains attached to the surviving, ratified, answer, and the question may reappear. In other words, the answer is provisional; it cannot be completely separated from the question and the set of pros and counterarguments that generated it. The answer is therefore an answer by default; an unstable answer, that may be subject to revision.

The Centrality of Third parties

Given that third parties play a role in decision making, it follows that:
1) The evolution of the exchange will generally change the initial positions as expressed in the opening sequence. Then, the final conclusion will not be identical to any of the positions as expressed in the opening sequence of the interaction.

2) A well-executed, successful argumentative exchange may conclude without a winner and a loser.

3) Participants are not forced to give up their positions

Question and Relevance
The question establishes the relevance principle for argumentative contributions: relevance of the arguments to the conclusion, relevance of the conclusions as answers to the question.

The question itself, and thus the relevance of the contributions, can  be challenged during the debate. It can be rejected on the grounds that it is flawed, poorly stated, or irrelevant to « deeper, real » issues.

Burden of Proof
The previous diagram attempts to show the asymmetry between discourse and counter-discourse, as determined by the burden of proof resting on the proponent. This allocation may change depending on the participants and the nature of the forum in which the discussion takes place.

3.2 A double constraint

Arguments are constructed under a double constraint; on the one hand, they are oriented by a question, and, on the other hand they are under the pressure of the counter-discourse. This situation is characterized by macro-discursive phenomena, such as the following ones:

 Bipolarization of discourse
Followers are attracted by the issue; they identify themselves with the speakers involved; they adapt their language to reflect the words and practices of the leading speakers; on the other hand, they exclude speakers and supporters of the opposing discourse (us versus them).

Crystallization of discourse
Fixed lexical collocations, antonymic pairs emerge. Positions tend to become stereotyped;  argument scripts tend to stabilize.

Resistance to refutation
Mechanisms of resistance to refutation emerge. Arguments are presented  in the form of self-argued claims, mimicking analyticity.

3.3 Changing minds, language and roles

Not only at the end of the discussion, but also during the exchange, participants can be persuaded to change their minds, their opinions and their and language, from one role to another.

4. Monologizing the “Question — AnswerS” game

The vision of argumentation as a discussion between incompatible points of view on the same subject is operative in both monologues and dialogs.

4.1 Dialogs can be monologized in two different ways

4.1.1 Monologal, non-polyphonic interventions

In an argumentative intervention that develops a series of co-oriented arguments to a conclusion, the arguer expresses only one position, and adopts a demonstrative “no alternative” rhetoric. The monologue is monophonic.

Monophonic interventions ignore the speeches and positions of the opponents. This means that their practical study requires the construction of a corpus that brings together the various interventions that support the various responses. The case for P is best understood when it refers to some denial, or neglect of P.

4.1.2 Monologal, polyphonic intervention

In another type of monologue, the arguer takes different positions, and puts forward several hypotheses about the same argumentative issue, without advocating any of them in particular. The discourse stages several voices, especially the main competing voice that of the opponent. Such a monologue is polyphonic, see interaction, dialogue, polyphony.

Polyphonic interventions contain a representation of the speeches of the other participants. Under different polyphonic modalities, they take over the set of situational discursive data, the question and the speech and position of the opponent, which are reformulated under different discursive regimes, according to different images assigned to the interlocutor and different self-allocated ethos. As a result, the assertion is introduced under an interrogative veil.

These strategies of polyphonic monologizing of the question have been clearly identified in ancient rhetoric, where they are considered as figures of speech, interrogation (interrogatio), subjection (subjection) and dubitation (dubitatio) (Lausberg, [1960], § 766-779).

(i) The question is framed as having one self-evident answer (interrogatio)

This is the case of the interrogatio, or “rhetorical question” classically defined as a question with an obvious answer.

Now, can such a person make a better president than our candidate? Certainly not.

The speaker “disambiguates ” the argumentative question and gives it an answer that is presented as the only possible, self-evident answer.

The speaker assumes the position of “the one who knows” and embeds the answer in the question. Third parties are placed in the position of allies who also know and applaud; opponents are challenged by a form of argument by ignorance. The purpose of this strategy is to suggest that “there is no problem with this issue”.

(ii) The question is framed as having a justifiable answer (subjectio)

Latin subjectio, “to put before, under the eyes”; here, “to submit to” the audience.

The question is presented as requiring clarification and explanation rather than argument. The speaker takes the place of the investigator or the teacher who asks the right question and solves it objectively. The interlocutor is framed as a student or a judge, who shares the question and accepts the proposed answers according to the logic of pedagogical co-construction.

Here is the situation, here is the question, and here are the data. We can think of three different answers, solutions, possibilities (a), (b), (c)… Solution (a) is a variant of solution (b), as we will show. For this and that a good reason, solution (c) must be preferred to solution (b). So, the correct answer is (c).

Ph.D. dissertations might approximate this strategy. During the defense, a member of the jury may re-dialectize the monologue, expressing solution (a) differently , and reversing the evaluation of (c) over (b).

(iii) The question is framed as open-ended, and the speech constructs the answer in real time (dubitatio)

The speaker now takes the place of the third party, the ignorant party who has his or her doubts. In a kind of role reversal, the interlocutor is placed in the elevated position of an advisor. The construction of the solution is now attributed to the interlocutor-counselor, rather than the speaker-investigator.

In all three cases, the monologizing of the argumentative situation plays heavily on the preference for agreement. It does not leave the floor to other participants, and can channel their voices toward the speaker’s conclusion.

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« QUASI-LOGICAL ARGUMENTS »

Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca introduce the class of quasi-logical arguments as the first of the three categories of “association schemes” ([1958], p. 191) (or argument schemes). Quasi-logical arguments can be understood

by bringing them closer to formal thought, logical or mathematical. But a quasi-logical argument differs from a formal deduction in that it always presupposes adherence to non-formal theses, which alone allows the application of the argument. (Perelman 1977, p. 65)

Six schemes are analyzed in more details; they bear the same names as their logical counterparts:

Among the quasi-logical arguments, we shall first analyze those which depend on logical relations — contradiction, total or partial identity, transitivity; we shall then analyze those which depend on mathematical relations — the connection between the part and the whole, the smaller and the larger, and frequency. Many other relations could obviously be examined. (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca [1958], p. 194)

Definitions are “typical of quasi-logical argumentation” (id., p. 214):

When they are not part of a formal system, and when they nevertheless claim to identify the definiens and the definiendum, we shall consider them a form of quasi-logical argumentation” (id., p. 210).

The label “quasi-logical” is symptomatic of the method of the Treatise, which rejects “logic” but constantly uses it a contrario to define argumentation in general and to characterize the “quasi-logical” super-category of argument schemes in particular. This category includes all the argumentative strategies involving phenomena such as negation, scales, relations and definitional stereotypes. In practice, it is the system of language that is considered to be quasi-logical. Logic plays the role of an absent grammar.

The arguments in this category are defined by a common characteristic:

[Quasi-logical arguments] lay claim to a certain power of conviction, to the extent that they claim to be similar to the formal reasoning of logic or mathematics. Submitting these arguments to analysis, however, immediately reveals the differences between them and formal demonstrations, for only an effort of reduction or specification of a non-formal character makes it possible for these arguments to appear demonstrative. This is why we call them quasi-logical. (Id., p. 193)

According to the traditional definition, a fallacy is an argument that looks like a valid argument but is not. There is a striking similarity between this, and the definition given in the Treatise: quasi-logical argumentation “claim[s] to be similar” to formal reasoning, but is not.

See fallacies; logic; collections 3.